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**Deutsch** Christoph Butterwegge & Gudrun Hentges (eds.), 2006. Massenmedien, Migration und Integration. Herausforderungen für Journalismus und politische Bildung. Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

## Editorial

Das Verhältnis von Krieg, Journalismus und den Medien war immer schon problematisch. Fast zeitgleich mit der Entstehung der Tageszeitungen begannen die Krieg führenden Eliten, die Presse (und später auch andere Medien) zu zensieren und/oder für ihre Zwecke zu funktionalisieren. Auch Journalisten haben sich immer wieder selbst als Kämpfer an der Propagandafront verstanden. Zugleich aber hat es stets auch kritische Journalisten gegeben, die sich nicht funktionalisieren ließen, die dem Ideal einer wahrheitsgemäßen und unparteilichen Berichterstattung selbst unter massivem sozialem Druck nicht abgeschworen haben; und manche, die für das Recht auf freie Meinungsäußerung sogar ihr Leben lassen mussten.

Auch in den Kommunikations- und Medienwissenschaften sind Propaganda und Kriegsberichterstattung ein Dauerbrenner. Jeder neue Krieg zieht eine Unmenge an sozialwissenschaftlichen Studien nach sich: solche, die der Optimierung von Propaganda dienen, zunehmend aber auch solche, die der unheiligen Allianz von Militär und Medien nachspüren und/oder die faktische Ununterscheidbarkeit von Kriegsberichterstattung und Propaganda offen legen.

Erst gegen Ende des letzten Jahrtausends jedoch begannen Friedensforscher, Kommunikationswissenschaftler, Journalisten und Medienschaffende systematisch darüber nachzudenken, wie das Potential der Medien dazu genutzt werden könnte, statt zur Anheizung von Konflikten zur friedlichen Streitbeilegung und am Ende vielleicht sogar zur Versöhnung zwischen den Konfliktparteien beizutragen.

Was zunächst noch ein akademisches Projekt war, entwickelte sich rasch zu einer Art Bewegung, die unter dem Schlagwort "Friedensjournalismus" teilweise recht heterogene Bemühungen in sich vereinigt, die von sozialwissenschaftlicher Grundlagenforschung über Fallstudien zur aktuellen Kriegs- und Nachkriegsberichterstattung der Medien bis hin zu Fortbildungs- und Trainingskursen für Journalisten reichen.

Die vorliegende und die nächsten beiden Ausgaben von *conflict & communication online* sind einer kritischen Bestandsaufnahme dieser Bemühungen gewidmet. Die ersten beiden Hefte stellen theoretische Zugänge (Vol. 5, No. 2, Oktober 2006) sowie Fallstudien und Unterrichtsmaterialien (Vol. 6, No. 1, April 2007) vor, deren Entwicklung vom Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research gesponsert wurde. Die Autoren, teils Wissenschaftler, teils Praktiker, gehören zu den prominentesten Vertretern des Friedensjournalismus-Projektes. Im dritten Heft (Vol. 6, No. 2, Oktober 2007) kommen dann die Kritiker des Friedensjournalismus zu Wort. Unter dem Titel "Die Friedensjournalismus-Kontroverse" findet ein Schlagabtausch zwischen Befürwortern und Gegnern des Friedensjournalismus statt. Als Kritiker konnten mit dem BBC-Journalisten David Loyn und dem Medienwissenschaftler Thomas Hanitzsch von der TU-Ilmenau auch hierfür wieder zwei hochrangige Autoren gewonnen werden.

Konstanz - Berlin  
Im Oktober 2006

Wilhelm Kempf

## Editorial

The relationship between war, journalism and the media has always been problematic. Soon after the daily newspaper arose, war-making elites began to censor the press and/or to instrumentalize it for their purposes (and later other media as well). Journalists have also always considered themselves fighters on the propaganda front. At the same time, however, there have also always been critical journalists who have not let themselves be instrumentalized, who have not abjured the ideal of truthful and impartial reportage, even under massive social pressure; and some have even given their lives to uphold the right to free speech.

As well in communication and media studies, propaganda and war reportage are of enduring interest. Every new war stimulates a mass of social-scientific studies; some serve the optimization of propaganda; increasingly, however, there are also studies that investigate the unholy alliance of military and media and/or expose the actual lack of differences between war reportage and propaganda.

Only toward the end of the last millennium, however, did peace researchers, journalists and media creators begin to systematically think about how the potential of the media could be used not to fuel conflicts, but rather to encourage peaceful conflict settlement and in the end perhaps even contribute to reconciliation between conflict parties.

What was initially still an academic project quickly developed into a type of movement that united under the slogan of "peace journalism" in part quite heterogeneous efforts, ranging from social-scientific basic research to case studies to current and topical war and post-war reportage by the media to further educational and training courses for journalists.

The present and the next two issues of conflict & communication online are dedicated to a critical evaluation of the state of these efforts. The first two issues present theoretical approaches (Vol. 5, No. 2, October 2006), as well as case studies and instructional material (Vol. 6, No. 1, April 2007), whose development was sponsored by the Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research. The authors, in part scientists, in part practitioners, are among the most prominent representatives of the peace journalism project. In the third issue (Vol. 6, No. 2, October 2007), critics of peace journalism have their say. With the title "The peace journalism controversy," an exchange of words takes place between proponents and opponents of peace journalism. For critics, we were fortunate to obtain contributions from two high-ranking authors, BBC journalist David Loyn and media researcher Thomas Nahitzsch from the TU-Ilmenau.

Konstanz - Berlin  
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Wilhelm Kempf

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*Annabel McGoldrick*

## **Kriegsjournalismus und "Objektivität"**

Dieser Artikel beginnt mit der Betrachtung eines offensichtlichen Paradoxons. Viele professionelle Journalisten, die in vielen Ländern mit vielen Medien arbeiten, halten sich selbst für "objektiv". Zumindest stellen sie ihre Berichterstattung über wichtige Angelegenheiten nicht zugunsten der einen oder der anderen Seite verzerrt dar. Und dennoch zeigt ein großer Teil ihrer Konfliktberichterstattung ein erkennbar dominantes Muster von Kriegsjournalismus - verzerrt zugunsten von Krieg. Dieser Artikel geht davon aus, dass dies nicht aus einem Mangel, sondern aus einem Übermaß an Objektivität geschieht. Die meisten Konventionen, von denen viele Herausgeber und Reporter glauben, dass sie "objektiven" Journalismus definieren, entstanden als Reaktion auf ökonomische und politische Bedingungen, welche v. a. solche Nachrichten bevorzugten, die von der Mehrheit der Konsumenten als einwandfrei akzeptiert wurden .

Drei der wichtigsten Konventionen bevorzugen offizielle Quellen, eine dualistische Konstruktion von Geschichten, und Ereignisse gegenüber Prozessen. Wenn man sie für die Darstellung von Konflikten verwendet, bringt jede von ihnen Leser und Publikum dazu - oder auch nicht -, gewaltsame, reaktive Antworten zu überbewerten und nicht-gewaltsame, entwicklungsartige Reaktionen zu unterbewerten.

Produktionsstandards stehen in einem Spannungsverhältnis zu den klassischen Erwartungen des Journalismus. Diese sind in den Regulationen vieler Rechtssprechungen festgelegt, die den Inhalt von Nachrichtensendungen bestimmen.

In einigen Aspekten kann gezeigt werden, dass es Kriegsjournalismus für Nachrichtensendungen schwieriger macht, ihre öffentlichen Verpflichtungen zu erfüllen. Derzeit wächst ein Bewusstsein für die Spannung zwischen diesen beiden Begrenzungen für Journalismus und den Einfluss auf die Art, wie öffentliche Debatten geführt und mediiert werden. Mehr Friedensjournalismus würde dazu beitragen, die Nachrichten wieder mit den berechtigten öffentlichen Erwartungen in Einklang zu bringen.

[Volltext \(in Englisch\)](#)

*Zur Autorin:*

Annabel McGoldrick ist eine erfahrene Journalistin und Produzentin für Fernseh- und Radionachrichten. Sie berichtete über Konfliktgebiete in Indonesien, den Philippinen, dem Mittleren Osten, Thailand und Burma.

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Sie ist auch eine erfahrene Psychotherapeutin, spezialisiert auf Traumata und Konflikterzählungen.

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*Annabel McGoldrick*

## **War Journalism and 'Objectivity'**

This article opens by considering an apparent paradox. Many professional journalists, working on many media in many countries, consider themselves 'objective'. They do not, at least, set out to skew their coverage of important issues in favour of one side or the other. And yet much of their coverage of conflicts shows a discernible dominant pattern of War Journalism - biased in favour of war.

This is not because of a lack of objectivity, the article suggests, but a surfeit. The set of conventions many editors and reporters regard as defining 'objective' journalism arose in response to economic and political conditions which rewarded news that could commend itself as unobjectionable to the maximum number of potential customers.

Three of the most important conventions privilege official sources; a dualistic construction of stories and event, over process. Each of these, when applied to the representation of conflicts, leads readers and audiences - or leaves them - to over-value violent, reactive responses and under-value non-violent, developmental responses.

Industry conventions sit uneasily alongside equally time-honoured expectations of journalism. These are encoded in rules and regulations governing the content of broadcast news, in many jurisdictions which have a public service concept for radio and television.

In some respects, War Journalism can be shown to make it more difficult for broadcast news services to fulfil their public service obligations. Awareness is now growing, of the tension between these two pressures on journalism and its influence on the way pressing public debates are shaped and mediated. More Peace Journalism would help to bring public service news back into line with legitimate public expectations.

[full text \(in English\)](#)

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She has led training courses for professional editors and reporters in many countries, and has taught postgraduate students at the universities of Sydney and Queensland, Australia. Her film, *News from the Holy Land* (2004) and book, *Peace Journalism* (2005) are published by Hawthorn Press.

She is also a trained psychotherapist specialising in trauma and the reporting of conflict.

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Annabel McGoldrick

## War Journalism and 'Objectivity'

*Kurzfassung:* Dieser Artikel beginnt mit der Betrachtung eines offensichtlichen Paradoxons. Viele professionelle Journalisten, die in vielen Ländern mit vielen Medien arbeiten, halten sich selbst für "objektiv". Zumindest stellen sie ihre Berichterstattung über wichtige Angelegenheiten nicht zugunsten der einen oder der anderen Seite verzerrt dar. Und dennoch zeigt ein großer Teil ihrer Konfliktberichterstattung ein erkennbar dominantes Muster von Kriegsjournalismus – verzerrt zugunsten von Krieg.

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*Abstract:* This article opens by considering an apparent paradox. Many professional journalists, working on many media in many countries, consider themselves 'objective'. They do not, at least, set out to skew their coverage of important issues in favour of one side or the other. And yet much of their coverage of conflicts shows a discernible dominant pattern of War Journalism - biased in favour of war.

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Three of the most important conventions privilege official sources; a dualistic construction of stories and event, over process. Each of these, when applied to the representation of conflicts, leads readers and audiences – or leaves them – to over-value violent, reactive responses and under-value non-violent, developmental responses.

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In some respects, War Journalism can be shown to make it more difficult for broadcast news services to fulfil their public service obligations. Awareness is now growing, of the tension between these two pressures on journalism and its influence on the way pressing public debates are shaped and mediated. More Peace Journalism would help to bring public service news back into line with legitimate public expectations.

## Introduction

This article explores some of the connections between the prevalent conventions of journalistic objectivity, and its predisposition towards patterns of reporting conflicts which deserve the name, War Journalism – biased in favour of war. This was first defined by Johan Galtung (in Lynch 1998) as journalism about conflict that is:

- violence orientated
- propaganda orientated
- elite orientated
- victory orientated.

In this kind of journalism, violence seems to 'make sense' and often appears to be the only solution. But why would this be the case when journalists strive so hard to be 'neutral' and objective? Well therein lies the problem. What journalists think of as 'objective' reporting actually consists of a set of conventions which predispose news about conflict in favour of War Journalism.

## Journalistic Objectivity

Objectivity developed at the time of urbanisation, industrialisation and the advent of consumerism. Greater literacy and more efficient transport links enabled newspapers to grow larger in circulation. Between them, these developments led to an increasing dependency on selling advertising. So now they had to avoid putting off potential customers, of all political views and none:

"The popular commercial dailies developed the first version of journalistic objectivity; an independent, universalizing stance that looked at the world and the body politic from the viewpoint of the ideal citizen: a prudent, rational, fair-minded individual, committed to individual rights, political democracy, a market economy, and progress through science and education" (Hackett and Zhao 1998, p. 18).

Some latter-day definitions:

"It is the value of fairness, which is extremely important. It's the ethic of restraining your own biases, which is also important... It's the idea that journalism can't be the voice of any particular party or sect" (Rosen 1994).

"An effort to report the facts without developing – or at least without revealing – an opinion about them" (Kinsey 2001).

Journalism matching these criteria lent itself to being marketed in a consumer society (Bagdikian 2000), because it avoided putting off potential consumers among the educated classes.

But what to do about the subjective aspects of the job? The choices facing reporters and editors are endless. Why this story, and not another? Then, once you have decided that, why interview this person, or use that organisation as a source of information and not another? This issue was defused, as the methods of Objective Journalism hardened into industry conventions, by the habit of *indexing* – projecting such basic decisions onto an external frame of reference that was not, apparently, of the journalist's own making.

## Indexing Official Sources

In practice, that often meant tracking the agenda set by official sources – governments, the police and courts, financial authorities and so on. Leading, say, the television evening news, or the front page of the *New York Times*, with a report of a speech by President Bush on Iraq, need not be taken to mean that the programme or the paper agrees with him. His comments can be presented as newsworthy – whatever he actually says – *because he's the President*, and the most powerful man in the land. Still a subjective interpretation, of what constitutes the most meaningful fact of that particular day – but one chosen on a seemingly 'neutral' basis, and one which is deeply embedded in the structures and practices of news:

"Journalism's criteria of newsworthiness and factuality, and its routines of newsgathering anchored in bureaucratic institutions with designated spokespeople and prescheduled routines, are mutually constitutive. Taken together, they tend to ensure routine and privileged access for bureaucrats and agency officials, who provide the "hard facts", credible claims and background information for Objective reporting" (Hackett and Zhao 1998, p. 78).

For these reasons, a bias in favour of official sources is probably still the single most widespread convention in global news. Go to any capital city in the world, pick up a copy of the main newspaper, and there's a good chance that the deeds and pronouncements of that country's political leaders will be on or near the front page.

## Objectivity and War Journalism

Lynch and McGoldrick argue that there are three ways in which news said to be Objective fuels further violence.

"Three conventions of Objective reporting, in particular, are *predisposed* towards War Journalism. Their 'natural drift', as it were, is to lead us – or leave us – to over-value violent, reactive responses to conflict, and under-value non-violent, developmental ones:

- A bias in favour of official sources
- A bias in favour of event over process
- A bias in favour of 'dualism' in reporting conflicts" (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005, p. 209).

The problem is that news is, by its very nature, preoccupied with change, yet it has a very fixed and one-dimensional understanding of how change comes about. Built into it is an orientation in favour of realism and ignores the insights of Peace and Conflict Studies, which argue that there are many ways to bring about change in a conflict, many 'levers' to pull. Later I will suggest that anyone working to intervene in the Cycle of Violence, for example, can be regarded as a 'change agent'.

But the Objectivity conventions mean we hear relatively little about them, compared with official sources – a category topped by leaders of national states. Max Weber provided a well-known definition: the state is "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (Weber 1946, p.78). Weber's argument was that a state could only be defined in terms of means rather than ends. States could not be said to be *for* anything, necessarily; they were better conceived in terms of their observable characteristics than assumptions about their purpose.

Weber's formulation has been seen as neutral, even normative – the word, 'legitimate' has seemed, to some, to suggest a benign hand, guaranteeing security for all citizens. But these are concepts later interrogated and revised by researchers in Peace and Conflict Studies. What if the effect of state action favours the interests of some citizens, and not others? In the words of veteran Australian peace researcher, John W Burton, the very notion of 'conflict resolution' is only admissible if conflict is understood as attributable not to "inherent human aggressiveness" but to "the emergence of inappropriate social institutions and norms that reasonably would seem to be well within human capacities to alter, to which the person has problems in adjustment" (Burton 1998).

Perhaps Burton's cardinal insight is that there is more to human relations than power – there are also human needs, including the basics of food, drinking water and shelter from the elements, certainly, but also intangibles such as identity, recognition and respect. If the institutions and norms of a state entrench power relations of a kind that deny these human needs to any or all of its citizens, 'the person' will inevitably resist them. In those circumstances, what Burton calls the 'deterrent strategies' of the state take on an altogether more sinister aspect.

Once deterrent strategies – such as the \$560bn Pentagon budget – are put in place, they inevitably alter the nature of power relations. Missiles have to be fired and replaced in order to maintain 'defence capacities' – rich and powerful interests are not served by allowing military hardware to gather dust. Prisons have to be filled to generate orders for correctional corporations to build more. So norms and institutions come to be influenced in favour of wars overseas and punitive criminal justice policies at home – variants on what President Dwight D Eisenhower called the "military-industrial complex" (Eisenhower, 1960).

Then the number of levers under the control of the leaders of national states has diminished in recent times. Industry has globalised, public services have been marketised and/or privatised and economic policy-making has become increasingly contingent on events elsewhere. Hence there may be more emphasis on the levers they do control, including the ability to set the news agenda and also the deployment of armed forces.

British Prime Minister Tony Blair has pitched the UK into more armed conflicts than any other – Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Iraq, Afghanistan – and is said to admire the armed forces for their "professionalism" (Brogan 2003). Their stock-in-trade being, of course, to follow orders, in marked contrast to Blair's experience with other areas of the public sector where change has to be negotiated and efforts at reform had left him with "scars on his back" (Watt 1999).

It all means that a reliance on official sources may, of necessity, predispose the coverage of conflict towards War Journalism. Military deployment always seems to move, as if by osmosis, on to the news agenda. Calls for collaborative effort to enforce international law, or building solidarity at the level of civil society – even, latterly, accepting as final the will of the UN – always seem to have to be justified afresh from first principles.

### *A bias in favour of event over process*

A news story is supposed to answer six basic questions:

- Who?
- What?

- When?
- Where?
- Why?
- How?

Most stories only deal superficially – if at all – with the 'why'. Many journalists argue that that it would make the story too long. But people can only begin to think themselves out of a conflict if they understand the underlying issues. The important thing to note here is that without *some* exploration of underlying causes, violence can be left to appear, by default, as the only response that 'makes sense'. Wars remain opaque, in the sense that we are given no means to see through the violence to problems that lie beneath. It therefore makes no sense to hear from anyone wanting those problems to be addressed and set right, as a contribution to ending or avoiding violence.

#### *A bias in favour of dualism*

One safe way to insulate oneself against allegations of bias is to 'hear both sides'. It means the journalist cannot be seen as 'the voice of any particular party or sect'. By tradition, classic BBC reporting, for instance, is said to adopt the formula:

"On the one hand ... on the other ... in the end, only time will tell" (Kampfner 2003).

But this inscribes a paradigm of dualism that frames out multiparty initiatives, complex causes and win-win situations. Dualism is a key part of Objectivity but also, for these reasons, a major contributory factor in the way in which it escalates a conflict, by turning it into a tug of war in which each party faces only two alternatives – victory or defeat. Their words and deeds must be unequivocally 'winning' if they are not to risk being reported as 'losing', 'backsliding' or 'going soft'.

Findings from researchers in Peace and Conflict Studies provide abundant evidence that this dualistic model of conflict is seldom, if ever, the whole picture; there are always third (or more) parties whose involvement may be hidden; and within the parties, there are fault lines and differentiations which open up the scope for more creative conceptualisations of the issues at stake (Francis, 2002).

#### *The liberal theory of press freedom*

Kempf puts his finger on a dilemma facing every journalist covering conflicts – "either to take sides and to incite one party against the other, or to play the role of a moderating third party in order to improve the communication between them and contribute to constructive conflict transformation" (Kempf 2003 p. 83). Failure to adopt a deliberate policy of constructive conflict coverage, he argues, is tantamount to escalating them, because of "the lack of differentiation between traditional conflict coverage and propaganda" (Kempf 2003 p. 83).

Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) give the following definitions:

"Peace Journalism is when editors and reporters make choices – of what stories to report, and how to report them – which create opportunities for society at large to consider and to value non-violent responses to conflict.

Peace Journalism:

- Uses the insights of conflict analysis and transformation to update the concepts of balance, fairness and accuracy in reporting
- Provides a new route map tracing the connections between journalists, their sources, the stories they cover and the consequences of their journalism – the ethics of journalistic intervention
- Builds an awareness of non-violence and creativity into the practical job of everyday editing and reporting" (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005 p. 5).

This contains a little more 'wiggle room' than Kempf's formula. Some journalists, in some places, will find themselves comfortable with the idea that they should decide, at the outset, to harness their journalism to the furtherance of socially desirable goals. In post-colonial societies, the traditions and assumptions journalists imbibe draw heavily on values of social solidarity, and the sense of obligation – on those fortunate enough to enter professional life – to use their education and position to improve the outlook for their society and the prospects for their fellow citizens. This certainly applies to responses to conflict. An exhaustive consultation with senior journalists from 11 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, in 1999, found:

"Whether employed by state-controlled broadcasting corporations or editing weekly or daily newspapers surviving on street-corner sales, most of the journalists involved said that they believe they have a vital role to play in the prevention (sic) and resolution of conflict. For many, the question was not whether they should be fulfilling that role, but rather how they could do so" (Onadipe and Lord 1999, p. 2).

Journalists in western countries sup from different sources, notably the liberal theory of press freedom, that media should be seen as a civic tool in democracy, flagging up problems and presenting 'the facts', without fear or favour. A UK study interviewed senior British editors, producers and reporters engaged in covering conflict, and recorded, as typical, this statement from an experienced frontline correspondent, Kim Willsher of the *Mail on Sunday*.

"I don't wish to sound pompous or arrogant about it, but you hope that by opening people's eyes to what is happening, that maybe something will be done to stop it from happening. If enough journalists are telling the story, the politicians will see what's happening and will actually do something to stop it continuing" (Tumber and Webster 2006, p. 67).

It's only a nuance away from the formulae for Peace Journalism and for constructive conflict coverage, quoted here, but, in this context, a nuance makes all the difference. Willsher cut his teeth covering the wars of succession in former Yugoslavia, Tumber and Webster record, and here, 'doing something', in the eyes of many UK-employed journalists, came to mean taking sides against the Serbs, up to and including military intervention.

"Journalists embarked on crusades and became partial. They empathised with the Bosnian government because of personal outrage at Serb aggression. *Prima facie*, this partiality distorted the reporting" (Gowing 1997, p. 12).

Inscribed in Lynch and McGoldrick's formula for Peace Journalism is a concept of redressing an imbalance. If War Journalism predominates, then the media contribution to democratic debate is skewed, in favour of violent outcomes – reproducing war propaganda, as Kempf rightly points out. Instead, according to the liberal theory, they should project into the public sphere as many views, perspectives and versions of events as possible.

"The peculiar evil of silencing an expression of opinion is that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error" (John Stuart Mill 1861).

A similar concept provides the underpinning for public service agreements common to many broadcast news organisations, both public and commercial. The BBC *Producer Guidelines* (2004), for example, stipulate that a "full range of significant views and perspectives" are heard and "There are usually more than two sides to any issue".

In Canada:

- "To achieve balance and fairness, the widest possible range of views should be expressed"
- "There must also be depth, the capturing of dimensions and nuances. Without these elements, the programming becomes too simplistic to permit adequate comprehension" (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2004).

In Australia:

- "Balance" should be achieved by presenting "a wide range of perspectives"
- "In serving the public's right to know, editorial staff will be enterprising in perceiving, pursuing and presenting issues which affect society and the individual".
- "Pursuing impartiality should not mean endorsing the status quo. The Corporation is also required to be innovative... The ABC seeks to be a pace-setter in community discussion" (Australian Broadcasting Corporation 2004).

Television in America is less overtly regulated, but the First Amendment to the US Constitution protects freedom of expression. A famous court ruling said that should mean:

"an uninhibited marketplace of ideas ... It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, and other ideas which is crucial" (Supreme Court 1969).

These are all useful arguments for Peace Journalism. If there are generally more than two sides to any issue, then BBC reports, at least, should generally frame conflicts as consisting of more than two parties; but most do not. The common denominator of these provisions – a responsibility to ensure public access to a "full range" of views – is generally trumped by the reporting conventions which award the agenda-setting role to official sources.

That means issues officialdom prefers to ignore tend to drop off the edge of the news agenda, even when it is in the public interest, as defined by these formulations, to discuss them. The conventions of Objectivity, in other words, are at odds with public service notions of balance and fairness; notions based, in turn, on the liberal theory of press freedom.

Sixty percent of journalists who responded to a global survey (Lynch and McGoldrick 2004b) believed that the media in their own country industry today is not performing this essential public service. Most blamed "journalistic conventions", with "market conditions" a close second.

For journalists in the West, most of whom will likely feel uncomfortable at any suggestion of geared their reporting towards contributing to particular outcomes, this is a slightly different rationale for Peace Journalism – as a remedial strategy, necessary to redress the current, built-in, easily observable imbalance in favour of War Journalism, to 'give peace a chance' in public debates about conflicts and how best to respond to them. In that, they are increasingly likely to have to find ways to take issue with, and look around the edges of, war propaganda.

## The CNN Effect

Inscribed in Willsher's comment about his role as a journalist is an assumption about media influence which has also come to be known as 'the CNN effect' – so called after the first Gulf War when the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali said: "We say we have 16 members in the Security Council: the 15 members plus CNN." (Boutros-Ghali 1995). The proposition is that today's global media have grown so mighty as to be able to raise issues to the political agenda by their own efforts; issues which would otherwise hold little or no interest for the powers-that-be. But researchers who have examined the causality find the reality differs from the hype. To take two *'cause celebres'* of this argument:

- 'Operation Restore Hope' – the US intervention in Somalia, in 1992-3
- 'Operation Provide Comfort' – protecting Iraqi Kurds fleeing the vengeance of a defeated Saddam Hussein in the winter of 1991

In Somalia, well before images of starving children started appearing on television, there were already moves afoot in Washington to build a case for military deployment. Ultimately the decision was "based more on diplomatic and bureaucratic operations than press coverage" (Livingston and Eachus 1995).

Operation Provide Comfort has been called "TV news' finest hour" (Shaw 1996) – an argument that nightly coverage of Kurdish refugees, fleeing Iraqi helicopter gunships over the mountains into southern Turkey, prompted governments to decisive action they would never otherwise have considered.

This, too, gives way under closer scrutiny, however. Another account quotes Andrew Natsios, then Director of the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, which is part of the US Government's Agency for International Development:

"Major geopolitical considerations drove policy at the time ... The first was concern for Turkey, one of Washington's closest Muslim allies ... Turkey, with its own Kurdish 'problem', had no desire to take in hundreds of thousands of destitute Kurdish refugees ... Even if the cameras had not been there, the Bush administration would have made the same decision" (Robinson 2002).

It underlines Kempf's observation, about the ease with which official propaganda frames can enter the news agenda – especially given the predisposition built in to the conventions of 'objective' reporting. Without Peace Journalism, the aspirations of the liberal theory of press freedom, and public service agreements for broadcasters, are likely to remain largely unfulfilled.

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*Samuel Peleg*

## **Friedensjournalismus aus der Sicht der Konflikt-Theorie: Analyse und Praxis**

Friedensjournalismus stellt einen mutigen Versuch dar, die Rolle von Journalisten, die über Konflikte berichten, neu zu definieren und sie zu rekonstruieren. Als neues Forum des Wissens baut Friedensjournalismus auf verschiedenen Theorien und Disziplinen auf, um seine Gültigkeit und Anwendbarkeit zu stärken. Eine Hauptquelle, auf die sich Friedensjournalismus stützen kann, um sowohl seinen analytischen als auch seine normativen Anspruch abzusichern, ist die Konflikttheorie. Dieser Artikel zeigt, wie verschiedene Erkenntnisse der Konflikttheorie Friedensjournalismus transparenter und zu einem wirkungsvollen Werkzeug in der Hand von Reportern und ihren Lesern machen können, um die Sinnlosigkeit von Konflikten zu realisieren und deren Lösung herbeizuführen. Noch spezifischer behandelt dieser Artikel die Vorstellung der Medien als dritte Partei in Konflikten. Die dritte Partei fungiert als Moderator der Kommunikation bzw. als Vermittler oder Schlichter zwischen den zwei rivalisierenden Parteien. Wir behaupten, dass Friedensjournalismus als dritte Partei die Chancen für Lösung und Versöhnung am besten erhöhen kann, indem er die Normen und Gewohnheiten der Konfliktberichterstattung ändert. Dies wird kurz und bündig anhand dreier Fallstudien langwieriger Konflikte dargestellt, welche aus der Sicht der Konflikttheorie beschrieben werden. Indem reguläre Zeitungsberichterstattung Friedensjournalismus gegenübergestellt wird, werden die Vorzüge des letzteren aufgedeckt.

[Volltext \(in Englisch\)](#)

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*Samuel Peleg*

## **Peace Journalism through the Lense of Conflict Theory: Analysis and Practice**

Peace Journalism is a bold attempt to redefine and reconstruct the role of journalists who cover conflicts. As a new arena of knowledge, Peace Journalism draws upon several theories and disciplines to enrich its validity and applicability. A major source which peace journalism can rely on to bolster its analytical as well as its normative rigor is conflict theory. This article demonstrates how several insights from conflict theory can advance the lucidity of peace journalism and render it a powerful tool in the hands of reporters and their readers to realize the futility of conflict and to bring about its resolution. More specifically, the article introduces the notion of the media as a third party to a conflict. The third party is the facilitator of communication, the mediator or the arbitrator between the two rivaling sides. It is our contention that Peace Journalism as a third side can best enhance prospects for resolution and reconciliation by changing the norms and habits of reporting conflicts. This is succinctly illustrated in three case studies of protracted conflicts, which are described through the lenses of conflict theory. By contrasting regular newspaper coverage with peace journalism coverage, the merits of the latter are revealed.

[full text \(in English\)](#)

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## **Peace Journalism through the Lense of Conflict Theory: Analysis and Practice**

*Kurzfassung:* Friedensjournalismus stellt einen mutigen Versuch dar, die Rolle von Journalisten, die über Konflikte berichten, neu zu definieren und sie zu rekonstruieren. Als neues Forum des Wissens baut Friedensjournalismus auf verschiedenen Theorien und Disziplinen auf, um seine Gültigkeit und Anwendbarkeit zu stärken. Eine Hauptquelle, auf die sich Friedensjournalismus stützen kann, um sowohl seinen analytischen als auch seine normativen Anspruch abzusichern, ist die Konflikttheorie. Dieser Artikel zeigt, wie verschiedene Erkenntnisse der Konflikttheorie Friedensjournalismus transparenter und zu einem wirkungsvollen Werkzeug in der Hand von Reportern und ihren Lesern machen können, um die Sinnlosigkeit von Konflikten zu realisieren und deren Lösung herbeizuführen. Noch spezifischer behandelt dieser Artikel die Vorstellung der Medien als dritte Partei in Konflikten. Die dritte Partei fungiert als Moderator der Kommunikation bzw. als Vermittler oder Schlichter zwischen den zwei rivalisierenden Parteien. Wir behaupten, dass Friedensjournalismus als dritte Partei die Chancen für Lösung und Versöhnung am besten erhöhen kann, indem er die Normen und Gewohnheiten der Konfliktberichterstattung ändert. Dies wird kurz und bündig anhand dreier Fallstudien langwieriger Konflikte dargestellt, welche aus der Sicht der Konflikttheorie beschrieben werden. Indem reguläre Zeitungsberichterstattung Friedensjournalismus gegenübergestellt wird, werden die Vorzüge des letzteren aufgedeckt.

*Abstract:* Peace Journalism is a bold attempt to redefine and reconstruct the role of journalists who cover conflicts. As a new arena of knowledge, Peace Journalism draws upon several theories and disciplines to enrich its validity and applicability. A major source which peace journalism can rely on to bolster its analytical as well as its normative rigor is conflict theory. This article demonstrates how several insights from conflict theory can advance the lucidity of peace journalism and render it a powerful tool in the hands of reporters and their readers to realize the futility of conflict and to bring about its resolution. More specifically, the article introduces the notion of the media as a third party to a conflict. The third party is the facilitator of communication, the mediator or the arbitrator between the two rivaling sides. It is our contention that Peace Journalism as a third side can best enhance prospects for resolution and reconciliation by changing the norms and habits of reporting conflicts. This is succinctly illustrated in three case studies of protracted conflicts, which are described through the lenses of conflict theory. By contrasting regular newspaper coverage with peace journalism coverage, the merits of the latter are revealed..

## 1. The Rationale: Peace Journalism as the Third Party

Conflict is a human interaction, which involves parties with incompatible interests. What renders such incongruity an overt and explicit strife is the awareness of the unsuitability and the ensuing choice of confrontation. Awareness is raised by communication, either with the environment or with the rivaling party. Communication produces information, which affects each side's decision whether to hash out the differences or shun them. Thus, communication becomes a crucial determinant in conflict and conflict resolution: it creates consciousness of, and attentiveness to, the other. Destructive and debilitating communication, which promotes noises, distortions, interruptions, deceptions, ploys, and false clues, promotes and expedites conflict. In contrast, constructive or beneficial communication relies on honesty, open channels and the effort to align the sent message with the received one. Such a pattern of interaction strives for accommodation and the relaxation of tensions and hostilities (Tillett, 1999; Lederach and Jenner, 2002; Pruitt and Kim, 2004).

Peace Journalism (henceforth- PJ) has the characteristics and capabilities of encouraging constructive communication. This paper illustrates how the introduction of PJ into conflict theory can advance the theoretical understanding and actual practice of conflict transformation. Peace journalism, as a motivator of peace and as a promoter of depolarization and de-escalation, (Galtung, in Hackett and Zhao, 2005) can accomplish a significant role by inspiring journalists to portray disputes in a different manner than that to which they usually ascribe. A successful conflict resolution process must be based on genuine and honest interaction between antagonists, whereby unmet human needs are frankly discussed and interests and motivations rather than positions are candidly aired. Interests such as the fulfillment of basic needs motivate parties to pursue conflicts in earnest. The continuing ignorance of such grievances turns conflicts into deep-rooted or protracted ones (Azar, 1985; Burton, 1987; Montville, 1990; Peleg, 1999). Peace journalism, with its keen eye for causes and stimuli and with its commitment to a broader and fairer depiction (Galtung, 1996; Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005), can and should bring such unattended human needs to the fore and alleviate intractable conflicts.

