GOVERNMENT OF INDIA CIVIL AVIATION DEPARTMENT



भारत सरकार नागर विमानन विभाग महानिदेशक नागर विमानन का कार्यालय सफदरजंग एयरपोर्ट के सामने नई दिल्ली - ११० ००३

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ADVISORY CIRCULAR 9 of 2009 FOR AIR OPERATORS

Subject: STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

1. PURPOSE

Standard operating procedures (SOPs) are universally recognized as basic to safe aviation operations. Effective crew coordination and crew performance, the two central concepts of crew resource management (CRM), depend upon the crew's having a shared mental model of each task. That mental model, in turn, is founded on SOPs. This advisory circular (AC) presents the background, basic concepts, and philosophy in respect to SOPs. It emphasizes that SOPs should be clear, comprehensive, and readily available in the manuals used by flight deck crewmembers.

This AC is designed to provide advice and recommendations about development, implementation, and updating of SOPs. Many important topics that should be addressed in SOPs are provided in Appendix 1, Standard Operating Procedures Template. Stabilized Approach, characterized by a constant-angle, constant-rate of descent ending near the touchdown point, where the landing maneuver begins, is among the SOPs specifically identified in this AC, and is described in Appendix 2, Stabilized Approach: Concepts and Terms. These and the other Appendices following them represent a baseline and a starting point. Start-up Air Operator Permit (AOP) holders and existing AOP holders should refer to the Template in Appendix 1, to Stabilized Approach in Appendix 2, and to the other Appendices to this AC in developing comprehensive SOPs for use in training programs and in manuals used by their flight deck crewmembers.

b. Using this Advisory Circular: This AC is designed to provide advice and recommendations about the development, implementation, and updating of SOPs. Appendix 1, Standard Operating Procedures Template, provides many important topics that should be addressed in SOPs. Stabilized Approach, characterized by a constant-angle, constant-rate of descent ending near the touchdown point where the landing maneuver

begins, is among the SOPs specifically identified in this AC and is described in Appendix 2, Stabilized Approach: Concepts and Terms. These and the other appendices represent a baseline and a starting point. Start-up certificate holders and existing certificate holders should refer to the Template in Appendix 1, to Stabilized Approach in Appendix 2, and to the other appendices in developing comprehensive SOPs for use in training programs and in manuals used by their flight deck crewmembers.

c. What's New in this Advisory Circular: Information has been provided to improve clarity, accuracy, completeness, and consistency. Two significant changes are the conversion of the term pilot not flying (PNF) to pilot monitoring (PM) and the addition of a related Appendix addressing "Crew Monitoring and Cross-Checking." It is increasingly acknowledged that it makes better sense to characterize pilots by what they are doing rather than by what they are not doing. Hence, pilot flying (PF) remains an appropriate term and is unchanged in this AC. But the term pilot not flying misses the point. Studies of crew performance, accident data, and pilots' own experiences all point to the vital role of the non-flying pilot as a monitor. Hence, the term pilot monitoring (PM) is now widely viewed as a better term to describe that pilot. The term PM is used liberally throughout this AC. In those instances where the older term PNF appears, it should be understood that pilot monitoring (PM) is the preferred meaning.

2. SCOPE

Appendix 1 consolidates many topics viewed by operators and by the DGCA/FID as important, to be addressed as SOPs in air operator training programs and in the manuals used by air operator flight deck crewmembers. This AC does not list every important SOP topic or dictate exactly how each topic an AOP holder should address. Instead, this AC offers a baseline of topics, to be used as a reference. In practice, each AOP holder's manuals and training programs are unique. Each AOC holder could omit certain topics shown in the template when they do not apply, and, on the other hand, could add other topics not shown in the template when they do apply. This AC contains guidance intended for use primarily by Air Operator Permit holders authorized to conduct operations in accordance with Indian Air Transport Regulations

3. RELATED REGULATIONS: CAR, Section 2, Series 'O', Part II

4. RELATED READING OR REFERENCE MATERIAL

- a. Crew Resource Management Training Advisory Circular 8 of 2009.
- **b.** Approach-and-landing Risk Awareness Tool. (ALAR tool-kit)
- c. CFIT Checklist (as developed by DGCA).
- d. Human Performance Considerations in the Use and Design of Aircraft Checklists in accordance with ICAO PANS OPS Document 8168 and ICAO Human Factors Training Manual Document 9683

5. BACKGROUND

- a. For many years the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has identified deficiencies in standard operating procedures as contributing causal factors in aviation accidents. Among the most commonly cited deficiencies involving flight crews has been their noncompliance with established procedures; another has been the non-existence of established procedures in some manuals used by flight crews.
- **b.** The ICAO has recognized the importance of SOPs for safe flight operations. Recent amendments to ICAO Annex 6 and PANS OPS Document 8168, Vol. I, establish that each Member State shall require that SOPs for each phase of flight be contained in the operations manual used by pilots.
- **c.** Many Aviation Safety Organizations have concluded that Air Operators perform with higher levels of safety when they establish and adhere to adequate SOPs.
- **d.** A study of CFIT accidents found almost 50 percent of the 107 CFIT interventions identified by an analysis team related to the flight crew's failure to adhere to SOPs or the AOP holder's failure to establish adequate SOPs.

6. THE MISSION OF SOPs

To achieve consistently safe flight operations through adherence to SOPs that are clear, comprehensive, and readily available to flight crewmembers.

7. APPLYING THE SOPS TEMPLATE AND OTHER APPENDICES

Generally, each SOP topic identified in the template (following as Appendix 1) is important and should be addressed in some manner by the AOP holder, if applicable. Stabilized Approach (Appendix 2) is a particularly important SOP. Other important SOPs, such as those associated with special operating authority or with new technology, are not shown in the template, but should be addressed as well, when applicable. Because each AOP holder's operation is unique, developing the specific manner in which SOPs are addressed is the task of the AOP holder. Topics expanded and illustrated in the Appendices are for example only, and represent renditions of SOPs known to be effective. No requirement is implied or intended to change existing SOPs based solely on these examples. An SOP topic shown in the Appendices may be addressed in detail, including text and diagrams, or in very simple terms. For example, an SOP may be addressed in a simple statement such as: "ABC Airlines does not conduct Category 3 approaches."

8. KEY FEATURES OF EFFECTIVE SOPs.

- **a.** Many experts agree that implementation of any procedure as an SOP is most effective if:
 - (1) The procedure is appropriate to the situation.

- (2) The procedure is practical to use.
- (3) Crewmembers understand the reasons for the procedure.
- (4) Pilot Flying (PF), Pilot Not Flying (PNF), and Flight Engineer duties are clearly delineated. (See para 1 c for reference of PNF as PM)
- (5) Effective training is conducted.
- (6) The attitudes shown by instructors, check pilots, and managers all reinforce the need for the procedure.
- **b.** If all elements (above) are not consistently implemented, flight crews too easily become participants in an undesirable double standard condoned by instructors, and check pilots. Flight crews may end up doing things one way to satisfy training requirements and check rides, but doing them another way in "real life" during line operations. When a double standard does appear in this way, it should be considered a red flag that a published SOP may not be practical or effective for some reason. That SOP should be reviewed and perhaps changed.

