

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND CITIZEN EVALUATION IN DISASTER RECOVERY

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In April 1997, Grand Forks, North Dakota, and East Grand Forks, Minnesota, experienced a disastrous flood. Both cities have been textbook examples of success according to the Federal Emergency Management Agency. They have an updated infrastructure, paid for largely by the federal government. Their downtowns are on the road to recovery with new construction and businesses. The paths of the two cities have diverged in the social and political aftermath of the flood. East Grand Forks, following consultant suggestions, instituted extensive citizen participation initiatives. East Grand Forks has experienced political stability and citizen satisfaction. Grand Forks relied primarily on bureaucratic guidance to react to the disaster. Grand Forks has experienced changes in government structure, turnover of elected and appointed officials, and much less positive citizen evaluation. This study examines the effect of perceptions of citizen participation on the citizens' evaluation of the success of the recovery.

Keywords: *citizen participation; disaster recovery; disaster and political change; politics and administration*

The American learns to know the laws by participating in the act of legislation; and he takes a lesson in the forms of government from governing. The great work of society is ever going on before his eyes and, as it were, under his hands.

Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America

On April 18, 1997, a flood that the National Weather Service predicted would crest at 49 feet topped the 52-foot dikes in Grand Forks, North Dakota, and East Grand Forks, Minnesota. Because the topography is so flat, the water spread throughout most of both communities, necessitating the evacuation of both. On April 19, a fire broke out in the flooded downtown of Grand Forks that eventually spread to 11 buildings, destroying a major part of downtown. When the residents returned from what some have called the largest per capita evacuation since the Civil War, most found that their homes had been at least partially flooded and their downtowns looked like a war zone.

Both cities recovered more quickly from the disaster than experts expected. They both instituted similar recovery policies. They bought out homes that had substantial damage or that would be removed to make way for future flood mitigation efforts. Both rebuilt their downtowns and chose policies to protect against flood damage in the future. Finally, both established programs to support local businesses and to encourage residents to remain in the

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cities and managed to retain more of their population and businesses than they feared immediately after the flood. On the 1-year anniversary of the flood, the director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) observed, "They ought to be commended for what they've been able to expedite. . . . It's unbelievable" (MacDonald, 1998, p. 3C).

Poll results for the 1st year after the disaster indicated that citizens apparently agreed with the director. Citizens in both communities gave high ratings to elected officials' management of recovery (Black, 1999). Seventy-three percent of East Grand Forks citizens reported that the city council had done very well or fairly well in managing recovery and 79% thought the mayor had done very well or fairly well. The comparable figures for Grand Forks were 75% for the city council and 81% for the mayor. The following year, the numbers in East Grand Forks were 81% for the city council and 77% for the mayor. In Grand Forks, the numbers had declined to 51.9% for the city council and 53.0% for the mayor (Black, 1999).

Since 1997, Grand Forks has experienced considerable political volatility. In 1997, the city council was made up of two representatives from each of seven wards. In 2000, citizens voted to reduce the size of the council to one representative per ward. By 2002, after the first election for the seven-person council, only two people who were on the council during the flood were still serving. The mayor, who had gained international attention for her handling of the crisis, was defeated in her first bid for reelection in 2000. It would be tempting to assume that this volatility is the natural result of the disaster, if it were not for the fact that East Grand Forks has not experienced similar change.

The combination of the poll results from 1999 and the political change in Grand Forks suggests that Grand Forks' residents are less satisfied with the recovery efforts of their community than are citizens of East Grand Forks. This research is an attempt to determine if citizen evaluations of the recovery efforts of the two communities do differ and, if so, to explain why. The cities differ in size, which may be an important factor. At the time of the flood, East Grand Forks had approximately 8,000 citizens and Grand Forks had approximately 50,000. But the cities in many other ways were similar. In addition, they both had suffered from the same disaster and they both had experienced devastating destruction. The situation provided a natural experiment to attempt to explain differential evaluation of policy and differential effects of disaster.

In December 2001, 600 randomly selected citizens who had been residents of the cities during the flood were interviewed through a telephone survey, with 400 coming from Grand Forks and 200 from East Grand Forks.¹ Phone books of the two cities were used as the sampling frame and numbers were chosen using systematic sampling. Respondents were asked a series of questions about their evaluation of the recovery effort (see the appendix for question wording²). Table 1 provides percentages in the two positive response categories (strongly approve and approve) to those questions. Although the citizens of both communities appear to be generally satisfied with the recovery of their cities, East Grand Forks residents appear to be somewhat more satisfied. The difference in level of satisfaction is statistically significant at the .00 level.

Because the substance of the policies adopted in the two cities was similar, this research focuses on the differences in the way policies were made during recovery to explain the differences in satisfaction levels. It specifically hypothesizes that citizens in East Grand Forks felt they played a more important role in recovery decisions and that this perception was an important factor accounting for greater satisfaction with the recovery outcome. In East Grand Forks, elected city officials played the major role in policy making, assisted by a citizen participation process facilitated by two local nonprofit foundations. In Grand Forks, three department heads were designated as tri-chairs of the recovery process. Following

TABLE 1: Evaluation of Recovery Issues

<i>Issue</i>	<i>Grand Forks Approving (N = 400)</i>	<i>East Grand Forks Approving (N = 200)</i>
Success of recovery	86.3% (n = 345)	97.0% (n = 194)
Rebuilding downtown	68.0% (n = 272)	87.5% (n = 175)
Corporate center	51.0% (n = 204)	N/A
Housing development	41.9% (n = 167)	N/A
Greenway	60.3% (n = 241)	N/A
Location of new schools	72.0% (n = 288)	51.5% (n = 103)
Home buyout plan	57.6% (n = 230)	55.0% (n = 111)
Support given business	65.5% (n = 254)	73.5% (n = 147)
Future flood protection	55.0% (n = 220)	86.0% (n = 172)
Cabelas store	N/A	84.5% (n = 169)

bureaucratic norms of expertise, regularized rules and procedures, and efficiency, the tri-chairs sought policy solutions primarily following neutral, technical criteria.

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND BUREAUCRATIC NORMS

Bureaucracies are organizations designed to coordinate the activities of individuals to provide the most efficient attainment of collective goals. Weber identified the core characteristics of bureaucratic organizations that contribute to efficient goal attainment: expertise, hierarchy, formal rules and procedures, and impartiality (Gerth & Wright Mills, 1958). These organizational features distinguish bureaucratic organizations from traditional, political organizations, a fact highlighted by Woodrow Wilson (1887/2000). Wilson's article spawned the conception of a politics/administrative dichotomy.