Protracted social conflicts, or apparently irresolvable disputes (Fisher, 1997), usually require a third party to mediate between the rivaling parties, or at least, to facilitate their interaction. On-going conflicts generate hostility, animosity, and consequently mistrust to the extent that no direct communication is feasible. This predicament is further exacerbated when the issues in contention are intangible and cannot be compromised (Burton 1979; Mitchell, 1981; Peleg, 2002). The idea of a third party ameliorating dialogue between intransigent belligerents was enthusiastically pursued in various methods and approaches. Third party consultation (Walton, 1987) emphasized the facilitation of productive confrontations, in which rivals openly discuss their incompatibilities. The third party's role is to stimulate mutual positive motivation to reduce conflict. Similarly, techniques such as controlled communication workshops (Burton, 1969) and problem-solving interactions (Kelman, 1972; Doob, 1981) were tried in small group fashion and in interpersonal orientations. The strategic functions of the third party in these endeavors were described by a leading scholar in the field, as follows: "balancing the situational power of parties, synchronizing confrontation efforts, pacing the phases of the dialogue, promoting openness [and] enhancing communication" (Fisher, 1997:143). These are precisely the tasks that peace journalism attempts to pursue.

I suggest, therefore, that peace journalism will assume the role of the third party in its facilitation capacity: allowing for the rivaling sides to get to know one another, to uphold understanding and empathy, to focus on creativity and human ingenuity to resolve conflicts and to emphasize truth-oriented, people-oriented and solution-oriented journalism to expedite peace. The relationship between conflict theory and peace journalism is reciprocal and contributive in both directions. Therefore, the research question in the heart of this concept paper can be presented as "what insights does conflict theory offer into how the media can serve as a third party to conflicts." To answer this question and to elucidate the potential nexus between conflict theory and PJ, I will approach this issue from two complementary directions: the triangular construction of conflict and the spatial escalation model of conflict. These two perspectives in conjunction, a structural one and a dynamic one, will demonstrate the putative merit of PJ as a third party in conflict resolution processes.

## 2. The Structural Dimension: the Triangle of Conflict

Conflict, in many respects, can be perceived as a unitary phenomenon. It has a similar structure and the same dynamics of escalation and de-escalation in spite of its numerous disparate spheres of occurrence. Thus, family feuds, office turf battles, intra-state clashes between vying factions or international war share common features. The structure that can best describe all types of conflict is the triangle of situation-attitude-behavior (Mitchell, 1981) or the ABC triangle of Attitude, Behavior and Contradiction (Galtung, 1969).

The situation of conflict is the initial state of incongruent interests, or the controversy. In other words, these are the circumstances that galvanized the parties to confrontation. The attitude connotes the psychological dimension: all the stigmata, prejudice, labeling, demonizing and de-legitimizing processes each side confers on the other. This mutual practice of disparagement and vilification is the crux of conflict and a major source of its worsening: stimuli for escalation are mostly psychological and subjective. Finally, behavior is how parties act and what they do with regard to the situation they are in

and following the attitude they develop towards the other. PJ can mitigate tensions and exert favorable influence in all three dimensions:

1. *Situation*: Recounting the initial interests in contention in contextual manner, whereby all circumstances, environmental conditions, spectrum of availabilities and sequential background are disclosed. Such a description does not present the parties to the conflict as hungry contenders vying for ascendancy and eager for the other's defeat. Describing the complexity of the scene: not two rivals trapped in an ultimate zero-sum-game of winning or dying but a complex arena of multiple players and options (Tannen, 1999).
2. *Attitude*: Laying out the gamut of psychological feelings and outlooks that are involved. Concentrating not just on the denigrating and condescending aspects of the dialogue between the sides, but also emphasizing fears, concerns, insecurities, mistrust, miscommunication, and ignorance to make the repertoire of dehumanization more human. Abandoning false and excessive polarization (Mnookin and Ross, 1995; Bar-Tal and Teichman, 2005) for a more reasonable and impartial study of mindsets under tension and duress.
3. *Behavior*: Calling attention to the fact that violence is not the only form of activity in conflict. Most conflict accounts are fighting or aggression-oriented. They are formulated in competition parlance and underscored by images of vanquish or subjugation. But violence is not the only performance in conflict, and certainly must not be the obvious one. Attempts to negotiate or create contacts can be depicted alongside with the more palpable belligerency descriptions.

This paper examines three cases of seemingly intractable, on-going conflicts--The Northern Ireland, the Basque, and the Palestinian-Israeli--to exhibit structure and escalation of conflict, and then, by introducing elements of PJ to each case, it demonstrates the potential capacity of the peace journalism perspective and understanding to pacify contention and reverse its deadly course.

## 2.1 Three Protracted Conflicts

Protracted conflicts display enduring features such as multiple reinforcing cleavages, perpetuated grievances and intolerable inequality and injustice. Such conflicts are usually not discrete and hence, cannot be studied in isolation. A first step toward trying to understand them is to become familiarized with their background and the motivations that spawn them. This section, however, displays the complexities and sensitivities of PJ: admittedly, the contextualization of these conflicts will always seem to different readers value-laden and biased. The following descriptions will not be totally immune to such criticism but an effort has been made to minimize partiality.

### a) Northern Ireland

The rift of the Irish Island is almost a century old and it is a corollary of a millennium of struggle between the indigenous population and the English who subdue them. The origins of the conflict go all the way back to the eleventh-century Norman takeover of England and the following subordination of the Irish by successive English kings. But it was only in the middle of the 16<sup>th</sup> century that English colonization really took root. It took shape in the relocation and resettlement of thousands of Englishmen and Scotsmen, mainly in Ulster, the nine northernmost counties in Ireland (Tilly, 2003). The national and ethnic schism matured and stabilized over the years into religious cleavage as well, when the two rivaling factions of Christianity consolidated as the Catholic Irish patriots versus the pro-English Protestants, the descendants of the English and Scottish settlers, in Ireland.

On the heels of WWI a civil war broke out, which brought about English military control. Within two years a partition agreement was signed between the King and the Irish leadership: an Irish Free State, the Republic of Ireland, and Northern Ireland composed of six counties as an integral part of England. Hard-line Irish Republicans refused to accept the treaty and initiated the resurrection of 1922. Tensions were mainly concentrated in Ulster, or Northern Ireland with its Protestant majority and Catholic minority. An uneasy *modus vivendi* was kept, interrupted by occasional outbursts of violence. In 1969 hostilities erupted again and commenced a new cycle of conflict heightened by the *Bloody Sunday* of 1972, the massacre of civilians by British soldiers. This escalation triggered the British government to resume direct rule over the province, which lasted roughly 20 years. The last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century witnessed some attempts to resolve the situation with the bilateral cease-fire agreement of 1994 and the Good Friday agreement of 1998. However, anxieties and animosities remain until this very day. The disagreements and misunderstandings between the two sides linger and the mistrust remains intact (Miller, 1994).

### b) Israel/Palestine

The seeds of the Arab-Israeli conflict, or in its more concise and contemporary version, the Palestinian-Israeli strife, were planted in the last two decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when Jews began immigrating to their perceived homeland to find the place already inhabited by indigenous Arabs. The birth of the Zionist movement in 1897 galvanized waves of newcomers from Europe and other corners of the world, who began settling and resettling Palestine. National institutions and organi-

zations were founded as an infrastructure for a prospective Jewish sovereignty. Foundations were laid to establish a safe haven for persecuted Jews all over the world by creating the State of Israel in May 1948 in defiance of the British Mandate. The irony, and indeed, the tragedy of the ensuing conflict was that the Jewish national movement stimulated and inspired an Arab national movement, which protested and rebelled against the dispossession of the Palestinian Arabs by the overflow of Jewish immigration.

The two incompatible paths collided, at first in an unpremeditated way and in a form of riots, dispersed clashes and sporadic violence. The years 1920-1921 and 1929 in particular experienced occasional massacres and bloody assaults against Jews, which triggered retaliatory attacks and the establishment of Jewish defense forces. In 1936, the Arabs of Palestine demonstrated for the first time, signs of cohesion and organization. Their leadership launched what became to be known as the Great Arab Rebellion, which paralyzed the economy of the land and convinced the British rulers of Palestine to take heed of the Arab demands (Bickerton and Klausner, 2002). The escalating confrontation between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, with the British as the incompetent and reluctant third side, came to a head during the WWII years. Between 1939 and 1945, while the UK was preoccupied with fighting the Nazis, both claimants of the Holy Land were jockeying for possession for the day after. The UN declaration of November 1947 partitioning the land between the two sides did not ease the tension because it was rejected by the Arabs. Hostilities peaked and an atmosphere of an imminent war took over. This scenario was realized in 1948, when hours after the British evacuation, the Jewish leadership declared Israel an independent sovereign State. The next morning, invading Arab armies from the neighboring states of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon invaded and the Arab Israeli conflict entered its full-fledged military phase. The peak of this phase has been the 1967 war, in which Israel took control of the Gaza peninsula in the south, the Golan Heights in the North, and the West Bank of the Jordan River to its East. To this day, approximately 2 million Palestinians live under Israeli military rule. Five wars and two centuries after the point of departure, the two sides are still at odds despite some high points along the way such as the Israel-Egypt peace treaty (1979), the (Israel-Jordan peace agreement (1994) and some brave attempts to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli dispute.

### **c) The Basque Country**

Euskadi, or Basque is the name most commonly used to refer to the people located on the shores of the Bay of Biscay and on the two sides of the western Pyrenees that separate the Spain and France. The Basque people have maintained their own unique identity throughout the centuries, while at the same time keeping their association with Spain as part of the republic. Following the coup d'état that overthrew the Republican Government and the bloody civil war of 1936-9, General Franco established a dictatorship that was to last for forty years. The standardized idea of the State applied by Franco, together with the fact that Basque nationalist forces fought on the side of the Republic, meant that the Basque Country suffered strong repression and the total inhibition of systems of self-government (Shabad and Ramo, 1995).

The death of Franco in 1975 led to the monarchy of Juan Carlos I. The new king took upon himself to transform Spain into a thriving democracy. The Basque nationalists and some left-wing formations wanted a break with the previous regime, but in practice it was replaced by a transition process from dictatorship to democracy. The challenges faced by this process were to deal with claims for basic democratic freedoms, amnesty for political prisoners, and the claims for sovereignty of the nations that made up the State, especially Catalonia and the Basque Country, the vanguard of political struggle during Franco's regime. The new Spanish Constitution of 1978 acknowledged and guaranteed the right to autonomy of all its provinces. However, the Constitution did not satisfy the claims of the Basque nationalists for independence and self-determination (Kurlanski, 1999).

ETA, the Basque armed national liberation movement, emerged in December 1958, half-way through the period of Franco. The group was born of the dissatisfaction of certain nationalist sectors who considered the moderate nationalists too passive in their defense of Basque culture and against the dictatorship. Initially it was a political group that limited its operations to propaganda. The move to the armed struggle started with occasional bombs, hold-ups and sabotage that only caused material damage. During the first decade of activity, the police detained members of ETA but there were no human casualties as a result of its operations. The first fatalities occurred on 2nd August 1968, and from then until Franco's death the action that had the greatest impact was the attack on Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, President of the Spanish government and the designated successor of Franco. For the next two decades, ETA and the Spanish police would engage in a merciless struggle, which exacted hundreds of casualties.

In March 1992 the leadership of ETA was detained in a single military operation, which handed the organization its biggest setback ever. Until then, ETA's strategy was based on the demand for political negotiations with the Madrid government. Following the detentions in 1992, ETA's policy changed considerably. They adopted a two-phase path: one with the Spanish State and then an inner Basque venue. In the first stage, if the Spanish government would recognize the right to self-determination and the territorial unity of Euskal Herria, ETA would declare a ceasefire. That would allow a democratic process for the Basque citizens to decide their own future. This shift brought some tranquility to the area but differences between the rivaling sides persisted. The current phase of the conflict began in 1998 when ETA opened direct dialogue with

the Basque nationalist parties without going through the government in Madrid. From that moment on, ETA stipulated ending violence by getting a nationalist agreement. Intermittent flare-ups of violence were justified by failure to sign an agreement on sovereignty in the terms proposed by this organization. That was the longest truce by ETA. In the last two years, out of frustration and dwindling supporters, violence against politicians, journalists, members of the judiciary and armed forces resumed. The incongruence of interests between ETA and the Spanish authorities were never dealt with.

The role of the media in sustaining the conflict and preserving the acrimonious atmosphere of suspicion and abhorrence has been substantial in all three cases. This was the routine and customary manner in which disputes were habitually covered. But such a routine is not a matter of course and should not be taken for granted. As Kempf points out:

"[J]ournalists always have two options: either to take sides and to incite one party against the other, or to play the role of moderating third party in order to improve the communication between them and contribute to constructive conflict transformation" (2003, p. 83).

The following will be an attempt to demonstrate the use of the media as a third party in those conflicts. A third side, in the terms of conflict resolution theory, serves as a container of escalation. One of the field's leading theorists likens the role of the third side to "a social immune system preventing the spread of the virus of violence" (Ury, 2000). Since this clearly wasn't the way the media treatment of conflicts functioned so far, our emphasis here is on transforming the approach by which journalists depict their stories.

## 2.2 The Peace Journalism Model and the Conflict Triangle

The peace journalism model (Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005) originally formulated by Johan Galtung, posits some dichotomies to differentiate the concept of PJ from regular, or war-oriented journalism. These are only some of the model's features. Others are displayed later in section F:

Peace/Conflict Journalism	War/Violence Journalism
<p><i>Peace-Orientated</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Explore conflict <i>formation</i>, x parties, y goals, z issues, 'win-win' orientation.</li> <li>2. Open space, open time; causes and outcomes anywhere, also in history/culture.</li> <li>3. Making conflicts transparent.</li> <li>4. Giving voice to all parties, empathy, understanding.</li> <li>5. See conflict/war as problem, focus on conflict creativity.</li> <li>6. Humanization of all sides; more so the worse the weapon.</li> <li>7. Proactive: prevention before any violence/war occurs.</li> <li>8. Focus on invisible effects of violence (trauma, damage to structure/culture).</li> </ol>	<p><i>War-Orientated</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Focus on conflict <i>arena</i>, 2 parties, 1 goal (win), war, zero-sum orientation.</li> <li>2. Closed space, closed time; causes and exits in arena, who threw the first stone.</li> <li>3. Making wars opaque/secret.</li> <li>4. 'Us-them' journalism, propaganda, voice, for 'us'.</li> <li>5. See 'them' as the problem, focus on who prevails in war.</li> <li>6. Dehumanization of 'them'; more so the worse the weapon.</li> <li>7. Reactive: waiting or violence before reporting.</li> <li>8. Focus only on visible effect of violence (killed, wounded and material damage).</li> </ol>

These distinctions will help demonstrate the value of peace journalism to conflict resolution processes. If we associate the first three items with the *situation* dimension of conflict, the next three items with the *attitude* dimension and the last two items with the *behavior* dimension, we get criteria with which to assess the nature and orientation of media messages. Equipped with these analytical tools, the actual media discourse about the conflicts can be examined.




Figure 1: PJ and WJ Attributes within Conflict Dimensions

### 2.3 The Conflict Triangle in Conventional Journalism

The *situation* is the first dimension of conflict to tackle. It illuminates the dispute's historical foundations and the original discrepancies between the parties. The media, as the conveyer of stories, can deliver such an account in more than one fashion, with differing emphases and nuances. History as a concept can be tricky, for it is not what has actually happened in the past, but what certain observers saw, understood and recounted. Thus, several contending, even contradictory, versions of the same events might emerge. Here, the more attractive storyteller prevails. Describing roots of conflicts adheres to the same rule-of-thumb: subjectivity of the relaters rather than objectivity of "reality".

The media as storytellers, wishing to attract audience in an era of multi-channel, rating obsessed and commercial time-span mindsets, opt for a more dramatic, more emotional, more provocative and more sensational mode of telling. Their natural choice would be the war/violence perspective, which is strewn with the ample amounts of blood and guts, heroes and villains, righteousness and wickedness (Shinar, 2000). The next session analyzes *situation* press descriptions of the three conflicts. It detects the features of traditional journalism and then attempt to demonstrate the impression of the same accounts had they been painted in PJ colors. The media citations represent various sources, with disparate proximity to the conflict: some are directly involved (Loyalist and Republican press in Northern Ireland); others are less directly involved (Spanish press in the Basque conflict) and some are utterly extraneous to the conflict (CNN and TIME magazine). This is done to demonstrate the ubiquity of PJ, and on the other hand, the temptation of the WJ coverage regardless of how involved the reporter is.

#### 1. The Situation Vertex:

(Arena, 2 parties 1 goal, Zero-sum, closed space/time, opaque/secret).

##### *Northern Ireland:*

The reports of the clashes in Northern Ireland usually focus on the *arena* of hostilities rather than on the origins of the strife. When the location of the conflict is described, each newspaper, the Catholic *Irish News* and the Protestant *News Letter*, tries to paint the scene with its own colors and substantiate its side of the story as 'real'. For example, the *Irish News* constantly refers to Northern Ireland as The North to connote the irrefutable relationship between the two parts. The *News Letter*, on the other hand, routinely refers to Northern Ireland as Ulster to emphasize the historic nine-county prov-



ince of England, and thus to perpetuate the linkage with the UK. The relevant parties to the conflict and their prospective national and religious affiliations are given special weight in the Irish war journalism. For years, the Catholic *Irish News* stubbornly bracketed under Home News all the events that occurred in both north and south Ireland. The World News section covered, among others, events in Britain. The rival *News Letter* used different titles, assuming the UK under local events and the Republic of Ireland as 'abroad' (Wilson, 1997).

The two newspapers unremittingly uphold, however, the rigid dichotomy between the belligerent communities. They assiduously align the Protestant with Unionist and Catholic with Nationalist. Thus, they contract the arena of discord into two participants, two main camps that are pitted one against the other. By lumping together all Catholics within the political position of Nationalists, i.e., Irish patriots advocating the unification of North and South into one nation, and identifying all Protestants as unequivocally Unionists who crave the kinship with Britain, the media distort the understanding of the conflict. The news reports flatten out the diversity within each religious community between moderates and extremists and nullify the existence of other groups in Northern Ireland, such as Chinese or Muslims. The polemic is unreasonably accentuated and heightened and the antagonists are solidified against each other to the point Giddens calls "the degenerate spirals of communication" (1994).

This crude and deliberate dichotomy spills over to the geographical parameters of the conflict. The BBC in its broadcasting routine refers to west Belfast, the capital of Northern Ireland, as mainly a "nationalist area" i.e., Catholic, whereas other areas are distinctly stamped as "loyalist," or Protestant. While it is true that the warring communities dwell together and concentrate in particular areas, it is still not a clear-cut division. Characterizing the geographical divide in such simplistic dyadic way heightens the perception of territoriality and fuels the tension further. The immediate corollary of such a formulation is the so called "parades controversy," of Catholics defiantly marching in Protestant turfs and vice versa. Had this rigid physical partition not been repeatedly stressed in the media, the parades would not have become such a volatile instigator of violence. The BBC North Ireland controller, Pat Loughery, acknowledged the problem of portraying strictly two sides to the conflict by admitting that "... there are many traditions, many backgrounds, and many identities and to easily succumb to an analysis that is simple dichotomy ... is to take the political polarization and to allow it to appropriate a far more diverse [situation]" (quoted in Wilson, 1997:17).

A lot of ambiguity is being kept in the media reports about the conflict. The vagueness has served to numb readers to the human tragedy involved and to implant the notion that nothing can be done. A keen observer noticed that describing the conflict as

"... a series of unconnected incidents helps promote in readers' minds the idea that the violence is mindless and has not grown out of specific economic, political and military causes" (Lundy, 1983).

Such a portrayal hardly encourages political activism or wide popular protest against the ongoing conflict due to its detached and isolated illustration of events. The consistently indistinct reporting affected the way people have viewed and understood the Northern Ireland situation. The regular lack of clarification and perspective and the omission of background created in the minds of readers a "procession of inexplicable events" (ibid.). The main theme became the illogical and unreasonable state of affairs, which was really a vacuous and inane umbrella expression to camouflage the complexities. As Elliott (1976) indicates: "the tendency of the media was to report violent events as simply irrational and horrid ... Such events were irrational *because* they were horrid" (original emphasis). Referring to the Northern Ireland events in the patronizing and haughty term of 'troubles' does not help either and leads to cynical reactions such as "the 'troubles' are like the weather: they appear completely beyond anyone's control" (Greensdale, 1993).

#### *Israel/Palestine:*

The gist of the quarrel between Israelis and Palestinians is captured in the mere title of the first all-out war between them in 1948. While the Israelis proudly call it the war of Independence, the Palestinians remember it as the Al Naqba, or the catastrophe. The media on each side reiterate and perpetuate these vying descriptions to revive the mythology of each party. As far as the Israeli newspapers are concerned, the conflict is between the Israelis and "the Arabs," the "Muslim world," or "the Palestinians". It is always a two-sided controversy, in which the just side, the Israelis, battle the monolithic anti-Israeli side. Any internal Arab or Palestinian differences are shunned in favor of the neat, bi-lateral illustration. Another habit is the description of the setting or location of events. The entire conflict is limited to the Middle East, and more precisely, to the jurisdiction of Mandatory Palestine and its neighbors. The relevance of occurrences in Europe or in the rest of the Arab and Muslim world is played down. The sequential references of history are ignored in a closed space-time paradigm. The dispute is regularly introduced as purely and unequivocally zero-sum: two peoples struggling for one state. There is no compromise: either bigger Israel or bigger Palestine. One denies the basic rights of the other and vice versa.

In most accounts in the Israeli media there is no serious and profound discussion about the historical roots of the dispute with the Arabs. There is a comfortable ambiguity hanging over any descriptions which relate to past events, chronologies, or sequential turns of events. The impervious narrative of modern Zionism regarding "who we are," "what are we doing here and why" and "why we are right and just and they are not", is tightly kept. Any attempt to challenge the narrative is

promptly and vigorously eschewed. The Israeli media has been very active in nurturing this storyline and backing up with "facts." Many unpleasant accounts or 'unfitting' details were ironed out. The Palestinian media did exactly the same and kept their exclusive narrative alive in a hapless mirror-image of their enemy's.

#### *The Basque Country:*

A CNN report on the Basque conflict boasts the following title: "Basque question: Spain's pressing problem." Then, in the subtitle, the network chief correspondent in Madrid, Al Goodman adds: "For Spaniards, hardly a day goes by when they are not confronted with the issue of Basque separatist violence" (Goodman, 2002). This is how, wryly and matter-of-factly, the complicated and sensitive controversy is presented to the readers of CNN. First, the title declares, it is a pressing problem for Spain, not for the Basques, thereby assuming that all Basques perceive themselves as Spaniards, or ignoring the Basques all together. Second, the issue is not a matter of sovereignty, autonomy, authority or power, but violence. The outcome is again mixed with the cause because it sounds more attractive.

The article continues in quoting Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar as saying: "We are not going to allow them to impose terror on our country. We will fight them with all the moral and material force of the state of law." (ibid). There are no counter citations in the text, and it concludes with the statement: "From bombs to peace marches, the problem of Basque violence is ever-present in Spanish society" (ibid). It is a one-sided and attributive account. There is no mentioning of the Spanish Army's violence, the cruelty of the Madrid secret police or the government-linked death squads of GAL (Anti-Terrorist Liberation Groups). Conspicuously missing are the background and origins of the dispute, and the divergence of actors partaking in it: the Spaniards and the Basque Extremists are depicted as two monolithic camps without any reference to Moderate Basques, Catalans, Andalusians, or other ethnic minorities, who might not see eye-to-eye with the Madrid line.

On the other hand, the Basque newspaper Euskal Herria Journal adopts a similar fomenting viewpoint. A report from August 23, 2002 reads:

"Thousands of people marched behind a Basque nationalist flag during a demonstration in support of the Basque nationalist party Batasuna in Bilbao on August 23, 2002. Spain's public prosecutor approved on Friday the suspension of the party, backing a notorious Judge's allegations that the group supports and funds the Basque national liberation organization Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). A sign at the demonstration read in Basque 'Basque Country Arise! Stop fascism'."

Similarly to the previous report, the story concentrates on the arena of conflict, which is current in space and time, and underlines two parties to the confrontation. The descriptions are very one-dimensional: ETA is never a terrorist but a national liberation organization, and the Spanish judge is notorious. Such provocative portrayals are certain to promote agitation and incitement.

## **2. The Attitude Vertex:**

(Propaganda, "us"/"them", other as problem).

#### *Northern Ireland:*

The *News Letter* insists on naming the Republic of Ireland as Eire, thereby inculcating the impression of a foreign country in its unionists, or Protestant readers. This is done deliberately and consistently in order to underline the sense of anomaly and remoteness from the southern part of the island. Another point which is diligently stressed in the *News Letter* is referring to the IRA and its activists as terrorists. This catch-all term vilifies the Catholic organization regardless of their deeds and ignores the fact that only a minority of their actions in recent years have been purely of a terrorist nature. Such labeling "...decontextualizes the IRA from its conditions of existence in Northern Ireland and displaces it into the international arena of organizations deemed simply to be a threat" (Wilson, 1997). A mirror image is sustained for the same purpose of denigrating the enemy in the depiction of Protestant paramilitary groups such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) or the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) in the pages of the *Irish News*.

The media are tempted to give voice to the extremists and to allow them easy access due to their vociferous prominence and stridency. Such characteristics are perceived as more alluring to readers and viewers. Consequently, communication channels are inundated with propaganda messages instead of a genuine discourse and exchange of views. Abandoning the media front to extremists might bear serious consequences, as a prominent analyst admonished with evidence from another conflict:

"... decent people and their activities are hardly ever news; nationalist demagogues are. There have been ten interviews with marginal fascists psychopaths in Serbia and Croatia for every interview with a human rights or peace activist. Thus the media have helped the bad guys" (Denitch, 1996).

In the same vein, media have a penchant toward elites as their source of information. Elites sense that weakness and exploit it to disseminate their own propaganda. This proclivity, again, does not propel dialogue or present a fair and balanced illustration but tends to reduce coverage to "routinist reportage of well-rehearsed adversarial positions of political spokespeople" (Wilson, 1996) to the detriment of authentic and fresh ideas and actors.

### *Israel/Palestine:*

It is difficult to find today a more psychologically charged and a more value-laden feud than the Israeli-Palestinian. Its protracted nature allowed the conflict to stockpile repertoires of negative images and prejudice on both sides. There is an abyss of mistrust between the belligerents, which feeds fears and hostilities. The media heat these emotions to a boiling point. In October 2000 the second Palestinian Intifadah (uprising) broke out against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Some Israeli-Palestinians (the Arab minority within the state of Israel) spontaneously joined the riots to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the way Israel treats its Arab citizens. Two weeks later, a poll was taken among the residents of the Jewish-Arab city of Jaffa to track any changes in the interfaith relations in the wake of the riots. To one of the questions, 40% of the Jewish residents answered that they believed that in times of war, their Arab neighbors might attack them. This datum was taken up by an Israeli local paper and published on the front page as: "In War Time the Jaffa Arabs will Attack Tel Aviv" in giant bold letters (Dor, 2001). This was a manipulative and scheming report intended to cause fear and disruption in its readers, or in other words, sheer propaganda that was fanned by panic and suspicion.

During the delicate negotiations to resume normalcy and reconciliation between Palestinians and Israelis, the media on both sides consistently accredited "the other" with the burden of accountability. In the bloody October 2000, Israeli press headlines competed in pinpointing the Palestinians, and especially their leader, as a hindrance to pacifying the violence. They read: "Arafat's Test," "Arafat Has 48 Hours to Achieve Cease-Fire," and "Arafat is not in a Hurry" (ibid, 2001, 30). That "us versus them" depiction, with "us" being on the clear and "them" carrying all the blame and responsibility, is typical of war journalism and of biased coverage. The "blame-the-other" theme is very prominent as well. Even in the heydays of optimism, skepticism was looming as hope and doom were bitterly mixed. On the morning of the historic treaty with the PLO on September 13, 1993, another terrorist attack killed four Israelis. The headlines of the Israeli press read: "Peace in the Shadow of Terrorism," "Israel-PLO agreement will be signed today, a wave of attacks in the country" (Wolfsfeld, 1997:111). Linking the two frames, the peace one and the violence one, together implies that the process and our (the Israelis) goodwill and sacrifice hinge upon the deeds of the Palestinians. The clear message is that terrorism jeopardizes the peace and the Palestinians must do something about it lest it would all crumble. The most common and persistent thesis in that matter became the incompetence, or unwillingness, of Arafat to carry out his obligations, as specified in the Oslo Accords: "Arafat is not keeping his commitment to operate against extremists" was the headline of Haaretz after the Beit Lid terrorist attack on Israeli soldiers and civilians in January 1995 (Wolfsfeld, 2004: 69).

### *The Basque Country:*

The CNN 2002 special report on the "Basque question" rather than the Spanish question had other attributive features. The major theme is the distinction between the 'trouble makers' and the regular folk, who merely want normal life. This division is underlined in the article not only between Basques and others but among Basques themselves in order to accentuate even further the extremism and fanaticism of the activists. This citation is typical:

"The region has even attracted a famous museum, The Guggenheim in Bilbao, whose modern, dynamic image is precisely the image the Basque people want to project of themselves. None of this, however, is enough for ETA and the other Basque nationalist political parties, with the result that the region's streets continue to simmer with tension, fear and a lot of anger" (Goodman, 2002).

This is an expressly judgmental account, which under the disguise of an evenhanded description, puts an indisputable blame on one party.

Another favorite technique to underscore the us/them attitude is comparison, which resembles dichotomies and labeling. An eye-catching comparison is usually an outrageous one. In the Basque context, it must involve Generalissimo Franco, as in this Time Magazine report:

"Since it aborted a 14-month cease-fire in November 1999, ETA has broadened its threats to include thousands of judges, journalists, politicians and businessmen, who are under constant guard. 'It's like the hardest days of the Franco dictatorship, when police informers were everywhere,' says [a resident]. 'But now we don't know who the informers are'" (Graff, 2003).

Some of the leading Basque newspapers conceal a great deal of nationalist propaganda in their reports. This camouflage comes to the fore especially when contrasted with the other party, the enemy. The *Euskal Herria Journal* demonstrates this trend in its August 2002 account of the outlawing of the Basque national political party Batasuna:

Tens of thousands of Basques marched on Sunday to protest against the Spanish government's moves to ban the Basque radical party Batasuna. Marchers shouted "Long live ETA military!" and "Independence!" Reporters estimated that thousands participated in the peaceful march. On Saturday, Spain's two leading parties agreed on plans to use a controversial new law to ban Batasuna, a party which shares the same Basque independence goal as ETA and denies links to the armed group. The ruling and main opposition parties called a session of parliament for later this month to mandate the government to ask the Supreme Court to ban the party under the law. The law holds that any party which supports, justifies or excuses terrorism can be banned. Batasuna's leader Arnaldo Otegi said last week Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar was trying to turn the clock back to the days of military dictatorship under Miguel Primo de Rivera.

Cloaked as a neutral report, the journalist emphasizes the peaceful nature of the event and the goals of the marchers. On the other hand, the opponents' move is described as "controversial" and their methods are estimated by an interviewee as dictatorial.

### 3. The Behavior Vertex:

(Reactive, Visible effects of violence).

#### *Northern Ireland:*

The press on each side depicted "its" activists as merely reacting to the aggressiveness of the other. This partisan perspective created a 'tunnel vision', in which escalation was expedited in light of the intransigence of the enemy vis-a-vis the innocence of one's own side. The British media habitually praised its soldiers in Northern-Ireland as peace-keepers, claiming further, that their army is "... merely reacting stoically to the inflammatory Irish with a restraint no other force would show" (quoted in Wilson, 1997:37). The adulation for the British soldier picked in such accounts of poetic heroism as "a great defender of civilization against chaos, of order against the apostles of violence. He is the most patient, decent, military man in the world" (McCann, 1992).

The British army, in general, appeared "above the fray--brave, tormented, but largely inactive except as a rather superior kind of Boy Scout Troop" (Elliott, 1976:355). All newspapers established the axiom that the source of violence and evil is terrorism, which is destructive, asocial and inexplicable. Of course, each side had a different felon to put in the terrorist role; nevertheless, the press on both sides excels in savory and flavorful descriptions of that evil. The October 1974 Guilford pub bombing and the August 1998 Omagh market atrocity were given prominence in all the media channels. They were markedly covered and blatantly posits as the kernel of the Northern Irish "problem." Causes and consequences were muddled up and confounded, but by the profligacy and extravagance of their coverage, the reports set off an atmosphere of fury and vehemence.

#### *Israel/Palestine:*

When it comes to terrorism, especially in its most arbitrary and painful mode--suicide bombing--it is very hard not to concentrate on reaction to the atrocity and to underline its sheer brutality. The callousness of the act obscures the grievances which propel it. Thus, to return again to the Beit Lid massacre, in which 20 Israelis were killed, the captions under bloody pictures of the event in the Israeli newspapers contended with each other in their hysterical and uproarious tones: "The Children that won't Return," "With Tears of Rage" in huge letters and flaming red colors (Wolfsfeld, 2004:64). Again, the focus on the reactive depiction of the terrorist deed and its harsh consequences totally eclipse the despair that provoked it in the first place. Those invisible sources of suffering are mute and inaccessible to media scrutiny. Such descriptions are rampant in Israeli media in every terrorist incident. The effect of indiscriminate violence is so mesmerizing that it silences every other aspect of the conflict. Analyzed from this perspective, Palestinian extremists are counter-productive to their cause.

