



# Lessons Learned

From the

# Organized Crime

Narcotics (OCN)

# Trafficking Enforcement

# Program Model

MONOGRAPH

**BJA**

*Bureau of  
Justice Assistance*

**U.S. Department of Justice**  
**Office of Justice Programs**  
810 Seventh Street NW.  
Washington, DC 20531

**Janet Reno**  
*Attorney General*

**Raymond C. Fisher**  
*Associate Attorney General*

**Laurie Robinson**  
*Assistant Attorney General*

**Noël Brennan**  
*Deputy Assistant Attorney General*

**Nancy E. Gist**  
*Director, Bureau of Justice Assistance*

---

**Office of Justice Programs**  
**World Wide Web Home Page**  
<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov>

---

**Bureau of Justice Assistance**  
**World Wide Web Home Page**  
<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA>

---

For grant and funding information contact  
**U.S. Department of Justice Response Center**  
1-800-421-6770

---

This document was prepared by the Institute for Intergovernmental Research, under grant number 95-DD-BX-0088, awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

The Bureau of Justice Assistance is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.



**Lessons Learned From the  
Organized Crime Narcotics (OCN)  
Trafficking Enforcement Program  
Model**

# Contents

<b>Executive Summary</b> .....	vii
<b>Chapter 1 History of the OCN Program</b> .....	1
The Crime Problem .....	1
Program Development .....	1
Program Guidance .....	2
Application Process .....	2
<b>Chapter 2 Dynamics of the OCN Program</b> .....	5
Program Strategy .....	5
Operational Characteristics .....	6
Contract Administration and Funding Chronology .....	7
History of Project Funding .....	8
Funding Availability and the Projects .....	9
<b>Chapter 3 OCN and SIRM Projects</b> .....	11
Site Selection .....	11
Population and Geographic Coverage of the OCN and SIRM Project Sites .....	12
Program Implementation Experience .....	16
Project Descriptions .....	16
OCN Projects .....	17
SIRM Projects .....	25
OCN Gang Violence Enforcement Projects .....	26
OCN Program Operational Results .....	27
<b>Chapter 4 OCN Control Group</b> .....	31
Overview of the Control Group .....	31
Purpose .....	31
Members .....	32
Meetings .....	33
Interagency Agreements .....	34
Goals and Objectives .....	35

## **Contents (continued)**

<b>Chapter 5</b>	<b>OCN Program Investigations</b> .....	37
	Case Selection Criteria .....	37
	Case Planning and Monitoring .....	38
	Target Selection .....	38
	Multijurisdictional Task Force Effectiveness .....	40
	Role of Self-Evaluation in Program Improvements .....	41
	Conclusion .....	42
<b>Appendix A</b>	<b>Average Value of Narcotics and Assets Seized Per Project and Per Case</b> .....	43
<b>Appendix B</b>	<b>Interagency Agreement (Sample)</b> .....	45
<b>Appendix C</b>	<b>Recommended Model Objectives for OCN Project Self-Evaluation Capability</b> .....	47
<b>Appendix D</b>	<b>Case Plan (Sample)</b> .....	49
<b>Appendix E</b>	<b>A Law Enforcement Response to Complex Criminal Activity: Multijurisdictional Task Forces</b> .....	51
<b>Appendix F</b>	<b>Guideline</b> .....	63

# Exhibits

1 Project Funding ..... 9

2 Project Sites and Host Agencies ..... 13

3 Project Population and Geographic Information ..... 14

4 Total Number of Arrests and Cases—All Projects ..... 28

5 Total Value of Narcotics Seized—All Projects ..... 29

6 Total Value of Assets Seized—All Projects ..... 29

7 Average Value of Narcotics Seized Per Case ..... 43

8 Average Value of Narcotics Seized Per Project ..... 43

9 Average Value of Assets Seized Per Project ..... 44

10 Average Value of Assets Seized Per Case and  
Average Number of Arrests Per Case ..... 44

# Executive Summary

Despite longstanding efforts to overcome organized crime and narcotics trafficking, the enormous profits derived from these illicit activities make their control one of the greater challenges facing American law enforcement today. Developing effective cases against high-echelon narcotics trafficking criminal conspiracies requires the maximum utilization of investigative and prosecutive expertise, resources and capabilities, and often, innovative techniques. As major narcotics trafficking conspiracies increasingly span jurisdictional boundaries, the participation of multiple agencies and authorities to successfully investigate and prosecute offenders has become essential.

The Organized Crime Narcotics (OCN) Trafficking Enforcement Program was developed in late 1986 by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), U.S. Department of Justice, as a discretionary grant program to assist law enforcement agencies in effectively responding to multijurisdictional narcotics trafficking activities. The goal of the OCN Program was to enhance, through the shared management of resources and joint operational decisionmaking, the ability of local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies to remove specifically targeted major narcotics trafficking conspiracies and offenders through investigation, arrest, prosecution, and conviction.

The strategy of the OCN Program was twofold: to promote a multiagency enforcement response—including one or more prosecution authorities—targeted against major narcotics trafficking conspiracies operating across multiple jurisdictions and to establish a formal project mechanism whereby investigative and prosecutive resources could be allocated, focused, and managed on a shared basis against targeted offenses and offenders.

Critical to the success of the OCN Program was the project Control Group, a representative oversight body incorporating a shared management system to direct and administer project resources. The OCN Control Group was the mechanism within the OCN Program intended to prevent any single agency's enforcement goals from controlling or dominating project operations. Control Group member agencies were required to execute a written Interagency Agreement, setting forth the desire of the participants to work together on common problems and to contribute resources to the joint effort.

The majority of Control Groups comprised senior operations managers of agencies expected to be most actively involved in cases conducted by the project. By reason of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA's) designation as lead federal drug enforcement agency, the inclusion of DEA in the Control Group was initially mandatory for all OCN projects.

Recognizing the need for early prosecution involvement and planning in the OCN project cases, membership in the Control Group was also mandated for at least one prosecutor drawn from the federal, state, or local level.

The Control Group not only served as a policymaking board, but also was responsible for selecting cases to be investigated and prosecuted, allocating project resources, and providing continuous oversight of all project investigations. In addition to the formulation of project goals and objectives, a major function of the Control Group was to determine whether proposed cases merited OCN project designation and resource support. Each case presented for consideration to the Control Group was required to be incorporated into a written case plan with a budget. Each member of the Control Group had an equal vote on all decisions, and the decisions of the Control Group were required to be unanimous. Regularly held meetings of project control groups proved to be beneficial in maintaining the productivity and focus of the project.

The OCN project locations included sites in 22 states across the continental United States. The OCN Program was successfully implemented in a number of communities throughout the United States: metropolitan, suburban, as well as smaller urban and rural areas. In addition, the population and geographic area served by the project varied, sometimes greatly, between project sites. Some projects concentrated efforts on larger areas, such as an entire state or several counties, while other projects concentrated mainly in a specific metropolitan area.

OCN projects were responsible for 16,366 drug-related arrests and seizure of over \$1 billion worth of illegal narcotics, cash, and illegally derived assets. Collectively, the projects demonstrated that the multijurisdictional approach to law enforcement was beneficial by not only removing criminals and illegal substances from the streets, but creating strong, united law enforcement structures that can effectively eliminate the problems associated with large-scale criminal organizations.



# History of the OCN Program

## The Crime Problem

Despite longstanding efforts to overcome organized crime and narcotics trafficking, the enormous profits derived from these illicit activities make their control one of the greater challenges facing American law enforcement today. Developing effective cases against high-echelon narcotics trafficking criminal conspirators requires the maximum utilization of investigative and prosecutive expertise, resources, capabilities, and innovative techniques. Successful cases most often result when skilled local, state, and federal investigators and prosecutors pool their jurisdictions' resources, capabilities, and expertise in planned and coordinated enforcement actions.

Given the diffusion of responsibilities among local, state, and federal law enforcement authorities, the absence of investigative and prosecutive coordination works to the advantage of organized criminal groups. As major narcotics trafficking conspiracies increasingly span jurisdictional boundaries, the participation of multiple agencies and authorities to successfully investigate and prosecute offenders has become essential.

Too often, individual law enforcement agencies lack the expertise and resources to assemble, process, and exchange intelligence about organized criminal activities. They also typically possess only a part of the legal authority necessary for a unified response to organized criminal activities which transcend jurisdictional boundaries. Consequently, the response of the law enforcement community to multijurisdictional offenders may be fragmented, duplicative, limited, or even counterproductive.

## Program Development

The Organized Crime Narcotics (OCN) Trafficking Enforcement Program was developed in late 1986 by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), as a discretionary grant program to assist law enforcement agencies in effectively responding to multijurisdictional narcotics trafficking activities.

At the time of conception, the goal of the OCN Program was to enhance, through the shared management of resources and joint operational decisionmaking, the ability of local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies to remove specifically targeted major narcotics trafficking conspiracies and offenders through investigation, arrest, prosecution, and conviction. In recent years, the Program goal has been expanded to include enforcement efforts directed at violent gangs and their criminal activities.

**Successful cases . . . result when . . . local, state, and federal investigators and prosecutors pool their resources, capabilities, and expertise in . . . coordinated enforcement actions.**

The OCN Program was rooted in previous multijurisdictional efforts such as the Joint Organized Crime Investigations Project in Dade County, Florida; the New England Organized Crime Strike Force; the multi-state Leviticus coal fraud project; and the DOJ Organized Crime and Racketeering Strike Forces. These pioneer efforts demonstrated the success of multi-agency investigations and prosecutions and the benefits of sharing intelligence, resources, and management decisionmaking.

In 1991, the OCN Program was expanded to include the Statewide Integrated Resources Model (SIRM) projects and, in 1995, the OCN Gang Violence Enforcement projects.

## **Program Guidance**

Program management and support, as well as other advice and assistance, were provided to OCN projects by BJA and policy guidance was given by the Office of Justice Programs (OJP), by means of a program guideline entitled "Funding and Administration of the Organized Crime Narcotics Trafficking Enforcement Program" (see Appendix F).

At the initiation of the Program, the Institute for Intergovernmental Research (IIR) was the recipient of a funding award from BJA and, at the direction of BJA, executed contracts with each project's host agency for the accomplishment of OCN Program operational objectives. In addition to contract administration, IIR provided technical assistance, operational performance assessment, and training services to the projects. IIR worked with the projects in developing measurable objectives, assisted in the development of ongoing project self-evaluation capabilities, collected and analyzed project activity and operational information, and reported to BJA on the status and development of the projects. After the OCN projects began receiving grant awards directly from BJA in July 1990, IIR continued its remaining technical assistance roles to the OCN projects.

## **Application Process**

In October 1986, BJA awarded a grant to IIR to assist in the implementation of up to 10 OCN Program project sites. Following publication of the BJA discretionary grant program funding announcement describing the OCN Program, the application process began. Initially, interested agencies submitted a preliminary application and related documents to IIR, which then made site selection recommendations to BJA.

The preliminary application required the following descriptive information:

- ❑ The multijurisdictional narcotics enforcement problems and needs to be addressed by the proposed project;

- ❑ The goals and objectives to be achieved, along with milestones and major achievements to be accomplished;
- ❑ Proposed project operations, including the administrative decisionmaking processes; and
- ❑ A list of participating agencies, including the resources to be contributed by each and their anticipated role in the project.

In addition to the standard certifications required in all applications for BJA funding, prospective OCN applicants were required to submit an interagency agreement signed by each of its Control Group members (a board of project representatives with equal decisionmaking and resource allocating authority).

# Dynamics of the OCN Program

## Program Strategy

The strategy of the Organized Crime Narcotics (OCN) Program was twofold:

- ❑ To promote a multi-agency enforcement response—including one or more prosecution authorities—targeted against major narcotics trafficking conspiracies operating across multiple jurisdictions; and
- ❑ To establish a formal, project mechanism whereby investigative and prosecution resources could be allocated, focused, and managed on a shared basis against targeted offenses and offenders.

Critical to the success of the OCN Program was the project Control Group, a representative oversight body incorporating a shared management system to direct and administer project resources. Overall project direction was shared equally by Control Group agencies and all decisions regarding project operations and administration were required to be unanimous. This accomplished several purposes. First, criteria to identify, select, and prioritize investigative targets were mutually established by the Control Group. Cases were then assigned for investigation and subsequent prosecution only upon unanimous agreement. The resources and skills required in the investigative and prosecution process were identified, acquired, and assigned by the Control Group throughout the duration of the case in accordance with an approved, written plan. Finally, OCN Control Groups coordinated and monitored cases to ensure proper timing of investigative and prosecution activities, as well as decisionmaking relating to case continuance, referral, redirection, and closure.

Beginning in 1991, the Statewide Integrated Resources Model (SIRM) was funded as a variation of the OCN concept. The SIRM projects adopted the same processes that the initial OCN projects did but also added a state regulatory agency as part of the joint decisionmaking mechanism embodied in the Control Group. With SIRM, in addition to criminal penalties and forfeitures, criminal conspirators faced administrative sanctions such as revocation of business licenses and corporate charters.

In 1992, the OCN concept was channeled into “New Directions” with investigations concentrated in the following areas:

- ❑ Organized gangs trafficking in drugs above the street level;
- ❑ Drug-related homicides and other *violent* criminal activities;
- ❑ Identification and removal of the financial incentives to drug trafficking organizations;
- ❑ Inclusion of regulatory agencies in the OCN projects at the local or regional level; and

**Critical to the success of the OCN Program was the project Control Group, a representative oversight body incorporating a shared management system to direct and administer project resources.**

**With SIRM, in addition to criminal penalties and forfeitures, criminal conspirators faced administrative sanctions such as revocation of business licenses and corporate charters.**

- ❑ Demonstration of the OCN Program concept in the rural areas of a state.

Initially, the OCN Program New Directions enforcement strategy was optional. However, beginning in 1993, all of the OCN projects were required to adopt at least one of the New Directions strategies as part of their project's focus.

With the emergence of violent gang criminal activities, the OCN Program expanded in 1995 to include two Gang Violence Enforcement projects. Both projects developed case selection criteria to target the most violent gangs within the project area and supported enforcement actions to disrupt illegal gang activity with the ultimate goal of dismantling the gang. While all the other OCN projects ended, the Gang Violence Enforcement projects continued to be funded.

## **Operational Characteristics**

The OCN Program Guideline prescribed the following types of project operational activities and requirements:

- ❑ Unanimous consent of a Control Group was required to initiate and continue funding of a project investigation;
- ❑ Control Groups selected one participant on each approved case as the "lead" agency which then was responsible to the Control Group for operational management;
- ❑ Lead agencies could be changed by the Control Group if deemed in the best interest of the case;
- ❑ Control Group oversight continued from the time of case selection through prosecutor disposition;
- ❑ Proceedings of the Control Group were documented in regularly scheduled meetings;
- ❑ Each project was required to provide formal procedures and processes governing the conduct of project activities including target selection, allocation of resources, investigative and prosecution plans, and case selection;
- ❑ All project enforcement operations were required to be based upon formal investigative/prosecution plans setting forth case objectives, resources required, specific enforcement activities to be taken, agencies involved, and a prosecution strategy;
- ❑ State or local and federal agency participation in each project case was mandatory;
- ❑ Each project case, with the exception of the two Gang Violence Enforcement projects, was required to be fully coordinated with the

U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and U.S. Department of Justice Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF);

- ❑ SIRM project cases were required to include a regulatory agency;
- ❑ Projects were required to conduct coordinated investigation and prosecution of selected targets in a timely and thorough manner; and
- ❑ OCN project funds were available to support project cases for such investigative purposes as vehicle rental, surveillance costs, and purchase of supplies, evidence, and information.

