

**A Ruthless Form of Warfare except all Others?**  
**The Challenge of Drone Warfare to International Society**

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**Abstract**

Since the formation of today's state's system, international society adhered to the norm that the assassination of political leaders is taboo. Since the 20<sup>th</sup> century individuals are held personally and principally accountable. Killing alleged top terrorists via drone strikes is the most obvious and recent example. Norms as collective understandings depend on the consensus of a collective understanding. The use of force in international politics today challenges international society's norms, principles, and its collective consensus even more. The paper discloses the relationship between the structure of international society in terms of the English School and individual agency therein. In doing so, it relies on the Realist premises of Hans Morgenthau that annulled the ideational assumption of such different thinkers such as Hobbes and Rousseau that men need society to achieve what they cannot do on their own. Decapitating drone strikes, seen as a necessary evil, forgetting that war is deeply human and political, seem to prove the Rousseauian point of politics right but fateful nevertheless.

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## **A Ruthless Form of Warfare except all Others?**

### **The Challenge of Drone Warfare to International Society**

#### **1 Introduction**

The precluded so-called “Times Square Bomber” of 2010, Faisal Shahzad, who was trying to blow up a truck loaded with explosives on Times Square in New York City, justified in court his action on the grounds of United States (US) drone strikes in his home country Pakistan. (Boyle 2013, 1)<sup>1</sup> This is only one prominent case where the policy of using drones for targeted killings backfires.<sup>2</sup> Although it is impossible to evaluate the truth of such numbers, it is safe to say that decapitating drone strikes since 2004 killed over 3000 people, mostly in Afghanistan and Pakistan.<sup>3</sup> It is also safe to say that the Obama administration, compared to its predecessor George Bush, who worried about destabilizing Pakistan in turning to drone strikes, intensified the use of targeted killings carried out by drones in the Near and Middle East and Africa. (Coll 2013) Targeting terrorist leaders, preferably via long distance weapons such as drones, has become the US’s instrument of choice, despite evidence that terrorist groups seem to survive decapitation strikes. (Jordan 2014)

Facts alone speaking would not be something extraordinary in the field of international politics. What causes a research puzzle for International Relations, however, is the fact that drone warfare made in international politics an almost forgotten act of principled agency respectable: political assassinations in the occurrence of targeted killings via drones as an inflationary used instrument of foreign policy. What is

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<sup>1</sup> The United States Air Force, for example, prefers the term “Remotely Piloted Aircraft” (RPA) or “Unmanned Aerial Vehicle” (UAV). In this article I will nevertheless stick to the common term “drone.”

<sup>2</sup> One of the prominent cases where the use of drones is documented have backfired is Yemen. (Johnsen 2012)

<sup>3</sup> For sources see: <http://drones.pitchinteractive.com/>; <http://www.livingunderdrones.org/>; <http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/>.

more, the boundaries between targeted killings and political assassinations are blurring. Whereas the former may be regarded as justified in legal and ethical terms of warfare (e.g. snipers), the latter tended to be, at least officially, condemned. Since the formation of the state's system as we know it today, international society has established the norm that assassination of political leaders is taboo. Even more, society considered assassinations as an anachronism threatening order and condemned it on moral grounds. Structural forces and moral principles in close relationship influenced the development of this norm.

Material factors such as the rise of mass armies, war, and ideational factors, such as the assumption that it are states that wage war not humans, led to this conclusion. (Thomas 2000) Individuals, in terms of International Relations theory, therefore become to be seen as agents. Since the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century we are witness to a reverse tendency: contrary to the Westphalian norm of the state as the legitimized and accountable principle to use force, individuals are held personally accountable. Killing alleged top terrorists via drone strikes is only the most obvious and recent example. The better recorded, although longer past ones, are the Nurnberg War Crime Tribunals in the aftermath of the Second World War. The installation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is but another example of the rising awareness of individual responsibility in foreign policy. In short, in the post-Cold War age it seems, individual agency prevails in ethical and moral considerations on the international stage. (Gaskarth 2011; Ainley 2008, 2011)