A similar reactionary coverage is prevalent in other patterns of behavior between Israelis and Palestinians. Wars and other acts of violence naturally shoulder the major brunt of the conventional reporting but failure of diplomatic efforts or cessation of peace endeavors get a similar treatment. They are unceremoniously conveyed in an after-the-fact vein and seldom as forewarning or admonition in an effort to salvage resolution. When the first Intifadah broke out, the headline in *Yediot Aharonot* read: "The Uprising Began: A Dialogue through the Stone, the Sling and the Molotov Cocktail" (*Yediot Aharonot*, 9/12/1987). When the Oslo process began and the treaty between the PLO and Israel was signed, a series of terrorist attacks perpetrated by the Islamic extremists shook the country. The headline in one of the leading Israeli newspaper was: " Hamas is Sabotaging the Peace Process" (*Ma'ariv*, 9/10/1994). This is just a tiny sample of the general attitude of the Israeli press toward Palestinian violence. The more obvious and conventional manner of reporting is not necessarily the most conscientious and accountable one. As far as encouraging conflict resolution, it was certainly not the optimal way. Relaying the horrors of terrorism, as appalling as they are, extract fury and ferocity which intensify conflicts.

#### *The Basque Country:*

In their reports on the Basque conflict, most journalists opt for recounting observable violence--the highest attention-grabbing technique. By so doing, they often omit invisible consequences of aggression and brutality, which cause more damage and suffering than the visible ones. By concealing the more severe horrors of conflict, journalists actually condone the spirit of dispute. When finally the CNN reporter mentions cease-fire efforts, he immediately deserts them with this more typical kind of depiction:

"They were shattered more than a year later, however, by a car bomb in Madrid, with both the government and ETA blaming each other for wrecking the cease-fire. Now, hundreds of local officials who oppose ETA must go everywhere with bodyguards" (Goodman, 2002).

Many media accounts are passively and reactively describing rather than preemptively raising and discussing a point. A 2004 BBC Monitoring report depicts the critical issue of outlawing a Basque newspaper in a reticent, *post-facto* manner:

"[The] Madrid government of Prime Minister José María Aznar ... regards the shuttering of *Egunkaria* — like last year's banning of the political party Batasuna for alleged close ties to ETA — a necessary step in its war on terrorism."

A Time Magazine reporter relates to a previous time the Basque newspaper was closed, in a similar reactive, though more vivid, fashion:

"First came the predawn trip, blindfolded in the back of a Spanish paramilitary van, from his home in Tolosa to a police cell in Madrid. It was there, claims Martxelo Otamendi — the last managing editor of the now banned Basque-language daily *Egunkaria* — that his ordeal began. While police interrogated him about his newspaper's alleged links to the Basque separatist terror organization ETA, he claims they had him stand naked in his cell for three days, with a chance to sit down only every five hours" (Graff, 2003).

No discussion follows this report and no profound deliberation of the implications and connotations of such a radical step by the government ensue. The same dry and unreflective manner is discerned in this *Euskal Herria Journal* description of a violent attack in the summer of 2002:

"A car-bomb blamed on Euskadi Ta Askatasuna ripped through a police barracks killing two, including a six-year old girl. The explosion in the tiny Spanish resort of Santa Pola on Sunday night also injured about 25 according to local media. It was the first lethal attack blamed on ETA since Socialist politician Juan Priede, 69, was shot dead in a bar in March. The force of the blast tore the facade off a four-story building in the barracks, exposing the staircase and the inside of the flats. The girl killed in the blast was the daughter of a paramilitary Civil Guard police officer. A 50-year-old man identified as Cecilio Gallego was also killed. There was no immediate claim of responsibility. ETA usually gives a warning about the bomb, but on this occasion it did not."

The details of this gruesome attack are calmly and painstakingly relayed in an almost ceremonial regularity, although the nuances of empathy are not relinquished: "a car-bomb *blamed on* ETA," instead of an ETA car-bomb, and the conspicuous absence of the word terrorism in this paragraph despite its content. The reactive, visible-violence oriented character of War Journalism is aptly caught in this short summation of the CNN report on the Basque Question: "There is continued so-called low-level violence throughout the region, with pro-independence Basque youths attacking businesses, city buses, even homes on both sides of the border" (Goodman, 2002). What are the reasons and motivations of these youngsters to commit such violent deeds? What are the consequences and prospective implications of their delinquency? Who is going to face them and how? These essential questions remain unanswered.

One final note to conclude this section: there are more features to the distinction between war and peace journalism. They are surveyed here briefly. A very important difference is truth-oriented writing versus propaganda-oriented. The former is the exposure of cover-ups and schemes on all sides whereas the latter is selective disclosure, or 'cherry-picking' of the other's deceptions while concealing our secrets. Another disparity is the emphasis on elites in conventional news stories as opposed to PJ's people-centered stories. Finally, while regular conflict journalism is biased toward victory or defeat tales, peace journalism concentrates on resolution and peace initiatives. Whereas the former anticipates and predicts reemergence of discord, the latter seeks reconciliation and prevention of future hostilities (Galtung, 1996). All the newspaper articles read for this paper stood up to conflict journalism standards. The Catholic, Protestant, Israeli, Spanish and Basque newspaper constantly blamed the 'other side' for being deceiving, unreliable and conniving. By contrast, their side was just and honest except for times when deception was required due to unexpected circumstances. In most descriptions, reports focus on leaders, political or military, their decisions, their actions, their comments. The plight of the common people was rarely mentioned in spite of its vast scope and rate of recurrence. Lastly, most reports in all three cases aimed at the ultimate "score": who wins, who loses, and by how much. Excruciating depictions of misery and failure always conquer over stories of resolution and settlement.

### 3. The Dynamic Dimension: Escalation of Conflict

An additional way that conflict theory demonstrates the rigor and necessity of PJ is through escalation theory. There are several contending explanations for conflict dynamics but amongst them Schattschneider's contagion model, originally composed in 1960, still stands apart from all its successors. In his spatial model, the direct partners to the feud are less interested in one another. They are preoccupied with communicating to the environment and fortify their relative position by attracting other parties to join forces with them to outweigh the opponent. The media are the communication channels, and reporters carry the messages the rivaling sides transmit. The messages are molded and constructed by journalists and pertain to their reporting talent and style. If the tone they set is vehement and ardent, accentuating the zeal of combat and the spoils of war, other parties might be enthused and drawn into the cycle of violence, thus expanding it. If, on the other hand, the tone is reticent and composed, underlying the anguish of battle and the affliction of warfare, then other parties would refrain from intervening or would interfere to discontinue the conflict. PJ fits the second scenario. In the Irish case, if British public opinion is the observing crowd, bloody descriptions of the clashes between the IRA and British forces, laden with allegations and demonization, will encourage a hawkish mood and public support for an assertive policy in Ulster. In the Palestine/Israel conflict, if world public opinion is to be swayed, harsh depictions of violence devoid of background and circumstances will prop up hostility and anger to further the spiral of confrontation. If the Spanish populace is the critical mass, reports that accentuate cruelty and indiscriminate ETA violence without mentioning government reprisal or political restriction will foment resentment and readiness to sustain the struggle against Basque nationalism until submission. By contrast, fair and balanced reporting, which advances origins and not only symptoms of strife, multilateral relations

and not inescapably dyadic ones, dehumanizes and de-objectifies mutual images instead of de-humanizing and objectifying (Manoff, 2005), and supplies warnings as to the vagaries of war, will significantly alleviate the adversity of contention.

Schattschneider's metaphor of contagion emphasizes how more and more actors and issues join the conflict and exacerbate the escalation process whereby hostilities spread and infect others. The gist of his model, which suggests two direct protagonists who compete for the attention and support of the observing crowd, confers a lot of responsibility on the media. Each side hopes to lure the critical mass and gain sufficient muscle to outweigh the other. The expansion or contraction of conflict hinges, therefore, upon the success or failure to draw more parties into the fray. This endeavor, again, relies on communication. This time, the interaction is not between the two antagonists but between each of them and their environment. PJ as a conveyer of views and ideas, has the potential of favorably affecting the scope and direction of external involvement in the conflict. By presenting a balanced, well informed picture, and by supplying the onlookers with ample evidence and opportunity to intervene and deescalate the conflict, PJ utilizes the practices and patterns of conflict dynamics to advance peace.




Figure 2: Schattschneider's Model of Conflict Escalation

The importance of the media role in the containment or contraction of conflict cannot be exaggerated. A major component of conflict is the environment that hosts it. Confrontation between sides at odds never occurs in a vacuum. There is always a context, a setting which confers the feud with perspective and circumstances. The parties to the conflict establish connections with the surroundings to sense the atmosphere and to detect sympathetic dispositions that might tip the balance in their favor. The conflict milieu is not merely the physical or geographical location of the disagreement but also the psychological, cultural or sociopolitical background. By conversing with the environment, the actors really construct the meaning of the conflict. This spatial interaction is the incubator of terminology, images, labels, categorizations and stigmata. These, in turn, portray and piece together the discourse of conflict (Berger and Luckmann, 1967).

Inter-personal quarrel takes place in a small environment and the interaction between the actors is direct. Beyond that, the construction of reality through decoding the environment requires the mediation of the media. Thus, in larger conflicts, it is the media which supplies the images, the characterization, the classification and the direction of the conflict discourse. The media sets the agenda, pits the rivaling camps one against the other, and draws the fault-lines of the ensuing battles. This is how the observing crowd learns of the dispute and makes up its mind. Furthermore, this is how the involved parties themselves formulate and reformulate their positions and consequent moves. Thus the contribution of the media to the escalation or de-escalation of conflict is crucial and this is where the transformation from regular, sensational and contention-prone journalism to the accountable, evenhanded and rigorous peace journalism, is most desired.

#### 4. Protracted Conflicts in Peace Journalism

The perspective of peace journalism demands a major philosophical and ethical shift. It literally entails a fundamental conversion of professional etiquette and of work habits – not an easy task by any standard. Essential observations regarding conflicts are revised and discarded. Some convenient “truths” must be cast off to make room for innovative and daring

thinking. For example, the vision of conflict as inevitably a zero-sum-game is replaced by the possibility of a win-win orientation. The excited anticipation for the thrill of victory or the drama of defeat is substituted by the eagerness for resolution, and the ambiguity of tension and suspense is exchanged for the clarity of relief and hope.

Accordingly, at its situation vertex, PJ's responsibility is to equally present all sides and to allow common people, not elites or leaders to express genuine thoughts and ambitions. Equal access must be permitted not only to fanatics, who bomb their way into the news but to other sides to the conflict as well. Conventional journalism highlights the militants and their conduct and thereby paints the entire conflict in belligerent colors. Consequently, the actual foundations of the controversy are disregarded. PJ would cover all involved to expose the sincerity of incompatible interests. Thus, in PJ reporting, the IRA, the Islamic Jihad, ETA or any other violent players, would not automatically gain central stage despite their added value of sensationalism. Moreover, PJ would grant more weight to the historical circumstances of the Irish conflict. It would expand the scope of time and place to include not only the current arena but also Scotland, Wales and England and their relation to the Irish Isles in the 16<sup>th</sup> century. PJ would try to avoid volatile labeling such as Ulster on the one hand or the IRA terrorists on the other hand. It would use Northern Ireland to connote geography and the neutral term IRA radicals to indicate a non-compromising political views. A PJ coverage would introduce the multiplicity of actors on each side, and familiarize the readers with the nuances and sensitivities of everyone involved. The connection between the grievances and desires of all participants and their respective behavior would be clearly illustrated to prevent obscurity and confusion. Similarly, the Israeli-Palestinian dispute must be presented with lucidity and perspicuity. The Arab camp should be dissected into its various components as well as that of the Israelis. Both sides have hawks and doves and a variety of ideological and political stands regarding the conflict. There is more than one way, and not necessarily the zero-sum way, to get out of the Middle East predicament. PJ would shift the overemphasis on the arena of conflict by tracing down the sources of the strife to Europe and to other Arab countries in the region, stretching back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the beginning of Jewish and Arab national revival. Finally, the Basque question ought to be presented as a Spanish question, thereby moving the onus to the Spaniards at large. Thus the issue of terrorism is not attributed to Basques as such, but to disagreements within the Spanish sociopolitical system. Such an approach does not alienate anyone and hence, does not promote conflict. Here, as in the other cases, elucidating the historical origins of the struggle and the incompatible interests of each side would help disassociate readers from the harsh and immediate impression of terrorism and lead them more profoundly into the nature of the contention. PJ would persistently distinguish between militant and moderate Basques, independence and autonomy exponents.

In the attitude vertex, PJ reporting circumvents propaganda messages. Peace reporters serve nobody's cause but peace, and thus, won't avail themselves for anyone's particular agenda. Conflict journalism carries propaganda message occasionally if they are 'newsworthy' in their attractiveness. PJ exponents would not compromise their quest of representing a fare picture for the allure of the 'us versus them' spectacle. In the Irish case, PJ would not point a finger at the IRA as 'saboteurs' of reconciliation, nor to the Ulster paramilitary units as jeopardizing stability. They would describe the conflict as "a fly on the wall" (Fisher and Ury, 1981), bringing forth the claims and woes of all. In the Middle Eastern struggle, PJ exponents must work around the abyss of mistrust and hatred on both sides and not be carried away by the torrent of accusations. Instead of indicating who started the conflict or who has more justified claim on the Holy Land, emphasis should be put on the responsibility the two sides share for the future of that cherished area. As for terrorism, although it is spine-tingling, PJ would avoid the exhibitionism usually associated with the publicizing of these atrocities. The customary labels and generalizations such as 'killers', 'Jihadists', 'Zionists' or 'occupiers' would be toned down, for they serve no purpose but fueling the discourse. In the Basque example, PJ could start by presenting the Basque nationalists and the Madrid government as two accessories to the conflict, who evenly share not the blame, but the responsibility to resolve the differences between them. Perceiving only the Basques as the 'trouble-makers' and holding them as liable for the quandary, is erroneous and counter-productive. All the analogies with the dictatorship of Franco on the one hand and with other terrorist movements around the globe are useless and self-defeating. PJ comparisons would be with positive historical examples, those who promoted peace and the good of the community. Lastly, neither the propaganda of the Madrid government nor the Basque nationalists' would be carried by PJ reports. No defamation of the other or misinformation would be allowed by peace journalism. Only an accurate account of each side's claims and interests would be described.

The behavior vertex in the PJ mode concentrates on the proactive: it endeavors to raise awareness of cores and hubs of potential violence in order to prevent them before they erupt. There is also a strong emphasis on invisible or 'silent' effects of violence such as trauma, damage to structure or culture, grievances, and various insecurities. Accordingly, peace journalists covering the Irish conflict ought not wait for another IRA assault or British troops' curbing of civil liberties, but rather, through an in-depth investigation and a prudent use of sources, discover impending focal points of intensification or nucleuses of discontent and call attention to them before they burst. Similarly with the Palestinian-Israeli dispute. Suicide bombers can be detected in advance. They are recruited in the most wretched places and their zeal is stimulated by ignorance, poverty and religious fervor. PJ can surface these elements and bring them to the attentiveness and understanding of Westerners and Israelis. Once the roots of this intolerable behavior are explicated, it can be approached in a more sophisticated way, and ultimately, be worked out. The same quest into the motivations and stimuli of extremism can be

launched in the case of the ETA activists. An exploration into 'what makes them tick' is a proactive move, which would bear more fruits for conflict de-escalation than the most vivid and flamboyant account of a terrorist act. Finally, bringing the outcomes of violence into the fore can be a double-edged sword. If the depiction focuses on killings and destruction, the tangible and observable impact of aggression, it might elicit counter-violence, reprisal and enhancement of the conflict. If, on the other hand, the indiscernible aspects, the psychological damages and waste of resources are elucidated, then the futility of war becomes evident and de-escalation might pursue. This assumption is valid in all three cases.

#### 4.1 PJ in Action: Search for Common Ground

Let us turn now to a concrete example of how peace journalism works. The Search for Common Ground (SFCG) is a non governmental organization, which attempts to transform the way the world deals with conflict since 1982. It has endeavored to shift away from adversarial approaches and towards collaborative problem solving. Its activists engage in projects in various parts of the globe to understand the differences and to act upon the commonalities. Search for Common Ground relies in earnest on a "long-term process of incremental transformation, pursued on a realistic scale and with practical means" ([http://www.sfcg.org/sfcg/sfcg\\_intro.html#1](http://www.sfcg.org/sfcg/sfcg_intro.html#1)). In their credo, which is specified in their homepage website, they present a PJ approach to the media coverage of conflicts:

"The cost of dealing with conflict from an adversarial, win/lose mind set is apparent on the evening news every night. There are the obvious consequences where thousands of lives are lost to armed combat or neighborhood crime. Billions of dollars are spent on military expenditures and humanitarian aid after wars. Then there are the less obvious consequences, such as thousands of lives lost to hunger, poverty and preventable diseases, and the billions of dollars spent in legal battles. By transforming how people deal with conflict, we can make significant strides in addressing the major issues facing the world."

The following presents three articles from the Common Ground News Service (CGNews), which publishes balanced and solution-oriented articles by local and international experts in order to promote constructive perspectives and encourage dialogue. The insights from conflict theory will be highlighted as they were used in the CGNews authentic attempt at PJ coverage. The articles were randomly chosen with the common denominator of describing volatile and highly conflictual political issues, which are the stuff conventional media prosper on.

The first article is titled " Hamas' Victory " and it was written by Gwynne Dyer, a London-based independent journalist, for *The Jordan Times* on January 27, 2006. The reporter takes on the delicate issue of the extremist Hamas victory in the Palestinian parliamentary elections and attempts to illustrate its implications in a more evenhanded manner. He posits the seemingly earth-shattering development within an evolutionary and gradual framework, which might have been obscured in most conventional reports lest sensationalism would be hampered:

" Hamas did not win its surprise victory because a majority of Palestinians are religious fanatics, nor because they believe that Israel must be destroyed. It won because the old mainstream liberation movement, Fatah, had squandered its credibility in ten years of corrupt and incompetent rule in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and because after 39 year of Israeli military occupation, there is still no sign of a genuinely independent Palestinian state...In fact, most Palestinians do want peace. They would quite like it if Israel were to vanish, of course, just as most Israelis would be happy if the Palestinians vanished. But as much the weaker party in the conflict, Palestinians have long been more realistic about what they would have to give up in a final peace settlement."

Such a description disarms the temptation for a rant-and-rave writing, which Hamas and its declarations so comfortably allow. This is a PJ style of reporting, which barter the gusto of confrontational accounts for the responsibility and conscientiousness of fairness. Such journalism evidently leads to hope and de-escalation of conflict. Owing to the way it is structured – the broad perspective it illustrates and the transparency of motivations and interests of all sides – the expectations from such an account is not for a clear winner or more bloodshed, but for a genuine resolution, as the summation of this piece demonstrates:

"So is the 'peace process' finally, legally dead? It certainly is for the moment. Hamas has reaffirmed that it has no intention of giving up the armed struggle against Israeli occupation. And yet there is always hope, because having genuine political power and responsibility for the results of exercising that power is a crash course in realism. Fatah made the journey from rejectionism to negotiation; it is not inconceivable that Hamas can do the same."

The second article is called "Targeting the innocent" and it was written by MJ Rosenberg, a Capitol Hill staffer, for the *Israel Policy Forum* on April 21, 2006. The author reacts to Prime Minister Tony Blair's remarks about Hamas terrorism and Islamic terror in general. His insights put such violence within broader and less simplistic context:

"As evidenced by Blair's remark, sometimes this whole issue of terrorism gets way too abstract. Take the phrase 'war on terrorism'. Instead of producing an image of actual civilians slaughtered by killers, we think about policy and battle fronts."

Then the author specifies names of Israeli victims who were murdered by a Hamas suicide bomber the day before. However, he follows through with an unexpected addition:

"Of course, we cannot continue to pretend that the only innocent people killed in this conflict are Israelis and Jews. In the last few weeks, six Palestinian children died as a result of Israeli shelling in Gaza and the West Bank."



A detailed list of the Palestinian victims follows. Outlining such a juxtaposition in the aftermath of a Hamas terrorist act is a rare and valiant writing, well worthy of the PJ endeavor. The concluding remarks go even farther:

"Some readers will, I am afraid, view these Palestinian kids as not in the same category as the Israelis. They will view them as collateral damage, just people who were in the wrong place at the wrong time. And, of course, the Israelis do not target innocent civilians nor do they invite attacks by intentionally placing armor in the midst of neighborhoods. Unlike the terrorists, the IDF regrets the innocent loss of life. Nevertheless, a dead child is a dead child: Innocent by definition."

The third article is titled "Meanwhile: An Eerie Lull in an Unfinished Conflict" and it is co-written for *The International Herald Tribune* by Jerrold Kessel and Pierre Klochendler, Jerusalem-based reporters on July 1, 2004. They open by pointing out that "an eerie normalcy has settled over the Palestinian-Israeli conflict" and wonder whether that was an authentic state of affairs. When they describe the components of that normalcy, they supply a symmetric description:

"Anyone taking an Israeli bus these days from – say, from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv – is struck by the sense of normalcy. Not long ago, every hour, every half-hour, passengers would insist that the bus driver switch his radio on to catch the news headlines. Israelis made sure of being up to the second with the latest bombing, the latest political crisis, the latest proposals to tend the conflict ... Now constant cell phone conversations mixed with oriental pop on the radio swirl uninterrupted around the passengers. No one seems to feel a need for the news."

Eerier still, Ramallah, on the West Bank, seems more and more like a city that is less and less engaged in being the Ramallah of the Intifada. Take the wedding-gown store just off Manara Square where turnover is way down from pre-Intifada days and where the boutique owner can no longer provide custom-sewn gowns because his workshop, in a village outside Ramallah, lies on the other side of the Israeli wall. The store is bustling and the owner says that to circumvent the closures he now imports his extravagant party dresses from China – ,cheaper, too', he confides."

This piece vividly demonstrates the empathy toward both sides and the orientation of conflict, or in this case, violence and terrorism, as the problem and not one of the proponents. Such a balanced and composed account, devoid of the cutthroat anticipation for action does not serve the stimulation of readers toward supporting the escalation of conflict.

Furthermore, the reporters offer a bold analysis, which suggests future paths of action. Their concluding admonition fits the proactive philosophy of PJ by advocating a non-violent scenario before an escalation breaks out:

"On the one hand, the relative quiet does serve a salutary end – and not just because every moment of real quiet is a respite from death and mayhem. On the other hand, the apparent subsiding of tension could be lethal if it leads world leaders into accepting the lull as a prospect in itself, as a basis for resurrecting peace plans which have already proved illusory. The current quiet must not be allowed to become an end in itself. The world cannot afford to go on a summer holiday, to let the Israelis believe that their holiday can last even if they don't bring the occupation to an end. Sustaining the drive for disengagement requires constant international – and especially American – engagement."

## 5. Conclusion: the Useful Nexus of Theory and Practice

This article has probed how conflict theory can contribute to consolidate peace journalism as a valid and practical approach. Although PJ may sound promising and meritorious, it must be anchored to theoretical grounds. Such sustenance would credit PJ with sufficient explanatory power to become more pragmatic and programmatic in the face of structural, psychological, and professional hindrances. This is what Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) mean by the term anchorage: drawing distinctions and assigning meanings to peace journalism by supplying a theoretical frame of reference. Conflict theory, with its focus on the structure and dynamics of conflict and on the strategy of how disputes are captured and comprehended by their participants and their environment, is the ultimate candidate to "anchor" PJ to solid ground.

Conflict theory can assist peace journalism in more than one way. The brevity of this paper left room for only two, albeit of the more seminal and pertinent: 1) the three dimensions of conflict--situation, attitude and behavior--and 2) the contagious model of escalation. As for the former, the paper recommends the valuable PJ methodology in approaching each dimension, or each vertex of conflict, in the attempt to overcome the peril of destructive conflict. Only the PJ description, with all its elaborated features, would promote conflict de-escalation at the situation, attitude and behavior junctures. As for the latter, peace journalism is capable of influencing the wider population, represented in the readers' public, to dissuade the rivaling sides from escalating their feud rather than urging them on. A balanced account, an empathical approach to all parties and a broad contextual writing may reduce the penchant for "taking sides" and observing the conflict as a whole not as a match to be won but as a menace to be contained.

In that sense, as the communication channel between the warring sides and the attentive crowd, media have a heavy burden of responsibility to carry. The way they transmit the messages could decide the rate of acceleration or inhibition of hostilities. True to their mission as a third side to mitigate conflicts, peace journalists would meticulously choose their words and emphases to prevent the intensification and amplification of discord. Moreover, the nexus between peace journalism and conflict theory might be beneficial in both directions: while being strengthened theoretically, PJ could supply conflict

theory with new evidence or refutation "from-the-field". As a novel empirical endeavor, PJ could enrich conflict theory with hitherto unfamiliar knowledge and experience. Since the traditional coverage of conflict and war has been strongly marred by a confrontational and belligerent bias, the innovation and freshness of PJ should bring in original insights and perspectives. Such a fruitful collaboration between scholars and practitioners of conflict resolution would surely help alleviate the hazardous and ambitious challenge of conflict reduction.

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## **Konflikte dekonstruieren: Eine gezielte Überprüfung von Kriegs- und Friedensjournalismus**

Diese Übersicht über Medien, Konfliktliteratur sowie Fallstudien zur Medienberichterstattung über Frieden bietet eine Orientierung für Friedensjournalisten.

Viele Studien zeigen, dass die Medien selten neutral über Konflikte berichten. Humanpsychologie, journalistische Normen und strukturelle Einschränkungen halten die Medien von einer komplexen historischen Berichterstattung über Gewalt ab. Die begrenzte systematische Forschung zur Medienberichterstattung über Frieden reicht nicht aus, um auf den vorherrschenden Kriegsjournalismus reagieren zu können. Eine Fallstudie der Berichterstattung von *The Washington Report* über Friedensinitiativen im Nahen Osten weist auf Probleme in der Medienberichterstattung über Frieden hin. Sie lässt fünf Trends der Presseorientierungen erkennen. Demnach sind Friedensinitiativen: 1. politische Manöver und strategische Stellungnahmen, 2. rhetorische Spiele, um Konflikte und Differenzen zu verschleiern, 3. eine Charade unter Spielern mit geringem Glauben an ihren Erfolg, 4. fragil und unbeständig und 5. eine Übung in Doppelzüngigkeit und Verzerrung.

Friedensjournalisten nutzen die Medien entweder in einer aktivistischen Funktion oder betreiben Friedensjournalismus als objektiven Qualitätsjournalismus, der unterrepräsentierte Perspektiven mit berücksichtigt, um tiefere und breitere Informationen zu liefern. Diese Zuordnung reflektiert seit langer Zeit bestehende ideologische Ziele im Gebiet der Konfliktstudien, Friedensstudien und Konfliktlösung. In diesem Sinn diskutieren ökonomisch orientierte Wissenschaftler auch die Beeinflussung der Medien durch Industriestrukturen und Profitdenken, wodurch die Mächtigen bevorzugt und das Potential für Veränderung eingeschränkt werden. Das Propagandamodell der Medien zeigt, dass friedensjournalistische Initiativen wirkungslos sind, da die Medien ein Sprachrohr der Regierung darstellen. Es wird behauptet, dass die Situation der Welt nach dem Kalten Krieg Qualitätsjournalismus unterdrückt und lokale Medien ineffiziente begrenzte Plattformen zu Verbreitung alternativer Ideen darstellen. Kritische Wissenschaftler betrachten Friedensjournalismus als fehlerhaft, unwirksam oder von vornherein zum Scheitern verurteilt. Medientexte können jedoch vielfältig interpretiert werden; Risse im Monolith bieten Gelegenheiten für Reformen.

Friedensjournalismus muss tief verwurzelte professionelle Muster, strukturellen und finanziellen Druck und psychologische Reaktionen, die eine reaktive, nationalistische Berichterstattung fördern, verändern. Friedensjournalisten müssen gut zuhören, "den anderen" mehr Gehör schenken und dieses neue Verständnis begreifen und verinnerlichen, um die Verbindungen zwischen Identität und Feindschaft zu überwinden. Effektiver Friedensjournalismus muss ein Journalismus

symbolischer Annäherung sein. Er muss Journalisten als menschliche Wesen erkennen, die dem gleichen sozialen, politischen, religiösen und nationalistischen Druck ausgesetzt sind wie alle Menschen. Restrukturierung und Umschulung als Mittel zur Befreiung unabhängiger Medien und Journalisten von ökonomischem und politischem Druck sind entscheidend. Der Schlüssel liegt in einer pluralistischen Verteilung von Besitz, Strukturen und Einkünften. Training muss Journalisten gegen automatische Reaktionen auf Angst und Gewalt impfen. Friedensjournalismus muss das Bewusstsein für die verschiedenen Identitäten und Realitäten der Konfliktparteien, für die Subjektivität und Kontextabhängigkeit der Konfliktursachen und für die Falle des Dualismus einschließen.

Volltext (in Englisch)

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*Susan Dente Ross*

### **(De)Constructing Conflict: A Focused Review of War and Peace Journalism**

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Peace journalists are divided between an activist, advocacy role for media and a definition of peace journalism as quality, objective journalism that includes under-represented perspectives to provide deeper and broader information. The divide reflects long-standing imprecision and ideological objectives in the fields of conflict studies, peace studies, conflict resolution, and more. Thus, economic theorists contend that industry structure and profit-motives drive media to privilege the powerful, limiting the potential for change. The propaganda model of media suggests peace journalism initiatives are impotent because media are a mouthpiece for government. Some say the realities of the post-Cold War world undermine quality journalism, and local media are an inefficient and limited mechanism to disseminate dissident ideas. Critical scholars view peace journalism as flawed, ineffectual, or certain to be co-opted. However, media texts are subject to multiple interpretations; cracks in the monolith offer opportunities for reform.

Peace journalism must transform deeply trained professional patterns, structural and financial pressures, and psychological responses that encourage reactive, nationalistic reporting. Peace journalists must listen well, hear "the other" better, and understand and incorporate that new understanding to transcend the bonds of identity and enmity. Effective peace journalism must be a journalism of symbolic rapprochement. It must recognize journalists as human beings subject to the same social, political, religious and nationalistic pressures as all people. Restructuring and retraining to insulate independent media and journalists from economic and political pressures are critical. Increased pluralism in ownership, structures, and revenue streams is key. Training must inoculate journalists against knee-jerk responses to fear and violence. Peace journalism must embrace awareness of the varied identities and realities of parties to a conflict, the subjective and contextual nature of root causes, and the trap of dualisms.

full text (in English)

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*Kurzfassung:* Diese Übersicht über Medien, Konfliktliteratur sowie Fallstudien zur Medienberichterstattung über Frieden bietet eine Orientierung für Friedensjournalisten.

Viele Studien zeigen, dass die Medien selten neutral über Konflikte berichten. Humanpsychologie, journalistische Normen und strukturelle Einschränkungen halten die Medien von einer komplexen historischen Berichterstattung über Gewalt ab. Die begrenzte systematische Forschung zur Medienberichterstattung über Frieden reicht nicht aus, um auf den vorherrschenden Kriegsjournalismus reagieren zu können. Eine Fallstudie der Berichterstattung von *The Washington Report* über Friedensinitiativen des Mittleren Ostens weist auf Probleme in der Medienberichterstattung über Frieden hin. Sie lässt fünf Trends der Presseorientierungen erkennen. Demnach sind Friedensinitiativen: 1. politische Manöver und strategische Stellungnahme, 2. rhetorische Spiele, um hartnäckige Unterschiede zu verschleiern, 3. eine Charade unter Spielern mit geringem Glauben an ihren Erfolg, 4. fragil und unbeständig und 5. eine Übung in Doppelzüngigkeit und Verzerrung. Friedensjournalisten nutzen die Medien entweder in einer aktivistischen Funktion oder betreiben Friedensjournalismus als objektiven Qualitätsjournalismus, der unterrepräsentierte Perspektiven mit berücksichtigt, um tiefere und breitere Informationen zu liefern. Diese Zuordnung reflektiert seit langer Zeit bestehende ideologische Ziele im Gebiet der Konfliktstudien, Friedensstudien und Konfliktlösung. In diesem Sinn diskutieren ökonomische Wissenschaftler auch die Beeinflussung der Medien durch Industriestrukturen und Profitdenken, wodurch die Mächtigen bevorzugt und das Potential für Veränderung eingeschränkt werden. Das Propagandamodell der Medien zeigt, dass friedensjournalistische Initiativen wirkungslos sind, da die Medien ein Sprachrohr der Regierung darstellen. Es wird behauptet, dass die Situation der Welt nach dem Kalten Krieg Qualitätsjournalismus unterdrückt und lokale Medien ineffiziente begrenzte Plattformen zu Verbreitung alternativer Ideen darstellen. Kritische Wissenschaftler betrachten Friedensjournalismus als fehlerhaft, unwirksam oder von vornherein zum Scheitern verurteilt. Medientexte können jedoch vielfältig interpretiert werden; Risse im Monolith bieten Gelegenheiten für Reformen.

Friedensjournalismus muss tief verwurzelte professionelle Muster, strukturellen und finanziellen Druck und psychologische Reaktionen, die eine reaktive, nationalistische Berichterstattung fördern, verändern. Friedensjournalisten müssen gut zuhören, "den anderen" mehr Gehör schenken und dieses neue Verständnis begreifen und verinnerlichen, um die Verbindungen zwischen Identität und Feindschaft zu überwinden. Effektiver Friedensjournalismus muss ein Journalismus symbolischer Annäherung sein. Er muss Journalisten als menschliche Wesen erkennen, die dem gleichen sozialen, politischen, religiösen und nationalistischen Druck ausgesetzt sind wie alle Menschen. Restrukturierung und Umschulung als Mittel zur Befreiung unabhängiger Medien und Journalisten von ökonomischem und politischem Druck sind bedenklich. Der Schlüssel liegt in einer pluralistischen Verteilung von Besitz, Strukturen und Einkünften. Training muss Journalisten gegen automatische Reaktionen auf Angst und Gewalt impfen. Friedensjournalismus muss das Bewusstsein für die verschiedenen Identitäten und Realitäten der Konfliktparteien, die Subjektivität und Kontextabhängigkeit der Ursachen und die Falle des Dualismus beinhalten.

*Abstract:* This overview of the media and conflict literature and case study of media coverage of peace offers a framework and guidance for peace journalism.

Many studies show media rarely report conflict neutrally. Human psychology, journalistic norms, and structural constraints draw media away from complex historical reporting of violence. Limited systematic research on media coverage of peace is insufficient to direct response to prevalent war journalism. A case study of *The Washington Report* coverage of Middle East peace initiatives suggests problems in media coverage of peace. It demonstrates five trends in press orientations. Peace initiatives are: 1. political maneuvering and strategic posturing, 2. rhetorical games to mask intractable differences, 3. a charade among players with little belief in their success, 4. fragile and impermanent, and 5. an exercise in doublespeak and distortion.

