CR 2002/25 (traduction)

CR 2002/25 (translation)

Jeudi 21 mars 2002 à 15 heures

Thursday 21 March 2002 at 3 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is open and we are meeting today to hear the observations of Cameroon, first on the subject-matter of the intervention of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea on the occasion of the second round of oral argument devoted to that topic. Then the presentation and reading of Cameroon's final submissions. Without further ado, I give the floor to Professor Alain Pellet.

Mr. PELLET:

I. THE EFFECTS OF THE INTERVENTION

Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, Members of the Court,

1. During this short, too short, hour and a half, Professor Maurice Kamto and myself are going to try and reply, on certain points, both to the observations made yesterday by the representatives of Equatorial Guinea and to those presented the day before yesterday on behalf of Nigeria. Also, Mr. Amadou Ali, Agent of Cameroon, will make a final declaration before, as I said, reading the submissions of the Republic of Cameroon.

2. Mr. President, the intervening State has reverted at length to the effects of its intervention, or rather, to the ones it appears to fear above all, to the effects of the decision you are to make. It is to this aspect of its oral argument that I shall seek to respond, as well as to some of the remarks made on Tuesday by my very dear friend Professor Abi-Saab.

3. I note, moreover, that despite the protestations of the Agent of Equatorial Guinea, his country is, objectively seen, in the same interest as Nigeria. And, indeed, Nigeria was not mistaken: it devoted its entire "reply" to the observations of Equatorial Guinea to . . . adding to its oral argument against Cameroon. And I must say that the Respondent actually has no reason to complain about the intervening State, which is generously ceding to it a maritime territory of some 430 km^2, on which Nigeria itself has no claim, but which manifestly belongs to Cameroon. I shall revert to this.

4. Since, as has most aptly been said, your time is precious and ours is limited, the easiest thing is probably to identify first the points of agreement between the three interested States, then going on to focus on the ones which still divide them.

5. What are we agreed on?

— First on the non-binding nature of the judgment you are going to deliver for Equatorial Guinea, which wished to be a third party to the proceedings (see CR 2002/23, p. 18, para. 3, Mr. Abi-Saab or CR 2002/24, p. 23, para. 12, Mr. Dupuy);

— then on the fact that your judgment must preserve the rights of Equatorial Guinea in their entirety (CR 2002/23, p. 21, paras. 16-17, Mr. Abi-Saab; CR 2002/24, p. 24, para. 14, Mr. Dupuy);

— settling the dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria in full (CR 2002/23, p. 21, paras. 17-18, Mr. Abi-Saab);

— we are also, apparently, agreed on Professor Dupuy's conclusion of yesterday afternoon, to the effect that you cannot pass judgment on the submissions of the Parties which would directly dispute the rights of the third parties (CR 2002/23, p. 35, para. 31, Mr. Crawford; CR 2002/24, p. 30, para. 27, Mr. Dupuy);

— and also, I believe, on the impossibility for you of fixing a tripoint (CR 2002/23, p. 24, para. 23, Mr. Abi-Saab; CR 2002/24, p. 31, para. 7, Mr. Colson).

6. These, Mr. President, are major points of agreement in intellectual, theoretical and doctrinal terms; but it must be acknowledged that we draw very different and sometimes opposite concrete conclusions from them. The essential reason for this is that, although both our opponents appear to accept that you can and must settle the dispute between the Parties completely and effectively (this is the third point of agreement I have just identified), they only concede this reluctantly, without visibly really wanting to do so — probably for different reasons: Nigeria has never resigned itself to your effectively exercising your jurisdiction; Equatorial Guinea is fearful of seeing its claims checked and its freedom of negotiation limited.

7. I therefore come now to the points which continue to divide us. They relate to two major questions:

(1) What are the consequences for Equatorial Guinea of the judgment you are called upon to deliver?

(2) Bearing these consequences in mind what, on the one hand, can you do? What, on the other hand, should you not do?

1. The consequences of the judgment for Equatorial Guinea

8. Georges Abi-Saab and Pierre Dupuy have both stressed the fact: the judgment you are going to deliver, Members of the Court, will be *res inter alios judicata* for Equatorial Guinea (CR 2002/23, p. 18, para. 3, (Abi-Saab), or CR 2002/24, p. 23, para. 12, (Dupuy)). There is no arguing with this proposition. But it is valid for any State which is not party to the proceedings. For Equatorial Guinea, for Sao Tome and Principe or for Nepal.

9. Yet who does not feel that these three States are not in exactly the same position? Nepal is a "third party"; the legal adviser of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs is no doubt following your discussions almost in real time by each day connecting to the Internet and will carefully study your judgment in search of a determination of the rules of law relating to maritime delimitation set out in it with all the authority vested in your decisions.

10. Sao Tome and Principe is also a third State; but one more directly concerned: the equitable line runs not far from the joint development zone which it created with Nigeria by the Treaty of 21 February 2001; and, by your Judgment of 11 June 1998, you recognized the entitlement of that country — I am referring to Sao Tome and Principe — to intervene. It did not see fit to avail itself of that opportunity. But the fact nevertheless remains that, in accordance with your settled case law, you will ensure that its rights are not infringed by your judgments — which would run counter to the fundamental principle of the consensual nature of your jurisdiction.

11. It goes without saying, Mr. President, that the same applies where Equatorial Guinea is concerned. It is a third State as regards the proceedings; as such, like Sao Tome and Principe, it has the right that you should not settle the dispute (one distinct from the dispute before you), which there may be between itself and either of the other Parties. But I think that, in this respect, Professor Dupuy is wrong when he states: "While the very institution of intervention under Article 62 requires the Court to take account of the rights of the intervening third State, it is precisely in order not to adjudicate upon them or to prejudge them." (CR 2002/24, pp. 25-26, para. 16). Not at all, Mr. President, this does not flow from Article 62! It is a consequence of the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court which protects the rights of all third States, whether they intervene (as non-parties) or not. This is not "the very logic of . . . intervention", as Pierre-Marie Dupuy also said (*ibid*., p. 23, para. 12); it is quite simply the effect of *res judicata*.

12. This being so, Equatorial Guinea is also an *intervening* State, and I insist that this must mean something; that it has an effect. But what effect? None of our opponents tells you. But we do. It seems to us, in fact, that by resorting to intervention, Equatorial Guinea has not only won the right to inform you about everything it considers to be its rights, but also to be informed, if I may say so, on the rebound, of the scope which you yourselves assign to them. This is what I meant when I referred the other day to the "risk of law": because you are now fully informed of the position of the intervening State, you can, by the same token, fully appreciate the limit of its rights.

13. Where Sao Tome and Principe is concerned, you may be mistaken — it would of course not occur to me that you could be fallible, Members of the Court! But this country has not informed you of what it considers the situation to be and this lack of information may be a source of mistaken interpretation. This is the risk of "non-law", of non-intervention. On the other hand, where the intervening State is concerned, your "infallibility" cannot be called into question: you *know* what the precise extent of its rights is; you can therefore ensure that they are fully respected; and can do so *because* you are fully informed.

14. This, Mr. President, seems to us to be the object and indeed the very reason for the intervention under Article 62 of the Statute. By having recourse to it, a law-abiding State takes no other risks than of enabling you to precisely assess the scope of its own rights — yet without your ruling on the dispute which the intervening State may have with either of the Parties, and without this assessment being *res judicata.* This was the rationale behind the idea I put forward, and still do so, that, where Equatorial Guinea is concerned, your judgment might be compared to an advisory opinion: it will indicate which are the parts of the maritime zone concerned in which Equatorial Guinea cannot claim any rights whatever without at the same time settling the dispute between Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon (since it claims no longer to have any dispute with Nigeria and with good reason, the two States having reached an agreement to the detriment of the rights of Cameroon!). I would add that it is not correct to say that we are asking the Court "to mark the existence of a situation harmful to the third State", as claimed by Mr. Dupuy (CR 2002/24, pp. 23-24, para. 13): recognizing the situation as it is in law is clearly not, and cannot be, "prejudicial" to anybody — it is the recognition of a fact. And moreover, Mr. President, this is tantamount to saying that the States which submit cases to the Court are to some extent "victims"

of your judgments (this was clearly the thrust of my friend Pierre Dupuy's remarks) and would *a priori* find themselves in a situation more prejudicial than those which refrain from doing so. With your permission, I shall not follow him on this point.

15. Let me, if I may, put this another way, as we attach a certain importance to it. The three States agree that the judgment which the Court is called upon to deliver must not prejudice the rights of Equatorial Guinea. But to ensure that this is so, the Court must clearly have determined the scope of these rights and can do so more precisely with respect to an intervening State than with respect to a third State not intervening. And the intervening State thereby suffers no "prejudice"; it is simply enlightened as regards the scope of its rights.