Although the politics/administrative dichotomy has been rejected quite thoroughly among public administration scholars (Long, 1949/2000; Rourke, 1984; Wildavsky, 1974; Woll, 1977), it is not quite dead. The concept lives on in the daily lives of many bureaucrats who must deal with competing sets of behavioral norms, one that characterizes the bureaucratic organizations of which they are a part and one from the larger democratic structure of which bureaucracies are a part (Gruber, 1987; Kweit & Kweit, 1997). The Progressive Era, of which Wilson's article was a part, created the expectation that bureaucrats should be buffered from politics and make decisions based on professional norms. Members of bureaucracies are expected to follow three specific behavioral norms that are aimed at efficient and effective production of public services. First, bureaucrats are expected to have expertise and to apply that expertise to the implementation of policy. Second, they are expected to develop and follow regularized procedures and to apply those procedures impartially. Third, they are expected to pursue the ultimate goal of efficiency, understood as the maximum attainment of policy goals with a minimum expenditure of public resources. On the other hand, the democratic government of which bureaucracies are a part creates the expectation that they should be responsive and accountable to the public.

These two sets of behavioral norms may compete, creating ethical dilemmas for bureaucrats who may have to choose between them. The conflict has especially difficult implications for the question of the relationship between bureaucrats and the citizens they serve.

Bureaucratic norms can often create barriers to effective citizen participation. First, although some citizens may share the expertise of bureaucrats, that is the exception rather than the rule. Bureaucrats may rightfully recognize that citizens lack the necessary technical expertise to make the “right decisions.” As Foley has noted, bureaucrats fear that citizens’ lack of technical expertise does not always deter them from making judgments (Foley, 1998, p. 151).

Bureaucratic rules and regulations can also act as a barrier to participation. Although it is possible to structure citizen input to be part of bureaucratic standard operating procedures, that structuring of citizen input is not always accomplished. Citizen demands are often ad hoc and consequently tend to be seen as antithetical to normal regularized procedures. In addition, the regularized procedures presumably are designed to maximize the attainment of particular policy goals and would therefore commit the organization to the continuation of existing programs. Citizen demands are often focused on a desire for change, however, and those demands frequently conflict with the desire to perpetuate the bureau’s mission.

Finally, the ultimate goal of efficiency (Simon, 1976) can also create obstacles to participation. Citizen input may impede the achievement of efficiency in two ways. First, the time and effort it would take to listen to citizen demands would detract from the time and effort that could be spent on goal attainment. Second, because citizens would not normally have expertise in the policy area, responding to their demands might mean not providing services in the best way as determined by technical expertise.

In sum, whereas the politics/administrative dichotomy has been widely rejected within academic public administration ranks, the concept lives on in the competing behavioral norms facing bureaucrats because the norms of their profession may compete with the democratic norms of citizen responsiveness and accountability. The issue then is defined as a trade-off between the “good government” as defined by the Progressives and participatory government as desired by Democrats. But is it always the case that participation must conflict with the effective government? Are there ways in which citizen participation can contribute to effective government?

THE IMPORTANCE OF PARTICIPATION

One approach to the question of the importance of citizen involvement is to refer to arguments from classical democratic theory. Some scholars argue that citizens need to be involved in decisions that affect them to achieve self-fulfillment. For example, a recent call for increased citizen involvement in bureaucratic decisions by prominent figures in public administration provides an example of such an argument (King & Stivers, 1998a):

In order to live fully, human beings need the experience of wrestling with problems larger than their own private interests. Their capacity to learn and grow as a result of experience is what ensures that a government run in some meaningful sense by citizens will be run well. (p. 197)

Although this passage focuses on the intrinsic value of participation, it also recognizes that participation may be instrumental in improving the functioning of government.

Recent research suggests fundamental ways in which participation may affect the functioning of government positively. In his influential study of Italian regional government, Robert Putnam (1993) focused on explaining institutional performance. What he concluded from his 20-year study was that “the more civic the region, the more effective the

government” (p. 98). By civic, he is referring to what he calls the presence of social capital, which he defines as “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (p. 167). Although Putnam’s focus was on a much different subject from participation and bureaucratic norms, his conclusion does point to the possibility that good government performance—or at least the perception of it—may be affected more by fundamental citizen values than by the effective application of neutral, expert principles.

Putnam (1993) argues that networks in the broader social context create important bonds of trust and reciprocity that support government actions. Whereas political participation is only one possible form of networking that could create trust, Putnam explicitly acknowledges the role of citizen participation in creating good government. In his 1993 book, Putnam was examining patterns that stretched over centuries, but in his more recent research applying the concept of social capital to developments in America, Putnam documents the decline in social capital over a relatively short period and establishes an agenda to increase social capital, including the suggestion that more Americans should participate in their communities (Putnam, 2000). This suggests that he believes that change need not take centuries.

Research specifically on disaster recovery tends to support Putnam’s arguments. Comparing disaster recovery in three different cases in the United States and abroad, Berke, Kartez, and Wenger (1993) developed a model of recovery based on the extent of a community’s vertical and horizontal integration. Vertical integration refers to the connections between the community and other political, social, and economic units outside the community (Warren, 1963). Vertical integration can help a community expand its capacity by enabling it to access additional resources. The authors argue, however, that the ability to use such resources effectively is related to the community’s horizontal integration, which they define as a “tightly knit social network among local organizations” (Berke et al., 1993, p. 100).

The Berke et al. (1993) article suggests that horizontal integration has a positive effect on recovery through its effect on citizen participation. The connections among people in the networks of a horizontally integrated community help to mobilize citizens to participate in recovery decisions. Many researchers have documented the relationship between social networks and participation (Hansen, 1985; Kenny, 1992; King, Feltey, & Susel, 1998; Leighley, 1996; Robinson & Tang, 1995; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Uhlaner, 1989).