The developments of the actual and potential use of force today – from civil war and genocide to a nuclear apocalypse – challenges international societies norms, principles, and its collective consensus about them even more. The paper discloses the relationship between the structure of international society in terms of the English School and individual agency therein. In doing so it relies on the Realist premises of Hans Morgenthau which annulled the ideational assumption of thinkers as Hobbes and

Rousseau that men need society to achieve what they cannot do on their own. Drone strikes, seen by major powers as a necessary evil, ignoring that war is a deeply human and political conduct, seem to prove the Rousseauian view of politics right but fateful. The widespread use of armed drones indicates, at least in the case of the US, a trend not only towards preventive war but to the use of preventive force as such. Although preventive self-defence and the use of drones might not be directly linked, the rhetoric that accompanies them does so indeed. “The global use of preventive self-defence is likely to be destabilizing, leading to more war in the international system, not less.” (Fisk and Ramos 2013, 21) The use of drones is but fuel to the expansion of preventive self-defence and effectively have “lowered the threshold for the use of force” (Kreps and Zenko 2014)

After settling down definitions on structure, agency, and norms in the context of Realism and the English School, the paper provides an overview of how the use of force in terms of targeted killings in international society developed. In turning to the use of drones as instruments of targeted killings by the US the paper goes on to evaluate arguments for and against the use of drones. Finally, I turn back to the agent-structure debate, pointing out that the allegedly lesser evil of drone strikes eventually threatens the foundations of international society.

## **2 Structure and norms: Realist-Constructivism**

Most of international relations theory is better in explaining stability rather than change. This is even more so since International Relations turned away from the study of norms during the so-called behavioural revolution with its desire to scientifically “measure” social phenomena. (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 888–89) Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink define a norm as “a standard of appropriated behaviour for actors with a given identity.” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891; Björkdahl 2002; Klotz 1999) The

important aspect about understanding norms is their intersubjective reference: we only know what they are when we turn to the society which adheres to the norm in question. Thus, norms depend on a societal consensus. (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891–92) “Norms,” in other words, “are both products of power and sources of power in the international system” (Thomas 2001, 3) since they are made by society and influence it. However, they are not simply statements but social facts which themselves influence action. Norms therefore are intervening variables between interest and foreign policy outcomes. (Thomas 2001, 37)<sup>4</sup> This is even more so if we rely on the Realist definition of power by Hans Morgenthau as a psychogenic condition which arises via social interaction. Power is a result *and* quality of human action, (Morgenthau et al. 2012, 47) shaped in dialogue.

In order to approach the usefulness of such a definition we have to take a look back at the Aristotelian roots of Realism in terms of Morgenthau. Aristotle differs from modern thinkers such as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau insofar that for him humans are political animals by nature. (Fukuyama 2011, 26) Rousseau resumed that society is needed for what men could otherwise not achieve on their own. At least the “later” Morgenthau subscribed to the view of Aristotle and counter-echoes the *Social Contract's* first lines in writing “Men lives in chains, but everywhere he wants to be free.” (Morgenthau 1958, 239) For a great many forerunners of the philosophical foundations of International Relations it is therefore structure that defines the intercourse of humans, and, in the words of Rousseau, keeps them in chains. On the other side of the spectrum, Aristotle – and Morgenthau – attempts to pursue agency (since humans are political animals by nature), namely that humans should accord themselves with structure insofar that the central question is how to live a good life.