16. Professor Dupuy accuses me (CR 2002/24, p. 21, para. 7) of having frankly acknowledged that "Equatorial Guinea's legal interests 'will necessarily be affected' by the Court's decision" (cf. CR 2002/22, p. 23, para. 16) — an expression which, moreover, was simply borrowed from the Judgment of the Chamber of the Court of 13 September 1990 concerning Nicaragua's intervention in the case between El Salvador and Honduras (*I.C.J. Reports 1990*, p. 122, para. 73).

17. A small parenthesis on that case, on which counsel for Equatorial Guinea dwelt at considerable length (CR 2002/24, pp. 24-25, para. 16). He stressed what differentiates it from the one we are concerned with here and I am certainly not seeking to place them on a par. But the case which gave rise to the 1990 Judgment is nevertheless full of lessons: indeed the Chamber did not scruple to rule "positively" on the rights of the intervening third party, Nicaragua, which it expressly stated — and as Pierre-Marie Dupuy very honestly notes — that it had rights of "joint sovereignty" over the waters of the Gulf of Fonseca, on the same basis as the two parties to the case. There is no need to go as far in this case; you have no need to state what the rights of Equatorial Guinea are, only what they are not.

18. The fact is that there is no doubt that the legal interests of that country will necessarily be affected by your judgment (even though to a lesser extent to those of Nicaragua by the 1992 Judgment). They will be affected, like, admittedly, those of any State, as territorial delimitations have an objective significance and are binding on all. When you have indicated where the maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria runs, all the other States, including

but not only Equatorial Guinea, will know that, on either side of this line, there is a Cameroonian maritime area on the one hand, and a Nigerian maritime area on the other. On the other hand, what they will not know is how far, on either side of this line, the sovereign rights of each of the Parties extend — and this is what my colleague Maurice Mendelson meant when he asserted "emphatically" that "upholding Cameroon's line [does not] necessarily mean that all waters to the south of it belong automatically to Cameroon" (CR 2002/23, p. 52, para. 16). Despite what Georges Abi-Saab (CR 2002/23, p. 25, para. 25) and Pierre-Marie Dupuy (CR 2002/24, pp. 27-28, para. 22) sought to believe, this quite simply means that, south of this line, there is a Cameroonian maritime area then, further on, an area falling within the jurisdiction of Equatorial Guinea, with effect from another line which it is not possible for you to determine, Members of the Court, because it is not the subject-matter of this dispute. It is the subject-matter of the dispute between Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon.

19. This, Mr. President, enables us to reply fairly briefly, as Maurice Kamto is going to return to the other two questions I raised just now but from a different angle: what can you do, Members of the Court in concrete terms in this case? And what should you not do? It being understood — and this is extremely important — that everything you can do, you must do, since it is your task to rule as completely as possible on the dispute before you.

2. The Court's power of decision

20. What you must not do is quite easy to describe: you cannot settle the existing disputes — this is clear now — between Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea with respect to their common boundary. And it is for this among other reasons that you could not a fix tripoint — even accepting that such a point existed, which let me repeat, we do not believe.

21. It has been said — and I even think I may have said it myself, but one can change — that this reason was associated with the fact that Equatorial Guinea had refused to become an intervening *party*. On reflection, I do not think that this is the principal reason for your duty to refrain: a tripoint is an intersection between two lines; in this case, you can, you even must determine the line which separates the maritime areas belonging to Cameroon from those

belonging to Nigeria; on the other hand, you cannot make a ruling on the maritime boundary between Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea.

22. [Projection No. 1 — sketch-map No. 161.] A brief graphic illustration of this, Mr. President, if you will allow me. According to Cameroon, the boundary between the maritime areas falling within its jurisdiction and those belonging to Nigeria is the equitable line — it is shown in red on this sketch-map, whose general lines you are familiar with, which is being shown behind me and which is No. 161 in the judges' folder. Hence, if there were to be a tripoint, it would lie somewhere on this line, at the intersection of the maritime boundary, which you cannot determine, between Cameroon and Nigeria.

23. Yet one thing is absolutely certain: if this tripoint exists, it cannot, even in anyone's wildest dreams, be the quite excessive claims of Equatorial Guinea on sector H-H' — H being, let me remind you, an equidistance point between Cameroon and Nigeria, but further from the coasts of Bioko than from the coasts of these two States, and H' being, for its part, the point of intersection of the equitable line with the equidistance line drawn between Bioko and the mainland. In other words, Mr. President, Equatorial Guinea has absolutely nothing to say where this portion is concerned — and one therefore wonders what the function of the little yellow line (a more poetic expression than banana) can really be, unless it is a trompe l'œil.

24. Its purpose is undoubtedly, Members of the Court, to distract you from the equitable line and to induce you to focus on an area on which you cannot rule: it concerns Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea and therefore another dispute which is not before you. There is no yellow line — this is pure Magritte, and Jean-Pierre Cot was right!

25. But this is not all. As my friend and colleague Professor Kamto will show in greater detail in a few minutes, the reasoning which is valid for the H-H' portion of the equitable line is equally valid for the H'-H" portion. Whatever it may say now, Equatorial Guinea has no rights over the maritime area crossed by this line. While it might have had claims under its theory of equidistance, *quod non*, Mr. President, it relinquished them by concluding the Treaty of 23 September 2000. Of course, this Treaty is, for Cameroon, *res inter alios acta*, but it creates an objective territorial situation which Equatorial Guinea can no longer alter, apart from accepting that

it may choose its neighbours. Not a bit of it, Mr. President: neighbours are like a family: one puts up with them, but one does not choose them! [End of projection No. 1.]

26. To counter this argument (which only affects portion H'-H" — H-H' east "outside equidistance" where Equatorial Guinea is concerned), Professor Abi-Saab put forward a theory which I must comment on; the theory of "credible claims" — which is essentially akin to the "honest belief and reasonable mistake". What does Georges Abi-Saab actually tell us? To sum up: that, since the intervener is not party to the case, it can make any claim whatever provided it is "credible"; and that this credibility must be assessed prima facie by the equidistance test (CR 2002/23, pp. 21-24, paras. 16-23). With all the respect I have for my friend, opponent and inventor of systems, this is doubly wrong. First, as I showed a few moments ago, the intervener's argument must not only be "credible"; it must be correct; and by virtue of the intervention, the Court may verify that it is correct. Second, and in any case, even prima facie, Equatorial Guinea cannot rely on rights which it has clearly, formally, irremediably recognized as not appertaining to it.

27. [Start of projection No. 2 — sketch-map No. 162.] Hence, Mr. President, Equatorial Guinea cannot make any claim to section H'-H" of the equitable line — any more than it can do so against H-H'. The upshot of this is also that it has no right over the H-H"-I-B-A area. This area is represented by hatching on sketch-map No. 162 in your file, where the trompe-l'œil is found moreover: in fact, of itself, the little yellow line shows that the intervening State is not interested in this area. While disputing Cameroon's claim to it, it generously relinquishes this area to Nigeria — and at little cost, since it does not belong to it. [End of projection No. 2.]

28. But I am well aware, Mr. President, that the equitable line does not stop at H". [Start of projection No. 3 — sketch-map No. 161.] Beyond this, there is the 34 km^2 quadrilateral, upon which Cameroon has always recognized Equatorial Guinea as having claims: this quadrilateral lies outside, not the equidistance line, which would not be important, but the line of the Treaty of 23 September 2000.

29. Yet this is not sufficient reason, Members of the Court, for you to decline to rule that:

(1) it is not enough for a third State in a case to make a claim for you to be obliged to accept it; as we have seen, it is for you to assess this claim;

(2) in this case — a point Maurice Kamto will revert to — it is based on the assumption that Bioko inevitably produces full effect, which is not compatible either with the principles of the law of the sea, or with the special circumstances particular to this region [end of projection No. 3 — start of projection No. 4 — sketch-map No. 163];

(3) there are various possibilities open to the Court, which we have already listed (cf. CR 2002/6, pp. 68-70, paras. 39-42, A. Pellet; CR 2002/22, p. 26, para. 24, A. Pellet and pp. 53-54, para. 19, M. Mendelson) and to which I shall not revert, other than to observe:

(4) Equatorial Guinea cannot, in any event, assert any claim in any of the hatched area shown on sketch-map No. 163, now being projected behind me; consequently, the Court may run the equitable line through all this area without having to concern itself with the rights of Equatorial Guinea: it has no rights and cannot make any claim there. I would add in passing that this is true not only of the area with green hatching, but also, in general, of all the area north-west of the blue line of the Treaty of 23 September 2000. This line does not concern Equatorial Guinea at all. [End of projection No. 4.]

30. To sum up, Mr. President:

— Equatorial Guinea cannot make any reasonable claim to the H-H" portion of the equitable line;

— beyond that, it is for the Court to assess the extent of Equatorial Guinea's rights;

— once these have been assessed, your distinguished Court must settle the dispute before it completely, preserving the rights of the intervening State in their entirety.