## Contract Administration and Funding Chronology

Beginning in January 1987, following Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) approval, Institute for Intergovernmental Research (IIR) executed contracts with eight successful applicant agencies for OCN Program Basic awards. In August 1987, IIR entered into a cooperative agreement with BJA to enhance and expand the OCN Program. Subsequently, the contracts of four of the initial projects were modified to add Operational Support (overtime funds) and Financial Investigations components. In December 1987, funding for the OCN Program was increased to allow 13 new OCN projects. Twelve of these sites received Basic awards, 10 of the 13 received additional Operational Support funding awards, and 6 also received Financial Investigations component awards. This brought the total number of OCN projects to 21.

**By December 1987, there were 21 OCN projects.**

The contract with one of the original eight projects terminated in March 1988, and was not renewed. In January 1989, BJA extended the IIR cooperative agreement for OCN through July 1989 which, in turn, allowed for renewal and extension of project contracts. As their enforcement operations continued, several projects requested and received Addition to Basic awards, the first was awarded in January 1988 and the last in August 1989.

In early 1989, as a result of the success of the OCN Program's Financial Investigations components, BJA created a separate discretionary grant funding program entitled the Financial Investigations (Finvest) Program. The OCN projects which already had Financial Investigations components were encouraged to apply to BJA for direct awards in the Finvest Program. In March 1989, the first OCN project received a Finvest award, and by September, five more had transitioned into the Finvest Program. There were insufficient funds at that time, however, for all OCN projects to transfer their Financial Investigations components to the Finvest Program.

In August 1989, the BJA Program Office, in anticipation of making direct awards to OCN sites (instead of IIR contracting with projects), extended IIR's cooperative agreement as amended through June 1990. IIR contracts with the OCN projects were terminated and funds were adjusted and redistributed.

BJA began making direct awards to OCN projects effective July 1990, for an initial 12-month period. Three of the original OCN projects completed their participation in the Program at that time. Continuation funding was subsequently provided for the remaining active OCN projects and BJA then announced funding availability for new OCN projects on a competitive basis. Applications were considered by a peer review panel selected by BJA, and in October 1990 four new OCN projects were funded. Funding for two of the aforementioned SIRM projects began in October 1991. In 1995, the two OCN projects that focused on violent gang crime received OCN funding.

In May 1990, IIR's cooperative agreement was extended through May 31, 1991, providing for continued IIR technical assistance and training support to the OCN Program. At the conclusion of that grant period, BJA then approved a grant adjustment that extended IIR's cooperative agreement through June 30, 1992. BJA also reallocated funds for the development and implementation of the OCN Program Center for Task Force Training (CenTF). Subsequent awards and continuation by BJA extended IIR's technical assistance cooperative agreement into 1996.

## History of Project Funding

Over the lifespan of the OCN Program, funding methods changed to coincide with changes in Program focus. Initially, the OCN Program awarded a Basic component. Basic component funding was limited to the reimbursement of specified investigative expenses; but not for purposes such as investigator or prosecutor salaries, fringe benefits, equipment, or facilities construction. The Addition to Basic award supplemented the Basic award and was for the same purposes. Essentially, successful OCN Program implementation, the level of Basic award investigative activity, and effective expenditure of the project's funds were the criteria upon which supplemental or Addition to Basic funding awards were made. One major change in the OCN Program was the inclusion of overtime funds. Once OCN projects became operational, a high-priority need developed to provide for personnel overtime costs on a case-by-case basis. The only alternatives to overtime funds were to cease new case activity or utilize less experienced personnel. Thus, the "Operational Support" component became part of the Program and established criteria for payment of overtime monies, but only on a case-by-case basis and only for personnel working on OCN project investigations and prosecutions.

Lastly, the Finvest component of the OCN Program was created to support OCN project financial investigations of narcotics traffickers and their illicit organizations. The Finvest component was designed to increase the number of narcotics-related financial crime investigations and prosecutions as well as to develop a proactive approach to tracing narcotics-related

**Over the lifespan of the OCN Program, funding methods changed to coincide with changes in Program focus.**

financial transactions, analysis of the movement of currency, and identification of criminal financial structures and money laundering schemes.

## Funding Availability and the Projects

There is a general consensus among the projects that the OCN funding provided them with the only means to conduct investigations into complex criminal activities that may have otherwise gone undetected. In addition, the funding allowed for much needed training conferences to be conducted. The training was critical to the success of the OCN Program in that the conferences enabled representatives from each project to be provided with relevant training as well as the ability to network with other project representatives.

Exhibit 1 provides information related to the amount of funding received and the timeframe of each project that participated in the OCN Program.

**There is a general consensus among the projects that the OCN funding provided them with the only means to conduct investigations into complex criminal activities that may have otherwise gone undetected.**

**Exhibit 1 Project Funding**

Project	Award Date	Closing Date	Cumulative Award Amount
<b>OCN Projects</b>			
Arizona Department of Public Safety	12/1/87	9/30/93	\$859,000
Broward County, Florida, Sheriff's Office	3/1/87	9/30/93	\$1,167,880
Colorado Department of Public Safety	4/13/87	6/30/90	\$227,000
City of Conyers, Georgia	10/1/90	12/31/93	\$146,550
Dallas County, Texas, Sheriff's Department	12/1/87	9/30/93	\$785,000
Florida Department of Law Enforcement	2/10/87	3/31/88	\$170,000
Georgia Bureau of Investigation	12/1/87	7/31/89	\$349,556
Harrison County, Mississippi, Sheriff's Department	2/16/87	6/30/90	\$115,000
Jefferson County, Kentucky, Police Department/ Louisville Division of Police	10/1/90	12/31/95	\$554,000
Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department	2/4/87	3/31/94	\$797,650
Las Vegas, Nevada, Metropolitan Police Department	12/1/87	12/31/93	\$600,971
Louisiana State Police	12/1/87	6/30/90	\$140,000



**Exhibit 1 Project Funding  
(continued)**

<b>Project</b>	<b>Award Date</b>	<b>Closing Date</b>	<b>Cumulative Award Amount</b>
Maine Department of Public Safety	12/1/87	12/31/95	\$769,000
Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services	10/1/90	12/31/95	\$406,892
Multnomah County, Oregon, District Attorney's Office	1/25/87	9/30/93	\$997,143
Nebraska Commission on Law Enforcement/Omaha, Nebraska, Police Department	10/1/90	12/31/95	\$471,721
New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety	12/1/87	6/30/90	\$275,409
New Mexico Department of Public Safety	12/1/87	1/31/96	\$583,000
New York County, New York, District Attorney's Office	12/1/87	9/30/93	\$1,014,000
Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation	12/1/87	9/30/93	\$449,000
Oklahoma State Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Control	2/2/87	7/31/89	\$170,000
Pima County, Arizona, Sheriff's Department	12/1/87	3/31/96	\$824,000
Riverside, California, Police Department	12/1/87	9/30/95	\$1,113,883
Suffolk County, Massachusetts, District Attorney's Office	12/1/87	6/30/94	\$689,000
Utah Department of Public Safety	3/12/87	12/31/95	\$784,000
<b>SIRM Projects</b>			
Arizona Attorney General's Office	10/1/91	12/31/95	\$587,500
Florida Department of Law Enforcement	10/1/91	6/30/95	\$500,000
<b>Gang Violence Enforcement Projects</b>			
Bernalillo County, New Mexico, District Attorney's Office	10/1/95	ongoing	\$375,000
Multnomah County, Oregon, District Attorney's Office	10/1/95	ongoing	\$475,000

# OCN and SIRM Projects

## Site Selection

Once a proposed site's application for Organized Crime Narcotics (OCN) funding received preliminary approval by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), the Institute for Intergovernmental Research (IIR) staff typically conducted a site visit and gathered additional information to assist the process of final selection and approval by BJA.

BJA used the following criteria to select OCN sites:

- The nature and magnitude of conspiratorial drug crimes in relation to the multijurisdictional geographic area being considered;
- Willingness to implement OCN Program concepts;
- Experience with coordinated approaches to crime problems;
- Potential for effective multi-agency management and direction of investigations and prosecutions;
- Capacity and experience of the participating agencies to conduct a complete and coordinated project; and
- Anticipated impact of the project on the crime problem.

## Project Locations and Host Agencies

The OCN project locations included sites in 22 states across the continental United States (see exhibit 2).

Although the OCN Program involved multi-agency participation, a single state or local law enforcement agency applied for the federal program funding and then administratively served as the project grantee. The agencies which served as applicant/host agencies were:

- Arizona Attorney General's Office\*
- Arizona Department of Public Safety
- Bernalillo County, New Mexico, District Attorney's Office\*\*
- Broward County, Florida, Sheriff's Office
- Colorado Department of Public Safety
- City of Conyers, Georgia

---

\* These agencies hosted Statewide Integrated Resources Model (SIRM) OCN projects.

\*\* These agencies hosted OCN Gang Violence Enforcement projects.

- Dallas County, Texas, Sheriff's Department
- Florida Department of Law Enforcement \*
- Georgia Bureau of Investigation
- Harrison County, Mississippi, Sheriff's Department
- Jefferson County, Kentucky, Police Department/Louisville Division of Police
- Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department
- Las Vegas, Nevada, Metropolitan Police Department
- Louisiana State Police
- Maine Department of Public Safety
- Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services
- Multnomah County, Oregon, District Attorney's Office\*\*
- Nebraska Commission on Law Enforcement/Omaha, Nebraska, Police Department
- New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety
- New Mexico Department of Public Safety
- New York County, New York, District Attorney's Office
- Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation
- Oklahoma State Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Control
- Pima County, Arizona, Sheriff's Department
- Riverside, California, Police Department
- Suffolk County, Massachusetts, District Attorney's Office
- Utah Department of Public Safety

## **Population and Geographic Coverage of the OCN and SIRM Project Sites**

The OCN Program was successfully implemented in a number of communities throughout the United States: metropolitan, suburban, as well as smaller urban and rural areas. In addition, the population and geographic area served by the project area varied, sometimes greatly, between project sites. Some projects concentrated efforts on larger areas, such as an entire state or several counties, while other projects concentrated mainly in a specific metropolitan area.

Exhibit 2 Project Sites and Host Agencies




Exhibit 3 demonstrates the great differences in population size and geographic area of coverage between projects participating in the OCN Program.

As shown in the exhibit, the OCN Program operated in jurisdictions containing approximately 67 million persons. This population figure only takes into account the population areas that the projects targeted in their OCN applications. During the lifespan of a project, however, it was not unusual for OCN investigations to extend beyond the targeted population areas. As a result, an even greater portion of the U.S. population was served and benefited through the OCN Program.

The OCN Program was just as effective in a large population center in the West as in a rural area in the Northeast. Whether a small or large

**Exhibit 3 Project Population and Geographic Information**

<b>Project</b>	<b>Host City/ Headquarters</b>	<b>Project Area Served</b>	<b>Population of Project Area</b>
<b>OCN Projects</b>			
Arizona Department of Public Safety	Phoenix, Arizona	Arizona	3,700,000
Broward County, Florida, Sheriff's Office	Ft. Lauderdale, Florida	Broward County, Florida	1,300,000
Colorado Department of Public Safety	Denver, Colorado	Colorado	3,300,000
City of Conyers, Georgia	Conyers, Georgia	12 Surrounding Counties & Cities, Including Atlanta	1,600,000
Dallas County, Texas, Sheriff's Department	Dallas, Texas	Dallas County, Texas	1,900,000
Florida Department of Law Enforcement	Tallahassee, Florida	Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina	27,000,000
Georgia Bureau of Investigation	Atlanta, Georgia	Georgia	6,500,000
Harrison County, Mississippi, Sheriff's Department	Gulfport, Mississippi	Harrison County, Mississippi	170,000
Jefferson County, Kentucky, Police Department/Louisville Division of Police	Louisville, Kentucky	Jefferson County, Kentucky	670,000
Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department	Kansas City, Missouri	Kansas City Metropolitan Area	1,600,000
Las Vegas, Nevada, Metropolitan Police Department	Las Vegas, Nevada	Clark County, Nevada	740,000
Louisiana State Police	Baton Rouge, Louisiana	Four Louisiana Cities & Seven Texas Cities	2,400,000

**Exhibit 3 Project Population and Geographic Information  
(continued)**

<b>Project</b>	<b>Host City/ Headquarters</b>	<b>Project Area Served</b>	<b>Population of Project Area</b>
Maine Department of Public Safety	Portland, Maine	Maine	1,200,000
Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services	Columbia, Maryland	Maryland	4,800,000
Multnomah County, Oregon, District Attorney's Office	Portland, Oregon	Four Portland-Area Counties	1,200,000
Nebraska Commission on Law Enforcement/Omaha, Nebraska, Police Department	Omaha, Nebraska	Four Omaha-Area Counties	520,000
New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety	Trenton, New Jersey	New Jersey	7,700,000
New Mexico Department of Public Safety	Santa Fe, New Mexico	New Mexico	1,500,000
New York County, New York, District Attorney's Office	New York City, New York	New York County, New York	1,500,000
Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation	Columbus, Ohio	Montgomery County, Ohio	570,000
Oklahoma State Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Control	Oklahoma City, Oklahoma	Oklahoma	3,100,000
Pima County, Arizona, Sheriff's Department	Tucson, Arizona	Pima County, Arizona	670,000
Riverside, California, Police Department	Riverside, California	Riverside County, California	1,200,000
Suffolk County, Massachusetts, District Attorney's Office	Boston, Massachusetts	Suffolk County, Massachusetts	660,000
Utah Department of Public Safety	Salt Lake City, Utah	Utah	1,700,000
<b>SIRM Projects</b>			
Arizona Attorney General's Office	Phoenix, Arizona	Arizona	3,700,000
Florida Department of Law Enforcement	Tallahassee, Florida	Florida	13,000,000
<b>Gang Violence Enforcement Projects</b>			
Bernalillo County, New Mexico, District Attorney's Office	Albuquerque, New Mexico	Albuquerque, New Mexico	590,000
Multnomah County, Oregon, District Attorney's Office	Portland, Oregon	Multomah County, Oregon	580,000

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 1990 statistics (figures have been rounded).

metropolitan area, OCN project performance proved that the OCN Program had a positive impact on the targeted criminal activities.

## **Program Implementation Experience**

The OCN Program demonstrated that shared management oversight of drug investigations and prosecutions involving local, state, and federal agencies can be operationally effective, efficient, and successful. The cumulative OCN project operational results and outcomes presented in this monograph are of significance, but perhaps even more important are the many strong interagency police and prosecutor relationships which were formed, for they often occurred in areas that have not traditionally supported these type of relationships.

