



Rising Soft Powers

TURKEY

CPD

USC Center on Public Diplomacy

3502 Watt Way, Suites 232-234

Los Angeles, CA 90089

P: 213.821.2078 F: 213.821.0774E: cpd@usc.edu

Visit uscpublicdiplomacy.org

© 2016

Contents

FEATURES

| | |
|---|----|
| The Public Diplomacy of Emerging Powers: The Case of Turkey | 1 |
| ICT and Organizational Culture in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs | 18 |

SPOTLIGHT

| | |
|---|----|
| Patterns of News Media Consumption and Social Media Use in Turkey | 36 |
|---|----|

Q&A WITH CPD

| | |
|-------------|----|
| Senem Cevik | 49 |
|-------------|----|

VIEWPOINTS

| | |
|---|----|
| The “Ethos Gap”: A Challenge or an Opportunity for Turkey’s Nation Brand? | 51 |
| Making the Geopolitical Connections: Turkey and China in Syria | 54 |
| The Rise of NGOs: Islamic Faith Diplomacy | 56 |
| Turkey’s Foreign Aid: Who is the Target Audience? | 60 |

MULTIMEDIA

| | |
|----------------------|----|
| Turkey at Expo Milan | 62 |
|----------------------|----|



FEATURES

The Public Diplomacy of Emerging Powers: The Case of Turkey

By Ellen Huijgh and Jordan Warlick

ABSTRACT

This paper demonstrates that domestic socio-cultural historical developments, including politics, have always played a part in Turkey's evolution as a re-emerging power on the world scene. Its "intermestic" (domestic-international related) feature comes to the foreground to such an extent that its public diplomacy whims can be traced back to deeper domestic hurdles. The ruling political elite and the Turkish government should think twice before further neglecting the intrinsic intermestic nature of the country's public diplomacy; especially where human and civil rights are concerned and with a civil society increasingly objecting digitally to political suppression.

The paper introduces the complex historical developments within which Turkey's current situation as an emerging power must be comprehended. It then explains the influence of domestic transformations, and democratization in particular, on the re-emergence of Turkey, and on its foreign policy narratives, with a focus on its public diplomacy. The Turkish government's inconsistent and even old-fashioned authoritarian behavior in dealing with the country's citizens is shown through a few examples. The typically intermestic nature of emerging powers' public diplomacy narratives requires the realization that a strict line between abroad and at home is a relic of the past. It also implies an increased comprehensive and balanced approach between old and new, pro- and counter-narratives, and the dominant stories of governmental and public opinion.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

While Turkey has long been an important nation given its geographical location, its status as an emerging power is equally the result of the nation's domestic developments.

Briefly, in 1923, only five years after the Ottoman Empire collapsed following WWI, Turkey was proclaimed a republic under the nationalist Kemal Ataturk. A number of reforms were made under Ataturk, including making primary education free and compulsory, giving women equal civil and political rights and, most notably, transforming Turkey into a secular nation-state. Yet he also ruled as a virtual dictator. Ataturk remained President

for 15 years and, with only brief interludes, established the Republican People's Party as the sole legal party. Ataturk ruled under a belief system that saw the West as Turkey's future and path to prosperity, changed the alphabet from Arabic script to Latin, westernized traditional clothing, and instituted other cultural shifts.¹

The Democratic Party, established in 1946, defeated the Republican People's Party in the elections of 1950, in which Adnan Menderes became Prime Minister. Under his new administration Turkey became a full member of NATO, and the Central Treaty Organization (with Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and UK) was formed. Yet an

economic crisis in the late 1950s led to domestic unrest, resulting in government crackdowns including the jailing of journalists and the suppression of protests. Kemalist democratic principles were diverted. General Cemal Gursel organized a coup in May 1960, which resulted in the execution of Menderes and many other leaders for constitutional violations.²

The second Turkish Republic was established in 1961 with the signing of a new constitution. However, domestic and foreign strife continued into the 1970s: tension and violence with the separatist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) often erupted in Kurdish regions of Turkey, and disputes with Greece over Cyprus were continuous. Those long-standing issues have continued to trouble Turkey and have contributed to negative perceptions of Turkish foreign policy. The electoral victory of The Islamist Welfare Party in 1995 and the nomination of its leader Necmettin Erbakan as Prime Minister marked the end of 75 years of secular government. The Party's Islamist ruling style broke with Turkish norms, and thus Erbakan was forced to resign in June 1997.³ Aside from this brief diversion, secularism has defined Turkish political culture since Kemal Ataturk.

In 2002, the coalition government led by Bulent Ecevit was divided over making tough reforms necessary for European Union (EU) membership candidacy. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) ran on the platform of reform and Euro-Atlantic integration, and won by a wide margin, thus securing Recep Tayyip Erdogan's position as Prime Minister.⁴ Since then the AKP has represented the largest political party in Turkey, and Erdogan's power has gone nearly unchallenged, remaining either the nation's Prime Minister or President since 2003. Under his leadership, Turkey has sought to match its economic growth, political stability, and overall domestic advancement with a rising position in the international system.

DOMESTIC TRANSFORMATION AND EMERGING POWER GROWTH

Since Turkey became an independent republic on October 29, 1923 the country has experienced a series of economic ups and downs, including two wars, recessions, and a series of sometimes painstaking reforms. Turkey suffered from economic mismanagement and experienced two decades of double-digit inflation. Its currency tumbled in value to 1.65 million lira on the dollar between 1995 and 2001.⁵ Though reforms to bring Turkey's inflation under control were undertaken in 2000 with a \$7.5 billion loan from the IMF, economic

strife continued well into 2002.⁶ With its prosperous end goal in sight, Turkey's EU bid incentivized the government to undertake economic reforms, considering them to be worth a temporary downturn.

Since then, economic growth has boomed and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Turkey has doubled from \$8.5 billion in 2009 to \$16.2 billion in 2011.⁷ In 2010, the Ford Motor Company demonstrated its confidence in the security of the Turkish economy by adding an additional \$630 million to its existing investments.⁸ In less than a decade, per capita income in the country has nearly tripled and the economy has almost doubled in size, making Turkey the 18th largest economy in the world.⁹

Of course, despite Turkey's growth its economy must still confront certain challenges. The AKP government faces a growing national deficit and tightening credit, and despite the creation of new jobs, unemployment has mostly remained at or above 10%. Furthermore, certain public institutions, such as education, have lagged behind the nation's economic growth.¹⁰

As a result of its flourishing economy, Turkey is a member in a number of informal and formal groups of other emerging powers. The term BRIC was launched in 2001 by then-chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset Management, Jim O'Neill, as an acronym for an association of major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China (South Africa was added in 2010). The Developing-8 (D-8) is an example of a more formal economic partnership among leading Muslim nations and was actually proposed by Turkey in 1997. The D-8 has been successful in fostering trade relations and economic cooperation, and engages in summits on a biennial basis.

The Group of Twenty (G-20) is an international forum for the governments and central bank governors from 20 major economies to promote global financial stability and engage in yearly summits to discuss key issues affecting the global economy. A different country assumes the G-20 presidency each year, and Turkey was responsible for hosting the major 2015 G-20 summit on November 13-15.

MIKTA, which includes the nations of Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia, is a middle power alliance which seeks to collaborate on areas of common interest, but it needs to work hard to increase its visibility and identify objectives if it is to participate in concrete undertakings and make its voice heard.

Turkey's democratization process and political stability

undoubtedly contributed to its economic success, and congruently to its status as an emerging power. Not only has its authoritarian past receded, but Turkey's EU aspirations have given the government incentive to make political reforms that encourage democracy, including the banning of torture, strengthening civilian control of the military, and changes in municipal governance that give citizens more say over local matters.¹¹

Balancing traditional religious identity and secular democracy is delicate, but appeared successful in Turkey. While the Turks are a people greatly steeped in their cultural and religious heritage, the Kemalist ideology that religion is best separated from politics has been widely accepted in Turkish political culture and narratives, until recently. EU and Euro-Atlantic aspirations have helped guide Turkey towards legislating democratic structures.

With the lifting of authoritarian restrictions, the Turkish people have become increasingly engaged in political processes and have sought to have their voices heard. Discussions on controversial issues that were once taboo, such as the Kurdish issue or the "events of 1915" in Armenia, have become much more commonplace. The Turkish people and their politicians alike aspire for Turkey to become a bigger player on the international stage, and voters want to see their country advance through an active foreign policy.¹²

Demographic changes—such as younger, growing populations, urban migration, and ethnic diversity—are often symptoms of the emergence of a nation, and Turkey has proven to be no exception. Demographically, the population has increased from its 1990 level of 56 million to over 75 million today. Turkey is also a young society, with 60% of its population under 35. Around 75% of the population lives in urban areas, as compared to 50% in 1990, and Istanbul has doubled in size from 7.2 million people in 1990 to 15 million people or more in 2010.¹³ This rural to urban migration, and the trend of people moving east to west, has drawn a greater number of members of the religious, conservative middle class to the cities.

In Former U.S. Ambassador Ross Wilson's Atlantic Council report on Turkey's transformation in the 21st century, he predicts that this emerging traditional, conservative class of citizen will begin to play a larger role in Turkish politics, a sphere that has recently been dominated by liberal Western-leaning thought.¹⁴ How-

ever, the recent parliamentary elections in June 2015 showed a 13% win for the pro-Kurd HDP Party, whose young liberal leaders advocate for human rights, climate change, and gender equality. While the conservative class of Turkish citizens may begin to play bigger roles, so are the liberal youth.¹⁵

Since 2002, the Justice and Development Party has managed to retain enormous domestic support, winning 47% of the vote in parliamentary elections in 2007, 49% in 2011, and most recently, 41% in 2015.¹⁶ The AKP Party has managed to be attractive to the Turkish masses, including both those with nationalist and liberal sentiments, and has overseen a tremendously prosperous period for the country, which naturally appeals to all sides.

Many Kurdish people have also migrated from their traditional southeast territories to cities, and as many as 2 million Kurds now live in Istanbul. This has made the Kurdish issue more national, rather than one stuck to regional confines. Yet these pop-

ulation trends have resulted in the emergence of challenges, including urbanization bringing an increased demand for services, and disadvantaged youth receiving inadequate access to education.¹⁷

To a certain extent, its increased economic relevance and democratic identity in the global arena has contributed positively to Turkey's international and domestic image. When a nation is seen as economically successful and politically stable, its power increases regionally and globally. Published on the global affairs website "Project Syndicate" (see www.project-syndicate.org) and subsequently disseminated in a number of other publications in the region, a December, 2010 article¹⁸ written by Prime Minister Erdogan titled "Turkey as an Emerging Power" emphasized Turkey's successes and how its leadership will be an asset to the region.

FOREIGN POLICY NARRATIVES

In a discussion at the Brookings Institution in November, 2013 entitled "Turkish Foreign Policy at a Time of Global and Regional Transformation: Vision and Challenges," Former Minister of Foreign Affairs H. E. Ahmet Davutoglu (Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2009-2014; prime-minister since 28 August 2014) identified

Turkey's three dominant foreign policy goals: (1) EU accession and Euro-Atlantic integration; (2) strengthening ties with neighbors and neighboring regions; and (3) opening up to new areas of the world.¹⁹

Turkey's EU integration process has been tumultuous and a source of controversy in Turkish-European relations. In 1999, Turkey was invited to apply for membership, which reversed a 1997 decision that blocked its candidacy due to its poor human rights record (the Kurds, Armenia, etc.). In December 2002, and again due to EU uneasiness about Turkey's human rights record, the EU refused to set a date for talks on Turkey's accession.²⁰ Turkey perceived this decision as being related to EU discomfort with the country's identity as a Muslim nation as well as age-old misconceptions of Turkey.

In 2003, however, Turkey passed a series of reforms aimed at facilitating the membership process, and its EU accession appeared to once again be on track. Despite the final part of the reform package (concerning the penal code) being passed in September 2004, further resistance was seen from some EU countries and the suggestion of further conditions arose. The possibility of additional obstacles was met with strong opposition from Erdogan and other leaders and at the end of 2004, the EU agreed to begin formal membership negotiations the following year.²¹

Former Foreign Minister Davutoglu has asserted that while EU integration is still the chief foreign policy goal for Turkey, this drawn-out accession process has led some Turks to make allegations of unfairness; arguing that they are judged by their country's past rather than its present. Professor Ibrahim Kalin argues that despite Turkey's rapid transformation, changing deep-rooted perceptions overnight is unrealistic. For example, despite five million Turks living in Europe, as well as efforts by Turkey to make necessary reforms, images of Turks, Ottomans, Muslims, and Middle Easterners continue to be shaped by perceptions dating back to the Middle Ages.²²

Davutoglu has also asserted that Turkey has been compliant with EU demands, and that he is confident that Europe would be better off with Turkey as a member. In a speech at the Brookings Institution, he said, "If [Turkey] had become a member of EU in 2006 or

2007... I am sure today we should have a new Europe, a much more creative, dynamic Europe, even responding to economic crisis in a much better way. But that did not happen and nobody can blame Turkey because of this, because, you know, remember how we had a very active diplomacy regarding integration with EU, also regarding Cyprus issue [sic] in 2004."²³

Although he still hopes for EU integration as soon as possible, there is a sense that Turkey's efforts are futile and that its accession depends on the EU's cultural acceptance. Though the EU's reluctance to admit Turkey can certainly be partially attributed to unfair perceptions, the remnants of autocracy and the undemocratic behavior of Turkey's past are undoubtedly on the EU's radar as well. Turkey's relationship with Europe is still strong—the EU is Turkey's largest economic partner, making up 46% of Turkey's trade in 2011.²⁴ If Turkey remains resolved to EU integration, membership is likely in their future.

While Turkey's strategic relationships in the Middle East, Eurasia, and Eastern Europe have always been present, an emphasis on its leadership in these areas has moved to the forefront. Turkey's ongoing policy of "zero problems" with its neighbors was a signature phrase of the former foreign ministry under Davutoglu. By pursuing this policy today, Turkey aims to not only strengthen ties with neighbors and thaw frozen relations with others, but also to work towards engagement with countries it may have previously avoided or ignored. It is a policy of regional stability, and Turkey is seeking to position itself as a leader promoting regional peace.²⁵

In Davutoglu's Brookings address, he stressed that Turkey will not idly stand by waiting for EU integration and will continue to develop its own foreign policy and form its own vision.²⁶ Citing Turkey's focus on strengthening ties with neighbors and neighboring regions, Davutoglu stated that high-level strategic cooperation consultations have been initiated with 15 neighboring countries and that 358 agreements have been signed with 14 countries in 4 years.²⁷ This displays not a shift in orientation from West to East, but a restructuring of foreign policy goals. Furthermore, Turkey tried—with varied success—to achieve regional peace through numerous regional conflict resolution initiatives.²⁸

The country's public diplomacy appears to have currently two prominent narratives: one conveys a new Turkish identity ... and another focuses on enhanced international credibility.

Over the last decade, a key element that has differentiated Turkey as an emerging leader is its pursuit of an independent yet multilateral foreign policy. The view that Turkey's foreign policy goals are best realized through bilateral and multilateral partnerships, and that success in a globalized world is best achieved through intergovernmental cooperative agreements and adherence to international law, has also emerged under the AKP government.²⁹

Its membership in the G-20 since 1999; in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation since 1969; in the Council of Europe since 1949; in NATO since 1952; OSCE since 1973; and other international organizations demonstrates Turkey's emphasis on global governance. At the same time, however, it asserts an independent foreign policy that is not particularly hindered by the influence of great powers and which is guided by ideology and principles. Professor Ibrahim Kalin claims that Turkey is not interested in passively conforming under a great power system, and instead wishes to adopt an active foreign policy through a unique point of view based on its own geography and history.³⁰

For example, Turkey gained (albeit temporarily) credibility in the Middle East when the Turkish parliament refused in March, 2003 to authorize access to its territory for the U.S. invasion of Iraq, despite a multi-billion dollar aid package offered in exchange.³¹ By showing that it is subservient to no state, Turkey elevated its credibility as an evenhanded player on the global stage.

EMPOWERED PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Master Narratives and Emergence

Recognizing its economic clout and growth, the government of Turkey has also empowered public diplomacy. As Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated in his 2010 article, "Turkey as an Emerging Power," emerging powers require increased public diplomacy strategies that highlight the nation's successes, compared to established powers that have already proven their position in the global order. If an emerging power seeks to be more highly regarded in the global arena, it requires that states acknowledge and appreciate its progression. Thus, Turkey's increased public diplomacy efforts concerning their domestic transitions to a flourishing economy and strengthened democracy are a result of their emerging power status.³²

As its recent entrance into normative Turkish foreign policy language shows, "public diplomacy" has been openly acknowledged as a fundamental tool for in-

creasing Turkish international stature and soft power. The country's public diplomacy appears to have currently two prominent narratives: one conveys a new Turkish identity and highlights its economic prosperity and commitment to democracy; and another focuses on enhanced international credibility, which in turn reinforces Turkey's regional leadership.

The Turkish government actually has an advantage over established powers, and has benefited from this, as have its emerging state peers. They have all come to the field of public diplomacy relatively late and so were able to learn from predecessors' failures. One of the lessons drawn here is that in the 21st "digital" century, it no longer makes sense to strictly distinguish between at home and abroad. So Turkey began, as did many of its peers and other newcomers, with an intermestic public diplomacy stance (a blend of international and domestic public diplomacy). Moreover, Turkey's current public diplomacy master narratives primarily concern its domestic achievements. Master narratives are stories that reflect a community's identity and help community members to understand who they are and what they stand for, and make sense of the developments around them.³³

Effective communications strategists and public diplomacy practitioners invoke these master narratives to move audiences in certain directions, but all narratives have their detractors. Some analysts of master narratives believe that the failures of an emerging power's public diplomacy or communication narrative can be explained by looking deeper into the domestic acceptance of and reaction to the projected dominant narrative. This is an interesting and revealing conceptualization for the analysis of public diplomacy in different countries and is applicable to understanding present-day Turkish public diplomacy within its broader context.³⁴

In short, Turkey has historically had several dominant (sometimes conflicting) narratives, each comprised of the following:

1. Core Audience

- Mainstream (deeply embedded, broad audiences, influencers likely to manipulate)
- Outsiders' rallying cry (deeply embedded by outsiders, alienating broader audiences, understanding minority-majority dynamics)
- Opposition voices (narrow appeal, counter-narratives, primarily secularist)

- Trendsetters (broad appeal, prevailing socio-political winds)

2. Theme (summary of most prominent)

- The Injustice of Sèvres; The Arab Betrayal; The Deep State; One Identity, One Turkey; The Lausanne Betrayal; Restoring the Kurdish Homeland; The Sharia Trojan Horse; The Moderate Islam Project; The New Modernization; Reclaiming the Ottoman Past

3. Audience segments

- Old guard: military and judiciary (high ranking influential leaders of the Turkish Military and Judiciary), Kemalist Urbanists (middle upper class elites who trace their authority and role within Turkish society to Atatürk and the founding of the modern republic;
- The new order: Religious reformers, Anatolian Tigers, Kurdish Autonomy Advocates;
- Challengers/potential destabilizers: Turkish Neo-Nationalists, Kurdish Separatists

4. Level of embedment (broad, narrow appeal/emergent or embedded)

Linking domestic developments to public diplomacy, and even framing domestic achievements as a master narrative, can boost a country’s positive image and foreign policy clout. Or, as B. Senem Çevik and Philip Seib conclude in their latest book’s introduction (Turkey’s Public Diplomacy, 2015, pp. 11): Consolidating Turkey’s public diplomacy strategy would require Turkey to bring more sophistication into the intricate relationship between domestic and foreign policy and how they influence one another.³⁶

Indeed, as the following research shows, such sophistication is lacking when the story told abroad does not entail or equal the entire domestic reality, or when the voices of opponents at home undermine the dominant narrative projected abroad. It may be impossible to craft a single grand narrative and dispose of the others, given humanity’s knack for being contrary. Thus, it is the search for a balance between pre-existing and new narratives that must sit at the core of this quest for a claimed grand strategy—regardless of whether the latter is simply a country’s or scholar’s illusionary ideal.

It is against the complex background of co-existing conflicting and commonly held narratives abroad and at home that the public diplomacy of Turkey must be understood. It is within this broader context that the public diplomacy narratives and initiatives described below can be more profoundly understood and placed.

Considering the enormous reform and progress Turkey has undergone in the last decades, it is no surprise that Turkey wishes to be recognized and not be

Table: Turkey’s Public Diplomacy Master Narratives in Perspective

| THEME | NARRATIVE | TYPE | LEVEL OF EMBEDMENT | AUDIENCE SEGMENTS |
|-------------------------|---|------------|--------------------------|--|
| The Injustice of Sèvres | After WWI, Western powers unjustly divided Turkish homeland in effort to undermine Turkish influence. This persists today in attempts to undermine Turkey’s security and unity. Turks must remain vigilant. | Mainstream | Broad appeal Emergent | Old guard: Military & Judiciary New Order: Religious reformers, Anatolian Tigers Challengers: Turkish Neo-Nationalist |
| The Arab Betrayal | During WWI, Arabs stabbed Turks in the back by revolting against the Ottomans. This will happen again if possible, so Turkey cannot rely on the friendship of Arab Nations. | Mainstream | Broad appeal Embedded | Old guard: Military & Judiciary, Kemalist Urbanists |

| | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|----------------------------|---------------------------|--|
| The Deep State | Turkish democracy is under threat from the deep state, a powerful secret unit of well-connected figures in the military. Tusk's must rally against these adversaries and support legislative and juridical efforts to punish deep state plots to destroy Turkish democracy. | Mainstream | Broad appeal Embedded | New Order: Religious reformers, Anatolian Tigers Kurdish Autonomy Advocates |
| One Identity, One Turkey | Turkish culture predates its modern founding by hundreds of years and its survival relies on a uniform national identity centered on Turkish ethno-cultural heritage. The country must be united, through violence if necessary, under a single identity and a strong central government. | 'Outsider' military cry | Narrow appeal Embedded | Challengers: Turkish Neo- Nationalist |
| The Lausanne Betrayal | The founding of Turkey was based upon an injustice in which Kurds were deprived of the promised independent state. This became the basis for Turkish occupation and oppression, and Kurds should use their strength to rise against Turkish occupiers. | 'Outsider' military cry | Narrow appeal Embedded | Challengers: Kurdish Separatists |
| Restoring the Kurdish Homeland | Kurds have always lived on the land in southeastern Turkey. Turkey today occupies this historical homeland and tramples on the Kurdish community's identity. Kurds should reject assimilation in order to defend Kurdish heritage from extinction. | 'Outsider' military cry | Narrow appeal Embedded | Challengers: Kurdish Separatists Kurdish Autonomy Advocates |
| The Sharia Trojan Horse | Islamists want to take over the entire region, and 'moderate' Islamist democracy is a myth perpetuated by those who want to see Sharia spread everywhere! the AKP hides its Sharia agenda behind this myth today. Tusk should be fearful of Islamization and return secularization to power. | Opposition voices | Narrow appeal Emergent | Old guard: Military & Judiciary, Kemalist Urbanists |
| Moderate Islam Project | Turkey is threatened by a secret American project to install U.S.-friendly 'moderate' Islamic governments across the region. In Turkey, the U.S. is propping up the AKP to this end. The only way to prevent Islamists from destroying Atatürk's legacy is to restore | Opposition voices | Narrow appeal Emergent | Old guard: Military & Judiciary, Kemalist Urbanists |

held back because of past actions. In *Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey*, Kalin describes the government's strategic reasoning for its new emphasis on

public diplomacy: "In order for us to achieve success in explaining Turkey's position in the face of accusations and problems our country has long endured in

the international arena, it is necessary to use public diplomacy tools and methods to inform accurately the international community.”³⁷ With rational, transparent and defensible policies, Turkey can increase its credibility in the international arena. Kalin acknowledges that he believes most countries recognize Turkey’s social change and economic growth, but age-old narratives are difficult barriers to overcome.³⁸ By gaining better control over its narrative, Turkey’s public diplomacy strategy appears to be guiding narratives in a certain way so as to steer nations’ perceptions of Turkey’s actions. However, such a desire for control may backfire in the long run.