9. THE IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING THE REASONS FOR AN SOP

- **a. Effective Feedback.** When flight crewmembers understand the underlying reasons for an SOP they are better prepared and more eager to offer effective feedback for improvements. The operator/ AOP holder, in turn, benefits from more competent feedback in revising existing SOPs and in developing new SOPs. Those benefits include safety, efficiency, and employee morale.
- **b. Troubleshooting.** When flight crew members understand the underlying reasons for an SOP, they are generally better prepared to handle a related in-flight problem that may not be explicitly or completely addressed in their operating manuals.

10. COLLABORATING FOR EFFECTIVE SOPs

- **a.** In general, effective SOPs are the product of healthy collaboration among managers and flight operations people, including flight crews. A safety culture promoting continuous feedback from flight crews and others, and continuous revision by the collaborators distinguishes effective SOPs at air operators of all sizes and ages.
- **b.** New operators, operators adding a new aircraft fleet, or operators retiring one aircraft fleet for another must be especially diligent in developing SOPs. Collaborators with applicable experience may be more difficult to bring together in those instances.
- c. For a startup operator/ AOP holder, or an applicant for an AOP, this AC and its Appendices should be especially valuable tools in developing SOPs. The developers should pay close attention to the approved airplane flight manual (AFM), to AFM revisions and operations bulletins issued by the manufacturer. Desirable partners in the collaboration would certainly include representatives of the airplane manufacturer, pilots having previous experience with the airplane or with the kind of operations planned by the operator, and representatives from the FID, including the

flight operations inspector (FOI) and members of the preparedness team. It is especially important for a new operator to maintain a periodic review process that includes line flight crews. Together, managers and flight crews are able to review the effectiveness of SOPs and to reach valid conclusions for revisions. The review process will be meaningful and effective when managers promote prompt implementation of revisions to SOPs when necessary.

- d. An existing operator/ AOP holder introducing a new airplane fleet should also collaborate using the best resources available, including the AFM and operations bulletins. Experience has shown that representatives of the airplane manufacturer, managers, check pilot, instructors, and line pilots work well together as a team to develop effective SOPs. A trial <u>period</u> might be implemented, followed by feedback and revision, in which SOPs are improved. By being part of an iterative process for changes in SOPs, the end user, the flight crew member, is generally inclined to accept the validity of changes and to implement them readily.
- e. Long-established operators should be careful not to assume too readily that they can operate an airplane recently added to the fleet in the same, standard way as older types or models. Managers, check pilot, and instructors should collaborate using the best resources available, including the AFM and operations bulletins to ensure that SOPs developed or adapted for a new airplane are in fact effective for that aircraft, and are not inappropriate carryovers.

11. SUMMARY

Safety in commercial AND non- commercial aviation continues to depend on good crew performance. Good crew performance, in turn, is founded on standard operating procedures that are clear, comprehensive, and readily available to the flight crew. This AC provides an SOPs template and many other useful references in developing SOPs. Development of SOPs is most effective when done by collaboration, using the best resources available including the end-users themselves, the flight crews. Once developed, effective SOPs should be continually reviewed and renewed.

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NOTES ON APPENDICES

The following appendices contain examples of standard operating procedures (SOPs) that are identical to or similar to some SOPs currently in use. Those examples do not represent a rigid FID view of best practices, which may vary among fleets and among AOP holders, and may change over time.

Some of the examples may be readily adapted to an AOP holder's flight crew training and operating manuals for various airplane fleets. Others may apply to a certain airplane fleet and may not be adaptable apart from that fleet.

In some cases a term shown in an Appendix is a term used by an operator/ AOP holder, not the equivalent term used by the DGCA. Example: Where the DGCA would use the term "height above touchdown," or HAT, the example shows that the AOP holder has used the term "above field elevation," or AFE.

LIST of APPENDICES CONTAINED IN THIS ADVISORY CIRCULAR:

APPENDIX 1: Standard Operating Procedures Template APPENDIX 2: Stabilized Approach: Concepts and Terms APPENDIX 3: ATC Communications and Altitude Awareness APPENDIX 4: Normal Go-Around – Actions and Callouts APPENDIX 5: Single Engine Go-Around – Actions and Callouts APPENDIX 6: Single Engine Visual Landing – Profile APPENDIX 7: Single Engine ILS Approach – Actions and Callouts APPENDIX 8: Approach Profile: LNAV, LOC, or LOC B/CRS* APPENDIX 9: LNAV, LOC or LOC B/CRS Approach -* Actions and Callouts APPENDIX 10: Engine Failure at or Above V1 – Profile APPENDIX 11: Engine Failure at or Above V1 – Actions and Callouts APPENDIX 12: Windshear – Takeoff While on the Runway – Recovery Technique APPENDIX 13: Ground Proximity Warning APPENDIX 14: Descent Planning Guide for Visual Approaches **APPENDIX 15: Descent Planning for Visual Approaches APPENDIX 16: Preflight APPENDIX 17: Crew Briefings** APPENDIX 18: Landing Rollout – Actions and Callouts APPENDIX 19: Crew Monitoring and Cross Checking

* The type of approaches listed may not all be approved operations.

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES TEMPLATE

A manual or section in a manual serving as the flight crew's guide to standard operating procedures (SOPs) may double as a training guide. The content should be clear and comprehensive, without necessarily being lengthy. No template could include every topic that might apply unless it was constantly revised. Many topics involving special operating authority or new technology are absent from this template, among them ETOPS, PRM, SMGS, RNP, and many others. Industry and DGCA nevertheless view the following alike as examples of topics that constitute a useful template for developing comprehensive, effective SOPs:

- Captain's authority
- Use of automation
 - The operator's automation philosophy
 - Specific guidance in selection of appropriate levels of automation Autopilot/flight director mode control inputs
 - Flight management systems inputs
 - Monitoring of automated systems and Flight Mode Annunciator (FMA) & callouts Cross checking of FMS routing with ATC clearance during preflight
- Checklist philosophy
 - Policies and procedures
 - (Who calls for; who reads; who does) Checklist interruptions Checklist ambiguity Checklist couplings Checklist training Format and terminology Type of checklist Challenge-Do-Verify Do-Verify Walk-arounds
- Checklists
 - Safety check -- power on Originating/receiving Before start After start Before taxi Before take-off After take-off Climb check Cruise check Approach

Preliminary landing Landing After landing Parking and securing Emergency procedures Non-normal/abnormal procedures

• Communications

Who handles radios ATC On the flight deck Keeping both pilots in the loop Company radio procedures Flight deck/cabin signals Cabin/flight deck signals