The successful implementation of projects within the OCN Program resulted in a variety of other positive outcomes including:

- ❑ Equal sharing in the coordination and direction of personnel, financial, equipment, and technical resources necessary for the successful investigation and prosecution of targeted conspirators;
- ❑ Increased capability by state and local agencies in directing the investigation and prosecution of major multijurisdictional narcotics traffickers;
- ❑ Increased use of civil remedies and recovery of criminal assets acquired with funds traceable to criminal activity;
- ❑ The reduction of fractional and duplicative investigations and prosecutions by OCN projects;
- ❑ The use of revocation of business licenses, corporate charters, and other certifications possessed by criminal enterprises (SIRM projects) as valuable enforcement tools; and
- ❑ The finding that OCN Program concepts are equally effective in dismantling a violent gang (OCN Gang Violence Enforcement projects) as in narcotics trafficking.

## **Project Descriptions**

Following are summary descriptions of the OCN projects including the SIRM projects and the OCN Gang Violence Enforcement projects. Each summary briefly describes the project goals, target areas, date of activity, and Control Group member agencies.

## OCN Projects

### **Arizona Department of Public Safety (December 1, 1987–September 30, 1993)**

This OCN project, hosted by the Arizona Department of Public Safety, focused on illegal importation of narcotics from Mexico into Arizona and other border states. Also targeted was the detection and destruction of illicit drug laboratories. The project later expanded investigations to include the interdiction of highway transportation of large quantities of cocaine and other drugs through and into Arizona. The project's Financial Investigations component successfully identified and seized assets associated with illegal narcotics activity.

In addition to the Arizona Department of Public Safety, other Control Group member agencies included the U.S. Attorney's Office, the U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.

### **Broward County, Florida, Sheriff's Office (March 1, 1987–September 30, 1993)**

Since inception of the project, the Broward County Sheriff's Office, as applicant agency, worked with the Florida Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, the U.S. Attorney's Office, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. One original member of the project, the Pompano Beach Police Department, subsequently withdrew from the Control Group.

The project's original goals included development of a coordinated multi-agency law enforcement/prosecution effort against major organized crime and narcotics conspiracies. With the addition of a Financial Investigations component, the project also successfully seized assets of major narcotics traffickers gained through illegal drug activity.

### **Colorado Department of Public Safety (April 13, 1987–June 30, 1990)**

This OCN project's operations involved the detection and disruption of major narcotics offenders and their associates who utilized general aviation aircraft as the principal mode of illegal distribution into and out of Colorado.

Along with the applicant agency—the Colorado Department of Public Safety, Bureau of Investigation—the project included the following participants: the Alamosa County Sheriff's Department, the Colorado Attorney General's Office, the Colorado District Attorney's Council, the U.S. Attorney's Office, the U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.



**City of Conyers, Georgia  
(October 1, 1990–December 31, 1993)**

Initially, the principal objective of this project was to disrupt the illegal activities of mid- to upper-level narcotics dealers by coordinating multi-agency resources in its enforcement activities. As the project period progressed, project goals were added to include investigations which also targeted methamphetamine laboratories.

Original Control Group members consisted of the Conyers Police Department, the Covington Police Department, the Rockdale County District Attorney's Office, the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. The Newton County District Attorney's Office joined the Control Group after the inception of the project.

**Dallas County, Texas, Sheriff's Department  
(December 1, 1987–September 30, 1993)**

This OCN project involved the Dallas County Sheriff's Department, the applicant agency, the Dallas County District Attorney's Office, the Dallas Police Department, the Fort Worth Police Department, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. The Fort Worth Police Department subsequently withdrew from the Control Group and was replaced by the Duncanville Police Department.

The project goal was to decrease the flow of illegal drugs into and through the Dallas/Fort Worth area by targeting, investigating, and prosecuting individuals and organizations involved in high-level narcotics distribution.

**Florida Department of Law Enforcement  
(February 10, 1987–March 31, 1988)**

This OCN project joined the applicant agency—the Florida Department of Law Enforcement—with the Alabama Bureau of Investigation, the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division, the U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.

The project utilized the short-range radar detection capabilities of National Guard units from the participating states and the investigative capabilities of the participating law enforcement agencies to detect and intercept airborne smuggling operations along the coast of the Southeastern United States.

**Georgia Bureau of Investigation  
(December 1, 1987–July 31, 1989)**

From its inception, this OCN project focused exclusively on narcotics-related financial investigations. In addition to the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, the Georgia Attorney General's Office and the U.S. Drug

Enforcement Administration were participants. Together they sought to fill a void in state efforts to seize assets of major drug traffickers and to provide information to federal agencies for asset seizure where state law did not apply.

### **Harrison County, Mississippi, Sheriff's Department (February 16, 1987–June 30, 1990)**

The Harrison County Sheriff's Department, the applicant agency, along with the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, sought to develop a unified enforcement and prosecution strategy to maximize criminal and civil remedies against targeted offenders along the Mississippi Gulf Coast. This strategy was intended to reduce the availability of illicit drugs and the number of drug-related crimes.

### **Jefferson County, Kentucky, Police Department/ Louisville Division of Police (October 1, 1990–December 31, 1995)**

The Jefferson County Police Department, the Louisville Division of Police, the Jefferson County Commonwealth Attorney's Office, the Kentucky State Police, the St. Matthews Police Department, the Jeffersonton Police Department, the Shively Police Department, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration made a joint effort to target mid- to high-level narcotics dealers.

The primary goal of this project was to eliminate cocaine and methamphetamine trafficking operations. Also targeted was the detection and destruction of heroin and opiate traffickers. The New Directions strategy of the project was designed to identify and remove the financial incentives of drug trafficking organizations through asset seizure and forfeiture.

### **Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department (February 4, 1987–March 31, 1994)**

Originally stating that it wished to identify and document the organization and leadership of area crack cocaine distributors, this OCN project later expanded its objective to include financial investigations of drug trafficking conspiracies. As a New Directions approach to the investigations, the project targeted high-level dealers who supplied narcotics to organized gangs.

The applicant agency, the Kansas City Police Department, worked with the following participating agencies: the U.S. Customs Service; the Jackson County Drug Task Force; the U.S. Attorney's Office; the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration; and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

### **Las Vegas, Nevada, Metropolitan Police Department (December 1, 1987–December 31, 1993)**

The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, the applicant agency, along with the Clark County District Attorney, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, and the U.S. Attorney's Office, combined resources to investigate, prosecute, and convict major narcotics traffickers.

The OCN project's Financial Investigations component was funded to focus on financial intermediaries, to trace drug money through gambling casinos, and to use Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO), Continuing Criminal Enterprise, and money laundering statutes to seize assets.

This project's initial plan targeted the organizational components that allowed the drug trade to thrive and focused on known traffickers and legitimate businesses suspected of money laundering. The project later included as targets for enforcement emerging criminal groups that distribute cocaine.

### **Louisiana State Police (December 1, 1987–June 30, 1990)**

The Louisiana State Police, Texas Department of Public Safety, U.S. Attorney's Office, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration served as the Control Group for this OCN project. The project targeted the manufacture and distribution of methamphetamine in the Sabine Strip along the Texas/Louisiana border.

### **Maine Department of Public Safety (December 1, 1987–December 31, 1995)**

Coincidental to the initiation of this OCN project, Maine formed the Bureau of Intergovernmental Drug Enforcement (BIDE), a new effort joining narcotics investigators from the Maine State Police, municipal police departments, and sheriff's departments. Renamed as the Maine Drug Enforcement Agency, this organization hosted the OCN project. Control Group members included the Maine Drug Enforcement Agency, Maine Attorney General's Office, U.S. Attorney's Office, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.

The OCN project concentrated its efforts on mid- to upper- level cocaine smugglers and wholesalers. This project's New Directions plan expanded the OCN concept into the rural areas of the state.

**Maryland Department of Public Safety and  
Correctional Services  
(October 1, 1990–December 31, 1995)**

The following agencies participated in the project: Maryland State Police, Delaware State Police, Maryland Natural Resources Police, Maryland National Guard, Delaware National Guard, Maryland Port Administration Police Department, Baltimore State Attorney's Office, Baltimore Police Department, Anne Arundel County Police Department, U.S. Customs Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Navy, U.S. Department of Justice Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.

Originally the project was to detect and interdict marine smugglers, but later increased its objectives to include a New Directions strategy of dismantling the more aggressive and violent drug trafficking networks.

**Multnomah County, Oregon, District Attorney's Office  
(January 25, 1987–September 30, 1993)**

The host agency, the Multnomah County District Attorney's Office, worked with the following agencies: Clackamas County Sheriff's Office, Multnomah County Sheriff's Office, Oregon State Police, Portland Police Bureau, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington County Sheriff's Office, Clackamas County District Attorney's Office, Gresham Police Department, Washington County District Attorney's Office, Lake Oswego Police Department, Hillsboro Police Department, St. Helens Police Department, Columbia County District Attorney's Office, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.

The project's original goal was to reduce regional drug trafficking through coordinated enforcement and prosecution of targeted drug traffickers. Specifically, the project focused on tar heroin, cocaine, methamphetamines, and marijuana. The project's Financial Investigations component targeted illegally obtained narcotics assets and initiated their seizure and forfeiture. As the project progressed, a greater emphasis was placed on investigations involving methamphetamine manufacturing and large marijuana cultivation operations.

**Nebraska Commission on Law Enforcement/  
Omaha, Nebraska, Police Department  
(October 1, 1990–December 31, 1995)**

The original host agency, the Nebraska Commission on Law Enforcement, joined the Nebraska State Patrol, Omaha Police Department, Douglas County Sheriff's Office, Saunders County Sheriff's Office, Sarpy County Sheriff's Office, Bellevue Police Department, Douglas County Attorney's

Office, U.S. Attorney's Office, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration to form the project's original Control Group. The Saunders County Sheriff's Office and Bellevue Police Department subsequently withdrew from the Control Group and the Federal Bureau of Investigation joined as a member. During the project period, the Omaha Police Department became host agency.

The combined efforts of these law enforcement agencies centered on controlling organized street gang involvement in the manufacture and sale of its controlled substances. For New Directions strategy, the project intensified investigations of mid- and upper-level organized gangs involved in drug trafficking.

### **New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety (December 1, 1987–June 30, 1990)**

Control Group agencies for this OCN project were the applicant (the New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety), the New Jersey State Police, New York State Police, Pennsylvania State Police, Delaware State Police, U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.

The original project goal was to interdict air smuggling of cocaine, to locate and destroy clandestine cocaine laboratories, and to use the project's Financial Investigations component to identify and seize illegal narcotics assets. The Control Group subsequently expanded the project's focus to include all types of narcotics distribution conspiracies.

### **New Mexico Department of Public Safety (December 1, 1987–January 31, 1996)**

Along with the applicant agency, the New Mexico Department of Public Safety, the project included the following participants: Albuquerque Police Department, Las Cruces Police Department, New Mexico Attorney General's Office,

U.S. Attorney's Office, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The original Control Group included the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, which later withdrew from membership when the project also targeted violent gang activities.

The project's goal was to conduct coordinated, multijurisdictional investigations and prosecutions of targeted organized criminal narcotics trafficking conspiracies and offenders operating in New Mexico. Investigations centered on violent gangs and narcotics smuggling across New Mexico's borders. This project's New Directions investigations also targeted illegal gang activities.

### **New York County, New York, District Attorney's Office (December 1, 1987–September 30, 1993)**

The New York County District Attorney's Office, the applicant agency, joined with the New York City Special Narcotics Prosecutor's Office and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration to establish an OCN project. The project's goal was the investigation, prosecution, and conviction of major heroin and cocaine importation rings based in the New York City area. Operations were later expanded to include the dismantling of major, international drug trafficking organizations. The project also sought to reduce the area's drug-related homicides.

The project's Financial Investigations component was funded to identify, trace, and seize the assets of the organizations investigated.

### **Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation (December 1, 1987–September 30, 1993)**

The applicant agency, the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation, worked with the Dayton Police Department, Kettering Police Department, Montgomery County Sheriff's Department, Montgomery County Prosecutor's Office, Miami Township Police Department, Trotwood Police Department, Huber Heights Police Department, U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. The Control Group of this project established as a goal the investigation and prosecution of mid- to high-level narcotics traffickers operating in and around Montgomery County, Ohio.

### **Oklahoma State Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Control (February 2, 1987–July 31, 1989)**

The original Control Group members, along with the applicant, the Oklahoma State Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Control, were the Custer County Sheriff's Office, Enid Police Department, Midwest City Police Department, Muskogee Police Department, Norman Police Department, Tulsa County Sheriff's Office, U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. The Dell City Police Department joined as a Control Group member after project inception.

The principal goal of this OCN project was to disrupt statewide illicit drug manufacturing and trafficking.

**Pima County, Arizona, Sheriff's Department  
(December 1, 1987–March 31, 1996)**

This OCN project joined the applicant, the Pima County Sheriff's Department, with the Cochise County Sheriff's Department, Yuma Police Department, Arizona Attorney General's Office, and U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.

The initial joint effort targeted narcotics smuggling and distribution across the Arizona/Mexico border. The project directed enforcement resources against enterprises whose destruction was most likely to cause lasting impact to smuggler organizations. The project's focus on New Directions operations was twofold: drug-related homicides and other violent activities and the demonstration of the OCN concept in the rural areas of the state.

**Riverside, California, Police Department  
(December 1, 1987–September 30, 1995)**

The applicant agency, the Riverside Police Department, joined the Riverside County Sheriff's Department, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Riverside County District Attorney's office in attacking major narcotics violators in and around Riverside County, California. Ultimately, a major portion of this OCN project's resources were focused on groups which manufactured and distributed methamphetamine. The project's New Directions investigations targeted mid-level street gang cocaine traffickers.

Subsequent to the original award, the project received funding for a Financial Investigations component to identify, seize, and process forfeiture assets illegally derived.

**Suffolk County, Massachusetts, District Attorney's Office  
(December 1, 1987–June 30, 1994)**

The participants in this OCN project consisted of the applicant, the Suffolk County District Attorney's Office, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, and the U.S. Attorney's Office.

The project targeted major narcotics trafficking conspiracies in Suffolk County and its principal city, Boston. Project investigations were intended to eliminate area cocaine and heroin trafficking. The Financial Investigations component sought to identify and seize illegally derived assets.

**Utah Department of Public Safety  
(March 12, 1987–December 31, 1995)**

This OCN project's original goals were to identify, investigate, and prosecute multi-kilo cocaine traffickers. As the project progressed, conspirators

involved in money laundering activities were targeted. As its New Directions strategy, the project aimed enforcement efforts at mid- to high-level narcotics traffickers and financial investigations in rural as well as urban areas.

Control Group members included the Utah Department of Public Safety, Salt Lake City Police Department, Utah County Sheriff's Department, Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, Ogden City Police Department, U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, U.S. Attorney's Office, U.S. Customs Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internal Revenue Service, and U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.