In January 2010, Prime Minister Erdogan announced the launch of the Office of Public Diplomacy, signifying a new focus on the importance of public diplomacy as a tool for influencing Turkey’s international image. The Office of Public Diplomacy would be tasked to “provide cooperation and coordination between public agencies and non-governmental organizations in their activities related to public diplomacy” for the promotion and presentation of Turkey. The Office of Public Diplomacy is a separate entity under the auspices of the Chief Advisor to the Prime Minister, with its secretarial services carried out by the General Directorate of Press and Information.³⁹

Since the Office of Public Diplomacy is involved in the management of perceptions in and promotion of a number of areas, including “diplomacy, foreign aid, science and technology, economy, higher education, tourism, culture, arts and media” (read: control of the master narratives), the office is organized into five units: Media Studies; Political Communication; Cultural Studies; Institutional Studies; and Project Development.⁴⁰ Their activities involve a number of initiatives to engage domestic and international students, academics, journalists, and policymakers in events and programs aimed at engaging on a variety of relevant foreign policy and public diplomacy topics. They also inform the international media through meetings and briefs. The Office of Public Diplomacy was established with the government’s Circular of the Prime Ministry No: 2010/3, published in the Official Gazette No. 27478 dated January 30, 2010 to serve as an effective public relations tool for the Turkish government. Its aim is to manage international perceptions and convey a new Turkish narrative.

Naturally, Turkey’s public diplomacy efforts are focused on areas of the world where the country has some kind of greater foreign policy strategy, and where it hopes to increase its soft power. Its concerted efforts can be seen most predominantly in the Middle East,

Eurasia, and Eastern Europe, and in nations that share with Turkey a notion of common memory, conscience, and cultural depth where Turkey aims to reinforce its position as a regional leader through public diplomacy activities.⁴¹

Public diplomacy activities, compounded with Turkey’s reputation as a stable and prosperous nation, increase Turkey’s reputation, and therefore their leadership capacity. Turkey’s ability to fuse secular democracy and socio-economic modernization with the preservation of Islamic-Ottoman culture and conservative values provides a powerful example to other states in the Middle East. The Arab Spring, which left Turkey nearly untouched, also reaffirmed Turkey’s political stability in the region.⁴² Establishing people-to-people relations has reinforced Turkey’s cultural bonds and soft power with the region’s countries.

Turkish public diplomacy strategies are also employed in Western Europe and other EU member states. Considering the diaspora of over 5 million Turks living in Europe and Turkey’s EU aspirations, facilitating cultural dialogue and exchange is important to the promotion of Turkey’s new narrative. The majority of public diplomacy activities in Europe are related to Turkish cultural promotion so as to convey a positive image of Turkish culture. The EU is also home to a number of Turkish schools and centers aimed at reinforcing relations with the Turkish diaspora.

Capitalizing on its political stability and economic growth, the Turkish government has taken ownership of its public diplomacy in order to foster its emergence as a regional and global leader. Davutoglu has made furthering Turkey’s soft power a conscious priority. Turkey’s efforts focused on former Turkic republics and the Middle East prove that regional leadership is a priority.

Maintaining public diplomacy relations with EU member states shows that Turkey’s EU aspirations remain high on its agenda, as does preserving relations with Turkish diaspora populations. To this end, the government has not only focused its attention on developing public diplomacy agencies, but also on promoting non-state actors’ activities. Turkey continues to try to put its best foot forward, emphasizing the progress it has made and maintaining a position of regional and global leadership, especially in two areas: cultural promotion and humanitarian aid.

Cultural Promotion and Humanitarian Aid

Cultural promotion and dialogue are key avenues for public diplomacy to flourish. Inspired by religious schol-

ar Fethullah Gulen, the Hizmet, or Gulen, movement, is one of the first and most successful at promoting Turkish culture. It is Islamic and conservative, yet tolerant, in nature. The Hizmet (meaning “service”) movement has no formal structure or membership, but is a loose network of volunteers and civil society organizations inspired by Gulen’s vision. The movement is therefore difficult to track, but it may be one of the largest Islamic movements in the world, and is certainly the most influential socio-religious movement Turkey has ever seen.⁴³

Gulen’s movement emerged in the early 1990s with the mission of developing institutions to benefit both Turkish migrants and host communities in areas such as education, commerce, and culture. Gulen’s ideology promotes traditional, yet open-minded, conservative, yet tolerant, Islam, and is based on volunteer action and contribution. The Gulen movement community seeks to forge closer ties with Christian and Jewish organizations in order to promote cultural dialogue and understanding, and strives to remain apolitical in all aspects, which allows the movement to foster close relationships with host governments. With education as a particular focus, approximately 1,000 schools have opened around the world, operated by Turkish entrepreneurs guided by Gulen’s vision.⁴⁴

The movement originated in post-Soviet Central Asia with the goal of reinvigorating the nations’ Turkic roots and it has subsequently expanded to Western Europe, the U.S., and Africa. Despite the enormous success it has had in promoting Turkish culture and soft power around the world, deep political tensions have arisen between Fethullah Gulen and the AKP Party. The movement’s success was only beneficial to the government as long as the Gulen-Erdogan team remained functional and not oppositional.⁴⁵

The Yunus Emre Foundation is another more recent, and government-affiliated, structure for cultural promotion. The foundation was created in 2007 as an addition to preexistent Turkish cultural centers, with the goal of exporting Turkish culture, society, and language abroad. In a 2010 Yunus Emre bulletin, then Minister of Foreign Affairs Davutoglu noted that “foreign policy is not carried out solely with diplomacy but also with cultural, economic, and trade networks...this will enable us to place our historical-cultural richness in our current strategy.”⁴⁶

Yunus Emre centers exist throughout Europe and the Middle East. The first center opened in Sarajevo, followed by Skopje, then Cairo. In Davutoglu’s speech at the Sarajevo center’s inauguration in 2011, he explained that Sarajevo was chosen as the first location because “if we thought about where Turkish culture was reflected best, this place would be the city of Sarajevo.”⁴⁷ Neo-Ottoman undertones are implicit in Davutoglu’s statement, which appeals to cultural similarities between the two nations. The president of the Yunus Emre Institute, Hayati Develi, stated to the popular news source, Today’s Zaman, that another goal of the centers is to “change the negative image of Turkey in certain European countries by means of introducing a different image of Turkey.”⁴⁸ It has also been suggested that Erdogan created the centers to co-opt the Gulen movement.

The Ministry of Tourism and Culture and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have both also been very active in promoting Turkish culture in Europe. In 2013, Turkey ranked 6th globally in tourism, with 37.8 million visits. This was a 5.9% jump from the previous year and was indicative of both better global economic conditions and the promise of Turkey’s tourism industry.⁴⁹

Turkey has increasingly become a donor country, which reasserts its economic stability.

The annual London Turkish Film Festival is one example of such promotion; it is sponsored by the Turkish Ministry of Culture and features a variety of Turkish films and documentaries for an international audience. While it began in 1993 as a three-day event, it is now a full-fledged two-week festival. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ pursuit of hosting a future Expo World Fair in Izmir, Turkey is another example of the Turkish government’s cultural promotion. The Expo is held every five years, lasts for a total of six months, and is attended by 157 countries convening on ideas, innovation, and culture. The promotion of Turkey for Expo 2020 is an important agenda item for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁵⁰ “Spot On, Turkey Now,” a Turkish festival in Vienna that took place in October 2009, was an example of effective coordination between government and civil society to promote cultural diplomacy. In collaboration with the Wiener Festwochen (Vienna Festival), one of the world’s largest cultural festivals, the Istanbul Foundation for Culture and Arts initiated the festival, which featured Turkish and Austrian literature, music, and dance performance collaborations.⁵¹ The event was supported and sponsored by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Promotion Fund of the Turk-

ish Prime Ministry, and was backed by the public support of both the Turkish and Austrian governments.⁵² This cross-cultural action is an innovative, often-used model for multilateral Turkish public diplomacy engagements.

The impact of television and the arts on Turkish public diplomacy and soft power cannot be overestimated. “It’s one thing if there were a couple of popular Turkish series, but they are on every single major Arab channel,” says Beirut-based media critic and blogger Habib Battah.⁵³ Turkish dramas and soap operas have swept the Arab world in recent years, making Turkey more idealized than ever before. Many Arabs are charmed by the Turk’s liberal lifestyles, presenting an image of a Muslim nation that is dynamic and modern, yet loyal to its traditions and history.

It is significant that Turkish series deal with issues that Arab series typically avoid, such as gender equality, love affairs, and treason. Mazen Hayek, spokesman for the Saudi-backed Middle East Broadcasting Centre believes that these Turkish series have also displayed an ideal for male-female romantic relationships, where women are adored and respected. In Turkey, a comparatively liberal nation in the region, shifting gender roles are less of a taboo. The Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism even believes this cultural export has contributed to the increase in tourism, due to the depiction of Turkey’s beautiful scenery, lifestyle, and culture.⁵⁴

Turkey has increasingly become a donor country, which reasserts its economic stability. Humanitarian aid provides another vehicle than cultural promotion for public diplomacy. Turkey’s spending on official aid has risen from \$73 million in 2002 to \$3.3 billion in 2013.⁵⁵ The Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) is a central agency for Turkey’s aid work that operates in 34 coordination offices in 31 countries, primarily in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Central Asia.

TIKA was first established in 1992 to respond to the restructuring and development of former Turkic Republics in the post-Soviet era, but since 2002, the organization has effectively taken off and expanded.⁵⁶ No longer limited to countries with Turkish cultural or historic ties, today TIKA invests in a total of 100 nations on various projects, such as giving agricultural training to potato farmers in Peru, or investing in Turkology departments

in Cuban universities, such as Havana University.⁵⁷ While TIKA president Dr. Serdar Cam acknowledges that TIKA has become a soft power tool, he underlined that “these steps were not consciously taken to increase Turkey’s soft power,” and that they are sincerely in humanitarian interest.⁵⁸ Aside from TIKA, Turkey has also spent over \$3 billion to host Syrian refugees since their country’s crisis began in 2011. In a demonstration of its leadership in this area, Turkey is hosting the first international summit on humanitarian aid in 2016, sponsored by the United Nations.⁵⁹

Turkey’s Red Crescent Society, or Kizilay, is a Red Cross member society that engages in disaster response and has benefited from approximately 1.2 million volunteers to date. In existence since the late 19th Century (still the Ottoman era), the Red Crescent Society is one of Turkey’s oldest and largest civil society organizations.⁶⁰ Like its Red Cross and Red Crescent counterparts, it is a non-governmental organization, but is a critical component in the government’s international presence and soft power. The Red Crescent Society has worked closely with the Turkish government to accommodate the influx of Syrian refugees, and with an estimated 65,000 Syrian refugees in nine camps in Turkey, camps and services provided by the Red Crescent Society have helped reduce tension (see e.g. <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65814>).

Although traditionally focused on more regional crises, such as the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 and the ongoing crises in Gaza and Lebanon in 2008 and 2009, the Red Crescent Society has raised its profile outside of the Muslim world as well. Examples include the building of “Turkish towns” for tsunami survivors in Sri Lanka in 2004, and search-and-rescue missions after the earthquakes in Haiti and Chile in 2010. These humanitarian missions are undoubtedly a positive representation for Turkey, and are a positive force for the country’s public diplomacy.⁶¹

Domestic Civil Society and the Contradictions in Public Diplomacy

Engaging domestic stakeholders in foreign policy decisions, including civil society organizations (CSOs) and citizens, is essential to successful public diplomacy. The Office of Public Diplomacy recognizes the importance that domestic public opinion plays in support of or against international policy and public diplomacy.

In evaluating Turkey’s public diplomacy abroad, it is important also to evaluate the state’s engagement in public diplomacy’s domestic dimension

Its website, which explains the concept of public diplomacy, states: "Another important element of public diplomacy is the public opinion, which has increasingly undertaken a more central role in determining the national and international policies. The national and international policy processes are monitored closely, and are announced to world public opinion through the media. Without a certain support from the public opinion, it does not seem possible to determine or implement a policy in the fields of economy, foreign policy, energy or environment."⁶² Therefore, in evaluating Turkey's public diplomacy abroad, it is important also to evaluate the state's engagement in public diplomacy's domestic dimension, loosely defined⁶³ as the government's involvement of civil society at home in international policy making and conduct.

Although Turkey's civil society sector has grown tremendously over the past twenty years, its voice is still very small compared to most European countries, and the success and growth of the sector's organizations will be compromised unless their rights are protected and they are supported.⁶⁴

The 2013 CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report found that Turkey's civil society is most hindered in the area of structure, referring to the small size and depth of civil society organizations, undeveloped linkages, and inadequate resources. With a highly-centralized state administration, pre-existing corruption and a lack of adherence to the rule of law, it is difficult for civil society to thrive and not have its impact limited.⁶⁵

A 2011 study by the Third Sector Foundation of Turkey (TUSEV) found that the autonomy of civil society is at risk, with 78% of NGOs saying they were subject to frequent or occasional illegitimate government interference. Government-civil society dialogue is limited, with 68% stating that the state only engages with a selective group of CSOs, and only as needed. A staggering 97% describe the state support they receive as limited or very limited.⁶⁶

The editor-in-chief of Turkish Policy Quarterly, Diba Nigar Goksel, describes the state's priorities in supporting CSOs: "More often than not, domestic resources available to Turkish NGOs for neighborhood engagement are linked to Turkish government interests or affiliated with Islamic networks. Turkish official narratives are emphasized and sticky human rights issues often avoided." The idea of a "civil society endowment" fund, which the government could use to develop the breadth and depth of Turkish NGOs, has been discussed for years (Goksel).⁶⁷ However, considering that the government's public diplomacy priorities are

guided by the promotion of the state, the fairness of initiative selection would be questionable.

Despite certain challenges, Turkey's civil society is in a state of transition and the rapid growth of Turkey's civil society is promising for the future of civic discourse. Reform designed to create space for the development of civil society was only significantly undertaken from 2002-2004, and then only because of EU requirements. Civil liberties reform continues to this day.⁶⁸

Third sector organizations have also stepped up to protect and empower the non-profit world. The Third Sector Foundation of Turkey (TUSEV) was established in 1993 and has grown into a network of over 100 CSOs, and includes in its main objectives "non-profit law reform, research on civil society and philanthropy, promoting social investment and social justice philanthropy, and facilitating partnerships across sectors, as well as across borders."

Strengthening Civil Society Development and Civil Society– Public Sector Dialogue in Turkey Project, a civil society-public cooperation project funded by the European Union and Turkish government, is one of many third sector initiatives. It holds as one of its main objectives "to bring the relations between civil society and public institutions to a new level where a permanent dialogue is held and participation of civil society organizations in public debate and decision-making is visibly increased." The project involves creating tangible measures, including conferences and frameworks, which will promote civil sector-public sector dialogue.⁶⁹

Apart from Turkish CSOs, the Turkish government has also sought to engage other stakeholders in the public diplomacy dialogue. The Turkish Office of Public Diplomacy has a number of university programs that involve students discussing foreign policy issues. For example, once a month, panels on public diplomacy and foreign policy issues are held in different Turkish cities, where students and academics are able to voice opinions and pose questions to high ranking foreign policy experts and bureaucrats.⁷⁰ The Office of Public Diplomacy also facilitates Foreign Policy Promotion Programs at universities, which bring together students, academics, experts, and decision-makers to set up a network for dialogue.⁷¹

Furthermore, the Office of Public Diplomacy arranges panels, conferences, forums, and other think tank-like events with different thinkers, academics, and journalists to encourage interaction with policymakers. While it is commendable that steps have been taken to include various publics, the government still needs to

take additional actions to listen better to and include the narratives of stakeholders who challenge the government's policies, such as politicians from opposing parties or controversial journalists. Erdogan has become resistant to challenges to his rule, which is partly reflected in how often two phrases crop up in his justifications for subduing domestic protests: "Know your limits and place (Haddini bilmek)" and "What is necessary is being done (Gereğini yapmak)."⁷²

Ever-growing discord between the government's democratic rhetoric and some autocratic tendencies hinder Turkey's new projected narrative, however. Turkish public diplomacy and soft power can only be credible with rational and defensible policies. Here again, if the master narrative projected abroad is based on the domestic development of democracy, and civil society is only heard when its narrative pleases the government, and counter-narratives are suppressed, the narrative shows a skewed version of reality, and may be a sign of underlying problems and upcoming public diplomacy contradictions.

The vestiges of Turkey's authoritarian past linger to this day. Between unresolved Kurdish issues, a tense relationship with Armenia on its borders, political corruption, and public censorship, Turkey has its fair share of problems, as the master narratives in the table above indicate. Like other nations, Turkey will continue to be judged by its flaws, but the government hopes to simply overshadow its flaws by highlighting its successes.

However, Turkey's international stature is threatened by some authoritarian elements and the resulting instability. Freedom of the press, for example, has been suppressed to the point where journalists face a precarious existence. In fact, Turkey holds the dubious record of jailing more journalists than any other country in the world, followed by Iran and China.⁷³ Prime Minister Erdogan even briefly banned Twitter and YouTube, a ruling that was subsequently deemed unconstitutional by the highest court. After mounting pressure against certain authoritarian elements of the Erdogan regime, the Taksim Square protests in the summer of 2013 sparked a major Turkish movement, which brought to light internationally some of the AKP government's behavior.

The Gezi Park protests in the summer of 2013 were a turning point in domestic dissatisfaction with certain AKP domestic policies. The protests began as a peaceful sit-in at Istanbul's Taksim Square on May 28, 2013, against the government's decision to turn one of Istanbul's last urban public parks into a mall or museum. Many citizens felt that this decision was made too quickly without public or media discourse, and in the

eyes of many, it underscored the AKP government's repeated disregard for public opinion.

What changed everything in the #occupygezi movement was the intensity of the police brutality that ensued. Police met the protestors with enormous force, and images of police setting protesters' tents on fire, using tear gas, pepper spray, and pressurized water surfaced on the Internet. The movement quickly spread, and over 60 cities across Turkey hosted protests in solidarity against various AKP government actions, including the violation of democratic rights, media censorship, police brutality, and the overall authoritarianism of Erdogan.⁷⁴

Increasing restrictions on freedom of speech and censorship in Turkey have put Recep Erdogan and the AKP's credibility on the line both nationally and internationally. Journalists risk incarceration if they criticize AKP politicians or policies. Social media restrictions have also occasionally been put into effect since 2013. Every six months, Twitter releases a transparency report to show which national governments have requested the most takedowns of posts. In the first six months of 2015, Turkish authorities represented 72% of all requests, followed by Russia at 7%. Governments are authorized to request the takedown of posts that "violate personal rights or other local laws."⁷⁵ Although Twitter and other social media sites are not technically banned, the Turkish government still continues to censor a great deal of content (that is, counter-narratives).

Another central domestic issue which Erdogan must address on the national and international stage is the "Kurdish question." The Kurdish people face extreme prejudice; Kurdish intellectuals and advocates are easily suspected and charged with supporting terrorism. The Kurdish language, and thus the Kurds' entire narrative, is treated as essentially illegitimate. Even reporting on the Kurdish issue can lead to imprisonment.⁷⁶ Turkey also struggles with other cultural prejudices, with Turkish nationalism and xenophobia continuing to create a precarious environment for minorities and minority religions, particularly for Greek and Jewish communities.⁷⁷

The Kurds make up a large minority in Turkey (about 25%), concentrated primarily in the south, and are the largest ethnic community in the Middle East seeking self-determination. The Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK), labeled a terrorist group by the

U.S. and the EU, began its insurgency for an autonomous Kurdistan in 1984. Flare-ups of violence between Turkey and the PKK have gone on for decades and have

so far cost 40,000, mostly innocent, lives.⁷⁸ During the Arab Spring, Turkey deflected domestic issues by concentrating on negotiations surrounding a Kurdish Peace Process. Although a dialogue has opened up, the Turkish government and the Kurds still struggle to find compromise.⁷⁹ However, tensions flared up again in August 2015, when the Turkish government launched airstrikes against Kurdish militants in southern Turkey, causing concern in the U.S. about Ankara's ability to negotiate peacefully with the Kurds.⁸⁰

The deadliest terror attack in Turkey's history happened quite recently in Turkey's capital, Ankara, on October 10, 2015, with two suicide bombings at a peace rally in the center of the capital.⁸¹ In order for Turkey to successfully join the EU, it must maintain peaceful relations with the minority group, and grant it sufficient rights. If Erdogan's recently autocratic tendencies continue and injustices are not addressed, the nation's political stability and success of the current master narrative will be in jeopardy. Furthermore, with an increasingly youthful and liberal demographic which supports the Kurdish cause, the AKP is under pressure from below to guarantee the Kurdish people's human rights.

Human rights issues are detrimental to the credibility of Turkey's public diplomacy. An October 2012 report by the Committee to Protect Journalists stated that Turkey now has "the disreputable distinction of being the world's worst jailer of the press." The government's repeated censorship of writers, journalists, and political activists has had an adverse affect on the AKP Party's popularity, as demonstrated by the June 2015 parliamentary election results. Despite winning 40% of the vote, it was the AKP Party's worst election performance ever. The much more liberal pro-Kurdish HDP Party, whose young, charismatic leaders promote gender equality and human rights narratives, won 13% of the vote and 80 MPs.⁸² It seemed as if Erdogan and the AKP may find themselves on increasingly shaky ground if they continue to silence dissent.

As the June 7, 2015 general election produced a hung parliament, a second general election was held in Turkey on November 1, 2015. This time, and to some quite surprisingly, Erdogan did much better, with the AKP Party winning 49.4% of the vote and its main opposition, the CHP, winning 25.4%. President Erdogan hailed the result early on the following morning, stating: "The national will manifested itself on 1 November in favour of stability." It would thus appear that "stability" is of greater importance to Turkey's population than human rights and media freedom.

As noted by the BBC:⁸³ "While Turkish President Re-

cep Tayyip Erdogan called on the world to respect the result of Sunday's election, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) went further and denounced the entire process as 'unfair.'" Fair or not, a new government has been formed—in a polarized, not stable—Turkey, as shown in the Turkish media's mixed reactions. The question inevitably arises, then, of how much longer (inter)national concern for human rights can and will provide counterbalance.

CONCLUSIONS

Turkey's transition into an emerging power over the last few decades has been a defining factor in shaping its public diplomacy strategy and master narrative. Turkey has thus diverse strategic motives behind its public diplomacy initiatives; promoting its emerging power status. Public diplomacy is driven by a desire to be perceived in accordance with a narrative (that of an emerging power) that they have helped construct through their public diplomacy initiatives.