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<sup>4</sup> Norms understood as a certain consensual proper behaviour of actors are different to moral principles since the former must not be ethical in the sense that they must be about right or wrong. (Thomas 2001, 27)

(Gaskarth 2012) This touches the very heart of the “narrative” (Suganami 1999) of the agent-structure debate in international relations.<sup>5</sup>

The English School concept of international society is normative as well as analytical, trying to avoid the agency-structure distinction. “International society,” as Rodger Epp captures its essence, “is a matter of intersubjective meaning embedded in practice.” (Epp 1998, 55) The more formal definition of international society is certainly the one of Hedley Bull and Adam Watson:

a group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behavior of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognise their common interest in maintaining these arrangements. (Bull and Watson 1984, 1)

Norms, shaped by power as described above and part of international society’s conduct are therefore inherent to social structure. Constructivist approaches to the agent-structure debate have highlighted this facet after Realism or the English School did so already.<sup>6</sup> After outlining briefly the setting in which norms are shaped and operate, a close up look shall be taken on the development and change of the ethical norm abstaining from political assassinations.

### *The norm against political assassinations*

Ward Thomas illustrates at the example of the norm of governments staying away from the killing of foreign leaders that “although the norm is grounded in fundamental moral principles, its development was decisively influenced by the structure of the

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<sup>5</sup> Concerning the agent-structure debate I refer to the International Relations mainstream literature as outlined and represented by Alexander Wendt. (Wendt 1987, 1999)

<sup>6</sup> This is for example obvious when Wendt describes any structure as social structure which exists only in process (i.e. practice). (Wendt 1995, 74)

international system.” (Thomas 2000, 107) Before the 17<sup>th</sup> century anything like such a norm was nowhere in sight. This changed in early 17<sup>th</sup> century Europe while people began to condemn assassinations on moral and rational grounds. The condemnation grew stronger as religious violence decreased and the institutionalization of international society increased. In short, the sense prevailed that assassinations are an anachronism. International ethical norms are based on a-priory moral principles and historical contingent cultural and geopolitical factors. Thomas argues that both factors are necessary since no abstract principle and no power interest alone will give rise to an international ethical norm as something obligatory. Only, if there is a mutual relationship between principle and structure, norms will arise. (Thomas 2000, 112–15) They are, in other words, products of moral and political (instrumental) processes. (Nevers 2007, 56) It is therefore that the 17<sup>th</sup> century began to see governmental legislated assassinations with chaos and disorder. This development is bound to and resulted from changes in the distribution and exercises of power (i.e. the development of sovereign statehood). This was propelled by material and ideational factors. At the forefront of the former one was the rise of mass armies (which gave cause and effect of the modern state), at the latter one was the fiction that wars are waged between states, not humans (i.e. the assumption that humans are only acting on behalf of the state).

As we have encountered, Rousseau was the vanguard of this position, holding that war is not a relation between humans but states. This leads to the conclusion that, in international politics, individuals should be seen as agents, rather than as principals. (Thomas 2000, 116–18) In other words, individuals turned out to be framed as agents bound by structural constraints. However, this enlightened “escape from power,” (Morgenthau 1958, 239–45) as Morgenthau termed it, leads to the assumption that structural forces determining humans are a problem of social life which is “in essence similar to the problems of physical nature” (Morgenthau 1958, 240) and can be dealt with in the same fashion. The “war on terror” was officially framed as a war due to the

attack of American/Western values, way of life, freedom etc.<sup>7</sup> Calling on the destructive structural (e.g. failed states as safe havens for terrorists) and principal (e.g. fanatical religious leaders, etc.) forces, the US consolidated the agent picture drawn in the *Social Contract*. It is – to return to the definition of international society – a political community, which is a political and social abstraction waging war.

The paper does not attempt to qualify the usefulness of the traditional agent-structure definition in the light of these thoughts. What it does want to challenge, however, is the way we think about those terms. More precisely this means that re-thinking definitions can shed light to current issues of real world international politics. No matter if institutions of international society (war, diplomacy, great powers, balance of power, international law) are degenerating in the wake of drone strikes or not. Before doing so, I briefly recall the most common definition of political assassinations and targeted killings alike. For a murder to be a political assassination “the act must resonate with many people other than the perpetrators, it must find at least tacit support elsewhere, and it must spring from conditions other than those of personal pathology.” (Norris 2004, 250) That does not mean that each murder associated with politics or politicians is automatically a political assassination.<sup>8</sup> Targeted killing on the other hand “is the intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force, by States or their agents acting under colour of law, or by an organized armed group in armed conflict, against a specific individual who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator.” (Alston 2010, 3) In other words, targeted killing does not necessarily resonate anything of a political assassination. Rather, it is a frequently used tactic to conduct political assassinations.