The participation that such networks foster may have an effect on citizen evaluation of policy in two specific ways. First, with citizens actively involved, they can alter the substance of policy to be more acceptable to them. This is the instrumental value of participation. Second, participation may create conditions that make citizens more accepting of government policies regardless of their substance. This is the symbolic value of participation. Involvement creates a sense of ownership of the policies, which tends to mute political conflicts later and to increase satisfaction with the outcomes (Berke & Beatley, 1997; Berke et al., 1993). The ability to participate in itself may increase citizen acceptance of policy. As one activist/author observed, “What citizen activists want most is to be heard” (King & Stivers, 1998a, p. 200). Research by Tyler supports that proposition, concluding that citizens value the ability to present their views and to be listened to more than they value specific policy outcomes (Tyler, 1990).

Participation may also create higher levels of trust, which may enable citizens to accept with greater equanimity even those policies with which they disagree (Gamson, 1968). Empirical research on the effect of participation on citizen trust has produced conflicting results (Kweit & Kweit, 1981). More recent research has attributed the decline in citizen trust to various policies that decreased citizen participation in the public life of their communities

(King & Stivers, 1998b). Putnam also linked trust with civic involvement, although he recognized that the causal connections among trust and involvement as well as reciprocity and honesty “are as tangled as well-tossed spaghetti” (Putnam, 2000, p. 137).

Ultimately, good government in a democracy depends on positive citizen evaluation. That evaluation may be entirely subjective. A policy evaluated as best using neutral, technical criteria may not be acceptable to citizens. A recent work reinforces the importance of subjective evaluation of policy success. In examining crisis management, Sandra Schneider (1995) observes that there are two sets of norms that operate in disaster situations: bureaucratic norms and emergent norms. She argues that the extent to which these two sets of norms are compatible will determine the evaluation of the success of the government’s response to crises. Significantly, she concludes, “Stated simply, the acknowledged success or failure of the governmental response is almost entirely a matter of public perception” (p. 71).

In Schneider’s conception, following bureaucratic norms not only may not guarantee successful policy but may create a gap that will lead to the perception that policy is unsuccessful. It is possible to argue that such a gap between bureaucratic norms and emergent norms could be minimized in ways discussed above by the inclusion of citizens in the development of recovery policy. This article will examine participation in decisions concerning recovery of Grand Forks and East Grand Forks following the flood of 1997.

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN GRAND FORKS

The Grand Forks mayor quickly designated three department heads to be “tri-chairs” of the recovery process: the director of urban development, the director of public works, and the finance director. She explicitly acknowledged their superior technical expertise as the reason for their lead role in recovery. Much of the mayor’s time in the immediate recovery period was spent on speaking to the media and going to Washington, D.C., to lobby for the federal financial support of the recovery effort.

While the mayor was preoccupied with the search for federal financial support, there is evidence that, at least in the initial recovery phase, the city council also was not providing policy leadership. As one council member reported (Glassheim, 2002),

Since the flood, I don’t think the council has been involved to the degree that we should be. People are making decisions for us or throwing documents on our desks the night of the council meeting that they want us to vote on. I don’t think they’re doing it to supersede the government structure. They’re doing it to recover as fast as possible. (p. 122)

In essence, the three tri-chairs were thrust into a policy role.

As several city workers reported in personal interviews, officials immediately recognized the importance of hearing citizens’ views about the issues facing the city, but there was little planning or organization for collecting that input. The city eventually relied on three means of involving citizens: holding public meetings, establishing a public information center to provide a central point for citizens to contact to find answers to questions, and appointing one advisory committee.

The city’s major means of hearing from citizens was through public meetings. The city council meeting of May 12, 1997, was moved out of city hall to a large auditorium on the campus of the University of North Dakota to accommodate an expected large attendance of citizens who had just returned to the city following the evacuation. During the initial

recovery period, the city council met on a weekly rather than a biweekly basis. It is important to note, however, that not all of the council meetings permitted citizens to provide input. Eventually, there were other meetings dealing specifically with future flood control. The city held neighborhood meetings to allow citizens to comment on the Army Corps of Engineers' plans for building dikes. The corps also had public meetings, but again, citizens were not always allowed to comment.

The initial attendance at the various meetings was large. At the May 12 city council meeting at the University of North Dakota, approximately 1,100 people were in attendance. Suffice it to say that is a substantially larger number than would normally attend a council meeting. Officials reported that after strong attendance at meetings in the immediate postdisaster period, the numbers attending quickly dwindled (personal interviews).

In addition to the participation at public meetings, participation in the form of citizen contacting also increased. To respond to the increased level of contacts, the city established a public information office in June 1997 to provide a centralized location where citizens could seek answers about flood recovery. The office also produced regular newsletters to provide information about what was happening in the recovery and to answer the most common citizen questions. Indeed, information dissemination was identified as the primary means of providing "meaningful citizen participation" in the recovery process in the city's flood recovery action plan for June 1 through November 1, 1997 (Owens, O'Leary, Schmisek, & Vein, 1997, p. 4).

Similar to Stalling and Quarantelli's (1985) findings, a few emergent groups formed. One wealthy neighborhood in which many homes would have been destroyed to accommodate the building of the dike proposed by the corps did have several meetings to plan strategy to oppose the dike, but no formal organization was created. Another group organized to influence recovery plans of the school board. Parents hoping to ensure that one badly damaged school would be rebuilt in the same location organized "Neighborhood Education Works," but that disbanded after achieving a quick success. A third group emerged among homeowners in the poorer neighborhoods where virtually all of the homes were destroyed either because of the extensive damage or because the land would be needed for the construction of dikes. This group filed a lawsuit against the city. When the lawsuit was dismissed, the group became inactive. There was an adversarial relationship between these groups and the city.

Two important organizations that formed were the Mayor's Task Force on Business Redevelopment and the Downtown Development Commission, which evolved from a subcommittee of the Task Force. These groups were integrated into the recovery process. The Mayor's Task Force was formed after several business leaders approached the mayor immediately after the disaster to volunteer to help in disaster recovery planning. The Task Force, which was made up of 15 prominent leaders, immediately identified issues that it believed would dominate the recovery process: access to funding for business recovery, cutting red tape, workforce retention and development, reimagining downtown, communications, housing, and flood control. The Task Force held its last meeting on October 10, 1997, but the Reimagining Downtown Subcommittee was reconstituted as a Downtown Development Commission with the charge to continue to oversee the recovery and rebuilding of the downtown.