• Briefings

CFIT risk considered (see example, paragraph 4. c in this AC) Special airport qualifications considered Temperature corrections considered Before takeoff Descent/approach/missed approach Approach briefing (general) done prior to beginning of descent Landing Distance available at destination runway considered in view of weather runway conditions

• Flight deck access

On ground/in flight Jumpseat Access signals, keys, codes Defined procedures

- Flight deck discipline Sterile cockpit Maintaining outside vigilance Monitoring / Cross checking
- Transfer of Control
 - Additional duties Flight kits Headsets/speakers Boom mikes/handsets Maps/approach charts Meals
- Altitude awareness

 Altimeter settings
 Transition level
 Callouts (verification of)
 Minimum safe altitudes (MSA)
 Temperature corrections

Monitoring during last 1000 feet of altitude change

- Reporting times Check in/show up On flight deck Checklist accomplishment
- Maintenance procedures

 Logbooks/previous write-ups
 Open write-ups
 Notification to maintenance of write-ups
 Minimum equipment list (MEL)
 Where it is accessible
 Configuration Deviation List (CDL)
 Crew coordination during ground de-icing
- Flight plans/dispatch procedures
 VFR/IFR
 - Icing considerations Monsoon Operations Fuel loads Weather package (briefing) Where weather package is available Departure procedure climb gradient analysis SID requirements gradient/ noise requirements and gradient
- Boarding passengers/cargo
 - Carry-on baggage Exit row seating Hazardous materials Prisoners/escorted persons Guns onboard Count/load
- Pushback/powerback
- Taxiing
 - All engines running Less than all engines running On ice or snow or heavy rain Low visibility Prevention of runway incursion Transponder procedures
- Crew resource management (CRM) Crew briefings Cabin Crew Flight crew
- Weight & balance/cargo loading Who is responsible for loading cargo, and securing cargo

Who prepares the weight & balance data form; who checks it Copy of Load & Trim sheet to crew

 Flight deck/cabin crew interchange Boarding Ready to taxi Cabin emergency Prior to take-off/landing

Take-off

PF/PNF (PM) duties and responsibilities Who conducts it? Briefing, IFR/VFR Reduced power procedures Tailwind, runway clutter Intersection departures Noise abatement procedures Special departure procedures Flight directors Use of: Yes/No Callouts

Clean up

Loss of engine Transfer of controls – if appropriate Rejected takeoff

After V1

Actions/callouts

Flap settings

Normal Nonstandard (and reason for) Crosswind Close-in turns

Climb

Speeds Configuration Confirm compliance with climb gradient required in departure procedure Confirm appropriate cold temperature corrections made

- Cruise altitude selection
 Speeds/weights
- Position reports/ pilot weather reports ATC – including pilot report (PIREPs) of hazards such as icing, thunderstorms and turbulence Company calls
- Emergency descents
- Holding procedures

Procedures for diversion to alternate

Normal descents

Planning and discussing prior to beginning of descent point Risk assessment and briefing (see example, paragraph 4.b in this AC) Speedbrakes: Yes/No Flaps/gear use Icing considerations Convective activity

- Ground proximity warning system (GPWS or TAWs) Escape maneuver
- TCAS
- Windshear
 - Avoidance of likely encounters Recognition Recovery / escape maneuver
- Approach philosophy

Monitoring during approaches Precision approaches preferred Stabilized approaches standard CANPA approaches/ briefings in case of non-precision approach. Use of navigation aids Flight management system (FMS)/autopilot Use, and when to discontinue use Approach gates Limits for stabilized approaches Use of radio altimeter Go-around: Plan to go around; change plan to land when visual, if stabilized

- Individual approach type All types, including engine-out
- For each type of approach

Profile

Airplane configuration for conditions

- Visual /Instrument-Approach
- Low visibility
- Wet-Runway-considerations/actions

Flap/gear extension

Auto spoiler and auto brake systems armed and confirmed armed by both pilots, in accordance with manufactures recommended procedures (or equivalent approved company procedures) Procedures – Actions and Callouts

 Go-around / missed approach When stabilized approach gates are missed Procedure – Actions and Callouts (see example, Appendix 4) Clean-up profile

• Landing

Actions and callouts during landing Close-in turns Crosswind Rejected landing Actions and Callouts during rollout "No Spoilers" callout Reverse thrust "Overboost" callout (see example, Appendix 18) Transfer of control after first officer landing

STABILIZED APPROACH: CONCEPTS AND TERMS

A stabilized approach is one of the key features of safe approaches and landings in air operator operations, especially those involving transport category airplanes.

A stabilized approach is characterized by a constant-angle, constant-rate of descent approach profile ending near the touchdown point, where the landing maneuver begins. A stabilized approach is the safest profile in all but special cases, in which another profile may be required by unusual conditions.

All appropriate briefings and checklists should be accomplished before 1000' height above threshold (HAT) in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), and before 500' HAT in visual meteorological conditions (VMC).

Flight should be stabilized by 1000' height above threshold (HAT) in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), and by 500' HAT in visual meteorological conditions (VMC). An approach that becomes unstabilized below the altitudes shown here requires an immediate go-around.

An approach is stabilized when all of the following criteria are maintained from 1000' HAT (or 500' HAT in VMC) to landing in the touchdown zone:

The airplane is on the correct¹ track.

The airplane is in the proper landing configuration.

After glide path intercept, or after the Final Approach Fix (FAF), or after the derived fly-off point (per Jeppesen) the pilot flying requires no more than normal bracketing corrections² to maintain the correct track and desired profile (3° descent angle, nominal) to landing within the touchdown zone. Level-off below 1000' HAT is not recommended.

The airplane speed is within the acceptable range specified in the approved operating manual used by the pilot.

The rate of descent is no greater than 1000 fpm.

- If an expected rate of descent greater than 1000 fpm is planned, a special approach briefing should be performed.
- If an unexpected, sustained rate of descent greater than 1000 fpm is encountered during the approach, a missed approach should be performed. A second approach may be attempted after a special approach briefing, if conditions permit.

Power setting is appropriate for the landing configuration selected, and is within the permissible power range for approach specified in the approved operating manual used by the pilot.

When no vertical guidance is provided: Vertical guidance may be provided to the pilot by way of an electronic glideslope, a computed descent path displayed on the pilot's navigation display, or other approved electronic means. On approaches for which no vertical guidance is provided, the flight crew should plan, execute, and monitor the approach with special care, taking into account traffic and wind conditions. To assure vertical clearance and situation awareness, the pilot not flying should announce crossing altitudes as published fixes and other points selected by the flight crew are passed. The pilot flying should promptly adjust descent angle as appropriate. A constant-angle, constant-rate descent profile ending at the touchdown point is the safest profile in all but special cases.