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<sup>7</sup> See, for example, George Bush’s first official speech in which he used the term “war on terror” during a joint session of Congress on, September 20, 2001: <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/>.

<sup>8</sup> For example, John F. Kennedy’s assassination was one whereas when his wife would have killed him it would not.

The use of drones actually is a combination of both: tactical means (targeted killings) conducted to execute a political strategy (political assassinations).

### **3 Drone warfare unleashed: international societies' challenge**

A often quoted evidence in arguing “Why drones work” (Byman 2013) are technical and economic reasons: Drones are cost-effective, they minimize the risk of soldiers life’s who otherwise maybe directly involved in combat and they produce less civil casualties than conventional tactics – in other words, a post-heroic society’s line of argument. Daniel Byman argues that the criticised “signature strikes”<sup>9</sup> of drone warfare are in line with general military practice. The use of drones reduces risks around traditional military operations. (Byman 2013) For Byman, as for most other supporters, this resonates Winston Churchill’s argument on democracy: drone strikes are a ruthless form of warfare except all others.

The opponents of drone warfare primarily criticise that tactics (targeted killings via drones) drive strategy (i.e. the pursuit of the “war on terror”). (Cornin 2013) Indeed, there are many arguments worthwhile to be mentioned opposing the use of drones as a means for targeted killings. It is, for example, not possible to evaluate what kind or how many terror attacks would have been prevented with one or another drone strike. Another argument is the dehumanization via “signature strikes,” a tactic to kill suspicious persons due “patterns of behaviour.” (Boyle 2013, 7–8) Moreover, drone strikes are only as effective as the intelligence (on the ground) is and there is a certain need for bases within regional reach. (Zenko 2013, 6–7) Finally, no clear generalizable assessment of the effectiveness can be made. (Carvin 2012) What certainly is true about

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<sup>9</sup> “Instead of having to confirm the identity of a suspected militant leader before attacking, this shift allowed American operators to strike convoys of vehicles that bear the characteristics of Qaeda or Taliban leaders on the run, for instance, so long as the risk of civilian casualties is judged to be low.” (Schmitt and Sanger 2008)

all these discussions is the fact that drones are a tool of warfare that will not vanish. The possibility of a new arms race around drones and the need for more legal clarification of their use are legal and technological challenges that are yet to come upon us.<sup>10</sup>

But how are drones different compared to other instruments of warfare? On the first glance they do not differ. I argue about weaponized drones in a way that identifies them as the preferred weapon of targeted killings and not as something unique in warfare. There are, however, several points that have to be mentioned when putting drones into a political context. First of all, they represent an “arrogant sort of warfare” which is reflected in the way they are used: (Kaplan 2013) far behind enemy lines, over sovereign states not officially in a state of war. In other words, they represent a fundamental unfair way of military action. (Bowden 2013)<sup>11</sup> It is not technology which makes drones unique. It are the “results of human decision: of political calculation and, too often, strategic evasion.” (Kaplan 2013) The consequence, most often, is that the use of drones likely fools their strategic (i.e. politicians) and end users (i.e. operators), that they are not fighting a war at all. (Kaplan 2013) That is not, however, to say that I follow the widely held view of the video games analogy that drone warfare – particularly for their operators – is unreal since they only are staring at a screen. (Gregory 2012)<sup>12</sup>

Rather, my argument is that drone warfare tends to be seen out of a genuine *political* context. My main point hence is that the use of drone strikes resembles what was called “The Pipe Dream of Easy War.” (McMaster 2013) What we tend to forget, as military