The North Dakota Consensus Council, a statewide good government group, offered to facilitate citizen involvement in the recovery planning. The offer was rejected. One official reported that it was rejected because there was concern it would create political problems because the Consensus Council was tied to Democrats and the Republicans controlled state government. That same official also reported that the Consensus Council did not have

adequate knowledge about recovery, “nor did the citizens”³ (personal interview). Other officials in Grand Forks who were asked to think in retrospect about the role of citizens in the recovery process appeared to be a bit perplexed about the question. One official reported that they were so focused on dealing with the initial issues that there was “probably not much concern about citizens” (personal interview). Others reported that involving citizens would have slowed down the decision making (personal interviews). One member of the Mayor’s Task Force observed, “Right after the flood the staff were making most of the recommendations. . . . The whole city government was changed in a way that made it possible for the staff to move things at a pace that they couldn’t have done before” (Glassheim, 2002, p. 188).

These and other comments suggest that the norms of efficiency and expertise were important in recovery decision making in Grand Forks and that citizen input was seen by some as incompatible with those norms. There is also some evidence that Grand Forks adhered strongly to rules and regulations. Despite appeals by citizens that the city consider alternatives to the dikes for future flood protection proposed by the Army Corps of Engineers, the city engineer followed the corps’s proposals, which were supported by a cost-benefit analysis. One consultant who worked with Grand Forks suggested that the strict adherence by the city to existing building codes following the disaster had created citizen resentment (personal interview). The important role played by the tri-chairs, who were department heads chosen to lead the recovery due to their technical expertise, probably was a major factor in creating the primacy of bureaucratic norms even though officially the decisions were being ratified by the regular political process.

In the 2nd year of the recovery, two highly publicized events in Grand Forks may have served to illustrate dramatically the role of the tri-chairs in the policy making of the city and may have contributed to the decline in approval ratings of the mayor and city council in the poll done on the 2nd-year anniversary of the disaster. One event related to one of the most contentious issues in the recovery effort: the siting of permanent dikes for future flood protection. Some citizens expressed concern about the dike line proposed by the Army Corps of Engineers. In response to those concerns, the city council allotted money to bring in private consultants to consider the lines. Unknown to anyone, including the mayor and the council until the newspaper broke the news, the city engineer decided not to do that because he thought it was a waste of city money. The other event was a decision to allocate Community Development Block Grant funds given to the city to help it recover to develop land in an attempt to lure a major new business to town. This decision was made by the city council in a closed executive session in response to input from the director of urban development. The money was spent, but in the end the business did not come to Grand Forks. Both of these stories evoked substantial citizen discontent after the local newspaper reported them. City administrators spearheaded both actions. Citizens had no direct means of holding these officials accountable and may have felt that neither they nor their elected officials were in control.

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN EAST GRAND FORKS

Decision processes changed less in East Grand Forks. Although the building director was appointed to be the flood recovery coordinator, officials in East Grand Forks agreed that policy decisions were made, as they were before the flood, by the mayor and the president of the city council and ratified by the council (personal interviews). Citizen participation processes, however, did change.

As soon as people returned to East Grand Forks, the city instituted weekly town meetings to answer citizens' questions and to introduce ideas about recovery. At the time, the president of the city council reported that the meetings would continue as long as the people wanted them. Hundreds of people attended the initial meetings. Such meetings were much more feasible in East Grand Forks than in Grand Forks because, as reported before, East Grand Forks' population was substantially smaller than that of Grand Forks.

A more structured citizen participation process was created at the impetus of two foundations, the Blandin Foundation and the Northwest Area Foundation. The foundations provided grants to the city to facilitate a citizen participation process. According to one person involved with the process, the two foundations "kept saying the East Grand Forks Council should not make decisions without citizens" (personal interview). The process began on August 19, 1997, when a scale model of the proposed rebuilding of the city was unveiled. Then, on October 27 and 28, 1997, a series of "community homecoming" meetings took place. These meetings were open to all, but the foundations assisted the community in identifying key stakeholders who were sent invitations to attend. Between 50 and 60 people attended. On those days, there were several simultaneous sessions facilitated by foundation representatives focusing on specific topics. According to one respondent, the sessions discussed what was good before the flood and what could be better. In addition, they also specifically talked about what government could do and what it could not do to hasten recovery (personal interview).

Out of those meetings came two major accomplishments. First, there was a report of citizens' top concerns. Second, a smaller group of citizens was created that acted as a liaison between the government and citizens. This group, initially called the Community Advisory Rebuilding Team and later renamed the Community Advisory Response Team (CART), met for approximately 1 year. A member reported that the group realized that it was not representative of the whole community and made efforts to reach out to get other citizens' opinions (personal interview). The group provided citizens a way to get involved if they wished and the council went to CART to get citizen views.

Bureaucratic norms did not seem to be as prominent in East Grand Forks as in Grand Forks. Political leaders dominated the decision process in East Grand Forks throughout. When asked about whether East Grand Forks had established a group similar to the Mayor's Advisory Committee in Grand Forks, the president of the East Grand Forks City Council scoffed, "We're not into bureaucracy here" (personal interview). Through the intercession of the foundations, East Grand Forks established a visible participation process. What is the evidence concerning the effect of the participation processes on the citizens' evaluation of the postflood recovery in these two cities?

AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE IMPORTANCE OF PARTICIPATION

Table 2 indicates that citizens in East Grand Forks were more likely to believe that citizens like themselves had exercised an impact on recovery decisions and that the city had attempted to involve citizens in recovery decisions in a genuine way. It also demonstrates that citizens in Grand Forks were slightly more likely to report they had attempted to influence recovery decisions. Table 3 reports gamma correlation coefficients summarizing the relationship between citizens' overall evaluation of the success of recovery, the citizen participation variables, and their trust of the city government.⁴ Table 4 includes correlations between

the evaluation of the recovery and specific decisions made by the governments. In Grand Forks, the three strongest relationships with the overall evaluation of the success of recovery occur with citizens' belief that the city attempted to involve citizens in recovery decisions, their level of trust of the city, and the choice of future flood protection. Following in importance behind those three variables are three others: the belief that ordinary citizens had an effect on recovery decisions, the evaluation of the decisions made to rebuild the downtown, and the decision to build a corporate center downtown, a decision closely related to the general decision about rebuilding the downtown. No other decisions concerning specific recovery issues were strongly related to the evaluation of the success of the recovery. From this set of findings, it appears that the belief that the city attempted to involve citizens as well as the level of citizen trust are quite important determinants of the evaluation of the success of recovery; these factors are stronger than the effect of decisions about individual recovery issues, with the sole exception of the choice of future flood protection. It is interesting to note that citizens' report that they had tried to influence decisions is not strongly related to the evaluation of the success of the recovery and is related in a negative direction.