## **SIRM Projects**

In 1991, the Statewide Integrated Resources Model was developed as part of the OCN Program. SIRM projects utilized the OCN approach in their investigations with one important difference: the mandatory inclusion of a state regulatory agency such as those involved with banking, securities, or real estate as a member of the Control Group. With this regulatory agency Control Group member, SIRM projects were able to include the investigative authority and administrative sanctions available to the state regulatory agencies, including revocation of business licenses and corporate charters.

### **Arizona Attorney General's Office (October 1, 1991–December 31, 1995)**

This SIRM project began by focusing on illegal financial enterprises in Arizona that supported major drug traffickers and applied civil and regulatory remedies to money laundering. The project aimed to substantially disrupt drug trafficking activity by targeting, investigating, and eliminating major narcotics trafficking organizations.

As a direct result of the project, new state legislation regulating money transmitters and enacting financial reporting regulations was implemented to enhance Arizona's existing money laundering statute. Project investigations severely disrupted the illegal activities of money transmitter businesses on Arizona's southern border and drug runners operating in and around the state of Arizona. Another direct result of this program was the Suspicious Transaction Report Initiative which enhanced Arizona's anti-money laundering efforts.

Control Group members of this project included the Arizona Attorney General's Office, Arizona Department of Banking, Arizona Department of Public Safety, U.S. Customs Service, and U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.

**SIRM projects utilized the OCN approach in their investigations with one important difference: the mandatory inclusion of a state regulatory agency such as those involved with banking, securities, or real estate as a member of the Control Group.**



**OCN projects were responsible for 16,366 drug-related arrests and seizure of over \$1 billion worth of illegal narcotics, cash, and illegally derived assets.**

### **Florida Department of Law Enforcement (October 1, 1991–June 30, 1995)**

The Florida Department of Law Enforcement also participated in the OCN SIRM Program. As a SIRM project, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement joined forces with the Office of the Statewide Prosecutor/Office of the Attorney General, Office of the Comptroller, and U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.

This project investigated large-scale, statewide drug organizations and associated money laundering businesses including traffickers with connections to other countries. As a result of the project's investigations, networks transporting major amounts of cocaine, crack, and marijuana were dismantled. Sizable assets were also seized from these traffickers including businesses, residences, cash, and other personal property as a result of project investigations. In addition, a number of spinoff cases evolved from the investigations which, in turn, lead to many of the smaller dealers also being dismantled.

### **OCN Gang Violence Enforcement Projects**

The OCN Gang Violence Enforcement projects were launched in 1995. These projects included the same Program elements as earlier OCN projects in that multi-agency management and operational decisionmaking were shared. However, the Gang Violence Enforcement projects were established with the intent to assist law enforcement agencies and prosecution agencies in enforcement exclusively against violent gangs. The two projects selected were the Bernalillo County, New Mexico, District Attorney's Office, and the Multnomah County, Oregon, District Attorney's Office. Both developed strategies to gather intelligence on violent gangs and to implement investigative and prosecution strategies designed to dismantle their most violent gangs.

#### **Bernalillo County, New Mexico, District Attorney's Office (October 1, 1995–current)**

As an OCN Gang Violence Enforcement project, the Bernalillo County District Attorney's Office formed a Control Group with the U.S. Attorney's Office, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the New Mexico Department of Public Safety, the Bernalillo County Sheriff's Department, and the Albuquerque Police Department. Through investigation and intelligence sharing, the stated goal of this project was dismantling and eliminating violent gangs operating in the project area.

Since the activation of this project, two of the area's most violent gangs have been targeted for investigation. Several members from one gang were indicted on federal charges including multiple homicides, other acts of violence, drug offenses, and firearm offenses. The investigation of the second gang focused on the members' violent crimes such as homicide as well as drug conspiracies. In addition, the project actively gathers intelligence on possible future violent gang targets.

### **Multnomah County, Oregon, District Attorney's Office (October 1, 1995–current)**

In addition to participating in the initial OCN Program, the Multnomah County District Attorney's Office participates in the OCN Gang Violence Enforcement project. Using Oregon's "Little RICO" statute for prosecution, this project targeted the area's most violent and criminally active gangs, particularly those involved in drug sales and weapon offenses.

Control Group members for this project include the host agency, the Multnomah County District Attorney's Office, as well as the Multnomah County Sheriff's Office, Portland Police Bureau, Oregon State Police, and the Oregon Department of Justice.

**In 1991, one project's investigations resulted in an extremely large seizure of over 6,100 pounds of cocaine hydrochloride with a reported street value of \$553 million.**


## **OCN Program Operational Results**

The successful implementation of projects within the OCN Program resulted in the development of an array of successful multijurisdictional enforcement strategies. By using these strategies, the projects experienced significant investigative, prosecution, and forfeiture success.

OCN projects were responsible for 16,366 drug-related arrests and seizure of over \$1 billion worth of illegal narcotics, cash, and illegally derived assets (see exhibit 4). Exhibits 5 and 6 provide a breakdown of these seizures on a yearly basis. Further analysis of the OCN and SIRM project enforcement successes have been included in Appendix A.

The dollar amount of narcotics seizures and property seizures varied from year to year, quite often affected by the number of active projects. Seizures were higher in the earlier years of the Program when there were more active projects. Consequently, in the later years, as the number of active projects decreased, so did the seizure of property and narcotics.

**Exhibit 4 Total Number of Arrests and Cases—All Projects**




Note: The number of active projects varied by year.

Note: The values on the line graph are independent of the values on the x- and y-axes.

There were, however, exceptions to this pattern. One exception of note is the total value of assets seized in 1987 (see exhibit 6). Although many of the initial projects began operation in 1987, a majority were not implemented until December of that year. Consequently, most project enforcement activities were not fully operational until the following year. Another exception was the total value of narcotics seized in 1991 (see exhibit 5). During this year, one of the project’s investigations resulted in an extremely large seizure of over 6,100 pounds of cocaine hydrochloride with a reported street value of \$553 million.


All of the exhibits present consolidated outcome information reported by OCN and SIRM projects in progress reports submitted to BJA. Because of the diversity of the project areas, comparisons of activity levels between individual projects were not encouraged. Each project’s geographic region of operation was unique and goals and objectives were designed specifically for each project.

**Exhibit 5 Total Value of Narcotics Seized—All Projects**



Note: The number of active projects varied by year.

**Exhibit 6 Total Value of Assets Seized—All Projects**



Note: The values on the line graph are independent of the values on the x- and y-axes.

# OCN Control Group

## Overview of the Control Group

Each Organized Crime Narcotics (OCN) project was required to be comprised of a formally organized group of participating law enforcement agencies, one of which was the applicant agency, and a management Control Group. Each Control Group included, at a minimum, one federal and one state or local law enforcement agency. In addition, at least one federal or local prosecutor was required to serve on the Control Group. Statewide Integrated Resources Model (SIRM) projects were required to be hosted by a state agency and to include at least one regulatory agency in the Control Group.

The senior agency administrators of the participating agencies executed a formal intergovernmental agreement, or memorandum of understanding, affirming their intent to fully participate in the management and operations of the project. The agreement was intended to be brief and simply stated, addressing the goals and objectives of the project, the anticipated contributions of resources and, as appropriate, the expertise of each participant, and a projected end date, after which the need for continuing participation in the project would be reaffirmed.

One of the participating state or local agencies served as the applicant agency or grantee, accepting not only responsibility for preparation of the grant application, but for project administrative and financial matters as well.

## Purpose

The OCN Program was designed so that the identity of the project and its control were equally shared by all participants. The Control Group was the mechanism within the OCN Program intended to prevent any single agency's enforcement goals from controlling or dominating project operations. To accomplish this, a Control Group comprised of a senior command representative from each of the participating agencies was established.

Each member of the Control Group had an equal vote on all decisions, and the decisions of the Control Group were required to be unanimous. Unanimous decisionmaking on case selection ensured that investigative targets were an important enough problem for all jurisdictions to actively support the project efforts.

The Control Group not only served as a policymaking board, but also was responsible for selecting cases to be investigated and prosecuted, allocating project resources, and providing continuous oversight of all project investigations.

**The Control Group was the mechanism within the OCN Program intended to prevent any single agency's enforcement goals from controlling or dominating project operations.**

Perhaps the most unique features of the OCN Program model were the Control Group decisionmaking and oversight processes. In a traditional task force organization one agency manages the task force administration and operations. In such an arrangement, a board of directors, if there is one, is usually comprised of the administrators of the participating agencies, and is most often limited to an advisory role. In any event, other participants have little influence on the task force's goals and objectives. Essentially, the involvement of other participating agencies is one of the contributing resources to the lead agency.

Once a case received approval by the OCN Control Group, the selection of one agency to be responsible for the day-to-day supervision of the project case became a priority. Agency designation only applied to the individually assigned investigation and could change in the course of an investigation. Control Group oversight continued until the conclusion of the project case. Any changes in operational strategy or resource requirements received formal Control Group approval. All project cases were supported by formal operational plans and budgets prior to Control Group approval.

## Members

The first organizational task of an OCN project was determining the composition of the Control Group. The majority of the Control Groups were comprised of the senior operations managers of those agencies expected to be most involved in cases conducted by the project. Because federal investigative funds form the basis for the OCN Program and by reason of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA's) designation as lead federal drug enforcement agency, the inclusion of DEA on the Control Group was initially mandatory for all OCN projects. Later as OCN goals expanded, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Internal Revenue Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and the U.S. Customs Service served in lieu of or in addition to the DEA. Recognizing the need for early prosecution involvement and planning in the OCN project cases, membership on the Control Group was also mandated for at least one prosecutor drawn from the federal, state, or local level. In addition, OCN SIRM projects were required to include at least one regulatory agency. Other than these requirements, no specific guidance was furnished to applicants in determining Control Group membership.

The size of Control Groups varied from a minimum of 3 to a maximum of 13. Projects near the upper range in numbers of Control Group members tended to involve large, but sparsely populated, geographic areas. Control Groups located in large metropolitan areas also tended to be larger since participants were found to have long-standing cooperative associations and working relationships too important to be fragmented by the OCN task force. While other considerations were no doubt influential, experience with the OCN Program indicated that maximum Control Group

**The majority of the Control Groups comprised the senior operations managers of those agencies expected to be most involved in cases conducted by the project.**

effectiveness was achieved when membership involved only those agencies which had important and beneficial resources to contribute to the joint effort.

The inclusion of more than seven members on a Control Group seemed to encumber requisite decisionmaking. Just the logistical obstacles to scheduling meetings of a large Control Group proved to be a serious constraint. Some Control Groups which originally had as many as 12 or 13 members later reduced their size. Over time, agencies withdrew from the project while new agencies joined.

Those projects which by necessity created large Control Groups often created smaller executive committees, or operations groups, to provide day-to-day support to project casework and act as liaison between Control Group members, in addition to other operational roles in the OCN task force.

Another initial issue pertained to the rank of the agency assigned to the Control Group. Because many agencies had participated in previous cooperative, multijurisdictional efforts there was a tendency to nominate the agency's chief executive to attend Control Group meetings. It soon became apparent that agency chief executives were preoccupied with other agency business or that they simply were not the most effective choices for Control Group representation. Generally, it was found that the agency representative on the Control Group should be an operational commander or staff person, albeit one with direct access to the highest command levels of the parent agency. As a fundamental rule, the Control Group representative must be in the mainstream of his or her own agency's operation so that he or she needs little preparation on matters of OCN interest and be able to commit the agency's resources to a case. As Control Groups gained experience and confidence in the OCN Program, a self-leveling process took place in which agency chief executives relinquished their memberships on the Control Groups and were replaced with operational commanders.

It was important that the prosecutor's representative be either principally involved in the prosecution of narcotics cases or in a direct supervisory capacity to assigned prosecutors. An occasional troublesome area was an initial tendency on the part of some prosecution Control Group agencies to substitute freely among their Control Group representatives, but this process soon abated.

## Meetings

The OCN Guideline intentionally offered no detailed advice as to Control Group meeting format, frequency, or location, other than meetings were to be regularly held and minutes recorded. These matters were decided early on in the project startup process and modified as appropriate over time. Control Groups, in addition to making minutes of their meetings available for review, submitted quarterly activity and progress reports to the BJA Program Office.

**Generally, it was found that the agency representative on the Control Group should be an operational commander or staff person, albeit one with direct access to the highest command levels of the parent agency.**

**Projects reported that meeting on a regular basis helped maintain productivity and project focus.**

Most Control Groups met frequently, but at least monthly in the early stages of project implementation. Some maintained that frequency throughout the project period, but most, once project implementation was completed, met only once each quarter. There was also a tendency to meet less frequently in those projects where the operational commanders serving on the Control Group were in almost continuous contact on their casework.

Generally, the projects reported that meeting on a regular basis proved to be beneficial in maintaining productivity and project focus. In addition, the regular meetings increased successful working relationships, with the OCN cases as well as non-OCN-related issues, and intelligence sharing.

Most projects established a formal policy for convening Control Group meetings by telephone to handle emergencies. Overall, OCN Program experience indicated that the functions of the Control Group were best exercised in a formal, in-person meeting on at least a monthly basis.

## **Interagency Agreements**

The OCN Program Guideline required Control Group member agencies to execute a written Interagency Agreement or Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) as part of their OCN grant application process. A proposed model agreement was included in the Guideline (see Appendix B), setting forth the desire of the participants to work together on common problems and to contribute resources to the joint effort. Participants were free to modify the model agreement or come up with their own.

The Interagency Agreement was not intended to be a policy and procedures manual nor was it to encompass issues related to liability or other technical matters. Experience with the Program indicated that it was usually better to deal with policies, procedures, and these other issues in separate agreements which could be more easily amended by the Control Group.

Few problems were encountered with the Interagency Agreement process, although some tended to be lengthy. Although DEA's membership in the Control Group was required by the OCN Program announcement, most local DEA offices elected to seek approval from DEA headquarters before signing the agreement.



## Goals and Objectives

The formulation and expression of goals and objectives proved to be one of the more challenging administrative tasks undertaken by Control Groups. Many initial applications lacked specificity as to what was to be accomplished and were subsequently revised to develop objectives which were measurable and observable. Samples of such objectives were furnished to projects during the preliminary application phase and further refinement took place as the Program progressed (see Appendix C). Projects were required to evaluate their progress and make necessary adjustments to their goals and objectives prior to applying for continuation funding.

**The formulation and expression of goals and objectives proved to be one of the more challenging administrative tasks undertaken by Control Groups.**

# OCN Program Investigations

## Case Selection Criteria

The Bureau of Justice Assistance's (BJA's) Organized Crime Narcotics (OCN) Program Guideline encouraged applicants to generally describe the criteria by which the Control Group would select cases for funding to ensure high level project targets. Some initial applications contained specific criteria. For instance, one project in the Southwest stated that selection was based, at a minimum, on the target organization or individual possessing the following traits:

- ❑ Multijurisdictional operation;
- ❑ At least 3 years of documented narcotics trafficking;
- ❑ Previously unsuccessful law enforcement targeting;
- ❑ Prior prosecutions of individuals in the targeted organization group; and
- ❑ The organization, as well as its illicit activities, continuing after the prior prosecutions.