Emerging powers particularly benefit from steering their international image, as this helps drive positive perceptions of the nation's emergence. Emerging nations seek to dispel perceptions of their, perhaps, former weakness, backwardness, or stagnant growth. Emphasizing a growing economy, for example, will attract further foreign investment and drum up interest in travel or products from the nation. While claims must be supported with truth and statistics, public diplomacy informs and influences perception.

Foreign policy goals are a key driver of Turkish public diplomacy narratives. Admission to the European Union has been a long-standing objective for Turkey; furthering cultural, political, and economic ties within Europe emphasizes Turkey's emergence and its position as a key player in the region. In the Middle East, the country has played a stabilizing, peacemaking role, both as a political mediator and as a major donor of aid and assistance. Turkey has also reinforced its political and economic leadership through a number of multilateral organizations, particularly within the Middle East and Eurasian regions.

From a historical and geographic approach, Turkey's emerging power in the region is reminiscent of the Ottoman Empire, which reigned from the 16th to 18th centuries. Cultural nostalgia for former greatness can remain ingrained in civilizations for centuries, and the AKP Party's economic and political successes have been reminders of the flourishing, powerful empire the country Turkey once helmed. This neo-Ottoman

narrative is evident in Turkey's particular focus on cultural public diplomacy initiatives: the Ottoman Empire emphasized creativity and thought, education and the arts were critical to society, and authors, artists and architects from this era are a source of national pride. Therefore, the promotion of education and cultural exchange, establishment of Turkish institutes, and language programs can all be seen as extensions of the Turkish people's pride in their culture. It is also an effective way to maintain ties to Turkish diaspora around the world.

Governmental and non-governmental actors both play critical roles in forming Turkey's public diplomacy and formulating its master narratives. While both act largely independently of one another, it is promising to see that there are increasing examples of public-private partnerships and coordination through Turkey's Office of Public Diplomacy. Still, government interference in civil society activities and oppression of counter-narratives remains a problem. Developing further constructive dialogues and partnerships with their own civil society is a necessary domestic public diplomacy condition.

Along with adverse domestic consequences, governments around the world have taken note of Turkey's human rights issues which are damaging its public diplomacy credibility. Freedom House and other prominent human rights organizations wrote a letter to President Obama in January 2013, asking the President to express his concerns about Turkey's record of censorship, writing, "These developments have had a detrimental effect not only upon Turkish people, but also hinder Turkey's contribution as an emerging power in the vision of the world."⁸⁴ The Turkish government must realize that if it wishes to continue the emergence of its power in the 21st century, counter-narratives must not be suppressed but engaged with; they are a logical and crucial part of contemporary integrative public diplomacy.

ENDNOTES

1. "Republic of Turkey: Brief History," *The Columbia Encyclopedia*. 6th ed. 2001-2005; Vedat Demir (2015) , 'Historical Perspective: Ottomans and the Republican Era' in B. Senem Çevik and Philip Seib (eds), *Turkey's Public Diplomacy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 43-66.
2. "Republic of Turkey: Brief History," *The Columbia Encyclopedia*. 6th ed. 2001-2005.
3. "Republic of Turkey: Brief History," *The Columbia Encyclopedia*. 6th ed. 2001-2005.
4. "Republic of Turkey: Brief History," *The Columbia Encyclopedia*. 6th ed. 2001-2005.
5. Ross Wilson, "Turkey's Three Transformations," Issue Brief, The Atlantic Council, 2011, 2.
6. "Republic of Turkey: Brief History," *The Columbia Encyclopedia*. 6th ed. 2001-2005.
7. The World Bank, "Turkey Overview" (2014) Available: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/turkey/overview>.
8. Ross Wilson, "Turkey's Three Transformations," Issue Brief, The Atlantic Council, 2011, 2.
9. The World Bank, "Foreign Direct Investment, net inflows" (2014) Available: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD>
10. Ross Wilson, "Turkey's Three Transformations," Issue Brief, The Atlantic Council, 2011, 2.
11. Ross Wilson, "Turkey's Three Transformations," Issue Brief, The Atlantic Council, 2011, 3.
12. Ross Wilson, "Turkey's Three Transformations," Issue Brief, The Atlantic Council, 2011, 3.
13. Ross Wilson, "Turkey's Three Transformations," Issue Brief, The Atlantic Council, 2011, 1.
14. Ross Wilson, "Turkey's Three Transformations," Issue Brief, The Atlantic Council, 2011, 1.
15. Mark Lowen, "Turkey: Bloody Nose for Erdogan's AK Party," *BBC News*. BBC News, 8 June 2015. Web. 10 Sept. 2015.
16. Ross Wilson, "Turkey's Three Transformations," Issue Brief, The Atlantic Council, 2011, 3.
17. Ross Wilson, "Turkey's Three Transformations," Issue Brief, The Atlantic Council, 2011, 1.; Güneş Murat Tezcür and Alexandru Grigorescu, "Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy," *International Studies Perspectives* (2014) 14:257-276.
18. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, "Turkey as an Emerging Power," *Business Standard*, Business Standard, 29 Dec. 2010, Web, 2 Jan. 2015 at http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/recep-tayyip-erdogan-turkey-as-an-emerging-power-110122900018_1.html

19. H. E. Ahmet Davutoglu, "Turkish Foreign Policy at a Time of Global and Regional Transformation: Vision and Challenges," with Fiona Hill and Kemal Kirisci (The Brookings Institution, Alexandria, 18 Nov. 2013).
20. "Republic of Turkey: Brief History," *The Columbia Encyclopedia*. 6th ed. 2001-2005.
21. "Republic of Turkey: Brief History," *The Columbia Encyclopedia*. 6th ed. 2001-2005.
22. Ibrahim Kalin, "Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey," Center for Strategic Research, 2011, 17; Özlem Tür (2015), 'Historical Perspective: Ottomans and the Republican Era' in B. Senem Çevik and Philip Seib (eds), *Turkey's Public Diplomacy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 66-84.
23. H. E. Ahmet Davutoglu, "Turkish Foreign Policy at a Time of Global and Regional Transformation: Vision and Challenges," with Fiona Hill and Kemal Kirisci (The Brookings Institution, Alexandria, 18 Nov. 2013), 10.
24. The World Bank, "Turkey Overview" (2014) Available: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/turkey/overview>.
25. "Policy of Zero Problems with Our Neighbors," *Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d., Web, 2 Jan. 2015.
26. H. E. Ahmet Davutoglu, "Turkish Foreign Policy at a Time of Global and Regional Transformation: Vision and Challenges," with Fiona Hill and Kemal Kirisci (The Brookings Institution, Alexandria, 18 Nov. 2013), 10.
27. H. E. Ahmet Davutoglu, "Turkish Foreign Policy at a Time of Global and Regional Transformation: Vision and Challenges," with Fiona Hill and Kemal Kirisci (The Brookings Institution, Alexandria, 18 Nov. 2013), 12.
28. Richard Falk, "Turkey's new multilateralism: a positive diplomacy for the twenty-first century," *Global Governance* 19.3 (2013): 353-376.
29. Richard Falk, "Turkey's new multilateralism: a positive diplomacy for the twenty-first century," *Global Governance* 19.3 (2013): 353-376.
30. Richard Falk, "Turkey's new multilateralism: a positive diplomacy for the twenty-first century," *Global Governance* 19.3 (2013): 353-376.
31. "Republic of Turkey: Brief History," *The Columbia Encyclopedia*. 6th ed. 2001-2005.
32. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, "Turkey as an Emerging Power," *Business Standard*, Business Standard, 29 Dec. 2010, Web, 2 Jan. 2015.
33. Open Source Center, Institute of Analysis, Monitor 360, "Master Narratives Country Report: Turkey; Executive Summary (The Open Source Center, Washington D.C., 2014), 3-42.
34. Open Source Center, Institute of Analysis, Monitor 360, "Master Narratives Country Report: Turkey; Executive Summary (The Open Source Center, Washington D.C., 2014), 3-42.
35. Slightly adjusted table from Open Source Center, Institute of Analysis, Monitor 360, "Master Narratives Country Report: Turkey; Executive Summary (The Open Source Center, Washington D.C., 2014), 5, 3-42.
36. B. Senem Çevik and Philip Seib (2015), "Historical Perspective: Ottomans and the Republican Era" in B. Senem Çevik and Philip Seib (eds), *Turkey's Public Diplomacy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 11.
37. Ibrahim Kalin, "Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey," Center for Strategic Research, 2011, 8.
38. Ibrahim Kalin, "Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey," Center for Strategic Research, 2011, 17.
39. Prime Ministry, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, *Circular: Office of Public Diplomacy*, Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Office of Public Diplomacy, 30 Jan. 2010, Web, 15 Dec. 2014.; Gaye Asli Sancar (2015), 'Historical Perspective: Ottomans and the Republican Era' in B. Senem Çevik and Philip Seib (eds), *Turkey's Public Diplomacy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 13-42.
40. "Organisational Structure," *Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Office of Public Diplomacy*, Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Office of Public Diplomacy, n.d., Web, 4 Jan. 2015.
41. Ibrahim Kalin, "Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey," Center for Strategic Research, 2011, 11.
42. Ibrahim Kalin, "Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey," Center for Strategic Research, 2011, 9.
43. Bayram Balci, "The Gülen Movement and Turkish Soft Power," *The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (4 February 2014) Available: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/02/04/gülen-movement-and-turkish-soft-power/h04s#comments>.
44. Today's Zaman, "Turkey has become more visible due to activities of 'non-state' actors," *Today's Zaman* (3 April 2013)

- Available: <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-311563-turkey-has-become-more-visible-due-to-activities-of-non-state-actors-2.html>.
45. Bayram Balci, "The Gülen Movement and Turkish Soft Power," *The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (4 February 2014) Available: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/02/04/gülen-movement-and-turkish-soft-power/h04s#comments>.
46. Ayhan Kaya and Ayse Tecmen, "The Role of Common Cultural Heritage in External Promotion of Modern Turkey: Yunus Emre Cultural Centers," Working Paper, Istanbul Bilgi University (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University, 2011).
47. (<http://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/2015/01/06/turkeys-ever-expanding-helping-hand-over-latin-america>)
48. Today's Zaman, "Turkey has become more visible due to activities of 'non-state' actors," *Today's Zaman* (3 April 2013) Available: <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-311563-turkey-has-become-more-visible-due-to-activities-of-non-state-actors-2.html>.
49. UN World Tourism Organization, "UNWTO Tourism Highlights 2014 Edition," UN World Tourism Organization, 2014.
50. Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, "Cultural Diplomacy Outlook Report," 2011.
51. Istanbul Foundation for Culture and Arts, "International Projects: Vienna 2009," 2013 Available: <http://www.iksv.org/en/vienna2009>.
52. Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, "Cultural Diplomacy Outlook Report," 2011.
53. Nathan Williams, "The rise of Turkish soap power," *BBC News Magazine* (27 June 2013) Available: <http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-22282563>.
54. Nathan Williams, "The rise of Turkish soap power," *BBC News Magazine* (27 June 2013) Available: <http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-22282563>.
55. David Lepasca, "Turkey's rise from aid recipient to megadonor," *Al-Jazeera America* (25 April 2014) Available: <http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/4/turkey-international-aid-africasomali-middle-east-erdogan.html>.
56. Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, "TIKA's History," Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry, Cooperation and Coordination Agency (15 June 2014) Available: <http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/about-us/history/1>.
57. David Lepasca, "Turkey's rise from aid recipient to megadonor," *Al-Jazeera America* (25 April 2014) Available: <http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/4/turkey-international-aid-africasomali-middle-east-erdogan.html>.
58. Today's Zaman, "Turkey has become more visible due to activities of 'non-state' actors," *Today's Zaman* (3 April 2013) Available: <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-311563-turkey-has-become-more-visible-due-to-activities-of-non-state-actors-2.html>.
59. David Lepasca, "Turkey's rise from aid recipient to megadonor," *Al-Jazeera America* (25 April 2014) Available: <http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/4/turkey-international-aid-africasomali-middle-east-erdogan.html>.
60. Elif Unal Arslan, "The Turkish Red Crescent Society, from past to present," *The Magazine of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement* (2007) Available: http://www.redcross.int/en/mag/magazine2007_2/12-13.html.
61. Mehmet Burk, "Turkey: Red Crescent Complements Ankara's National Security Objectives," *Eurasianet.org* (22 August 2012) Available: <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65814>; B. Senem Çevik (2015), 'Historical Perspective: Ottomans and the Republican Era' in B. Senem Çevik and Philip Seib (eds), *Turkey's Public Diplomacy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 43-66.
62. "A Glance at Public Diplomacy," *Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Office of Public Diplomacy*, Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Office of Public Diplomacy, n.d., Web, 07 Jan. 2015.
63. Ellen Huijgh (guest ed.) *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy—Special Issue: The Domestic Dimension of Public Diplomacy*, vol. 7, no. 4 (2012) Brill | Martinus Nijhoff Publishers ISSN 1871-191X - full access; free download
64. Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, "Cultural Diplomacy Outlook Report," 2011.
65. CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation, "CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report for Turkey, Executive Summary," Index Report, CIVICUS and Third Sector Foundation of Turkey, 2013.
66. Ahmet Icduygu et al., "Civil Society in Turkey: At a Turning Point," *Civil Society Index Project* 51 (2011): 1-181, TUSEV Publications, Apr. 2011, Web, 2 Jan. 2015, 125.
67. Diba Nigal Goksel, "Can Turkey Inspire? Part I: Civil Society in the MENA Neighborhood," *On Turkey* (2011): 1-4. The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 14 Sept. 2011. Web. 3 Jan. 2015, 1-4.

68. CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation, "CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report for Turkey, Executive Summary," Index Report, CIVICUS and Third Sector Foundation of Turkey, 2013.
69. "Civil Society Public Cooperation Project," *TUSEV Third Sector Foundation of Turkey*, TUSEV, n.d. Web, 5 Jan. 2015.
70. "Public Diplomacy Panels," *Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Office of Public Diplomacy*, Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Office of Public Diplomacy, n.d. Web, 4 Jan. 2015.
71. Ertuğ Tomuş, "Erdoğan's Turkey: Beyond Legitimacy and Legality," Vol 3, no.12 (December 2014): pp. 40-52. Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (Research Turkey, London); see also "Press Freedom Under Pressure: The Widening Gap Between Turkey's PD Rhetoric and Reality," CPD Blog, Jan 13, 2015 at <http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/press-freedom-under-pressure-widening-gap-between-turkeys-pd-rhetoric-and-reality>
72. "Foreign Policy Promotion Programs," Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Office of Public Diplomacy, Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Office of Public Diplomacy, n.d. Web, 4 Jan. 2015.
73. Nina Ognianova, "Turkey—world's Top Press Jailer Once More," *Committee to Protect Journalists*, Committee to Protect Journalists, 18 Dec. 2013, Web, 15 Dec. 2014.
74. Elif Shafak, "The view from Taksim Square: why is Turkey now in turmoil?" *The Guardian* (3 June 2013) Available: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/03/taksim-square-istanbul-turkey-protest>.; Altug Akin and Doğan Emrah Zıraman, "Power struggle in/around the Turkish online realm and three forms of opposition: Redhack, Alternative IS Association and personal resistances against YouTube ban," *GMJ: Mediterranean Edition* (Spring 2015) 10 1:13-21.
75. Matt Rosoff, "Turkey Leads the World in Twitter Censorship—and No Other Country Is Even Close," *Business Insider*. Business Insider, 13 Aug. 2015. Web. 10 Sept. 2015.
76. Jeremy Bender, "10 Shameful Facts About Censorship In Turkey," *Business Insider* (24 March 2014): Available: <http://www.businessinsider.com/10-facts-about-censorship-in-turkey-2014-3>.
77. Ross Wilson, "Turkey's Three Transformations," Issue Brief, The Atlantic Council, 2011, 3.
78. http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2014/01/23-turkey-kurds-predicament-opportunity-taspinar-tol/turkey-and-the-kurds_predicament-to-opportunity.pdf
79. Omer Taşpınar and Gonul Tol, "Turkey and the Kurds: From Predicament to Opportunity," *Brookings: US-Europe Analysis Series 54* (2014): *Brookings Institution*. Web. 9 Sept. 2015.
80. Dion Nissenbaum, and Ayla Albayrak, "U.S. Concerns Grow About Turkish Bombardment of Kurdish Separatists," *The Wall Street Journal*. WSJ, 12 Aug. 2015. Web. 10 Oct. 2015.
81. Turkey terror attack: mourning after scores killed in Ankara blasts, *The Guardian*, 11 Oct. 2015 or see more at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/10/turkey-suicide-bomb-killed-in-ankara>
82. Mark Lowen, "Turkey: Bloody Nose for Erdogan's AK Party," *BBC News*. BBC News, 8 June 2015. Web. 10 Sept. 2015.
83. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34704834>
84. Freedom House, POMED, Reporters Without Borders, and The Foreign Policy Initiative, "Obama Must Speak Out on Hostile Climate for Free Speech in Turkey," Letter to President Barack Obama. 10 Jan. 2013. MS. Washington, D.C.

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES

Ellen Huijgh conducts research on public diplomacy and its domestic dimension at different levels of government through the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael' (since 2008) and the University of Antwerp (since 2010). She is also a Research Fellow at the University of Southern California's Center on Public Diplomacy, working on emerging powers' public diplomacy (2013–2015).

Jordan Warlick is a CPD Contributing Researcher to Ellen Huijgh's project entitled "The Public Diplomacy of Emerging Powers: Insights from Indonesia and Turkey." She is a senior pursuing her B.A. in International Relations, with minors in French and Global Health.

Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and Organizational Culture in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

By Bilgin Özkan

Information and communication technologies (ICT) play a significant role in changing traditional diplomacy and the organizational culture of foreign ministries. The literature on public diplomacy offers a rich account on the role of ICT in foreign policy processes.¹ However, except for a few valuable pieces of research,² it does not say much about the interplay between ICT and organizational culture in individual foreign ministries. One of the reasons is that researchers look at the implementation phase of foreign policies with a narrow focus rather than adopting a broader perspective, including challenging and less visible earlier phases such as decision-making and policy formulation within bureaucracy. The culture of secrecy dominating foreign ministries further exacerbates this trend by making it difficult for outsiders to have access to information about the inner functioning of foreign ministries. In order to fill this gap in the literature, this article offers an insider's perspective on the interplay between ICT reforms and the organizational culture of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter referred to as "the Ministry") over the last two decades.

It is argued that the introduction of ICT to work processes at the Ministry has been a series of reform attempts by a group of senior bureaucrats to recalibrate the capacity of foreign service officials to handle more effectively contemporary foreign policy processes, which are today much wider in scope and diverse in terms of actors and technologies in use. The underlying objective of those reforms has always been to reassure the dominance of the Ministry as a "hub agency" in the information field governing Turkey's foreign policy processes, which has long been challenged by new actors and power shifts in Turkish politics. The Turkish experience indicates that ICT have consciously been employed to mediate changes in organizational culture within the Ministry by conditioning the actions of foreign service officials, and through repeated human actions producing, maintaining and changing so-

cial contexts in which foreign service officials operate. ICT-induced changes have gradually become visible in the most profound manner in the attitudes of foreign service officials in engaging with the domestic and foreign publics, as well as their approaches towards cross-agency collaborative work at the national level.³

CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS

In this article, ICT is defined as computers (hardware and software), any form of connection facilitating Internet-based work processes, and social media technologies employed in foreign policy processes. In discussing ICT at the Ministry, it differentiates between *computer-supported work systems* such as DOC-ARCHIVE, BUDGET PROGRAMME, CONSULAR-NET and DIPLOMATIC PORTAL and *social media portal and technologies* such as MEMLEKETIM PORTAL, Facebook, Twitter and Instagram. The first category includes software designed for collaborative use in a work environment, whereas the latter are popular media applications designed for individual use for business and social purposes. One should also recognize the hybrid characters of CONSULAR-NET and MEMLEKETIM PORTAL designed for interaction with and among individuals. These two programs include features supporting both collaborative use in a work environment and person-to-person interaction for social purposes through web-based communication networks.

Furthermore, following the line of Orlikowski and Robey, it is assumed that ICT contains both social and material properties and that ICT, by nature, comprises social products created by human action within a specific structural and cultural context.⁴ Technology and institutional structures involve a process of mediating (enabling, constraining) human action, and through human action, contributing to producing, maintaining and changing social contexts. In other words, ICT are social

products constituted through institutional structures, and in turn, they contribute to the constitution of institutional properties of an organization by enabling and constraining human action.⁵

An explanatory cognitive model of two phases – the *technology enactment process* and the *transformation of organizational culture* – is offered to simplify various elements of intertwined arguments throughout discussions in this article. In the first phase, Fountain's *technology enactment framework* is employed to explore earlier processes involving the development, design, use and implementation of ICT in the Ministry.⁶ In the following transformative phase, priority is given to interaction between enacted technology and organizational culture in the Ministry.

In the technology enactment framework, Fountain differentiates between *objective* and *enacted* technologies. Objective technologies are hardware, software, telecommunications and other material systems as they exist apart from the ways in which people use them. Enacted technologies are the ways that a technological system is actually used by actors in organizations. She argues that similar technologies may acquire different social meanings and functions, resulting in different organizational outcomes.⁷ Two intermediating variables are identified in this framework: *organizational forms* and *institutional arrangements*. Organizational forms include both *bureaucracy* and *networks* in which civil servants operate interchangeably depending on the nature of their engagement in work environments. They operate in bureaucracy to carry out policy-making and service delivery activities, and in networks to engage in cross agency cooperation and coordination in the public sector. Institutional arrangements are comprised of *cognitive institutions* (referring to mental habits and other cognitive models influencing behavior and decision-making), *cultural institutions* (referring to shared symbols, narratives and meanings), and *government institutions* (denoting laws and rules framing problem-solving and decision-making). These variables influence technology choices, individual responses to those choices, and the outcomes of enacted technologies. Fountain argues that similar technologies may produce different organizational outcomes depending on the formal structure of an organization or institutional arrangements.⁸

In this article, two modifications are made to the original technology enactment framework: first, actors are limited to *bureaucratic leaders* and *foreign service officials*, while the varying roles in the enactment framework of all groups of actors are recognized.⁹ Bureaucratic leaders include a group of technology-

enthusiast foreign service officials with unique political connections and the professional capacity to initiate and implement ICT reforms. Turkish foreign service officials include those who are primarily responsible for conducting foreign policy processes in the Ministry. Second, the concept of *organizational culture* replaces *institutional arrangements* to highlight fundamental changes in social contexts in which foreign service officials operate. While there are numerous definitions of culture,¹⁰ the definitional and analytical framework of *organizational culture* provided by Schein allows us to differentiate between the levels of assumptions, values, beliefs and artefacts influencing the mind-set and attitudes of foreign service officials.¹¹ According to Schein, organizational culture is a pattern of shared basic assumptions, differentiating the members of an organization from those of the others, helping members in their adaptation to the environment and consolidating in-group integration. He argues that organizational culture can be analyzed at three different levels: (i) *basic assumptions* that are unconscious, taken-for-granted beliefs, perceptions, thoughts, and feelings (ii) *espoused beliefs and values* that are the ways an organization justifies what it does and (iii) *artefacts* that are visible organizational structures and processes.¹² Schein's approach allows one to highlight the definitional boundaries and functions of organizational culture. However, it does not say much about institutional sources, informing basic assumptions, values, beliefs and artefacts of organizational culture.