31. And all this for one purpose, which I do not think it vain to recall now that we are almost at the end of these long proceedings: the delimitation which you must effect between Cameroon and Nigeria must correspond to an equitable solution. The enclavement of Cameroon, which Nigeria is asking you to effect, so ably assisted by Equatorial Guinea, does not meet this requirement. Cameroon appeals to you again, Members of the Court: give equity a chance! Maurice Kamto will show you that this would not be the case if you accepted Equatorial Guinea's position, which seeks to get the Court to recognize the noose artificially fashioned by Nigeria to the detriment of the Republic of Cameroon.

32. As for what will happen south of the line which you fix, that is another matter; a matter which must be negotiated between Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea; but these negotiations will also need to be inspired by the desire to achieve an equitable solution.

It only remains for me, Members of the Court, to thank you for your renewed patience and to ask you, Mr. President, to give the floor to Professor Kamto.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Pellet. I now give the floor to Professor Maurice Kamto.

Mr. KAMTO:

II. Up to where may the Court rule?

1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, at this final stage in the proceedings, we must come back to the essential point: up to where may the Court rule? This is the question which Equatorial Guinea's intervention ultimately raises. I shall therefore continue the comments by my friend and colleague Professor Alain Pellet, noting three points raised by our distinguished friends and opponents from Equatorial Guinea.

1. I shall first consider the status of the Treaty concluded between Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria on 23 September 2000 in the light of this case.
2. Secondly, I shall explain Cameroon's action vis-à-vis its neighbours as regards maritime delimitation.
3. Lastly, I shall return to the main question, up to where may and must the Court delimit the respective maritime areas of Cameroon and Nigeria.

1. The status of the Treaty of 23 September 2000 in the light of the present case

2. A degree of confusion persists on this subject. If I have understood Equatorial Guinea correctly, this Treaty prohibits it from making any claim beyond the delimitation line. But this prohibition does not affect the delimitation with Cameroon by virtue of the relative effect of the Treaty. With respect, Mr. President, this is not the right way to present the problem.

3. In fact, the situation we are in here is that of incidental proceedings. Equatorial Guinea provides the Court with elements of information on the rights it seeks to ensure are respected in the

Gulf of Guinea. Among these elements of information, there are two which seem to us to be determinative. One is the Act of 12 November 1984[1]. Article 11, paragraph 1, of this Act states:

> "Except where otherwise provided in international treaties concluded with States whose coastlines are opposite or adjacent to those of Equatorial Guinea, the outer limit of the exclusive economic zone of Equatorial Guinea shall not extend beyond the equidistant median line."

4. The other element of information brought to the attention of the Court is precisely the "as otherwise provided" included in the Treaty of 23 September 2000, since that Treaty, as we know, abandons the equidistance line and shifts the delimitation between the two States appreciably south and east of this line. And Article 4 of this Treaty states quite clearly that Equatorial Guinea does not intend to assert any right of sovereignty beyond the agreed line.

5. Mr. President, the Treaty of 23 September 2000, like all the other documents of whatever kind produced by Equatorial Guinea in this case, is an element by which Equatorial Guinea informs the Court, but also the Parties to the principal proceedings, of the scope of its legal interests in the area to be delimited. Equatorial Guinea cannot provide this information, at the same time wanting one of the Parties to the case not to rely upon it in order to outline the extent of its claims. This is quite simply what Cameroon does.

6. The problem is not a problem of the opposability of the Treaty to Cameroon in this case, but, if I may put it like this, of the opposability of the Treaty to the Court! Or more exactly, of informing the Court of the scope and limits of the rights claimed by Equatorial Guinea. The Court has now been informed. [Projection fig. 18.] Equatorial Guinea seeks to claim the equidistance line north of its coasts, more precisely in the sector corresponding to what we kindly called Mr. Colson's banana, in other words, in yellow in the sector not delimited by the Treaty of 23 September 2000. On the other hand, with effect from this delimited sector, in other words from Mr. Colson's point B, Equatorial Guinea relinquishes all claims. It is for you to draw the necessary conclusions from this situation. [End of projection.]

---

[1]Application for permission to intervene by the Government of Equatorial Guinea, Annexes, Exhibit 1, pp. 16 *et seq.*

2. The action taken by Cameroon

7. Equatorial Guinea would appear not to have understood Cameroon's action. So I should like to explain it and, in so doing, reassure our friends from Equatorial Guinea.

8. In fact, counsel for Equatorial Guinea painted a worrying picture of our intentions. I refer here to the mauve area on the oil concessions map projected yesterday, an imprecise area, where Cameroon's undeclared and undeclarable ambitions are allegedly situated. This is like a cheap novel. Cameroon has never made any claim to that effect. It is awaiting the settlement of its dispute with Nigeria to begin negotiations with Equatorial Guinea. It is confident that the two parties will be able to reach an agreement. If not, some way of achieving a peaceful settlement of the disputes will have to be found. But we are not at that stage yet.

9. The Agent of Equatorial Guinea presented a picture of our talks in 1998, and not 1999 as he said[2], which does not really tally with my memory. The delegation of Equatorial Guinea which was headed by the Deputy Prime Minister of that country, assisted by the Secretary General of the Presidency of the Republic, did not come to Cameroon at the invitation of that country's Government, but to attend a meeting of the United Nations Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa. It was on that occasion that it called for a meeting of experts with Cameroon to examine the situation resulting from the fact that the problem of the delimitation of the boundary with Nigeria had been submitted to your Court. I was a member of the team headed by the then Minister for Justice, which met the delegation of Equatorial Guinea on 27 October 1998, then on 29 October at the Ministry of Justice. At these two meetings, the head of the delegation of Cameroon recalled Cameroon's consistent position since the dispute with Nigeria had been submitted to the Court. He informed the delegation from Equatorial Guinea that it was preferable to await the outcome of this dispute pending before your distinguished Court before relaunching negotiations with a view to the delimitation of the joint maritime boundary. The two delegations then exchanged certain oral information on maritime delimitation matters in the Gulf of Guinea. And the delegation from Equatorial Guinea suggested that the forthcoming discussions should be held at Malabou. These are the facts.

---

[2]CR 2002/24, p. 42, para. 14.

10. We now await the Court's decision. Your judgment will fix our boundaries with Nigeria to the extent that you determine. We will then negotiate with Equatorial Guinea on the basis of that information. We hope the starting point of the line laid down by the Maroua Agreement will have been fixed. We hope that the maritime delimitation between Cameroon and Nigeria will have been fixed. We will then be able to negotiate the delimitation with Equatorial Guinea south of the line, in accordance with the rules of international law and in particular, the Montego Bay Convention.

11. In the forthcoming negotiations, Equatorial Guinea announces that it will claim the equidistance line. That is its right. We announce that we wish to reach an equitable solution by reference to special circumstances. That is our right.

12. In the first round of this oral argument, we asked, Mr. President, for equity to be given a chance. We still do not understand why Cameroon is the only State in the Gulf of Guinea to be locked in the straightjacket of equidistance, without taking account of the very special circumstances marking its coastal front. I will not go back over that discussion again, but you should nevertheless be reminded of it.

13. What we are asking of you at this stage is not to prejudge the line which the Parties will have to determine after the negotiations laid down by the Montego Bay Convention. Without waiting for these forthcoming negotiations, Equatorial Guinea is seeking, already, here in this Court, to rely on the equidistance line. In so doing, it is entering into the discussion on the merits of the delimitation of the boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. "[O]ur claim is based on a median line"[3] says Mr. Colson, who returns to the attack two sentences later saying: "The median line is our claim"[4] before the Agent of Equatorial Guinea concludes that: "Equatorial Guinea's sole purpose for being here is to defend its interests"[5]; "to defend its interests", Mr. President, not to inform the Court so it can preserve them. Under the convenient cover of an intervening third State not party to the case, and not bound in any way by the judgment of the Court, it has embarked upon a discussion on the merits. It discusses and criticizes the line proposed by Cameroon, which it

[3]CR 2002/24, p. 31, para. 4.

[4]*Ibid*., p. 31, para. 5.

[5]CR 2002/24, p. 41, para. 11.

finds "extravagant" and argues the case for an equidistance line vis-à-vis Cameroon, while nevertheless reproaching us for replying to it on this subject.

14. The equidistance "rule" which the intervening State would like to oppose to us does not flow from oil practice either, which, as I showed yesterday, does not everywhere coincide with the median line, a fact which Equatorial Guinea was not able to dispute convincingly; for my distinguished colleague, Mr. Colson, did not manage to convince anyone by claiming that the overlap of the Moudi concession, which I presented, could be imputed to a technological factor. But I am not going to revert to that debate, which does not directly concern the Court. You only need to deal with it to avoid infringing the rights of the Parties to a future dispute, not yet before you.

3. Up to where may the Court rule?

15. At this stage in the proceedings, I repeat, the essential question is as follows: up to where may the Court rule?

16. In support of Cameroon's position on this question, I return to Mr. Colson's trizone now being shown on the screen. This yellow area, we are told, is allegedly the area of the tripoint. But this area itself is defined by reference to the equidistance criterion. I note that at least two of the three Parties repudiate this criterion, where the delimitation of the continental shelf or the exclusive economic zone are concerned: Cameroon, but also Nigeria, which invoked special circumstances in order to evade the constraints of equidistance in the context of the Treaty concluded, precisely, with Equatorial Guinea on 23 September 2000.