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<sup>10</sup> Not to mention the threat of the “disruptive technology” drones possess and their “innovative technology that triggers sudden and unexpected effects” in terms of the war theatre. (Dunn 2013, 1238)

<sup>11</sup> However, almost any revolutionizing instrument of warfare has been “unfair”. Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Although I recognize Carl Schmitt’s argument on air warfare (leading to an absolute distinction between bombers and the bombed), (Schmitt 1988, 297) there is at least enough actual evidence for the present view outlined above.

practitioners remind us,<sup>13</sup> is that war is *political*, war is *human* and war is *uncertain* just because war is political and human. In other words, drones as part of the Revolution in Military Affairs are promising fast, cheap, and easy military victories while mirroring the “persistent fascination with technology.” Thereby, however, there is a tendency to “confuse military activity with progress toward larger wartime goals” and “equate military capabilities with strategy.” (McMaster 2013) Ironically, members of the military itself bring to light the traditional Realist and English School insights of political affairs as a deeply human affair. In other words, politics, that is in this case particularly agency and principle, matters and that, in turn, means that the future is largely unwritten.

At this point, therefore, we need to be interested in the challenge of using drones as a-political means of warfare and what it does to international society. I will first have a brief look what Neorealism makes drones and then turn to the international society approach. I first look at Neorealism in order to illustrate that there are other ways of approaching the research puzzle outlined in the introduction but which are not prone to produce more insight to the fact that drone warfare made in international politics the act of targeted killings and political assassinations as principled agency a tool. What Neorealism interests are international political outcomes. Relative power distributions are framed as independent variables to explain international outcomes. It is therefore the structure of the international system (which is competitive and uncertain; i.e. anarchic) that matters because it determines outcomes. In terms of the capability of drone warfare the distribution of power around the globe is obvious: only a handful of countries other than the US (e.g. the UK and Israel) rely on drones, not to speak of weaponized ones. However, for Neorealism political assassinations via targeted killings conducted by the use of drones, do not pose to be something of a big challenge for the international

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<sup>13</sup> See, for example, the interview with General Stanley McChrystal in *Foreign Affairs*: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/generation-kill>.

system since drones are just another feature of (tactical) military power. Seen in this light, they do not influence the *system*. Although drone strikes injure international law in ignoring other countries sovereignty, there is little evidence that this has significant influence on the system of undifferentiated units. Only the danger of a new arms race around drones would be a possibility, following Kenneth Waltz' dictum "more maybe better" (Waltz 1981) that could threaten US supremacy in drone warfare capability as we can see in the attempts of many states to gather drones for military use.

The English School on the other hand never made a clear distinction between dependent and independent variables. Having a look at the foundations of the English School and classical Realism alike this does not surprise. It complicates, however, precise statements on specific issues in foreign affairs conduct such as the use of drones. I already outlined the common definition of the term "international society" as the English School understands it. Despite its Realist heritage – that international politics "is the realm of recurrence and repetition" (Wight 1966, 26) – the English School focuses, next to material factors (e.g. state size), heavily on normative factors (values, international law) in order to approach international politics. What is more, the English School centres on behavioural norms, which are rules of conduct as they are understood by the players. (Navari 2009, 39–40) Turned into positivist language, one can identify an international society once an institutionalization of regimes, rule-making, and the like can be observed. That is to say that international society is therefore always intentionally produced and re-produced. (Navari 2009, 45–48; Buzan 2004)

What follows from those assumptions of the loose English School canon? First of all, that in terms of the agent-structure debate both, agents and structure(s), are equally relevant in the construction of international politics. Opposed to Neorealism, then, we therefore first can state that (also individual) agency matters.<sup>14</sup> As we saw above, norms