In East Grand Forks, the belief that the city had attempted to involve citizens and that citizens had had an effect and the trust variable are also important predictors of the overall evaluation of the success of recovery. Again, the attempt to influence decisions was not strongly related to the evaluation of the success of recovery and is related in a negative direction. Because that variable was not an important predictor of evaluation of success of recovery in either city, it will not be included in future analyses, but a discussion of that variable will be included at the end of this article. It is important to emphasize that the following empirical analyses of the effect of participation involve variables measuring citizens' perceptions of participation, not their actual participation.

In East Grand Forks, there are four individual decisions made during the recovery effort that are as strongly or more strongly related to the evaluation of the success of recovery than the citizens' perceptions concerning participation: the support given to business, the decisions concerning the rebuilding of downtown, the decision to bring Cabelas (a major outdoor equipment store) to the downtown, and future flood protection. These findings suggest the possibility that the evaluation of the specific decisions made in the recovery effort is the dominant determinant of overall evaluation of the success of recovery.

To examine that possibility, an elaboration analysis was conducted. Elaboration analyses introduce a control variable in the attempt to understand bivariate relations better (Blalock, 1979; Davis, 1985; Rosenberg, 1968; Schutt, 2001). A major advantage of an elaboration analysis is that it makes it possible to specify the conditions in which contingent bivariate relations may exist. Elaboration analyses are also designed to test for spuriousness or to try to determine the causal mechanism by which the independent variable may affect the dependent variable.

It is possible that the support for specific decisions might create a halo effect, influencing both the perception of the success of the recovery and the perception that citizens had been involved in recovery decisions. In other words, the relationship between the perceptions concerning participation and evaluation of recovery may be spurious. An alternative interpretation derives from literature cited above that suggests that participation creates a context in which citizens are more supportive of policy options, regardless of which are chosen. The belief that the city attempted to involve citizens and that citizens in general had an effect may affect the evaluation of the specific issues, establishing the path through which those variables affect the overall evaluation of success.

TABLE 2: Evaluation of Role of Citizens

<i>Issue</i>	<i>Grand Forks: Yes (N = 400)</i>	<i>East Grand Forks: Yes (N = 200)</i>
Did average citizens affect decisions?	45.6% (n = 181)	54.8% (n = 109)
Did city attempt to involve citizens?	53.1% (n = 211)	57.8% (n = 115)
Did you attempt to influence recovery decisions?	35.5% (n = 142)	32.0% (n = 64)

TABLE 3: Gamma Correlations Between Evaluation and Participation and Trust

<i>Issue</i>	<i>Grand Forks</i>	<i>East Grand Forks</i>
Did average citizens affect decisions?	.57* (n = 388)	.56* (n = 198)
Did city attempt to involve citizens?	.65* (n = 389)	.58* (n = 198)
Did you attempt to influence recovery decisions?	-.26* (n = 390)	-.21 (n = 199)
How much of the time do you think you can trust the city government to do what is right?	.61* (n = 390)	.63* (n = 199)

* significant at .01 level. ** significant at .05 level.

TABLE 4: Gamma Correlations Between Overall Evaluations and Attitudes Toward Specific Governmental Decisions

<i>Issue</i>	<i>Grand Forks</i>	<i>East Grand Forks</i>
Rebuild downtown	.56* (n = 390)	.66* (n = 196)
Corporate center	.57* (n = 344)	N/A
Congressional housing project	.40* (n = 349)	N/A
Location of schools	.45* (n = 356)	.51* (n = 187)
Home buyout	.43* (n = 306)	.60* (n = 161)
Support for business	.47* (n = 342)	.79* (n = 177)
Flood protection	.60* (n = 363)	.73* (n = 189)
Cabelas	N/A	.67* (n = 188)

* significant at .01 level. ** significant at .05 level.

To test these alternative hypotheses, gamma correlation coefficients were calculated between the independent variables of perceptions of citizen role and the city's attempt to involve citizens and the dependent variable of the overall evaluation of the success of recovery, this time controlling for the effect of attitudes concerning the individual issues. The results of this analysis appear in Tables 5A through 5D. It is important to be cautious about these measures of association because the number of observations is quite small in some cases, especially in the case of the East Grand Forks data. However, the results observed do not support a conclusion that the relationship between the participation variables and the evaluation of recovery is spurious or that participation has an effect on overall evaluation only through its effect on the evaluation of specific decisions. The beliefs about participation retain an independent effect on the overall evaluation of the recovery even in the presence of controls for attitudes concerning specific issues.

The results reported in Table 3 suggest one other possible interpretation. In both cities, trust is as strongly or more strongly related to overall evaluation of success than are the perceptions concerning participation. Perhaps trust is the crucial variable, affecting both the

evaluation of success and the perception of citizen involvement in decisions and city effort to involve citizens, meaning that the relationships between the perception of success and the perception of citizen involvement are spurious. Alternatively, trust may be the path through which the perception of citizen involvement affects the perception of success. Some literature cited previously suggests that participation may create higher levels of trust. The relationships between the evaluation of success and the participation variables were again calculated, this time controlling for trust. The results of this analysis appear in Tables 6A and 6B. Clearly, trust has an effect on the relationships, but it is important to note that it does not eliminate them. In Grand Forks, the effect of trust virtually eliminates the relationship between the evaluation of success and the belief that the city had attempted to get the citizens involved among those who were most and least trusting, but it had a lesser effect among those who trusted the city most of the time or some of the time.⁵ These findings suggest that beliefs concerning participation have more effect on those with moderate views. Similarly, in East Grand Forks, controlling for trust had the least effect among those who trusted the city to do what is right most of the time. As indicated, research on the effect of participation on trust has produced conflicting results. One advantage of this elaboration analysis is that it permits the examination of contingent relationships that may provide a clue for the conflicting findings. Perhaps for those with strong positive or negative feelings, perceptions concerning participation make little difference, at least in the short run. But for those whose feelings about government are more ambivalent, the perceptions concerning the effect of citizens and the efforts of the city to involve citizens may contribute to the evaluation of government policy.