Case selection criteria initially proposed by other applicants were often less focused, and were required to be made more specific. One project stated that it would "select likely candidates as targets from previous [Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force] OCDETF intelligence." A number of applications did not contain case selection criteria and their formulation or refinement became a mandated priority during the startup phase of the project.

The earlier projects had workable case selection criteria formulated and in place, as soon as they became operational. In some projects, Control Group representatives had extensively discussed and agreed upon criteria in anticipation of multijurisdictional enforcement efforts before applying for OCN Program funding. In those instances, their level of confidence was higher, and they quickly initiated cases.

Several projects emphasized that they planned, in whole or in part, on accepting case proposals from agencies that were not Control Group members. Here, well-defined and publicized case selection criteria were especially necessary, so that non-Control Group agencies proposing cases for project funding would be aware of the type and level of case and the supporting documentation required. By knowing the acceptable standards, misunderstandings would be avoided if a case were not approved. Irrespective of whether investigative proposals were presented to the Control Group from one of its member agencies or from non-Control Group agencies, the criteria and the process were identical. In addition, the benefit of having promulgated clear and concise case selection criteria was found to be essential to the success of the OCN Program.

**The earlier projects had workable case selection criteria formulated and in place, as soon as they became operational.**

**Case plans resulted in efficient case preparation, better Control Group decisions, and, as a result, more successful investigations.**

## Case Planning and Monitoring

A major function of the Control Group was to determine if proposed cases merited OCN project designation. Whether derived from ongoing cases by one or more of the participating agencies or originating in agencies outside the Control Group, each case presented for consideration by the Control Group was required to be incorporated into a written case plan with a budget. Case plans resulted in efficient case preparation, better Control Group decisions, and, as a result, more successful investigations.

The OCN Guideline contained a sample case plan (see Appendix D). Typically included as elements in a case plan are target information, type and level of criminal activity, potential investigative impediments, proposed investigative actions, prosecution strategy deemed most conducive to success, personnel and equipment (project resources) needed, and anticipated expenses.

During the life of nearly every project, cases were rejected as not meeting the project's criteria or deferred pending provision of additional information or intelligence. Control Groups were not reluctant to request additional information, offer advice, or amend proposed case budgets. Likewise, most Control Groups took their case monitoring and review responsibilities seriously, showing no hesitancy to suggest changes as cases progressed, or to terminate investigations which were not fruitful. Amendments to case plans or budgets were processed with the same degree of formality as the original plans and budgets to ensure fairness to those whose plans may have been denied or who were awaiting requested funding. In a number of instances, Control Groups substituted another agency for the lead agency.

## Target Selection

It was critical to OCN Program success that, at the outset, project Control Groups agreed upon the offenses and offenders which would be targeted for priority enforcement action. Although participating agencies may have different criminal activity thresholds governing their interests, all equally participated in establishing the project's targets.

BJA's OCN Program Announcements and Guideline made frequent reference to "major" and "high-level" narcotics trafficking crimes as the Program focus. The OCN Program was not designed to support street-level enforcement or to engage in intelligence collection alone. Beyond this, however, agencies applying for funding were given considerable latitude in describing the nature and level of the narcotics problem which they intended to attack. Initially, their description of the narcotics problem to be addressed was included in the preliminary application reviewed by BJA.

In certain preliminary OCN applications, the initial description of the type and level of proposed investigative effort was quite specific. In one joint project involving two state investigative agencies, for example, the targets were described as “individuals and/or organizations involved in clandestine drug manufacturing, the distribution of illegally manufactured drugs, and other drug-related crimes including outlaw motorcycle gangs, suppliers of chemicals and/or laboratory equipment, marketing and distribution groups and chemists.” In some applications, not only was the targeted crime problem specifically described, but enforcement method to be used was also described. For example, the investigative agencies of four southern states planned to use portable radar sites to detect major, low-flying aerial smugglers along the coasts of the participating states and to coordinate joint interdiction efforts.

On the other hand, a number of applicants for funding described their targets in broader terms, such as “mid-level” or “high-level dealers.” These applicant agencies and Control Groups refined these descriptions either during the application process or as a condition of receiving an OCN award.

In the Program’s later years, the “New Directions” approach was adopted by projects. The targets of these investigations included one or a combination of the following: organized gangs trafficking in drugs beyond the street level, perpetrators of drug-related homicides and other violent activities, organized criminal activities in the rural areas of the project state, and identifying and removing the financial incentives to drug trafficking organizations. OCN Statewide Integrated Resources Model (SIRM) project targets were selected where the inclusion of a regulatory agency would be effective.

Gang Violence Enforcement projects were funded with the objective of targeting the most violent criminal gangs in an effort to dismantle and eliminate them. These projects established criteria that resulted in gangs posing the greatest threat to the community receiving priority. The recently funded Gang Violence Enforcement projects initiated ongoing investigations of their area’s most violent gangs, and have already experienced marked success with a number of criminal indictments.

Generally, with minor modifications, the targeted crime problems remained in place throughout the life of a project. In a few instances, subsequent analysis and operational experience resulted in the Control Group modifying its targets. The Control Group of one multi-state project, for example, found that after several months of operation it was unable to achieve its original, too narrowly focused objective of disrupting the aerial smuggling of cocaine into the state. Accordingly, with BJA approval, the Control Group expanded the project’s mission to include other smuggling modes and distribution conspiracies. Thus, when coupled with a clear description of projected criminal targets, OCN project self-evaluation kept the project on track and prompted a change in direction when needed.

**It was critical to OCN Program success that, at the outset, project Control Groups agreed upon the offenses and offenders that would be targeted for priority enforcement action.**

## Multijurisdictional Task Force Effectiveness

**These variations in effectiveness were considered to be routine by nearly all task force commanders, and no predictable decreasing effectiveness life cycle pattern was found.**

A select study of OCN project operations was conducted in 1992, to determine whether a predictable task force life cycle pattern existed which resulted in a change in task force effectiveness over time. If a pattern of decreasing effectiveness was found to exist, the study goal was then to assess how a project's effectiveness could be restored.

The OCN Program was selected for the task force study because of several characteristics unique to it which permitted an accurate measurement of task force effectiveness. These characteristics included: the time span of existence of the Program (since 1987), the number of projects that had been funded in different areas of the United States (27 at the time of the study), the extensive uniform activity and outcome data collected for each project, and accessibility to OCN task force commanders and other personnel knowledgeable of task force operations.

The initial, underlying perception was that task force effectiveness diminished over time. This diminishing was postulated to be a natural result of the extraordinary high level of enthusiasm of participants in the early stages of the effort, the large number of predictably productive cases available in the first years of operation, subsequent changes in Control Group and task force personnel, and various management deficiencies. These circumstances and others were explored in detail during the study to determine the validity of these assumptions.

OCN projects were required to provide quarterly progress reports, from which information regarding each project was analyzed for the study. Areas of analysis included the number of new cases opened, current active cases, arrests and charges related to project cases, and property and currency seized in conjunction with project cases.

Interviews were conducted with 12 selected task force commanders in 8 states. The commanders were asked about their observation of:

- Any decreased effectiveness of their task force;
- The availability of productive cases over time;
- Changes in the flow of relevant information to the task force;
- Changes in the Control Group of the task force or its personnel;
- Dropoffs, if any, in task force results over time; and
- Methods to use to identify and remedy any decrease in task force effectiveness.

After analysis of the OCN project activity and outcome information, coupled with interviews of project personnel, it was determined that a typical pattern of task force effectiveness showed only minor increases and

decreases in effectiveness, all of which were attributable to specific events. These variations in effectiveness were considered to be routine by nearly all task force commanders, and no predictable decreasing effectiveness life cycle pattern was found.

Many of the projects found the OCN task force to be a powerful tool in investigations, providing a setting allowing for a beneficial exchange of information and reduced duplicative enforcement efforts. Several projects also reported that the OCN Program provided a means to obtain necessary overtime pay to ensure case continuity and impetus. In addition, the availability of confidential funds, when coupled with skilled personnel, substantially aided successful multijurisdictional task force casework.

Other research has also demonstrated that a multijurisdictional task force can be an effective tool for law enforcement. In addition to multi-agency participation, prosecutor participation and active involvement of federal law enforcement agencies were noted to be critical to successful task force operations. Furthermore, once representatives from each participating agency became accustomed to each other, the working relationship improved, and individual agency “turf” considerations diminished as the task force investigations progressed.

## **Role of Self-Evaluation in Program Improvements**

One feature of the OCN Program was the adoption of a continual self-evaluation process by the projects during their operation. Each project Control Group, with technical assistance from the Institute for Intergovernmental Research (IIR), developed at the inception of the project, comprehensible, attainable, observable, and measurable performance goals and objectives. A uniform data collection process was initiated at each site and analysis of the information collected was centralized and automated by IIR. Assessments of project operational performance were routinely conducted. Feedback was provided to project administrators and program and performance data were furnished to BJA to assist in program evaluation efforts.

Using this evaluative information and the experiences and observations of their own agencies, Control Group members constantly monitored their project’s performance and made timely modifications as appropriate. This process usually resulted in subtle, incremental corrections in enforcement strategies and operational management, but occasionally introspective analysis by a Control Group produced fundamental change.

In addition to the effects on individual projects, the self-evaluation process resulted in numerous findings which were applied Program wide. These improvements and modifications were shared among the OCN projects

**One feature of the OCN Program was the adoption of a continual self-evaluation process by the projects during their operation.**

during periodic national Program cluster conferences, through site visits by the technical assistance provider (IIR), and through production of a series of OCN-derived instructional videotapes. Lessons learned were also periodically incorporated into OCN Program Guideline revisions to assist ongoing and future projects.


## **Conclusion**

Throughout the years the Organized Crime Narcotics (OCN) Program has continually evolved, improving its effectiveness in the enforcement of multijurisdictional narcotics trafficking crimes and violent gang crimes. Even though the OCN Program was originally designed as an illegal narcotics trafficking enforcement tool, the Program has proved equally effective in combating most any type of criminal activity that requires multijurisdictional investigative and prosecution expertise. In addition, by implementing the OCN Program in varying locations across the United States, the versatility of the Program has also been demonstrated in its effectiveness against crimes in metropolitan jurisdictions as well as rural areas, regardless of region.


One of the unique features of the OCN Program was the Control Group. The Control Group allowed for the benefits of the cooperative efforts of a task force while eliminating the usual drawbacks associated with traditional organized task forces. Collectively, the projects demonstrated that the multijurisdictional approach to law enforcement was beneficial not only by removing criminals and illegal substances from the streets, but also by creating strong, united law enforcement structures that can effectively eliminate the problems associated with large-scale criminal organizations. Further, OCN identified state and local agencies to be effective and competent partners in the management of multijurisdictional task forces and important resources in federal enforcement strategies as well as ensuring responsiveness to more “localized” needs. As the criminals became much more sophisticated, multi-agency unification was found to be necessary to continued enforcement success.

# Average Value of Narcotics and Assets Seized Per Project and Per Case

**Exhibit 7 Average Value of Narcotics Seized Per Case**




**Exhibit 8 Average Value of Narcotics Seized Per Project**






**Exhibit 9 Average Value of Assets Seized Per Project**



**Exhibit 10 Average Value of Assets Seized Per Case and Average Number of Arrests per Case**



Note: The values on the line graph are independent of the values on the x- and y-axes.

# Interagency Agreement (Sample)

## Interagency Agreement

Between (Names of Participating Agencies)

---



---



---



---



---

This agreement between the participating agencies of the (Name of Project) shall be effective when signed by the Chief Executive Officers of the participating agencies.

1. It is agreed that each of the agencies will participate in a Control Group by designating one specific individual at the command level to serve on the Control Group and act on behalf of the designating agency. Each member of the Control Group shall have one vote and shall vote on:
  - Approval/disapproval of cases to be investigated as part of the project;
  - Amount of and use of funds to be authorized for specific case investigations; and
  - Key decisions critical to the management of case investigation strategies and activities.

All votes of the Control Group are unanimous.

2. Each agency agrees to provide whatever resources are available at its disposal to specific cases as appropriate for effective investigation of same, as approved by the Control Group.
3. It is agreed that participation in multi-agency investigative efforts of this project is voluntary and that in the event a participating agency wishes to withdraw from this agreement, written notification of this decision will be provided to all parties to this agreement prior to withdrawal.

4. Parties to this agreement shall cooperate with the project applicant agency in following procedures relating to case management, reporting requirements, fiscal guidelines, and other appropriate policies as adopted by the Control Group and as consistent with IIR and federal program guidelines.
5. (Other clauses or stipulations as desired.)
6. The term of this agreement shall be from (date contract entered with IIR) to (ending date of contract).

BY: (Chief Executive Officer of Each Agency) \_\_\_\_\_

Name

Date

Title

Agency

BY: (Chief Executive Officer of Each Agency) \_\_\_\_\_

Name

Date

Title

Agency

Add others as needed.

# Recommended Model Objectives for OCN Project Self-Evaluation Capability

## Basic OCN

1. During the grant period, \_\_\_ (number of) formal meetings will be held by command-level staff representatives of the Control Group.
2. During the grant period, \_\_\_ (number of) cases involving mid- to upper-level drug conspirators will be presented to the Control Group for consideration as OCN investigations.
3. During the grant period, \_\_\_ (number of) cases will be approved by the Control Group for investigation.
4. Approved cases will include staff participation from at least two OCN project agencies in each investigation.
5. \_\_\_ (number of) cases approved for investigation will be completed with successful results. Arrests will occur in at least \_\_\_ percent of the cases investigated.
6. The arrests occurring in approved project cases will result in at least \_\_\_ percent guilty pleas or convictions on original or related charges of those arrested.
7. During the grant period, approved project cases will result in the seizure of at least \_\_\_ (grams, kilograms, ounces, pounds) of \_\_\_\_\_ (cocaine, crack, heroin, marijuana, hashish, amphetamine, other specify).
8. Approved OCN cases will result in the forfeiture of property valued at \$\_\_\_\_\_ (dollars) and \$\_\_\_\_\_ (amount of currency).
9. An analysis will be made at the end of the grant period to assess the amount and percentage of funds expended for various purposes; e.g., for the purchase of evidence, surveillance activities, confidential source payments.
10. (Other objectives as appropriate.)

## Operational Support

11. By the end of the grant period, at least \_\_\_ investigators from \_\_\_ project agencies will have carried out \_\_\_ overtime hours of physical surveillance and other investigative activity of suspected narcotics trafficking conspiracies approved for investigation by the Control Group.

12. Approximately \_\_\_ overtime hours of investigative activity will be carried out by the end of the grant period in at least \_\_\_ Control Group-approved investigations, at least \_\_\_ of which will result in arrest of or charges filed against alleged criminal conspirators.
13. (Other objectives as appropriate.)