17. In projecting this equidistance zone [projection fig. 18], Mr. Colson is seeking to oblige the Court to restrict its choice of the tripoint to an equidistance point lying between points A and B and therefore to restrict the delimitation between Nigeria and Cameroon to a choice between lines H-A and H-B. I apologize to the Court and to Professor Crawford for bombarding you with letters, but precision is required, even if we do not want to overdo it.

18. But the choice of H-A, H-B, or H-H', in other words, of the direction of the equitable line, in no way concerns Equatorial Guinea. We are far beyond any line claimed by that country. *"It's none of your business"*, as my friend Maurice Mendelson would say.

19. Mr. President, it is difficult for me to understand why and how Equatorial Guinea, which nevertheless declares that it holds Nigeria and Cameroon in equal esteem, feels it has convinced itself that its neighbour on the other side of the equitable line proposed by Cameroon can only be Nigeria. The fact that, in saying so, it espouses the Nigerian argument of the exclusion line will hardly come as a surprise. But Equatorial Guinea should know that, just as one does not choose one's brother or sister, a State does not choose its neighbour, as Professor Alain Pellet has just said. In this case, neither history, nor even less the law, permit it.

20. It is not for Equatorial Guinea to indicate any preference as regards a particular area where the tripoint should be situated, since that point does not infringe its rights. So much for the H–H' line. [End of projection.]

21. Cameroon thinks that you can extend this line as far as H" without infringing the rights of Equatorial Guinea. Why? Because Equatorial Guinea informs you that this is so. It is Equatorial Guinea which draws your attention to the 1984 Act and its exception with respect to treaties concluded with neighbouring powers. It is Equatorial Guinea which draws your attention to the Treaty of 23 September 2000, which it wishes to apply as quickly as possible, including in the provisions of its Article 4, which excludes any claim of sovereignty north and west of the agreed line.

22. Of course, Cameroon asks you to go further and thinks that you can go further than H". It has shown the possible alternatives in this respect, and I shall not go over that again.

23. I would add that the Court does not have to determine a tripoint. Alain Pellet pointed this out a few moments ago. That would be an outright *excès de pouvoir* and a patent infringement of the rights of third parties. We are all agreed on this count.

24. Equatorial Guinea seems to think that, if the Court endorsed Cameroon's position, it would be supporting a diversion of powers. For its part, Cameroon considers that Equatorial Guinea's intervention should not have the effect, and the sole effect, of preventing the Court from making a complete ruling on the dispute submitted to it by application and to which Guinea has chosen not to be party. The Court, in agreeing to attach such an effect to the intervention of that country, would be ruling *infra petita*. It had hoped that Sao Tome and Principe would be present, to enable it to make a complete ruling on the case between Cameroon and Nigeria; Sao Tome and

Principe did not feel itself concerned. Equatorial Guinea intervened to fully inform the Court. It is now for you to decide, Members of the Court.

25. Mr. President, Members of the Court, ultimately, there is nothing to prevent you from fully discharging your duty in this case. The Court may delimit without infringing the rights of third parties, whether intervening or not intervening. To state the law is not to create legal instability, it is the opposite.

26. Thank you for your attention. May I ask you, Mr. President, to give the floor to the Agent of the Republic of Cameroon to bring our oral argument to a close.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Kamto. I now give the floor to the Agent of the Republic of Cameroon.

Mr. ALI: Mr. President, Members of the Court.

1. This afternoon will see the close of the oral argument. For my country, it is a solemn moment, and I know that we can have total confidence that your Court will settle the serious dispute between ourselves and the Federal Republic of Nigeria completely, definitively and rigorously.

2. Cameroon seised your distinguished Court so that the most serious dispute it has ever had with another State since its independence, and the only one to have degenerated to the use of armed force and the occupation of part of its territory, can be settled definitively and in an atmosphere of calm.

3. The Agent of Nigeria complained that the last four Nigerian Heads of State have made the trip to Yaoundé without their visits being reciprocated; but what he did not tell you, Mr. President, Members of the Court, is that of all the Nigerian Heads of State, only four have made an official visit to Cameroon, whereas the Heads of State of Cameroon have all made official visits to Nigeria. For President Biya, it was even his very first official visit abroad, after his accession to the highest office. What he also omitted to tell you is that the purpose of the last two visits by Nigerian Heads of State to Cameroon, perhaps the only purpose, was to convince President Paul Biya, Head of the State of Cameroon, to abandon these proceedings before the Court.

4. The Agent of Nigeria complained that Cameroon's diplomatic representation in his country was not of an adequate level; but he seems to forget that his country invaded and is occupying a part — parts — and major ones at that, of mine. We did not break off diplomatic relations believing that, between neighbouring countries, dialogue must not be broken off or interrupted, but those relations can scarcely be cordial in present conditions: the wolf and the lamb, dear to old La Fontaine, can have a dialogue, but it is natural for the lamb to prefer to keep at a reasonable distance and seek the help of a respected third party. It is our firm intention not to be eaten "without further ado", as the lamb in the fable!

5. The Agent of Nigeria complained about the cost of the proceedings; but he also forgets that it is Nigeria which did everything in its power to slow down and draw out those proceedings to the maximum. Further, that cost cannot possibly be compared with that of the war which Nigeria is imposing on my country. Do not be deceived, Members of the Court, you have been told "of incursions by Cameroonian gendarmes", yet this is a war and the military occupation of Cameroon's territory; there has been an exchange of prisoners under the auspices of the Red Cross and very many Cameroonians, expelled from Bakassi or from the Lake Chad region by the Nigerian advance, have found refuge and protection in the interior of the country.

6. Mr. President, during these five weeks, we have done our best to present to you the arguments which support what we profoundly believe to be our just cause. We have done so in all honesty, and I should like to reiterate our gratitude to our counsel and to those who have assisted them in the preparation of their oral argument. We have done so out of a desire to inform the Court so that it can settle a dispute which, for Cameroon, whose development efforts it seriously jeopardizes, constitutes a veritable national drama. We have also done so out of a sincere desire not to attack Nigeria, even verbally, conscious as we are that the two countries must make every possible effort to re-establish relations of trust and good neighbourliness founded upon the law.

7. Unfortunately, and I say this with regret and even sadness, our moderation has not been reciprocated.

8. I do not wish to dwell on the tone of the two statements by the Agent of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; let me just say, Mr. President, Members of the Court, that the Agent of Nigeria depicted his country as a model of co-operation and consultation with its neighbours, as a

country enamoured of peace and justice, ready to fly to the aid of democracy under threat throughout Africa and the world at large.

9. Cameroon, on the contrary, is described as an aggressive country, one closed to consultation, one paying little respect to human rights and democratic principles. Our neighbour has thus made a deliberate travesty of the reality.

10. Owing to its geographical situation, its demographic and economic weight, Nigeria has naturally found itself assigned an eminent role in African affairs. And that is a good thing. Cameroon would welcome the fact without reservation if, rather than falling into self-glorification, our neighbour troubled every so slightly to maintain frank, honest and peaceful relations with it.

11. For its part, Cameroon does not forget that Nigeria remains one of its principal economic partners in Africa, that over three million Nigerians live on its territory, where, without any restrictions, they engage in various activities, well integrated as they are in Cameroonian society. It is therefore a neighbour with which Cameroon has always sought to maintain harmonious and mutually beneficial relations. In response, Nigeria faces us with threats, the occupation of our territory by force and, lastly, war.

12. At the darkest hours in its history, when the Federation has been shaken by a serious secessionist threat, Cameroon, by its attitude, has greatly contributed, with others, to protecting the national unity of the country. By an irony of fate, it is the same Nigeria which, today, with contempt for the ideals by which it claims to be inspired, is using a handful of separatist activists in an attempt to destabilize my country.

13. In 41 years of independence, Nigeria has experienced 29 years of military dictatorships. The Co-Agent of Nigeria, Chief Akinjide here present, exiled for ten years as he reminded us last Thursday (CR 2002/18, p. 23, para. 25), has had bitter experience of this. Nigeria is therefore particularly ill-placed to give lessons on democracy and good government.

14. I would ask you, Members of the Court, not to forget that my country has been militarily invaded; that it is militarily occupied; Bakassi and the Cameroonian region of Lake Chad are large gaping wounds in the side of my country.

15. This is why our claim in responsibility is not a subsidiary issue as Nigeria would have you believe. Not only was Bakassi not invaded inadvertently, through a “reasonable” error and an

"honest belief", its invasion and occupation were carefully and deliberately planned. Relations between the two States will only be normalized when the gravity of these internationally wrongful acts has been recognized. After that — but only after that — will come the time for normalization.