In both communities, controlling for trust reduces the relationship between the evaluation of success and the belief that average citizens had had an effect on decisions. It is impossible to determine empirically whether the reduction in the size of the gammas is the result of a spurious relationship or if trust is an intervening variable between the participation variables and evaluation. The basis for such a conclusion must be sought in theory (Jones, 1971). Although Putnam (2000) acknowledges that the direction of causation is unknown, he and others cited above argue that there is a relationship between participation and trust. On the basis of that literature, the hypothesis of spuriousness is rejected.

DISCUSSION

Although the concept of a politics/administrative dichotomy has been discredited in the public administration literature, bureaucrats themselves are faced with conflicting norms for decisions deriving from the conflict between bureaucratic norms and democratic norms (Rohr, 1989). Reliance on bureaucratic norms, although understandable from the bureaucrats' perspective, is subject both to normative and empirical attack. The normative critique is that in a democracy, citizens are the ultimate arbiters of the best policy. This article has provided empirical evidence that citizen perception of the role that citizens play in decision making can affect their evaluation of the success of government performance.

It is important to note that most of the analysis in this article relied on a subjective evaluation of the effect of citizens and the cities' attempt to involve citizens. It may not be the case that the citizens in East Grand Forks actually had more effect on decisions. Grand Forks had many public meetings and established a new public information office to keep the citizens of the city informed. To a large extent, however, the communication in Grand Forks was one-way: from the officials to the citizens. Not all the public meetings provided the opportunity for public comment. The information office responded to questions, but it was not a forum

TABLE 5A: Gamma Correlations Between Evaluation and Participation: Grand Forks (successful recovery and did average citizen have an effect? .57* controlling for individual issues)

	<i>Strongly Approve</i>	<i>Approve</i>	<i>Disapprove</i>	<i>Strongly Disapprove</i>
Downtown	.73* (n = 59)	.31** (n = 205)	.47** (n = 93)	.90 (n = 26)
Corporate	-.09 (n = 26)	.58* (n = 174)	.52* (n = 109)	.67** (n = 30)
Housing	.74** (n = 18)	.56* (n = 142)	.34** (n = 138)	.76* (n = 45)
Schools	.37 (n = 37)	.52* (n = 243)	.69* (n = 65)	1.00 (n = 5)
Buyout	1.0** (n = 16)	.49* (n = 210)	.68* (n = 58)	.38 (n = 19)
Business	.05 (n = 32)	.59* (n = 217)	.64* (n = 75)	1.00 (n = 13)
Flood	.40 (n = 35)	.38* (n = 181)	.60** (n = 95)	.42 (n = 47)

* significant at .01 level. ** significant at .05 level.

TABLE 5B: Gamma Correlations Between Evaluation and Participation: Grand Forks (successful recovery and did city attempt citizen participation? .65* controlling for individual issues)

	<i>Strongly Approve</i>	<i>Approve</i>	<i>Disapprove</i>	<i>Strongly Disapprove</i>
Downtown	.66* (n = 58)	.51* (n = 205)	.42** (n = 95)	.90 (n = 26)
Corporate	.50 (n = 26)	.59* (n = 175)	.50* (n = 109)	.47 (n = 30)
Housing	1.0* (n = 18)	.75* (n = 146)	.43** (n = 136)	.31 (n = 46)
Schools	.24 (n = 37)	.59* (n = 245)	.74* (n = 65)	1.0** (n = 5)
Buyout	1.0 (n = 15)	.59* (n = 212)	.58* (n = 58)	.30 (n = 18)
Business	.24 (n = 32)	.71* (n = 218)	.59* (n = 77)	1.0 (n = 13)
Flood	.70 (n = 36)	.52* (n = 182)	.36 (n = 95)	.56 (n = 48)

* significant at .01 level. ** significant at .05 level.

TABLE 5C: Gamma Correlations Between Evaluation and Participation: East Grand Forks (successful recovery and did average citizen have an effect? .56* controlling for individual issues)

	<i>Strongly Approve</i>	<i>Approve</i>	<i>Disapprove</i>	<i>Strongly Disapprove</i>
Downtown	.15 (n = 61)	.54* (n = 112)	.81 (n = 19)	-1.0 (n = 3)
Schools	-1.0 (n = 14)	.67* (n = 88)	.54** (n = 71)	-.85 (n = 13)
Buyout	1.0 (n = 13)	.59* (n = 97)	.25 (n = 34)	.00 (n = 16)
Business	-1.0** (n = 17)	.57* (n = 129)	.33 (n = 20)	
Flood	.27 (n = 39)	.61* (n = 132)	-.29 (n = 15)	
Cabelas	.45 (n = 57)	.58* (n = 110)	-.75 (n = 18)	

* significant at .01 level. ** significant at .05 level.

TABLE 5D: Gamma Correlations Between Evaluation and Participation: East Grand Forks (successful recovery and did city attempt citizen participation? .58* controlling for individual issues)

	<i>Strongly Approve</i>	<i>Approve</i>	<i>Disapprove</i>	<i>Strongly Disapprove</i>
Downtown	.40 (n = 61)	.49* (n = 112)	.00 (n = 19)	1.0 (n = 3)
Schools	-1.0 (n = 14)	.67* (n = 89)	.54** (n = 70)	-.85 (n = 13)
Buyout	1.0 (n = 13)	.56* (n = 97)	.61 (n = 34)	.00 (n = 16)
Business	-1.0** (n = 18)	.54* (n = 128)	1.0** (n = 20)	1.0 (n = 10)
Flood	.23 (n = 39)	.55* (n = 132)	1.0 (n = 15)	1.0 (n = 2)
Cabelas	.71* (n = 58)	.37 (n = 109)	1.0 (n = 18)	

* significant at .01 level. ** significant at .05 level.

TABLE 6A: Gamma Correlations Between Evaluation and Attempt to Involve Citizens (Grand Forks .65*, East Grand Forks .58*, citizens controlling for trust)

	<i>Grand Forks</i>	<i>East Grand Forks</i>
Always	.16 (<i>n</i> = 21)	1.0 (<i>n</i> = 15)
Most of the time	.42** (<i>n</i> = 167)	.52* (<i>n</i> = 96)
Some of the time	.63* (<i>n</i> = 174)	.07 (<i>n</i> = 77)
Not at all	-.03 (<i>n</i> = 27)	-.75 (<i>n</i> = 10)

* significant at .01 level. ** significant at .05 level.