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<sup>14</sup> Raymond Aron, for one Realist, pointed out that great powers have influenced (via international societies' institutions) structure more than the other way round (Aron 1966, 95)

emerge from the interaction of abstract moral principles *and* structural influence. In the end, however, they depend on the degree of consensus about them. (Thomas 2000, 132) Second, order, in terms of Hedley Bull, is a pattern of activity aimed to sustain international society's aims. (Bull 2002) International order is a "constellation of constitutional norms and fundamental institutions through which co-operation is cultivated and conflict contained between different political communities." (Phillips 2011, 5) International society, in other words, is the cornerstone of international order. Certainly, all international orders rely on coercive power to uphold their values since all of them contain some vision of the good. (Phillips 2011, 322) Turning to rule violating acts like the use of drones for targeted killings therefore seems in line with the official statements about the need to preserve "the" international order.<sup>15</sup>

### *"Dronification" of strategy*

The use of drones as coercive measures resembles a kind of self-assertion of the executive branch. What appeals is the presentation of narratives of individual actors that can be powerfully portrayed in the information age. (Norris 2004, 253; Arato 2002) Governments and the executive branch in particular thus have are in power to steer this narrative – no matter if in special military operations to kill Osama Bin Laden or in drone strikes, justified by killing high ranking terrorist members.<sup>16</sup> Even more, the executive branch is the stand-alone actor when it comes to unmanned warfare. It did not, for example, inform Congress of the use of drones at the dawn of the international intervention in Libya in 2011. It seems that congressional approval only is asked for when it comes to human deployment. (Singer 2012) It is thus that drone warfare produces two

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<sup>15</sup> Some even argue that global terrorism threatens the very foundations (i.e. sovereignty) of international society. (Mendelsohn 2005)

<sup>16</sup> This is not to mention that most of Special Forces operations ("black operations") etc. cannot be validated. (Mazzetti 2013)

basic distances: the distance between pilots and targets and a distance between the “Predator Empire,” where drone strikes actually take place, and the public. (Shaw 2013, 552) Assassinations are no longer “off the table” in the spectrum of policy debates. (Thomas 2005, 29) Not at least those debates are often – also academically – justified by just war theory. (Aloyo 2013)

Andrew Phillips illustrated that none of the preceding international orders, other than the present one, would have been as flexible in responding to such devastating events as 9/11 and the allegedly jihadist threat. (Phillips 2011, 261–99) What the English School reminds us of is that the reaction itself, not the reason for it, may pose a challenge to international order which is pulled together by an international society. Turning to Hedley Bull, (Bull 2002, 74–94) we can thus attach to Devlen’s, James’, and Özgür’s hypothesis on the English School: “The search for human (individual) and world (cosmopolitan) justice will likely destroy order in international society.” (Devlen, James, and Özdamar 2005, 190) I warranted this claim above with the illustration of the development (“individuals as agents”) of the norm of assassinations as a taboo towards the lesser evil and the self-assentation of the executive branch in turning to the allurements of individual narratives.

In his “Six Theses” on targeted killings Kyle Grayson lines out different dangers to the international society. Targeted killing is: “productive of an amalgamation of governing logics”; “a form of lawfare”; “a visual practice”; “a form of spatial management”; “a symbolic form of communication”; and, finally, “reflects weakness, not strength.” (Grayson 2012b) Targeted killings as well as political assassinations require “a choice that will be shaped by predominant discourses, modes of understanding and socio-political contexts.” (Grayson 2012a, 26) In other words, they reflect the desire to manage, via technical means, geo-political problems. Or, in the words of Morgenthau, they reflect the “escape from power.” (Morgenthau 1962, 3–9)

They are also a form of “lawfare” since they are presented as a form of prevention. As such they frequently take place outside the borders of international human rights.