Visual contact. Upon establishing visual contact with the runway or appropriate runway lights or markings, the pilot should be able to continue to a safe landing using normal bracketing corrections, or, if unable, should perform a missed approach.

No visual contact. The operator may develop procedures involving an approved, standard MDA buffer altitude or other approved procedures to assure that descent below MDA does not occur during the missed approach. If no visual contact is established approaching MDA or an approved MDA buffer altitude, or if the missed approach point is reached, the pilot should perform the published missed approach procedure. Below 1000' HAT, leveling off at MDA (or at some height above MDA) is not recommended, and a missed approach should be performed.

Note ¹: A correct track is one in which the correct localizer, radial, or other track guidance has been set, tuned, and identified, and is being followed by the pilot. Criteria for following the correct track are discussed in other DGCA CARs/ Circulars.

Note ²: Normal bracketing corrections relate to bank angle, rate of descent, and power management. Recommended ranges are as follows (operating limitations in the approved airplane flight manual must be observed, and may be more restrictive):

Course Guidance Specific types of approach are stabilized if they also fulfill the following: Instrument Landing Systems (ILS) must be flown with in +/- one (1) dot of the glideslope and localizer; Category II or Category III ILS approach must be flown within the expanded localizer band; during a circling approach, wing should be level on final; and,
 Unique approach procedures for abnormal conditions requiring a deviation from the above elements of a stabilized approach require a special briefing.
 Bank angle Maximum bank angle permissible during approach is specified in the approved operating manual used by the pilot, and is generally not more than 30°; the maximum bank angle permissible during landing may be considerably less than 30°(for large aircraft), as specified in that manual.

Rate of descent ±300 fpm deviation from target

Power management : Permissible power range is specified in the approved operating manual used by the pilot

Overshoots : Normal bracketing corrections occasionally involve momentary overshoots made necessary by atmospheric conditions. Such overshoots are acceptable. Frequent or sustained overshoots caused by poor pilot technique are not normal bracketing corrections.

ATC COMMUNICATIONS and ALTITUDE AWARENESS

<u>ATC Communications</u>: SOPs should state who (PF, PNF, FE/SO) handles the radios for each phase of flight and will read back to the air traffic controller the following ATC clearances and instructions; and air safety related information which are transmitted by voice:

- a. ATC route clearances
- b. Clearances and instructions to enter, land on, takeoff on, hold short of, cross and backtrack on any runway; and
- c. Runway-in-use, altimeter settings, SSR codes, level instructions, heading and speed instructions and, whether issued by the controller or contained in ATIS broadcasts, transition levels.
- d. Other clearances or instructions including, conditional clearances, shall be read back or acknowledged in a manner to clearly indicate that they have been understood and will be complied with.
- e. PF makes input to aircraft/autopilot and/or verbally states clearances while PNF confirms input is what he/she read back to ATC.
- f. Any confusion in the flight deck is immediately cleared up by requesting ATC confirmation.
- g. If any crewmember is off the flight deck, all ATC instructions are briefed upon his/her return. Or if any crewmember is off the flight deck all ATC instructions are written down until his/her return and then passed to that crewmember upon return. Similarly, if a crewmember is off ATC frequency (e.g., when making a PA announcement or when talking on company frequency), all ATC instructions are briefed upon his/her return.
- h. Company policy should address use of speakers, headsets, boom mike and/or handheld mikes.
- i. Company personnel will comply with all standard ATC phraseology as referenced in ICAO PAN OPS, Annex 11 and PANS–ATM (Air Traffic Management Document 4444).

<u>Altitude Awareness</u>: SOPs should state the company policy on confirming assigned altitude.

Example: The PNF acknowledges ATC altitude clearance. If the aircraft is on the autopilot then the PF makes input into the autopilot/altitude alerter. PF points to the

input while stating the assigned altitude, as he/she understands it. The PNF then points to the input stating aloud what he/she understands the ATC clearance to be confirming that the input and clearance match.

If the aircraft is being hand-flown then the PNF makes the input into the Altitude Alerter/autopilot, then points to the input and states clearance. PF then points to the alerter stating aloud what he/she understands the ATC clearance to be confirming that the alerter and clearance match.

Example: If there is no altitude alerter in the aircraft then both pilots write down the clearance, confirm that they have the same altitude and then cross off the previously assigned altitude.

NORMAL GO-AROUND – ACTIONS and CALLOUTS

Callouts: shown in 'BOLD TEXT" – Actions: shown with bullets(•) in plain text			
	PF	PNF	
Go Around	 "GO AROUND" Press either GA switch "GO-AROUND POWER" Verify thrust levers move to GA power Rotate towards 15° pitch 	 Verify GA annunciates 	
	attitude, then follow flight director commands "FLAPS 20"	 Select flaps 20 Verify thrust levers move to maintain 2,000 FPM climb rate "POWER SET" 	
Positive Rate of Climb	Verify positive rate climb "GEAR UP"	"POSITIVE RATE"	
	• Execute published missed approach or proceed as instructed by ATC	_	
At or above 400' AFE	"LNAV" or "HEADING SELECT"	 Select LNAV or HDG SEL Verify LNAV or HDG SEL annunciates 	
Climbing through 1,000' AFE	"REF 80" "FLAPS" (Retract flaps on flap retraction speed schedule)	 Set command airspeed cursor to V_{REF} 30+80 Select proper flap setting, when requesting 	
At flap retraction speed	"FLAPS UP, AFTER TAKEOFF CHECKLIST"	Retract flapsAccomplish checklist	

SINGLE ENGINE GO-AROUND – ACTIONS and CALLOUTS

Callouts: shown in 'BOLD TEXT" – Actions: shown with bullets(•) in plain text			
	PF	PNF	
Go-around Positive Rate of Climb	 "GO AROUND" Press either GA switch "GO-AROUND POWER" Advance thrust levers to GA power Rotate towards 10° pitch attitude, then follow flight director commands "FLAPS 5" Verify positive rate climb "GEAR UP" 	 Verify GA annunciates Verify GA power set Select flaps 5 "POWER SET" "POSITIVE RATE" Position gear lever UP 	
At or above 400' AFE, or lower if Engine Failure procedure specifies a turn prior to 400' AFE	 Execute airport specific "Engine published missed approach, or p ATC. as appropriate "LNAV" or "HEADING SELECT" 	Advise ATC Failure Missed Approach,"	
Climbing through 1,000' AFE or obstruction clearance altitude (OCA), whichever is higher	"REF 80" "FLAPS" (Retract flaps on flap retraction speed schedule)	 Set command airspeed cursor to V_{REF} 30+80 Select proper flap setting, when requesting 	
At flap retraction speed	"FLAPS UP"	Retract flaps	
At V _{REF} 30+80	"MAXIMUM CONTINUOUS THRUST, AFTER TAKEOFF CHECKLIST"	 Press CON on TMSP Set MCT "POWER SET" Accomplish After Takeoff Checklist 	