Batora's new institutionalist perspective provides the remedy in the case of foreign ministries. He argues that diplomacy is an institution comprised of a set of rules, norms and procedures defining appropriate behaviors for actors in terms of relations between roles and situations, and that it operates on the basis of three organizing principles: *hierarchy*, *secrecy*, and *one-way communication with the public*. Foreign ministries embody the organizing principles of this particular institution.¹³ Batora shrewdly puts in place the link between diplomacy and foreign ministries, and highlights similarities in organizational structure and professional behaviors among foreign ministries around the world. However, he falls short of explaining divergences in the mind-set and approaches of foreign service officials operating in the same professional field of diplomacy.

Batora's approach may further be developed by referring to the national-level sources of organizational culture. Apart from diplomacy, state traditions that are formed and sustained throughout centuries or millennia have an imprint in the organizational culture of individual foreign ministries. For instance, the Ministry, in the Turkish case, is not only the carrier of *hierarchy*,

secrecy, and one-way communication with the public but also the notion of the survival of the state (*devletin bekası*) originating from the particular historical and political evolution of the Turkish state and society. Turkey has inherited the political and bureaucratic culture of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁴ When the Ottoman government was abolished in 1922, the Foreign Ministry in Ankara recruited former foreign service officials who carried along their mental mappings of how to conduct foreign policy, and set the foundation for the organizational culture of the Ministry.¹⁵ The most salient of those mappings is the notion of the survival of the state, which refers to the excessive occupation of Turkish bureaucrats, including foreign service officials, with the long term well-being of the state.

In this article, the notion of the survival of the state is understood as a concept with two dimensions: first, that *foreign policy is presumed to be supra-political*, and, second, that *the long-term well-being of the state is considered critical for the survival of the Turkish nation*. These two dimensions are interrelated and reinforce one another in organizational practices. In Turkish society, state affairs are traditionally considered above society.¹⁶ They are treated as a cluster of security dominated issues about which only a handful of qualified elected representatives in the parliament, military and civilian officials have a say. Society has been practically banned from discussing state affairs or influencing the official decision-making process involving foreign policy issues.

Furthermore, the state dominates almost all aspects of social life in Turkey. Tension between the center and the periphery of the society keeps the bureaucratic elite from directly communicating with the public. Foreign policy is presumed to be a technical topic which requires special expertise and therefore of no interest to the public and political party figures representing the narrow interests of certain cliques within society. This notion has long kept the Ministry autonomous in its actions and unresponsive to the public. First, it legitimizes the exclusive nature of the hard-to-gain expertise of foreign service officials, second it grants these officials immunity from liability of any kind in their actions in foreign policy.

Turkish bureaucrats in general, and foreign service officials in particular, differentiate between the concepts of the *state* and the *government* in running state affairs. From the 14th century onwards, the state began to separate itself from the sultan during the Imperial Era.¹⁷ The core functions of the state had been institutionalized as hierarchically organized, strong bureaucratic organizations which operate on an exclusionary

logic of the *adab* (manner) tradition.¹⁸ According to this logic, the well-being of the state has been prioritized over the welfare of the society. The expectations of the society have been subjugated to an ambiguous concept of national interests. In other words, the organizational culture of the Ministry has been informed by not only the institution of diplomacy, but also state traditions exclusive to Turkish political life.

Drawing upon the deliberations in the preceding paragraphs, the rest of the article discusses the Turkish experience in a mental model of two consecutive phases of technology enactment process and the transformation of organizational culture.

TECHNOLOGY ENACTMENT PROCESS

The Ministry is a traditional public organization that is broadly organized and functions in line with the principles of Weberian bureaucracy.¹⁹ The main function of the Ministry is to conduct the foreign policy of the Turkish government. The Ministry has its headquarters in Ankara, five representational offices across Turkey, and more than 220 diplomatic missions worldwide. The number of missions has increased by approximately 40% from 2000 to 2015, following the policies of reaching out to Africa and Latin America, as well as other proactive initiatives, that required active involvement in foreign policy dialogues with the governments and the peoples of other states. The total number of foreign service staff is 6414, 20% of whom are career officials, 13% consular and administrative officials, and the rest advisors, clerical and technical staff employed both at the headquarters and diplomatic missions. For the purpose of this study, career as well as consular and administrative officials are categorized as *foreign service officials*.

The Ministry has had a certain degree of familiarity with technology over the course of many decades. The need to process diverse and large volumes of information over different time zones and vast geographical spaces, and simultaneously ensure secrecy in work processes, encouraged the Ministry to establish a cipher bureau in the early years of the Republic and widely used the telephone and telegraph in the following decades. The first facsimile machine and few personal computers were introduced in the 1980s. In spite of a general awareness about the role of ICT in diplomacy, however, technology was only a part of the office routine of typing and transmitting information. Foreign service officials have been poorly skilled in handling technologies because clerical staff and technicians would carry out those tasks on their behalf. A

review of memoirs of Turkish diplomats having served since the 1920s provides no reference to personal experiences involving communication technologies in either their public or private accounts.²⁰

Challenges and opportunities²¹ that recent advances in ICT introduced to the profession of diplomacy, as well as the diffusion of ICT through Turkish society and public administration, encouraged the Ministry to treat technology appropriation as an organizational policy priority from the mid-2000s. This approach gained further momentum with the e-Government Initiative.²² The early introduction of ICT into the Ministry has been a typical practice of imitating similar practices of other foreign ministries to reduce the uncertainty dominating the organizational field of diplomacy.²³ Foreign service officials curiously observed the ways other institutions deal with ICT in workplaces, and adapted those ICT practices which may be of some use in diplomatic communication within and across the Ministry. The first successful initiative was a consular project designed and implemented at the Turkish Consulate General in Chicago in the early 2000s. The project involved designing and implementing a consular website providing information for citizens and international visa applicants, an online mailbox to be attended regularly by consular clerks, and a modest office network to enable consular clerks to process consular applications in a system of networked computers.

The Ministry today provides ICT-supported public service to approximately six million Turkish nationals and many more internationals worldwide. Various forms of ICT-supported work systems and social media technologies have been added to the Ministry's technology basket. The hardware includes approximately six thousand computers (30% at the headquarters and 70% in the diplomatic missions), and approximately 700 physical and digital service providers worldwide. The Ministry currently operates an integrated network of multi-modular software applications, namely INTRANET (Dışnet), CONSULAR-NET (Konsolosluk.net), MEMLEMETİM PORTAL, DOC-ARCHIVE (Belge-Arşiv), BUDGET PROGRAMME (Bütçe Programı), DIP-

LOMATIC PORTAL (Diplomatik Portal), E-VISA (e-Vize), integrated WEBSITES, and E-ARCHIVE.²⁴ An explanatory note on these software applications is included in the appendix.

Furthermore, social media technologies such as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, podcasts, Internet TV and blogging are increasingly becoming indispensable components of the Ministry's ICT technology basket. The Ministry issued an organizational circular in 2012 which required high ranking bureaucrats and heads of mission to use Facebook and Twitter actively for official purposes, to regularly inform their peers and the public about the foreign policy priorities of the Turkish government. Social media technologies diffused quickly among foreign service officials at all levels. Those tools carries all the communication advantages of advanced ICT, such as being cost-effective, widely used, user friendly, and were already embedded in various social networks with high social capital for diplomats.

The rapid diffusion of ICT and social media technologies throughout Turkish society has brought about new opportunities for public organizations to obtain information, familiarize themselves with new professional networks, and engage in trans-boundary relations independent of the Ministry.

In the Turkish case, the technology enactment process exhibits dynamic characteristics from the beginning to the present. First of all, it was a top-down process. Ideas were formed in the minds of a group of technology-enthusiast bureaucratic leaders, technological choices were made exclusively by those bureaucratic leaders, and then put into use in accordance with instructions issued by the Information Technologies Department. In the early phases of the process, there were no prior consultations with foreign service officials, who were the main users of those technologies. The Department was not only closed to prior consultations but also feedback from users. Communication was limited to those installing ICT in workplaces. Otherwise, all users' complaints remained within the confines of offices. The Department's attitude can partly be explained by one-way communication dominating the organizational culture of the Ministry, and partly by a pragmatic policy choice of bureaucratic leaders to guard nascent reforms from discouraging critics. The Ministry has recently changed this attitude, with growing success stories in the technology enactment process over the last decade. The Information Technologies Department seems more ea-

ger today to interact with foreign service officials in designing and developing new ICT than before. It does consultations and receives feedback through questionnaires, online platforms for informal exchange of ideas among users, face-to-face consultations and brainstorming sessions.

Second, technologies available in the market initially constituted the main source of ICT reforms in the Ministry. The technology market has continuously been monitored for opportunities to improve the technological software used in the Ministry. Bureaucratic leaders observed the current of technological developments and determined the way forward.²⁵ Priorities in the technology enactment process are continuously re-molded in accordance with opportunities that innovative ICT may offer. The consular projects were top priority in the early stages of the process. Later, attention was paid to the office document management, archive, digital engagement with the public and later to various other fields which had been unimaginable or impossible to realize two decades ago. Since 2010, the Ministry accelerated the ICT appropriation with a modular approach and organization-wide blanket applications. In addition, one could observe a process of ICT hardware updates, network expansion worldwide, and the renovation of physical premises to reflect the new technology-enhanced make-up of the Ministry, both at the headquarters and in diplomatic missions abroad.

Technologies available on the market have been tailored for the work processes of the Ministry and the public services it delivers. Technologies obtained in the market were, in Fountain's terms, "objective" technologies existing independent of the ways the staff at the Ministry use them. The objective technologies were re-designed, developed, and adapted to the organizational goals, structure, and institutional particularities of the Ministry. Efforts toward technology design and development included various consultations between bureaucratic leaders from within and ICT vendors and consultants outside the Ministry. At the early stages of the reform process, the bureaucratic leaders used to approach local and international consultants to develop ICT suitable for the Ministry's work processes. Today, the Ministry receives numerous project proposals from local ICT consultants to be incorporated into its work processes.

Third, the Ministry has applied various policies in order to ensure the faithful and widespread appropriation of ICT by foreign service officials over the last five years. Those policies include actively monitoring and recording ICT-related trends and statistics in work processes,

intervening if those trends indicate directions other than those desired, stimulating staff members through reward systems (punishment of deviant practices, rewarding appropriate practices), providing in-service training and regular updates on ICT developments with special attention to success stories, and effective leadership in encouraging foreign service officials to contribute to the design and development of ICT. Among those methods, the most effective one is constant monitoring of ICT uses and delivering warnings for deviant behaviors, since no staff member would like to be singled out for not complying with rules and procedures that are already in place and widely observed at the Ministry.

Last, effective leadership is another important characteristic of the technology enactment process at the Ministry. For the purpose of this study, effective leadership is interpreted as personal efforts and a remarkable level of devotion of a group of senior bureaucratic leaders in advancing ICT reforms at the Ministry. Those bureaucratic leaders constitute the driving force behind technological reforms put in place at the Ministry. Bureaucratic leaders are personally involved in preaching the advantages of employing technologies in work processes, and took part in technology development and design processes.²⁶ Those leaders were initially accessible only to those who would like to take part in the technology development efforts. The author recalls email exchanges she had with the ICT team when installing the consular software at the Turkish Consulate in Melbourne in 2003. The ICT team was accessible for all enquiries and exchange of ideas on how to install and activate the consular application. She also recalls the personal involvement of then-Consul General Koru in Chicago in overcoming challenges originating from the poor Internet infrastructure at the local level when creating the website of the Turkish Embassy in Addis Ababa in 2004. From this case, one may notice the selective nature of interaction between bureaucratic leaders and foreign service officials. The former group cooperates with those who exert efforts in advancing the technology enactment process of the Ministry.

One may draw the conclusion from the Turkish technology enactment experience that, unlike the common misconception that bureaucrats constitute an impediment in the incorporation of information technologies into organizations, they have in fact played a critical role in technological reforms at the Ministry. This confirms the proposition that senior civil servants are not an impediment to organizational changes; rather they may become key players in government reforms. High-level bureaucrats are in a better position to work out details of critical importance to the success of techno-

logical reforms, and play a significant role in the enactment framework by combining deep tacit knowledge of policy and administrative processes with deep understanding of public service and the constraints it imposes on potential design choices for new ICT.

Following the technology enactment phase, foreign service officials gradually experienced changes in intra-organizational relations both at the horizontal and vertical levels, relations with other organizations, as well as in their interactions with the domestic and foreign publics. With Schein's levels of organizational culture and Batora's propositions about the organizing principles of foreign ministries in mind, the following section will discuss those changes under four sub-headings: hierarchy, secrecy, one-way communication with the public, and the notion of the survival of the state.

TRANSFORMATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

Hierarchy

Foreign service officials act in bureaucracies and networks simultaneously. The Ministry carries out policy-making in bureaucracy, and cooperating and coordinating diplomatic tasks in cross-agency networks at the national and international levels. These two forms of organizing require different logics of operation, a model of top-down decision-making and implementation through unitary chain of command in the former, and a model of horizontal decentralization and coordination in the latter. However, foreign service officials tend to apply the logic of hierarchy to all forms of engagement within and outside the organization. This is even more so when it comes to the Ministry's relations with the business community in Turkey.²⁷ Therefore, the interplay between ICT and the organizational form will be discussed with special attention paid to the Ministry's experience in collaborative networks.

The formal organizing form of the Ministry is hierarchy, with a clear line of authority and non-permeable walls separating departmental jurisdictions from one another.²⁸ This form of organization has long been a source of prestige among foreign service officials who refer to the so-called "clockwork functioning" of the organization, the precision of which is comparable to that of the Turkish army. Hierarchical organizing provides predictability and stability to large-scale organizations with a considerable volume of routine tasks, in the Ministry's case, routine diplomatic correspondence and consular services. However, it falls short in handling emerging collaborative engagement across networks and demo-

cratic demands from within and outside the Ministry for effective public relations, transparency, and accountability.

The initial design and development of ICT programs, particularly DOC-ARCHIVE, BUDGET PROGRAM, and INTRANET, included features reflecting the existing line of bureaucratic hierarchy. A director was supposed to receive documents related to the jurisdiction of his/her departments via DOC-ARCHIVE, and distribute them to individual desk officers in their units who administer a particular file. Desk officers produce appropriate outputs and submit them electronically to their closest supervisors, who would send them further up in the hierarchy to finalize the document. Following the formal line of authority, the document would reach the appropriate level and be endorsed to send to its final destination outside the Ministry. All official documents except for those classified above the level of "restricted" are processed through DOC-ARCHIVE.

In practice, however, the majority of directors request clerical staff to print all incoming documents that need to be processed. These directors review each document, tasking a desk officer to process them, and place appropriate instructions on printed documents. Clerical staff members then take marked documents to desk officers, who process them electronically and transfer printed documents to the closest supervisor for revision, endorsement or referral to an official of higher rank on the same jurisdictional line of authority. At the final stage, a desk officer electronically signs documents on behalf of the authorizing official and sends them to their final destination outside the Ministry, with printed and initialed copies kept in files. In addition, BUDGET PROGRAM has been in use for a limited number of staff in charge of financial affairs. The experience of those staff members is similar to that of those using DOC-ARCHIVE. Due to the regulations which require printed copy of documents with original signatures, the users of BUDGET PROGRAM complain about a cumbersome process of multiple printings, signings, and then sending documents to their final destinations by regular post.

On the other hand, communications regarding administrative issues strictly related to the functioning of the Ministry, including relations between staff members and the human resources department, have been carried out electronically with no printed papers involved. In addition, any communication calling for technical assistance for ICT use and maintenance of office machines is done electronically with no paperwork required.

The maintenance of beliefs, values, and practices producing hierarchical relations require routine face-to-face communication.²⁹ A director needs to see subordinates visiting his/her office on a regular basis to receive instructions, consult on how to process documents, and reassure one's loyalty to the superior. It is necessary for subordinates to secure the trust of the superior, to learn from the master the subtleties of diplomacy and to become acculturated into the community of foreign service officials. Routine conversations during the processing of foreign policy documents between superiors and subordinates carry the tenets of hierarchy as one of the basic assumptions of the organizational culture. Therefore, although DOC-ARCHIVE offers faster and more efficient ways of conducting business, foreign service officials resist using DOC-ARCHIVE in accordance with its original guidelines. However, they are more apt to use ICT in administrative and technical communications through INTRA-NET, since those applications are related to secondary matters (though not necessarily less important), which fall under the jurisdiction of departments such as the Information Technologies Department, the Human Resources Department or the Financial and Administrative Department. This experience illustrates differences between objective and enacted technologies, and unexpected outcomes of the technology enactment process.

From this analysis, one may argue that political departments play a critical role in producing, maintaining and modifying the notion of hierarchy at the Ministry. Foreign policy issues are handled in these departments. The notion of hierarchy is strongly experienced through face-to-face communication between superiors and subordinates working for those departments. These observations illustrate differences in the appropriation of ICT in processing foreign policy-related documents and carrying out administrative and technical applications. Foreign service officials resist using DOC-ARCHIVE in the fastest and most efficient way while almost fully complying with guidelines in using INTRA-NET. The organizational culture of prioritizing political issues over technical ones prevents staff members from fully utilizing DOC-ARCHIVE while endorsing the use of other programs.

Another dimension of hierarchy at the Ministry is the hierarchical relationship between the headquarters and

missions abroad. Diplomatic missions are subordinated to the headquarters in their conduct of foreign policy processes. The introduction to diplomatic missions of ICT increased the frequency, speed and volume of correspondence between the headquarters and diplomatic missions. Particularly DOC-ARCHIVE, CONSULAR-NET and E-VISA enable diplomatic missions to directly communicate and exchange documents, not only with the headquarters, but also with other public organizations, such as the Ministry of Interior Affairs and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, and the autonomous branches of those organizations. In addition, diplomatic missions have secured access to the national data banks of records of birth, death and marriages, as well as penal records of Turkish citizens. An increase in the frequency and speed of communication between diplomatic missions has reduced down-

time and narrowed geographical distances between various agencies. While the headquarters' control and monitoring over diplomatic missions has increased, the latter has secured more freedom of action in proceeding with their routine tasks. The headquarters receives daily activity reports from mis-

sions, carrying out all communications and providing instructions in response to emerging new conditions more quickly. Diplomatic missions don't need to wait for days for a response or confirmation from the headquarters, which has reduced significantly the reaction time of missions in responding to rapidly emerging foreign policy issues in host countries.

The third dimension of hierarchy at the Ministry is related to the perceived hierarchical relations between the Ministry and other public organizations. This dimension falls in the category of networks as a form of organization. Foreign service members have maintained a hierarchical professional culture which prioritizes the realm of foreign policy over areas that fall in the jurisdiction of other public organizations. This cultural attitude stems partly from the profession of diplomacy, and partly from the Ottoman and Republican state traditions which equate foreign policy to security policy.³⁰ Foreign service officials identify themselves as the guardians of an upper realm in state affairs and display corresponding organizational behaviors in the public sphere. This practice perpetuated a hierarchical relationship between the Ministry and other public organizations. Despite the law, which does not decree a relational hierarchy between the Ministry and other

Since diplomacy is treated as a delicate art of negotiations, senior foreign service officials are considered masters from whom subordinates should learn necessary qualifications.

Ministries which carry out the core functions of the state, the former has sustained a culture of hierarchical relations by exclusively mediating relations between the national and the international, producing strictly formal correspondences with other public organizations, paying special attention to meticulous customs in face-to-face engagement with those outside the Ministry and, most importantly, displaying an image of a class of foreign service officials with distinct high culture.

However, the rapid diffusion of ICT and social media technologies throughout Turkish society has brought about new opportunities for public organizations to obtain information, familiarize themselves with new professional networks, and engage in trans-boundary relations independent of the Ministry. This is most evident in the cases of the Ministry of Interior Affairs and the Ministry of Economy and Treasury, which have made efforts to provide linguistic, professional and cultural training for staff members to pursue ministerial tasks at the international level. With the emergence of new opportunities that have been seized by other public organizations, the facilitator role of the Ministry has decreased dramatically since the 1990s, and reduced it to the level of a post office, where formal correspondence is transmitted without any involvement in the substance of the jurisdictions of other public organizations.

The Ministry has faced challenges in conducting business as usual, and has had to revise its hierarchical engagement with other public organizations. As a remedy to this, the introduction of ICT to work processes at the Ministry provided an interesting opportunity for foreign service officials to transform relations with other public organizations from self-perceived hierarchy to collaborative network relations that provide the Ministry with the upper hand in reaping social capital from those networks. The Ministry has actively promoted the extension of its software service networks to other public organizations.³¹ It signed protocols to implement DOC-ARCHIVE in the Office of President, the Ministry for EU Affairs, and the Under Secretariat for Defense Industries. The Ministry produces organizational replicas by transferring those technologies to other public organizations, and creating collaborative networks. Cooperation with other public organizations not only makes ICT reforms sustainable within the Ministry, but also encourages further ICT reforms and legitimizes demands for more funds for new software programs. The Ministry uses ICT as strategic products to be tradable for securing the partnership of other organizations, creating networks and most importantly reclaiming dominance in the knowledge field of foreign policy and technological innovation in the public

sector. Although the new form of relations between the Ministry and other public organizations is far from being hierarchical today, it still displays a characteristic where the Ministry re-defines its role as a “hub agency” playing a unique, innovative and indispensable role in the public sector. This, in turn, reinforces the self-perception among foreign service officials of being a distinctive community with exclusive qualities in the public sector.

Secrecy

Following the line of Batora,³² secrecy is taken as a basic assumption of the Ministry’s organizational culture. The interplay between ICT and secrecy will be discussed in terms of access to *information* and *information security*. Both dimensions are governed by the traditional *need-to-know principle*, which implies that an officer has access only to those files that directly concern his/her daily work. Access to information within the Ministry is regulated through strict rules and procedures. Information is compartmentalized within departments. Each department adamantly guards the boundaries of its jurisdiction and pays particular attention to avoiding infringements from within and outside the Ministry. Information is managed and archived by authorized foreign service officials working at those departments with corresponding jurisdictions. Information exchange between departments is made through a written request that is drafted by the department requesting information and authorized by high-ranking officials in the line of authority. Holding information and expertise on a foreign policy topic is a source of power for individual foreign service officials, therefore the need-to-know principle is strictly adhered to at all levels in the bureaucratic hierarchy. Individual foreign service officials traditionally prefer a minimum level of disclosure of foreign policy information to the lowest number of authorized officials from within and outside the Ministry.

Information security constitutes the external dimension of secrecy. Official correspondence between the Ministry and diplomatic missions abroad is conducted through secured communication lines. Information is secured because of the sensitivity of the content that is related to the national interests of the state, a moral responsibility to keep any confidential information belonging to other states, or a precaution to avoid leaking information which may call into question the legitimacy of the Ministry. Risk avoidance is a policy choice resulting from the need-to-know principle at the Ministry. If there is high risk in using a certain communication method, then it is avoided for the sake of information security.