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It would be simple to join the chorus of media critics who castigate contemporary journalism for overt bias, systematic pandering, and flagrant participation in various conspiracies. However, such simple answers are rarely correct, as the following will demonstrate. Rather, if there is a singular truth about contemporary journalism, it appears that it is both better than ever and less than it could be. There is much contemporary journalism that is not broken, that does not need to be fixed, and that is worthy of praise and emulation. There is also unequivocal evidence that systematic pressures (economic, structural, social, professional) on journalists exacerbate the human tendency to see only part of the truth and to transmit that truth in ways that reinforce previous perceptions and beliefs (Altheide, 1987; Donsbach, 2004; Gamson et al, 1992; Gans, 1979; Gitlin, 1979; Hackett & Zhao, 2005; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Tichenor et al, 1980). The predictable rituals of journalists and their heavy dependence on official sources produce persistent patterns of inclusion and exclusion by the mainstream Westernized media (McLeod & Hertog, 1998; Paletz & Entman, 1981; Sigal, 1973; Tuchman, 1978).

The "narrative conventions of American journalism" also orient the media toward clashes rather than discussion of abstract political ideas (Hallin & Mancini, 1984, p. 845; Schudson, 1982). Among these, and of critical importance to the development of what many call the global civil society, is the pervasive pattern for media to exacerbate conflict and perpetuate wars through ethnocentric, nationalistic, and simplistic dualistic portrayals (Coe et al, 2004; Entman, 2004; Goldfarb, 2001; Hutcheson et al, 2004; Lazar & Lazar, 2004; Liebes, 1992; Nohrstedt et al, 2000; Ottosen, 1995; Ross, 2003; Wolfsfeld, 2001, 2001b, 2004). Thus, for example, Dominikowski (2004) traced the historical symbiosis of war and media back to antiquity, while Price and Thompson (2002) identified the close link between media and violence during the last 15 years. Case studies by Metz (1997a, 1997b), Thompson (1999), Naveh (1999), (2001), Hoijer, Nohrstedt & Ottosen (2002), Kondopoulou (2002), Stanley, Eriyanto, Sudibyo, Muhammad, (cited in Hanitzsch, 2004) and others demonstrate the deep and ongoing interconnections between media coverage and military aggression in various conflicts around the globe.

This paper offers a summary overview of the literature on media and conflict to establish a context, theoretical framework, and source of cautious guidance for the growing field and study of peace journalism.

## The War Media

The media play a central role in international affairs and violence because citizens are dependent on media to provide timely, credible information of distant events. Lake and Rothchild (1996) cited "information failures" as a primary contributor to rising fear that increases the potential for violent conflict. Scholars (Beit Hallahmi, 1972; Ben-Dak, 1972; Hofman, 1972; Ibrahim, 1972) examining the significant role of communication flows in conflict resolution frequently focus on nation-states and highlight the role of media in the construction and reinforcement of simplistic and extremely negative images of the "other". Thus, for example, Steuter (1990) and others found that national media exhibit a strong tendency to cover terrorism, war, and international relations from an ethnocentric position in which news "bear[s] a remarkable resemblance to many sentiments common in [the government's] foreign policy and, indeed, [the nation's] political culture" (p. 274).

Nearly three decades ago, Schlesinger (1978) observed that the media's persistent and myopic focus on politics – as defined by the narrow range of publicly visible events in which self-defined politicians operate – systematically reinforced political power, obscured other influences upon political decisions – such as decisions to wage war – and de-legitimized attempts by non-government organizations to influence international policy decisions. Similarly, Angus and Cook (1984) concluded that the media allied with the nation-state to constrain the boundaries of public understanding and debate to "the very terms that [any oppositional] movement attempts to criticize" (p. 6).

Numerous scholars have documented more direct government pressures on journalists in conflict zones (Bennett, 2003; Carruthers, 2000; Knightley, 1975; Lynch, 2003; Reese & Buckalew, 1995). In 1986, Hallin concluded that media coverage systematically excludes significant issues and distorts conflicts to conform to "the constraints of ideology and journalistic routines" closely aligned with the domestic government's power and perspectives (p. 214). In more concrete terms, Liebes (1992) observed that journalists tend to minimize the costs and accentuate the benefits of government-sanctioned violence when the domestic military is engaged in a conflict that is geographically distant from the domestic nation. Avraham (2003) found that media covering conflict zones report "different kinds of pain and different kinds of blood." Indeed, when the press looks on from a distance, it is more likely to ignore the pain and the blood to portray violent conflict as a natural and necessary part of political processes and social change. Such coverage often distinguishes worthy from unworthy victims (Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Karnik, 1998; Kempf, 1994; Minear, Scott & Weiss, 1996).

Wolfsfeld (1997b) suggested that structural constraints – e.g., the need to condense and simplify voluminous material and the strong orientation toward crisis coverage – draw the press away from complex historical context or abstract frames of international violence (p. 153). Dependency on government sources gives government voice and privilege to construct key issues and events (Gans, 1979; Paletz & Entman, 1981; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Wolfsfeld, 1997b). Thus, both the quantity and the nature of news reporting vary with expressed government attitudes and actions (Daugherty & Warden, 1979).

Herman and Chomsky (1988) argued that instead of an independent and critical press, media function as a propaganda tool for governmental elites, using binaries – such as us/them reporting – to echo and extend: 1. nationalistic political ideology, 2. media dependency on official government sources, and the influence of 3. corporate ownership, 4. advertising pressure, and 5. government and business spin. An analysis of U.S. and Canadian television coverage of Central American peace building by Adam (1991) found empirical support for the propaganda model, despite national differences and variations based on the language of coverage.

Others, particularly those closely examining variations in press coverage across nations or through time, have suggested that media are not an uncritical vehicle for government propaganda but rather an inefficient and limited mechanism for the distribution of minority and dissident ideas and information. Vincent (2000) found that coverage of war and peace is truncated so that “only the techniques of war may be debated, not the question of motives,” the morality of bombings, or the opportunity for non-violent alternatives (p. 336). Ackerman’s (1999) study of *The New York Times* concluded that the U.S. media virtually ignored any real possibility for peace and compromise in Rambouillet, France. He also found that, congruent with U.S. and NATO postures, the paper radicalized Milosevic’s stance in Rambouillet at a time when “the Yugoslav position had not changed at all.” Similarly, Vincent’s (2000) study of coverage of the NATO military intervention in Kosovo noted that occasional mentions of the Rambouillet peace talks were presented “almost exclusively from a US/NATO point of view” (p. 333, 331) and failed to use the talks as an opportunity “to go back and revisit events and to further examine them in historical context” (p. 333). Vincent argued that a primary cause of the media’s continuing role “as an organ of political propaganda” is its continued fervor and “myopic belief that objectivity is possible” (p. 341).

Some scholars point to the new realities of the post-Cold War world, in which global conflict is dominated by volatile, interethnic clashes designed to assert identity and protect security, as the source for imperfect media coverage (Terzis & Melone, 2001). Young and Jesser’s (1997) study of the media and war postulated a series of linkages in this new global reality: Because multiple states had the power of mutual annihilation, conflicts in the post-Cold War era would be limited in scope; The limited scope of conflict relieved citizens of their historical duty to support wars as an essential element of their civic obligation; The release of citizens from their patriotic obligation to serve in war 1) increased the discretion of citizens to oppose wars, which placed 2) new emphasis on the importance of public opinion, and promoted 3) sophisticated and pervasive government manipulation of media coverage of war (p. 272).

Wolfsfeld (1997) argued that media coverage could be understood primarily as part of a cycle of waxing and waning political influence that itself reflects varying external realities that mitigate the ability of political leaders to control relevant events. In a simplified vision of Wolfsfeld’s (1997, 2004) complex analysis that identifies several influential factors (e.g., media autonomy, political culture, etc.), peace coverage is in large part a factor of political power which, in turn, is driven by events. Lang and Lang (2004) also challenge the neat precision of the propaganda model for news and suggest that the process is more complex and disorderly. Other scholars assert national identity and political ideology, not governmental dictates, are the most significant and intractable factors directing media coverage. Lee and Maslog (2005) discredited government/media conspiracy theories and ideological reporting and concluded that “media outlets within the same cultural and political context do not frame the same event in the same way” (p. 323).

For decades, scholars have generally accepted Gitlin’s (1979) finding that media serve as sites of strategic political contests in which struggles contain only two sides. Earlier, Allport (1954) identified the fundamental role of categorization in human cognition and posited that contact between members from opposing groups can reduce conflict under controlled and optimal conditions. Coe et al (2004) underscored the fundamental, inherently oppositional nature of Western thinking that constructs reality in terms of binaries that unify and direct public beliefs and attitudes.

Coles (2002) indicated the power of U.S. government elites to diminish this potential by deploying media disseminated binaries to generate patriotic unity and fervor and stifle dissent. He also asserted that rational government actors may use and multiply the instances of violent conflict because they recognize that “war and its words can be a means by which a society, including those who don’t do the actual fighting, defines its national character and legitimates its existence” (p. 588). Coles argued that war is beneficial to national leaders for whom it provides “a teachable moment [in which to] socialize the nation’s members ..., defining who they are ..., and what their collective role is in the community of nations” (2002, p. 589).

One aspect of the political expediency of war is demonstrated by studies of business cycles and media coverage. Bloomberg and Hess (2002) found that domestic economic problems “create incentives for increased external and internal conflict” because war—and its jingoistic coverage by the “patriotic” media—serves as “a diversionary political instrument to signal [leaders’] competence to voters during recessions.” War not only stimulates the economy but also provides ready scapegoats to the nation’s ills. In a related study, Hess and Orphanides (2001) found the United States was twice as likely to engage in external conflict when the president was running for reelection and the economy had been in a recession.

Abundant public opinion polls and political commentary document that a sizeable majority of the U.S. public rallies behind

the president at the onset of military conflict (see Lindsay, 2003). Powlick and Katz (1998) suggested that major media coverage of foreign policy events prompts public attention and activates opinion formation. Some scholars argue that increased public and media dependency on the president to set the national course during national crises and military conflict (Brody, 1994; Brody & Shapiro, 1989; Mueller, 1971) helps explain why media suggest, prompt, or magnify the impulse of the public to participate in a patriotic, pro-administration "rally" at such times (Edwards & Swenson, 1997; Hutcheson, 2003; Lee, 1997; Mackuen, 1983; Mueller, 1994). Indeed, Hutcheson (2003) found such rallies endure only during elite consensus, when the president effectively speaks for a unified nation. Pan and Kosicki (1994) found that increased homogeneity between government and media discourse generated greater rallying effects.

Arguing against a strong direct effects model, Connell (1982) observed that media texts are subject to multiple interpretations and do not simply exclude alternative voices but rather undermine their credibility with negative discursive cues that alert readers to the lack of authority of such perspectives. Embedded in communication disorders, such as two-sided messages and double-bind communication, these cues finally immunize the dominant interpretation of reality against criticism (Reimann, 2002). Bratic (2006) reasons that the increasingly homogeneous media content and increasing media consumption, impact, dependence and susceptibility in communities experiencing violence heighten media effects. Bratic, like Hantzsch (2004), starts from a weak effects model of media influence but concludes that within the context of violent conflict "the role of media in building peace is simultaneously both substantial and limited ... by the uncertainty that [its] positive impact [on awareness and beliefs] will be translated into behavior" (p. 9).

Decades of study of the role of the media in ongoing conflict suggests that media rarely report conflict neutrally (Gamson et al, 1992; Noakes & Wilkins, 2002; Ross, 2003; Wolfsfeld, 1997b, 2001, 2001b). Taleb's (2004) overarching work on media coverage of conflicts asserted that media frame conflicts in one of five ways: as win/lose conflicts, as human interest stories, as economic forces, as morality tales, and as indicators of blame. Some scholars have argued that press and researchers' excessive focus on media coverage of conflicts, rather than more "normal" situations, provides limited potential for discovering paths to peace (Ben-Dak, 1970; Kent, 1971). Ben-Dak (1970), for example, concluded that much research on media and peace served primarily to establish the intractability and irreconcilability of parties engaged in conflict.

Carroll (1972) suggested that research focused on power relations at national and supranational levels served to increase the powerlessness, helplessness, impotence, and apathy of those whose mobilization would best serve peace efforts. She (1972; also see Hoffman, 1963) argued that too much research fails to "consider seriously the possibility that war is inherent not in human nature but in the power system of dominance in human relations" articulated through the nation-state.

In a recent study of political propaganda discourse and media content across four European nations, however, Nohrstedt et al (2000) found that media coverage of war is part of "propaganda flows and activities" that naturalize the fundamental paradox of "peace by bombs" and morality through immoral use of violence (p. 384). Hoijer, Nohrstedt & Ottosen (2002) suggested that three interconnected discourses constitute the global discursive order on war and peace: news discourse, propaganda, and a discourse of global compassion that embodies collective choices and effects change (Fairclough, 1995). They found post-Cold War politicians mobilized for war with the "designer language" of rights and compassion, not the discourse of dominance and power (Hoijer et al., 2002, p. 5; see also Terzis & Melone, 2001).

Nohrstedt et al's (2002) study of reporting on violence in Kosovo found that transnational media engaged in nationalized propaganda discourse that uncritically incorporated the government's concept of "military humanism" (p. 391) to the extent that military violence as a rational solution to the Kosovo conflict aligned with the domestic nation's international policy. The authors identified personalization of threats, exaggerated demonization of the enemy, acceptance of the "regrettable inevitability" of "accidental" casualties, and the consistent neglect of the existence or content of peace initiatives as components of media's war propaganda discourse that polarizes and suppresses shared or neutral positions. They also observed a continuum of media empathy with victims that paralleled national political policy.

Hackett (1991) argued that the need for public credibility, the journalistic ethos of public service, and the demands for professional integrity countervailed a singular, government-dictated discourse in the media. Decades earlier, Boulding (1972) contested focus on "the man' or capitalist imperialism as the source of oppression and violence, ... [arguing that it offers] simplistic, monocausal explanations of war" and that "powerful tools for understanding the dynamics of community formation are being left to one side in the peace research movement."

## Peace Journalism

At the start of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Galtung (1998, 2002), Kempf (1996, 2002), Shinar (2003) and others (see, e.g., Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution, 2003; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005) advocated creative models and training programs to respond to this reality and to transform the role of media. Young and Jesser (1997) proposed that international media consolidate and concentrate their coverage to establish a single press consortium with the economic and tactical independence of governments to provide a truly autonomous alternative voice. Botes (1995) contended that media could

play a critical positive role in conflict prevention. Gorsevski (1999) suggested that the media could advance "propaganda of peacemaking" by re-humanizing individuals engaged in conflict through a non-violent rhetoric (Chilton, 1987). Rather than use media as a tool for pro-peace advocacy (see e.g., Bell, 1997; Galtung, 1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2002), however, Terzis and Melone (2001) asserted that media should pursue balance and neutrality, but they "cannot be neutral toward peace" (p. 19).

Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) similarly defined peace journalism as quality journalism that uses a creative set of tools to include routinely or habitually under-represented perspectives to provide deeper and broader coverage of news (pp. 5, 224). In place of advocacy journalism that envisions or portrays a conflict-free society, they argued for a peace journalism that helps produce a society "good at handling [] conflicts non-violently" (p. 48). Kempf (2002) also rejected attempts to understand peace journalism as a form of advocacy and favors peace journalism as "good journalism" that goes well beyond simplistic dualisms of good and bad. Kempf (2003) suggested a two-stage strategy to reduce the escalation orientation of mainstream conflict coverage: His first stage of "de-escalation oriented coverage" is characterized by neutrality and critical distance from all parties to the conflict and coincides broadly with what is generally considered quality journalism. It goes beyond the professional norms of journalism only to the extent that the journalists' competence in conflict theory produces coverage in which the conflict is kept open to a peaceful settlement. His second stage requires the abandonment of dualism and the reframing of conflict as a cooperative process through "solution-oriented coverage," which, he concluded, is likely to garner majority support only when an armistice or a peace treaty is already in place.

Possibly in response to critiques against peace journalism, Bauman and Siebert (2000) found nothing inherently unique or objectionable in its postulates and posited that media are inevitably engaged in conflict mediation. At the same time that media inherently educate, contextualize, provide an outlet for strong emotions, offer solutions, and build consensus, "journalists [also] mediate conflict whether they intend to or not" (Bauman & Siebert, 2000; see also Merrill, 1989, pp. 10-11). Astorino-Courtois (1996) suggested that media can play a pro-active role in marketing peace by identifying publicly salient attributes of peace and encouraging opposing groups to seek accord in areas of low-risk gain with little or no loss to their information role to society. Gilboa (2003) documented a positive, though ethically and professionally ambiguous, media role in helping peace negotiators build external support and test strategies and terms of agreement. Howard (2003) asserted that peace journalism does not require a departure from fundamental news values and professional practices but rather arises when the press attends carefully "to its own professional strictures ... [of] accuracy, impartiality, and independence" (p. 1). Lee and Maslog (2005) found that peace journalism relies less on overt advocacy than on "extensions of the objectivity credo... avoidance of good-bad labels, a non-partisan approach, a multiparty orientation, and an avoidance of demonizing language" (p. 324). Their empirical study of Asian newspaper coverage of conflicts found "little in terms of a solution-seeking approach [or] ... people orientation" (p. 324).

Clearly, however, peace journalism is not without its critics. Hammond (2002) has castigated the false morality of peace journalism as a form of "advocacy" journalism, evoking memories and fears of "yellow" journalism and abdication of social responsibility. Hammond argued that only a truly "dispassionate," neutral, objective press serves the needs of an open society and concluded that the agenda-driven coverage of the "journalism of attachment" increases, rather than reduces, the errors of distorted consensual reporting, moral certainty, lack of balance, selectivity, over simplification, dichotomization, polarization, dismissal of contrary or dissenting evidence, refusal to critically evaluate claims, and insufficiency of context. Hanitzsch (2004) complained of severe theoretical, ethical, and practical limits to the engagement of peace journalism and argued that some underlying assumptions of peace journalism are both naïve and simplistic. In what may be viewed as praise or condemnation, Winoto (2002) said, "The concept of peace journalism looks quite suitable, especially ...where the *purpose* of communication is to *generate social harmony and freedom*" (emphasis added). Fawcett (2002) suggested shortcomings of the narrative assumptions of peace journalism reporting. Howard (2003) argued "that the media may well be the most effective means of conflict resolution and preventing new wars" (p. 2), but competitive Westernized media will not quickly or easily abandon their "obsession with commercialized conflict" (p. 8).

Despite growing interest and controversy related to peace journalism, too little systematic empirical research has been conducted in the field. Wolfsfeld (2001c) and Howard (2003) decried the scarcity of academic analysis of the role of the media in peace building. Some three decades earlier, Ben-Dak (1970) encouraged the field to engage in systematic translation of the literature and to adopt "exact and reproducible methodologies" of consistent quantitative analyses from varied perspectives and experimental designs to counterbalance the dominance of "impressionistic" studies. Scholars including Fabris and Varis (1986), Hackett (1991), and Kempf (2003) have asserted that more systematic scientific analysis and empirical data on media coverage of war *and peace* are vital to understand the roles of the media and to mitigate social harms of media coverage. Daugherty and Warden (1979) argued that far-flung attacks on U.S. media coverage of the Middle East had been made "without substantial empirical data" about their content or their effects. Their analysis of 11 years of editorials in four elite newspapers found the press provided overwhelmingly more favorable coverage of Israel than Palestine but the skew in coverage was event driven, and press support for Israel was "neither monolithic nor invariable."

Political scientists repeatedly have reviewed and analyzed the literature in peace studies and conflict resolution (Arendt, 1969; Ben-Dak, 1970; Ben-Dak, 1972; Boulding, 1968; Boulding, 1972; Carroll, 1972; Converse, 1968; Kent, 1971; Parenti, 1970; Rapoport, 1970) in search of innovative directions and reasonable expectations for the field. These scholars simultaneously accused the field of experiencing a drought, lacking substance, being overly pragmatic and excessively "technical," preoccupied with institutionalized power rather than people, polemical, illusory, fashionable, narrow, amorphous, homogeneous, conflicted, reactive, ideological, ineffectual, biased, misdirected, speculative, trivial, marginal, reductionist, and meaningless. Anderson's (1963) overview of the status and weaknesses of peace research focused predominately on the United States and limited discussion of the role of the media (segregated under the effects of communication on attitude formation) to their function "as inventors of images and ideas" (p. 34)

Carroll (1972) suggested that peace was best advanced through the empowerment of small, self-focused, non-status-competitive, austere, isolated, independently competent, non-state actors. What was needed, Carroll (1972) asserted, was a reinvigoration of the sense of individual and autonomous competence and capability among the "underdogs." Peace studies, therefore, should refocus outside the nation-state, and away from the normative practices of superpowers and toward deviators and the potentialities of individual agents by defining "power as ability, energy and strength." Carroll (1972) barely acknowledged the pervasive influence of media and other social control institutions and claimed that the "integrative" power to build community and identity lies with the people.

Davison (1974) suggested a constructive media role and argued vaguely that the press could become an agent of "peace-keeping" because of its ability to direct public attention toward negotiations and enhance the exchange of information among parties. Boulding (1969) noted the "integrative power" and the ability of the media to define the central concepts of community and identity upon which peace could be founded. Beit Allahmi (1972), Ben-Dak (1972), Hofman, (1972), and Ibrahim (1972), who explicitly examined the significant role of improved communication and information flows in conflict resolution, tended to highlight the role of the media in the construction and reinforcement of simplistic and extremely negative images of the "other." Ben-Dak (1970), for example, observed that the media could serve either as a mechanism of "socialization for hostility or for coexistence." Much of this work implicitly centered on and presaged subsequent research on the role of media in identity formation rather than peace-building.

Arno (1984) argued that media can and do "operate as effective third parties" in conflict resolution (p. 233). Based primarily on case studies, O'Heffernan (1991) and Loshitsky (1991), and indeed Wolfsfeld (1997b), suggested media – especially television public affairs programs – function as public forums in which disputants engage and conflict is resolved. Spencer (2004) concluded that because the media attract public attention and generate public pressure to "facilitate diplomacy and force movement," they inherently play a role in peace by pressuring politicians to engage actively and effectively in peace negotiations (p. 604). Kelman (1996) argued that the media support conflict resolution by encouraging and facilitating positive commitment to negotiations and peace building, and Burton (1969) indicated that this media role is tied to its ability to control the pace and content of communication.

Botes (2003) and Becker et al. (1995) cautioned that the peace-making function of media is not automatic and hinges on the degree to which dialogues are respectful and reasoned exchanges rather than attacks and insults. Hopman and Druckman (1991) observed that media forums sometimes simply provided a highly visible opportunity for competitive posturing. Botes (2003) argued that media deal with disputants "relatively unconsciously and invariably without taking any responsibility for bringing the parties closer to any form of resolution" (p. 16). While reconciliation may arise through mediated exchanges, then, such an outcome is a largely unintentional effect of programming that is actually "a form of media voyeurism that does not take any responsibility for its social intervention" (p. 16). Indeed, journalists understand that parties in conflict use the media to advance their own self-interests. Yet Vayrynen (1991) noted significantly that the media can bring "out-parties" into the dialogue, thereby transforming the power dynamics and redefining the conflict. This function is most likely to occur, according to Botes (2003), when communication among the parties is limited, strained or otherwise "impoverished."

While one author flatly denied any independent media power and asserted that media in conflict zones are "the most manipulated and powerless players" (Three Kings, No Journalists, mediachannel.org, Dec. 20, 1999), more analytical attempts to grapple with the issue of the power of the media remain inconclusive, conflicted, or so complex as to evade rigorous empirical testing. Howard (2003), for example, distinguished among the "undeniably deadly side" of media as instruments of totalitarian regimes, the "partisan ... and destructive role" of completely free media in the most open democracies, and the challenging and problematic development of autonomous media in states moving from totalitarianism to democracy (p. 2; see also Bennett & Paletz, 1994; Strobel, 1997). Stone (1989) and Bruck (1989) argued that media discourse is highly contextual and far from determinative or closed. Thus, for example, Bruck (1989) said research into the role of media in peace must consider "historical and social embeddedness" as well as "ongoing [social] struggles" (p. 109).

Tehrani (2002) is an exemplar of those peace journalism scholars who assert that peace building requires "a media system that promotes peace rather than war, understanding rather than obfuscation, tolerance rather than hatred, celebration

of diversity rather than xenophobia" (p. 74) (Galtung, 2000, 2000b). He (2002) advocated greater structural pluralism to free independent media outlets to embrace discrete agendas and selected components of peace journalism. Tehranian argued that pluralistic ownership and governance of media are necessary but not sufficient for the praxis of peace journalism because media "objectives are ultimately hostage to the institutional, *national and international regimes* under which they are being pursued" (p. 71) (emphasis added).

Chomsky (1999) and Thussu (2000) have examined the ideological content of peace reporting by the U.S. media and assert that U.S. evocations of peace are strategically employed not to support peace but to cast a "saintly glow" over American aggression (Chomsky, 1999, p. 14). Thussu (2000) suggested that media representations of peace are defensive – presenting peace as the military protection of "our" borders against evil incursions (p. 358). Solomon (1992) similarly concluded that U.S. news media portray U.S. militarism as "establishing democracy and ... peace" (p. 57). Stone (1989) argued that Canadian newspapers use the language of "peace" as a surrogate for "our" values, beliefs and ideals in opposition to those of the "other" (pp. 57-8).

### **Illustrative Problems and Concerns: A case study**

Foreign press coverage of Middle East peace initiatives offers insight into some of the key concerns of Tehranian, Lynch, a, and others, and reflects this author's interest in non-local, especially international media coverage of regional conflicts. While Shinar (2003) demonstrated the problematic role local media may play in building excessively high expectations for peace processes and conflict transformation, the global U.S. hegemon relies on long-distance wire reportage and U.S. summaries of the foreign press for much of its Middle East news. Here a purposive sample of European press summaries in *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* is used to highlight some problems and concerns with media coverage of distant conflicts that implicate U.S. interests or cultural values. While some would challenge the objectivity or selective coverage of this publication, *The Washington Report* presents itself as a magazine "that focuses on news and analysis from and about the Middle East and U.S. policy in that region, ... published by ... a non-profit foundation [created by] by retired U.S. foreign service officers to provide the American public with balanced and accurate information concerning U.S. relations with Middle Eastern states." The publication proclaims itself to be the most exhaustive and significant U.S. periodical covering these issues that reaches more than 100,000 of "the nation's most sophisticated populace," who are decision makers and opinion leaders in government, business, and the media. As such, *The Washington Report* is positioned to influence U.S. public policy, public opinion, and media content (McCombs & Shaw, 1972, 1993; Shah & Thornton, 2004).

A review of *The Washington Report* with particular attention to its summaries of press coverage of peace initiatives between Israel and the Palestinian territories suggests five trends in press orientations: 1. Peace initiatives are represented as political maneuvering and strategic posturing, 2. Peace initiatives are rhetorical games that hide fundamental and intractable differences and hatreds, 3. Peace initiatives are a game among players who have little commitment to or belief in their success, 4. Peace initiatives are fragile and will evaporate given any provocation, and 5. The language of peacemaking is doublespeak and distortion.

The following purposive sample from stories in *The Washington Report* illustrates these trends.

#### **1. Peace: Politics by Another Name**

The tendency to represent peace efforts as political games is pervasive and overt. General summaries of news coverage (Marshall, 1991) as well as references to specific newspaper stories (Jones, 2000, 2001, 2001c) suggest that peace initiatives are a farce and a "meaningless" "charade" played out by politicians who seek the spotlight rather than substantive agreements. Jones (2000) cited newspapers that represent peace negotiators as "playing for time" in a "game of exploiting the unrest." Marshall's (1991) summary suggested that the political game is fixed; he called U.S.-brokered peace initiatives "a contest [in] which the other side had drawn up the rules, could choose the players, and had determined the outcome in advance." In this game, newspapers in Frankfurt, Germany, and London represented weak political players as patsies or "stooges" in the talks (Jones, 2000). Intervention by U.S. President Bill Clinton in 2001 was justified because the "unfolding tragedy ... could have a decisive effect on America's other interests in the region" (Jones, 2001). However, the political involvement of the United States was portrayed as an "11<sup>th</sup> hour grasp" to "allow [... Clinton] to ride off in glory into the sunset as credits roll" rather than to advance or achieve lasting peace in the Middle East (Jones, 2001).

Such representations of peace negotiations as a political game render the violence invisible, consistently minimize the real costs of conflict, and marginalize human suffering. Both violent conflict and its cessation are seen as political maneuvers in which human lives are a reasonable cost. Jones highlighted this inhumane perspective by citing an *Economist* story on peace negotiations that concluded that "stopping the slaughter is worth doing for its own sake. The killing is leading to nothing good. It's a tragedy in itself" (Jones, 2001c).

## 2. Conflict: Evidence of Essentialist Hatreds

While the political game perspective suggests that the costs of violence are immaterial, the essentialist perspective suggests that violent conflict is natural, inherent, and inevitable. Jones (2000) documented this type of reporting in German, Italian, Polish, and Russian media that portrayed the collapse of peace talks as evidence of the fundamental insolubility of violence in the Middle East. Such reporting called the violent conflict evidence of "a holy war" and the embodiment of the "people's anger" and a "growing wave of hatred on both sides." Media adopting this view saw peace treaties as efforts to "paper over the irresolvable contradictions" between peoples convinced violence was the only path to pursue (Jones, 2000).

## 3. Peace Efforts: Charades, Futilities and Foolishness

A closely related media frame begins with a fundamental disbelief in the potential for true peace, perhaps due to an assumption of the inherent evil of human nature. Such media coverage of political actors' peace initiatives tended to suggest that the participants themselves lacked faith in the process (Jones, 2001c). Marshall (1991), for example, summarized stories in which both the possibility of conducting talks and their potential for effectiveness is seen as a sham. In this light, peace talks in fact do more harm than good; they produce "only empty promises" that "can only arouse a sense of betrayal and intensify existing grievances" (Marshall, 1991). British, German, French, Swedish, Italian, and Austrian media stories are cited to demonstrate coverage in which negotiations are presented as "worthless" and "likely to fail" from the start (Jones, 2000, 2001, 2001c, 2001d). For example, Jones (2000) noted a story in the French *Liberation* that said a summit was "better than military escalation" although no one should harbor "any illusions about the outcome." The *Berliner Zeitung*, according to Jones (2001), said the peace process would "lurch from crisis to crisis for many years," and the Italian *La Repubblica* paradoxically called the *peace plan* "a burial shroud."

Coverage of citizens protesting U.S. military action in Afghanistan was more than merely skeptical of its efficacy. Reporting challenged the "sincerity" of the protesters, and it overtly dismissed their rationale, their logic, and their understanding of international issues (Jones, 2001d).

## 4. Events: Portents of Doom

Coverage of potentially conflict-laden events and actions did not receive this same skeptical or dismissive treatment in the news media routinely reviewed by *The Washington Report*. Instead, media tended to accept the potency of events that challenged, rather than supported, peace talks. Examples from German, Dutch, and British newspapers represented Ariel Sharon's 2000 visit to the Temple Mount, for example, as a powerful, intentional, and unmitigated act of agitation that presaged future violence that might explode "into full-scale war" (Jones, 2000). Here even the 2001 Israeli elections are presented as a harbinger of a new "wave of violence" (Jones, 2001, 2001b). Here, the future potential for violence is made concrete and present, overshadowing the possibility of peace.

## 5. Officialspeak: Truth and Other Constructions

Press summaries also indicate that journalists sometimes exaggerate positions and polarize participants in peace negotiations, perhaps to overcome the inherent absence of drama in ongoing talks. Thus, for example, selected media labeled U.S. pressure on Palestinians to participate in talks an "ultimatum" (Marshall, 1991).

In its selection and representation of mainstream media coverage of peace initiatives in the Middle East, *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* highlights five mechanisms through which news media undermine and marginalize the credibility and effectiveness of peace processes while simultaneously underscoring the potency of actions that threaten peace. To the degree that *The Washington Report* contributes to the U.S. public and policy agenda in the Middle East, it portrays peace as uncertain, remote, and untenable. Through both news coverage and commentary, the selected newspapers recurrently dismiss the potential for peace and denigrate diplomatic solutions. Peace initiatives are alternately a political charade or a vital component of imperialist ambitions. Public protests against war are condescendingly represented as sincere but misguided. Violence is inherent, logical, and imbedded in the very nature of the peoples and the extremism of the region; it is an intractable cultural phenomenon among those "other" people, who often are represented as irrational, full of essentialist hatred, and increasingly committed to violence as a solution.

## Media, Conflict, and Identity

Understanding of the complex intersections of media, conflict, and identity is foundational to the practice of peace journalism. Tomlinson (1991) observed that newspapers both naturalize and "promote identification within the nation as *the* dominant form of cultural identity" (p. 83) (emphasis added). While the media occasionally evoke "images and representations of explicit nationalism," they more frequently call upon and reinforce national identity "through the construction of an abstract nation at risk through constant evocation of the 'natural' boundaries of the national community" (Brookes, 1999, p.



261). Some scholars (see, e.g., Shinar, 2003) have argued that nationalist media have emphasized and magnified popular sensitivity to essentialist differences, fueling conflicts between cultures, and, in the words of Tehranian (2002), promoting "envy and hatred [that] ... outpaced mutual understanding, respect, and tolerance" (p. 59; also see Hackett, 1991). Challenging the naturalness of nationalism as the master identity requires a more complex vision in which identity is understood as an ongoing process of boundary construction, maintenance, and destruction (Brookes, 1999; Schlesinger, 1991, 1991b).

Majstorovic (1997) noted that each of the two prevailing interpretations of the nature of conflict is profoundly flawed. Portraits of two sides, divided by essentialist differences and primordial hatreds (Geertz, 1973; Shils, 1957, 1995; Smith, 1983, 1986, 1991, 1995; Hunter, 1991; Moscovici, 1981) misunderstand the malleable multiplicity of identity (Swidler, 1986), misrepresent history (Mermin, 1999), dichotomize complex problems, and ignore the interconnections among various groups (Majstorovic, 1997). In contrast, insights into the constructed nature of ethno-nationalism (Anderson, 1991; Hall, 1992; Ignatieff, 1993; Shils, 1957) colored by critical perspectives of power and of nation-state manipulation of the masses to their own ends (Haas, 1993; Hobsbawm, 1990) fail to recognize the contingent, fluid nature of identity; dismiss the varied constraints of myth, history, and tradition; and underestimate the agency of the people (Barthes, 1972; Brookes, 1999; Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983; Majstorovic, 1997).