(EXAMPLE)

SINGLE ENGINE VISUAL LANDING - PROFILE

Complete Approach Briefing

Select active RWY in FMC Set 50' above TDZ at RWY Set INTC LEG TO RWY in FMC

- Complete Single Engine Preliminary Landing Checklist
- Select LNAV ILS, if available
- Standby ILS ON

Turning base:

- Gear down
- Flaps 20
- Set V_{REF} 20+5
- Entering downwind: Initiate Single Engine Landing Checklist • Flaps 5 • • Set V_{REF} +40 1,000 and 500': •Standard Callouts LOM MM

Turning final:

- Do not slow below V_{REF} 20+5
- Do not exceed a 15° bank angle

(EXAMPLE)

I

SINGLE ENGINE ILS APPROACH – ACTIONS and CALLOUTS

Callouts: shown in 'BOLD TEXT" – Actions: shown with bullets(•) in plain text			
	PF	PNF	
Initial Approach	"FLAPS 1, REF 60" "FLAPS 5, REF 40"	 Select flaps 1 Set command airspeed cursor to V_{REF} 30+80 	
		 Select flaps 5 Set command airspeed cursor to V_{REF} 30+80 	
	• • Verify Nav radio tuned to appropriate ILS frequency		
When Cleared for the Approach	Select APP mode	 Verify LOC and G/S annunciates white (armed on ADI 	
LOC Alive	Verify localizer indication	"LOCALIZER ALIVE"	
LOC Capture	Verify LOC annunciates gree	-	
GS Alive	 Verify G/S indication "GEAR DOWN, FLAPS 20, V_{REF} 20+5, SINGLE ENGINE LANDING CHECKLIST" 	 GLIDE SLOPE ALIVE" Position gear lever DOWN Select flaps 20 	
		 Set command airspeed cursor to V_{REF} 20+5 Complete Single Engine Landing Checklist 	
GS Capture		"GLIDE SLOPE CAPTURE"	

(EXAMPLE)

APPROACH PROFILE: LNAV, LOC, OR LOC B/CRS


- Complete Approach Briefing
- Complete Preliminary Landing Checklist

When cleared for the approach:

Select LNAV , LOC, or LOC B/CRS*, as appropriate

Verify armed

• Set raw data backup, as required



2-1/2 miles from FAF:

- Gear down
- Flaps 20
- Set V_{REF} +20
- Initiate Landing Checklist

At 1,000' HAT:

Stabilized Approach

AT MDA or MDA Buffer Altitude:

 Set missed approach altitude
 If runway environment is in sight and the aircraft is in a position from which a normal approach to the intended runway can be made, land the aircraft.

or

 If runway environment is not in sight, perform a missed approach procedure.

LNAV, LOC or LOC B/CRS APPROACH – ACTIONS and CALLOUTS

Callouts: shown in 'BOLD TEXT" - Actions: shown with bullets(•) in plain text			
	PF	PNF	
Initial Approach	"FLAPS 1, REF 60"		
		 Select flaps 1 Set command airspeed cursor to V_{REF} 30+60, if requested 	
	"FLAPS 5, REF 40"	 Select flaps 5 Set command airspeed cursor to V_{REF} 30+40, if requested 	
2-1/2 miles from FAF	"GEAR DOWN, FLAPS 20, REF 20, LANDING CHECKLIST"	 Position gear lever 	
		DOWN Select flaps 20 	
		 Set command airspeed cursor to V_{REF} 30+20, if requested Initiate Landing Checklist 	
¹ / ₂ mile prior to	"FLAPS 30, REF 5"		
FAF	Set/Request MDA or MDA Buffer Altitude	 Select flaps 30 Set command airspeed cursor to V_{REF} 30+5 IF requested 	
	Barlor / Millado	 Set altitude, if requested 	
At FAF	•• Start timing, if appropriate		
	Select/Request V/S	Set V/S, if requestedMonitor descent	
At 1,000' AFE	Verify altitudeStabilized approach	"1,000 ft."	

APPENDIX 9 (con'td)

Callouts: shown in 'BOLD TEXT" – Actions: shown with bullets (•) in plain text				
	PF	PNF		
At 100' above MDA (or MDA buffer altitude)	 Verify altitude 	 Divide time between monitoring instruments and scanning outside for runway environment 		
AT MDA (or MDA buffer)	 "SET MISSED APPROACH ALTITUDE" Execute missed approach 	 MINIMUMS" Set missed approach altitude 		
(Runway environment IS in sight)	•• Call out appropri "LANDING" •• See landing	"RUNWAY IN SIGHT"Monitor speed and sink rate		
-or- (Runway environment NOT in sight or a safe	"GO-AROUND"	"MISSED APPROACH POINT, NO CONTACT"		
landing is NOT possible)	•• See go-around procedure			


ENGINE FAILURE AT or ABOVE V1 – PROFILE

FLAP/SPEED SCHEDULE				
	Flap Setting for	Flap Setting for Takeoff		
	20	15	5	1
Select flaps 5 at	V _{REF} +20	V _{REF} +20		
Select flaps 1 at	V _{REF} +40	V _{REF} +40	V _{REF} +40	
Select flaps 0 at	V _{REF} +60	V _{REF} +60	V _{REF} +60	V _{REF} +60
Final Segmen	t V _{REF} +80			
Climb				

NOTE: After takeoff (and accelerating), the next lower flap setting may be made 20 knots prior to the maneuver speed for the flap settings as shown in the table above. In the event of a turn during flap retraction, limit bank angle to 15° or delay flap retraction until maneuver speed is reached.

<u>V_{REF}+80:</u>

- Select FL CH and MCT
- Accomplish appropriate checklist
- Accomplish After Takeoff Checklist



ENGINE FAILURE AT or ABOVE $V_1 \ \mbox{--}$ ACTION and CALLOUTS

Callouts: shown in 'BOLD TEXT" – Actions: shown with bullets(•) in plain text			
	PF	PNF	
Engine Failure	•• Pilot first noting Engine Failure "ENGINE FAILURE"		
	"SET MAX POWER"	 Advance thrust levers to maximum take off thrust "POWER SET" 	
V _R		"ROTATE"	
	• Rotate towards 10° pitch attitude		
Positive rate of climb	Verify positive rate of climb	"POSITIVE RATE"	
	"GEAR UP"		
		Position gear lever UP	
After lift-off	Maintain F/D commanded attitude "ADVISE ATC" when appropriate	Monitor speed and attitude	
		Advise ATC	
	•• Comply with airport specific "Engine Failure After Takeoff" procedure (if published); otherwise, fly runway heading		
	"HEADING SELECT"	Select HDG SEL	
		Verify HDG SEL annunciates	
		Position A/T arm switch OFF	

APPENDIX 11 (con'td)

(EXAMPLE)