The introduction of ICT to work processes at the Ministry has not changed the appearance of traditional rules and procedures on the management of and access to information within the Ministry. Information is still compartmentalized among various departments, and access to information depends on a written authorization. However, the boundaries of information to be disclosed within the Ministry have been re-drawn to allow the construction of semi-permeable walls within and outside the Ministry. The volume of unrestricted information increases as their contents are disclosed by other sources than foreign ministries in mainstream or social media. Most of the time, an outbreak of armed conflict elsewhere in the world is disclosed in the mainstream or social media hours before a secured correspondence is completed between a particular diplomatic mission abroad and the headquarters in Ankara. Therefore, foreign service officials have relaxed internal access to information, and become willing to share more information with other stakeholders.

A gradual policy change could be observed in information security at the Ministry over the last two decades. It was a change from risk avoidance to risk management. In the past, the Ministry would communicate confidential information via the cipher bureau, in which diplomatic cables were coded, transmitted through the communication lines to the final destination, and decoded for foreign service officials to read the content of the cable. Today, the cipher bureau is still in use for confidential information.³³ However, as the volume of unrestricted information sent electronically has increased dramatically, so has the risk of leaking information to unauthorized third parties. Instead of banning the use of ICT and social media technologies, the Ministry applies a policy of free usage of electronic communications on the condition that users strictly follow information security guidelines. Drawing on lessons learned from the WikiLeaks scandal involving the disclosure of sensitive foreign policy information of the U.S. State Department, Deputy Foreign Minister Koru has stated that such leaks could happen any time in any country, including Turkey, and no one can claim that their country will not ever face such challenges. The purpose of the information security policy of the Ministry is not to eradicate the possibility of leakages, but to minimize such incidents.³⁴

The Ministry's risk management policy has three dimensions: first, the Board of Response to Cyber Incidents was established to assess risks arising in cyberspace and formulate measures to be taken in handling cyber incidents in 2013. The Board comprises high-ranking foreign service officials and representatives of the Information Technologies Department. It plays a

critical role in reviewing the Ministry's current communication infrastructure and developing guidelines and procedures to be followed to minimize the impacts of cyber incidents. One may observe an institutionalization process involving rules and procedures on how to reduce unauthorized disclosure of foreign policy information, and deal with cyber incidents related to the diffusion of ICT within the Ministry and missions abroad. Second, the Ministry's Information Technologies Department often issues circular notes in which foreign service officials are requested to be extra careful in communicating foreign policy information, and to be vigilant in bringing to the Department's attention any infringement of the Ministry's communication infrastructure. The Information Technologies Department deals with thousands of cyber attacks each day. Third, the Ministry takes an active role in drafting national laws and regulations on cyber security, proactively sharing its experience on cyber security with other public organizations, and promoting international cooperation between Turkish authorities and international organizations, such as the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), and the Task Force-Computer Security Incident Response Teams/Trusted Introducer (TF-CSIRT/TI). The Ministry hosted the D-8 Information Technologies Workshop in Ankara in April 2014, and facilitated the conduct of the International Cyber Shield Exercise in Istanbul in May 2014.

Furthermore, the concept of risk management enabled bureaucratic leaders to put into action the long awaited E-ARCHIVE project, in which documents in the diplomatic archive covering the period of 1919-2008 are declassified and re-catalogued for the public eye. The introduction of ICT into the diplomatic archive enabled foreign service officials to get key documents in a shorter period of time and assess current foreign policy issues with sound background knowledge. In addition, E-ARCHIVE is used to facilitate the re-branding of the existing paper-based diplomatic archive and institutionalize public access to digitalized documents. This allows the Ministry to reinforce its position as a hub agency in the knowledge field on the foreign policy of Turkey.

One-Way Communication with the Public

The historical evolution of Turkish diplomacy resulted in a centralized public communication function in foreign ministries. All messages were drafted and disseminated by the Department of Information at the headquarters. In addition, the communication style between the state and the public has usually been one-way and ex-post in nature. In other words, the public was informed only if it was deemed necessary by the state, and only

after events occurred.³⁵ There have been no channels for state consultation with the public in the process of foreign policy-making or implementation.

The introduction of ICT to work processes at the Ministry has influenced communication patterns in interactions among foreign service officials as well as their communication style with the public. In this article, it is assumed that the communication style of foreign service officials with the public is strictly related to and influenced by intra-organizational communication patterns of work processes at the Ministry. Therefore, both dimensions are discussed within this section.

As to intra-organizational communication, one may observe two lines of communication simultaneously operating among foreign service officials at the organizational level. The first one is the formal communication line that follows the line of authority and regulating processes involving foreign policy decision-making. The second is the informal communication line in which the formal line of authority has been mostly ignored. Informal conversations dominate the discourse and play a complementary role to the formal communication line involving foreign policy decision-making and a much greater role in administrative decision-making. In the latter form of communication, a network of people with converging interests is in operation. These informal networks are constituted of people with similar educational background, familial ties, political and religious affiliations or a constructive work experience, generating personal trust. Participants interact with one another as long as social capital in the networks serves their individual interests.

In both formal and informal communication lines, an authoritative-benevolent tone prevails in the language of superiors while a submissive and reverent tone is the norm on the side of subordinates. The converging attitudes of benevolent authoritarianism and submissiveness originate from socioeconomic environments, such as family structure, education, and state traditions, where the mode of *master-apprenticeship* is the primary source of socialization and organizational learning. Organizations replicate authority structures of families where fathers acquire the highest level of authority and others occupy lower levels. The education system perpetuates those tendencies in families and in society.³⁶

In addition, the mode of master-apprenticeship plays a critical role in socialization and organizational learning at the Ministry. Since diplomacy is treated as a delicate art of negotiations, senior foreign service officials are considered masters from whom subordinates should

learn necessary qualifications. It is the duty of subordinates to create a trustworthy environment by exerting the highest quality of service, and showing absolute loyalty to superiors to obtain valuable insights about the art of diplomacy. This mode accentuates the hierarchy in communication between superiors and subordinates at the Ministry.

The introduction of ICT to work processes at the Ministry has had an impact on the mode of master-apprenticeship as the primary source of socialization and organizational learning. With more information readily available online both within and outside the Ministry, information is suddenly freed from the tight grip of a few foreign service officials holding key positions in the organization. The conditionality between access to valuable information and absolute loyalty to superiors has eased to a considerable extent that no longer defines vertical relations in the formal lines of authority. The reduction of the master-apprenticeship mode paved the way for previously unimaginable constructive exchanges of ideas through the horizontal and vertical lines of authority. Therefore, the hierarchy-informed communication style among foreign service officials has gradually given way to a two-way communication, in which both superiors and subordinates constructively exchange views without evoking a sense of threat or challenge to superiors.

Organizational patterns of communication among foreign service officials are similar to their communication style with the public, both at the national and international levels. In the mind of Turkish foreign service officials, the traditional media landscape positions the Ministry at the center of the communication network. The public receives messages crafted and disseminated unilaterally by the Ministry in a one-way and ex-post fashion. This model of communication between the Ministry and the public has been profoundly challenged by the new media landscape painted by Shirky.³⁷ In order to adapt to the new media landscape, bureaucratic leaders encouraged foreign service officials to use social media technologies in crafting messages for the public, with a particular interest being vested in input from the public. The use of social media has diffused rapidly throughout various departments and diplomatic missions. Social media technologies provide foreign service officials with the opportunity to present the contributions they have made in foreign policy processes, enabling them to interact with colleagues around the world, exchanging experiences on how to put into practice foreign policy instructions received from the Ministry, and most importantly, attracting attention to their personal attributes, preferences and knowledge.

The introduction of ICT, particularly software such as E-VISA and CONSULAR-NET, as well as social media portal and technologies such as MEMLEKETIM PORTAL, Facebook and Twitter, formed online communication lines with the public, both domestically and internationally. The Public Diplomacy Department was formed in 2010 in order to deal with input from the public, and to coordinate the public diplomacy initiatives of diplomatic missions abroad, as well as the headquarters' public relations.³⁸ Diplomatic missions are requested to take into account the public diplomacy dimension of their activities, and regularly report on diplomatic activities involving public diplomacy and advocacy initiatives since 2012. The Human Resources Department and the Diplomacy Academy offer a diverse set of in-service training for foreign service officials. Those courses involve seminars and workshops to improve the communication and public engagement skills of foreign service officials. The burgeoning literature refers to the potential of generating soft power through an active engagement with the public. This has raised awareness among foreign service officials about the benefits of constructively engaging with the public. The creation of new channels has enabled the public to contribute to foreign policy processes by conveying their requests and expectations in advance, and constituting viable public pressure on foreign service officials, among others, on policy choices available.

The two-way communication emerging out of the technology enactment process indicates the change of mind-set among foreign service officials. Although the Ministry occupies a central position in the media landscape in the thinking of foreign service officials, it no longer displays characteristics of outdated hierarchical relationships between a dominating organization and a passive audience. The public is now considered an active and legitimate contributor to foreign policy processes. Furthermore, the dismantling of the model of master-apprenticeship as a form of socialization and organizational learning accelerates social media-enhanced communication trends suitable to the new media landscape.

The Notion of the Survival of the State

The idea that foreign policy is supra-political was ren-

dered untenable following socio-political changes in Turkish society. Those changes include the pro-active involvement of the AKP government in foreign policy processes,³⁹ the decoupling of foreign and security policies with the emergence of economic factors as a key determinant in policy choices,⁴⁰ the rise of interest in foreign policy issues in society in general, and among think tanks and universities in particular, since the 1990s.⁴¹ Those changes influenced the Ministry in two ways: first, actors influencing foreign policy processes increased in number. The Ministry now needs to coordinate foreign policy processes with various actors ranging from business associations to influential lobby groups. Second, those actors have become more influential in determining particular policy choices serving their interests. For instance, foreign policy papers are regularly published by the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD), Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association (MUSIAD), and the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON). Those papers inform the public about the business priorities of those associations and offer policy suggestions for the Government. Third, the diffusion of democratic ideals through Turkish society forces public organizations to be accountable to and receptive of demands from the public.

In the new socio-political environment, foreign service officials are encouraged to become constructive interlocutors negotiating with the public in working out particular foreign policy choices. Therefore, in this social context it is rather difficult to identify how ICT influences the tenet of foreign policy as being supra-political, within a socio-political environment which has already undergone radical transformation over recent decades. However, one may observe that ICT provided the Ministry with ample opportunities to constructively engage with other public organizations through technology and data transfer and joint use of software such as INTRA-NET, E-VISA and CONSULAR-NET. These newly forged collaborative networks reinforce the Ministry's role as the leading public organization mediating relations between public organizations and their peers internationally, as well as its primary role in foreign policy processes at the domestic level. In addition, there are new avenues available for engagement with influential actors in Turkish society. The Ministry effectively uses its valuable expertise and information by allowing the

The well-being of the state will depend on a complex re-assessment involving the past, present and future of Turkish society, with a particular emphasis on the well-being of society at present.

public to access the information it holds. Furthermore, as in the case of E-ARCHIVE, the Ministry recalibrates foreign service officials by encouraging them to use social media technologies in public engagement, and by providing in-service training to improve their communication and negotiation skills. The Ministry actively weaves networks which may contribute to its adaptation to the changing socio-political environment.

However, the introduction of ICT to the Ministry has not made a noticeable difference in the mind-set of foreign service officials in differentiating between the concepts of the state and the government. Foreign service officials keep believing that the state is permanent and sacred, while governments are temporary and may change in parliamentary elections. This traditional line of thinking has increasingly been questioned from within and outside the Ministry over the last two decades. In fact, the well-being of the state will depend on a complex re-assessment involving the past, present and future of Turkish society, with a particular emphasis on the well-being of society at present. It would not be mistaken to conclude that the Ministry has become more responsive to public opinion and the views of other stakeholders involving foreign policy processes following recent social and political changes in Turkish society and rapid changes in the communication capacity of individuals, thanks to the diffusion of ICT through societies at the national and international levels.

CONCLUSION

The introduction of ICT to work processes at the Ministry was based upon the conscious decision of a group of computer-enthusiast senior foreign service officials. The underlying motivation for this initiative was to adapt the Ministry to the rapidly changing socio-political environment, and secure dominance in the information field of foreign policy of Turkey. The technology enactment framework provides a useful analytical tool to examine those processes involving technological reforms in public organizations. It enables the research to focus on processes involving mutually constitutive interactions between technology and organizational culture.

The continuous introduction of ICT to work processes in the Ministry has resulted in a gradual transformation in the basic assumptions of the organizational culture over recent decades. Noticeable changes have arisen in the communication style of foreign service officials with the public and their approach towards cross-agency collaborative work. Although a certain degree of

change is observed in the notion of the survival of the state, it is difficult to identify the extent to which those changes emanate from ICT, and the extent to which those changes are related to the transformation of the socio-political environment in Turkish society.

This case study contributes to the literature in three areas: first, it enriches the literature, which lacks case studies involving interactions between technology and public organizations. Second, while providing insights on some aspects of the technology enactment process of the Ministry, it calls for new questions on the roles of ICT in foreign policy processes as well as the public diplomacy of Turkey. It invites students of public diplomacy and foreign policy to carry out comparative analyses on the adaptation processes of foreign ministries to the emerging information society. Last but not least, this article tests the explanatory power of the technology enactment framework applied to analyses involving interactions between technology and public organizations. Students of public diplomacy and ICT studies are encouraged to engage further in the basic premises of the main argument in this article through alternative studies in public organizations and diplomacy.

APPENDIX

INTRANET is a software application designed to provide standardized and up-to-date information to foreign service officials employed at the headquarters and diplomatic missions abroad. It also allows staff members to process routine human resource-related applications online. There are online platforms where staff members may exchange ideas, and coordinate group actions.

CONSULAR-NET is the earliest and the most advanced technology application. It includes a website and a secured software application which allows integrated information processing by all the Turkish Consulates worldwide. CONSULAR-NET has multiple functions: first, it provides citizens abroad with pragmatic and procedural information on consular matters. It provides those services through websites, call centers, mailboxes and consular TV. Second, Turkish citizens are able to fill out certain consular applications online and complete those processes without being present in person at the Consulate. Third, it links Turkish Consulates to the headquarters and key public organizations such as the Ministry of Interior Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, and in doing so, enables fast and secure data transfer between those public organizations. While it used to

take up to three months to issue a penal certificate for an applicant through a paper-based correspondence between diplomatic missions abroad and the law enforcement authorities in Turkey, it takes only 2-3 minutes today to provide this service, thanks to the online access of Consulates through CONSULAR-NET to the database of those authorities.

MEMLEKETIM PORTAL is a web-based social networking site for Turkish nationals abroad and those of Turkish and Turkic background around the world. The portal aims to build stronger communication ties within the Turkish diaspora and enhance their connection with and interest in Turkey. It includes a web-based communication network, online shopping, e-education, youth programs, and a Turkish FM online radio channel disseminating the most up-to-date information about cultural, economic and political life in Turkey. Since it launched in early 2015, the number of members reached 4733 in total. There are occasional convergences of information to be provided through CONSULAR-NET and MEMLEKETIM PORTAL, since the target audience is the Turkish nationals and Turkish speaking communities around the world. However, the function of the former is more one of official communication between citizens and the state, while the latter is less formal in tone and prioritizes networking building among the target audience.

DOC-ARCHIVE is a web-based document management and archive application. It was designed in 2001 to process documentation and unclassified data transmission between the headquarters and diplomatic missions. The functioning of this application follows the logic of hierarchical authority and a formal communication line. This application oversees the process of drafting documents, sending them for endorsement, endorsing those documents via an e-signature application by an authorized superior, sending the endorsed documents to the designated department or organization, and finally saving the document in the electronic archive. DOC-ARCHIVE constitutes the backbone of the communication and information processing system of the Ministry. Approximately 12 million official documents have been processed and archived electronically since 2001. The application was revised and further developed in 2008 and 2013 to take advantage of technological advances to improve organizational efficiency in information processing and transmission. This application has been replicated for the use of public organizations such as the Secretariat General of the Presidency, the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries, and the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior Affairs, the Directorate General for Civil Aviation, and the Secretariat General of the Grand National

Assembly of Turkey (Parliament). These organizations use similar document management systems to process information and exchange documents online with the Ministry.

DIPLOMATIC PORTAL is a web-based document management and transmission application launched in July 2013. This application is designed to process electronically formal communication between the Ministry and foreign diplomatic missions in Turkey.⁴² It has two properties: a web page which provides up-to-date information about the Turkish foreign policy, diplomatic procedures and ceremonial practices, and an innovative communication channel which allows the drafting and transmission of notes verbales online between foreign diplomatic missions and the Ministry. This application also incorporates an electronic archive, which offers data storage and allows electronic searches. In April 2015, the new face of DIPLOMATIC PORTAL was introduced. It features an interactive platform where information on cultural activities is exchanged regularly between the Ministry and foreign diplomatic missions. The Ministry takes a proactive role by broadcasting news or announcements about its activities, which may be of interest to the diplomatic community in Turkey.

E-VISA is a web-based visa application system launched in April 2013. It provides a simple and straightforward visa application process and service for citizens of approximately 100 countries. This application has so far received encouraging feedback from visa applicants and the business community in Turkey. The Turkish Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD) and the Turkey Information Technology Foundation's technology award for "e-services from public organizations to citizens" went to the Ministry for its E-VISA application in 2013.

In addition, the Ministry was one of the earliest public organizations to launch an official Internet site in the 1990s. In the following years, diplomatic missions abroad launched individual websites in English and other languages. The websites have been standardized and interconnected to provide a unified frame for disseminating information on Turkish foreign policy since 2010. As part of the standardization process, departments at the headquarters and diplomatic missions abroad have been required to use official email addresses only to be provided by the Ministry.

E-ARCHIVE is another technological initiative that the Ministry has embarked upon. The diplomatic archive of the Turkish state from 1919 - 2008 is kept on the Ministry's premises. It includes more than 65 million

documents in paper format. Those documents are poorly catalogued and kept in dusty files that are out of reach of the public. To bring those documents to light, the Ministry launched the E-ARCHIVE project in January 2015.⁴³ More than 200 specialists are taking part in the project. A total of 25 million documents will be scanned and electronically catalogued by the end of 2015. The project is warmly welcomed in Turkey.⁴⁴

ENDNOTES

1. Cowan, G. & Arsenault, A. (2008) Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy. *ANNALS. AAPSS.* 616. pp.10-30; Cull, N.J. (2009) *Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past.* Los Angeles: Figueroa Press; Karl, P.A. (1982) Media Diplomacy. *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science.* 34 (4) The Communications Revolution in Politics. pp.143-152.; Melissen, J. (ed.) (2005) *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.; Ozkan, B. (2013) Public Diplomacy of Turkey. *TASAM.* 11 December 2013. Available from: http://www.tasam.org/en/Icerik/5136/public_diplomacy_of_turkey; Wriston, W.B. (1997) Bits, Bytes and Diplomacy. *Foreign Affairs* 76 (5). pp.172-182.; Zaharna, R.S. (2011) Strategic Stakeholder Engagement in Public Diplomacy. *International Stakeholder Engagement in Public Diplomacy. American University-School of Communication.* 15-19 March 2011.

2. Batora, J. (2008) *Foreign Ministries and the Information Revolution: Going Virtual?* (Diplomatic Studies, Volume 2). Leiden:Martinus Nijhoff.; Eldon, S. (1994) From Quill Pen to Satellite. *Occasional Paper.* London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.; Huijgh, E. (2013) The Ebbs and Flows of Canada's Public Diplomacy with a Domestic Foundation. *International Journal of Canadian Studies.* 47. pp.147-169.; US. CSIS. (1998) *Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age.* Washington D.C: Center for Strategic and International Studies.; Steiner, Z. (1982) Foreign Ministries Old and New. *International Journal.* 37 (3). pp.349-377.

3. Ozkan, B. (2013) Public Diplomacy of Turkey. *TASAM.* 11 December 2013. Available from: http://tasam.org/en/Icerik/5136/public_diplomacy_of_turkey [Accessed: 17 November 2015].

4. For an overview of the nature of technology see: Barley, S. R. (1986) Technology as an Occasion for Structuring: Evidence from Observations of CT Scanners and the Social Order of Radiology Departments. *Administrative Science Quarterly* 31 (1). pp.78-108.; Chisholm, R.F. (1988) Introducing Advanced Information Technology into Public Organizations. *Public Productivity Review.* 11 (4). pp.39-56.; Davidson, E. (2006) A Technological Frames Perspective on Information Technol-

ogy and Organizational Change. *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science.* 42 (1). pp.23-39.; DeSanctis, G.M. & Poole S. (1994) Capturing the complexity in Advanced Technology Use: Adaptive Structuration Theory. *Organizational Science.* 5(2). pp.121-147.; Heintze, T. & Bretschneider, S. (2000) Information Technology and Restructuring in Public Organizations: Does Adoption of Information Technology Affect Organizational Structures, Communications, and Decision Making?. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory.* 10 (4). pp.801-830.; Jones, M. R. & Karsten, H. (2008) Giddens's Structuration Theory and Information Systems Research. *MIS Quarterly* 32 (1). pp.127-157.; Kraemer, K.L. & Jason D. (1997) Computing and Public Organizations. *Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory* 7 (1). pp.89-111.; Markus, M.L. & Robey, D. (1988) Information Technology and Organizational Change: Causal Structure in Theory and Research. *Management Science.* 34 (5). pp.583-598.; Orlikowski, W.J. (2000) Using Technology and Constituting Structures: A Practice Lens for Studying Technology in Organizations. *Organization Science.* 11 (4). pp.404-428.; Orlikowski, W.J. & Robey, D. (1991) Information Technology and the Structuring of Organizations. *CISR WP No. 220. Sloan WP No. 3284.* Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Information Systems Research.; Orlikowski, W.J. & Baroudi, J.J. (1991) Studying Information Technology in Organizations: Research Approaches and Assumptions. *Information System Research* 2 (1.); Orlikowski, W.J. (1992) The Duality of Technology: Rethinking the Concept of Technology in Organizations. *Organization Science.* 3 (3). pp.398-427.

5. Kling, R. (2000) Social Informatics: A New Perspective on Social Research about Information and Communication Technologies. *Prometheus.* 18 (3). pp.245-264.

6. Fountain, J.E. (2001) *Building the Virtual State: Information Technology and Institutional Change.* Washington, D.C.: Brooking Institute Press.; Fountain, J.E. (2004) Prospects for the Virtual State. *Institute of Developing Economies/JETRO.*; Fountain, J.E. (2006a) Enacting Technology in Networked Governance: Developmental Processes of Cross-Agency Arrangements. *National Center for Digital Government. Paper 16.*; Fountain, J.E. (2006b) Challenges to Organizational Change: Multi-Level Integrated Information Structures (MIIS). In: Lazer, D. & Mayer-Schoenberger, V. (ed.) *Information Government.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

7. Fountain (2001, 2004, 2006a, 2006b).

8. Ibid.

9. Mentioned in Fountain (2004): Hirokazu Okumura develops the technology enactment framework by adding three groups of actors who take part in the enactment process. He argues that (i) vendors and consultants, (ii) key decision makers of technology systems within the organization, and

(iii) policy makers, managers and staff members play roles with varying degree of influence in the technology enactment processes.

10. Hofstede, G. H. (2001) *Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations Across Nations*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.; Pettigrew, A. M. (1979) On Studying Organizational Cultures. *Administrative Science Quarterly*. 24 (4). Qualitative Methodology (December), pp.57-581.

11. Schein, E.H. (2004) *Organizational Culture and Leadership*. 3rd Ed. San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons.