## **Finvest**

14. During the grant period, \_\_\_ (number of) formal meetings will be held by command-level staff representatives of the Control Group and \_\_\_ (number of) cases will be presented for consideration as Finvest cases.
15. During the grant period, \_\_\_ (number of) Finvest cases will be approved by the Control Group for investigation.
16. Approved Finvest cases will include operational staff participation from at least two project agencies in each investigation.
17. By the end of the grant period, at least \_\_\_ financial investigations will be successfully completed, as measured by the presentation of sufficient information to prosecutive agencies to initiate RICO, CCE, or other type of property seizure proceedings or criminal actions against defendants.
18. By the end of the grant period, \_\_\_ (number of) arrests will be made and, as a result, \_\_\_ percent of guilty pleas and convictions will be obtained.
19. By the end of the grant period, at least \_\_\_ (number of) investigations will be completed of narcotics-related financial operations which will involve at least \$\_\_\_\_\_ million in assets tied to criminal activities.
20. At the end of the grant period, an analysis will be made to assess the amount and percentage of funds expended for various purposes; e.g., for personnel, purchase of services, purchase of evidence, contractual services.
21. (Other objectives as appropriate.)

# Case Plan (Sample)

## Elements

- I. Background and Summary of Case
- II. Target(s) of Case
  - A. Name
  - B. Detailed identification information
- III. Need for Joint Jurisdiction
  - What laws are possibly being violated that require a multi-agency effort?
- IV. Operational Plan
  - What specific investigative actions and prosecutive steps will be involved in pursuing the case?
- V. Participating Agencies
  - A. Personnel—financial specialists, prosecutors, etc.
  - B. Other resources—equipment, vehicles, etc.
- VI. Anticipated Expenses (Use the expense categories in the approved budget to estimate case expenditures and show basis for calculation, e.g., man-hours estimate, travel expense.)

Minutes of Control Group meetings should reflect case approval and a control number for tracking case.

# A Law Enforcement Response to Complex Criminal Activity: Multijurisdictional Task Forces

Copyright 1989 IIR  
All Rights Reserved by IIR

## I. Introduction

Today as never before, law enforcement is being challenged; challenged by an increasingly complex society making increasingly complex demands for law enforcement services. So too, criminal organizations benefiting from seemingly insatiable demands for illicit goods and services and restrained by few, if any, of the constraints on American law enforcement have grown more complex and more difficult to control. Today, it is virtually impossible for a single agency, much less a single investigator or prosecutor, to successfully combat organized criminal activity.

To meet these challenges, law enforcement had to become more innovative and resourceful in combating crimes, criminals, and criminal activity. Multijurisdictional task forces have emerged as one of the most effective modern law enforcement tools; in part because task forces can transcend not only agency differences in organization, orientation, policies, size, constituency, and even personalities, but also resource and jurisdictional constraints. The emergence of task forces is also due in part because task forces have proved just as adaptable to multi-agency street enforcement activities as they have to the multijurisdictional investigation of the most complex criminal organizations.

The term “multijurisdictional” describes a task force in terms of its composition: the multiple agencies and authorities participating in the task force. More specifically, multijurisdictional refers to the composite of territorial boundaries and enforcement authorities of the task force’s individual participants. Unless specific legal authority is granted to a task force, the task force’s jurisdiction is, in effect, the collective or composite jurisdiction of the agencies operating under the task force umbrella.

Generally, a task force is described by the geographic territory encompassed. For example, depending on a task force’s enforcement mission, the participants might come from some or all of the law enforcement agencies:

- Within a single county—countywide;
- Within several counties—multi-county;

- ❑ Within a region of a state—regional;
- ❑ Within a state—statewide;
- ❑ Within a group of states—“Border,” “Western,” or “Mid-Atlantic”; or
- ❑ Within all states—national.

Federal law enforcement agencies often sponsor task forces, many of which have state and local agency representation. These are generally identified as “federal,” “DEA,” or “FBI” task forces. Federal agencies are also frequent participants in state and local multijurisdictional task forces. The inclusion of a federal agency better ensures followup of investigative leads on a national basis, but perhaps even more importantly, federal participation provides a means of coordinating task force investigations with federal investigations as well as enhancing task force capabilities. In organizing a task force, territorial jurisdiction and enforcement jurisdiction are extremely important considerations in the selection of member agencies.

In this discussion, we will first talk about task forces and how they are organized. Then, we will explore a new multijurisdictional task force model that has been used with great success by law enforcement agencies across the country.

## **II. Task Forces**

Instead of being obstructed by criminal activities that cross city, county, state, and federal boundary lines, task forces have the potential to organize in as expansive, functional, and flexible manner as any complex criminal organization. Rather than rely upon occasional instances of agencies working together in expressions of good will, task forces provide the formal framework for local-to-national multi-agency planning and coordination of case activities.

Task forces facilitate the pooling of expertise and other resources so that the individual strengths of the member agencies become collective task force strengths. Intelligence gathering, information sharing, and communications among agencies are greatly enhanced in the more formal coordinated task force setting and on a much broader base than in a case-by-case setting.

### **Versatility**

One of the most versatile characteristics of the task force model is that it is equally effective whether addressing state, regional, national, or distinctly local problems. A countywide task force might address a rash of convenience store robberies or residential burglaries, while a statewide task force might be organized to address the crime of arson and include participation by regulatory agencies and the private sector, as well as law enforcement.



Few innovations in the history of law enforcement offer the versatility of task forces; whether local, regional, national, or international in scope; whether city, county, state, or federal agencies; whether in rural, urban, or metropolitan settings. In any mix or combination, one common theme emerges: the joining together to overcome obstacles to a successful enforcement effort.

Although task forces may be organized to conduct long-term investigations of every complex criminal conspiracies, they have also proved successful in performing more fundamental law enforcement tasks, particularly where the primary obstacles to success are limited resources and insufficient information upon which to act. This more fundamental use is often seen in street-level narcotics enforcement where multiple cities combine with one or more counties to jointly perform dealer-to-user narcotics enforcement. These street-level narcotics enforcement task forces are generally designed to continue for long periods of time, with an established chain of command, a governing board, formal administrative and operational policies and procedures, and long-term commitments to provide personnel, equipment, and in some instances funding.

Not all task forces are designed to exist for a long time, nor are they necessarily formal. There are many examples of short-term, ad hoc task forces at the local level. Sometimes these efforts are under prosecutive leadership or part of a state or federal agency's enforcement program. Vice offenses, drunk driving crackdowns, marijuana eradication, and fugitive sweeps are common examples of these usually well-publicized, short-term task force efforts. Short-term task forces are effective in increasing enforcement pressure on a particular public nuisance or criminal condition and in increasing the public awareness of the law enforcement effort as well.

### **III. Organizing Task Forces**

#### **Task Force Development in American Law Enforcement**

Historically, law enforcement cooperation was often signified by man-hunts, checking leads for another agency, or otherwise assisting out-of-town police agencies. Law enforcement cooperation in the more formal multijurisdictional task force sense is of fairly recent origin, dating from the 1960s.

Two examples of task force evolution in the 1960s were the Kansas City Metro Squad and the U.S. Department of Justice Organized Crime and Racketeering Section Strike Force. The Kansas City Metro Squad was unique in that it involved both large and small law enforcement agencies entering into a formal agreement to pool their investigative resources to concentrate on major felony crimes in the area. The Organized Crime and Racketeering Section Strike Forces introduced formal investigative planning and coordination to organized crime law enforcement.

Another innovation in the late 1960s and 1970s was pioneered by the New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice, which incorporated civil and regulatory authorities into task force strategies. The adoption of the task force model as an important means of overcoming the obstacles to successful narcotics enforcement resulted from an effort in South Florida in the early 1970s, the Joint Organized Crime Investigations task force.

In the 1970s and 1980s, narcotics and dangerous drug enforcement fostered new generations of task forces involving rural and urban law enforcement and city, county, state, and federal enforcement agencies. For instance, in San Mateo, California, a countywide task force was created based on support from area cities by means of a population-based funding formula. In Clallam County, Washington, rural communities provided personnel resources to a formal, structured, countywide task force. And in one federally funded program, over 2,500 local and state task forces were identified as recipients of federal support.

As a result of these efforts, single agency domination of task forces gave way to a new concept of members having equal participation in task force management and operations. Formal investigative planning was utilized, prosecutive strategies were incorporated, and unanimous decisionmaking was adopted as the basis for determining unified narcotics enforcement actions.

### **Organizational Constraints**

The first step in organizing a task force is to determine what the proposed task force is to accomplish. This is more than a mere discussion of the crime problem to be addressed. Rather, the deliberations should, in addition, include the obstacles to success which limit traditional means and how using a task force can overcome these obstacles. Generally, these obstacles are described in terms of the difficulties presented by the targeted criminal organization itself and existing law enforcement constraints.

For example, the target may be a narcotics distribution ring working in numerous cities, which is being supplied from a distant location, and which is controlled by leaders known to be insulated from the street distribution. Here, likely law enforcement constraints include the lack of a single jurisdiction where supply and distribution occurs and the lack of fiscal resources to pursue investigative leads outside the jurisdiction. The nature of the organization also suggests the need for additional information about criminal activity and the individuals involved at each level of the activity. Additionally, the lack of manpower, expertise, or surveillance equipment might well be obstacles. The criminal organization may be so insulated that an investigative grand jury, or at least prosecutive support for search and arrest warrants, may be needed.

Each of these constraints can be overcome by combining agencies having the requisite authorities, resources, and expertise. These agencies and their capabilities should be set out in the documentation of the task force

purpose. Stating what the task force is to do implies intended results, and these results must be realistically stated and capable of translation into performance measures once the task force is organized.

## Size

Next, the size of the task force must be addressed. Broad participation of agencies having a legitimate interest in the task force's mission can be very advantageous in terms of coordination, information sharing, and effective pooling of resources. The most critical decision, however, relates not necessarily to the size of overall participation, as participation can be structured, but rather to the size of the task force's governing body or control group. While the governing body's size will be influenced by the need for adequate participant representation, size should be guided by considerations relating to the strategic and tactical decisionmaking required, as well as the sensitivity of the criminal information and casework. Seven members appears to be optimal for most multijurisdictional task force governing body management mechanisms.

## Makeup

The selection of task force members and the task force governing bodies is not easy. As a general rule, agencies should be selected on the basis of their potential contribution to task force success, with those most important to success comprising the task force governing body. Task forces should provide for the addition of new participants or the deletion of existing members over the life of the task force.

In addition to jurisdictional considerations, task forces benefit from being interdisciplinary. An interdisciplinary task force is one that uses authorities other than criminal enforcement and prosecution. For example, a state or federal taxation authority might be included in a task force for the purpose of seizing assets, or a civil authority agency might be responsible for task force property forfeitures. Other regulatory agencies may also be of benefit to a task force, particularly in economic crime investigations.

A somewhat related though separate issue pertains to the suitability of agencies to work effectively in a task force setting. Long-standing rivalries or unsatisfactory records of past cooperation are important considerations in selecting task force participants. Task forces can ill afford to include sources of dissension solely to avoid offending them. On the other hand, historical animosities should be revisited as experience reveals many of these are without any legitimate foundation, and task force involvement often results in a wide range of information sharing and additional cooperative ventures.

Once initial approvals are obtained, task force participation should be reduced to writing in a formal agreement. To prevent misunderstandings later, the written agreement should incorporate as necessary the specific

capabilities to be made available by an agency and its acknowledgment of the general responsibilities of task force participation.

## **Management**

Next, task force operational activities must be made accountable and operate under the aegis of one or more duly constituted governmental entities. One of the most common ways of accomplishing this is to operate the task force under the authority of one of its member agencies. It is important, however, that the extent that other members participate in task force management be thoroughly understood and incorporated into the task force agreement. Although many federal task forces incorporating state and local agencies use a single agency/authoritarian management structure, other state or local task forces utilize participation models which allow member agencies to participate to some degree in task force decisions, such as setting task force priorities, target selection, and the formulation of policies and procedures.

Increasingly, task force success is dependent upon the task force agreements and processes. Many have formal agreements governing the disbursement of forfeited assets, but other formalities exist as well, such as requiring written investigative plans and budgets before task force resources are committed. Where member officers may be performing enforcement activities outside their own jurisdiction, and in the absence of statutory protections, liability agreements may be a prerequisite to participation.

## **Life Span of the Task Force**

Finally, task forces should have a life span—a specific period of time at the end of which the task force disbands or reorganizes. This allows the maximum opportunity for the participants to review the task force's accomplishments and the value of their continued participation, and allows for disbanding, or revising and restructuring, without undue stress among the participating members. In any case, a task force must have the ability to add or to remove members when the best interests of the task force are served.

## **Liability**

As statutory protections and insurance provisions covering liability may differ in each state and locale, liability issues should be addressed by the participating agencies in a task force. Although there are no guarantees that an agency will not be sued for the acts of another participating agency, a formal agreement stating that each agency will be responsible only for the acts of its members might at least serve as evidence of the intent of the task force participants. Liability issues should only be resolved by appropriate legal authorities of the participating agencies.

## IV. The OCN Program Model

### Two Task Force Models

After examining the strength and weakness of two decades of multijurisdictional task force operations, at least two new models for state and local task forces had evolved by the 1980s.

The first of these models may be characterized by a combining of law enforcement resources to perform street-level narcotics enforcement on a citywide, countywide, or regional basis. These task forces are often unique in that the participating agencies agree to a single chain of command and, dependent upon local laws and customs, agree to provide the requisite personnel and other resources. Often, the support for these task forces is derived from a pro rata formula or may be obtained from task force seizures and forfeitures. These task forces are activity-response oriented and, essentially, their purpose is to perform the enforcement function of the individual members on a collective or joint basis. Of course, the pooling of resources and expertise and the ability to operate in a larger geographic territory can yield new enforcement capabilities and, therefore, opportunities not available to a single agency.

The other new model that has evolved is investigative oriented, allowing members to conduct related street enforcement activities separately. This model more often than not involves local, state, and federal agencies as participants, as well as prosecutors.

There is a degree of similarity between these two models in terms of their motivation to form task forces, as well as influences on their organizations and performance. There are also differences: the former are by necessity more response oriented, whereas the latter tend to be more formal in their planning and strategies (the casework consumes more time and resources, and there is more emphasis on targeting criminal organizations, as well as the criminals involved).

In the remainder of this discussion, we will focus on one type: the investigative model task force. This model was developed by the Bureau of Justice Assistance as part of its Organized Crime Narcotics (OCN) Trafficking Enforcement Program. The model is known as the OCN Task Force. The OCN model incorporates new, innovative concepts into an experience-proven task force framework, and has relevance to both “activity-response” and “investigative” oriented task force development.

### Organizing an OCN Task Force

Although a number of law enforcement agencies may initiate interest in a multijurisdictional task force, generally only one agency assumes a leadership, organizing role in terms of having responsibility for the administrative details of establishing a task force. The designation of the organizing

agency is important, as it must not only be able to expend the necessary energies, resources, and administrative capabilities involved in organizing, but it must also be able to recruit other agencies essential to the task force. In the OCN Program, the organizing agency also serves as the “applicant” agency. In addition to the responsibilities of organization, the applicant agency also assumes the responsibilities of applying for and administering funds for use by the OCN task force. Absent specific authority to the contrary, any organizing agency of a task force supported by funding not supplied by the organizer would assume somewhat similar grant financial and administrative responsibilities.