Majstorovic (1997) suggested that prevailing perspectives on national identity may result from the "shared perspectives" of scholars, the product of ideology, perhaps, rather than deep insight into the nature of intergroup dynamics. While vital questions remain unanswered, it seems evident that Huntington's (1998) thesis that global conflicts arise from irreconcilable fundamental cultural differences is profoundly flawed. To overlook the varied, distinct, or potentially overlapping ways in which parties to a conflict may self-identify, and to ignore the highly subjective and contextual nature of identities is to fall into the trap of reductionism. Neither the "peoples" nor the causes of conflict are fixed or unitary. Thus, reporting practices that essentialize and reify difference are not only simplistic, they are simply inaccurate. Moreover, analyses that focus on elite representations and portraits of reality (e.g., media content analyses) suffer from the same exclusivity of focus for which researchers castigate the media.

### Contested Directions

While much current energy is directed toward practical training initiatives to address the perceived inadequacies of contemporary media practice, systematic research on media coverage of peace is insufficient to direct these efforts. One point of contention is the locus (or loci) of the problem. External events and shifting realities are a primary source of existing coverage patterns, according to Young and Jesser (1997), and Ross and Bantimaroudis (2005). Hess and Orphanides (2001) and Bloomberg and Hess (2002) suggest that strategic political economic gamesmanship drives world events that, in turn, drive media coverage (Mosco, 1996). More generally, Bruck (1989), Stone (1989), and others, point to the highly contextual nature of media coverage and assert that a significant impetus toward war reporting lies within the world itself and within the nature of catastrophic events. Such perspectives suggest limits to the transformative power of journalism training.

A stronger argument, effectively articulating the impotence of peace journalism initiatives, posits that the media are a propaganda mouthpiece for the government, and journalistic norms and standards are little more than a ruse (Chomsky, 1999; Herman & Chomsky, 1980). Several scholars explicitly reject this vision of journalists as patsy to government (Lang & Lang, 2004; Lee & Maslog, 2005; Wolfsfeld, 1997), but a large and well-established body of work emphasizes the significant influence of political propaganda upon reporting (Nohrstedt et al, 2002; Solomon, 1992; Stone, 1989; Thussu, 2000). Hallin (1986) and Avraham (2003), for example, hold that the political culture in which media operate holds enormous sway over coverage patterns.

Rejecting portraits of relatively powerless media, many scholars assert that both internal industry norms and pressures and external ideology and politics drive the tendency for media to participate in rallies around government elites (Coles, 2002; Edwards & Swenson, 1997; Hutcheson, 2003; Lee, 1997; Lindsay, 2003; Mackuen, 1983; Mueller, 1994; Powlick & Katz, 1998). Gans (1979), Paletz and Entman (1981), and Shoemaker and Reese (1996) articulate a reciprocal influence between government elites and media in which a pivotal component is media dependency on government spokespeople. Bennett (2003), Body (1994), Lynch (2003), and Mueller (1971) point toward media reliance on government sources as the crux of the matter. Here, then, government exerts its power to set the media (dis)course indirectly by articulating coverage narratives and establishing salient binaries (Coe et al, 2004; Coles, 2002; Gitlin, 1979). Tuchman (1978), Schudson (1982), and Hallin and Mancini (1984) acknowledge the linguistic power of sources but suggest that the narrative conventions of journalism themselves are also at fault for media's proclivity to emphasize and exacerbate conflict. Professional norms and practices contribute to this formula (Hackett, 1991), making it particularly useful to consider new reporting and editing practices.

Wolfsfeld (1997b), Hackett (1991), Tehranian (2002), and Howard (2003) direct attention to the organizational structure, the increasing lack of pluralism, and the political economy of the media to argue that increased pluralism in ownership,

structures, and revenue streams is a key concern. In their view, a considerable portion of the problem lies within the power and prerogatives of media ownership and must be addressed at that level.

The complexity of the issues underlying peace journalism may elude scholarly consensus; a sufficient body of theory and evidence exists to support divergent positions. Thus, portents of gloom for the future of peace journalism see the field as flawed, certain to be ineffectual, or – worse – certain to be co-opted and manipulated to serve the “man” rather than the “people.” Others see opportunities for change and empowerment through retraining, restructuring, and re-envisioning the field. It is the reconciliation of these positions that is required.

Those who envision media as a public forum for open and productive debate (Arno, 1984; Loshitsky, 1991; O’Heffernan, 1991) must contend with abundant evidence that these industries are driven by the profit motive and the competitive lure of conflict (Howard, 2003) and often function as purveyors of fear and essentialist hatred at the behest of the powerful (e.g., Brookes, 1999). Those who advocate using the media to market salient, low-risk steps toward peace (Astorino-Courtois, 1983) or as a mechanism for advancing mutual respect and redefining community (Becker et al, 1995; Botes, 2003; Boulding, 1986) must address others who condemn the journalism of engagement as an abandonment of its vital role as an objective source of information (Fawcett, 2002; Hammond, 2002; Holquin, 1998). Those who suggest that citizens exert significant influence on media content because of their power to confer, or deny, media credibility (Tehrani, 2002) must recognize their diminished influence in the arena of international coverage. Those who believe in transcendent populist media standing outside existing power dynamics and transforming public dialogue to embrace new voices (Vayrynen, 1991) must grapple with the realities of competition in a lucrative global market and the expanding influence of media conglomerates and cross-national political initiatives (Burton, 1969; Kelman, 1996). And each of these must incorporate rich understanding of the variety of individuals and organizations that comprise the field of journalism as well as the dramatically different economic, cultural, and political environments in which they operate.

### **The Middle Road**

Today both peace and war are caricatured in media coverage that seeks drama, political congruence, and clarity in 150 words or less. Such reporting obscures reality and confounds human initiatives toward global peace. Yet this practice is the result of a profound human tendency; journalists evoke oppositional dualities more readily during coverage of violent conflict, when their increased fear and mortality salience prompt heightened desire to cling to one’s own world view (Jonas & Greenberg, 2004). Inchoate fear also increases nationalism, defensiveness, and the willingness to censor the flow of information and to forego other fundamental liberties (Blanchard, 1992). Siebert (1952) and Blanchard (1992) are among a much broader group of scholars (see, e.g., Smith, 1999) who have argued that this “urge toward conformity,” in Blanchard’s (1992) terms, undermines the ability of the press to function as a check on government abuse of power during times of fear (pp. viii-ix).

Peace journalism, therefore, faces a daunting challenge to address deeply trained professional patterns, structural and financial pressures within the industry, and profound psychological responses that encourage reactive, and at times reactionary, nationalistic reporting. Calls to simply “do better” will, therefore, likely fall short if they fail to help journalists negotiate the terrors of war and transcend the human desire to distance and to blame. The challenge is not only for journalists to listen well and to hear “the other” better but to understand and incorporate that new understanding into an expanded revision of self that transcends national, religious, ethnic, and other profound aspects of identity and enmity. This shift demands abandonment of the moral certainty in one’s own beliefs to adopt a broader and more fundamental set of values grounded in clarity that peace is always better than violence, health is better than epidemic disease and starvation, and economic sufficiency is better than ravaging poverty.

To move toward media that serve global peace not war, we must avoid the alluring yet insubstantial path of reductionism. Allport (1954) and Tajfel (1969) observed that people employ categorizations to economize and simplify their assessments of others and to direct their intergroup behavior. The human urge to simplify complexity and divide continua into discrete categories upon which we base future choices and actions is a fundamental precept of contemporary understanding of social cognition and intergroup psychology (Miller & Hoffman, 1999). Kempf’s (2003) observations on human psychology are particularly useful here. He noted that humans tend to focus on their own intentions but on the actual effects of other’s actions. This tendency systematically underestimates the harm of personal actions as it overestimates the harm caused by others. The influence of such categorizations upon stereotyping, outcasting, and symbolic representations of culture is well documented (e.g., Hazlam et al., 1995, Hunter, 1991).

Yet the varied categories to which individuals belong do not coalesce into hostile opposing camps unless the groups are “*clearly defined in a public forum*.” That is, people are not likely to see themselves as belonging to a broad social category until some event, popular group, or charismatic leader defines the category” (Miller & Hoffman, 1999, emphasis added). Decades of agenda setting and framing research confirm the role of the media as this forum and support the conclusion

that people employ the categorizations with the greatest salience (Hogg & Turner, 1997; McCombs & Shaw, 1972). Thus, people aggregate around dominant categories, forming groups that will adopt increasingly extreme positions and exaggerate inter-group differences as the media portray conflict between the groups as rising (Brown & Williams, 1984).

An effective praxis of peace journalism must recognize first that journalists are human beings, citizens, social beings, and products of the same social, political, religious, ethnocentric, and nationalistic pressures and predilections as the people about whom they report. It is paradoxical, but nonetheless true, that many journalists attracted to the profession by a desire to "change the world" systematically engage in practices that entrench the status quo. Wilhoit and Weaver (Weaver, 1998; Weaver et al, 2002; Weaver & Wilhoit, 1996, 1991) repeatedly have documented the solid membership of U.S. journalists in the elite caste that benefits from the very conflicts peace journalism would ask them to work toward eliminating. Given human nature, peace journalism seems unlikely to take hold until proposals provide mechanisms to assist journalists in transcending their own individual and collective identities.

Journalists themselves, however, recurrently cite training as the greatest influence on their news values (Weaver et al, 2002). Modern journalism education in the United States is essentially an outgrowth of the U.S. government's extensive and effective use of communications media in World War II (Rogers, 1994). Here history suggests attention to retraining is well placed, at least in the United States and in countries where independent, autonomous media have not been the norm (Howard, 2003). James Carey (1978) and others (Edge, 2003) long have argued that the contemporary training of professional journalists stifles original and critical thinking. Improved practice, they say, requires journalists to be more self-reflexive and to better understand their role in society and in conflict (Edge, 2003).

Based in knowledge of the powerful role of war coverage to divert public attention away from enormous transfers of wealth, Galtung (1970, 2000, 2000b) and Tehranian (2002), like Kaldor (2003), nonetheless argues that strong, diverse, independent media are essential to civil society and "to counter the powers of the state and the market" to dominate and, hence, diminish civil discourse ((Tehranian, p. 79, 77). It is clear peace journalists and activists promoting peace must abandon the tactics of conflict and the reactive rhetoric of negativity, blame, and criticism (Coles, 2002; Gorsevski, 1999; Harvey, 1991; Ivie, 1987) to engage in a positive discourse of principled, compassionate humanism, and provide positive alternatives to the status quo. Proponents of peace must not engage in the game of shaming, demonizing, and othering mastered by the mongers of war (see, e.g., Lazar & Lazar, 2004) but should rally the people with invitations to act upon their essential "peace and justice sentiments" (Coles, 2002, p. 599) and conceptualize a transnational identity of universal humanity (Coles, 2002, p. 602).

What is needed is a journalism of symbolic rapprochement. My views adopt some of the principles of "conflict transformation" identified by Shinar (2003), who suggests that a transformation of "the images of the self and the other," rather than reconciliation, is necessary to end intractable, essentialist, cultural conflicts. I strongly support the focus on image transformation as vital to resolution of all conflicts regardless of whether essentialist or not. The key, as Shinar (2003) notes, is for "groups engaged in conflict [to] achieve a fairly accurate understanding of each other."

The role of the media in such transformations is critical, yet extremely difficult. Journalism structures of conglomerated ownership politically aligned or interwoven with government actors exerting transnational or even global influence and peddling government rhetoric present significant sources of resistance particularly when legal structures limit their autonomy. Yet assertions that media have expanded their influence on and their intervention in international policy processes (Fowler, 1991; Gilboa, 1998; Hall, 1980; Larson, 1986; Tuchman, 1978) may be unduly pessimistic. It is likely media consistently have partnered, throughout time and to varying degrees, with governments in international affairs.

The challenge to create new constructions of reality is, at its base, a human challenge. Fisher (1989, 1989b) first suggested that narrative conventions have enormous societal impact because humans are story-telling animals, what he called *homo narrans*, who experience and understand life as a series of narratives with beginnings, middles, and ends (Niles, 1999). Humans naturally craft stories with dramatic coherence that transform individuals into archetypes and connect events into a logical series. Familiar story lines that place good and evil in dramatic combat, link hard work to resource acquisition, and create a world of finite resources and zero-sum contests resonate with the human psyche and drive the journalist who crafts the story as well as the reader.

Here restructuring and retraining that insulate independent journalism organizations and journalists themselves from the economic, socio-political, and nationalistic pressures exerted by corporate and government elites are critical. Independent organizations and individuals can provide coverage responsive to events (manipulated by these elites) but redefined by a new array of credible and authoritative sources who offer resources of the imagination from which citizens can craft alternatives to elite constructions. The challenge to create more open and varied news outlets that embrace a range of views rather than parrot dominant political ideologies is in large part one of capital. Internet-based independent media centers (IndyMedia) today are expanding news narratives and increasing the rhetorical space for open exchange of information while evading many of the obstacles of capital. Independently funded through multiple private supporters, "Indymedia is

a democratic media outlet for the creation of radical, accurate, and passionate tellings of truth" (<http://www.indymedia.org/en/index.shtml>). A non-hierarchical collective of independent media organizations and hundreds of journalists, Indymedia advances the objectives of peace journalism through grassroots, non-corporate coverage with access for alternate voices.

As voices rise and independent, self-critical media grow, training also can provide journalists with strategies to inoculate themselves against knee-jerk responses to evocations of fear and the realities of violence. As in most attempts at self-change, moving beyond denial is a critical first step. Thus it is encouraging that journalists are aware of government control and spin of war coverage and have become somewhat self-critical about press participation in propaganda efforts (Hoijer, Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2002, p. 7). The dominance of the discourse of compassion among audience members is a potential resource for those seeking to transform media coverage toward praxis of peace.

Peace praxis also requires the deconstruction of national identities and movement toward representation of humans as individual people not as exemplars of a national, religious, ethnic, or other group. This is a particularized practice. According to Juanita Leon, editor of *El Tiempo's* (Colombia) Peace Unit, what is needed is a journalism that "create[s] the idea that peace is possible in the collective imagination" (Pratt, n.d.). Journalism that displays the society's efforts toward peace is essential because "government and media attention [to] the peace process, and the specific benefits to be gained from a peace accord, would be directly associated with public attitudes concerning the *vitalness* of that process" (Astorino-Courtois, 1996, p. 1039, emphasis in original). Actions to disempower the primacy of national identity and coalesce new communities can be built through coverage that places transnational linkages, regional alliances, and global concerns at its center.

The goal of peace journalism should not be to achieve rational mutual understanding at all times for all peoples around the globe. Such a goal would ignore the importance of what Kaplan (2003) eloquently called "the beauty of intolerable truths:" irrational, destructive, cruel, and violent "explosions of passion ... are central to the human spirit." Numerous psychologists, similarly, have recognized the role of violence in fulfilling both individual and collective needs that include relief from boredom and stimulation of an increased sense of creativity, confidence, empowerment, and agency (Grundy & Weinstein, 1974).

A more realistic objective for peace journalism, and one that conforms to the norms of professional ethics and objectivity, is to include a rich array of "symbols of security" and peace as resources for the collective imagination, particularly in nations or regions where long-term violence has rendered peace an unknown and unimaginable concept (Ghazy, 2003; Kashua, 2004; Shinar, 2003). The primary task of peace journalism, then, is to render the unknown thinkable; the alien, recognizable; the different, compatible. For, "in the absence of positive depictions ..., it is extremely unlikely that [others'] interests will resonate" (Noakes & Wilkins, 2002, p. 649).

## The War on War

Some will continue to argue that the practices outlined above as central to peace journalism praxis abandon the essential and central role of objective reporting. Poppycock! U.S. media long have embraced the government's "war on crime," its "war on drugs," its war on drinking and driving and an array of other public policy initiatives designed to alter the practices of residents. No one suggests the media should be an objective and neutral platform to exchange ideas on the pros and cons of rape or genocide. Why, then, is it more acceptable for media to promote anti-drug and anti-crime messages than to advocate for the end of violence? Clearly Lynch (1998) is correct: No substantial professional/ethical obstacle exists to the inclusion of pro-peace narratives by the media, and peace journalism does not involve any radical departure from contemporary journalism practice. Rather peace journalism requires numerous subtle and cumulative shifts in seeing, thinking, sourcing, narrating, and financing the news: shifts toward citizens and away from elite spokespeople, toward the value of peace rather than the adrenalin rush of conflict, toward mutual benefits rather than unilateral victory.

Caution is advised in pursuing a "peace frame" that encourages continued reliance on elites, media events, etc (Dayan & Katz, 1992) or a practice reliant upon overly concentrated media power (Young & Jesser, 1997). History demonstrates how quickly power corrupts and the agility with which governments co-opt external elites and effectively silence expression of truly original visions. Symbolic representations of equality, humanity, and harmony grow best in the rich soil of diverse experience and freedom (Shinar, 2004).

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*Robert A. Hackett*

## **Ist Friedensjournalismus möglich?**

Als Beitrag zur Beurteilung der Chancen für die Realisierung friedensjournalistischer Prinzipien in der Praxis berücksichtigt dieser Artikel drei konzeptionelle Modelle zur Untersuchung des Verhältnisses zwischen Journalismus und anderen Machtinstitutionen und -beziehungen. Das Propagandamodell von Herman und Chomsky beschreibt effizient einige Methoden der Beeinflussung von Journalismus durch Staat und Kapital. Es birgt aber die Gefahr, reduktionistisch und funktionalistisch zu sein. Das Modell der "Hierarchie der Einflüsse" von Shoemaker und Reese ermöglicht die Beurteilung der Positionen für und gegen Friedensjournalismus auf jeder seiner fünf Faktorstufen. Bei beiden Modellen besteht das Risiko, die Spezifität und Kohärenz von Journalismus als kulturelle Praxis und Form der Wissensproduktion zu verdecken. Pierre Bourdieus Vorstellung von Journalismus als relativ autonomes institutionelles Gebiet hat den Vorteil, konzeptionellen Raum sowohl für strukturelle Einflüsse von und auf Nachrichtenmedien als auch für die Tätigkeit und Kreativität von Journalisten zu gewährleisten. Die drei Modelle tragen gemeinsam dazu bei, Aufgaben, Herausforderungen und potentielle Strategien für die Bewegung des Friedensjournalismus aufzuzeigen.

[Volltext \(in Englisch\)](#)

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## **Is Peace Journalism Possible?**

### **Three Frameworks for Assessing Structure and Agency in News Media**

As a contribution to an assessment of the prospects for realizing the principles of peace journalism in practice, this article considers three conceptual frameworks for analyzing the relationship between journalism and other relations and institutions of power. Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model usefully highlights some ways that state and capital influence journalism, but it risks being reductionist and functionalist. Shoemaker and Reese's "hierarchy of influences" model helps us to assess pressures for and against peace journalism at each of five levels of factors. But both models risk obscuring the specificity and coherence of journalism as a cultural practice and form of knowledge-production. Pierre Bourdieu's notion of journalism as a field, a relatively autonomous institutional sphere, has the advantage of allowing conceptual space for both the structural influences of and on news media, as well as the potential agency and creativity of journalists. Taken together, the three models help to identify the tasks, challenges and potential strategies for the peace journalism movement.

[full text \(in English\)](#)

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### **Is Peace Journalism Possible? Three Frameworks for Assessing Structure and Agency in News Media<sup>1</sup>**

*Kurzfassung:* Als Beitrag zur Beurteilung der Chancen für die Realisierung friedensjournalistischer Prinzipien in der Praxis berücksichtigt dieser Artikel drei konzeptionelle Modelle zur Untersuchung des Verhältnisses zwischen Journalismus und anderen Machtinstitutionen und -beziehungen. Das Propagandamodell von Herman und Chomsky beschreibt effizient einige Methoden der Beeinflussung von Journalismus durch Staat und Kapital. Es birgt aber die Gefahr, reduktionistisch und funktionalistisch zu sein. Das Modell der "Hierarchie der Einflüsse" von Shoemaker und Reese ermöglicht die Beurteilung der Positionen für und gegen Friedensjournalismus auf jeder seiner fünf Faktorstufen. Bei beiden Modellen besteht das Risiko, die Spezifität und Kohärenz von Journalismus als kulturelle Praxis und Form der Wissensproduktion zu verdecken. Pierre Bourdieus Vorstellung von Journalismus als relativ autonomes institutionelles Gebiet hat den Vorteil, konzeptionellen Raum sowohl für strukturelle Einflüsse von und auf Nachrichtenmedien als auch für die Tätigkeit und Kreativität von Journalisten zu gewährleisten. Die drei Modelle tragen gemeinsam dazu bei, Aufgaben, Herausforderungen und potentielle Strategien für die Bewegung des Friedensjournalismus aufzuzeigen.

*Abstract:* As a contribution to an assessment of the prospects for realizing the principles of peace journalism in practice, this article considers three conceptual frameworks for analyzing the relationship between journalism and other relations and institutions of power. Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model usefully highlights some ways that state and capital influence journalism, but it risks being reductionist and functionalist. Shoemaker and Reese's "hierarchy of influences" model helps us to assess pressures for and against peace journalism at each of five levels of factors. But both models risk obscuring the specificity and coherence of journalism as a cultural practice and form of knowledge-production. Pierre Bourdieu's notion of journalism as a field, a relatively autonomous institutional sphere, has the advantage of allowing conceptual space for both the structural influences of and on news media, as well as the potential agency and creativity of journalists. Taken together, the three models help to identify the tasks, challenges and potential strategies for the peace journalism movement.

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Amongst practitioners and scholars of journalism, a movement towards "Peace Journalism" is gaining momentum, and attracting controversy.<sup>1</sup> Its proponents see it as an expression of, and/or improvement upon, the best practices of actually-existing journalism, as well as a means of ameliorating conflicts and opening up new opportunities for their peaceful resolution (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005). Peace Journalists regard conventional international news coverage – its typical emphasis on violence, conflict as a two-sided win/lose struggle, government and military sources, and "our" suffering versus "their" villainy – as comprising War Journalism.

By contrast, the opponents of Peace Journalism (henceforth, PJ), raise a number of objections: PJ is an unwelcome departure from objectivity and towards a journalism of attachment; it mistakenly assumes powerful and linear media effects; it is a normative model, rooted in the discipline of peace research, that fails sufficiently to take into account the constraints imposed by the actual dynamics of news production (including professional values and organizational imperatives), and hence, may have little to offer journalists in practice (Hanitzsch 2004a; 2004b).

In this paper, I want to take up the last of these criticisms. I start from the assumption that PJ is, or would be, a Good Thing, and thus, I largely bypass debates about its desirability. I also take for granted that journalism does matter to the prospects for war and peace, even if not in a unilinear or deterministic way. Rather than address the debates about media ethics and effects that PJ has provoked, this paper addresses another aspect. I want to argue that to succeed, PJ must translate its normative concerns, rooted in the discipline of peace research, into a strategy based on a theoretically-informed analysis of the governing logics of news production. PJ supporters need to conduct a purposeful review of what media scholarship tells us about the determinants of news production. Such a review could help us to identify blockages and opportunities for the practice of PJ (and conversely, War Journalism). Do media organizations have sufficient autonomy vis-a-vis other institutions, or journalists vis-a-vis media organizations, to put PJ into practice? Or is structural reform a prerequisite for the successful implementation of PJ?

This paper does not attempt a full literature survey, particularly since other scholars are also engaging in that task from a PJ perspective (e.g. Spencer 2005). Here, I want briefly to review three conceptual frameworks which could help shed light on the scope for agency in existing media institutions – Herman and Chomsky's Propaganda Model of the media, Shoemaker and Reese's hierarchical model of influences on media content, and Pierre Bourdieu's notion of journalism as a field. I conclude that a precondition of PJ's success is structural reform in that field, raising the strategic issue of how to build coalitions for media change.

It is not that PJ proponents have altogether ignored the question of how to transform journalism's practices, in the context of news media structures. In a landmark text that admirably combines theory and practice, Lynch and McGoldrick (2005: xix) enquire into how deeply embedded War Journalism is, in the political economy of media industries:

If there's to be a journalistic revolution, does it entail taking over the commanding heights of the media economy? Not necessarily. In one sense, both government and commercial media have their own interests in creating images of 'self' and 'other' -- to command allegiance, and to sell products and services, respectively. The two systems thus tend to exacerbate international tensions by dichotomizing, dramatizing, and demonizing "them" against "us". [citing Tehranian 2002].

The authors argue that even though War Journalism "has powerful political and economic imperatives at its back," there is still scope for PJ, through the agency of journalists. In a chapter devoted to explaining "why is news the way it is," they give particular attention to Herman and Chomsky's (1988) "Propaganda Model". More generally, amongst civil society activists concerned with media change, especially in the US, the Propaganda Model is probably the best-known critical theory of the media. It thus makes a useful starting point for this review.

## The Propaganda Model

Herman and Chomsky (1988: 2) regard the dominant American media as comprising a single propaganda system in which "money and power are able to filter out the news fit to print, marginalize dissent, and allow the government and dominant private interests to get their messages across to the public." In their extensive studies of American media treatment of

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1. I am assuming that most readers of this journal are already familiar with the basic concepts of Peace Journalism. Briefly, as outlined by Lynch and McGoldrick (2005), PJ draws upon the insights of Conflict Analysis to look beyond the overt violence which is the stuff of news (especially television) and calls attention to the context, of Attitudes, Behaviour and Contradictions, and the need to identify a range of stakeholders broader than the "two sides" engaged in violent confrontation. If War Journalism presents conflict as a tug-of-war between two parties in which one side's gain is the other's loss, PJ invites journalists to re-frame conflict as a cat's cradle of relationships between various stakeholders. It also calls on journalists to distinguish between stated demands, and underlying needs and objectives; to identify and attend to voices working for creative and non-violent solutions; to keep eyes open for ways of transforming and transcending the hardened lines of conflict. And it calls attention to expanding our understanding of conflict beyond the direct physical violence which is the focus of War Journalism, to include the structural and cultural violence that may underlie conflict situations (Hackett 2006a).



human rights and US foreign policy during the period of the Cold War, the authors found example after example of politically-charged double standards (Hackett 1991: 35-36). Human rights abuses committed by pro-US regimes were ignored, minimized or excused, while those perpetrated by pro-Soviet or other enemy states were more likely to receive extensive and strongly negative treatment. The US press implicitly treated repressive US client states in Latin America and elsewhere as if they were autonomous allies of the US, whereas the responsibility for human rights violations in pro-Soviet regimes (in eastern Europe and elsewhere) was laid at the feet of the Soviet Union. People abused in enemy states were defined implicitly as "worthy victims," their suffering treated in detail and sympathetically, while those in US client states were portrayed as "unworthy victims" (Chomsky and Herman 1979: 12, 37-41). The term "terrorism" was typically applied to the "retail terror" of left-wing insurgent groups, and not to the "wholesale" official or clandestine violence of states – except sometimes, those hostile to the US. Staged, coercive elections held in militarized US client states in Latin America were portrayed as legitimate expressions of the popular will, while an election held under conditions of greater real freedom by Nicaragua's left-wing regime in 1984, was framed as deficient and illegitimate (Herman and Chomsky 1988: 87-142; Hackett 1991: 36).

While Chomsky and Herman do not use the term, their findings correspond to the characteristics of War Journalism: double standards consonant with elite perspectives, that portray "our" side as moral and righteous, and "them" as evil and aggressive. While the Soviet bloc has disintegrated and the Cold War ended, Chomsky and Herman continue to find similar media subservience to warlike elite perspectives in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the "war on terror" (e.g. Chomsky 2001: 30).

Why do these patterns persist? The Propaganda "Model" is actually more than that – it is not just an heuristic device for organizing data, but an actual theory, a set of related propositions about the media's governing logics, intended to "help explain the nature of media coverage of important political topics" (Herman 1996: 116). In its original version, Herman and Chomsky (1988: 3-31) identified five institutionalized pressures or "filters" that bind the media to elite interests: first, the corporate and commercial of media, including the wealth, size and concentrated nature of media ownership; second, media dependence on corporate advertising revenue; third, media reliance on information from government, business and associated "expert" sources; fourth, right-wing "flak" in the form of sustained criticism and pressure from conservative media monitoring and policy institutes; and fifth, the ideological environment of anti-communism as a "national religion". In the post-Cold War era, Herman (1996: 125) has supplemented anti-Communism with free market fundamentalism as an ideological filters. (In a later modification of the Propaganda Model, Herman dispenses with the ideological filter altogether, perhaps because it too directly implies a critique of popular consciousness that is difficult to reconcile with a populist stance. Conversely, he divides the information/source filter into two components: news shapers (experts, disproportionately conservative); and news makers – politicians and institutions capable of generating what Boorstin (1980 [1961]) christened "pseudo-events", such as press conferences, created for the purpose of being reported and to serve a political agenda (Media Education Foundation 1997).

The Propaganda Model emphasizes the major media's structured subordination to (or imbrication with) the interests of political and economic elites. A similar analysis, concerned more specifically with media's role in representing and reproducing violence and peace, was earlier offered by Becker (1982). If Chomsky and Herman empirically critiqued American mass media, Becker theoretically critiqued transnational (but western-dominated) media (Hackett 1991: 36). Drawing inspiration from the then-current New World Information and Communication Order movement, which called *inter alia* for more equal information flows between the global North and South, Becker attacked the liberal notion that the extension of transnational information flows necessarily promotes peace. Deriding the typical research focus on the effects of media (representations of) violence on their audiences, Becker reframes the issue: media are part of a system of structural violence, which Lynch and McGoldrick (2005: 59-60; emphasis in original) define as "a structure, usually understood as a *system* of political, social or economic relations, [that] creates barriers that people cannot remove ... an *invisible form* of violence, *built into* ways of doing and ways of thinking," a form that "includes economic exploitation, political repression and cultural alienation". For Becker, media are embedded in, and help to reproduce, relations of inequality within and between nations. Accordingly:

If mass-media reception as well as production are at once expression and motor of structural violence; if communications technology can be understood, historically, only as an integral part of the emerging military industrial complex; if the access to and the power over the mass media are unequal and unbalanced...then the mass media can fulfill their original hoped for function as "peace-bringers" [only] under rare and exceptional circumstances. The representation of violence in the mass media, then, is part and parcel of the universal violence of the media themselves (Becker 1982: 227).

Such structural critiques, particularly the Propaganda Model, have important advantages for PJ educators and practitioners. The model's moral and empirical clarity has helped it gain a hearing amongst youth and social movements, probably more so than any other critical or left-wing perspective on media, at least in North America. It is an antidote to naive liberal notions of the free press, and still more so to the conservative concept of the "left-liberal media", heavily promoted in the US. It calls attention to the inherent articulation of media with power, and identifies specific structural links which can help explain the persistence of War Journalism. In testing its explanatory capacity, Chomsky and Herman have used a "paired example" approach (e.g. "worthy" versus "unworthy" victims) which can readily be adopted as criteria for monitoring and

evaluating conflict coverage.

Nevertheless, the model has significant limitations, particularly when it is misconstrued as a complete explanation of the news agenda, contrary to its authors' stated intentions (Herman 1996: 118; see also Herman 2000). To be sure, there are some "silly" criticisms (such as the claim that it is a "conspiracy theory") that can readily be dismissed. But over the years, more serious criticisms have emerged:

It tends towards *reductionism*, oversimplifying the complexity of the news system, treating it as an epiphenomenon of other institutions (state and capital). In particular, it has little to say about journalists, or the ways in which they may exercise agency within newsrooms; instead, Chomsky has sometimes argued, the news is a predictable product of institutional priorities, much like cars on an assembly line (Media Education Foundation 1997). Similarly, it has little to say about how audiences interpret the news. Although Herman (1996: 118) stresses that it is a model of media performance and behaviour, not effects, the very phrase "manufacturing consent" implies that audiences accept elite frameworks relatively passively. (Yet at the same time, it has been argued, the model seems to imply a naive faith in the possibility of unrestrained "free" communication, and in the rationality and ideological independence of audiences-as-citizens, once the shackles of media-induced false consciousness are removed (Hackett 1991: 39)).

Similarly, the model has been criticized as *functionalist*, emphasizing the smooth reproduction of the system, scanting contradictions and tensions within it, and thus failing adequately to explore the openings for oppositional interventions within and against the propaganda system. When taken as a complete analysis, such functionalism can be disempowering to peace movements and other agents of social change. It also does little to identify the scope and conditions under which newswriters could exercise the kind of choices called for by PJ.

To be sure, Herman (1996: 124) points to certain conditions which permit the expression of dissent within the dominant media, notably division within elites, and mobilization by oppositional groups. But other contradictions are relatively overlooked, such as the tension between media corporations' need to attract audience trust, and their reliance upon official sources whose credibility may be in question in some contexts (such as the non-discovery of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction). In the context of the British government's support for the invasion of Iraq, Lynch and McGoldrick (2005: 199-200) argue that neither British business in general, nor media corporations specifically, had a vested interest in promoting the war. To the contrary, the war brought "depressed stock market performance," meagre pickings in reconstruction contracts, and mushrooming public deficits to industry; and an advertising recession, declining newspaper sales, and "plummeting ad revenues" to the media. Yet the patterns of War Journalism persisted, for reasons (notably, the objectivity ethos) not well addressed in the Propaganda Model.

In short, and particularly in some of its more doctrinaire interpretations, the Propaganda Model risks:

... reducing the news media to tired ideological machines confined to performing endlessly, and unflinchingly, the overarching function of reproducing the prerogatives of an economic and political elite through processes of mystification. Journalists would then become little more than well-intentioned puppets whose strings are being pulled by forces they cannot fully understand (Allan 2004a: 55).

### **The Hierarchy of Influences Model**

Compared to the Propaganda Model, the "Hierarchy of Influences" model calls attention to a broader range of pressures on news content (Shoemaker and Reese 1996). This model is hierarchical in that the five layers of influences identified range successively from the micro level to the macro. The authors use this model to organize the substantial literature on media determinants.