Mr. President, Members of the Court,

16. When it was under German administration, Cameroon had an area of 739,000 km^2. Under the Franco-British mandate, some 215,000 km^2 was severed. I hardly dare remind you that, after the 1961 plebiscite, it again lost some 50,000 km^2 of territory, that it has never sought to win back by force, nor, actually by any other means. For when it brought the *Northern Cameroons* case before the Court, my country did not make any territorial claim.

17. But, Mr. President, Members of the Court, without in any way disputing this historical fact, we do indeed intend to keep the 475,000 km^2 which remain to us; and we know that you will ensure that this is done.

18. These 475,000 km^2 constitute the "colonial legacy", guaranteed by the principle of *uti possidetis juris*, which Nigeria is endeavouring to bend, not being bold enough to challenge it head on, flagrantly disregarding the Cairo Resolution of 1964. At the same time, Nigeria is, to say the least, undermining another fundamental principle of international law, namely that of respect for treaties. And what treaties! Boundary delimitation treaties, and even demarcation agreements — as the boundary separating Cameroon from Nigeria is not only delimited throughout its length, but major portions of it are precisely demarcated, as I pointed out during my brief statement last week.

19. Moreover, since Nigeria no longer disputes either the relevance or the validity of the instruments which delimit the boundary,

> "there is no need for the Court to explore matters which have been discussed at length before it such as the principle of *uti possidetis* and the applicability of the Declaration adopted by the Organization of African Unity at Cairo in 1964 . . . Likewise, the effectiveness of occupation of the relevant areas in the past, and the question whether it was constant, peaceful and acknowledged, are not matters for determination in this case." (Judgment of 3 February 1994, case concerning the *Territorial Dispute*, *I.C.J. Reports 1994*, p. 38, para. 75.)

20. In the face of all reason, Nigeria nevertheless obstinately persists in seeking to dissociate the two ends of the boundary — Bakassi in the south and Lake Chad in the north — from the instruments which delimit them on the same basis as the rest of the boundary sectors under which

they fall respectively, and principally the Anglo-German Treaty of 1913 and the Milner-Simon Declaration. It does so on various pretexts, which, moreover, have varied over time.

21. Where Bakassi is concerned, the emphasis has been, in turn, on a claimed partial nullity of the Anglo-German Treaty of 1913; then on various historical or ethnic considerations or on the national origin of the inhabitants, which are of no relevance whatever here; or, alternatively, on the rights of a claimed "acephal federation" of the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar; all of this lumped together under the umbrella notion of the "historical consolidation" of a title whose precise content we have yet to understand: for a title to be "consolidated", it first has to exist. In the Lake Chad region, the "ethnic-national" argument has been preponderant.

22. Yes, Cameroon welcomes foreigners. Yes, it gives shelter to a great many people, including those of Nigerian origin and nationality. Yes, this is true in Bakassi as in Lake Chad and in other regions of the country. But this has nothing to do with the determination of our boundaries.

23. Allow me, if you will, Mr. President, Members of the Court, to let you into a secret. I was alarmed — surprised would be more accurate! — to learn that apparently I am Nigerian. In his statement of 6 March, Mr. Brownlie asserted that: "the majority of the residents [in the region of Darak] come from Nigerian tribes, of which the Kanuri and Hausa form the major components" (CR 2002/12, p. 36, para. 70). I am a Kanuri, Mr. President — and I can assure you that I am not and do not in any way feel Nigerian! Moreover, the Nigerian President Sani Abacha, himself a Kanuri, originally came from Bama in Cameroon. I would also point out that, in his statement introducing the second round of Nigerian oral argument, Chief Akinjide listed the many titles of the *Obong* of Calabar. Here I noted the "Grand Patriarch of the Efiks" (CR 2002/18, p. 18) — "wherever they may be", Mr. President; whether in New York, in The Hague or, of course, when they are in Cameroon's Bakassi Peninsula. In "complicated Africa", ethnicity really proves nothing at all.

24. Much more prosaically, our boundaries, which mostly do not care a whit about ethnic groups, are established by perfectly valid delimitation treaties, as Nigeria itself has finally recognized. These treaties have been confirmed by the practice of the League of Nations and of the United Nations. The line they fix has been recognized by an independent Nigeria. Apart, that it,

for 210 km. These are the famous 22 points which I referred to last week and which I shall not go over again, apart from to remind you:

— that they now appear to be only 13; or perhaps nine;

— that we persist in thinking that they have been raised in a wholly artificial way solely to complicate the Court's task;

— that there are, moreover, other border segments which may be debatable;

— that in any event these are questions which, in most cases, can only be settled on the ground and which, moreover, pose no problem in relations between the local populations — which know perfectly well where the boundary runs — that is, when Nigeria's central or provincial authorities do not intervene;

— that if, on one point or another, you should find, Mr. President, Members of the Court, that a genuine delimitation problem falling within your jurisdiction nevertheless arises, we would ask you to be so good as to settle it; but

— that, on the other hand, experience having shown the virtual impossibility of successfully concluding a dialogue with Nigeria, I stand, in this connection, by the proposals I made at the end of our second round of oral argument. We do not present them as formal submissions, but would ask you, Mr. President, Members of the Court, to bear them in mind when you deliver your judgment.

25. And I would point out that our position is identical where the delimitation of the maritime boundary is concerned. We urge you to find that the boundary is definitively and precisely delimited by the Maroua Agreement and to make a complete delimitation beyond point G fixed by that Agreement.

26. Beyond that point, in fact, all negotiation has proved fruitless. Even worse: Nigeria sought, when this case was already before you, to have Cameroon enclosed within a cramped maritime area, by neighbouring States, which it has persuaded to conclude with it treaties which, to its advantage, depart from the equidistance principle (disguised as a pseudo-rule of protection of alleged acquired oil rights), a principle of which it nevertheless becomes the advocate when it comes to determining its maritime boundary with Cameroon. You cannot, Members of the Court, allow yourselves to be impressed by this policy of the fait accompli, patently incompatible with the

equitable solution, which is the sole objective laid down both by the Montego Bay Convention and by the general principles of the law of the sea.

27. The equitable line, defended by Cameroon, does not infringe the rights of anyone; those of Nigeria, those of Equatorial Guinea, or those of Sao Tome and Principe. It does not refashion the geography; it simply takes it into consideration in order to arrive at the equitable solution for the Parties imposed by the most established principles of the law of the sea. It leaves completely open the question of the rights of third States, with which my country is clearly ready to negotiate in good faith agreements which respect the rights and interests of everyone.

28. Including, of course, those of Equatorial Guinea, whose intervention has enabled the Court to be fully informed of the situation as that country sees it. You are, therefore, Members of the Court, in a position to completely delimit the maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. And it will be in full knowledge of the facts that, when your judgment has been delivered, we will be able to resume negotiations with our friends and neighbours in Malabo, negotiations, which we desire as much as they do, with a view to settling the pending bilateral problems, in a spirit of good neighbourliness and mutual trust.

29. Here, Mr. President, Members of the Court, is a brief summary of Cameroon's position on the various problems raised by the case which it has referred to you. These problems are many; they are not as complex as Nigeria has contrived to make you believe and the solution you will eventually find to them can, in our view, be summed up in just a few words:

— from the tripoint in Lake Chad to point G fixed by the Maroua Agreement, the boundary is completely delimited by perfectly valid legal instruments;

— beyond point G it must follow an equitable course, which does not enclose Cameroon in a cramped maritime area, without any circumstance to justify it;

— the obvious result of this is that the area of Lake Chad occupied by Nigeria and Bakassi Peninsula belong to Cameroon; and that

— by having invaded and occupied these two areas in disregard of the most imperative rules of international law, Nigeria has incurred its responsibility with respect to Cameroon.

30. A final remark if you will allow me Mr. President: we had thought that some of the recent official declarations by Nigeria entitled us to deduce that that country was now committed to

complying with the judgment which the Court is going to deliver. I must say that some of the statements made in the hearings have given us fresh cause for concern, since the most authoritative representatives of Nigeria, starting with its Agent and one of its Co-Agents, have made scarcely veiled threats regarding the faithful implementation of your decision, above all where Bakassi and the Lake Chad region are concerned (cf. CR 2002/8, p. 27, para. 29, (Abdullahi); CR 2002/18, p. 26, para. 35 (Bakassi) and p. 28, para. 43 (Lake Chad), (Akindije); CR 2002/20, p. 66, para. 5, (Abdullahi)), on the pretext of the unrest which would ensue among the populations in these regions and the threat that the "Cameroonian guns" would pose to navigation in the channels of Calabar, Cross River and Akwayafe. Our opponents also claim that the Court should not accede to Cameroon's request to return to equidistance between points G and H, because in so doing, it would attribute to Cameroon areas of oil exploitation there and Nigeria would have problems with the oil companies carrying out their activities in that area.

31. This is worrying for us, but we are sure, Members of the Court, that you will not allow yourselves to be impressed, you to whom the international community has entrusted the noble mission of stating the law.