ENGINE FAILURE AT or ABOVE $V_1 \ \mbox{--}$ ACTION and CALLOUTS

Callouts: shown in 'BOLD TEXT" – Actions: shown with bullets(•) in plain text			
Climbing through	PF	PNF	
1,000' AFE or obstruction clearance altitude (OCA), whichever is higher	 VERTICAL SPEED PLUS 100" Reduce pitch and accelerate "FLAPS 	 Select VERT SPD to + 100 FPM 	
	(Retract flaps on flap retraction speed schedule)	 Select proper flap setting, when requested 	
At flap retraction	"FLAPS UP"		
speed		Retract flaps	
At Vref 30 + 80	"FLIGHT LEVEL CHANGE, MAXIMUM CONTINUOUS THRUST, ENGINE CHECKLIST, AFTER TAKEOFF CHECKLIST"	Select FL CH	
		 Select FL CH Press CON on TMSP Set MCT "POWER SET" Accomplish appropriate checklist "ENGINE CHECKLIST COMPLETE" Accomplish After Takeoff Checklist 	

WINDSHEAR – TAKEOFF WHILE on the RUNWAY -- RECOVERY TECHNIQUE

Takeoff While on The Runway Recovery Technique
THRUST
 Apply thrust aggressively (Firewall Power)
PITCH
 Push go-around switch
 Rotate toward 15° no later than 2,000 ft. remaining
 Increase beyond 15° if required to lift off
 Follow flight director commands
Note: After lift-off, follow After Lift-off Recovery Technique
······································
After Lift-off/On Approach Windshear

After Lift-off/On Approach Windshear Recovery Technique

- THRUST
 - Apply thrust aggressively (Firewall Power)
 - PITCH
 - Push either go-around switch
 - Adjust pitch as recommended in the DGCA approved AOM.
 - Follow flight director commands
 - Increase pitch beyond recommended, if required, to ensure acceptable flight path
 - Always respect stickshaker
- CONFIGURATION
 - Maintain existing configuration

Note: With a WINDSHEAR warning, if normal commands do not result in a substantial rate of climb, the AFDS smoothly transitions to a 15° pitch attitude or slightly below the pitch limit indicator, whichever is less.

(EXAMPLE)

GROUND PROXIMITY WARNING

Refer to the FOM for Ground Proximity Warning System general procedures.

BELOW GLIDESLOPE ALERT


If a GLIDESLOPE alert is activated between the altitudes of 1,000' and 150' AGL, application of power sufficient to bring the airplane back up toward the glideslope beam center will cancel the alert when it is less than 1.3 dots below the glideslope. The allowable deviation increases to 2.7 dots at 50' AGL. This deviation causes an off scale deflection on the glideslope deviation scale.

GPWS WARNING ESCAPE MANEUVER

If a GPWS "PULL UP" warning or "TERRAIN" alert occurs at night or in IMC, perform the following maneuver entirely from memory:

Callouts: shown in 'BOLD TEXT'' – Actions: shown with bullets(•) in plain text				
Step	PF	PNF		
1	 Thrust Auto throttles – disconnect FIREWALL POWER," set firewall thrust Pitch Autopilot – disconnect Roll wings level Rotate (3°/sec) to 20° pitch attitude. If GPWS warning continues – increase pitch (respect stickshaker/buffet) 	 Monitor radio altimeter, and call out information on flight path (e.g., "300 FEET 		
2	 Configuration Speedbrakes –retract Do not alter gear/flap configuration 	 Call out safe altitude (e.g., "MSA IS 3,400 FEET") Advise ATC 		
3	Climb to safe altitude			
4	 Resume normal flight. Retract flaps on flap retraction speed schedule. 			

DESCENT PLANNING GUIDE FOR VISUAL APPROACHES



DESCENT PLANNING for VISUAL APPROACHES

DESCENT PLANNING for VISUAL APPROACHES

At some airports,ATC has established descent profiles to vector aircraft to intercept an instrument approach. However, pilots are cleared for visual approaches with the descent profile at the discretion of the pilot. If the pilot's descent profile does not result in a stabilized visual approach by 500' AFE, then a missed approach must be executed (see FOM).

Visual approaches can be difficult. The wide range of variables, such as position and altitude when cleared for the approach, the lack of glide slope information, and establishing separation from a variety of visual traffic all contribute to the complexity. The secret to flying a good visual approach is accurate descent planning. This requires analysis at sequential points during the descent/approach, and making corrections to altitude and airspeed.

The Descent Planning Guide provides suggested reference points or "gates" to assist in analyzing the descent to arrive at 500' AFE in a stabilized condition. As you progress through these "gates," it is important that any deviations be corrected immediately to arrive at the next "gate" within the parameters. The longer the delay in making a correction, the greater the chance of arriving at 500' AFE in an unstabilized condition.

During the early stages of the descent, corrections to altitude and/or airspeed can usually be done using speed brakes. If in the latter stages of the descent/approach, or if speed brakes are not effective in correcting to the desired airspeed/altitude, consider extending the landing gear to assist in increasing rate of descent and/or deceleration. Extending flaps and slats to increase deceleration or descent rate is not as effective as the use of speed brakes and gear extension.

Utilizing the FMC to reference the landing runway is an excellent technique for a visual approach. This will easily establish a DME reference to the landing runway for the targeted "gates." The key to a successful visual approach is to plan and make corrections early.

PRELIGHT

CAPTAIN	FIRST OFFICER			
The first pilot on the flight deck will determine the aircraft maintenance status prior				
actuating switches and controls.				
Brief the lead cabin crew (see FOM, chapter 9). Accomplish the captain's	Accomplish the exterior preflight.			
preflight.	Accomplish the first officer's preflight.			
After fueling is complete, verify that the fuel load on board meets the requirements of	Record the current ATIS information.			
the dispatch release and is adequate for the route of flight	Note: The captain may accomplish this step if it will expedite the departure process.			
	When the fuel slip becomes available, review it for any discrepancies, and perform the reasonableness check (see FOM, chapter 5). Verify that the fuel on board meets the requirements of the dispatch release and the flight plan.			
	Check the ECAM/ EICAS fuel page to verify the total fuel load and the proper distribution.			
Obtain and print the ATC clearance using ACARS Predeparture Clearance (PDC) procedures. If ACARS PDC is not available, obtain the ATC clearance using voice procedures at a time convenient to both crewmembers. The captain may ask the first officer to call for the clearance or the first officer may initiate the call after ensuring the captain is prepared to listen as the clearance is received. The captain will monitor the clearance as it is copied by the first officer.				
Verify that the proper clearance altitude and transponder code are set.	Set the clearance altitude in the FCU ALT window.			
Ensure that the cleared route is the active FMGC route, or modify as required.	Set the transponder code.			
	Verify that the cleared route is the active FMGC route.			

Set the required navigation frequencies and courses for the departure. If required, use the RAD NAV page to modify the frequencies and courses.

Caution: Frequencies and courses set by the pilot must be cleared when no longer required.