As I have summarized elsewhere (Hackett and Uzelman 2003), the first level comprises media workers themselves. Their professionally-related roles and ethics appear to have a direct influence on content, whereas their socio-demographic backgrounds and their personal and political beliefs shape news indirectly, especially when individuals are in a position to override institutional pressures or organizational routines (Shoemaker and Reese 1996: 65). The second layer of influence consists of daily work routines within the newsroom, routines that structure journalists' output independently of their personal backgrounds and values. Converting raw materials (information) garnered from suppliers (sources) and delivering it to customers (audiences and advertisers) results in standardized and recurring patterns of content (p. 109). The third layer of influence references the broader organizational imperatives of media institutions. Here, the profit orientation shared by private media companies, combined with their hierarchical structure, in general shape content in accordance with ownership's interests. The fourth layer comprises extra-media influences, including sources, advertisers, the political power of governments, market structures, and technology. Finally, and most broadly, is the influence of ideology – a system of values and beliefs that governs what audiences, journalists and other players in the news system see as 'natural' or 'obvious' and that furthermore serves in part to maintain prevailing relations of power (pp. 221-24). Ideology not only shapes news, it is extended, renewed and reproduced through media content.

This model is an heuristic device, not a theory *per se*. It should be evaluated on the basis of its utility in raising questions and organizing research data, rather than its explanatory power as such. I have found it useful in organizing the media sociology literature with a view to identifying the extent of corporate influence, and the offsetting "progressive" and "conservativizing" forces operating at different levels of the press system (Hackett and Uzelman 2003; Hackett and Carroll 2006: Chapter 2). It should be possible to do likewise with respect to the forces which reinforce War Journalism, and the openings for the practice of PJ. The following is offered speculatively, as a basis for further research.

At the microlevel of journalists' influence on news production, at least in the North American context, some of the personal values of journalists (social liberalism, respect for human rights, "post-materialist" attitudes (Miljan and Cooper 2003: 59)) may incline them towards suspicion of militarism, sympathy for moderate dissenters, and/or personal voting support for liberal politicians or parties (Lichter, Lichter and Rothman 1986). Aspects of their social background would lead in the same direction; journalists tend to be more secular, urban and educated compared to the national population (e.g. Miljan and Cooper 2003: 68-72).

On the other hand, most journalists are citizens of particular states and members of national cultures, and they are not immune to the biases of nationalism in covering international conflict, particularly when their news organizations and audiences are also nationally based. Moreover, journalistic professionalism privileges the ethos of objectivity, albeit more strongly in some countries and news organizations than others; as we argue below, it is an ethos that correlates all too readily with key characteristics of War Journalism.

At the second and third levels of influences on the news, daily news routines and organizational imperatives may provide some scope for diversity and for contextual news broader than that typical of War Journalism. The convention of covering "both sides" of legitimate controversies (Hallin 1986: 116-17) provides openings for anti-war voices, in historical situations (such as the later years of the Vietnam war) when a war policy has produced dissension amongst elites, and when dissent is not equated with deviance. (On the other hand, the same convention of "two sides" to a controversy reduces its complexity and the diversity of viewpoints, at odds with the PJ proposal to identify multiple stakeholders in conflicts.) The sociologist Herbert Gans (1980) identified a number of factors that news producers take into account in framing the news, including "audience considerations"; some of these, such as the audience-building potential of "human interest" stories about peacemaking and reconciliation, are consistent with PJ. The fact that some media, like BBC World or CNN International, are aimed at audiences in different countries, as well as the stake these organizations have in their reputation for independence and trustworthiness, could help to temper tendencies towards national chauvinism in conflict reporting.

On the other side of the ledger, many organizational routines and imperatives lend themselves all too easily to War Journalism. In selecting and framing news, journalists employ professional "news values" that, in part, link news judgement to audience considerations. In an update of pioneering peace/media research by Johan Galtung and Mari Ruge (1965), Harcup and O'Neill (2001) suggest ten such criteria: the power elite (reference to powerful people or organizations); celebrity; entertainment (including drama and human interest); surprise; bad news; good news (e.g. rescues and cures); magnitude; relevance to the audience; follow-up; and the news organization's own agenda. Roughly speaking, one can infer from this list that war and governments are typically more newsworthy than peace processes and activists. In addition to audience considerations, the pressures of meeting deadlines encourage newsmakers to stick to simple storylines and familiar stereotypes, and to favour immediate events (like battles) over long-term processes (like peacebuilding) – all key features of War Journalism.

Such pressures undoubtedly reinforce "rhetorical and narrative structures" that "shape and constrain the way in which newspapers report conflict" (Fawcett 2002: 213). Even when they were editorially committed to a "win-win" compromise, two newspapers on opposite sides of the Northern Ireland conflict failed to escape the conflict-exacerbating frames of their respective political communities in their actual reporting – until a particularly tragic (and newsworthy) event, and a consequent shift in elite opinion, altered the narrative (*ibid.*).

At the fourth level, of extra-media institutions and processes, the factors identified by Shoemaker and Reese also cut in both directions. Consider audiences as an influence on news frames. Depending perhaps on the political context, audiences may sometimes reject wartime news (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005: 200); but they also enjoy drama and ethnocentric, manichean narratives. They may also share a patriotic and/or morbid fascination with the spectacle of violence and the display of military prowess, particularly on television.

When translated into the terms of the Shoemaker/Reese model, many of the "filters" identified in the Propaganda Model (state/government financial and legal influence, conservative "flak," elite experts, government information control, etc.) can be considered "extra-media" influences. Many of these do on balance tend to favour War Journalism. However, we should not automatically assume that these influences always work against conflict resolution; elites may sometimes initiate and promote peace processes.

Technology is another cross-cutting influence. The influence of the Internet on the practices and agendas of journalism,

and of communication in conflict situations, is a topic too vast for exploration here; suffice to note that it has facilitated the expansion of voices, and new forms of online journalism – including the weblogs of Iraqi civilians as witnesses to the 2003 invasion -- that are often consistent with PJ (Allan 2004a: 188-90; Allan 2004b). On the other hand, some writers regard the still-powerful media of television (and film) as technologically biased in favour of the aestheticization of war (Mander 1978; Nelson 1987).

As an especially important extra-media influence, the pressures of commercialism on the globally dominant western media deserve particular consideration. As noted above, many advertisers and media organizations have a structural interest in directing societal resources to consumer spending rather than military production; on the other hand, some advertisers and media conglomerates (like the General Electric-owned NBC network) are significantly involved in the latter. More significant, advertising subtly but decidedly contributes to the corporate media's "democratic deficit," partly by disproportionately serving, informing and empowering affluent urban consumers, who are the prime target markets for advertisers, at the relative expense of the rural and the poor (Hackett and Carroll 2006, chap. 1). In a country like India, such a disparity can have devastating consequences for the (lack of) access to the dominant public sphere on the part of the poor and their issues, including the social roots and consequences of drought and famine (Thomas 2005).

Moreover, advertising-based media are structurally linked to the "ceaseless promotion of consumerism," with its destructive consequences for the physical and cultural environment (Hackett and Carroll 2006: 8). As American environmentalist Bill McKibben (1999: 45-6) has put it,

the thing to fear from television is less the sight of [people] mowing each other down with machine guns than the sight of people having to have every desire that enters their mind gratified immediately...[T]hat kind of culture is going to be a violent one, no matter what images one shows. Television hasn't done this by itself,...but it's the anchor and central ideal of this system of values that dominates us.

The broadest layer of influence, ideology and cultural narratives, also cuts in both directions. For instance, Canada's myth of peacekeeping, or concepts of democracy and human rights embedded in the culture, are resources for peace advocates. But conversely, dominant cultural narratives can emphasize national self-glorification, hostility to particular Others, and the connection of national self-esteem and self-defence to military power, as in America's "master narrative" of war (Hackett and Zhao 1994).

Like the Propaganda Model, the Hierarchy of Influences framework was developed in the American national context. Any contemporary analysis of journalism and conflict must now also take into account the context of cultural and economic globalization (growing interdependence and the near-universalization of capitalist social relations) as well as more specifically, media globalization, by which I mean not only the emergence of transnational media organizations, but also "the articulation of nationally based media systems with global markets and processes" (Zhao and Hackett 2005: 1). Like other influences identified by Shoemaker and Reese, globalization has contradictory implications for the prospects for PJ. Economic "globalization from above" has created growing economic interdependence (Friedman 2000) and arguably a capitalist class which is increasingly integrated across national boundaries (Sklair 2001). As broad contexts for the media, these features can be read positively: they raise the economic costs and political barriers for regimes contemplating war as an option (Friedman 2000), and thus may act as brakes upon war-mongering within nationally-based media.

But capitalist globalization can also be read negatively: it arguably intensifies the structural violence of marginalization, inequality, exploitation and ecological degradation, compounded by the media's "global fishbowl" effect (Tehrani 2002: 59), whereby the world's poor majority is increasingly aware of the North's (media-exaggerated?) affluence. Whether "globalization from below," the mobilization of an emergent global civil society, is sufficient to challenge the dark side of capitalist globalization from above, remains to be seen; at the very least, it may create a social basis for PJ, as global justice struggles challenge and transform dominant news narratives.

## Journalism as a Field<sup>1</sup>

The Hierarchy of Influences model is useful to researchers seeking to identify specific influences on the news, and to explore relationships between them. Compared to the Propaganda Model, it calls attention to a broader range of factors, and to their often contradictory nature. If the Propaganda Model overemphasizes structural determination, however, the Hierarchy model may overplay the multiplicity and contingency of influences; and both models risk obscuring the specificity and coherence of journalism as a cultural practice and form of knowledge-production.

Not just those two models, but much of the anglo-American literature on media determinants and media power, is informed by empiricist notions of linear causality; where scholars differ concerns the direction in which the causal arrow runs -- from

1. With grateful acknowledgement to the publisher, this section is a revised version of Robert A. Hackett and William K. Carroll, *Remaking Media: The struggle to democratize public communication* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006 forthcoming), pp. 32-35.

economic and political power to the media, or vice versa. A somewhat different way of conceptualizing journalism's political functioning can be obtained by selectively drawing from French social theory about social structure. The work of Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu implies an analysis of media as a relatively autonomous institutional sphere, one which articulates with relations of power, knowledge and production more broadly, but which also has a certain logic of its own. Foucault spoke of "discursive regimes" - of how power is imbricated with knowledge, not by directly imposing censorship or coercion from outside, but indirectly and internally, through the criteria and practices that "govern" the production of statements (Foucault 1984: 54-5; Hackett and Zhao 1998: 6). Thus, power relations may be manifested or even constituted, within the everyday routines and ethos of workaday journalism -- a conception which implies the productivity and power of journalism, and the potential agency of journalists as social actors, without seeing it as entirely free-floating or self-determining.

Bourdieu's concept of "field" may be more useful still, since it pays more fulsome attention to the potentially asymmetrical relationship *between* as well as within institutional spheres. In his view:

... any social formation is structured by way of a hierarchically organized series of fields (the economic field, the educational field, the political field, the cultural field, etc.), each defined as a structured space with its own laws of functioning and its own relations of force independent of those of politics and the economy...Each field is relatively autonomous but structurally homologous with the others. Its structure, at any given moment, is determined by the relations between the positions agents occupy in the field (Johnson, in Bourdieu 1993: 6).

Each field is "a social universe with its own laws of functioning" (*ibid.*, p. 14), a "microcosm with its own laws, defined both by its position in the world at large and by the attractions and repulsions to which it is subject from other such microcosms" (Bourdieu 1998: 39). Typically, each field is characterized by its own ethos, its own formal and informal rules and logics, its own set of status and power positions for individual agents (such as journalists) to occupy, its own forms of interests or resources -- capital -- for which agents compete. In the economic sphere, agents presumably compete for economic capital through investment strategies; in the political sphere, they compete for governmental power. If we regard cultural production in general, and mass media or journalism specifically, as distinct fields, two forms of capital are particularly relevant: symbolic capital, the accumulation of prestige or celebrity; and cultural capital, forms of cultural knowledge or dispositions (Johnson 1993: 7). Indeed, this insight suggests that journalism and related forms of large-scale cultural production (the "media"), have the distinct feature of combining economic power (the production of profit) and symbolic power, which is ultimately the capacity to define social reality. The "media" are influential in so far as they comprise a concentration of society's symbolic power (Couldry 2003: 39), with a consequent "reality effect" (Bourdieu 1998: 21-22). That is, media generate categorizations of the world that acquire a reality of their own and influence the course of social struggles and the perceptions of peace movements, other social movements, and broader publics.

Put differently, Bourdieu suggests that the journalistic field is considerably influenced by commercial or economic constraints, particularly as embodied in the audience ratings system, but in turn (especially due to the mass reach of television as a medium), journalism imposes structural constraints upon other fields (notably on politics, and on other spheres of cultural production) (Marliere 1998: 220; Bourdieu 1998: 56).

Thus, this approach invites us to consider journalism and mass media as relatively autonomous fields within a broader field of power, which itself is structured in dominance: some fields may well be more dominant, or may exert a greater gravitational force, over the whole social formation. This metaphor takes us beyond linear, billiard-ball causality, to suggest a new way of conceptualizing how journalism interacts with economic forces, the political system, science, or other institutional spheres, and also with capitalism, patriarchy, racism, militarism, or other axes of domination. While recognizing, indeed insisting, that individuals are active and creative agents pursuing strategies with the resources available to them, this model turns our attention to structured roles and relationships -- including interactions between institutional fields. Thus:

External determinants can have an effect only through transformations in the structure of the field itself. In other words, the field's structure *refracts*, much like a prism, external determinants in terms of its own logic, and it is only through such refraction that external factors can have an effect on the field. The degree of autonomy of a particular field is measured precisely by its ability to refract external demands into its own logic (Johnson 1993: 14; emphasis in original).

This very rich passage suggests that the most important form of external influence upon journalism is not explicit and occasional interventions (like an advertiser trying to kill a story, or a source pressing for favourable spin), but rather the long-term re-structuring of the ground rules and routines which shape (relatively autonomous) journalism on a workaday basis.

What does this conceptual framework look like "on the ground," when it is applied to actual journalism practices? And how is it relevant to Peace Journalism? In his controversial critique of television journalism, written for a French readership in the 1990s (Bourdieu 1998), Bourdieu himself was not centrally concerned with war and peace, but with the impact of the journalism field on democracy and on the quality of cultural production. However, his analysis clearly has implications for peace discourse in and through the news.

For Bourdieu, TV journalism has developed a number of destructive characteristics. It privileges entertainment over real information, confrontations over reasoned arguments, political tactics over substance, individuals, anecdotes and scandals over the analysis of structures or processes. TV news has created a new category of journalist/intellectuals, fast-food thinkers who promote cynicism and simplification (ibid: 3, 29). Worse, it stimulates xenophobic fears, excessive concerns about crime and safety, and the "primal passions" of nationalism (ibid: 11), and it overaccesses ethnocentric and racist demagogues (ibid: 8). In offering fragmented, decontextualized images of events, and in portraying politics as a game for professionals, TV disempowers audiences as citizens, giving them nothing to stimulate cohesive or oppositional interpretations. TV breaks the ties between politicians and publics (ibid: 5), undermining intermediary institutions like unions and parties which have a mandate as guardians of collective values, to elaborate "considered solutions to social questions" (ibid: 77). All these factors bear ominously against the kind of discourse that PJ asks news media to generate. At their root, Bourdieu points to the subordination of journalism to market logic through the mechanism of audience ratings, although he acknowledges other factors, such as journalists' training and their long-standing tradition of competing for "scoops" and exclusives.

There is much to criticize in the specifics of Bourdieu's particular analysis. In the US, the country where "hyper-commercialism" has arguably taken its greatest toll on the quality of journalism (McChesney 2004), his observations may well seem commonplace. More important, his normative standpoint seems less concerned with peaceful humane governance (though he repeatedly stresses his commitment to democracy) than with insulating other fields of cultural production (juridical, literary, art, science) from degradation by market-driven journalism. Though he disavows "nostalgia" for paternalistic television (Bourdieu 1998: 48), there is arguably an element of cultural elitism in the analysis.

Nevertheless, his framework is very rich, and can be applied to news characteristics more directly relevant to PJ. Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) see journalism's ethos of objectivity as a primary mainstay of War Journalism, particularly the dualistic presentation of conflict (Us versus Them), dependence on official sources, and the preference for events (e.g. battles) over processes (e.g. the build-up to, or resolution of, conflicts). It may thus be useful to consider the analysis by Hackett and Zhao (1998) of the "regime of objectivity" that has characterized North American journalism for most of the twentieth century. While they do not explicitly use Bourdieu's framework, their analysis illustrates his emphasis on the relative autonomy of the journalism field, and the way its relationship with other fields is refracted through its own governing logics.

By "regime of objectivity," Hackett and Zhao (ibid: 86) mean an interrelated complex of ideas and practices that provide "a general model for conceiving, defining, arranging, and evaluating news texts, news practices, and news institutions". The regime comprises five dimensions. Objectivity is a normative ideal, a set of desiderata (factualness, accuracy, completeness, as well as a stance of detachment, neutrality or independence). Second, it entails an epistemology, assumptions about knowledge and reality, like the possibility of separating values from facts and observers from observed. Third, objectivity also crucially involves newsgathering and presentation practices, like the use of appropriate sources and the separation of news from opinion in the pages of the daily paper. Fourth, the objectivity regime is institutionalized in social structures, a framework which journalism has actively helped to construct, not merely reflect, and comprises "complex, specialized news organizations, with compartmentalized roles and departments (the marketing and advertising departments over there, the newsroom pristinely over here), staffed by professionals with appropriate skills and ethical commitments, and enjoying autonomy from the state ..." (ibid: 86). And finally, as an active ingredient in public discourse, objectivity and related concepts, like bias, fairness and balance, provide the language for everyday talk about news.

While journalism's regime of objectivity is no mere expression of external forces, however, neither is it free-floating. It has social, political, historical conditions of existence. One might say that journalism's objectivity regime, and the institutional environment of other fields, were mutually constituting. The invention of the telegraph and the related emergence of wire services encouraged a shift from partisan commentary to non-partisan facticity in the nineteenth-century press. So too did the economic interest of reaching large, multi-partisan readerships, on the part of the emerging commercial daily press. The state has used the objectivity/balance ethos in regulating broadcasting and in guiding its relationships to media outlets; compared to media seen as "mainstream" or "objective," those defined as "alternative" or advocacy media are more vulnerable to legal harassment or informal discrimination (such as exclusion from high-level political meetings, or wartime reporter "pools"). Other factors that have shaped and solidified the objectivity regime included the rising status of science and empirical research in the nineteenth century, the increasing educational level and professional-status claims of journalists, and the political legitimation needs of monopoly newspaper owners in the twentieth century (ibid: 36-81).

Historically, the characteristics of the objectivity regime have not been fixed in stone. Both journalism, and its articulation with other institutional fields, have evolved over time. Thus, while the notion of objectivity as truth-telling in the public interest has been a remarkably persistent touchstone of North American journalism, both its practices and conceptualization have shifted. The "naive realism" of late-nineteenth century faith in the ability of facts to speak for themselves gave way after World War I to a narrower definition of objectivity as "a method designed for a world in which even facts could not be trusted" (Schudson 1978: 122). The carnage of war, the apparent success of wartime propaganda, Freudian psychology, the rise of totalitarian regimes, and the Great Depression all undermined the culture's confidence in the reliability of facts,

the rationality of citizens, and the permanence of democratic capitalism (Hackett and Zhao 1998: 40). The same historical moment of confusion and complexity also gave rise to interpretive reporting, intended to provide context and perspective without undermining objectivity. Later, the upheavals in 1960s popular culture, and the "credibility gap" between American government and public resulting from the Vietnam war and the Watergate scandal, paved the way for a more critical mode of journalism, albeit one more prone to adversarial style than to counterhegemonic substance.

So, an interacting set of fields have generated journalism's regime of objectivity, and in turn, the routine practices of journalism objectivity have political or ideological consequences – largely unintended, but in a generally conservative direction. Consider one of the hallmarks of "objective" reporting – the use of "appropriate sources" to provide credible, relevant and authoritative "facts". It just so happens that the sources who are most "appropriate" – available, articulate, convenient and apparently authoritative – as frequently representatives of powerful institutions (ibid: 142). While it may provide openings for change and the expression of opposition, journalism's objectivity regime on the whole:

... provides a legitimation for established ideological optics and power relations. It systematically produces partial representations of the world, skewed towards dominant institutions and values, while at the same time it disguises that ideological role from its audiences. It thereby wins consent for 'preferred readings'...embedded in the news. In contemporary North American society, these preferred readings ratify and reproduce the ideological framework of liberal-democratic capitalism. More specifically, over the last two decades or so, objective journalism has been complicit in naturalizing a move towards a right-wing market-liberalism (Hackett and Zhao 1998: 161).

Such "conservatizing" consequences of objectivity are not necessarily intended, but, given the position of journalism within a structured field of power, neither are they purely accidental. Journalism (and media) may be a relatively autonomous field, but it is not a level one on which to play. The insistent attention to the (re)production and contestation of hierarchies, and to the structural embeddedness of inequality, differentiates this position from the liberal-pluralism arguably implicit in the Hierarchies of Influence model.

Moreover, as the three conceptual frameworks we have reviewed above suggest, if indeed journalism can be considered a field, it is a relatively "weak" one, in two related senses. First, its boundaries are permeable, its autonomy limited. Compared to fields like "high" culture (art, literature, poetry), science and technology, or (though now in retreat) academia, the logics and resources of journalism/mass media are less self-determining.

Second, while journalism/mass media is a field vastly more influential than high culture and academia, and while its concentration of symbolic power can constrain other fields, it does not perch atop the social formation. Arguably, in the era of market liberal hegemony and state- and corporate-driven globalization, all fields have become more subject to direct determination by the economic, and more specifically the untrammelled logic of capital accumulation. But journalism/mass media are especially vulnerable, because they are so heavily integrated into processes of generating political and economic capital. (Speculatively, in an era of corporate and political "branding" (Klein 2000), the very distinctions between symbolic, economic and political capital are themselves eroding.)

Journalism's weakness as a distinct field is evident in the significant erosion of the regime of objectivity, the emblem of autonomy and professionalism, during the past two decades. The Reagan government's abandonment of the Fairness Doctrine, one which had mandated broadcasters to provide opportunity for counterbalancing commentary on controversial issues, narrowed the range of views and paved the way for partisan (mostly right-wing) networks, notably Fox. The 1996 Telecommunications Act enabled massive growth in media concentration, and further encouraged the ethos of broadcasting as a property right rather than a public service. In 2001, the 9/11 terror attacks led US journalism to a largescale disavowal of "objectivity" as even an appropriate stance to take in reporting the Bush administration's "war on terror" (Navasky 2002). Shifts in the economic field (such as the rise of conglomerates driven by shareholders seeking short-term profits) have contributed to the prevalence of "infotainment" over public affairs programming. The depoliticization of the culture, and the concomitant decline of party identification amongst media audiences, has undermined the economic necessity for careful nonpartisanship amongst commercial media organizations.

The erosion of objectivity finds its pinnacle in Rupert Murdoch's Fox News Channel. This development can hardly give comfort to Peace Journalists. The fusion of news and commentary, the close political ties of its decision-makers with the Republican Party, the daily memos to set editorial agendas on blatantly political grounds, the political screening of its pundits, the musical and graphical tributes to American nationalism during news programs, are all clear violations of even the cautious, conservatizing versions of objectivity that had marked US journalism in earlier decades. Fox's only vestiges of objectivity are window-dressing: point-counterpoint talks shows setting right-wing pitbulls against *faux* liberal poodles (notably the talk-show *Hannity and Colmes*), and the network's marketing slogan "fair and balanced" (Franken 2003). The respected correspondent and author Philip Knightley (2002: 171) notes that Fox:

... has significantly increased its ratings by its all-out support for the war, encouraging its correspondents and presenters to express anger and a thirst for revenge, and to present the conflict as a biblical battle of good versus evil.

What is most revealing is not only that Fox has encountered little organized opposition within the ranks of journalism, but

that its jingoistic and ultra-nationalist style and stance may be influencing other networks. To the extent that such is the case, Knightly concludes that "Dark days lie ahead."

## Conclusion

The three models of news determinants discussed in this paper have rather different emphases. The Propaganda Model highlights several repressive "filters" that allegedly subordinate the news media to elite interests. The Hierarchy model identifies a broader range of influences in a more open-ended way. The Journalistic Field model moves away from linear causality to emphasize the relative autonomy and coherence of journalism as an institutionalized sphere, functioning in relationship with other homologously structured fields.

All three models, however, have limitations which much be acknowledged, and taken as a challenge for further research. All three were developed in the context of powerful western nation-states (respectively, the US and France). Each of them assumes that journalism operates within entrenched institutional settings, with well-established and relatively stable relationships with mass audiences, and with economic and political institutions. Needless to say, these conditions do not obtain throughout the planet, and the three models may have less to offer as a "map" for Peace Journalism in countries struggling to emerge from a neo-colonial and/or authoritarian past.

In addition to the models' own national biases, the global mediascape is changing in ways that these models cannot fully handle, premised as they are on relatively stable national media systems. Oppositional and grassroots Internet-based outlets are challenging the dominance of mass media, introducing new voices and expanding the definition of journalism. On the other hand, the dominant media corporations are extending their influence transnationally, through a multi-faceted process of media globalization, marked by the emergence of transnational media firms and markets; the spread of commercialized media as the general organizational form; the continued dominance of transnational media flows by western-based TNCs, with some reverse flow from regional production centres in the global South; emerging neo-liberal regimes of global media governance; and more ambiguously, the globalization of media effects (Zhao and Hackett 2005: 6-8). Particularly at the level of English-speaking urban elites, media globalization is transforming the terrain for Peace Journalism. Interestingly, Reese (2001) has begun an effort to adapt the Hierarchy model to the analysis of global journalism.

Within the dominant western countries, social and economic changes are also shifting the nature of journalism, as it increasingly dissolves within profit-driven media and entertainment and information conglomerates; its economic basis threatened by audience fragmentation; its governing ethos shifting from public service and "objectivity" (however conservatively defined), to one of consumerism and commercialism. The regime of objectivity is in decline, but no clear replacement has emerged. The whole field of journalism may be fragmenting, its social bases eroding. This presents opportunities for PJ – there are more niches in the system to practice and find a constituency for different and experimental forms of journalism. But it is also a challenge – it may be more difficult to locate, let alone transform, the "commanding heights" of the agenda-setting national and global media.

That said, the three models do suggest the range of tasks and challenges confronting PJ. These cannot be reduced to a single variable or point of intervention. The barriers to PJ include the difficulties of constructing 'peace' as a compelling narrative, the national basis (and biases) of much of the world's news media and their audiences, the ideological and structural links between media corporations and states, and the embeddedness of dominant media and states in relations of inequality (as the NWICO movement had argued). In western media, the regime of objectivity may be a particularly important impediment to PJ, as Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) suggest; but our analysis above suggests that journalism objectivity is itself a multi-faceted regime that is related to institutional structures and imperatives.

In light of these challenges, I conclude by briefly addressing two questions. First, what kind of media system could best facilitate PJ? Second, through what strategic routes might it be implemented?

Tehrani (2002: 80) rightly notes that media ethical codes for PJ are "necessary but not sufficient," since ethical codes without sanctions are largely "pious wishes"; rather, "the structure is the message". While this formulation may be overly deterministic, all three models point to the intrinsic relationship between media structure, and journalism practices and content. Tehrani identifies the need for more "structural pluralism in media ownership and control" as a precondition for more democratic checks and balances, and for more content pluralism, including the diversity of voices in conflict situations that is called for by PJ. Support for public and community media systems is also required, to help offset the biases of corporate and government media towards commercial and political propaganda respectively. Moreover, echoing the NWICO movement's concerns, Tehrani calls for a World Media Development Bank, to help reduce the inequalities of media production and access within and between nations of the global North and South.

To these structural changes, one could add the development of genuinely multinational and internationalist media, able to address and engage audiences in different countries with programming that challenges ethnocentric narratives and pro-



vides multiple perspectives on conflict. Finally, PJ would be strengthened by national and global regimes of media governance that reinforced popular communication rights -- not only freedom of expression, but also access to the means of public communication.

What about vectors or strategies for change? From Bourdieu's analysis of fields, we can extrapolate three broad approaches (Hackett and Carroll 2006: 52).

One broad strategy is to reform the journalism field from within. The Hierarchy and Field models both suggest some degree of agency for newswriters. There is indeed a necessary role for dedicated journalists to take the lead; as teachers, practitioners, writers and advocates, Jake Lynch and Annabel McGoldrick are themselves exemplars. Unfortunately, it seems probable that in the Western corporate media, at least, journalists have neither sufficient incentives, nor autonomy vis-à-vis their employers, to transform the way news is done, without support from powerful external allies. It may be that PJ is most likely to take root in societies (Rwanda? Indonesia? the former Yugoslavia?) that have experienced the ravages of violent conflict, and where the media have played a blatant role in fuelling the destructive fires of enmity. Moreover, I speculate, much of the impetus (or constituency) for PJ is likely to derive from the victims of war, from activists committed to peacebuilding processes, and/or from social justice movements marginalized by current patterns of national or global communication.

A second approach is to build a new field, parallel to currently-existing journalism. This is the option of creating alternative media organizations, supported by civil society, insulated from corporate or state power, and capable of putting into practice the ethos of PJ. The current Canadian-based initiative to create an Independent World Television news network, and to offer "real news" about peace and development to an international viewership, is a very encouraging step in this direction.

Finally, a third approach entails intervening in adjacent fields (such as those of politics, or social movements) to change the environment of journalism, the gravitational pulls to which it is subject. One key aspect of journalism's environment are state policies regarding culture and communication. Here, there are encouraging signs. Citizens' movements have emerged in a number of countries, demanding democratic reform of state communication policies, to help bring about more accountable, diverse and better quality media (see e.g. McChesney 2004; Hackett and Carroll 2006). In recent years, similar efforts have been directed towards democratizing global media governance, such as CRIS, the Campaign for Communication Rights in the Information Society (O Siochru 2005). More broadly, social justice movements struggling to project their voice in the public arena could help shift the environment of journalism. So too could mobilized audiences, demanding "real news" as a condition of their own empowerment. Or indeed, survival.

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*Irina Wolf*

## **Hizb ut-Tahrir in Kirgisistan: Quantitative Medieninhaltsanalyse**

Für den Durchschnittsbürger stammt Wissen über jegliche Organisationen normalerweise eher von den Massenmedien als aus direkter Interaktion, insbesondere, wenn eine Organisation geheim ist. Diese Studie versucht zu ermitteln, wie viele und welche Art von Informationen die Menschen in Kirgisistan durch die Lektüre der *Vechernii Bishkek* (VB), der nationalen kirgisischen Zeitung mit der höchsten Auflage im Land in der Periode von 2001 2005 über die religiöse Organisation Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) erhalten haben. Diese Organisation wurde von der kirgisischen Regierung als extremistisch eingestuft. Die Haupthypothese dieser Studie, dass die Berichterstattung über Hizb ut-Tahrir in der *Vechernii Bishkek* in den letzten fünf Jahren kein vollständiges Bild der Organisation geliefert habe, wurde mittels elf Unterhypothesen geprüft. Die Untersuchungsmethode ist zweigeteilt – quantitativ und qualitativ. Halbstrukturierte Interviews mit vier Journalisten der *Vechernii Bishkek*, die den größten Teil der relevanten Artikel geschrieben hatten, und qualitative Inhaltsanalysen der ausgewählten Artikel trugen dazu bei, die quantitativen Ergebnisse zu erklären und die "Warum" und "Na und?"-Fragen zu beantworten.

Während der letzten fünf Jahre haben VB-Journalisten mehr Artikel über HT geschrieben als andere Journalisten der bedeutendsten kirgisischen Printmedien. VB scheiterte jedoch aufgrund politischer und sozialer Einschränkungen für Journalisten und Zeitungen daran, ein vollständiges Bild und ausgewogene Informationen über diese Organisation zu liefern. Jede positive Berichterstattung über die verbotene und geheime Organisation richtet sich gegen die offizielle Meinung über HT, die noch immer die Tagesordnung für private, aber regierungsorientierte Zeitungen in Kirgisistan bestimmt.

[Volltext \(in Englisch\)](#)

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## **Hizb ut-Tahrir in Kyrgyzstan: Quantitative Media Content Analysis**

People are more likely to learn about organizations from the mass media than from personal experience, especially in the case of clandestine organizations. This study covers the period 2001-2005 and tries to determine how much and what kind of information Kyrgyz readers received about Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), an allegedly extremist religious organization, from Vechernii Bishkek (VB), a Kyrgyz national newspaper. VB enjoys the highest circulation of any newspaper in the country. The main hypothesis is that Vechernii Bishkek's coverage of Hizb ut-Tahrir did not provide a complete, balanced picture of the organization during the five years covered by the study. This is tested on the basis of eleven sub-hypotheses. The research method is two-fold – quantitative and qualitative: Semi-structured interviews were held with the four Vechernii Bishkek journalists who wrote the majority of the relevant articles, and qualitative content analyses were made of selected articles. Together, these explain the quantitative findings and help answer questions like why and wherefore.

During the five years covered by the study, VB journalists wrote more articles about HT than any other journalists working for major Kyrgyz print media. However, VB failed to provide a complete picture of and balanced information about this organization due to political and social constraints upon journalists and the newspaper. Covering any positive aspects of this officially-banned and clandestine organization would conflict with the government's opposition to HT, which still sets the agenda for this private, but pro-government Kyrgyz newspaper.