The act of targeted killing via drones for political aims represents the above mentioned desire for personal narratives: they rely on visibility and communication. And, finally, the previous theses lead to the assumption that the use of drones reflect weakness, not strength: “The turn to targeted killing in counter-insurgency also reflects a Western hubris that technological development can solve what are primarily (geo)political challenges.” (Grayson 2012b, 126) This is even more so if we consider the development of the strategic use of drones by the US which, eventually, leads, via a “dronification of security strategy” to a “Predator Empire.” (Shaw 2013) First, this means that the “Predator Empire” is in line with the fading out of the “boots on the ground” strategic approaches, i.e. empire aspiration changes from topographic to “topological, aerial empire.” (Shaw 2013, 551) As governmental rhetoric indicates, this “dronification” of strategy contributed, in the case of the US, to the cascading norm of the preventive use of self-defence. (Fisk and Ramos 2013) “Dronification” and “Predator Empire,” along the “robotics revolution” (Singer 2009) in 21<sup>st</sup> century conflict furthermore indicates the relevance and ongoing practice of the diffusion of financial and organizational challenges in adapting new weapons systems, finally threatening the balance of power. (Horowitz 2010)

Restraining imperial hubris was the lifelong concern of Morgenthau and other Realists. (Recchia 2007) In declining to the “cultural resonance of the ‘will to revenge’” (Grayson 2012a, 36) the use of targeted killings is presented as a “lesser evil,” producing “dirty hands” (Wijze 2009) but necessary nevertheless. On the first instance Morgenthau seems to be an advocate of this policy – especially when we only cursory capture his phrase in “The Evil of Politics and the Ethics of Evil:” “To know with despair that the political act is inevitably evil, and to act nevertheless, is moral courage. To choose among several expedient actions the least evil one is moral judgment.”

(Morgenthau 1945, 18) The decision to kill someone deliberately is not a political act. Political power as such must be separated from power in terms of force. If force gets a matter of fact, illustrates the turn away from political to military power. (Morgenthau 1956, 27) And power in terms of force can never overrule political power – the traditional “struggle for power”. To “impose Locke everywhere” (Hartz 1955, 13) resembles the difference between the genuine liberal approach and the one of Aristotle outlined in the introduction.

## 5 Conclusion

In conclusion we therefore able to support another hypothesis of the English School and international society, brought forward by Bull and reformulated by Devlen, James, and Özgür: “Order in international politics is more likely to be sustained by fortification of the institutions of an international society (that is, the practice of balance of power, diplomacy, and international law).” (Devlen, James, and Özdamar 2005, 192) Representative of the international society approach of the English School and classical Realism as put forward in this paper, is Bull’s call for the “classical approach.”<sup>17</sup> The claim for the classical approach in maintaining order in international society was backed with the differentiation of war as a human and thus political act and the differentiation of material force and politics as such.

In *Power Politics* Martin Wight wrote that morality in international politics is not a matter of civilization. Only if great powers enjoy security they will assent to moral

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<sup>17</sup> The classical approach is one “to theorizing that derives from philosophy, history, and law, and that is characterized above all by explicit reliance upon the exercise of judgment and by the assumptions that if we confine our- selves to strict standards of verification and proof there is very little of significance that can be said about international relations, that general propositions about this subject must therefore derive from a scientifically imperfect process of perception or intuition, and that these general propositions cannot be accorded anything more than the tentative and inconclusive status appropriate to their doubtful origin.” (Bull 1966, 361)

standards in political conduct. (Wight 1979, 292) Fear – as we witness it in the fear of unwarranted terror attacks – is not only a human condition and motive for going belligerent towards the assumingly source of this fear but also for putting aside moral standards in battling this fear; no matter how great the power in question is. The “Liberalism of Fear,” (Keohane 2002) in a declared and narrated but not actual age of globalized terror, makes us think again about the role of the state in protecting its citizens from informal violence. It is not reason but fear that makes us to give up independence as Adam Watson argued. (Watson 1992, 321)

The Realist notion of agency is generally portrayed as one which acts through structure; no matter if this is the state of international society. International society as was supported in this paper “is a matter of intersubjective meaning embedded in practice.” (Epp 1998, 55) If this practice is shaken, ignored, or violated international society indeed is endangered. Drone warfare and its attempts to pursue individual and cosmopolitan justice around the globe shatters order in international society and drone warfare, exemplified by the “dronification” of strategy endangers international society’s foundations in neglecting fostering international order via the institutions of international society.

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