Review the preliminary MGL (see FOM, chapter 8). This will enable the crew to plan the anticipated runway, flap setting, and FLEX capability.

APPENDIX 16 (con'td)

(EXAMPLE)

PRELIGHT

CAPTAIN	FIRST OFFICER	
At convenient time prior to engine start, give a pilot briefing to ensure an understanding by both pilots as to the conduct of the flight (see FOM)		
 Call for the PREFLIGHT CHECK. Verify, as appropriate, and respond to the PREFLIGHT CHECK. 		
	 Read, verify as appropriate, and respond to the PREFLIGHT CHECK. 	
	Announce "PREFLIGHT CHECK COMPLETE".	
	When the takeoff weight data becomes availa prior to engine start, complete the initialization on INIT page B. Insert ZFW and BLOCK FUEL.	

(EXAMPLE)

CREW BRIEFINGS

Pilot Briefing

The purpose of the pilot briefing is to enhance communications on the flight deck and to promote effective teamwork. Each crewmember is expected to perform as an integral part of the team. The briefing should establish a mutual understanding of the specific factors appropriate for the flight.

A pilot briefing will be given prior to starting engines for the first flight of the day (subsequent flight, if applicable). The captain determines the length and detail of the briefing. Factors to consider include:

- Experience level of the pilots
- Special MEL procedures as a result of inoperative components
- Altimeter setting units
- Use of delayed engine start and/or engine out taxi procedures
- Presence of armed passengers, when applicable

When personnel occupy the extra crew seat(s), ensure they understand the use of oxygen/interphone operations and emergency exits, and sterile flight deck procedures.

Takeoff Briefing

A Takeoff Briefing will be given prior to takeoff. Factors to consider include:

- Takeoff weather conditions
- Runway surface conditions
- NOTAMS
- Departure review
- Obstructions and high terrain
- Closeout weight and balance message/takeoff numbers
- Critical conditions affecting the GO/NO GO decision (e.g., gross weight limited takeoff, wet or slippery runway, crosswind, aircraft malfunctions)
- Birdstrike potential, if applicable

Cabin Crew Briefing

The purpose of the cabin crew briefing is to develop a team concept between the flight deck and cabin crew. An ideal developed team must share knowledge relating to flight operations, review individual responsibilities, share personal concerns, and have a clear understanding of expectations.

Upon flight origination or whenever a crew change occurs, the captain will conduct a verbal briefing, preferably with all the cabin crew. However, preflight duties, passenger boarding, rescheduling, etc. may make it impractical to brief the entire cabin crew complement. Regardless of time constraints, company policy is that the captain must brief the lead cabin crew. The briefing will be supplemented with a completed Cabin Crew Briefing Form. The briefing should cover the following items:

- Logbook discrepancies that may affect cabin crew responsibilities or passenger comfort (e.g., coffee maker inop, broken seat backs, manual pressurization, etc.)
- Weather affecting the flight (e.g., turbulence including appropriate code levels, thunderstorms, weather near minimums, etc.). Provide the time when the weather may be encountered rather than a distance or location (e.g., "Code 4 Turbulence can be expected approximately one hour after takeoff.")
- Delays, unusual operations, non-routine operations (e.g., maintenance delays, ATC delays, re-routes, etc.)
- Shorter than normal taxi time or flight time which may affect preflight announcements or cabin service.
- Any other items that may affect the flight operation or in-flight service such as catering, fuel stops, armed guards, etc.
- A review of the sterile flight deck policy, responsibility for PA announcements when the Fasten Seat Belt sign is turned on during cruise, emergency evacuation commands, or any other items appropriate to the flight.

During the briefing, the captain should solicit feedback for operational concerns (e.g., does each person understand the operation of the emergency exits and equipment). The captain should also solicit feedback for information which may affect expected team roles. Empower each crewmember to take a leadership role in ensuring all crewmembers are made aware of any potential item that might affect the flight operation.

The lead cabin crew will inform the captain of any inoperative equipment and the number of cabin crew on board. The captain will inform the lead cabin crew when there are significant changes to the operation of the flight after the briefing has been conducted.

(MD-80 example)

LANDING ROLLOUT – ACTIONS AND CALLOUTS

Callouts: shown in "BOLD TEXT" – Actions: shown with bullets (•) in plain text	
PF	PNF
Moves throttles to Idle	 Observes Spoiler Lever moves aft to EXT position. If spoiler lever does not move aft to EXT position, PM calls, "NO SPOILERS" and moves lever to full extend position and up to latched position.
 Deploys Thrust Reversers Maintains directional control and initiates braking as required 	 Monitors Thrust Reverser Deployment Advises PF of thrust reverser status Advises PF if 1.6 EPR is exceeded on dry runway or 1.3 EPR is exceeded on a wet or contaminated runway. (Suggested EPR limits may be exceeded in the event of an emergency)
	 Monitors airspeed and announces, "80 KNOTS"
Reduces reverse thrust to achieve idle reverse thrust by 60 knots.	
If First Officer is PF, a positive transfer of controls shall occur during landing roll- out in accordance with company procedures	
	 Confirms retraction of ground spoilers and selects flaps to 0/RET position.

CREW MONITORING AND CROSS-CHECKING

Background

Several studies of crew performance, incidents and accidents have identified inadequate flight crew monitoring and cross-checking as a problem for aviation safety. Therefore, to ensure the highest levels of safety each flight crewmember must carefully monitor the aircraft's flight path and systems and actively cross-check the actions of other crew members. Effective monitoring and cross-checking can be the last barrier or line of defense against accidents because detecting an error or unsafe situation may break the chain of events leading to an accident. Conversely, when this layer of defense is absent, errors and unsafe situations may go undetected, leading to adverse safety consequences. It is difficult for humans to monitor for errors on a continuous basis when these errors rarely occur. Monitoring during high workload periods is important since these periods present situations in rapid flux and because high workload increases vulnerability to error. However, studies show that poor monitoring performance can be present during low workload periods, as well. Lapses in monitoring performance during lower workload periods are often associated with boredom and/or complacency.

Developing and implementing effective SOPs to support monitoring and crosschecking functions, by training crews on monitoring strategies, and by pilots following those SOPs and strategies can significantly improve crew monitoring performance. This Appendix focuses on the first of these components, developing and implementing SOPs to improve monitoring.

A fundamental concept of improving monitoring is realizing that many crew errors occur when one or more pilots are off-frequency or doing heads-down work, such as programming a Flight Management System (FMS). The example SOPs below are designed to optimize monitoring by ensuring that both pilots are "in the loop" and attentive during those flight phases where weaknesses in monitoring can have significant safety implications.