Upon achieving operational status, OCN policy dictates that the applicant agency becomes only one of the equal voting members of the task force’s governing body or managing control group. This is a substantial departure from traditional task force management policies in that by having equal voting authority, a dominating operational agency is eliminated.

### **Establishing the Control Group**

Separate entity status is further ensured by the establishment of the managing Control Group, the governing body of the task force. The Control Group comprises command-level representatives from three different groups: state and local law enforcement agencies, federal law enforcement agencies, and state or federal prosecution agencies.

Each agency represented on the Control Group has one vote. In addition to the one agency—one equal vote characteristic of OCN task forces—there is another vital difference in the Control Group’s decisionmaking process: Control Group decisions must be approved by a unanimous vote of all Control Group members. Task force experience has indicated that where a majority rules there is a high risk of alienating the minority, and this too easily leads to factions and dissension within a task force. This dissension is obviously disruptive to the management and operational effectiveness of the task force; thus, the unanimous vote requirement in this successful model.

The Control Group’s size must be conducive to the management responsibilities and the sensitivity of case information. Even though the optimum size of a Control Group is considered to be seven agencies, additional agencies are not precluded from participating in individual case investigations. Once operational, task force activities often lead to inquiries from other local agencies desirous of participating in specific cases of mutual interest.

### **Policymaking and the Interagency Agreement**

First, the Control Group determines the purpose of the task force and expresses this purpose in specific, understandable, and measurable objectives. Second, the commitment of each member agency to fully participate and to assist in meeting these objectives is also determined. These

organizational matters are committed to writing in the form of an inter-agency agreement, and each member of the Control Group must register his or her concurrence by signing the agreement.

The Control Group addresses a number of other organizational matters, including the case selection process, expenditure of investigative funds, utilization of confidential informants, processing seizures of property, distributing forfeited assets, and media contacts including press releases.

Control Group decisions on these matters should be incorporated into written administrative and operational policies and promulgated to all participants. It is important that Control Group representatives be delegated authority by their parent agencies to promulgate and enforce policies governing task force activities and casework. As is the case in task force Control Group decisionmaking, these policies must be adopted unanimously by all Control Group members.

## **Case Selection**

A critical task is to establish case priorities and case selection criteria. The case selection criteria must be specific enough to effectively guide the development of successful candidate cases for task force adoption and investigation. Nonmember agencies interested in task force assistance will also need to be advised of the standards their cases must meet.

The objectives and investigative priorities of OCN multijurisdictional task forces generate cases which are usually more complex, involving higher level organized criminal activities. For example, one OCN Control Group's case selection criteria required that the targeted subjects:

- Be involved in a multijurisdictional operation;
- Have documented narcotics trafficking over a significant period of time;
- Have been previously investigated or prosecuted;
- Be involved in an organization that has an identifiable structure; and
- Be individuals who are themselves, or who are likely to lead investigators to those who are, involved in a higher level of organized criminal activity.

This Control Group also considers in its selection of cases the availability of witnesses and evidence, the potential for dismantling the criminal enterprise, the opportunity to pursue forfeiture or other civil relief against the criminal organization and its members, the impact of success upon the task force's enforcement priorities, and, in general, the opportunities for success.

## **Resource Allocation**

Once a case is accepted, the Control Group allocates investigative resources. In the OCN Program, investigative expense funds are provided for Control

Group allocation. Agencies presenting cases for task force adoption must also include an investigative budget setting forth estimated investigative expenses that are being requested from the Control Group's funds. Once the Control Group approves a case budget, it may allocate OCN funds to pay for information, contraband or other evidence, investigative travel, other costs of the investigation, and case overtime.

Although one of the participating agencies is designated the lead agency on each OCN case and is responsible for OCN case allocations, the Control Group retains overall responsibility until the termination of the case. In practice, once a case is approved, OCN funds are allocated in increments in accordance with the investigation's progress. Changes in funding requirements sometimes occur, and each revision requires formal case budget revision and Control Group approval.

The Control Group may also identify other resources that can be applied to a task force investigation. For example, if a particular investigation needs a secure undercover vehicle or an undercover officer from outside the jurisdiction or specific technical equipment, the resources can usually be provided by task force participants.

Task forces operating without OCN or similar grant funds that wish to emulate OCN Control Group investigative expense functions might consider monetary assessments from members, contributions of "seed" money from participants, or an asset forfeiture fund pool to provide a source for initial funding, with continuing funding provided from future forfeitures.

## **Case Plans**

In the OCN Program, cases considered for task force adoption must be presented in the form of a written case plan. Although case planning formats vary, most OCN Control Groups require seven elements:

- A summary of the case to date, with sufficient detail to make the summary self-explanatory;
- A list of the targets believed to be involved, with available identification and supportive information;
- A statement about why joint jurisdiction is believed necessary for investigative success;
- A proposed operational plan setting out specific investigative steps leading to a successful conclusion;
- A listing of those member and non-member agencies deemed necessary for a successful investigation;
- A description of the level of assistance expected from the task force participants in terms of personnel and other resources; and



- ❑ A case budget setting out all estimated costs of the investigation and the funding sources, if not OCN Control Group investigative expense funds, and the basis for the calculations.

After reviewing the case plan, the Control Group decides whether the case meets the selection criteria, and if so, whether the case plan is complete enough to adopt. If the Control Group agrees to undertake the case, and is satisfied that the participation levels required and necessary resources are available, one agency is appointed as the lead agency on the investigation. The lead agency is most often the original presenter of the case.

Once designated, the lead agency is responsible to the Control Group for managing the investigation, and routinely reports case progress and any problems, including additional resource needs, to the Control Group. The lead agency's case reporting procedures are generally used by all agencies working on the case, and the lead agency is responsible for the maintenance of all case files and evidence.

## **Case Oversight**

To monitor the status and assess progress in all active cases, the OCN Control Group meets as often as required, but it should meet at least once every 30 days. At these Control Group meetings the lead agencies present case progress reports including additional funding requests, significant developments or changes, and problems. Minutes of the meeting should be prepared and distributed to participants.

As the Control Group retains authority over all cases, it can redirect stalled investigations by providing additional resources or otherwise amend the case plan. The Control Group can also change the designation of the lead agency if the best interests of the case dictate, or order an early termination of a case when promising investigative leads are exhausted.

## **Task Force Performance Measures**

The ultimate question is whether a task force has fulfilled its purpose and met its objectives. In multijurisdictional task force efforts, as in other law enforcement endeavors, it is often difficult to quantify results such as enhanced information sharing, communication, cooperation, and understanding between law enforcement and prosecuting agencies. Nevertheless, task forces can adopt quantifiable objectives which adequately demonstrate performance to the participants, parent governments and sponsors, and the general public. Some examples of measurable objectives are:

- ❑ Number of cases presented to the Control Group for consideration and their disposition;
- ❑ Number of cases managed by the Control Group;

- ❑ Number of arrests or indictments and the percentage of arrests that result in guilty pleas or convictions;
- ❑ Dollar value and amount of contraband and forfeitable property seized as a result of task force investigations; and
- ❑ The number of criminal organizations and leaders investigated and the results in terms of disruption and elimination.

## **V. Conclusion**

The new multijurisdictional task force is the result of serious thought and analysis about collective law enforcement efforts that are successful and those that are not. The task force model described here is probably more structured and formal than many of those which currently exist, but the structure and formality help to bring law enforcement agencies together and provide a way to unite against previously insurmountable crime problems. Although not all the OCN features may be applicable to every task force, they do represent current thinking in task force organization and operations based upon field testing and proven performance.

# Guideline

## Funding and Administration of the Organized Crime Narcotics Trafficking Enforcement Program

- I. **PURPOSE.** The purpose of this guideline is to provide information and guidance concerning the funding and administration of the Organized Crime Narcotics Trafficking Enforcement Program. This guideline is complemented by additional regulations, guidelines, instructions, and policies such as the current edition of the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) Guideline Manual M 7100.1, Financial and Administrative Guide for Grants.
- II. **SCOPE.** This guideline is of interest to state and local criminal agencies involved in the administration and implementation of the Organized Crime Narcotics Trafficking Enforcement Program.
- III. **AUTHORITY.** The Justice Assistance Act of 1984, Public Law 98–473 (October 12, 1984), 42 U.S.C. 3711 et seq., and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Subtitle K–State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1986, Public Law 99–570 (October 27, 1986) authorizes the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) within the Office of Justice Programs to award discretionary grants to public and nonprofit agencies. The Organized Crime Narcotics Trafficking Enforcement Program, hereinafter named the Organized Crime Narcotics (OCN) Program, is a demonstration program announced under the above-authorized criminal justice discretionary grant program. This guideline replaces the former guideline.
- IV. **PROGRAM GOAL.** The goal of the OCN Program is to enhance, through an assured management approach to joint operations, the ability of federal, state, and local criminal justice agencies to remove specifically targeted major narcotics trafficking conspiracies and offenders through investigation, arrest, prosecution, and conviction. The Program will formally structure and centrally coordinate multijurisdictional activities, resources, and functions of law enforcement agencies in the successful investigation and prosecution of complex multijurisdictional crimes and their perpetrators.

In some jurisdictions the OCN Program is complemented by a Statewide Drug Prosecution (SDP) Program. Both programs include as their goal the enhancement of the ability of criminal justice agencies to investigate and prosecute major narcotics conspiracies. Because of the close association between the goals of these programs, where OCN and SDP projects are co-located, cooperation and coordination will be required. Applicants requesting funding should

indicate their willingness to cooperate in joint OCN and SDP efforts as appropriate. Specific requirements related to coordination will be established by BJA on a project-by-project basis.

In some jurisdictions, an OCN project may be co-located with a Financial Investigations (Finvest) Program project. The projects should be mutually supporting and the OCN project considered a major source of cases for the Finvest effort.

- V. PROGRAM FUNDING FOCUS.** The focus of this program is directed to the provision of investigative resources for organized crime narcotics investigations. Program funds for Basic OCN projects will be used for investigative costs only, and not for items such as salaries, fringe benefits, equipment, contractual services, or construction. When specifically approved, program funds for payment of costs associated with overtime are provided within an optional Operational Support Component and for personnel within a Financial Investigations Component. (See paragraph VII for further information.)

**VI. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION.**

**A. Problem Analysis.** Drug trafficking is a root cause of violence and major crime in our cities and rural areas alike. Development of successful cases against narcotics trafficking conspiracies and offenders requires multiagency investigative efforts. The diffusion of responsibility among federal, state, and local jurisdictions for organized crime and narcotics control works to the advantage of the criminal groups. Major criminal conspiracies often span jurisdictional boundaries to the extent that two or more state or local jurisdictions may be required to respond to the same offense or conspirators. The enforcement community's response to the conspiracy/offense may be fragmented, duplicative, counterproductive, or limited, resulting in lack of prosecution or a reduction in the level of conspirator investigated and prosecuted. A formal mechanism whereby shared interdisciplinary resources are centrally coordinated can work to immobilize targeted offenders who manage these networks and organizations.

**B. Results Sought.** It is expected that successful implementation of projects within the OCN Program will achieve some or all of the following results:

1. Development of an overall enforcement strategy which includes identification and targeting of major narcotics trafficking conspiracies for priority enforcement action, planning of all human and technical resources required to pursue the investigation and prosecution of individuals involved in those conspiracies, and active involvement of agencies necessary to pursue those conspiracies.

2. Selection of a management system for the shared coordination and direction of personnel, financial, equipment, and technical resources for the investigation and prosecution of targeted conspirators in support of the project's overall enforcement strategy. OCN project success is attributed to comprehensive planning and coordination.
3. Investigation and prosecution of major multijurisdictional conspirators.
4. Reduction of fractional and duplicative investigations and prosecutions.
5. Promotion of civil remedies and recovery of criminal assets (e.g., assets acquired with funds traceable to criminal activity; assets used in the commission of crime; contraband and stolen property).
6. Cooperation and coordination of efforts, as appropriate, among OCN projects, BJA-funded SDP projects, and BJA-funded FINVEST projects.

## VII. PROGRAM STRATEGY AND COMPONENTS.

**A. Strategy.** The strategy of the OCN Program is twofold: to promote a multiagency enforcement response—including a prosecutive strategy—to commonly shared major narcotics trafficking crimes throughout a multijurisdictional area and to establish a formal mechanism whereby investigative and prosecutive resources can be allocated, focused, and managed on a shared basis to target offenses and offenders. The adoption of the required administrative and operational components specified in Paragraph VII B serves as the means by which this strategy is implemented. Critical to the success of this program is a management system of shared enforcement resources which includes the following elements:

1. Establishment of criteria to identify, select, and prioritize investigative targets.
2. Assignment of cases for initiation of investigation and subsequent prosecution.
3. Identification, acquisition, and assignment of resources and skills required in the investigative and prosecutorial process throughout the duration of the case.
4. Coordination and monitoring of the cases to ensure proper timing of investigative and prosecutorial activities and facilitate decisionmaking concerning case continuance, referrals, redirection, and closure.

**B. Administrative, Operational, and Optional Components.** Each project must initiate required administrative and operational components. Those applying for the optional component of Operational Support must structure this element to support the required administrative and operational components of the program.

1. Administrative (Required). Every project must be made up of a formally organized group of participating agencies, one of which is the applicant agency and another the management control group.

A) Participating Agencies. Each project will be composed of participating agencies which must include as a minimum a federal agency and a state and/or local agency. Because these are federal funds and because of DEA's significant enforcement role, their inclusion in the control group of each OCN project is mandatory. One of the participants must be a prosecutive agency. Each senior agency administrator of the participating agencies will sign a formal intergovernmental agreement or memorandum of understanding affirming his or her intent to fully participate in the management and operations of the project. The agreement should be simply stated and brief, but it should contain the goals and objectives of the project, contributions anticipated by the participants, and a projected date of when the need for continuation of the project is to be re-evaluated. One of the state or local participating agencies will serve as the applicant agency, which accepts responsibility for project administrative and financial matters. Agencies may fully participate in OCN casework without being members of the control group.

B) Control Group. Each project must have a control group that is composed of senior operations managers representing those agencies expected to be most involved in cases conducted by the project. DEA and the prosecutive agency must be control group members. Experience has shown that for most effective decisionmaking, the control group should consist of not more than seven members. The size of the control group does not, however, limit the number of agencies that can work on a case. The control group will establish policies to: select cases to be investigated; allocate, direct, and manage project resources; and jointly manage project investigations. The control group must meet regularly, not only to consider new investigations, but to evaluate and monitor ongoing cases. Experience has shown that the case oversight process must be formal and should cover prosecutive developments as well as investigative progress. Members of the group will have an

equal vote on all matters before the group, and their decisions must be unanimous. Minutes will be taken for all meetings.