12. Priority is given to basic assumptions that are related to the most fundamental elements of organizational culture, namely its goals and missions, means to be employed to reach those goals and missions, and organizational identity. Beliefs, values and artefacts are referred to as they contribute to elaborations on the basic assumptions of the organizational culture of the Ministry.

13. Batora, J. (2008), *Foreign Ministries and the Information Revolution: Going Virtual?*. (*Diplomatic Studies*), Vol. 2. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff.

14. Babul, E. M. (2012) Training Bureaucrats, Practicing for Europe: Negotiation Bureaucratic Authority and Governmental Legitimacy in Turkey. *Political and Legal Anthropology Review*. 35 (1) pp.30-52.; Findley, C.V. (1970) The Legacy of Tradition to Reform: Origins of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. 1. pp.334-357.; Gurpinar, D. (2013) *Ottoman Imperial Diplomacy: A Political, Social and Cultural History*. London, NY: I.B. Tauris.; Heper, M. (1974) Bürokratik Yönetim Geleneği: *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Gelişimi ve Niteliği (Bureaucratic Ruling Tradition in the Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic)*. Ankara: Middle East Technical University Publication; Heper, M. (1979) Patrimonialism in the Ottoman Turkish Public Bureaucracy. *Asia and African Studies*. March.; Heper, M. (1985) The State Tradition in Turkey. Walkington, England. The Eothen Press.; Heper, M. (2000) The Ottoman Legacy and Turkish Politics, *Journal of International Affairs* 54 (1).; Mardin, S. (1973) Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?. *Daedalus* 102 (1) Post-Traditional Societies (Winter). pp.169-190.; Ozen, S. (1991-1993) Political and Administrative Attitudes of Turkish Bureaucrats: An Explanatory Framework for Change and Stability. *Turkish Public Administration Annual* 17-19. pp.19-37.; Roos, N. P., Roos L.L. Jr. (1968) Changing Patterns of Turkish Public Administration. *Middle Eastern Studies*. 4 (3). pp.270-295.

15. Gurpinar (2013).

16. Heper (1985, 2000), Mardin (1973).

17. Heper (2000).

18. Findley (1970).

19. While assuming that the Ministry is formed and operates in according to the ideal model of Weberian bureaucracy, it is acknowledged that this simplification falls short of illustrating administrative particularities emanating from the political culture of the Turkish bureaucracy. However, this simplification will be kept in this article to provide an analytically understandable organizational structure in discussions.

20. Reviewed memoirs are as follows: Barutcu, E. (1999) *Hariciye Koridoru (Corridors of the Foreign Ministry)*. Istanbul:21.YY Yayinlari.; Erkin, F.C. (0) *Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl* Cilt.1, Cilt.2, Cilt.3. (34 Years at the Foreign Ministry Vol.1, Vol.2, Vol.3). Ankara:Turk Tarih Kurumu.; Girgin, K. (2005) *Hariciye Tarihimiz:Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Dönemleri Teşkilat ve Protokol (Diplomatic History: Organization and Protocol during the Ottoman and Republican Years)*. Istanbul: Okumus Adam Yayinlari.; Girgin, K. (2007) *Diplomatik Anılarla Dış İlişkilerimiz: Son 50 yıl: 1957-2006 (Foreign Relations in Diplomatic Memoirs: Last 50 Years:1957-2006)*. Istanbul: Ilgi Kultur Sanat Yayinlari.; Gurun, K. (1995) *Fırtınalı Yıllar: Dışişleri Anıları (Stormy Years: Memoirs of the Foreign Ministry)*. Istanbul:Milliyet.; Gokmen, O. (1999) *Bir Zamanlar Hariciye: Eski Bir Diplomatın Hatıraları 1 (the Foreign Ministry Once Upon a Time: Diplomatic Memoirs of a Former Diplomat Vol.1)* Istanbul:Kitap Rafi.; Paker, E.C. (2000) Kırk Yıllık Hariciye Hatıraları (Memoirs of the Foreign Ministry for Forty Years). Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi.; Tuncer, H. (2007) Bir Kadın Diplomatın Anıları: *Meksika'dan Milano'ya Norveç'ten Güney Afrika'ya (Memoirs of a Lady Diplomat: From Mexico City to Milan, From Norway to South Africa)*. Istanbul:Logos Yayinlari.; Tuygan, A. (2012) *Gönüllü Diplomat: Dışişlerinde 40 Yıl (Voluntary Diplomat: Forty Years at the Foreign Ministry)*. Izmir: Senocak Yayinlari.

21. Cull (2009), Melissen (2005), US CSIS Report (1998)

22. Benschir, T.K. & Yildiz, M. (2001-2002) Perceptions of E-Government in Turkey. *Turkish Public Administration Annual*. 27-28. p.41-57.; Nohutçu, A. (2009) The Journey and Experiences of e-Government Policies of Turkey: An Emerging and Innovative Public Policymaking Experience. *EGovshare2009*. p.122-136.; Metin, A. (2012) Türkiye'de E-Devlet Uygulaması ve E-Devletin Bürokrasiye Etkisi (E-Government Application in Turkey and Effects of E-Government on Bureaucracy). *Dicle Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi (DÜSBED) (University of Tigris Social Studies Institute Journal)* 4 (7). p. 98-108.; Temur, N. (2013) E-transformation Studies in Public Administration and Implications for Turkey. *Polis Bilimleri Dergisi (Police Studies Journal)*. 15 (1). pp.31-62. In addition, for information on the e-Government strategies of Turkey see: Turkey. DPT. (2006) *Bilgi Toplumu Stratejisi 2006-2010 (The*

Strategy of Information Society 2006-2010). Ankara: DPT, Turkey. DPT. (2014) *2014-2018 Bilgi Toplumu Stratejisi ve Eylem Planı (The 2014-2018 Strategy and Action Plan of Information Society)*. Ankara:DPT

23. DiMaggio, P & Powell, W. (1983) The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. *American Sociological Review*. 48 (April),p.147-161.

24. <https://www.konsolosluk.gov.tr/eKonsolosluk/> [Accessed: 17 November 2015]. <https://diplomatic.mfa.gov.tr/> [Accessed: 17 November 2015]. <https://www.evisa.gov.tr/en/> [Accessed: 17 November 2015]. <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/default.en.mfa> [Accessed: 17 November 2015]. <http://www.memleketim.gov.tr/> [Accessed: 17 November 2015].

25. Koru, N. (2015) *Naci Koru Hariciyeden Bilişim Yazıları (Naci Koru IT Notes from the Foreign Ministry)*. Available from: <http://nkoru.blogspot.com.tr/> [Accessed: 15 November 2015].

26. Koru became familiar with computers while serving as Second Secretary at a Turkish diplomatic mission in Saudi Arabia in 1984. For his memoir see: Koru, N. (2015) *Naci Koru Hariciyeden Bilişim Yazıları (Naci Koru IT Notes from the Foreign Ministry)*. Available from: <http://nkoru.blogspot.com.tr/2010/04/bilgisayarla-ilk-tansma.html?view=flipcard> [Accessed: 17 April 2015].

27. Ozkan, B. (2015) '*Türk İş Dünyasının Kamu Diplomasisindeki Rolü (The Role of the Turkish Business Community in Public Diplomacy)*', in M. Sahin and B. S. Cevik (ed.) *Türk Dış Politikası ve Kamu Diplomasisi (Turkish Foreign Policy and Public Diplomacy)*, Nobel, 2015.

28. Mintzberg, H. (1978) *The Structuring of Organizations*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

29. Hatch, M.J. (1993) The Dynamics of Organizational Culture. *Academy of Management Review*. 18 (4). pp.657-693.

30. Tur, O. & Han A. K. (2011) A Framework for Understanding the Changing Turkish Foreign Policy of the 2000s. In Oktav, O. Z. (ed.) *Turkey in the 21st Century: Quest for a New Foreign Policy*. Farnham: Ashgate.

31. Koru, N. (2014) *Presentation on Technological Partnership Opportunities with Turkish Public Organizations*. Available from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=icblyJodXz8>. [Accessed: 16 November 2015].

32. Batora (2008).

33. Akman, N. (2010). Turkey Strengthens Document Security After WikiLeaks Revelations. *Today's Zaman*. 4 Decem-

ber 2010. Available from: http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_turkey-strengthens-document-security-after-wikileaks-revelations_228669.html. [Accessed on 17 March 2015], Koru, N. (2010) Wikileaks Ders Oldu, Kendimize Çeki Düzen Veriyoruz (We Have Lessons Learnt From WikiLeaks, and Now Taking Necessary Precautions). *Zaman*. 3 December 2010. Available from: http://www.zaman.com.tr/roportaj_wikileaks-ders-oldu-kendimize-cekiduzen-veriyoruz_1060170.html [Accessed on 17 November 2015].

34. Akman (2010).

35. Batora (2008).

36. Ozen (1993).

37. Shirky, C. (2008) *Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organizations*. New York: The Penguin Press.

38. Ozkan (2013).

39. Ersoy, E. (2009-2010) Old Principles, New Practices: Explaining the AKP Foreign Policy. *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 8 (4). pp.115-127.

40. Kirisci, K. (2009) The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State. *New Perspectives on Turkey*. 40. pp.29-57.

41. Siefert, G. (2012) Foreign Policy and Self-image: The Social Basis of Strategy Shifts in Turkey. *SWP Research Paper*.11.

42. Akarcesme, S. (2013) Deputy FM: Foreign Ministry to Eventually Go Paperless. *Today's Zaman*. 6 August 2013. Available from: http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_deputy-fm-foreign-ministry-to-eventually-go-paperless_322922.html [Accessed: 17 November 2015].

43 Daily Motion (2015) *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Arşivi Dijital Ortama Aktarılıyor (The Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry Goes Digital)*. 16 January 2015. Available from: http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x2ev1kc_disisleri-bakanligi-arsivi-dijital-ortama-aktariliyor_news[Accessed: 17 April 2015]., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey (2015) *Dışişleri Bakanı Sayın Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu'nun Elektronik Arşiv Projesi Tanıtım Konuşması* (Speech by H.E. Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu on the Occasion of the Launch of the Electronic Archive Project). Available from:http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-mevlut-cavusoglu-nun-elektronik-arsiv-projesi-tanitim-konusmasi_-16-ocak-2015_-ankara.tr.mfa [Accessed: 17 November 2015].

44 Erhan, C. (2014) *Dışişlerinin Hafızası Araştırmacılara Açılıyor*

(The Memory of the Ministry will be Open to the Public). Türkiye Gazetesi. 2 November 2014. Available from: <http://test.turkiyegazetesi.com.tr/yazarlar/prof-dr-cagri-erhan/583044.aspx> [Accessed: 17 November 2015].

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Bilgin Ozkan is the Counsellor of the Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Tokyo. She has served in diplomatic posts in Australia, Ethiopia, and Latvia. Counsellor Ozkan has been following a doctoral study on public diplomacy at Riga Stradins University (Latvia), and is currently a visiting senior researcher at the SFC Research Institute of Keio University (Japan). She published articles on the public diplomacy of Turkey.



SPOTLIGHT

Patterns of News Media Consumption and Social Media Use in Turkey

By Aysenur Dal, Erik C. Nisbet and Ali Çarkoğlu

INTRODUCTION

According to the Freedom House organization, press freedom in Turkey has experienced a steady decline over the last five years with its media system moving from being characterized as “partly free” in 2010 to “not free” in 2014 (Freedom House, 2015a). This decline in press freedom has been paralleled in declines of Internet freedom as well, though as the latest 2015 Freedom of the Net report by Freedom House notes, Turkey’s Internet space remains more open and free as compared to its mass press (Freedom House, 2015b). The primary driver of these democratic declines is the Justice & Development Party (AKP) dominated government and President Erdogan. The AKP and President Erdogan have systematically attempted to silence political dissent through the imprisonment of journalists, mass firings of media personnel, issuance of gag orders, intimidation of journalists through prosecution and lawsuits, imposing large fines on media corporations, facilitating the concentration of media ownership in the hands of government supporters, and blocking social media channels such as YouTube or Twitter when anti-government information is made available on their platforms (Corke, Finkel, Kramer, Roberts, Schenkan, 2014). These overt acts of censorship have induced many media outlets to engage in their own self-censorship about political issues, candidates, or events in order to avoid government retribution.

This article moves beyond these macro evaluations of the Turkish media to examine the individual-level media and Internet use behaviors of Turkish citizens within these censored information environments. Our data on Turkish media use comes from a national, face-to-face, general population household survey of Turkey conducted over a six-week period between December 20, 2014 and February 2, 2015 by the authors. The survey population were adults living in the Republic of Turkey (men and women, 18 years or older) selected through a random, clustered sample with stratification applied in two levels based on the total population of the Turkish census region and the urban/rural population within each region, with clusters containing 20 households. The Turkish census agency randomly selected clusters and households for the survey. Survey interviewers contacted 2,111 households with one survey respondent randomly selected within each household without replacement. The response rate was 55% for a total of 1,161 completed survey interviews.

FREQUENCY OF MEDIA USE

Table 1 reports the percentages of respondents who employ each form of media split into three categories of frequency of use: non-users, light users (for whom the frequency of use range from less than once a month to two to three times a week), and heavy users (reporting daily use). Overall, television is the most popular media outlet for respondents followed by the Internet, newspapers and radio. As shown in Table 1, while 3% of

all respondents report no TV use at all, this percentage is 51% for Internet, 47% for newspapers and 84% for radio. About two-thirds (72%) watch TV on a daily basis and about half as many (35%) of all respondents use the Internet every day. About one in five respondents read the newspaper every day (21%). Radio and foreign media are only used by very small percentages of the population.

TABLE 1: FREQUENCY OF MEDIA USE

(Percentage of total respondents)

| | Frequency of Media Use | | |
|---------------------------|------------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | % of Non-Users | % of Light Users | % of Heavy Users |
| TV | 3 | 26 | 72 |
| Internet | 51 | 14 | 35 |
| Newspapers | 47 | 33 | 21 |
| Radio | 84 | 13 | 4 |
| Foreign TV | 95 | 4 | .8 |
| Foreign Newspapers | 98 | 2 | .2 |
| Foreign radio | 98 | 2 | .2 |

Ten TV news channels were cited by at least 3% of respondents as their primary source of TV news as listed in Figure 1. The most cited source of TV news was the non-partisan channel Kanal D at 19% of TV viewers that was closely followed by the pro-government TV channel ATV at 18% of TV viewers. Fox, an anti-government channel was selected by 13% of TV viewers and two other pro-government channels, TRT (10% of viewers) and Star TV (5% of viewers), rounded out the top five most popular TV channels for news. Overall, 31% of viewers selected non-partisan TV channels, 36% selected pro-government channels, and 16% selected anti-government channels as their primary source of TV news.

FIGURE 1: MOST POPULAR TURKISH TV CHANNELS




Table 2 provides the demographic characteristics of TV news viewers by frequency of use. TV news non-users are younger than heavy TV viewers (48% between 18 and 34 years old), are less educated (13% have some college education or more), are heavily women (71%), have a lower mean household income (1627 TRY), are more likely to identify as Kurdish than the general population (32%), and are highly non-partisan (51% no party

affiliation). In contrast, heavy TV news viewers are older (21% over age 55), are moderately educated (16% with some college or more), have a middle household income (1627 TRY), are of heavily Turkish ethnicity (83%), and lean toward the ruling AKP party (42%). Respondents who watch TV news on less than a daily basis are by far the youngest (58% between 18 and 34 years old), are more likely to be women (55%), are the most educated (23% with some college or more), are ethnically pluralistic (69% Turkish, 27% Kurdish), and are polarized politically with 36% favoring the AKP, 36% favoring opposition parties, and 28% favoring no party.

TABLE 2: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF TV USE SEGMENTS

(percentage of total respondents)

| Demographic Category | Frequency of TV Use | | | |
|---|---------------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------|
| | Non-Users | Light Users | Heavy Users | All Respondents |
| Age | | | | |
| % 18-34 years old | 48 | 58 | 41 | 45 |
| % 35-54 years old | 38 | 33 | 38 | 37 |
| % 55 or more years old | 14 | 9 | 21 | 18 |
| Gender | | | | |
| % Men | 29 | 45 | 51 | 49 |
| % Women | 71 | 55 | 49 | 51 |
| Educational Attainment | | | | |
| % Primary education or less | 48 | 35 | 46 | 43 |
| % Secondary or high school | 39 | 42 | 39 | 39 |
| % Some college or more | 13 | 23 | 16 | 18 |
| Household Characteristics | | | | |
| Monthly Household Income (TR per month) | 1627 | 1929 | 1809 | 1834 |
| Mean Household Size (persons) | 3.8 | 3.6 | 3.5 | 3.6 |
| Monthly Household Income Per Person | 428 | 536 | 517 | 509 |
| Primary Ethnicity | | | | |
| % Turkish | 55 | 69 | 83 | 87 |
| % Kurdish | 32 | 27 | 15 | 10 |
| % Other | 13 | 4 | 2 | 3 |
| Self-Reported Muslim Religiosity | | | | |
| % Low | 21 | 24 | 25 | 25 |
| % Moderate | 34 | 33 | 28 | 29 |
| % High | 45 | 43 | 47 | 46 |
| Party Identification | | | | |
| % Justice and Development Party (AKP) | 36 | 36 | 42 | 40 |
| % People's Republican Party (CHP) | 3 | 16 | 18 | 17 |
| % Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) | 0 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| % People's Democratic Party (HDP) | 10 | 12 | 9 | 10 |
| % Other Party/ No party identification | 51 | 28 | 23 | 25 |

Turning to the most popular newspapers by readership depicted in Figure 2, the newspaper most commonly cited by readers as their primary source of news was the non-partisan paper Posta (22% of readers), followed

distantly by the non-partisan Hurriyet (14% of readers). The pro-government Sabah was a close third with 12% of readers selecting it as their primary newspaper source and the anti-government Sozcu (8% of readers) and non-partisan Milliyet (5% of readers) coming in fourth and fifth in popularity. In contrast to TV viewership which is much more partisan, almost half (49%) of newspaper readers selected non-partisan newspapers as their primary source of newspaper news. Also in contrast to TV news where pro-government channels dominated, about equal numbers of newspaper readers selected pro-government (15%) or anti-government (16%) outlets as their primary newspaper.

FIGURE 2: MOST POPULAR TURKISH NEWSPAPERS




Table 4 provides the demographic characteristics of our respondents based on their frequency of newspaper use. As for newspaper use, non-readers heavily populate the age extremes (40% between 18 and 34 years old and 25% over 55 years of age). Non-readers are also primarily women (61%), less educated (7% have some college or more), have a low monthly household income (1375 TRY), are more religious (49% high self-reported religiosity), more likely to be Kurdish than the general population (27%), and politically favor the Justice and Development Party (48%). In contrast, daily newspaper readers age distribution resembles the general population, are heavily male (63%), highly educated (36% have some college or more), have a high monthly household income (2432 TRY), have a high percentage of Turkish ethnicity (89%), and lean more toward opposition parties (40%) compared to the AKP (31%). Light newspaper readers for the large part resemble daily readers, except they are not as quite as highly educated (21% have some college or more), have a better gender balance (55% are men), have a moderately high monthly household income (2085 TRY), and are more equally split between favoring opposition parties (36%) and the governing AKP (34%).

TABLE 3: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF NEWSPAPER USE SEGMENTS

(percentage of total respondents)

| Demographic Category | Frequency of Newspaper Use | | | |
|---|----------------------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------|
| | Non-Users | Light Users | Heavy Users | All Respondents |
| Age | | | | |
| % 18-34 years old | 40 | 51 | 49 | 45 |
| % 35-54 years old | 35 | 40 | 35 | 37 |
| % 55 or more years old | 25 | 9 | 16 | 18 |
| Gender | | | | |
| % Men | 39 | 55 | 63 | 49 |
| % Women | 61 | 45 | 37 | 51 |
| Educational Attainment | | | | |
| % Primary education or less | 62 | 29 | 22 | 43 |
| % Secondary or high school | 31 | 50 | 42 | 39 |
| % Some college or more | 7 | 21 | 36 | 18 |
| Household Characteristics | | | | |
| Monthly Household Income (TR per month) | 1375 | 2085 | 2432 | 1834 |
| Mean Household Size (persons) | 3.9 | 3.4 | 3.1 | 3.6 |
| Monthly Household Income Per Person | 353 | 613 | 785 | 509 |
| Primary Ethnicity | | | | |
| % Turkish | 71 | 83 | 89 | 87 |
| % Kurdish | 27 | 14 | 7 | 10 |
| % Other | 2 | 3 | 4 | 3 |
| Self-Reported Muslim Religiosity | | | | |
| % Low | 21 | 29 | 26 | 25 |
| % Moderate | 30 | 28 | 30 | 29 |
| % High | 49 | 43 | 44 | 46 |
| Party Identification | | | | |
| % Justice and Development Party (AKP) | 48 | 34 | 31 | 40 |
| % People's Republican Party (CHP) | 11 | 20 | 27 | 17 |
| % Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) | 7 | 8 | 9 | 8 |
| % People's Democratic Party (HDP) | 12 | 9 | 6 | 10 |
| % Other Party/ No party identification | 22 | 29 | 27 | 25 |

Profile of Internet Users

Consistent with the number of Internet users in Turkey according to the latest figures from the World Bank, 49% of our survey respondents reported using the Internet. When split into segments based on their frequency of Internet use, non-users are 51% of survey respondents, heavy (daily users) are 35% of respondents, and light users (less than daily use) are 14% of respondents. On the one hand, based on each segment's demographic characteristics as provided in Table 4, non-users of the Internet are older (32% over 55), more likely to be women (58%), have lower education (70% primary education or less) with larger household size (3.7 persons on average) and lower monthly household income (1394 TRY). They are also more religious (51%), more likely to be Kurdish than the general population (24%) and supporters of Justice and Development Party (47%). On the other hand, daily users of the Internet in Turkey are young (66% less than 34

years old), more likely to be male (57%), with higher rates of secondary school education (53%) and some college attainment (13%), with smaller household size (3.4) and higher monthly household incomes (2376 TRY). Moreover, daily Internet users tend to report less religiosity (37% with high religiosity), are more likely to identify with being Turkish (87%), People's Republican Party (21%), Nationalist Movement Party (8%) or no Party at all (29%). Light users overall have a similar profile to that of heavy users but with a higher likelihood of identifying with AKP (40%) and exhibit higher religiosity, with 47% reporting high religiosity.