TABLE 6B: Gamma Correlations Between Evaluation and Belief Average Citizens Had an Effect (Grand Forks .57*, East Grand Forks .56*, citizens controlling for trust)

	<i>Grand Forks</i>	<i>East Grand Forks</i>
Always	-.17 (<i>n</i> = 20)	
Most of the time	.30 (<i>n</i> = 168)	.38 (<i>n</i> = 95)
Some of the time	.42** (<i>n</i> = 173)	.28 (<i>n</i> = 78)
Not at all	.87 (<i>n</i> = 27)	-.35 (<i>n</i> = 10)

* significant at .01 level. ** significant at .05 level.

for input. With the exception of the Mayor's Task Force, emergent groups were not integrated into the recovery process, as Stalling and Quarantelli (1985) recommend should happen.

The efforts in East Grand Forks were outside the normal participation channels of attending council meetings or contacting government officials. In addition, there were efforts to mobilize citizens to participate, permitting greater integration of citizens in the recovery process. Both of these facts may be important for several reasons. First, the efforts to mobilize participation could have been more visible to citizens than the normal channels of participation, making them more aware of participation opportunities. Second, as Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) found, mobilization is effective in creating participation. More people may have become involved than if only the normal channels of participation were used. Third, the methods used to mobilize citizens provided them with a means to express their preferences concerning recovery decisions, making the communication two-way. Finally, the mobilization effort made participation part of a community effort and focused on community goals. By contrast, participation in Grand Forks was largely the result of individual initiative and, as one council member observed, (personal interview) often focused on resolving individual problems rather than community problems. As noted earlier, one proposed advantage of participation is to provide citizens with "the experience of wrestling with problems larger than their own private interests" (King & Stivers, 1998a, p. 197).

An important final question about this case is whether the differences between the two communities are due solely to the difference in their sizes. Could Grand Forks have involved its citizens to the same degree as did East Grand Forks? Clearly, it would be very difficult to involve the same proportion of citizens in Grand Forks as in East Grand Forks. But it is possible that the numbers actually involved are less important than the perception of city effort. As noted above, in both cities, there was a small negative relationship between the citizens' report that they had tried to influence decisions and their evaluation of the success of the

recovery. As previously argued, participation may have an effect on citizens' evaluation of policy in two ways: by enabling citizens to alter the substance of policy or by creating a context in which they are more likely to accept policy regardless of its substance. This research lends support to the importance of the second mechanism in this case. Actual involvement in efforts to influence policy is not as important a predictor of the overall evaluation of success as were the perceptions of citizens concerning participation. In addition, those perceptions are independent of the evaluation of specific policy choices. This set of findings suggests that the symbolic value of participation may be more important than its instrumental value, at least in this case of disaster recovery.

This creates an interesting dilemma for communities. The more people who are involved may result in more people who are dissatisfied. On the other hand, the perception that the community did not make an effort to involve citizens and that they did not have an effect will result in negative evaluations. It seems that communities must visibly attempt to involve citizens but also attempt to ensure that those who do participate are satisfied. In this context, it is interesting that of those who felt they had tried to influence recovery decisions, 39% (based on 138 responses) in Grand Forks felt that they had been successful compared with 46% (based on 63 responses) in East Grand Forks. Because of the small number of responses, the difference is not statistically significant; however, the relationship between feeling successful and the evaluation of recovery is statistically significant in both communities and is very strong ($\gamma = .83$ in Grand Forks and $.65$ in East Grand Forks). The message seems to be that there must be valid attempts to respond to the concerns of those who do participate. This certainly means that substantial planning must go into participation efforts by communities. Communities should include plans for how to facilitate citizen participation in recovery decisions in their emergency planning activities before disaster strikes. Planning for participation in advance may make it possible for authorities to structure participation to be compatible with the norms of bureaucratic officials who will be involved in recovery decisions, thus minimizing the costs of participation to the bureaucrats and maximizing their benefits (Moynihan, 2003). Including participation in the plans would also make clear to bureaucrats the importance of seeking and responding to public input.

This case has led to some suggestions for those plans. When major decisions need to be made about recovery after disaster, communities should go beyond traditional participation mechanisms and attempt to mobilize citizens and provide opportunities for citizen input. Stalling and Quarantelli (1985) have even argued that planning should include a policy for including emergent citizen groups into networks of recovery organizations.

There are barriers to doing that, in general, and those barriers are especially problematic in decision making following a disaster. Officials themselves may not have the time or strength to focus on mobilizing citizens. In addition, citizens may irrationally focus their frustrations and fears on officials, making public meetings unruly and contentious events. One suggestion would be for officials to find outside facilitators to mobilize citizens and to gather citizen input. That would be less demanding on officials and citizens might be more focused on problem solving rather than simply venting their spleens. It may also be important to attempt to focus citizen concerns on community issues rather than simply individual issues. Dividing citizens into manageably sized groups to discuss specific community issues may also help focus attention more productively. Although planning is important, it is also important that managers be educated to understand that they must be flexible in disaster situations and to learn to improvise (Drabek, 1983).

CONCLUSION

The impetus for this research was the observation that although both Grand Forks and East Grand Forks appear to have recovered successfully from the flood, indicators including greater political change in Grand Forks suggested that the citizens of Grand Forks were less satisfied with their city's efforts than the citizens of East Grand Forks. The explanation focuses on the differences in participation mechanisms used by the two communities. In both cities, the beliefs that the city attempted to involve citizens and that citizens in general had an effect on decisions are strongly related to the evaluation of the success of the recovery. East Grand Forks residents were more likely to believe that citizens had an effect on decisions made and that the city made attempts to involve them. In Grand Forks, three department heads provided policy direction for recovery decisions. The need for quick decisions based on technical expertise and rules and regulations underlay their decision processes. In East Grand Forks, the political leaders dominated. Grand Forks relied on regular participation mechanisms such as open meetings and government contacting. East Grand Forks, with the aid of outside foundations, instituted a participation process specifically for recovery decisions focusing on issues of community-wide recovery.