Review and Modification of Existing SOPs

Some SOPs may actually detract from healthy monitoring. Operators should review existing SOPs and modify those that can detract from monitoring. For example, one air operator required a PA announcement when climbing and descending through 10,000 feet. This requirement had the unintended effect of "splitting the cockpit" at a time when frequency changes and new altitude clearances were likely. When the air operator reviewed its procedures it realized that this procedure detracted from having both pilots "in the loop" at a critical point and consequently decided to eliminate it.

Another operator required a company radio call to operations once the aircraft had landed. A critical review of procedures showed that this requirement, although sometimes necessary, had resulted in runway incursions because the first officer was concentrating on making this radio call and not fully monitoring the captain's taxi progress. The procedure was modified so that crews make this call only when necessary and then only once all active runways are crossed, unless unusual circumstances warrant otherwise (such as extensive holding on the ground).

In addition to modifying existing SOPs, operators may consider adding sections to the SOP manual to ensure that monitoring is emphasized, such as:

• High-level SOPs that send an over-arching message that monitoring is a very important part of cockpit duties.

Examples:

A. The SOP document could explicitly state that monitoring is a primary responsibility of each crewmember.

Example:

Monitoring Responsibility

The PF will monitor/control the aircraft, regardless of the level of automation employed.

The PNF will monitor the aircraft and actions of the PF.

Rationale:

- A. Several air operators have made this change because they feel it is better to describe what that pilot should be doing (monitoring) rather than what he/she is not doing (not flying).
- B. Although some SOP documents do define monitoring responsibilities for the PF, this role is often not explicitly defined for the PNF. In many cases non-monitoring duties, such as company-required paperwork, PA announcements, operating gear and flaps, are clearly spelled-out, but seldom are monitoring duties explicitly defined for each pilot.

SOPs to support monitoring during airport surface operations

Examples:

- A. Both pilots will have taxi charts available. A flight crewmember—other than the pilot taxiing the aircraft—should follow the aircraft's progress on the airport diagram to ensure that the pilot taxiing the aircraft is following the instructions received from ATC.
- B. Both pilots will monitor taxi clearance. Captain will verbalize to FO any hold short instructions. FO will request confirmation from Captain if not received.
- C. When approaching an entrance to an active runway, both pilots will ensure compliance with hold short or crossing clearance before continuing with non-monitoring tasks (e.g., FMS programming, Airborne Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS), company radio calls, etc.).

Rationale:

Pilot-caused runway incursions often involve misunderstanding, not hearing a clearance or spatial disorientation. These SOPs are designed to do several things.

- A. The requirement for both pilots to have taxi charts out ensures that the pilot who is not actively taxiing the aircraft can truly back-up the pilot who is taxiing.
- B. Requesting that both pilots monitor the taxi clearance and having the captain discuss any hold short instructions is a method to ensure that all pilots have the same understanding of the intended taxi plan.
- C. The requirement to suspend non-monitoring tasks as the aircraft approaches an active runway allows both pilots to monitor and verify that the aircraft stops short of the specified holding point.

SOPs to support improved monitoring during vertical segments of flight (also refer to Appendix 3 of this document, "ATC Communications and Altitude Awareness")

Examples:

- A. PF should brief PNF when or where delayed climb/descent will begin.
- B. Perform non-essential duties/activities during lowest workload periods such as cruise altitude or level flight.
- C. When able, brief the anticipated approach prior to top-of-descent.
- D. During the last 1,000 feet of altitude change both pilots should focus on the relevant flight instruments to ensure that the aircraft levels at the proper altitude. (When VMC one pilot should include scanning outside for traffic; however, at least one pilot should focus on ensuring that the aircraft levels at the proper altitude.)

Rationale:

A study on crew monitoring revealed that three-quarters of the monitoring errors in that study occurred while the aircraft was in a vertical phase of flight, i.e., climbing, descending or approach. These SOP statements ensure that proper attention can be devoted to monitoring during vertical phases of flight.

A. The monitoring study highlighted that a number of altitude deviations occurred when crews were given an altitude crossing restriction, but then failed to begin the descent in a timely manner. Briefing the anticipated top-of-descent point not only promotes healthy CRM, but also allows the other pilot to "back up" the planned descent point and ensure the descent begins at the proper point. Example: "We'll begin our descent at 80 DME."

- B. Studies likewise show that in order to minimize the chance of a monitoring error, crews should schedule performance of non-essential duties/activities during the lowest workload periods, such as cruise altitude or level flight.
- C. Briefing the anticipated instrument approach prior to descent from cruise altitude allows greater attention to be devoted to properly monitoring the descent because the crew is not having to divide attention between reviewing the approach and monitoring the descent. It also allows greater attention to be devoted to the contents of the approach briefing, which can increase situation awareness and understanding of the intended plan for approach and landing.
- D. Many altitude deviations occur because pilots are not properly monitoring the level off.

This SOP statement is to ensure that pilots concentrate on ensuring the aircraft levels at the proper altitude, instead of being distracted by or performing non-monitoring tasks.

SOPs to support improved monitoring of automation

Examples:

- A. Before flight, the routing listed on the flight release must be cross-checked against the ATC clearance and the FMS routing.
- B. When making autoflight systems inputs, comply with the following items in the acronym **CAMI**:

Confirm FMS inputs with the other pilot when airborneA ctivate the inputM onitor mode annunciation to ensure the autoflight system performs as desiredI ntervene if necessary.

- C. During high workload periods FMS inputs will be made by the PNF, upon the request of PF. Examples of high workload include when flying below 10,000 feet and when within 1000 feet of level off or Transition Altitude.
- D. Pilots should include scanning of the Flight Mode Annunciator as part of their normal instrument scan, especially when automation changes occur (e.g., course changes, altitude level off, etc.). All FMA changes are mandatory callouts.

Rationale:

- A. It is not unusual for the routing that is loaded in the FMS to be different from the routing assigned by ATC, especially in those cases where the flight plan is unlinked directly into the FMS, or when an FMS stored company route is used. Various studies have demonstrated that FMS programming errors made during preflight are not likely to be caught by flightcrews during flight. Therefore it is critical that these items be crosschecked before takeoff.
- B. The above-mentioned monitoring study found that 30 percent of the monitoring errors in that study's dataset occurred when a crewmember was programming a Flight Management System (FMS). Another study showed that even experienced pilots of highly automated aircraft sometime fail to adequately check the Flight Mode Annunciator to verify automation mode status. The acronym "CAMI" can be used to help emphasize cross-checking of automation inputs, monitoring and mode awareness.
- C. The statement concerning FMS inputs during high workload allows the PF to concentrate on flying and monitoring by simply commanding FMS inputs during highly vulnerable times. Several reports indicate problems with failure to level-off and failure to reset altimeters to proper settings. Therefore, the definition of "high workload" should include those vulnerable phases.
- D. Automated flight guidance systems can have mode reversions and can sometimes command actions that are not anticipated by pilots. Therefore, pilots should include the Flight Mode Annunciator into their normal instrument scan. Special attention should be given to periods of course changes, altitude level off, etc.)