TABLE 4: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERNET USE SEGMENTS

(Percentage of total respondents)

| Demographic Category | Frequency of Internet Use | | | |
|---|---------------------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------|
| | Non-Users | Light Users | Heavy Users | All Respondents |
| Age | | | | |
| % 18-34 years old | 28 | 56 | 66 | 45 |
| % 35-54 years old | 40 | 39 | 31 | 37 |
| % 55 or more years old | 32 | 5 | 3 | 18 |
| Gender | | | | |
| % Men | 42 | 57 | 56 | 49 |
| % Women | 58 | 43 | 44 | 51 |
| Educational Attainment | | | | |
| % Primary education or less | 70 | 25 | 11 | 43 |
| % Secondary or high school | 26 | 54 | 53 | 39 |
| % Some college or more | 4 | 21 | 36 | 18 |
| Household Characteristics | | | | |
| Monthly Household Income (TR per month) | 1394 | 2110 | 2376 | 1834 |
| Mean Household Size (persons) | 3.7 | 3.5 | 3.4 | 3.6 |
| Monthly Household Income Per Person | 377 | 603 | 699 | 509 |
| Primary Ethnicity | | | | |
| % Turkish | 78 | 72 | 80 | 87 |
| % Kurdish | 18 | 24 | 17 | 10 |
| % Other | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 |
| Muslim Religiosity | | | | |
| % Low | 20 | 29 | 30 | 25 |
| % Moderate | 29 | 24 | 33 | 29 |
| % High | 51 | 47 | 37 | 46 |
| Party Identification | | | | |
| % Justice and Development Party (AKP) | 47 | 40 | 29 | 40 |
| % People's Republican Party (CHP) | 13 | 20 | 21 | 17 |
| % Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) | 7 | 8 | 9 | 8 |
| % People's Democratic Party (HDP) | 11 | 11 | 7 | 10 |
| % Other Party/ No party identification | 22 | 21 | 34 | 25 |

Internet Activities

Internet users were asked how frequently they engage in a variety of online activities. Table 5 provides the frequency percentages among those who engage in nine different activities at least once a month. Based on the survey results, the most popular online activity is using social media platforms such as Facebook or Twitter (83% of light users, 93% of heavy users and 90% of all Internet users). The gap between light and heavy users is wider in the following online activities: downloading or listening to music (66% of light users vs. 86% of heavy users), downloading or watching videos, movies or TV shows (58% of light users vs. 86% of heavy users), sending or receiving email with friends and family (63% of light users vs. 82% of heavy users), using Internet sources (blogs, websites or social media) for news (49% of light users vs. 68% of heavy users), playing games online (51% of light users vs. 66% of heavy users), posting or commenting on entries on a blog or news website (39% of light users vs. 63% of heavy users), searching for information on political leaders or topics (39% of light users vs. 58% of heavy users) and buying or ordering goods or services (21% of light users vs. 36% of heavy users).

TABLE 5: ONLINE ACTIVITIES ONCE A MONTH OR MORE BY INTERNET USE SEGMENTS

(Percentage of Internet users)

| Type of Internet Activity | Frequency of Internet Use | | % of All Internet Users |
|--|---------------------------|------------------|-------------------------|
| | % of Light Users | % of Heavy Users | |
| Use online social networking platforms such as Facebook or Twitter | 83 | 93 | 90 |
| Download or listen to music | 66 | 86 | 80 |
| Download/watch videos, movies, TV shows | 58 | 86 | 78 |
| Send/Receive email w/ friends and family | 63 | 82 | 76 |
| Use Internet sources (blogs, websites, social media) for news | 49 | 68 | 63 |
| Play games online | 51 | 66 | 62 |
| Post comments/entries on blog or news website | 39 | 63 | 56 |
| Search for information on political leaders or topics | 39 | 58 | 53 |
| Buy/order goods or services | 21 | 36 | 31 |

Social Media Activities

In order to further investigate the high frequency of using social networking sites (SNS) among different Internet use segments (90% of all Internet users), the survey then asked questions on which SNS platforms respondents use and what kind of specific SNS activities they engage in the most. Among all social media users, Facebook (92% of heavy users), YouTube (61% of heavy users), Twitter (44% of heavy users), and Instagram (27% of heavy users) were the top four social networking sites that respondents report using regularly. When it comes to specific activities, Internet users seem to engage more in information-seeking behaviors than political expression behaviors. Table 6 provides percentages for heavy (use everyday – 47% of all SNS users) and light (use social media two to three times a week or less – 44% of all SNS users) social media users, as well as overall percentages for all regarding their engagement in a total of eight activities at least once a month or more.

Among the four activities listed under information-seeking behaviors, reading news headlines or short news summaries is the most frequent activity (79% of all social media users) with 85% of heavy users reporting

engaging at least once a month in comparison to 75% of light users. Respondents from both segments exhibit similar majorities in engaging in the next two most frequent information seeking behaviors on social media, looking at videos or images (57% of all SNS users) and reading opinions (56% of all SNS users) about political leaders and issues, once a month or more. The least frequent social media activity is reading messages from, or profiles of, political leaders or parties with only about half of users from both segments reporting engaging at least once a month.

When it comes to political expression via SNS, the percentages of social media users who discuss political issues with others, share news stories or websites automatically and like, post or comment on anything related to politics on SNS at least once a month are all the same (44%). However, unlike the pattern we see in the differences between light and heavy users' frequency of engagement in information seeking behaviors, light users report engaging in political expression via SNS more than heavy users. In other words, heavy social media users are more active information seekers than expressers regarding political issues.

TABLE 6: SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORM ACTIVITIES ONCE A MONTH OR MORE BY INTERNET USE SEGMENTS

(percentage of social media users)

| Type of Social Media Activity | Frequency of Social Media Use | | % of All Social Media Users |
|--|-------------------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|
| | % of Light Users | % of Heavy Users | |
| Information-seeking behaviors | | | |
| Read news headlines or short news summaries | 75 | 85 | 79 |
| Look at videos or images about political leaders or parties | 58 | 58 | 57 |
| Read political opinions about political leaders or issues | 57 | 57 | 56 |
| Read messages from, or profiles of, political leaders or parties | 49 | 52 | 50 |
| Political expression behaviors | | | |
| Discuss political issues with others | 47 | 44 | 44 |
| Share news stories or videos automatically that you view on news websites or blogs | 51 | 40 | 44 |
| Like, post or comment on anything related to politics, including news stories, opinions, images, or videos | 51 | 39 | 44 |
| Recruit people to get involved with political issues | 40 | 26 | 32 |

News Attention

In order to learn about our respondents' attention to news, we asked them how closely they follow news and information about domestic political (Turkish politics in general) and international (international issues and events) news. About one-quarter (26%) of respondents stated they followed domestic political news extremely or fairly closely, as compared to 16% who stated they did the same for international news. In fact, over half of survey

respondents (52%) replied that they followed international news not at all closely or not too closely. Similarly, a plurality of survey respondents (38%) said they followed domestic political news not at all closely or not too closely.

TABLE 7: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF ATTENTION TO NEWS AND INFORMATION ABOUT TURKISH POLITICS

(Percentage of total respondents, excluding middle responses)

| Demographic Category | Not at all closely / Not too closely | Fairly closely / Extremely Closely | All Respondents |
|--|---|---|------------------------|
| Age | | | |
| % 18-34 years old | 48 | 42 | 45 |
| % 35-54 years old | 33 | 39 | 37 |
| % 55 or more years old | 20 | 19 | 18 |
| Gender | | | |
| % Men | 35 | 67 | 49 |
| % Women | 65 | 33 | 51 |
| Educational attainment | | | |
| % Primary education or less | 55 | 32 | 43 |
| % Secondary or high school | 35 | 38 | 39 |
| % Some college or more | 10 | 30 | 18 |
| Ethnicity | | | |
| % Turkish | 72 | 83 | 87 |
| % Kurdish | 25 | 14 | 10 |
| % Other | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Muslim Religiosity | | | |
| % Low | 21 | 28 | 25 |
| % Moderate | 28 | 26 | 29 |
| % High | 51 | 46 | 46 |
| Party Identification | | | |
| % Justice and Development Party (AKP) | 44 | 36 | 40 |
| % People's Republican Party (CHP) | 13 | 22 | 17 |
| % Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) | 7 | 7 | 8 |
| % People's Democratic Party (HDP) | 9 | 10 | 10 |
| % Other Party/ No party identification | 27 | 25 | 25 |

Tables 7 and 8 provide the demographic breakdowns for who pays and does not pay attention to domestic political and international news. For both domestic politics and international news, about half of the under 34 years of age population does not pay close attention to news and information. Of those who follow both domestic and international political news closely or very closely, two-thirds (67%) are males and primarily identify as Turkish (83%). Those who pay extremely or fairly close attention to domestic and international news tend to be highly educated (30% and 35% have some college or more). Respondents who pay close attention to domestic news

also tend to be somewhat less religious (28% low self-reported Muslim religiosity), and are somewhat more likely to favor opposition parties (39%) than the AKP (36%). However, the split between those who favor the opposition (38%) and those who favor the AKP (37%) is more equitable among those who pay extremely or fairly close attention to international news.

TABLE 8: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF ATTENTION TO NEWS AND INFORMATION ABOUT INTERNATIONAL ISSUES AND EVENTS

(Percentage of total respondents, excluding middle responses)

| Demographic Category | Not at all closely / Not too closely | Fairly closely / Extremely Closely | All Respondents |
|--|---|---|------------------------|
| Age | | | |
| % 18-34 years old | 47 | 40 | 45 |
| % 35-54 years old | 35 | 41 | 37 |
| % 55 or more years old | 19 | 19 | 18 |
| Gender | | | |
| % Men | 37 | 67 | 49 |
| % Women | 63 | 33 | 51 |
| Educational attainment | | | |
| % Primary education or less | 55 | 27 | 43 |
| % Secondary or high school | 36 | 38 | 39 |
| % Some college or more | 9 | 35 | 18 |
| Primary Ethnicity | | | |
| % Turkish | 74 | 83 | 87 |
| % Kurdish | 24 | 14 | 10 |
| % Other | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| Muslim Religiosity | | | |
| % Low | 25 | 27 | 25 |
| % Moderate | 27 | 28 | 29 |
| % High | 48 | 45 | 46 |
| Party Identification | | | |
| % Justice and Development Party (AKP) | 43 | 37 | 40 |
| % People's Republican Party (CHP) | 15 | 21 | 17 |
| % Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) | 6 | 7 | 8 |
| % People's Democratic Party (HDP) | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| % Other Party/ No party identification | 26 | 25 | 25 |

(Dis)Satisfaction with the Quality of Media in Turkey

Beyond media use behaviors, we also asked respondents about their level of satisfaction and other attitudes

about the media and Internet in Turkey. In terms of satisfaction with quality of the news media in Turkey, a plurality of all respondents (44%) report being very unsatisfied or unsatisfied, one third (32%) report being neither satisfied nor unsatisfied and one-fourth (25%) report being very satisfied or satisfied. As Table 9 demonstrates, however, AKP supporters do not share the same level of dissatisfaction with supporters of other parties. Unlike CHP (66%), MHP (55%), and HDP (61%) supporters that report being very unsatisfied or unsatisfied with the quality of news media in Turkey, only 27% of AKP supporters rate Turkish news media as unsatisfying.

When the same question is asked regarding websites and social media available in Turkey, a slightly different picture emerges (see Table 10). Although the percentage of those who rate the quality of online media as satisfying is quite close to that of traditional news media (27%), the percentage of respondents who rate it as unsatisfying or very unsatisfying drops by 10% percent (33%). Similarly, AKP supporters have the highest satisfaction rate for the quality of online media in Turkey (38%) in comparison to the ratings of CHP (21%), MHP (16%), and HDP (21%) supporters. Moreover, the overall higher percentages of respondents who report being neither satisfied nor unsatisfied with the perceived quality of online media suggests that respondents are less confident about their evaluations of websites and social media.

TABLE 9: SATISFACTION WITH QUALITY OF NEWS MEDIA IN TURKEY BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION

| Party Identification | Very Satisfied / Satisfied | Neither Satisfied nor Unsatisfied | Very Unsatisfied / Unsatisfied |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--|---------------------------------------|
| % Justice and Development Party (AKP) | 27 | 33 | 39 |
| % People’s Republican Party (CHP) | 66 | 23 | 11 |
| % Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) | 55 | 23 | 22 |
| % Peace and Democracy Party (HDP) | 61 | 26 | 13 |

TABLE 10: SATISFACTION WITH QUALITY OF INTERNET IN TURKEY BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION

| Party Identification | Very Satisfied / Satisfied | Neither Satisfied nor Unsatisfied | Very Unsatisfied / Unsatisfied |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--|---------------------------------------|
| % Justice and Development Party (AKP) | 22 | 40 | 38 |
| % People’s Republican Party (CHP) | 44 | 35 | 21 |
| % Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) | 38 | 46 | 16 |
| % People’s Democratic Party (HDP) | 47 | 32 | 21 |

Turkish Media Outlets: Censored or Free?

Following the questions of perceived quality of media, we asked our respondents whether they think news media and the Internet are censored or free. When asked whether news media is censored or free in Turkey, more than half (53%) of all respondents rate Turkish news media as censored or very censored and only one in four (27%) rate news media as free. However, when party differences are taken into account, as shown in Table 11, AKP supporters demonstrate a stark contrast in their evaluation of the freedom of Turkish news media. While 33% of AKP supporters rate news media in Turkey as very censored or censored, this number goes up to 81% for CHP supporters. Likewise, unlike a plurality (43%) of AKP supporters who believe that news media is free or very free in Turkey, CHP, MHP and HDP supporters demonstrate significantly lower levels of belief in the free-

dom in Turkish news media (11%, 17% and 13% respectively).

TABLE 11: PERCEIVED NEWS MEDIA FREEDOM IN TURKEY BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION

| Party Identification | Very Censored / Censored | Neither Censored nor Free | Very Free / Free |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------|
| % Justice and Development Party (AKP) | 33 | 24 | 43 |
| % People's Republican Party (CHP) | 81 | 9 | 10 |
| % Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) | 70 | 13 | 76 |
| % People's Democratic Party (HDP) | 69 | 19 | 12 |

In comparison, fewer respondents rate the Internet as censored across party support and Internet use segments. However, similar to their evaluation of news media freedom, AKP supporters constitute the only group that gives high ratings to freedom on the web (46% claim that Internet is not censored in Turkey). Moreover, among Internet use segments, a majority of heavy users (61%) think that Internet is censored in comparison to 52% of light users.

TABLE 12: PERCEIVED INTERNET FREEDOM IN TURKEY BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION

| Party Identification | Very Censored / Censored | Neither Censored nor Free | Very Free / Free |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------|
| % Justice and Development Party (AKP) | 29 | 25 | 46 |
| % People's Republican Party (CHP) | 67 | 16 | 17 |
| % Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) | 56 | 19 | 25 |
| % People's Democratic Party (HDP) | 65 | 21 | 14 |

SUMMARY

In summary, the media consumption trends, level of selective exposure to polarized media channels, and polarized attitudes about the quality and openness of the Turkish media and Internet are very consistent with what Hallin and Mancini (2004) would term a polarized pluralist media system (see also Çarkoğlu, Baruh, Yıldırım, 2014). Television news dominates as the primary channel of political information, with over 50% of TV news viewers preferring partisan TV channels compared to non-partisan outlets. In contrast, regular newspaper readership is confined to educated and economic elites, representing an "elite to elite" horizontal channel of political communication rather than providing connective tissue between a mass readership and the political system. The partisanship of the TV and newspaper press is reflected in the polarized views of satisfaction with the mass media and opinions on the level of censorship the government exerts over the Turkish press.

In contrast, the level of Internet penetration in Turkey, while below most of Europe, is much higher than other countries in the Middle East/ North Africa region and provides an alternative source of information for audiences in Turkey. Furthermore, social media is highly penetrated among Internet users in Turkey with 88% of Internet users on Facebook, for example, making Turkey the 7th largest population of Facebook users in the world, with an estimated 36.5 million users. This alternative source of political information-seeking and expression is per-

ceived as relatively more open than the media system by Turkish audiences.

REFERENCES

- Çarkoğlu, A., Baruh, L., Yildirim, K. (2014). Press-party parallelism and polarization of news media during an election campaign: The case of the 2011 Turkish elections. *International Journal of Press/Politics*. 19(3) 295-317
- Corke, S., Finkel, A., Kramer, D. J., Robbins, C. A., & Schenkkan, N. (2014). Democracy in crisis: Corruption, media, and power in Turkey. Retrieved from: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/democracy-crisis-corruption-media-and-power-turkey>
- Freedom House (2015a) Freedom of the Press. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/reports>
- Freedom House (2015b) Freedom on the Net. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/reports>
- Hallin, D.C. & Mancini, P. (2004). *Comparing Media Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES

Erik C. Nisbet (Ph.D., Cornell University) is an associate professor of communication and political science at the Ohio State University. He is also a faculty associate at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and co-Principal Investigator of the Comparative National Election Project funded by Mershon. His research focuses upon the role of media in comparative democratization, public opinion, and political behavior.

Aysenur Dal (B.A., Bogazici University) is a doctoral candidate in the School of Communication at the Ohio State University. Her research interests are political expression via social media and pro-democratic mobilization in nondemocratic states.

Ali Çarkoğlu (Ph.D., SUNY-Binghamton) is a professor of international relations and the dean of the College of Administrative Sciences and Economics at Koç University in Istanbul, Turkey. His recent research focuses on voting behavior, party systems and political parties, and public opinion. He is co-author of the book *The Rising Tide of Conservatism in Turkey* (Pelgrave, 2009) examining the development and impact of conservatism in Turkish politics following the Cold War.

Q&A WITH CPD

Senem Cevik

Senem Cevik is assistant professor at Ankara University and Tobis Research Fellow at the University of California Irvine Center on Ethics and Morality. She is a fellow with the International Dialogue Initiative (IDI), and a CPD Contributing Scholar, where she is working with the Center on the Rising Soft Power in Emerging Markets initiative. Cevik, co-editor with Philip Seib of *Turkey's Public Diplomacy* (Palgrave Macmillan), spoke with CPD about the writing and editing process.



Why is your forthcoming book, *Turkey's Public Diplomacy*, crucial reading for students and practitioners of public diplomacy?

There is plenty of popular discussion on Turkey and soft power, however, there is not enough scholarly work on Turkey's public diplomacy practice, the motivations and tools to consolidate soft power. *Turkey's Public Diplomacy* aims to put Turkey's engagement across the globe and the Middle East into a broader perspective. We try to answer the question of what Turkey is doing, why, and how. This book provides an overall assessment of Turkey's public diplomacy practice, its prospects and challenges. Anyone with an interest in the Middle East and Turkey's regional role can benefit from the discussions in this book.

Why was this project meaningful to you on a personal level?

Turkey's Public Diplomacy is the first scholarly work on this subject, and I am honored to be the co-editor of this volume with Professor Philip Seib. I hope that with this project we can generate some domestic and international discussion on Turkey's public diplomacy and offer a roadmap for practitioners in Turkey. This book may also help generate academic interest in Turkey's public diplomacy practice.

If you could recommend one book on Turkey to non-Turkish readers, what would it be?

I don't think it's possible to grasp the complexities of Turkey in one single book, but there are a few books that I find very enlightening in assessing contemporary Turkish politics and nation branding. I would suggest *Another Empire?: A Decade of Turkey's Foreign Policy Under the Justice and Development Party* by Kerem Öktem, Mehmet Karlı and Ayşe Kadioğlu (Eds.); *After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live With the West* by Ayşe

Zarakol, *Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and Everyday Politics in Turkey* by Esra Özyürek. Also, *The Making of Modern Turkey* by Feroz Ahmad, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* by Bernard Lewis and *Turkey: A Modern History* by Erik J. Zürcher are classics that I find are excellent reference books.

What surprised you in the process of researching and editing your book?

Turkey's Public Diplomacy is a collaborative effort, which brings together discussions on Turkey's interest in different parts of the world. One of the biggest surprises for me was to discover the abundant potential Turkey has in improving its public diplomacy practice. I think the scholarly discussions laid out in this volume can open up discussion in PD practice as well.

What was the biggest challenge in editing your book?

There were two challenges in editing this volume. The first was the organizational issues and making sure that the chapters flow in regards to the coverage of their topics. However, having an exceptional mentor and co-editor like Professor Philip Seib helped me facilitate the process of bringing together authors from diverse academic backgrounds and perspectives. The second challenge was the changing political climate in the Middle East, and sudden shifts in Turkey's domestic and foreign policy issues. During the two years we worked on this project, there have been many important changes, which have been difficult to catch up with. Still, we covered many of these issues.

This interview first appeared September 2015 as part of our [Meet the Author](#) series.

VIEWPOINTS

The “Ethos Gap”: A Challenge or an Opportunity for Turkey’s Nation Brand?

By Senem Cevik

Public diplomacy scholars and practitioners frequently discuss the “say-do gap,” which refers to the discrepancy between discourse and actions. This discrepancy has an adverse effect on the credibility and legitimacy of a nation brand. A nation’s domestic political conduct and whether it can practice what it preaches are inherently correlated with its international

reputation. Hence, domestic political conduct is inevitably at the center of a nation’s brand.

The say-do gap can be exacerbated by a moralistic and values-oriented foreign policy discourse that contradicts a country’s domestic engagements. Such a deficiency can be termed an “ethos gap,” which underlines



[Photo](#) by Freedom House | CC BY 2.0

the disjuncture between stated values and the reality on the ground. Ethics, values, and morals-driven foreign policy undermines real-politik and puts a nation's domestic political actions in the limelight. Domestic political conduct is perhaps more meaningful in cases where the nation brand is based on an idealistic moral policy. An idealistic expectation is likely to undermine a realistic assessment of a nation brand. Hence, the discrepancy between the intended and the actual nation brand can send perplexing messages to foreign audiences.

Over the past few years, Turkey has been attempting to craft its nation brand on global humanitarian values. Key points in the Turkish foreign policy framework have been justice, equal representation rights, political inclusiveness, support for regional political demands, and global governance. Turkish policy makers have been positing Turkey as a values-driven nation in pursuit of global governance. Turkey's current position as the third biggest global humanitarian donor is reflective of its foreign aid initiatives. For example, over two million Syrians have found refuge in Turkey and hundreds of thousands are hosted in Turkish camps that have been praised by the UN. Turkish foreign policy makers have been vocal about providing foreign aid, which they frame as Turkey's historical duty and its self-proclaimed "manifest destiny," inspired by its Ottoman heritage. However, Turkey has fallen short of living up to its own discourse, most notably in the domestic realm (see below). As a result, the humanitarian element of Turkey's nation brand has been undermined by its idealistic discourse.

Turkey's ethos gap manifests itself in three areas. The first area is coherence in its values-based foreign policy discourse. Turkey's inconsistency in applying universal human rights, both domestic and international, is contradictory to Turkey's humanitarian discourse. While the Turkish response to the Palestinian plight has been informed by an Islamic point of view, it has failed to fully embrace the universal humanitarian aspect of the tragedy. Although Turkey has been a vocal promoter of peace and justice in Gaza and in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, its approach to Darfur has been far less critical or outspoken. This same inconsistency—perhaps stem-

ming from historic anxieties around partition—appeared in its initial hesitancy to engage with the Kurdish region in Syria during the siege of ISIL/DAESH. In addition, the limited expression of concern on similar domestic issues also contradicts the ethos-based nation brand crafting. Quite often, the plight of fellow Muslims in other parts of the world hold center stage in Turkish political discourse, while similar local issues are downplayed. A similar, ethical response towards domestic cases would consolidate Turkey's foreign policy discourse on conscience.

The second area of Turkey's ethos gap is in relation to the Kurdish question and the confrontations with Armenians and Alevis – longstanding conflicts inherited from the Ottoman Empire. These disputes influence Turkey's global reputation and challenge the vision of its highly idealistic values-driven foreign policy discourse. Recognizing the importance of seeking resolutions to these concerns, Ankara initiated the Kurdish reconciliation process two years ago.