This natural experiment did not permit controlling for other factors that may have affected the citizens' evaluations. For example, as noted, the two communities differed substantially in size. That difference may have permitted citizens in East Grand Forks to feel they could play a more important role than did citizens in Grand Forks. It is also possible that the flood simply accelerated political change that was in process in Grand Forks (Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977). Because of the focus on only two communities, it is also difficult to determine how generalizable these findings are. The political culture in both North Dakota and Minnesota emphasizes the right and responsibility of citizens to participate in political decisions. In other areas of the country with a different political culture, the role of participation in evaluating the success of the recovery may not be as great. The finding of the importance of participation is, however, consistent with other research (see, for example, King & Stivers, 1998b).

Nevertheless, the basic conclusion to be drawn from this research is that in these communities, beliefs concerning participation matter a good deal. This research suggests that the belief that citizens had an effect on decisions and that the cities attempted to get citizens involved had a substantial effect on the overall evaluation of the success of recovery. This effect is, for the most part, separate from the evaluation of the specific decisions made on recovery issues. The beliefs about participation are clearly intermingled with trust of the city government, as participation literature would predict, but controlling for trust does not totally eliminate the effect of beliefs concerning participation. The beliefs concerning participation had the most independent effect on those with moderate levels of trust and the least effect on those with strong positive or negative views.

Although the reliance on the bureaucratic norms of expertise, efficiency, and rules and regulations may produce good policy as judged by technical criteria, it may not result in policy that citizens evaluate as good. In general, both elected and unelected officials must take seriously their responsibility to include citizen input in their decision making and to be responsive to that input. Although it may be contrary to bureaucratic norms and may appear to impede service delivery, citizens' beliefs about participation can contribute to citizens' perceptions of governmental performance. The lesson for officials, generally and not just after disasters, is that citizens must feel that they are involved, for it is the citizens who ultimately determine what makes up good policy.

APPENDIX

Do you live in Grand Forks or East Grand Forks? _____ Grand Forks _____ East Grand Forks

Did you live there during the 1997 flood? _____ Yes _____ No

If Grand Forks:

Please rate how you feel about the following recovery issues. Do you strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or strongly disapprove what was done in each area?

	Strongly Approve	Approve	Disapprove	Strongly Disapprove
The rebuilding of downtown	_____	_____	_____	_____
The corporate center	_____	_____	_____	_____
The Congressional housing development	_____	_____	_____	_____
Greenway	_____	_____	_____	_____
The location of new schools	_____	_____	_____	_____
The home buyout plan	_____	_____	_____	_____
The support given to business	_____	_____	_____	_____
Future flood protection	_____	_____	_____	_____

Overall, how would you rank the success of the recovery of Grand Forks? Do you think it was very successful, successful, unsuccessful, or very unsuccessful?

_____ very successful _____ successful _____ unsuccessful _____ very unsuccessful

If East Grand Forks:

Please rate how you feel about the following recovery issues. Do you strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or strongly disapprove what was done in each area?

	Strongly Approve	Approve	Disapprove	Strongly Disapprove
The rebuilding of downtown	_____	_____	_____	_____
The decision to bring Cabelas to town	_____	_____	_____	_____
The location of new schools	_____	_____	_____	_____
The home buyout plan	_____	_____	_____	_____
The support given to business	_____	_____	_____	_____
Future flood protection	_____	_____	_____	_____

Overall, how would you rank the success of the recovery of East Grand Forks? Do you think it was very successful, successful, unsuccessful, or very unsuccessful?

_____ very successful _____ successful _____ unsuccessful _____ very unsuccessful

Both:

Do you feel that citizens like you were able to have an effect on the decisions made concerning recovery if they wanted to? _____ Yes _____ No

Do you feel that the city made an attempt to involve citizens in the recovery process? _____ Yes _____ No

Did you do anything to try to influence decisions concerning the recovery process? _____ Yes _____ No

If yes, do you feel you were successful? _____ Yes _____ No

APPENDIX (continued)

How much of the time do you think you can trust the city government to do what is right—just about always, most of the time, some of the time, or not at all?

_____ Always _____ Most _____ Some _____ Not at all

NOTES

1. The limited grant money funding this research necessitated keeping sample sizes small. The decision was made to consider the cities as one population of 58,000. Two Web sites with random sample size calculators were consulted (custominsight.com and chartwellsystems.com). Both suggested a sample of 600 for a confidence level of 95% and a confidence interval of 5%. The sample was chosen using disproportionate stratified sample. To test for the accuracy of results using those sample sizes, we used the formula for determining sample size in Kenneth J. Meier and Jeffrey L. Brudney's, *Applied Statistics for Public Administration*. The required sample size for 95% confidence level and 5% confidence interval with a proportion of .5 (assuming maximum variability) is 384. The required sample with the same confidence level and variability with a 7% confidence interval is 196. With these sample sizes, the maximum confidence interval for the Grand Forks estimates would be 5% and for the East Grand Forks estimates would be 7%. Both cities are demographically quite homogeneous and on many questions there was strong agreement, meaning the confidence intervals are probably smaller. The response rate in Grand Forks was 50% and in East Grand Forks was 55%. The Bureau of Governmental Affairs, which conducted the polling, normally gets between 20% and 25% response rate. The response rates in this study were deflated by the fact that those who were contacted but did not live in Grand Forks or East Grand Forks during the flood were not interviewed and were counted toward the nonresponses.

2. Many questions did not provide a neutral category of response. There are two schools of thought on this. Some argue that the neutral category gives a more accurate picture of opinion because there are people who are neutral, but others argue that it gives a less accurate picture because it's a convenient way to avoid giving an accurate response. This research opted for eliminating the neutral category. This research also used narrative categories rather than numeric scales. Experience with other surveys has convinced the authors that interpreting intermediate numbers in the numeric scales is difficult. For example, what does a 2 mean on a scale of 1 to 7 with 1 being strongly approve? Not so strongly approve? Just approve? Giving the responses in narrative form allows the respondents to know precisely how their responses will be interpreted.

3. Interviews were conducted with a guarantee of confidentiality unless attribution was essential.

4. Gamma is a widely used ordinal-level measure of association. For descriptions of gamma and its calculation, see Blalock (1979) and Schutt (2001). It is a proportionate reduction in error measure that indicates a weak monotonic relationship.

5. Controlling in this manner is admittedly cumbersome, but it is sensitive to the limitations of nominal and ordinal data. Blalock (1979) argues that this method of controlling "is perhaps the most straightforward and the one most directly analogous to the laboratory experiment in which control variables are actually physically held constant" (p. 316). Another advantage of this means of control is that it permits examination of contingent relations by making it possible to examine differential effects of the control variable.

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