I can assure you that, faithful to its traditional policy of openness to foreigners and tolerance, Cameroon will continue to offer protection to the Nigerians living in the peninsula and those living in the Lake Chad region, who seem to be a matter of such concern to Nigeria. Let that country be reassured, they represent no more than a drop in the ocean compared to the millions of Nigerians who already live in Cameroon and do so unmolested.

32. Mr. President, as I said at the beginning of my statement, Cameroon earnestly desires normalization of its relations with Nigeria. I am convinced that your judgment will make a major contribution to this by reaffirming and guaranteeing the territorial integrity of my country so gravely jeopardized for 15 years. Your judgment will enable us to rediscover the atmosphere of trust which characterized relations between the two countries following independence. This is what the Republic of Cameroon seeks to achieve.

33. Mr. President, before reading the final submissions, I should like to convey to the Registrar and all his staff, in particular to the interpreters who have had the difficult task of translating our oral arguments, the most sincere thanks of the delegation it is my honour to lead for

the efficiency and the cheerful willingness they have constantly displayed over the past five weeks and more broadly, throughout these protracted proceedings.

34. I should also like to convey to you, Mr. President, Members of the Court, our immense gratitude for the attention you have shown throughout these weeks, months and years. And I would also like to reiterate the passionate conviction but at the same time the serene calm with which my country awaits your judgment.

35. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 60, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, I shall now read the final submissions of the Republic of Cameroon:

The Republic of Cameroon has the honour to request that the International Court of Justice be pleased to adjudge and declare:

(a) That the land boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria takes the following course:

— from the point designated by the co-ordinates 13° 05' N and 14° 05' E, the boundary follows a straight line as far as the mouth of the Ebeji, situated at the point located at the co-ordinates 12° 13' 17" N and 14° 12' 12" E, as defined within the framework of the LCBC and constituting an authoritative interpretation of the Milner-Simon Declaration of 10 July 1919 and the Thomson-Marchand Declarations of 29 December 1929 and 31 January 1930, as confirmed by the Exchange of Letters of 9 January 1931; in the alternative, the mouth of the Ebeji is situated at the point located at the co-ordinates 12° 31' 12" N and 14° 11' 48" E;

— from that point it follows the course fixed by those instruments as far as the "very prominent peak" described in paragraph 60 of the Thomson-Marchand Declaration and called by the usual name of "Mount Kombon";

— from "Mount Kombon" the boundary then runs to "Pillar 64" mentioned in paragraph 12 of the Anglo-German Agreement of Obokum of 12 April 1913 and follows, in that sector, the course described in Section 6 (1) of the British Nigeria (Protectorate and Cameroons) Order in Council of 2 August 1946;

— from Pillar 64 it follows the course described in paragraphs 13 to 21 of the Obokum Agreement of 12 April 1913 as far as Pillar 114 on the Cross River;

— thence, as far as the intersection of the straight line from Bakassi Point to King Point with the centre of the navigable channel of the Akwayafe, the boundary is determined by paragraphs XVI to XXI of the Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913.

(b) That, in consequence, *inter alia*, sovereignty over the peninsula of Bakassi and over the disputed parcel occupied by Nigeria in the area of Lake Chad, in particular over Darak and its region, is Cameroonian.

(c) That the boundary of the maritime areas appertaining respectively to the Republic of Cameroon and to the Federal Republic of Nigeria takes the following course:

— from the intersection of the straight line from Bakassi Point to King Point with the centre of the navigable channel of the Akwayafe to point "12", that boundary is confirmed by the "compromise line" entered on British Admiralty Chart No. 3433 by the Heads of State of the two countries on 4 April 1971 (Yaoundé II Declaration) and, from that point 12 to point "G", by the Declaration signed at Maroua on 1 June 1975;

— from point G the equitable line follows the direction indicated by points G, H (co-ordinates 8° 21' 16" E and 4° 17' N), I (7° 55' 40" E and 3° 46' N), J (7° 12' 08" E and 3° 12' 35" N), K (6° 45' 22" E and 3° 01' 05" N), and continues from K up to the outer limit of the maritime zones which international law places under the respective jurisdiction of the two Parties.

(d) That in attempting to modify unilaterally and by force the courses of the boundary defined above under *(a)* and *(c)*, the Federal Republic of Nigeria has violated and is violating the fundamental principle of respect for frontiers inherited from colonization *(uti possidetis juris)*, as well as its legal obligations concerning the land and maritime delimitation.

(e) That by using force against the Republic of Cameroon and, in particular, by militarily occupying parcels of Cameroonian territory in the area of Lake Chad and the Cameroonian peninsula of Bakassi, and by making repeated incursions throughout the length of the boundary between the two countries, the Federal Republic of Nigeria has violated and is violating its obligations under international treaty law and customary law.

(f) That the Federal Republic of Nigeria has the express duty of putting an end to its administrative and military presence in Cameroonian territory and, in particular, of effecting

an immediate and unconditional evacuation of its troops from the occupied area of Lake Chad and from the Cameroonian peninsula of Bakassi and of refraining from such acts in the future.

(g) That in failing to comply with the Order for the indication of provisional measures rendered by the Court on 15 March 1996 the Federal Republic of Nigeria has been in breach of its international obligations.

(h) That the internationally wrongful acts referred to above and described in detail in the written pleadings and oral argument of the Republic of Cameroon engage the responsibility of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

(i) That, consequently, on account of the material and moral injury suffered by the Republic of Cameroon reparation in a form to be determined by the Court is due from the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the Republic of Cameroon.

The Republic of Cameroon further has the honour to request the Court to permit it, at a subsequent stage of the proceedings, to present an assessment of the amount of compensation due to it as reparation for the injury suffered by it as a result of the internationally wrongful acts attributable to the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

The Republic of Cameroon also asks the Court to declare that the counter-claims of the Federal Republic of Nigeria are unfounded both in fact and in law, and to reject them.

Mr. President, Members of the Court, thank you for your attention and above all your patience. I have now concluded and I place the submissions of the Republic of Cameroon at the disposal of the Registrar.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Ali. The Court takes note of the final submissions which you have now read on behalf of the Republic of Cameroon. The Court will meet again at 4.45 p.m. in order to hear the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The sitting is closed.

The Court rose at 4.30 p.m.

THEMATIC INDEX

CONTENTS

THEMATIC INDEX TO THE WRITTEN PLEADINGS AND ORAL ARGUMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON

I. General

I.a. Political context

Application of Cameroon

pp. 4-8, paras. 1-11;

Memorial of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 11-24, paras. 1.01-1.41; pp. 28-34, paras. 1.61-1.74;

Oral argument of Cameroon (provisional measures)

CR 96/2, p. 19; p. 23; pp. 27-29 (Moutomé, Agent); pp. 32-39 (Engo); CR 96/4, pp. 13-15 (Cot);

Observations by Cameroon on the preliminary objections

Volume I, p. 15, paras. 21-23; pp. 87-88, paras. 2. 39-2.42;

Oral argument of Cameroon (preliminary objections)

CR 98/3, pp. 16-20 (Esso, Agent);

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 13-19, paras. 1.02-1.16;

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/1, pp. 25-32 (Amadou Ali, Agent); pp. 32-35 (Kamto);

CR 2002/15, pp. 23-30, paras. 16-43 (Pellet);

CR 2002/17, pp. 64-66 (Amadou Ali, Agent);

CR 2002/25, pp. (Amadou Ali, Agent).

I.b. Procedure

Oral argument of Cameroon (provisional measures)

CR 96/2, pp. 40-54 (Pellet); pp. 55-71 (Cot);

Observations by Cameroon on the preliminary objections

Volume I, pp. 9-10, paras. 1-4;

Memorandum on procedure. Reply of Cameroon, Volume III, Annex RC I

pp. 16-20, paras. 23-30;

Observations of Cameroon on Nigeria's Request for Interpretation

para. 2;

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 19-33, paras. 1.17-1.47;

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/15, pp. 18-22 (Pellet);

CR 2002/17, pp. 64-66 (Amadou Ali, Agent);

CR 2002/25, pp. (Amadou Ali, Agent).

I.c. Burden of proof

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 71-76, paras. 2.78-2.95; pp. 351-355, paras. 7.27-7.42; pp. 475-482, paras. 10.38-10.58.

I.d. Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute

Observations by Cameroon on the preliminary objections

Volume I, pp. 32-69, paras. 1.101-1.109;

Oral argument of Cameroon (preliminary objections)

CR 98/3, pp. 3-48 (Simma);

CR 98/6, pp. 15-24 (Sinclair).

I.e. Prior exhaustion of diplomatic negotiations

Observations by Cameroon on the preliminary objections

Volume I, pp. 85-95, paras. 2.45-2.61;

Oral argument of Cameroon (preliminary objections)

CR 98/3, pp. 53-64 (Shaw);

CR 98/6, p. 25 (Sinclair).