Despite occasional setbacks, Turkey is dedicated to the peace process, with significant strides being made on the cultural and political front in regards to the Kurdish question. In addition, the Armenian opening was initiated with the persistent efforts of the AK Party government and is

based primarily on cultural heritage conservation, such as returning confiscated land and properties, support of minority institutions, and the renovation of churches. For the first time in 99 years, Turkey has participated in an official liturgy by the Istanbul Armenian Patriarchate.

Yet there is still an unaddressed ethical predicament facing Turkish-Armenian relations post-2015. Turkey's vocal position on Israel's crimes against Palestinians and liberal use of the word "genocide" to describe the degree of violence of Israeli operations against Gaza discredits the state's own approach vis-à-vis the Armenians. Similarly, Turkey's historical participation in oppressing its Alevi population in the Dersim, Tunceli, and Sivas atrocities and through the lingering discriminatory discourse in the political and social spheres constitute a fundamental societal question, which needs to be answered. The Sunni character of the state religious structure has long caused discontent amongst the Al-

Turkish foreign policy makers have been vocal about providing foreign aid, which they frame as Turkey's historical duty and its self-proclaimed "manifest destiny," inspired by its Ottoman heritage.

evi population. In attempts to bridge this gap, the AK Party administration has held meetings with various representatives of the Alevi community, but with minimal legislative progress or commitment. The socio-political prejudice against the Alevi population persists in Turkey and Turkish political rhetoric, all of which makes the government's position hard to manage and impossible for it to gain traction. Ultimately, deconstructing these key historical issues is vital in Turkey's search for a pluralistic society. Ironically, the ethos gap manifests itself not in what the state apparatus does, because it has improved its policy. It is, in fact, the rhetoric of what the political elite and/or bureaucrats say at times that discredits Turkey's progress.

The third area in relation to the ethos gap is the contemporary domestic limitations on human rights, freedoms, and the rule of law. Issues surrounding the interpretation of freedoms have negatively affected the national image of Turkey in the Western imagination and have raised concerns regarding its democratic credentials. The government's exercise of control over social and print media—such as the short-term Twitter bans—has also furthered these concerns. The Gezi Park protests, unsettled corruption allegations against the government, and charges against the Gülenist formation infiltrating into the state have prompted an increasingly polarizing political rhetoric. Prosecuting violence against women and hate speech have not improved Turkey's standing either. Mass discontent over interference in the lifestyle of Turkish citizens' choices has also contributed to a discrepancy between discourse and interpretation and implementation of basic human rights.

Turkey's domestic policy and foreign affairs are interrelated and are both heavily influenced by political rhetoric. The discrepancy between these yields an ethos gap, exemplified by a domestic political rhetoric which undermines policy through rhetoric that eschews the global in favor of the national. This gap sends mixed messages to global audiences in regards to Turkey's nation brand.

Recognition of the ethos gap and the adoption of a liberal democratic tradition will likely eliminate the gap's adverse effects and become an opportunity for Turkey to consolidate the ethos component of its nation brand. Narrowing the discrepancy between rhetoric and action rests on refining foreign policy. Further, narrowing the ethos gap will help facilitate Turkey's efforts in establishing itself as a niche actor in humanitarian diplomacy efforts. Traditionally, diplomatic efforts should be guided by the notion of practicing what one

preaches. In the Turkish context, it is more of a matter of preaching what it practices and furthering its practices to complement the humanitarian and ethical nation brand. Despite the challenges and opportunities posed by Turkey's ethos gap, global hypocrisy on moral and ethical issues undermines the ability for other nations to evaluate or judge Turkey on moral grounds. Nevertheless, it is up to Turkish policy makers to find a balance between an idealistic discourse and policy implementation in the process of nation branding.

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Senem Cevik is assistant professor at Ankara University and Tobis Research Fellow at the University of California Irvine Center on Ethics and Morality. Cevik is a fellow with the International Dialogue Initiative (IDI). As a CPD Contributing Scholar, Senem Cevik is working with the Center on the Rising Soft Power in Emerging Markets initiative.

This article was published in two installments in March and May 2015 as a [CPD blog](#).

Making the Geopolitical Connections: Turkey and China in Syria

By Shaun Riordan

The former British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan once commented that the most difficult thing about politics was “events, dear boy, events.” Events can be helpful or unhelpful coincidences for statesmen. No one would suggest that Russia was in any way related to the Paris attacks. Nevertheless it has played out well for Putin as Hollande has sought to involve Russia as a key member of the coalition against Islamic State. The Kiev government’s relationship to the attacks that cut off electrical supplies to the Crimea is more ambiguous. However, the Ukrainian government is increasingly concerned that Russia will leverage its role in Syria to secure a beneficial deal on the Ukraine. Stressing the costs of Russia’s occupation of the Crimea, and reminding the West of Russia’s nefarious role there, certainly suits Kiev’s purpose. Likewise, Turkey may not have shot down the Russian fighter for geopolitical purposes, but it will take advantage of the incident to put a spoke in any Western rapprochement

with Russia (and Iran) over Syria.

The West needs to engage seriously with Turkey. Turkey looks to be the major loser in any settlement of the Syrian (and Iraqi) crisis. Turkey’s major regional rival, Iran, will probably end its international isolation and gain influence. Turkey’s Syrian allies will be marginalized. Turkey’s declared enemy Assad may survive for a while, and at worst will enjoy a comfortable retirement. Most crucially the Kurds will secure a de facto if not de jure state. Erdogan is increasingly authoritarian and increasingly mistrustful of the West. Turkey, rejected by the EU, marginalized in the Middle East, with a failing economy and internal political instability, risks becoming another destabilizing factor in the Middle East. The West, and especially Europe, must pose the question “what does Turkey get out of the defeat of ISIS,” and find a convincing answer.



Photo by Norman B. Leventhal Map Center | CC BY 2.0

Ignoring Turkey's interests will be dangerous. Turkey no more wants a direct conflict with Russia than Russia wants one with Turkey. But Turkey does have a convenient proxy war at hand in the frozen conflict over Nagorno Karabakh. Azerbaijan has spent the last few years using its oil money to build up its military with a view to retaking Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia. But the collapse in oil prices has hit its economy and the window of opportunity for a successful military operation may be closing.

A Turkish-encouraged Azeri attack on the enclave would force Moscow to choose between Yerevan and Baku (so far Moscow has guaranteed Armenia's security while hedging its bets by selling weapons to Azerbaijan). For Turkey this could be a low risk option. But if Moscow is seen to support Christian Armenia against Muslim and Turkic Azerbaijan it could have serious implications for Moscow's position elsewhere in Central Asia, and the Middle East. At the very least, it would put serious strains on the Eurasian Economic Community. Nagorno Karabakh could be a conflict too many for Putin and the Russian military.

The Ukraine is less geopolitically challenging for the West than Turkey. There is little prospect of Russia returning the Crimea. This makes it all the more important to secure a good deal for the rump Ukraine, which guarantees not only its borders and security, but also its economic and financial stability. If Putin wants sanctions lifted, then he must still pay a price, in the form of guaranteed security for Ukraine and the other former Soviet Republics in Russia's Western Near-Abroad. Europe has its own leverage over Russia. It must not give the game away in exchange for Russian support against Islamic State.

China's role in the geopolitical nexus has been underestimated. Only Merkel invoked China to put pressure on Putin over the Ukraine. Otherwise the West, led by the Obama Administration, has seemed determined to drive Russia and China together into an anti-Western embrace. China's direct relevance in Syria may be limited. But it too has declared war on Islamic State after the decapitation of a Chinese hostage and has its own jihadist problems in Xinjiang.

If France is insistent on bringing Russia into an anti-

Islamic State coalition, it should bring in China as well. Partly as a means of bringing China ever more into the processes of global governance, and partly as another channel for applying pressure to Moscow. China may have a limited military role, but it could play a significant economic role in post-settlement reconstruction. If China wants to proclaim its standing as a world power, it is time it got its hands dirty in the Middle East.

Many of the problems in constructing an anti-Islamic State coalition arise from U.S. disengagement with the world. Like the British Empire before WWI, the U.S. is ambivalent about its superpower role. But this ambivalence generates a loss of confidence among allies and uncertainty among rivals.

Tensions increase as regional rivals seek to re-calibrate their security assumptions. In 1914 uncertainty about British intentions was a factor in the outbreak of WWI. In 2015 Obama's indecision has allowed Putin's irruption into Syria and may yet cede leadership of the anti-Islamic State coalition. This would have serious implications for the future of both NATO and the EU. The main lesson to be drawn from Macmillan's preoccupation with "events" is the need to be adaptable, but within the framework laid down by a coherent narrative that prevents the statesman being constantly blown-off course by events. In the U.S., such narrative frameworks are called Grand Strategy, which brings us back to the inability of the West any more to do strategy.

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Shaun Riordan is a British Senior Visiting Fellow of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ("Clingendael"), where he is a member of the Diplomatic Futures Group and heads the Business Diplomacy Project. He is also Principal Consultant with Aurora Partners. Prior to this, Shaun spent 16 years in the British Diplomatic Service with postings to New York, Beijing and Madrid as well as stints in the Counter-Terrorism and Balkans Departments of the Foreign Office.

This article first appeared December 2015 as a [CPD Blog](#).

The Rise of NGOs: Islamic Faith Diplomacy

By Senem Cevik

Non-government PD is an essential part of the new public diplomacy. The rise of Turkish relief NGOs is owed to increasing economic development, a flourishing democratic sphere, and growing foreign policy ambitions. Currently the most popular and active relief NGOs in Turkey have Islamic roots and are active in the country's policymaking and soft power.

BACKGROUND

The evolution of Turkish NGOs dates back to the early 1990s, a time when the military still had an overwhelming influence on politics. During that period, Turkey experienced political turmoil symbolizing a buildup of decades-long friction between Islamist and secularist groups. As a consequence, politics or parties with Islamic tendencies had minimal power in the state system, so they built grassroots organizations to establish political and economic power. The rise of relief NGOs in Turkey therefore corresponds with the containment of Islamic movements in the socio-political sphere and their re-emergence in contemporary

Turkish politics. Their prominence on the global scene today can be credited to Turkey's economic progress, foreign policy ambitions and to the rising demand from Muslim and non-Muslim communities in Africa who have felt that their resources have been exploited in the past by colonialists. This public perception and mistrust towards Western organizations has been providing a safe-haven for Turkish faith-based NGOs, underscoring the role religion plays in public diplomacy.



Photo by HH Humanitarian Relief Foundation | CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

FAITH-BASED BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS

First, I'd like to discuss the faith-based business organizations that have a stronghold in Turkey's proactive foreign policy before delving into the faith-based NGOs. Turkish NGOs that are actively involved in economic development and foreign policy predominantly have a conservative characteristic, but it would be an overstatement to call them Islamic. With the introduction of liberal economic policies in the mid 1980s and early 90s, and with the rise of the current AK Party government, NGOs have found a more fertile ground to expand their influence.

Business organizations, have almost been acting as diplomats improving bilateral economic, commercial, and social ties since the 90s. [MÜSiAD](#) (Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association) was established in 1990 to serve as a counter to the older establishment [TÜSiAD](#) (Turkish Industry and Business Association d. 1971). TÜSiAD represents the older, traditional secular Turkish establishment, while MÜSiAD represents a more Islamic conservative background, which is occasionally dubbed the 'Anatolian Tigers' or the rising economic powerhouse of conservative Anatolian capitalists. MÜSiAD now serves in 60 countries at 143 locations, many of these being in Africa and Asia. Another organization, [TUSKON](#) (Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists), having close ties to the Hizmet/Gülen movement, was established in 2005 and has four international offices with various business ventures in Africa. TÜSiAD's few international offices are mainly located in Europe and one in China.

Even the location of foreign offices of more recent business associations is an indication of how the new Turkish foreign policy and businesses are interrelated. Both MÜSiAD and TUSKON have played a key role in developing Turkey's economic and diplomatic ties with Africa. 'Anatolian Tigers' or the new bourgeoisie are influencing foreign policy by their economic engagement, becoming key denominators of Turkey's foreign policy. Hence, these NGOs are playing a central role in Turkish foreign policy, illustrating how a shift in domestic power can impact foreign policy.

It can be argued that the presence of business NGOs in the African continent and increasing trade volume have had a catalyzing effect on the expansion of the Turkish diplomatic corps in countries where Turkey previously had no representation. To illustrate, by 2013 the total number of embassies and consulates reached 35 and the total trade volume exceeded \$12 billion by the end of 2012. [1]

TURKEY'S FAITH-BASED NGOS: A NEW FOREIGN POLICY TOOL

Together with the AK Party's multilateral foreign policy approach, the faith-based NGOs have become one of the key players in shaping Turkish policies. NGOs have highlighted a new instrument in Turkey's foreign-policy toolkit, humanitarian aid and development assistance.

“One could argue that faith-based NGOs have found fertile ground to expand their power domestically as well as their activities internationally due to the convergence of Turkey's foreign policy ambitions and domestic shifts in the representation and re-emergence of Islam within the political sphere.”

Several of the most active NGOs in this category are [İHH](#), [Cansuyu](#), [Deniz Feneri](#), and [Kimse Yok Mu](#). These organizations are involved in offering emergency assistance and relief work domestically while also expanding their visibility on the global scene, predominantly in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Besides emergency relief, they provide the tools for self-sustainability such as agricultural projects, workshops for women, crafts and various other instruments to make a living that aims to diminish the dependency

on foreign assistance. Besides these long-term aid incentives, the faith based NGOs provide development aid such as building roads, water wells, hospitals and schools that create a more progressive infrastructure as well as building long-term relationships with those communities in need.

The work of these faith-based NGOs focuses on goodwill and charity, giving utmost importance to the notion of benevolence, a main tenet of Islam. It can therefore be argued that the NGOs build on the sacred trust inherent in benevolence, enhancing the social credibility of these organizations within Turkey and within host societies.

With the advantage of a narrative that slants towards a faith-based understanding of goodwill and benevo-

lence, these NGOs have become mobilizers of domestic civic engagement as well as one of Turkey's main PD actors.

Indeed, faith-based NGOs have dominated the civic engagement sphere particularly with the rise of the ruling AK Party, reflecting the drive for social inclusion amongst conservative circles. Their support base has expanded as has their sphere of global influence and market penetration, in harmony with Turkey's aim to become a global actor in humanitarian assistance and humanitarian diplomacy.

One could argue that faith-based NGOs have found fertile ground to expand their power domestically as well as their activities internationally due to the convergence of Turkey's foreign policy ambitions and domestic shifts in the representation and re-emergence of Islam within the political sphere. The support base for these NGOs indicates conservatism in businesses linked with MÜSIAD and TUSKON as well as devout Muslims, indicating a visible connection between conservative businesses, pious masses and humanitarian assistance. Hence, faith-based NGOs have become convenient tools of policy-making and strengthening the dimension of the active foreign policy.

The Human Rights and Aid Organization (IHH) which received global recognition with the Mavi Marmara

flotilla incident,^[11] is an example of the interaction between politics and faith-based NGOs. Ever since, faith-based organizations have been included in the decision-making process and in mediation efforts in conflict regions.

These NGOs have also demonstrated their impact on Turkey's foreign policy priorities in the case of Somalia, where faith-based NGOs rushed to help Somalians facing famine and disease at the height of the 2011 drought crisis. Shortly after the efforts of NGOs, the Turkish government also took steps towards recognizing the Somalian tragedy and gained the upper hand in doing so. As a result, Turkey got involved in peace-building efforts in the Somalian conflict.

As such, Turkey's humanitarian assistance has become part of its foreign policy toolkit and a way to draw global attention to humanitarian causes. While its faith-based NGOs can be categorized as faith driven organizations they do not cultivate a particular faith. The irrefutable connection between faith-based NGOs, conservative business and policy, calls into question whether these civic engagement initiatives can be entirely considered as non-government initiatives or faith-driven organizations that have the blessing of the policy makers.

The ultimate dilemma of NGOs and their connections with governments has always been a global issue and it



Photo by HH Humanitarian Relief Foundation | CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

remains the same for faith-based NGOs. Nonetheless, as supranational entities, Turkish faith-based NGOs have so far succeeded in not only providing a substantial amount of global assistance but also in harnessing a positive image in recipient countries, strengthening Turkey's soft power and serving as agents of public diplomacy.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Atli, A. (2011). Businessman and diplomats. *Insight Turkey*, 13 (1), 109-128.

Ezell, D. (2011) Enriching post-secular discourse in faith diplomacy, in Naomi Leight (Ed.), *Essays on Faith Diplomacy*, CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy, Paper 8, pp. 67-82.

Fidan, H. (2013). A work in progress: the new Turkish foreign policy. *Middle East Policy*, 20 (1), 91-96.

Haşimi, C. (2014). Turkey's Humanitarian Diplomacy and Development Cooperation. *Insight Turkey*. 16 (1), 127-145.

Seib, Philip (Ed.) (2013). *Religion and Public Diplomacy*. New York: Palgrave, pp. 1-7.

Şahin, M. (2010). Anadolu kaplanları Türkiye'yi Ortadoğu ve Afrika'da etkili kılıyor (Anatolian Tigers are Enforcing Turkey's Influence in the Middle East and Africa). *Ortadoğu Analiz*. 17 (2), 94-99. (In Turkish).

Ozkan, M. (2013). Turkey's religious and socio-political depth in Africa, Emerging Powers in Africa, LSE IDEAS Special Report 016, <http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR016/SR-016-Ozkan.pdf>

Zaharna, R.S. Battles to Bridges: *U.S. Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy After 9/11*, Chapter 6, pp. 115-136.

[i] Sorumluluk ve Vizyon: 2014 Yılına Giren Türk Dış Politikası, T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı SAM: Ankara, 2014, pp 13-14, <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/sorumlu-lukvevizyon-2014.pdf> (In Turkish)

[ii] The violent clash on the MV Mavi Marmara organized by the IHH between its passengers and the Israeli Defense Forces in May 2010.

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Senem Cevik is assistant professor at Ankara University and Tobis Research Fellow at the University of California Irvine Center on Ethics and Morality. Cevik is a fellow with the International Dialogue Initiative (IDI). As a CPD Contributing Scholar, Senem Cevik is working with the Center on the Rising Soft Power in Emerging Markets initiative.

This article first appeared in May 2014 as a [CPD Blog](#).

Turkey's Foreign Aid: Who is the Target Audience?

By Mehmet Evren Eken



[Photo](#) by Peter Dosek | CC BY 2.0

At a panel on Turkish soft power which took place at the 2015 International Studies Association conference, panel discussant James Pamment addressed Turkey's foreign aid policy, asking why a foreign aid receiver country would itself distribute large amounts of foreign aid? Is Turkey simply redistributing the foreign aid it receives, or is it aiding countries in need out of benevolence steeped in the Ottoman tradition? Further, as panel chair Philip Seib asked, why is Turkey seeking soft power at all, particularly through the distribution of aid? Is this longing for soft power something the government wants, or something citizens want?

One of the best answers to such a question can be framed through [Zarakol's](#) comparative study on the processes of 19th century empires' falls from power and grace in international politics. Countries like Turkey, Japan, and Russia, inheriting nation-state territorialities

while clinging to their imperial identities, become hypersensitive about their status in world politics. One might suggest they miss their "once upon a time in international politics, we were the ones calling the shots" narrative, and have a collective desire for revived global power and visibility.

In this regard, it can be argued that drawing upon such narrative sensitivities, a foreign policy asset can very easily be turned into a domestic policy tool in those countries; hence in Turkey, a positive national government image in international politics can impress Turkish society by tapping into its soft spots. In that sense, the question of why Turkey has a desire for soft power should focus on functionality and audience issues to understand the mastermind behind the Turkish soft power, or the lack thereof. Does Turkey desire soft power for its functionality in its grand strategy, or primarily for tapping into the collective soft spots of

Turkish society?

Certainly, apart from the debilitating last two years, Turkish soft power has risen and shined during the last decade and this international visibility is well received by the Turkish society. Despite the fame of Turkish soap operas, which are being aired in countries varying from Brazil to Greece, to Georgia and Libya, and several other tools producing attraction towards Turkey, the main reference of a changing Turkish foreign policy discourse has continued to be seen through foreign humanitarian aid campaigns. However, why does Turkish government have a certain predilection for humanitarian aid, while there are less costly cultural assets?

As the ruling party members do not approve and publicly criticize the contents of these nearly world-famous soap operas for being morally degenerate, the government had to find an alternative image supporting its publicly acclaimed conservative position. Therefore, humanitarian aid campaigns seemed more favorable and culturally appropriate.

Unlike the Turkish image conveyed in soap operas, humanitarian aid campaigns are fitting in nicely to the “independent, influential, well-respected, generous and benevolent” image the conservative government promised to its voters. As a result, Turkey preferred to devise humanitarian aid campaigns to boost its soft power and has continuously ranked among the top three [donor](#) countries in recent years.

By questioning whether Turkish soft power is meant to appease “domestic soft spots or international soft power aims,” I mean to suggest that one of the aims of the aid is not so much to improve international relationships as to improve domestic relations within the Turkish population. Much of the focus and media attention towards the aid seems to be domestically focused, rather than outward towards an international audience.

As a result, Turkey’s global humanitarian aid campaigns are continuously broadcast to domestic audiences, assuring them that their country will soon be a major power again. On the other hand, despite the high amount of aid the country gives, Turkey has not drawn enough attention to rise to international fame as a donor country.

A recent [article](#) which appeared in the *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, titled “Emerging donors: the promise and limits of bilateral and multilateral democracy promotion,” might shed light on this issue. The article was primarily about India, Brazil, and South Africa’s foreign aid, leaving out any discussion

of Turkey’s aid programs. Another article [appeared](#) in the same journal in 2012, with the authors referring to Turkey only in passing as one of the emergent donor countries along with South Korea, Mexico, Chile, and Venezuela. Although Turkey is not the only country increasing its humanitarian aid, it is crucial to question why international discussion of Turkey’s aid programs is minimal, while Turkey’s internal media continuously discusses the impacts and outcomes of its aid. Hence, one might ask, is the soft power boosting policy Turkey devised through its generous foreign aid worth the heavy financial cost to a country which is itself a recipient of foreign aid?

In the past few years, Turkey has taken upwards of two million Syrian refugees into the country and provided large quantities of aid to them as well. Aid to Syrian refugees has increased the overall humanitarian aid Turkey gives each year and this spending is seemingly aimed at increasing Turkey’s soft power internationally, and regionally with the Middle East. Often we in Turkey hear ideas from major media outlets about supporting the Middle East based on shared culture and religion, or a shared historical Ottoman legacy.

These questions are of particular importance while Turkey is experiencing some stagnation in the development of its diplomacy. Although critical in tone and perhaps reductive in its examples, this piece is meant to stimulate discussion around a critical question for Turkey’s future. If we want to make Turkey’s soft power more inclusive and attractive in the future at the international level, we must ask what the returns are from current attempts at increasing soft power.

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Mehmet Evren Eken is a doctoral candidate at Royal Holloway, University of London’s geography department. His research interests lie at the intersection of critical geopolitics, international relations theory, visual culture, public diplomacy, and affect studies.

This article first appeared in September 2015 as a [CPD Blog](#).

MULTIMEDIA

Turkey at Expo Milan

CPD traveled to [Milan's 2015 World Expo](#) to explore the convergence of soft power on this major world stage. Curated below are some images and a highlight video of the Turkish pavilion. You can experience World Expo Milan in 360° virtual reality [here](#).







CPD

USC Center on Public Diplomacy
at the Annenberg School