[full text \(in English\)](#)

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Irina Wolf

## Hizb ut-Tahrir in Kyrgyzstan: Quantitative Media Content Analysis

*Kurzfassung:* Für den Durchschnittsbürger stammt Wissen über jegliche Organisationen normalerweise eher von den Massenmedien als aus direkter Interaktion, insbesondere, wenn eine Organisation geheim ist. Diese Studie versucht zu ermitteln, wie viele und welche Art von Informationen die Menschen in Kirgisistan durch die Lektüre der Vechernii Bishkek (VB), der nationalen kirgisischen Zeitung mit der höchsten Auflage im Land in der Periode von 2001–2005 über die religiöse Organisation Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) erhalten haben. Diese Organisation wurde von der kirgisischen Regierung als extremistisch eingestuft. Die Haupthypothese dieser Studie, dass die Berichterstattung über Hizb ut-Tahrir in der Vechernii Bishkek in den letzten fünf Jahren kein vollständiges Bild der Organisation geliefert habe, wurde mittels elf Unterhypothesen geprüft. Die Untersuchungsmethode ist zweigeteilt – quantitativ und qualitativ. Halbstrukturierte Interviews von vier Journalisten der Vechernii Bishkek, die den größten Teil der relevanten Artikel geschrieben hatten, und qualitative Inhaltsanalysen der ausgewählten Artikel trugen dazu bei, die quantitativen Ergebnisse zu erklären und die "Warum" und "Na und?"-Fragen zu beantworten. Während der letzten fünf Jahre haben VB-Journalisten mehr Artikel über HT geschrieben als andere Journalisten der bedeutendsten kirgisischen Printmedien. VB scheiterte jedoch aufgrund politischer und sozialer Einschränkungen für Journalisten und Zeitungen daran, ein vollständiges Bild und ausgewogene Informationen über diese Organisation zu liefern. Jede positive Berichterstattung über die verbotene und geheime Organisation richtet sich gegen die offizielle Meinung über HT, die noch immer die Tagesordnung für private, aber regierungsorientierte Zeitungen in Kirgisistan bestimmt.

*Abstract:* People are more likely to learn about organizations from the mass media than from personal experience, especially in the case of clandestine organizations. This study covers the period 2001–2005 and tries to determine how much and what kind of information Kyrgyz readers received about Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), an allegedly extremist religious organization, from Vechernii Bishkek (VB), a Kyrgyz national newspaper. VB enjoys the highest circulation of any newspaper in the country. The main hypothesis is that Vechernii Bishkek's coverage of Hizb ut-Tahrir did not provide a complete, balanced picture of the organization during the five years covered by the study. This is tested on the basis of eleven sub-hypotheses. The research method is two-fold – quantitative and qualitative: Semi-structured interviews were held with the four Vechernii Bishkek journalists who wrote the majority of the relevant articles, and qualitative content analyses were made of selected articles. Together, these explain the quantitative findings and help answer questions like "why" and "wherefore."

During the five years covered by the study, VB journalists wrote more articles about HT than any other journalists working for major Kyrgyz print media. However, VB failed to provide a complete picture of and balanced information about this organization due to political and social constraints upon journalists and the newspaper. Covering any positive aspects of this officially-banned and clandestine organization would conflict with the government's opposition to HT, which still sets the agenda for this private, but pro-government Kyrgyz newspaper.

## 1 Introduction

During the past five years, Vechernii Bishkek (VB), a Kyrgyz national newspaper with the largest circulation in the country, published an average of two lengthy articles per year solely to inform its readers about an allegedly terrorist religious organization called Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), including comprehensive information on its origins, objectives, ideology, activities in the country and arrests of its members. In the same period, however, VB also published 205 other articles which mentioned HT at least once. The objective of this study is to content-analyze all 215 articles, to identify the types of articles that contain references to HT, as well as the tone of such references, and, finally, to determine whether VB provided a comprehensive, balanced picture of the organization during the past five years.

### 1.1 Hypotheses

To answer these questions, the following eleven sub-hypotheses are tested: (H1) the number of articles that contain references to HT will increase over time; (H2) the majority of articles will be written by a small number of journalists; (H3) the number of informative articles on HT will be smaller than the total number of articles about HT member arrests and irrelevant articles; (H4) the majority of informative articles will address the question of combating HT; (H5) the majority of articles mainly irrelevant to HT will refer to the organization in the context of terrorism; (H6) in most cases the tone of references to HT will be very negative; (H7) the articles will become less informative over time; (H8) the tone of references to HT will depend on the article's content; (H9) the number of articles with very negative references to HT will increase over time; (H10) there will be a correlation between the authors of articles and their type of content; (H11) there will be a correlation between author and tone.

### 1.2 On Hizb ut-Tahrir

"Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami" ("Party of Islamic Liberation") was founded in 1952 in a Jordanian-ruled East Jerusalem suburb by Sheikh Taqiuddin an-Nabhani (1909-1977), a Palestinian Islamic legal scholar and political activist (Baran, 2004: 21). The central goal of HT ideology is to re-establish a Caliphate and apply Islamic law to all spheres of life. HT publicly rejects the use of violent means to achieve its goals, and "... the party's record provides no evidence of it being involved in terrorist activity against civilians, or in military actions against U.S. or Western interests" (ICG, 2003: 9). Because of its anti-Semitic slogans, the organization is banned in several Middle Eastern countries, including Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Iraq, and also in European countries, including Germany and Denmark. HT is banned in all Central Asian countries (ICG, 2003: 9-11).

HT reached Central Asia in the second half of the 1990s (ICG, 2002: 6). In this region, "the majority of – though by no means all – Hizb ut-Tahrir members appear to come from the Ferghana Valley region (including the Andijan, Ferghana and Namangan provinces of Uzbekistan, the Sughd province in Tajikistan, and the Osh and Jalalabad provinces of Kyrgyzstan)" (ICG, 2003: 18). Hizb ut-Tahrir membership in Kyrgyzstan continues to be overwhelmingly ethnic Uzbek<sup>1</sup> (ICG, 2002: 8). Under Article 299 of the Kyrgyz Criminal Code, which forbids instigating religious and ethnic tensions, HT members are generally fined or sentenced to two-five years of imprisonment if caught distributing literature with extremist content.<sup>2</sup>

In November 2003, the Kyrgyz Supreme Court banned HT and designated it as an extremist organization (Kushchubekov, 2004: 54; Baran, 2004: 109). However, "... many incidents that the government is quick to label as the work of 'Islamic extremists' are actually much more about growing organized crime, much of it linked to the drug trade and lucrative cross-border contraband with Uzbekistan" (ICG, 2003: 38). "There are also vested bureaucratic interests in the government structures that have used the Hizb ut-Tahrir 'threat' to broaden their own powers" (ICG, 2002: 12). In 2004, the Kyrgyz Ministry of Internal Affairs estimated that HT membership was 1522 (Satybekov and Himidov, 2005).

### 1.3 Kyrgyz print media

On January 6, 2006, 180 newspapers were registered in Kyrgyzstan, but *de facto* the number of newspapers that are actually published is far smaller (Internews, 2006). The number of newspapers that provide reliable political information is, however, even smaller than that. "There are 56 state-owned newspapers in Kyrgyzstan whose circulation does not exceed 5000 copies per week. These newspapers are not popular, and without state subsidies only a few of them could survive.

1. The Uzbek minority in the Kyrgyz Republic comprises 13%-14% of the 4.8 million population, the majority of which lives in the southern parts of Kyrgyzstan (Population census of 1999, <http://www.welcome.kg/ru/kyrgyzstan/population/sostav/>). The higher number of Uzbeks sympathizing with HT compared with Kyrgyz sympathizers may be explained by the fact that Kyrgyzstan has been unable to provide the population in the south with print media, school textbooks and other channels from which Uzbek citizens could obtain information in their own language. The vacuum that could not be filled by Kyrgyz officials is filled by HT leaflets, which contain information on current and topical political, social, and economic developments not only in the region, but also internationally (Grebenschikov, 2002: 1).
2. References to this article of the Criminal Law are made in many press news reports related to arrests of HT members.



The 16 private newspapers must absorb heavy court fines if they offend the honor and dignity of officials. Their circulation, nevertheless, varies from 10 to 60 thousand copies per week, and their popularity is greater than that of government publications" (Mambetaliev, 2003: 250-251). According to a 2005 Freedom House report on freedom of the press, the media in Kyrgyzstan are not free from government control (Freedom House, 2005).

VB was selected for this study for several reasons. First, VB is the only daily – appearing five times per week – national newspaper. It has the highest circulation in Kyrgyzstan: 8,000 copies printed from Monday to Thursday, and 62,000 copies on Friday (Internews, [www.vb.kg](http://www.vb.kg)). Second, VB published 215 relevant articles during the past five years. This number is considerably higher than that found in other major Kyrgyz newspapers.<sup>1</sup> Third, VB has an electronic database of all articles published since 1998. None of the other major newspapers posted articles published earlier than 2004 on their websites.<sup>2</sup> There is evidence that, considering all the print media in Kyrgyzstan, VB is one of the major sources of information on HT.

From May 2001 to August 2005, this newspaper was loyal to the government, i.e., to ex-president Akaev, because Adil Toigonbaev, Akaev's son-in-law, owned a controlling interest in VB. Shortly after the change of the Kyrgyz government on March 24, 2005, Aleksandr Kim, the previous owner of VB, demanded reconsideration of VB ownership, insisting that shares of VB were unlawfully appropriated by Toigonbaev. On August 15, 2005, Kim's ownership of VB was restored by a court decision (<http://news.akipress.org/news/21564>).

#### 1.4 Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Kyrgyz mass media

The Kyrgyz law "On combating extremist activity," which went into effect on August 19, 2005, contains many references to the activities of the mass media. "Extremist activity" includes, among other things, activities of the mass media directed at "... instigating racial, ethnic or religious discord, as well as social discord connected with violence or appeals for violence ...," and "... public appeals for the implementation of the mentioned activity or the perpetration of the mentioned activities ... ." (Jogorku Kenesh, 2005: 1). Article 8 of the same law warns against promulgating extremist ideas through the mass media when reporting on extremist activities. Articles # 11 and # 17 also contain regulations that prohibit distributing "extremist material" or publishing such material on behalf of extremist organizations in the Kyrgyz Republic.

A number of reports reveal that Kyrgyz regional administrations try to limit coverage of HT in the mass media in order to avoid accusations of violating this and other laws related to media and extremism (Marat, 2005: 3). In her final recommendations on how to combat religious extremism in Central Asian states, Zeyno Baran, Director of International Security and Energy programs at the Nixon Center, emphasized the crucial role of the media in this process. Not only should there be: "... free and reliable media sources to which people can turn to receive objective information ... all available media resources need to be used to disseminate the positive values of Islam and to increase basic levels of religious understanding" (Baran, 2004: 137-138).

Religious topics are, however, not extensively covered and discussed in Central Asian mass media (Freedman et al., 2005; Loma, 2003). One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that, "Religious freedom and restraint issues are controversial for reporting, as they come into conflict with unofficial government campaigns against pious Muslims" (Machleder quoted in Freedman et al., 2005: 5). The HT organization received limited or no coverage in Central Asian media. In Tajikistan, "... any information related to this movement [HT] is published under the heading 'Crimes', and only with reference to the law enforcement press service" (Mansurova, 2002: 2). In Uzbekistan, "... there are no reports whatsoever about the activities of the Hizb-ut-Tahrir radical Islamic party, no accounts of the party's members brought to trial, no accounts about protests staged in Ferghana province by wives and mothers of those arrested for links with informal religious organizations" (Tokhtakhojayeva, 2002: 1). In Kyrgyzstan, "[N]ewspapers and television channels have no balanced approach to the forbidden movement. The media persistently repeat the cliché that Hizb-ut-Tahrir's members are terrorists and extremists who wish to destroy the existing regime and establish an Islamic state in Central Asia, and this is all the authorities want to talk about" (Grebenschikov, 2002: 2).

The reason journalists avoid writing about HT is that they are afraid to discuss this organization objectively, "... largely because of the intimidating and repressive attitudes of governments ..." (Loersch, 2002: 1), and/or because there are few journalists who know and write about the subject (Sukhov quoted in Grebenschikov, 2002: 3).

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1. For example, during the same period *MSN* published 114 articles that contained references to HT. *MSN*, a private newspaper, has the second highest circulation after VB ([www.msn.kg](http://www.msn.kg); <http://www.internews.kg/?pid=81&cid=2&nid=40>).
  2. *Slovo Kyrgyzstana*, a state-owned newspaper, has maintained electronic archives of articles published since 2004. Thirty relevant articles were published in 2004-2005 ([www.sk.kg](http://www.sk.kg)). *Delo* \_ doesn't offer an Internet archive for issues appearing earlier than 2006 ([www.delo.ktnet.kg](http://www.delo.ktnet.kg)).

## 2 Methodology

The method of media content analysis employed in this study draws on the work of Neuendorf (2002), Stacks et al. (1992) and Stempel et al. (1981). These researchers, whose work spans 70 years, employ similar steps and rules in making quantitative media content analyses. The following principles, as stated by Neuendorf, are employed to give the study a scientific basis: 1) objectivity; 2) *a priori* design; 3) inter-coder reliability; 4) validity; 5) generalizability; and 6) replicability (Neuendorf, 2002: 11; 80-81; 142). The steps of quantitative analysis identified by the above-mentioned authors include 1) literature review; 2) definition of messages and/or variables to be studied; 3) data sampling methods that ensure that the selected messages are representative of all relevant messages; 4) identifying units of analysis, which can include selected words, themes or attitudes; 5) creating categories to which a unit of analysis can be assigned; 6) coding data in accordance with the created categories; 7) testing the reliability of the coding system; and 8) tabulating, analyzing and interpreting the coded results (Neuendorf, 2002: a flowchart for the typical process of content analysis research; Stempel et al., 1981: 119-129; Stacks et al., 1992: 252-253).

The unit of analysis of this study is each article published in VB during the period from January 1, 2001 – December 31, 2005 in which the name Hizb ut-Tahrir is mentioned at least once. Data was derived from the VB web page using a search engine. Since virtually no quantitative research has been conducted on the portrayal of religious extremist organizations in pro-government newspapers in Central Asia, this study attempts to fill this gap by using a quantitative media content analysis that tabulates the number of articles about HT published each year and the number written by various individual journalists, as well as the types of articles and the tone of reference to HT. The study also makes correlations between author and year, content and year, tone and year, content and author, tone and author, and content and tone. The independent variables are time and author. The dependent variables are content and tone. The coding sheet has six columns: sequence number of the article, year of publication, month of publication, author, content and tone. For an example of the coding sheet, see Appendix A.

Each article was assigned a number from 1 to 215, starting with January 2001 and ending with December 2005. Years of publication are encoded with the numbers 1 to 5, starting with 2001 and ending with 2005. Months are encoded from 1 to 12, starting with January and ending with December. During initial encoding, authors were coded with the capital letters of their initials. Having ascertained that the majority of the articles were written by a small group of journalists, the authors who wrote 12 or more articles were encoded with the numbers from 1 to 6: Erlan Satybekov is encoded as 1, Oibek Hamidov as 2, Mahamadjan Urumbaev as 3, Asel Otorbaeva as 4, Daniyar Karimov as 5, and Urii Kuzminyh as 6. Articles written by other authors were encoded as 7, and those containing no information about their authors as 8.

Initially, seven content categories were identified: 1) arrests of HT members, 2) activities of HT in Central Asia, 3) some information on HT *per se*, 4) some analysis or discourse on how to combat HT, 5) HT name is used either in the title or lead of the article, with no further reference to HT in the main text of the article, 6) the article contains references to HT, but overall is completely irrelevant to HT, and 7) article is irrelevant to HT, but reference is made to HT in the context of terrorism. Using so many categories made the number in each cell of the Statistical Program for Social Sciences too small to determine whether the correlations were statistically significant. For the statistical analysis, the seven categories were, consequently, combined into three. Articles solely dedicated to reporting about arrests of HT members were encoded with the number "1." The initial categories 2, 3, and 4 were combined as "informative articles" and were encoded with the number "2," while the categories 5, 6, and 7 were combined as "irrelevant articles" and encoded with the number "3." Although initial categorization of articles is not used in the computerized content analyses, these data are used to establish the dynamics of change in types of articles over the study period.

The tone of reference to HT was encoded into three categories: 1) neutral, 2) negative, 3) very negative. A "positive" category was initially included, but no article fit into that category, and it was, therefore, dropped. A positive attitude toward the organization could have been expressed by mentioning that members of the organization help each other in coping with such problems as unemployment, religious education, funerals, medical care, etc. – but it was not. Neutral articles, encoded as "1," were those in which the authors used no adjectives when referring to HT. They refer to the organization as religious or political, and/or mention that the organization's goal is to establish a Caliphate. Negative articles, encoded as "2," were those containing expressions with reference to HT such as: "prohibited organization," "clandestine organization," "spreading leaflets with anti-constitutional content," "government is concerned (or alarmed) because of HT activities." Very negative articles, encoded as "3," contained references to the organization such as the following: "religious extremists," "terrorists," "radicals," "religious fanatics" or "threat to the state and/or people."

A second coder coded every 10<sup>th</sup> article, and her data was compared to the encoding of the primary researcher. The established reliability coefficient was 93.2%. SPSS was used for the statistical analysis of the data – frequencies, cross tabulation and Chi-square tests. Excel was used for the graphic presentation of data.

Interviews with the journalists who wrote the majority of relevant articles – Erlan Satybekov, deputy editor-in-chief of VB; Urii Kuzminyih, a VB journalist in charge of crime reports; Oibek Hamidov, a VB journalist based in Osh, the southern oblast of Kyrgyzstan; and Mahamadjan Urumbaev, a VB journalist based in Osh – were conducted in an attempt to explain the quantitative data and to answer questions such as “why” and “wherefore.”

### 3 Findings

#### 3.1 Year

Of the 215 articles containing references to HT published in VB during 2001-2005, 10 (4.7%) were published in 2001, 48 (22.3%) in 2002, 50 (23.3%) in 2003, 55 (25.6%) in 2004, and 52 (24.2%) in 2005. The number of articles increased between 2001 and 2002 and then remained virtually constant from 2002 to 2005. There was no support for H-1, that the number of articles containing references to HT increases over time. Lack of support for the first sub-hypothesis lends support to the main hypothesis, according to which the coverage of HT in VB didn't provide a complete picture of the organization. For a graphic representation of these data, see Figure 1.




Figure 1: Frequency per year

#### 3.2 Author

Of the 215 articles, 39 (18.1%) were written by Erlan Satybekov, 20 (9.3%) by Oibek Hamidov, 23 (10.7%) by Mahamadjan Urumbaev, 12 (5.6%) by Asel Otorbaeva, 15 (7.0%) by Daniyar Karimov, 13 (6.0%) by Urii Kuzminyih, 46 (21.4%) by 29 other authors, and 47 articles (21.9%) did not contain information about their authors. There is support for H-2, that the majority of the articles are written by a small number of journalists. Support for the second sub-hypothesis lends support to the main hypothesis. For a graphic representation of these data, see Figure 2.

#### 3.3 Content

Of the 215 articles, 49 articles (22.8%) dealt with arrests of HT members, 109 articles (50.7%) were informative, and 57 articles (26.5%) were mainly irrelevant to the topic. We do not find support for Hypothesis (H-3), that there are fewer informative articles on HT than the combined number of articles about arrests and irrelevant articles. Lack of support for the third sub-hypothesis does not lend support to the main hypothesis. For a graphic representation of these data, see Figure 2.




Figure 2: Frequency of Content

Of 109 informative articles written over the five years, 58 articles (53%) focused primarily on describing HT activities in the Central Asian region, 30 articles (17.8%) provided general information about the HT organization, and 21 articles (12.5%), apart from providing relevant information on HT, focused on how to combat it. There is no support for H-4, that the majority of informative articles address the question of combating HT. Lack of support for the fourth sub-hypothesis does not support the main hypothesis.

Of 57 articles mainly irrelevant to HT, 6 (10.5%) contained references to HT in the titles or leads of the articles, but nowhere else in the main text of the articles, 22 (38.5%) contained references to HT in the main text, and 29 (50.95%) contained references to HT in the context of terrorism. There is support for H-5, that the majority of irrelevant articles contain references to HT in the context of terrorism. Support for the fifth sub-hypothesis lends support to the main hypothesis.

### 3.4 Tone




Figure 3: Frequency of Tone

Of the 215 articles, 20 (9.3%) contained neutral references to HT, 48 (22.3%) negative, and 127 (68.4%) very negative.

There is support for H-6, that in most cases the tone of references to HT is very negative. Support for the sixth sub-hypothesis lends support to the main hypothesis. For a graphic representation of these data, see Figure 3.

### 3.5 Content and Year

In 2001, VB published 1 (10.0%) article on arrests of HT members, 7 informative articles (70.0%), and 2 articles (20.0%) mainly irrelevant to HT. In 2002, VB published 13 articles (27.1%) about arrests of HT members, 23 informative articles (47.9%), and 12 articles (25.0%) mainly irrelevant to HT. In 2003, VB published 9 articles (18.0%) about arrests of HT members, 34 informative articles (68.0%), and 7 articles (14.0%) mainly irrelevant to HT. In 2004, VB published 15 articles (27.3%) about arrests of HT members, 23 informative articles (41.8%), and 17 articles mainly irrelevant to HT (30.9%). In 2005, VB published 11 articles (21.2%) on arrests of HT members, 22 informative articles (42.3%), and 19 articles mainly irrelevant to HT (36.5%). The correlation of content and year is not statistically significant ( $t=0.111$ ). Support was not found for H-7, that articles would become less informative over time. Lack of support for the seventh sub-hypothesis does not provide support for the main hypothesis. For a graphic representation of these data, see Figure 4.




Figure 4: Content\*Year cross tabulation

### 3.6 Tone and Content

Of 49 articles about arrests of HT members, 3 articles (6.1%) contained neutral references to HT, 13 (26.5%) negative, and 33 (67.3%) very negative. Of 109 informative articles, 8 articles (7.3%) contained neutral references to HT, 23 (21.1%) negative, and 78 (71.6%) very negative. Of 57 articles mainly irrelevant to HT, 9 articles (15.8%) contained neutral references to HT, 12 (21.1%) negative, and 36 (63.2%) very negative. The correlation between tone and content is not statistically significant ( $t=0.347$ ). Support was not found for H-8, that the tone of reference to HT depends on the article's content. Lack of support for the eighth sub-hypothesis lends support to the main hypothesis. For a graphic representation of these data, see Figure 5.




Figure 5: Tone\*Content cross tabulation

### 3.7 Tone and Year

Of 10 relevant articles published in 2001, none contained neutral references to HT, 1 (10.0%) contained negative references, and 9 (90%) very negative ones. Of 48 relevant articles published in 2002, 4 (8.3%) contained neutral references, 4 (8.3%) contained negative references, and 40 (83.3%) very negative ones. Of 50 relevant articles published in 2003, 4 (8.0%) contained neutral references, 9 (18.0%) articles contained negative references, and 37 (74.0%) very negative ones. Of 55 relevant articles published in 2004, 1 (1.8%) contained neutral references, 14 (25.5%) contained negative references, and 40 (72.7%) very negative ones. Of 52 articles published in 2005, 11 (21.2%) contained neutral references, 20 (38.5%) contained negative references, and 21 (40.4%) very negative ones. The correlation between negativity and year is statistically significant ( $t=0.000$ ). References to HT became more neutral over time. There is no support H-9, that the number of articles with very negative references to HT increases over time. Rejection of the ninth sub-hypothesis does not lend support to the main hypothesis. For a graphic representation of these data, see Figure 6.




Figure 6: Tone\*Year cross tabulation

### 3.8 Content and Author

Of 39 articles written by Satybekov, 1 (2.6%) was about arrests of HT members, 23 (59.0%) were informative, and 15 (38.5%) were mainly irrelevant to HT. Of 20 articles written by Hamidov, 6 (30.0%) were about arrests of HT members, 12 (60.0%) were informative, and 2 (10.0%) were mainly irrelevant to HT. Of 23 articles written by Urumbaev, 3 (13.0%) were about arrests of HT members, 15 (65.2%) were informative, and 5 (21.7%) were mainly irrelevant to HT. Of 12 articles written by Otorbaeva, 1 (8.3%) was about arrests of HT members, 6 (50.0%) were informative, and 5 (41.7%) were mainly irrelevant to HT. Of 15 articles written by Karimov, none was about arrests of HT members, 7 (46.7%) were informative and 8 (53.3%) were mainly irrelevant to HT. Of 13 articles written by Kuzminyh, 11 (84.6%) were about arrests of HT members, 2 (15.4%) were informative, and Kuzminyh wrote no articles irrelevant to HT. Of 46 articles written by other authors, 7 (15.2%) were about arrests of HT members, 24 (52.2%) were informative, and 15 (32.6%) were mainly irrelevant to HT. Of 47 articles that contained no information about authors, 20 (42.6%) were about arrests of HT members, 20 (42.6%) were informative, and 7 (14.9%) were mainly irrelevant to HT. The correlation between author and content is statistically significant ( $t=.000$ ). There is support for H-10, that there is a strong correlation between the author and the content of the article. Support for the tenth sub-hypothesis lends support to the main hypothesis. For a graphic representation of these data, see Figure 7.




Figure 7: Content\*Author cross tabulation

### 3.9 Tone and Author

Of 39 articles written by Satybekov, 3 (7.7%) contained neutral references to HT, 4 (10.3%) negative, and 32 (82.1%) very negative. Of 20 articles written by Hamidov, 2 (10.0%) contained neutral references to HT, 5 (25.0%) negative, and 13 (65.0%) very negative. Of 23 articles written by Urumbaev, 4 (17.4%) contained neutral references to HT, 2 (8.7%) negative, and 17 (73.9%) very negative. Of 12 articles written by Otorbaeva, 2 (16.7%) contained neutral references to HT, 3 (25.0%) negative, and 7 (58.3%) very negative. Of 15 articles written by Karimov, none contained neutral references to HT, 6 (40.0%) negative, and 9 (60.0%) very negative. Of 13 articles written by Kuzminyh, 2 (15.4%) contained neutral references to HT, 6 (46.2%) negative, and 5 (38.5%) very negative. Of 46 articles written by other authors, 2 (4.3%) contained neutral references to HT, 14 (30.4%) negative, and 30 (65.2%) very negative. Of 47 articles that did not contain information about their authors, 5 (10.6%) contained neutral references to HT, 8 (17.0%) negative and 34 (72.3%) very negative. The correlation between author and tone is not statistically significant ( $t=0.102$ ). There is no support for H-11, that there is a correlation between author and tone. Lack of support for the eleventh sub-hypothesis lends support to the main hypothesis. For a graphic representation of these data, see Figure 8.




Figure 8: Tone\*Author cross tabulation

### 3.10 Author and Year

Of 39 articles written by Satybekov, 4 (10.26%) were written in 2001, 14 (35.90) in 2002, 10 (25.64%) in 2003, 7 (17.95%) in 2004, and 4 (7.7%) in 2005. Of 20 articles written by Hamidov, 2 (10.0%) were written in 2001, 2 (10.0%) in 2002, 4 (8.0%) in 2003, 5 (25.0%) in 2004, and 7 (35%) in 2005. Of 23 articles written by Urumbaev, 1 (4.35%) was written 2001, 5 (21.74%) in 2002, 5 (21.74%) in 2003, 4 (17.39%) in 2004, and 8 (34.78%) in 2005. Of 12 articles written by Otorbaeva, none were written in 2001, 1 (8.33%) in 2002, 8 (66.67%) in 2003, 3 (25.00%) in 2004, and none in 2005. Of 15 articles written by Karimov, none were written in 2001, 1 (6.67%) in 2002, 4 (26.67%) in 2003, 6 (40.00%) in 2004, and 4 (26.67%) in 2005. Of 13 articles written by Kuzminyh, none were written in 2001-2003, 6 (46.15%) in 2004, and 7 (53.85%) in 2005. Of 46 articles written by other authors, 2 (4.35%) were written in 2001, 9 (19.57%) in 2002, 7 (15.22%) in 2003, 11 (23.91%) in 2004, and 17 (36.96%) in 2005. Of 47 articles written by unidentified authors, 1 (2.13%) was written in 2001, 16 were written (34.04%) in 2002, 12 (25.53%) in 2003, 13 (27.66%) in 2004, and 5 (10.64%) in 2005. The correlation between author and year is statistically significant ( $t=.001$ ). For a graphic representation of these data, see Figure 9.




Figure 9: Author\*Year cross tabulation



The main hypothesis, that the coverage of HT in VB did not provide a complete picture of the HT organization during the past five years, is supported by 7 sub-hypotheses, but not supported by 4 other sub-hypotheses.

## 4 Discussion

### 4.1 Year

Although the number of articles published in 2001 is considerably smaller than that in 2002-2005, this year was important enough to be included in the time frame of this study, because nine of the ten articles were published after September 11, 2001, the day of the terror attacks on the USA and a crucial turning point for major political transformations in the world, including subsequent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. According to an International Crisis Group report, HT started operating in Central Asian countries in the mid-1990s. There were, however, a limited number of articles on HT in the Kyrgyz press at that time. VB published 25 relevant articles from 1998 to 2000, and references to HT in those articles were mainly attributed to the incursions of a militant group, allegedly the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, in the Batken oblast of southern Kyrgyzstan in 1999-2000. The lack of articles in 2001 could be explained in various ways: first, notwithstanding events in Batken, HT may not have attracted much attention from journalists or law-enforcement agencies until the major terrorist attacks on the USA; second, perhaps there was no journalist at VB knowledgeable about HT or interested in writing detailed articles about the organization; third, the problem of religious extremism may have been neglected by the Kyrgyz government and brought up only during particular political events to justify its decisions and/or policies.

ICG researchers reported that, "during 2002 many observers sensed a decline in Hizb ut-Tahrir activity – fewer leaflets appeared, and some researchers claimed that the reason was a fall-off in financing, perhaps caused by restrictions introduced after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S." (ICG, 2003: 14). According to the findings of this research, the number of articles about arrests of HT members rose from 1 in 2001 to 13 in 2002. Taking into account that HT members were identified mainly if caught distributing leaflets, the ICG observation about fewer leaflets in 2002 is not supported. However, it could be assumed that HT activities were not closely monitored by Kyrgyz law enforcement agencies until September 11, 2001, so that the number of leaflets was greater than in 2002, when the organization had to become more clandestine to avoid arrests. Four VB journalists noted, however, that articles related to HT appeared in VB after the Batken events in 1999 and have increased in number since then, due to the increasing frequency of HT activities in the country (interviews with Satybekov, Hamidov, Urumbaev and Kuzminyh).

The number of relevant articles increased significantly in 2002, and since then has stayed at a level of approximately 50 articles a year. The logic behind seeing support for the main hypothesis because H-1 is not supported is that the more articles VB publishes referring to HT, the greater would be the probability that VB is providing a complete picture of the organization.

As noted by Hamidov, who writes for VB in Osh, HT has become a scapegoat that is blamed during periods of instability in the region, or during a wide range of political events. This view was supported by Urumbaev, who added, however, that references to HT become more frequent during political events, because HT becomes more active at such times and takes advantage of opportunities to disseminate propaganda. It can be assumed, then, that the number of relevant articles has reached a peak level and has not declined, because from 2002 to 2005 there were numerous relevant political events on the local, regional and international levels.

### 4.2 Author

The main hypothesis was supported by support for H-2, because it is plausible that a diverse group of authors could provide differentiated and comprehensive information about HT. That the majority of the articles were written by a small circle of journalists is attributable to the following factors: Satybekov joined VB in 2001. He has an undergraduate degree in journalism, has lectured in the USA on religious extremism and terrorism in Central Asia, and has visited Israel and other countries to learn more about religious extremism. His colleagues regard him as an expert in this area. Urumbaev and Hamidov, VB journalists based in Osh, the southern part of Kyrgyzstan, are father and son. The father uses a pseudonym not to avoid persecution for writing about HT, but simply to avoid the repetition of the same name in the newspaper. They joined VB in 2000 and write about HT as part of their job of covering events in the southern part of the country. The three journalists noted that they write articles about HT voluntarily and have never been asked by the editor-in-chief to submit additional articles. Kuzminyh joined VB in 1995 and as part of his duties has written crime reports and covered arrests of HT members. Although Otorbaeva and Karimov are two of the six main authors, they could not be interviewed. Karimov was on leave, and Otorbaeva has not worked for VB since 2004.

That 47 relevant articles did not give information about their authors was explained by Satybekov as a technical problem. According to him, if several articles on the same page are written by the same author, only the last article contains infor-

mation about the author. This convention may not have been taken into account when the articles were published on the web page. Kuzminyh suggested that unattributed articles are published by VB as expressing the views of the newspaper. A review of unattributed articles established that the overwhelming majority focused on arrests of HT members or reports by law enforcement bodies operating mainly in the southern regions of the country. The four main authors were strongly convinced that their names were reflected in each of their publications.

### 4.3 Content

Since the number of "informative" articles (109) was higher than the total number of other articles combined (106), the main hypothesis was not supported. However, the observed difference was negligible, and it is also noteworthy that "informative" articles differed in several respects.

Informative articles were initially subdivided into three groups: 1) articles on the activities of HT members, 2) general information about the HT organization, and 3) articles on how to combat HT. Articles were also noted if they were: 1) long (from 700 to 1500 words); 2) solely dedicated to the HT organization and/or its activities; 3) and/or provided exhaustive information on the organization, including a historical discussion of the origins of HT, its ideology and objectives, its various types of activity, reasons why it has been banned in various parts of the world, the location of its headquarters and/or its attitude towards violence and different forms of government.

In 2001 two such informative articles were published: interviews by Satybekov with an imprisoned HT member and with a religious scholar. He was also the author of three comprehensive articles on HT published in 2002 as part of a series of articles entitled "Servants of Death." In 2003 VB did not publish any such comprehensive articles. Karimov and Otorbaeva wrote one article each that were the most informative articles on HT published that year. In 2004 VB also published two articles on the topic that were quite informative, although not comprehensive. One of these was an interview by Urie Aleksandrov with the head of the Issyk-Kul regional department of internal affairs. This official, a lieutenant colonel, provided extensive information on HT's activities in the country. The other was based on material from the Uzbek Embassy in Kyrgyzstan and contained general information about the HT organization, as well as its activities in Uzbekistan. In 2005 VB published one comprehensive article on HT, which consisted of an interview with Diler Djumabaev, a HT member in Osh. The interview questions were written by Satybekov, and the interview was conducted by Hamidov. The main hypothesis is strongly supported by the fact that of 109 articles classified as "informative" in this study only 10 were comprehensive, and six of these were written by the same person, Satybekov.

Satybekov maintained that VB keeps its readers well informed about HT's organization, ideology, objectives and origins. He noted, however, that all the mass media inform the public about HT and that knowledge of the organization depends not on the quantity of relevant articles, but rather on their quality. According to Satybekov, much detailed information about HT has been provided by VB and may be repeated for readers about 6 times a year in the form of interviews with knowledgeable persons. He thought that interviews such as the one with Djumabaev permit readers "... to hear the voice of the other side, and at the same time increase the popularity of the newspaper" (Interview with Satybekov). Moreover, he insisted, overly frequent references to HT in numerous articles on the topic would be counterproductive. If people got used to reading a lot of information about HT, they might either skip over such articles, or begin to regard the organization as a part of everyday life. He said the popularity of the newspaper would, consequently, decline (Interview with Satybekov).