II. Applicable principles

II.a. Critical date

Memorial of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 79-82, paras. 2.105-2.115; pp. 327-328, paras. 3.378-3.384;

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 79-82, paras. 2.105-2.115.

II.b. *Uti possidetis*

Application of Cameroon

p. 14, para. 20 *(b)* (decision requested);

Additional Application

p. 84, para. 17 *(b)* (decision requested);

Memorial of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 79-82, paras. 2.105-2.115; pp. 322-326, paras. 3.363-3.377;

Oral argument of Cameroon (provisional measures)

CR 96/4, p. 66 (Moutomé, Agent);

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 7682, paras. 2.96-2.115.

II.c. Boundary treaties

Memorial of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 145-147, paras. 3.01-3.11;

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 45-51, paras. 2.02-215; pp. 57-71, paras. 2.35-2.76; pp. 71-76, paras. 2.77-2.95.

II.d. Delimitation and demarcation

Memorial of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 109-119, paras. 2.146-2.186;

Observations by Cameroon on the preliminary objections

Volume I, pp. 102-106, paras. 3.09-3.17; p. 142, paras. 5-21;

Oral argument of Cameroon (preliminary objections)

CR 98/3, pp. 24-25 (Kamto); pp. 68-69 (Cot);

CR 98/6, pp. 29-31 (Kamto);

Observations of Cameroon on the Request for Interpretation

para. 36;

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 82-88, paras. 2.116-2.135;

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/1, pp. 44-51 (Pellet);

CR 2002/15, pp. 56-63 (Simma).

II.e. Severability of treaties

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 52-57, paras. 2.21-2.34; pp. 122-135, paras. 3.45-3.66;

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/3, pp. 57-59 (Tomuschat);

CR 2002/15, pp. 66-68 (Simma).

II.f. Conventional boundary and *effectivités*

Memorial of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 179-184, paras. 3.89-3.110;

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 36-37, paras. 154-155;

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/2, pp. 37-39 (Cot).

II.g. Historic title. Prescription

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 33-34, para. 1.48;

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/15, pp. 31-35 (Cot).

II.h. Estoppel, preclusion. Acquiescence

Memorial of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 145-178, paras. 3.01-3.88; pp. 249-258, paras. 3.254-3.276;

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 89-97, paras. 2.140-2.158;

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/5, pp. 18-26 (Mendelson); pp. 26-33 (Thouvenin);

CR 2002/16, pp. 38-43 (Mendelson).

II.i. Role of maps

Memorial of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 258-321, paras. 3.277-3.358; pp. 461-473, paras. 4.327-4361;

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 115-120, paras. 3.26-3.37;

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/2, pp. 35-37 (Cot);

CR 2002/4, pp. 53-55 (Cot);

CR 2002/16, pp. 26-27 (Mendelson).

III. Land boundary

III.a. General

Application of Cameroon

pp. 8-14, paras. 14-19; p. 14, para. 20 *(a)* (decision requested);

Additional Application

pp. 76-82, paras. 1-15;

Memorial of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 24-28, paras. 1.42-1.60; pp. 107-108, paras. 2.143-2.145; pp. 141-142, paras. 2.252-2.256; p. 669, points *(a)* and *(b)* (submissions);

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 45-97, paras. 2.01-2.158; pp. 323-337, paras. 6.01-6.06 (table);

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/1, pp. 51-57 (Ntamark); pp. 58-67 (Shaw); pp. 67-75 (Simma).

III.b. Relevant instruments. General

Memorial of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 333-357, paras. 4.01-4.85;

Observations by Cameroon on the preliminary objections

Volume I, pp. 137-138, paras. 5.13-5.14; pp. 141-142, paras. 5.19-5.20;

Oral argument of Cameroon (preliminary objections)

CR 98/4, pp. 27-28 (Tomuschat);

CR 98/6, pp. 35-36 (Pellet);

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 45-71, paras. 2.01-2.76;

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/15, pp. 31-35 (Cot).

III.c. Relevant instruments: The Declarations of 1919 and 1930

[see also IV. Bakassi. IV *(e)* Mandate. Trusteeship, below]

Memorial of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 87-107, paras. 2.99-2.142; p. 140, para. 2.249;

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 159-168, paras. 4.09-4.41;

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/2, pp. 18-23 (Cot); pp. 48-51 (Khan).

III.d. *Id.*: The boundary between the two British Cameroons. The 1946 Order in Council

Memorial of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 140-141, para. 2.249;

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 168-173, paras. 4.42-4.59;

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/2, pp. 61-62 (Shaw).

III.e. *Id.*: The Anglo-German Agreements of 1913

Application of Cameroon

pp. 4-5, paras. 4-5;

Memorial of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 43-87, paras. 2.06-2.98; p. 139, para. 2.248; pp. 445-473, paras. 4.277-4.361;

Oral argument of Cameroon (provisional measures)

CR 96/2, p. 26 (Moutomé, Agent); p. 59 (Cot);

CR 96/4, p. 66 (Moutomé, Agent);

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 173-177, paras. 4.60-4.76; pp. 275-281, paras. 5.112-5.125;

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/3, pp. 18-27 (Simma); pp. 33-34 (Bipoun Woum); pp. 52-59 (Tomuschat);

CR 2002/5, pp. 26-33 (Thouvenin);

CR 2002/15, pp. 66-68 (Simma);

CR 2002/16, pp. 27-29 (Shaw).

III.f. Lake Chad

Additional Application

p. 84, para. 17 *(a)* (decision requested);

Memorial of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 109-126, paras. 2.146-2.210; pp. 358-385, paras. 4.88-4.131;

Observations by Cameroon on the preliminary objections

Concerning the LCBC: Volume I, p. 99, paras. 3.04-3.05;

Oral argument of Cameroon (preliminary objections)

CR 98/4, pp. 14-17 (Cot);

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 101-153, paras. 3.04-3.105 and annex; p. 591, para. 13.01, point *(a)* (submissions);

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/2, pp. 23-46 (Cot);

CR 2002/15, pp. 35-43, paras. 20-40 (Cot);

CR 2002/25, p. (final submissions).

Concerning the Lake Chad tripoint:

Observations by Cameroon on the preliminary objections

Volume I, pp. 118-121, paras. 4.04-4.09; pp. 123-126, paras. 4.15-4.20;

Oral argument of Cameroon (preliminary objections)

CR 98/4, p. 14; pp. 17-20 (Cot);

CR 98/6, pp. 31-33 (Kamto).

III.g. From the Ebeji to Mount Kombon

Memorial of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 386-413, paras. 4.132-4.193;

Oral argument of Cameroon (preliminary objections)

CR 98/6, pp. 36-39 (Pellet);

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 178-221, paras. 4.77-4.132; p. 591, para. 13.01, point *(a)* (submissions);

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/1, pp. 37-41 (Kamto);

CR 2002/2, pp. 47-61 (Khan);

CR 2002/15, pp. 44-69 (Simma);

CR 2002/25, p. (final submissions).

III.h. From Mount Kombon to pillar 64

Memorial of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 414-427, paras. 4.194-4.227;

Oral argument of Cameroon (preliminary objections)

CR 98/6, p. 40 (Pellet);

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 223-224, paras. 4.133-4.137; p. 591, para. 13.01, point *(a)* (submissions);

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/2, pp. 61-71 (Shaw);

CR 2002/15, pp. 44-69 (Simma);

CR 2002/25, p. (final submissions).

III.i. From pillar 64 to the sea

Memorial of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 427-496, paras. 4.228-4.456;

Oral argument of Cameroon (preliminary objections)

CR 98/6, pp. 39-40 (Pellet);

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, p. 591, para. 13.01, point *(a)* (submissions);

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/3, pp. 27-32 (Simma);

CR 2002/15, pp. 44-69 (Simma);

CR 2002/25, p. (final submissions).

IV. Bakassi

[see also III. Land boundary. III. *(e)* The Anglo-German Agreements of 1913, above]

Maps

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/4, pp. 53-63 (Cot);

CR 2002/16, pp. 31-32 (Shaw);

Recognition, acquiescence

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/5, pp. 18-26 (Mendelson); pp. 26-33 (Thouvenin);

Submissions concerning Bakassi

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/5, pp. 33-38 (Bipoun Woum);

CR 2002/25, p. (final submissions).

IV.a. German colonial administration

Application of Cameroon

p. 14, para. 20 *(c)* to *(e")* (decision requested);

Memorial of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 179-183, paras. 3.89-3.104;

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/3, pp. 59-63 (Tomuschat).

IV.b. Article 289 of the Treaty of Versailles

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 281-294, paras. 5.126-5.169.

IV.c. Ethnic considerations

Observations by Cameroon on the preliminary objections

Volume I, p. 17, para. 29; p. 140, paras. 5-17;

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 34-36, paras. 1.50-1.53;

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/3, pp. 40-43 (Bipoun Woum);

CR 2002/16, pp. 33-37 (Mendelson).