- C) Case Management. The program has shown that the control group can operate a wide variety of configurations and can handle organized crime narcotics investigations without interfering with or diminishing their street-level enforcement activities. Each case that is approved for investigative funding by the project control group is assigned to a single or “lead” agency who is responsible to the control group for the management and conduct of that case. Each case, however, involves the personnel and other resources of at least two or more participating agencies. The proposed case investigative plans specify the expected staffing required, as well as which case agency will be “lead” agency. Lead agencies designate agency procedures to be followed and are responsible for the administration of case funds and for compliance with case reporting procedures. Some case investigations will lead to cooperation with and possible inclusion into the control group of additional law enforcement agencies. This cooperation and expansion of participating agencies, including changes to the control group, is an allowable action as part of this program but must be approved by the control group.
2. Operational (Required). The following are operational activities or requirements of each project funded under this program:
- A) Each project must provide formal procedures and processes governing the conduct of project activities including target selection, allocation of resources, investigative and prosecution plans, and case selection.
  - B) Each project must be capable of conducting coordinated investigations and prosecution of selected targets in a timely and thorough manner.
  - C) All enforcement operations initiated under the project must be based upon a formal investigative/prosecutive plan setting forth case objectives, resources, specific activities of the enforcement actions to be taken and those agencies conducting the activities, and a prosecutive strategy.
  - D) Funds for basic OCN projects will be used to support project investigations for such purposes as rental of vehicles, surveillance costs (excluding personnel), purchase of supplies, purchase of contraband, investigative travel, and purchase of information.

- E) There must be state and/or local agency participation in each project case.
  - F) There must be federal agency participation in each project case.
  - G) Every project is require to fully coordinate with U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration efforts and those of U.S. Department of Justice Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces that may operate in the geographic areas of the project. The method by which this coordination is to be accomplished must be described in the application.
  - H) Unanimous consent of the control group is required to initiate funding of project investigations.
3. Optional Components. Operational Support and Financial Investigations Components will be made available to selected projects under the following conditions.
- A) Operational Support. An Operational Support Component may be made available to selected OCN projects for the payment of overtime costs for personnel working on approved OCN project cases. Operational Support funds will not be used to establish new positions or to pay regular salaries of current employees. Operational Support funds will be made available based generally on the following criteria:
    - 1) Provision of justification by the applicant that the type of cases to be investigated with funding provided by the OCN Program cannot be successfully pursued to the maximum extent possible without operational support;
    - 2) Lack of available funds from existing resources;
    - 3) The likelihood of these funds contributing to the accomplishment of project goals;
    - 4) Submission of overtime policies and procedures that will govern the use of these funds by the project, including the provision that payment for overtime for any OCN case will be approved by the case supervisor;
    - 5) Assurance that documentation will be included in the case investigative plan establishing that operational support funds are necessary for the specific case and approval of same by the control group; and



- 6) Operational Support funds are to be used only for approved OCN cases. Supervisors should ensure that where a requisite number of hours are required for eligibility for overtime, the majority of those hours are incurred on OCN cases.
- B) Financial Investigations. Additional allocations of funds may be made available to certain OCN projects to implement a Financial Investigations Component. The establishment of this component would accomplish the following:
- 1) Increase the number of narcotics-related financial crime investigations and prosecutions; and
  - 2) Develop a comprehensive operational approach to the identification of financial resources related to narcotics trafficking and the investigation and prosecution of those individuals involved, including the recovery of assets related to criminal activity.

Funds would be provided to develop a comprehensive, proactive law enforcement approach involving the tracing of narcotics-related financial transactions, analysis of the movement of currency, identification of criminal financial structures and money laundering schemes, asset forfeiture administration (civil remedies), and the provision of financial investigation and analysis techniques training.

Funding for financial investigations components implemented will provide each funded project a core financial investigations staff including investigators/accountants and analysts. The staff members will undergo extensive specialized training in financial investigative techniques, analytical techniques, asset forfeiture, and elements of financial crimes. Personnel costs including fringe benefits and indirect expenses will be allowed. In addition, funds will be approved for office furniture, supplies, rent for office space, and travel expenses for investigative and training purposes.

To support each component, limited funding for micro-computer hardware and software will be provided for financial investigations tracking, analysis, and reporting for cases directly related to OCN Program activities. Additional support will also provide for investigative accountant consultants for onsite advice and instruction during formative periods.

In addition to the criteria specified in paragraph X under PROJECT SITE/OPTIONAL COMPONENT SELECTION, the criteria to be used in selecting applicants to receive Financial Investigations Component funding will be based on those applicants that clearly specify how funds will be used to target investigations that focus on:

- 1) Uncovering how funding is raised for the illegal purchase of drugs and who provides such funding;
- 2) Discovering how profits from illegal drug transactions are laundered;
- 3) Identifying profits resulting from illegal drug trafficking;
- 4) Identifying assets acquired from illegal drug trafficking; and
- 5) Seizing assets gained from illegal drug trafficking under RICO or Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE), or similar state statutes.

The Financial Investigations Component must operate totally under the project control group, including required participation of a federal agency, approval of a case plan, allocation of resources, and unanimous case approval of the control group.

- VIII. ELIGIBILITY TO RECEIVE AWARDS.** One of the participating agencies from each operational project will serve as the applicant agency and be the award recipient from the Bureau of Justice Assistance.
- IX. DEADLINE FOR SUBMISSION OF APPLICATIONS.** Applications for OCN funds must be submitted as specified by application instructions.
- X. PROJECT SITE/OPTIONAL COMPONENT SELECTION.** The Bureau of Justice Assistance will select OCN project sites based on the following criteria:
- A.** In the multijurisdictional area being proposed, the nature and magnitude of conspiratorial drug crime;
  - B.** The capacity and experience of the participating agencies to conduct a complete and fully coordinated project component;
  - C.** Potential for joint agency management and direction of investigations and prosecution, including the presentation of signed interagency agreements;
  - D.** The presence of a coordinated approach to the crime problem;

- E. The use of standardized procedures for information collection and dissemination, for joint case administration, and for investigative techniques;
  - F. Proposed criteria to be used in the selection and prosecution of cases; and
  - G. The anticipated impact on the crime problem and the criminal justice system.
- XI. DOLLAR RANGE AND NUMBER OF CONTRACTS.** Approximately 20 awards ranging from \$100,000 to \$200,000 are anticipated. Length of the award is 12 months.
- XII. COST SHARING.** Projects will be funded up to 100 percent of total project costs. Projects are encouraged to obtain and utilize other resources to the maximum extent possible for the purpose of augmenting project operations.
- XIII. APPLICATION REQUIREMENTS.** The application process begins with the submission of an application to the Bureau of Justice Assistance. Once the preliminary project site has received initial eligibility approval by BJA, the applicant may receive a site visit and be requested to submit further information and application details prior to final selection and approval by BJA.
- A. Preparation.** All applications must be prepared on the forms attached as appendices to this guideline.
  - B. Content.** The following information must be included in the application:
    - 1. Project Narrative. Each applicant will present its project narrative in the following format:
      - A) Description of the multijurisdictional investigative and prosecutorial problems and needs to be addressed by the project.
      - B) Description of project goals and objectives to be achieved.
        - 1) The project goals should be consistent with the program goal set forth in this Guideline.
        - 2) Objectives must describe quantifiable achievements to the extent possible for each of the project components set forth in this Guideline.
    - C) Description of project operations to include administrative decisionmaking structure (including organizational chart).

- D) Description of milestones/major achievements to be accomplished and time frames.
  - E) List of participating agencies, and the reason why they were selected for the project, their anticipated role, and the resources they may devote to the project.
2. Budget Narrative. Applicants for project funds must submit on separate sheets a budget narrative which details by budget category. The purpose of the budget narrative is to relate items budgeted to project activities and to provide justification and explanation for budget items, including criteria and cost data used to arrive at the estimates for each budget category. The following information is provided to assist the applicant in developing the budget narrative.
- A) Personnel Category. NOTE: THIS CATEGORY IS ONLY FOR THE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT AND FINANCIAL INVESTIGATIONS COMPONENTS. For the total amount requested in this line item, break out dollar amounts for:
    - 1) Overtime salary.
    - 2) Financial Investigations Component salaries: list each position by title (and name of employee, if available); show annual salary rate and percentage of time to be devoted to the project by employee. Compensation paid to employees engaged in project-assisted activities must be consistent with that paid for similar work in other activities of the applicant.
  - B) Fringe Benefits. Indicate each type of benefit included.
  - C) Travel Category. Travel must comply with OJP M7100.1C, Financial and Administrative Guide for Grants.
    - 1) Identify the tentative location of all travel whenever possible.
    - 2) Applicants should consult such references as the Official Airline Guide and the Hotel and Motel Redbook in projecting travel costs to obtain competitive rates.
    - 3) Administrative travel. Administrative travel is defined as travel performed by participating agency employees to attend or participate in meetings, conferences, training, etc., or to perform liaison services to other projects or agencies. Applicants should budget funds in this category for two trips to a central U.S. location by approximately two members of the project control group to attend meetings with

other OCN projects. Itemize travel expenses of personnel by purpose and show basis of per diem computation (e.g., departmental per diem rate). EXAMPLE: "One trip for one person to attend OCN project meeting. Transportation at \$400 and 3 days per diem at the Massachusetts state rate of \$100 = \$700."

- 4) Investigative Travel. Investigative travel includes travel and transportation expenses for a non-federal investigator pursuing overt aspects of an approved OCN investigation.
  - a. Itemize investigative travel expenses of personnel by purpose (e.g., interview witnesses, conduct records search) and show basis for computation.
  - b. Undercover travel should be budgeted under "Purchase of Services" under the "Confidential Funds" category (see paragraph F(1)).
- D) Supplies. List items within this category by major type and show basis for computation. Provide unit or monthly estimates.
- E) Construction Category. No project funds may be allowed for construction or renovation.
- F) Other. Include direct expense items such as rent, reproduction, telephone, and janitorial expenses. List items by major type with basis or computation shown. (Provide square footage and cost per square foot for rent. Provide local and long-distance telephone charges separately.)
  - 1) Confidential Funds. Confidential expenditures are herein defined as funds used for purchase of services, purchase of contraband to be used for evidence (physical), and purchase of information. (See Appendix 11, OJP M7100.1C CHG 1.)
  - 2) The budgeting for and use of confidential expenditures under this program should only be allocated to support investigations approved by the control group when funds are not available from the participating agencies involved in the investigation and have not already been committed by the participating agency.
    - a. Purchase of Services (P/S). This category includes covert travel or transportation for an informant or for a non-federal officer in an undercover capacity for investigation purposes. Itemize travel expenses of personnel by purpose

(e.g., arrange delivery, debrief informant) and show basis of computation. The lease of an apartment, business front, luxury-type automobile, aircraft or boat, or similar effects to create or establish the appearance of affluence are also included. Meals, beverages, entertainment, and similar expenses for undercover purposes, within reasonable limits, are part of this category.

b. Purchase of Evidence (P/E). This category includes payment for evidence and/or contraband such as drugs, firearms, stolen property, counterfeit tax stamps, required to determine the existence of a crime or to establish the identity of a participant in a crime.

c. Purchase of Specific Information (P/I). This category includes the payment of monies to an informant for specific information.

G) Indirect Costs. BJA may accept the most recent indirect cost rate approved for an applicant by a federal agency. Applicants must enclose a copy of the approved rate agreement with the application.

3. Supporting Documents. As a minimum, the following documents must be submitted during the application process:

A) Certification that the applicant agency has a current Equal Employment Opportunity Program (EEO) which meets the requirements of 28 CFR 42.301, et seq. This requirement applies to applicant agencies that have 50 or more employees, have received contracts of more than \$25,000, and have a service population with a minority representation of 3 percent or more.

B) Certification signed by the appropriate authority indicating compliance with the Office of Justice Programs Guideline on the Use and Control of Confidential Funds, Page 2, Appendix 11, M 7100.1.

C) A signed formal intergovernmental agreement.

D) Certification signed by the appropriate authority indicating compliance with the Office of Justice Programs requirements regarding Debarment, Suspension, and Other Responsibility Matters—Primary Covered Transactions.

E) Certification signed by the appropriate authority indicating compliance with the Office of Justice Programs requirements regarding a Drug-Free Workplace.

- F) Certification signed by the appropriate authority indicating compliance with the Office of Justice Programs requirements regarding Disclosure of Lobbying Activities.
- XIV. REPORTS.** Reporting requirements for projects awarded under the OCN Program are articulated in the current edition of M 7100.1, Financial and Administrative Guide for Grants. Copies of all reports submitted to BJA must be submitted to the Institute for Intergovernmental Research.
- XV. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS.**
- A. Prohibition Against Lobbying.** All activities under the contract, including oral and written participating agency actions and direct or indirect congressional contact, shall be made in accordance with the anti-lobbying provision of the current edition of the Financial and Administrative Guide for Grants M 7100.1, as interpreted by Office of Justice Assistance, Research and Statistics, Office of General Counsel Legal Opinions Nos. 74-1, 75-45, and 77-30.
- B. Cooperation With Program Data Collection.** Each project will be required to maintain program data elements as determined in cooperation with program evaluation and monitoring efforts.

# Bureau of Justice Assistance Information

---

## General Information

Callers may contact the U.S. Department of Justice Response Center for general information or specific needs, such as assistance in submitting grants applications and information on training. To contact the Response Center, call 1-800-421-6770 or write to 1100 Vermont Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20005.

## Indepth Information

For more indepth information about BJA, its programs, and its funding opportunities, requesters can call the BJA Clearinghouse. The BJA Clearinghouse, a component of the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS), shares BJA program information with State and local agencies and community groups across the country. Information specialists are available to provide reference and referral services, publication distribution, participation and support for conferences, and other networking and outreach activities. The Clearinghouse can be reached by:

- Mail**  
P.O. Box 6000  
Rockville, MD 20849-6000
- Visit**  
2277 Research Boulevard  
Rockville, MD 20850
- Telephone**  
1-800-688-4252  
Monday through Friday  
8:30 a.m. to 7 p.m.  
eastern time
- Fax**  
301-519-5212
- Fax on Demand**  
1-800-688-4252
- BJA Home Page**  
<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA>
- NCJRS World Wide Web**  
<http://www.ncjrs.org>
- E-mail**  
[askncjrs@ncjrs.org](mailto:askncjrs@ncjrs.org)
- JUSTINFO Newsletter**  
E-mail to [listproc@ncjrs.org](mailto:listproc@ncjrs.org)  
Leave the subject line blank  
In the body of the message,  
type:  
subscribe justinfo  
[your name]

The logo for the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) features the letters 'BJA' in a large, bold, serif font. The letters are black and set against a white background.



# BJA World Wide Web Address

FOR A COPY OF THIS DOCUMENT ONLINE,  
AS WELL AS MORE INFORMATION ON BJA,  
CHECK THE BJA HOME PAGE AT  
<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA>

**U.S. Department of Justice**  
Office of Justice Programs  
*Bureau of Justice Assistance*

*Washington, D.C. 20531*

Official Business  
Penalty for Private Use \$300

PRESORTED STANDARD  
POSTAGE & FEES PAID  
DOJ/BJA  
PERMIT NO. G-91