The content of articles is carefully considered and discussed prior to publication by Urumbaev and Hamidov in Osh. They try to avoid mentioning such delicate matters as the ethnic identity of HT members (Interviews with Urumbaev and Hamidov). Urumbaev and Hamidov, who are also ethnic Uzbeks, emphasized that highlighting the Uzbek ethnicity of HT members might exacerbate inter-ethnic conflict and provoke violence. Printing that a majority of HT members are ethnic Uzbeks is not prohibited by any official government regulation. Nevertheless, journalists at VB do not write about this fact. The relevant articles published in 2001 and 2002 make no reference to HT members being Uzbeks. In 2003 two articles mentioned that HT leaflets were printed in both the Kyrgyz and the Uzbek languages. In the same year, an author other than the six main journalists wrote that traditionally HT disseminated its ideas among the Uzbek population in the south. In 2004 there was one reference to an arrested HT member being identified as an Uzbek, and one reference to confiscated HT leaflets in the Uzbek language. In 2005 two articles contained references to HT leaflets published in the Uzbek language.

Urumbaev said that the possession of weapons by HT members is another issue that should be thoroughly discussed before reporting it in articles, mainly because this claim has not been proved. However, a number of articles published in VB contain references to law enforcement agencies having proved that HT members possess arms. Such articles appeared in 2002. A September 3, 2002 article entitled "Terrorist Hideout" reported that the National Security Service had discovered a hideout containing weapons, allegedly belonging to HT, in the Jalalabad oblast in the south of Kyrgyzstan. This article was not written by one of the six main authors. Interestingly, in a number of articles journalists referred to both the discovery of arms and HT, but did not directly accuse HT of possessing arms. Such references were made very cautiously, so that readers could themselves infer that the arms discovered belonged to HT. In this connection, Urumbaev stated that VB has only

two reporters with a real grasp of HT issues: Satybekov and himself. Moreover, as noted by Urumbaev and Hamidov, some journalists from the north of the country do not possess in-depth knowledge of the organization and "... sometimes are too harsh ..." in their comments on HT (Interviews with Urumbaev and Hamidov).

#### 4.4 Tone

The reason H-6 appears to support the main hypothesis is that a lack of balanced information cannot contribute to the presentation of a balanced picture of the organization. This study reveals that no matter whether articles contain information about arrests of HT members, general information about the organization or mention of HT by name only, in 90.3% of the cases references to HT are not neutral. An absence of positive references lends further support to the main hypothesis.

However, the data reveal that the number of articles with neutral references to HT decreased between 2003 and 2004, but increased significantly in 2005 (4 in 2003, 1 in 2004 and 11 in 2005). Also, the number of negative references to HT steadily increased over the past five years, and the number of very negative references to HT fluctuated (9 in 2001, 40 in 2002, 37 in 2003, 40 in 2004 and 21 in 2005). These data do not support H-9 and do not lend support to the main hypothesis. Although these two sub-hypotheses seem to contradict each other, it is worth noting that support for H-6 is much stronger than for H-9.

Negative references to HT were found in 22.3% of the cases. Since the organization is officially banned and operates clandestinely, it could, however, be argued that expressions coded as negative portray the organization objectively. Kuzminyh, Urumbaev and Hamidov expressed this view in regard to their writing. According to Kuzminyh, who has written the lowest percentage of articles referring to HT very negatively (38.5%), he always writes neutrally on this topic. He considers it his duty to report information he receives from law enforcement agencies without adding analytical comments, thus avoiding personal criticism of the organization. According to Hamidov, the articles about HT published in VB are neutral, because VB doesn't make any accusations against this organization. He was convinced that he also reported neutrally on HT and that his tone of reference to HT has not changed over time. Hamidov, however, was very negative in 65% of the cases. According to Urumbaev, the portrayal of HT in VB reflected the real situation. He explained that, "VB presented the combined information of four sources: law enforcement agencies, HT, local clergy, and the local population. References to HT were close to being neutral, but were a bit negative because of the critical nature of analytical articles. After all, the organization is officially banned in the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic and cannot be portrayed positively." Urumbaev, nevertheless, made the second highest percentage of very negative references to HT (73.9%) after Satybekov (82.1%).

Satybekov explained that his attitude toward the organization has been changing over time. As an atheist since childhood, he claimed to reject all religious organizations, including HT. He claimed that for him all religions present a misleading picture of the world. He did try to understand HT's situation, as well as that of other religious organizations that set themselves apart from the mainstream religions such as Islam and Christianity. He saw the confrontation between official Muslim clergy and HT as a competition between the two sides for followers. In his view, people join HT, apart from trying to survive under difficult economic and social conditions, in an attempt to satisfy spiritual needs and to learn more about Islam. HT theologians, he thought, were knowledgeable and could explain complex questions to ordinary persons in understandable language. Official Muslim clergy cannot accept that people join this organization and fail to do anything about it (Interview with Satybekov).

Satybekov estimated that in 90% of the cases references to HT in VB are negative mainly because HT is banned, and the objectives of the organization conflict with the Kyrgyz constitution. Of the 32 articles Satybekov wrote about HT in the past five years, 82.1% contained negative references to it. To justify himself he insisted, "As a person, I am a radical myself and a proponent of dictatorship in all spheres. Under a dictatorship, law and order are upheld." He maintained, however, that he did not favor burning mosques and physically eliminating HT members, but made it clear that HT should be combated with forceful measures.

Satybekov and Urumbaev noted that there were some positive aspects of HT that could have been covered. They pointed out, for example, that in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan HT was known for its charitable activities. There was one occasion on which members organized a feast for the local population. HT members could count on financial support from the organization when they faced emergencies or medical needs. They held that such information could not, however, be published in VB, because "... the ultimate goals of this organization are well known ..." (Interview with Urumbaev), and "... VB doesn't promote the HT organization" (Interview with Satybekov).

Another possible explanation for negative references to HT is that Kyrgyz journalists cannot improve their reputation by writing about positive issues. One finding of quantitative research on Kyrgyz media is that the majority of articles published in *Slovo Kyrgyzstana* and *Delo* are negative (Ibraeva et al., 2002: 165-167). To be precise, an analysis of articles containing references to the legislative and executive branches of the Kyrgyz government written by a leading VB journalist in

1998-1999 showed that his comments were negative in 18 of 19 cases (ibid.). It is difficult to expect journalists to write positively about a banned organization when they cover the government of their country so negatively.

#### 4.5 HT and the mass media

Whereas Kyrgyz leaders of civil society and scholars think that the mass media should be used to combat religious extremism by promoting religious tolerance and exposing the real objectives of such organizations (Sagnaeva, 2002: 70; Musozoda, 2002: 168; Olimova, 2002: 202; Baran, 2004: 137-138), the journalists interviewed had somewhat different opinions. Kuzminyh claimed it was not his job to analyze the problem; he was only supposed to report on what happened and where. "Why" and "how" questions, he maintained, were not his responsibility. Hamidov and Satybekov maintained that the issue must be dealt with by the government and not by the mass media. Satybekov explained that, "... the objective of the mass media is not to campaign against anybody. Our country is not one where the mass media can be regarded as a fourth pillar of the state. I don't believe the mass media's role is to combat religious extremism" (Interview with Satybekov). Hamidov asked, "Why should VB combat HT at all? This group has a right to think whatever it wants, and we just inform the public about their ideas and objectives. It is up to the people to decide whether they will follow them or not." Urumbaev stated that, "... the mass media, and VB in particular, can only offer explanatory material on its pages, publish objective information about the organization so that people will be fully informed and kept up-to-date on the issues" (Interview with Urumbaev). Summarizing the views of the three journalists on ways of combating HT, it appears that Satybekov, who rejects all religions, advocates draconian measures against extremists; Hamidov, who describes himself as "half atheist," believes that the state should combine "hard" and "soft" measures to combat HT; and Urumbaev, who deeply respects all religions, but is not a strong believer, feels that HT cannot be combated with harsh measures at all. Instead, state and clergy should sponsor educational discussions and activities to help people understand the errors of HT ideas.

When the Kyrgyz law "On preventing extremist activity" was adopted on June 30, 2005, it promulgated the official regulation that the mass media is forbidden to publicize extremist ideas. Three of four interviewees, however, had never heard of this law. Satybekov was aware of it, but said that, "... this law, just like any other law in Kyrgyzstan, doesn't work, and it will not work for many years because of a very weak legal culture in Kyrgyzstan" (Interview with Satybekov). According to this law, however, the mass media are not allowed to disseminate extremist material or to contribute to extremist activities. One question this raises is whether interviews of HT members published in VB can be regarded as spreading extremist ideas. On the one hand, HT members are Kyrgyz citizens and have a right to practice the freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution. On the other hand, they are members of a banned organization and should not be given a public forum.

An analysis of interviews with HT members appearing in VB lends support to the charge that VB has, in fact, given a platform to HT, publishing information that would otherwise be spread clandestinely through HT leaflets. Satybekov's interview with Rahimjan Charikov, an imprisoned HT member, was published in VB on September 26, 2001 (Satybekov, 2001). Satybekov's questions disclosed important information about HT's objectives and ideology, informing readers as to why this organization has been banned in many countries throughout the world. Charikov's answers, moreover, presented HT's views about political developments in the world and the region. Commenting on the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the USA, Charikov insisted that, "... America has itself to blame. It provokes terrorism, because, in leading the West, it wants to suppress Islam" (Charikov quoted in Satybekov, 2001). Among Charikov's other controversial claims were: "Turkish activist Mustafa Kemal Atatürk destroyed it [a Caliphate] by splitting it up into a multitude of smaller states. He did it under the influence of the West ... . Why should we be surprised? Mustafa Kemal was a representative of a Jewish tribe, Yahudi, as is, by the way, the current Uzbek president, Islam Karimov ... . On February 16, 1999, Islam Karimov organized a great provocation: an assassination attempt ... on himself, with the help of the special services, in order to accuse true Muslims, including Hizb ut-Tahrir, of organizing bombings. After that he started arresting anyone who disagreed with the government. That is politics!" (Charikov quoted in Satybekov, 2001).

Another interview with a HT member was published in VB after the presidential elections in Kyrgyzstan on July 22, 2005. Satybekov wrote the questions, and Hamidov conducted the interview. This time the interviewee was Diler Djumabaev, an entrepreneur and press-attaché of the HT organization. In several of his questions, Satybekov revealed basic information about HT's membership, strategies, objectives and ideology. Other questions were aimed, moreover, at ascertaining HT's view on the presidential elections in Kyrgyzstan, the March events in Kyrgyzstan that resulted in the seizure of the government by opposition leaders, on Andijan events in Uzbekistan,<sup>1</sup> the American airbase in Kyrgyzstan and the London terrorist bombings in July 2005. Djumabaev's most interesting replies were: "If a mob of people managed to seize power [in Kyrgyzstan on March 24, 2005] in a couple of hours, we could have done it even faster"; "We inform the population on what the sharia [Islamic law] says about elections – the election of those who rule without the Koran and hadis is a sin – and to vote or not to is the private matter of each individual"; "It was tough for us during Akaev's rule, now it is even worse. As

1. In May 2005 Uzbek government forces killed several hundred protestors in the main square of Andijan who had gathered to protest the unfair trial of 23 businessmen.

an entrepreneur, I opened the TV studio 'Ong', that couldn't operate even for three days. There is an ideological struggle going on"; "[The Andijan events] were organized by the Uzbek special services. Three or four months ago they offered 820 million US dollars to the interested forces to overthrow Karimov's regime. They invited Hizb ut-Tahrir to lead this activity. We refused, [because] there will be another Karimov, but the regime will not change"; "Yuldashev is blamed for having been an HT member. Why doesn't Uzbekistan slander another activist who occupies a high post in official religious structures and at the same time a post of nakib in our organization"; "They [the USA] and their allies set up a base here in order to kill our brothers in Afghanistan. How can we silently watch this?"; "If England starts pressuring Hizb, it means that democracy is on the verge of collapse. Democracy has its own principles: freedom of personality, speech, religion, etc. If they renounce these principles, it means that it is curtains for their ideology" (Satybekov and Hamidov, 2005).

One would expect to find answers to Satybekov's questions in HT's leaflets, but this information was published by VB. Satybekov mentioned that he had initiated the interview with Djumabaev and that after its publication neither he nor the VB management was approached by government officials. Djumabaev was, however, arrested on April 25, 2006, almost a year after the publication. According to state officials, he was arrested because he refused to pay a US \$200 electricity bill (Mir-saitov, 2006). Hamidov said he did not think Djumabaev's arrest was connected with his membership in HT, and that he was not going to cover this event in VB (Interview with Hamidov).

#### 4.6 Hizb ut-Tahrir and changes in the Kyrgyz government and Vechernii Bishkek's directorship

Changes in the Kyrgyz government in March 2005 and the VB management in August 2005 seem to have had little influence on the content or the tone of articles containing references to HT. The only noticeable change is that after the opposition seized power, VB stopped referring to the former opposition as having contacts with and the support of the HT organization. The four journalists interviewed were of the opinion that these changes have influenced neither the content nor the tone of references to HT in VB (Interviews with Satybekov, Hamidov, Urumbaev and Kuzminyh).

### 5 Conclusions

The quantitative findings of the study revealed that the main hypothesis was supported by 7 of the 11 sub-hypotheses: 1) the number of articles containing references to HT did not increase over time; 2) the majority of the articles were written by a small number of journalists; 3) the majority of articles mainly irrelevant to HT referred to the organization in the context of terrorism; 4) the tone of references to HT was very negative in the majority of cases; 5) the tone of reference to HT did not depend on the article's content; 6) there was a strong correlation between the authors of articles and the type of article content; and 7) there was a strong correlation between authors and tone. Two sub-hypotheses – 1) there would be fewer informative articles on HT than articles about arrests and irrelevant articles combined; 2) articles would become less informative over time – were not supported by the quantitative data and, consequently, did not lend support to the main hypothesis. However, qualitative analysis of these sub-hypotheses revealed that they actually did support the main hypothesis. Two findings – that the majority of the informative articles did not address the question of combating HT, and that the number of articles with very negative references to HT did not increase over time – do not, however, support the main hypothesis.

To conclude, VB failed to provide a balanced, complete picture of the organization over the past five years. It provided information that wasn't balanced, perhaps because a tendency to writing critically and often very negatively about topical issues, including HT, not only increases the popularity of the newspaper, but also protects journalists against accusations of supporting an extremist religious organization.

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**Christian Büttner, Joachim von Gottberg & Magdalena Kladzinski, 2005. Krieg in Bildschirmmedien. München: kopaed.**

Wir leben in einer Welt, in der räumliche und zeitliche Entfernungen durch bildgebende Medien wie Satellitenfernsehen und Internet zunehmend an Bedeutung verlieren und jede kriegerische oder gewaltsame Auseinandersetzung von noch so entlegenen Orten auf dem Globus sich via Satellitenübertragung nahezu ohne Zeitverzögerung in unsere Wohnzimmer oder über das World Wide Web auf den Computermonitor unserer Kinder drängt. Deshalb ist es dringend notwendig, die Auswirkungen dieser Bilder und Berichte auf Kinder und Jugendliche und auch auf uns selbst verantwortlich wahrzunehmen, aufzufangen und gegebenenfalls zu beschränken.

Der Aktualitätsdruck der Presse verlangt die Ausstrahlung wichtiger Ereignisse insbesondere in Kriegssituationen auch zu Zeiten, wenn Kinder und Jugendliche fernsehen, wodurch sie zwangsläufig mehr oder weniger heftigen Gewaltdarstellungen ausgesetzt werden. Wie können wir uns und unsere Kinder vor den Wirkungen dieser Bilder schützen? Welche Stellen sind dafür zuständig? Welche gesetzlichen Bestimmungen gelten?

Dieses Buch entstand anlässlich der Diskussion um die Ausstrahlung des insbesondere aufgrund seiner umstrittenen blutigen Anfangssequenz erst ab 16 Jahre freigegebenen Kriegsfilms "Der Soldat James Ryan" im frühen Abendprogramm, wenn auch jüngere Kinder noch am TV-Programm teilnehmen. In diesem Zusammenhang erstellten die Autoren eine detaillierte Übersicht über die verschiedenen Gremien und Institutionen, die sich mit Regeln und rechtlichen Bestimmungen zum Schutz der Kinder und Jugendlichen und auch der Erwachsenen vor Gewaltdarstellungen in Internet, Computerspielen, Nachrichten und Spielfilmen befassen, und erklären anschaulich deren Vorgehensweisen. Darüber hinaus werden auch konkrete, praktische und didaktische Ansätze zur Behandlung dieser Thematik in der pädagogischen Praxis sowohl für den Schulunterricht als auch für die außerschulische Bildungsarbeit erläutert.

Im ersten Teil des Buches beschäftigen sich der Psychologe Christian Büttner und die Kulturwissenschaftlerin Magdalena Kladzinski mit der Rolle der Medien als Informationslieferant und hinsichtlich ihrer Darstellung der Kriegswirklichkeit, wobei die aktuellen Begriffe "Infotainment", "Politainment" und "Militainment" aufgegriffen werden. Magdalena Kladzinski vergleicht gezielt die Gestaltungsprinzipien von Krieg in Kriegsfilmen, TV-Nachrichten und Computerspielen.

Der zweite Teil des Buches stellt die Darbietung von Krieg in den Bildschirmmedien in einen gesellschaftspolitischen Zusammenhang. Magdalena Kladzinski setzt sich mit der Frage auseinander, welche Rolle die Medien in Demokratien und Nicht-Demokratien spielen und in welchem Verhältnis Medien, Militär und Politik zueinander stehen. Die Medienpädagogin Claudia Mikat wendet sich dem Problem zu, wie viel Gewaltdarstellung Zuschauer vertragen, und veranschaulicht an

mehreren konkreten Beispielen die Entscheidungspraxis der Freiwilligen Selbstkontrolle (FSK). Jürgen Hilse, Mitarbeiter der Obersten Landesjugendbehörden bei der Unterhaltungssoftware Selbstkontrolle, gibt anhand realer Beispiele einen Einblick in die Schwierigkeiten und Bewertungskriterien bei der Beurteilung der Freigabe bzw. Altersbeschränkung von Computerspielen. Sabine Frank von der Freiwilligen Selbstkontrolle Multimedia-Diensteanbieter (FSM) und die Medienwissenschaftlerin Isabell Rausch erläutern an zwei Fallbeispielen das Vorgehen und die Argumentation bei Entscheidungen des Beschwerdeausschusses der FSM über Klagen hinsichtlich gewalthaltiger Darstellungen im Internet. Christian Büttner und Magdalena Kladzinski runden diesen Teil ab, indem sie sich mit der Verarbeitung von Kriegstraumata am Beispiel der Kriegsveteranen, ihrer Integration in die Gesellschaft und der entsprechenden Behandlung in den Medien auseinandersetzen.

Der dritte Teil des Buches liefert Informationen über das Genre "Kriegsfilm", die Produktion von Nachrichten für Kinder, die Entwicklung und Vermarktung von Computerkriegsspielen und die pädagogische Arbeit mit Kindern und Jugendlichen in Bezug auf den Umgang mit dem Thema "Krieg" und seiner Präsentation in den Medien. Die Pädagogin Maya Götz geht gezielt auf Aspekte der Bearbeitung von Krieg in den Nachrichten für Kinder ein und verdeutlicht dies an verschiedenen greifbaren Beispielen wie der Kindernachrichtensendung "logo!". Der TV-Redakteur Hans-Otto Horst gibt einen Überblick über die Entstehung und Wandlung des Kriegsfilms von Beginn der Filmgeschichte an und erläutert, wie dabei Themen des Ersten und Zweiten Weltkriegs, des Vietnamkriegs und der Golfkriege umgesetzt wurden. Die Entwicklung von Kriegsspielen, die Zusammenarbeit von Unterhaltungsindustrie und Militär und Aspekte, welche die Anwendung des Jugendschutzgesetzes behindern, werden von Hartmut Gieselmann, Redakteur des Computermagazins "c't", anhand mehrerer Beispiele eindrücklich beschrieben. Eine ausführliche Datenbank zu den Genres Kriegsfilm und Computerspiele befindet sich auf der beigefügten CD-Rom. Christian Büttner und Magdalena Kladzinski steuern Ergebnisse einer Befragung und Auswertung von Gruppendiskussionen mit Jugendlichen zum Thema Kriegsdarstellung in den Medien bei. Hinweise und Anleitung für die konkrete Umsetzung der bislang dargelegten theoretischen Erkenntnisse in der praktischen pädagogischen Arbeit liefert der Pädagoge Günther Gugel. Die reichhaltigen didaktischen Materialien dazu werden auf der beiliegenden CD-Rom mitgeliefert. Zu guter letzt beschreibt der Kunstpädagoge Jochen Krautz ein bereits durchgeführtes pädagogisches Unterrichtsprojekt zum Irakkrieg 2003, in welchem deutlich wird, dass Friedenspädagogik sowohl einen rationalen als auch einen emotionalen Zugang zum Thema bieten muss, wenn sie wirkungsvoll umgesetzt werden soll.

Das vorliegende Buch liefert nicht nur eine anschauliche und verständliche Übersicht zu theoretischen Aspekten und rechtlichen Grundlagen innerhalb der Thematik "Krieg in Bildschirmmedien", sondern auch Ideen für die konkrete Umsetzung der Erkenntnisse in die pädagogische Praxis. Beide Teile werden durch ausführliches Material auf der mitgelieferten CD-Rom ausgezeichnet ergänzt. Dabei wird die Vielschichtigkeit des Themas erhalten und insbesondere die Besonderheit der Darstellung von Krieg und Gewalt für Kinder und Jugendliche greifbar und ausdrucksvoll aufbereitet. Entscheidungen der FSM und FSK werden für den Leser nachvollziehbar.

Insgesamt stellt dieses Buch eine gelungene Zusammenstellung sich optimal ergänzender Beiträge aus unterschiedlichen Bereichen dar, die sich mit

verschiedenen Gesichtspunkten der Darbietung von Krieg und Gewalt in den Medien auseinandersetzen.

Der psychoanalytische Zugang zur Bewältigung der Traumata von Kriegsveteranen im Rahmen dieses sonst eher in Richtung medialer Darstellung orientierten Buches mag auf den ersten Blick vielleicht etwas befremdlich wirken, da sich dieses Kapitel mit der Verarbeitung unangenehmer Emotionen und Verletzungen auseinandersetzt und dabei über Aspekte der medialen Umsetzung deutlich hinausgeht. Um ein Verständnis für die Parallelen der psychologischen Vorgänge im Individuum und der äquivalenten gesellschaftlichen Prozesse zu erhalten, ist diese psychologische Bearbeitung des Themas jedoch notwendig.

Auf jeden Fall bildet dieses Buch eine interessante, anregende Lektüre nicht nur für jeden, der im Bereich Friedensforschung, -pädagogik und Medienpädagogik tätig ist, sondern insbesondere auch für Eltern - und auch Nicht-Eltern -, die mit Gewaltdarstellungen in den Bildschirmmedien verantwortlich umgehen wollen.

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**Christoph Butterwegge/Gudrun Hentges (Hg.) Massenmedien, Migration und Integration. Wiesbaden: VS - Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 2006.**

Die Veröffentlichung des von Christoph Butterwegge und Gudrun Hentges herausgegebenen Bandes fällt für die Migrationsforschung in eine Zeit, in der das Thema der Integration vers. Segregation von Migrant(inn)en in der Aufnahmegesellschaft intensiv und besonders kontrovers diskutiert wird: Strukturelle Assimilation sei die notwendige Bedingung einer nachhaltigen Sozial-Integration der Migrant(inn)en, heißt es bei Vertretern (Brubaker, Alba und Nee) des Neu-Assimilationsansatzes. Kulturelle Vorgaben des jeweiligen Aufnahmekontextes hätten nach wie vor eine zentrale Bedeutung insbesondere bei der Vermittlung von generell verwendbarem Humankapital; sie seien Voraussetzung für die Vermittlung von Chancen der strukturell verankerten Inklusion. Es sei also doch im Interesse der Migrant(inn)en selbst, ihre Chancen in der Kernkultur und in den Kerninstitutionen des Aufnahmelandes zu suchen.

Die in Übereinstimmung mit diesem Ansatz häufig formulierten Forderungen sind doppeldeutig: Sie können einerseits einen unumstrittenen, universellen Charakter haben (z.B. "Alles für die Bildung"), sie können aber auch andererseits Elemente eines autoritären Diskurses enthalten: z.B. "Wer hier nicht gleich mithält und wer keinen langen Atem hat, bleibt im Rennen auf der Strecke"; "Wer nach dem Einreisealter auch nur ein wenig zu spät kommt, den hat das Leben eigentlich ganz früh bestraft. Man kann schon fast die Uhr danach stellen, und jeder Monat zählt" (Zitate, Hartmut Esser).

Man könnte sich diese zwei letzteren aus wissenschaftlichen Publikationen stammenden Zitate sehr wohl auch als Titel von Zeitungsartikeln vorstellen (ähnliche Forderungen der Medien etwa in der Form: "Integriert euch gefälligst und lernt Deutsch!", gibt es ja zahlreiche). Ein(e) Wissenschaftler(in), der/die diese Titel kritisch analysieren sollte, würde vermutlich von Beispielen eines recht unreflektierten medialen Diskurses sprechen: Die Migrant(inn)en würden hier einseitig als Problemgruppe dargestellt und gleichzeitig ihre tatsächlichen Probleme und die Rolle der Aufnahmegesellschaft ausgeblendet. Als Vorschlag zur Verbesserung der journalistischen Praxis würde man sogar dann eventuell an das Verantwortungsbewusstsein der Journalist(inn)en appellieren, sie zu einer reflektierten Medienberichterstattung oder zur Einnahme einer gegenüber Kindern mit Migrationshintergrund sensibleren Haltung auffordern, etc.

Der wissenschaftliche Diskurs unterstützt in diesem konkreten Beispiel offensichtlich Deutungsmuster, die in der öffentlichen Debatte ohnehin präsent sind und vom medialen Diskurs aufgegriffen werden: Im ersten Beitrag des Buches identifiziert und rekonstruiert Wengeler im Einwanderungsdiskurs verschiedene Deutungsmuster ("Topoi"), die in unterschiedlichen Phasen der ('Ausländerbeschäftigung' besonders präsent und wirkungsvoll waren und/oder sind.

Besonders brisantes und zu meiner Einführung passendes Beispiel eines solchen (Topos' ist der sogenannte "Anpassungs-Topos".

Mediale Diskurse verlaufen nicht gradlinig, sondern weisen häufig ambivalente Argumentationsmuster auf, was Hentges in seiner Analyse der Migrationsberichterstattung im *Spiegel* deutlich macht: Es wird zwischen wirtschaftlich (nützlichen' und für die Aufnahmegesellschaft (wenig gewinnbringenden', ja (unerwünschten' Ausländer(inne)n unterschieden. Entsprechend unterschiedlich fällt dann die Wirkung des Diskurses aus: Sympathien werben für die ersteren, Aversionen erzeugen gegen die anderen.

Der Zusammenhang zwischen Diskurs, Wissen und Macht sowie der Beitrag der Wissenschaft zur Entstehung und Reproduktion eines Minderheiten ausgrenzenden medialen Diskurses stehen im Mittelpunkt des Beitrages von Erol Yildiz. Durch gezielte Einnahme der Innenperspektive der Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund wird am Beispiel des "Ghettodiskurses" nachgewiesen, dass mediale Diskurse die Alltagswirklichkeit und die Erfahrungen von Minderheiten ausblenden. Dies führe dazu, dass der Ethnisierungsprozess vorangetrieben und permanent reproduziert wird. Das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen den tatsächlichen Lebensverhältnissen dieser Menschen und den in den Medien häufig konstruierten Wirklichkeiten wird den Leser(inne)n auch im Beitrag von Schahrzad Farrokhzad noch einmal bewusst: Die Konstruktion der (fremden Frau' in den Medien zeichne sich durch kulturrassistische Stereotypisierungen und eurozentrische Sichtweisen aus.

Die von Häusler durchgeführte Analyse von Medien der extremen Rechten zeigt nicht nur, dass dort die multikulturelle Gesellschaft dämonisiert und als Bedrohung für die (deutsche Kultur' dargestellt wird, sondern, dass sich diese Publizistik in ihrer Argumentation auf nationalistische Positionen stützt, die im öffentlichen Diskurs vertreten werden.

Besondere Aufmerksamkeit verlangt die Lektüre jener Beiträge, die ihren Fokus auf die Präsentation der Themen (Islamismus', (Terrorismus' und (Ausländerkriminalität' in den Medien richten. Denn in diesen Beiträgen verzahnen sich miteinander zwei Perspektiven: Analysen von Konfliktberichterstattung und Analysen des aktuellen medialen Migrationsdiskurses. Durch eine Untersuchung der Berichterstattung über "Sicherheitsgesetze", "radikalen Islamismus" und "Al-Quaida-Terroristenprozesse" zeigt Trautmann auf, auf welche Weise das Bild von Islamismus und islamischem Terrorismus konstruiert wird, und wie sich parallel die gesamte Migrationsfrage auf den Aspekt der Sicherheit verschiebt: Bei der Thematisierung von Ausländern werde dabei zunehmend mit bedrohlichen Sprachbildern ("sozialer Sprengstoff", "tickende Zeitbombe") operiert, die nicht zuletzt deshalb besonders wirkungsvoll seien, weil sie von der Leserschaft nun leichter mit den einschlägigen Ereignissen assoziiert werden könnten. Das enge Zusammenspiel von Bildern und Emotionen in der Kriegsberichterstattung in türkischen und deutschen Printmedien am Beispiel des Irakkrieges und der Aufbau des Feindbildes "Terroristen" machen die Massenmedien zum wichtigen Instrument der Kriegsführung (Seref Ates). Die Implikationen einer ethnischen Deutung komplexer Konflikte in Nachkriegsgesellschaften (Afghanistan) für das politische Vorgehen in der Region werden überzeugend dargestellt (Schetter).

Die letzten Beiträge im Kapitel "Alternativen für Journalismus und Pädagogik" stellen Impulse und konkrete Ansätze für die politische Bildung vor: Journalist(inn)en sollen durch angemessene Weiterbildungsangebote dazu befähigt werden, möglichst vorurteilsfrei über Migration und Integration zu berichten. Mediennutzer

(innen) sollen bereits im Kindesalter durch Medienerziehung u.a. in ihrer Kritikfähigkeit gestärkt werden. Eine intensivere Mediennutzung durch die Migrant (inn)en soll gefördert werden, um der Gefahr einer medialen Ghettoisierung bei ausschließlicher Nutzung der Medienangebote der Herkunftsländer vorzubeugen. Geleitet werden diese Überlegungen von einem Integrationsverständnis, wonach Integration nicht durch einseitige Leistung seitens der Migrant(inn)en, sondern nur in gemeinsamer Anstrengung von Migrant(inn)en und Einheimischen gelingen kann (Butterwege). Jenseits einer Medienwirkungsforschung, die von linearen und direkten Wirkungsprozessen der Medieninformationen auf die Rezipient(inn)en ausgeht, richtet Rudolf Leiprecht mit Bezug auf eigene Forschungsarbeiten zu Alltagsrassismus den Fokus darauf, wie Rezipient(inn)en Informationen gewichten, interpretieren und bewerten. In diesem Beitrag werden Möglichkeiten und erste Ansätze zur pädagogischen Arbeit mit Nachrichtensendungen und Pressemeldungen erarbeitet und vorgestellt. Besonders wertvoll für künftige erziehungswissenschaftliche Forschung in diesem Bereich ist m.E. der von Leiprecht favorisierte subjektbezogene Ausgangspunkt. Demnach sollen die konkreten subjektiven Begründungsmuster, Handlungskontexte und Möglichkeitsräume der Adressat(inn)en ernst genommen werden, um auf dieser Grundlage Medieninformationen zum Gegenstand einer gemeinsamen dialogisch und selbstreflexiv orientierten Forschung zu machen.

Bei der Lektüre des Buches wird deutlich, dass weitere interdisziplinär angelegte empirische Studien in diesem Bereich dringend notwendig sind. Wie wirken sich z. B. unreflektierte und vorurteilsbehaftete Berichterstattungen über Migration auf die Rezipient(inn)en tatsächlich aus? Und umgekehrt die Frage: Welche Wirkung hat denn eine differenzierte Migrationsberichterstattung auf die Leserschaft? Sind die Leser(innen) daran interessiert und bereit, eine solche Form des medialen Diskurses zu rezipieren?

Erst eine Antwort auf diese Fragen kann Auskunft darüber geben, inwieweit die - in mehreren Beiträgen des Buches explizit oder implizit vertretene - Annahme zutrifft, ein kritischer medialer Migrationsdiskurs erreiche oft nur eine kleine Anzahl von Leser(inne)n, differenzierte Berichterstattung würde sich schlechter verkaufen als Artikel, die spektakuläre und dramatisierende Schlagzeilen tragen. Wie einschränkend sich diese Annahme auf die Nutzung von Medien als Ressourcen für eine konstruktive Berichterstattung über Migration auswirken kann, wird in dem Beitrag von Bernd Scheffer deutlich. Er vertritt die These, dass übliche Empfehlungen an die Medien - von denen erwartet wird, dass Fremdenfeindlichkeit nach deren Umsetzung in Grenzen gehalten wird - allein nicht ausreichen. Aus dem Denkschema ('fremdenfeindlich', 'fremdenfreundlich' oder eben 'sachlich belehrend' lautet sein Vorschlag: eine "fremdenfreundliche Medienpraxis" zu fördern, deren Erfolg schätzungsweise ungleich größer sei als der Erfolg "sachlicher Belehrungen mit Hintergrundberichten".

Insgesamt liefern die Buchbeiträge mit zahlreichen empirischen Beispielen und einschlägigen Literaturhinweisen einen guten Überblick über den aktuellen Stand der Diskussion zur Thematik. Komplexe Mechanismen der Ausgrenzung und Diskriminierung von Migrant(inn)en im medialen Diskurs werden aufgedeckt und plastisch präsentiert.

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