IV.d. Old Calabar and British colonial protectorates

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 245-275, paras. 5.17-5.11;

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/3, pp. 34-39 (Bipoun Woum); pp. 44-51 (Aurillac);

CR 2002/16, pp. 18-27 (Shaw).

IV.e. Mandate, trusteeship

Memorial of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 185-258, paras. 3.111-3.276;

Observations by Cameroon on the preliminary objections

Volume I, pp. 13-14, paras. 13-17;

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 295-302, paras. 5.171-5.198;

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/1, pp. 60-63 (Shaw);

CR 2002/4, pp. 18-22 (Ntamark); pp. 22-29 (Shaw);

CR 2002/16, pp. 29-33 (Shaw).

IV.f. Plebiscite and independence

Memorial of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 237-258, paras. 3.224-3.276;

Observations by Cameroon on the preliminary objections

Volume I, p. 14, paras. 17-19; p. 16, para. 27; p. 18, para. 31;

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/1, pp. 61-67 (Shaw);

CR 2002/4, pp. 30-35 (Shaw).

IV.g. *Effectivités*

Memorial of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 486-496, paras. 4.420-4.456;

Oral argument of Cameroon (provisional measures)

CR 96/2, pp. 72-81 (Kamto);

CR 96/4, p. 71 (Moutomé, Agent);

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 294-320, paras. 5.170-5.268;

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/4, pp. 35-53 (Mendelson);

CR 2002/5, pp. 18-26 (Mendelson);

CR 2002/16, pp. 45-51 (Mendelson).

V. Maritime delimitation

V.a. General. Principles of delimitation of maritime areas

Application of Cameroon

p. 14, para. 20 *(f)* (decision requested);

Memorial of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 531-534, paras. 5.67-5.78; p. 670, point *(c)* (submissions);

Observations by Cameroon on the preliminary objections

Volume I, pp. 127-128, paras. 4.23-4.25; pp. 160-162, paras. 7.14-7.25;

Oral argument of Cameroon (preliminary objections)

CR 98/4, pp. 47-49 (Bipoun Woum);

CR 98/6, pp. 53-56 (Pellet); pp. 52-53 (Bipoun Woum);

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 343-355, paras. 7.01-7.42; pp. 387-401, paras. 9.01-9.44; p. 591-592, para. 13.01, point *(c)* (submissions);

Observations of Cameroon on the Written Statement (Equatorial Guinea)

pp. 26-30, paras. 78-94; pp. 30-31, paras. 97-98;

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/5, pp. 38-52 (Pellet);

CR 2002/7, pp. 28-34 (Kamto).

V.b. Intervention and third parties' rights

[See also III.f. Lake Chad concerning the Lake Chad tripoint, above.]

Memorial of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 550-558, paras. 5.114-5.139;

Observations by Cameroon on the preliminary objections

Volume I, pp. 172-183, paras. 8.01-8.33;

Oral argument of Cameroon (preliminary objections)

CR 98/4, pp. 56-59 (Highet);

Observations of Cameroon on the request to intervene (Equatorial Guinea)

p. 1, paras. 3-5;

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 440-453, paras. 9.118-9.153;

Observations of Cameroon on the Written Statement (Equatorial Guinea)

pp. 2-13, paras. 5-37; p. 14, paras. 40-41; p. 17, para. 51; p. 21, para. 64; p. 30, paras. 95-96;

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/6, pp. 56-73 (Pellet);

CR 2002/22, pp. 18-27 (Pellet); pp. 28-35 (Cot); pp. 35-46 (Kamto); pp. 46-55 (Mendelson);

CR 2002/25, pp. (Pellet); pp. (Kamto).

V.c. Negotiations between the Parties. The Kano and Maroua Agreements

Memorial of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 126-138, paras. 2.211-2.244; p. 141, para. 2.250;

Oral argument of Cameroon (provisional measures)

CR 96/2, p. 24 (Moutomé, Agent);

CR 96/4, p. 66 (Moutomé, Agent);

Observations by Cameroon on the preliminary objections

Volume I, pp. 73-86, paras. 2.09-2.37; pp. 164-168, paras. 7.29-7.42;

Oral argument of Cameroon (preliminary objections)

CR 98/3, p. 57-59 (Shaw);

CR 98/4, pp. 49-51 (Bipoun Woum);

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 359-384, paras. 8.01-8.87;

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/5, pp. 26-33 (Thouvenin); pp. 52-61 (Kamto);

CR 2002/6, pp. 18-27 (Tomuschat);

CR 2002/17, pp. 31-43 (Sinclair).

V.d. First sector, up to point G

Memorial of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 500-529, paras. 5.06-5.62;

Oral argument of Cameroon (preliminary objections)

CR 98/4, p. 55 (Highet);

CR 98/6, pp. 56-57 (Pellet);

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/5, pp. 52-70 (Kamto);

CR 2002/25, p. (final submissions).

V.e. Second sector, beyond point G. The equitable line

Memorial of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 529-558, paras. 5.63-5.139;

Oral argument of Cameroon (preliminary objections)

CR 98/4, pp. 55-56 (Highet);

CR 98/6, pp. 57-59 (Pellet);

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 401-426, paras. 9.45-9.95;

Observations of Cameroon on the Written Statement (Equatorial Guinea)

p. 2, para. 6; p. 6, para. 16;

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/6, pp. 27-44 (Kamto); pp. 45-56 (Mendelson);

CR 2002/7, pp. 18-34 (Kamto);

CR 2002/17, pp. 44-64 (Kamto);

CR 2002/22, pp. 35-46 (Kamto);

CR 2002/25, p. (final submissions).

V.f. Oil concessions and operations

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 244-245, paras. 5.14-5.16; pp. 427-440, paras. 9.96-9.117;

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/5, pp. 61-70 (Kamto);

CR 2002/7, pp. 18-26 (Kamto);

CR 2002/17, pp. 18-31 (Pellet).

VI. Responsibility

VI.a. In general and applicable principles

Additional Application

p. 82, para. 16; p. 84, para. 17 *(c)* to *(f)* (decision requested);

Memorial of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 596-625, paras. 6.110-6.186; pp. 629-648, paras. 7.01-7.57; pp. 670-671, points *(d)* to *(h)* and paras. 9.2 and 9.3 (submissions);

Observations by Cameroon on the preliminary objections

Volume I, pp. 150-151, para. 6.05;

Oral argument of Cameroon (preliminary objections)

CR 98/4, pp. 40-43 (Aurillac);

CR 98/6, pp. 44-45 (Pellet); pp. 47-48 (Bipoun Woum);

Observations of Cameroon on the Request for Interpretation

para. 36; paras. 37-38;

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 459-482, paras. 10.01-10.58; pp. 485-494, paras. 11.04-11.26; p. 592, para. 13.01, points *(d)* to *(h)* and 13.02 (submissions);

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/7, pp. 34-46 (Corten); pp. 58-70 (Tomuschat);

CR 2002/16, pp. 51-55 (Tomuschat);

CR 2002/25, p. (final submissions).

VI.b. Lake Chad

Memorial of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 586-590, paras. 6.79-6.89;

Oral argument of Cameroon (preliminary objections)

CR 98/4, p. 24, para. 7 (Tomuschat);

CR 98/6, p. 37 (Pellet);

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 536-547, paras. 11.165-11.214;

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/7, pp. 56-57 (Thouvenin);

CR 2002/16, pp. 55-61 (Tomuschat).

VI.c. Land boundary

Memorial of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 590-595, paras. 6.90-6.109;

Oral argument of Cameroon (preliminary objections)

CR 98/4, pp. 24-25 (Tomuschat);

CR 98/6, pp. 41-42 (Pellet);

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 548-557, paras. 11.215-11.244.

VI.d. Bakassi

Memorial of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 567-586, paras. 6.12-6.78;

Oral argument of Cameroon (preliminary objections)

CR 98/3, p. 14 (Esso, Agent);

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 494-536, paras. 11.27-11.164;

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/7, pp. 46-56 (Thouvenin);

CR 2002/16, pp. 61-63 (Tomuschat).

VI.e. The Order indicating provisional measures and its application

Request for the indication of provisional measures

pp. 4-5, paras. 3-7; p. 5, para. 8 (1) to (3) (request);

Observations by Cameroon on the preliminary objections

Volume I, pp. 10-12, paras. 5-9;

Memorandum on procedure. Reply of Cameroon, Volume III, Annex RC I

pp. 3-15, paras. 1-22;

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 23-25, paras. 1.24-1.29;

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/7, pp. 58-70 (Tomuschat);

CR 2002/16, pp. 63-66 (Tomuschat);

CR 2002/25, p. (final submissions).

VI.f. Counter-claims

Reply of Cameroon

Volume I, pp. 561-587, paras. 12.01-12.53; p. 593, para. 13.03 (submissions);

Observations of Cameroon on the counter-claims

pp. 1-19, paras. 1-57;

Oral argument of Cameroon (merits)

CR 2002/16, pp. 71 (Tomuschat);

CR 2002/22, pp. 55-59 (Thouvenin).