XXXII 2000

Eksemplare van *Kleio* (ISSN 0023–2084) kan bestel word van die Bedryfsafdeling, Unisa Uitgewers, Universiteit van Suid-Afrika, Posbus 392, Unisa, 0003 teen R30,00 (BTW ingesluit) stuk. Tjeks en posorders moet uitgemaak word ten gunste van die Universiteit van Suid-Afrika.

Geset, gedruk en uitgegee deur die Universiteit van Suid-Afrika, 2001.

Uittreksels en geïndekseerde artikels uit hierdie tydskrif verskyn in HISTORICAL ABSTRACTS en/of AMERICA: HISTORY AND LIFE. Artikels verskyn ook in die REPERTORIUM VAN SUID-AFRIKAANSE TYDSKRIFARTIKELS.

Copies of *Kleio* (ISSN 0023–2084) may be ordered from the Business Section, Unisa Press, University of South Africa, PO Box 392, Unisa, 0003 at R30,00 (VAT included) each. Cheques or postal orders should be made out in favour of the University of South Africa.

Set, printed and published by the University of South Africa, 2001.

Articles appearing in this journal are abstracted and indexed in HISTORICAL ABSTRACTS and/or AMERICA: HISTORY AND LIFE. Articles also appear in the INDEX TO SOUTH AFRICAN PERIODICALS.



Kleio

33 2001

Journal of the Department of History
University of South Africa

Tydskrif van die Departement Geskiedenis
Universiteit van Suid-Afrika

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General/Algemeen

The encounter between the Basotho and the missionaries of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society, 1833–1933: some perspectives

S G de Clark

The Paris Evangelical Missionary Society (PEMS) encounter with the Basotho is an interesting case study for several reasons. When the first group of PEMS missionaries arrived at the Sotho capital, Thaba Bosiu, in June 1833, the Basotho had had very little contact with Europeans. Eugène Casalis and Thomas Arbousset, together with their assistant Constant Gosselin, were indeed the first Europeans to report on their contact with them.[1] Also, in the early 1830s the Basotho were still a people in the making. They were mostly composed of diverse groups who had pledged allegiance to Moshoeshoe in the previous decade, after their polities had been scattered by a series of conflicts. Hoping to protect the group which he was creating from outside threats, the paramount welcomed missionaries, whom he had tried to attract even before Arbousset and his companions arrived. With the support of Moshoeshoe, Casalis, Gosselin and Arbousset founded the mission which was to become the pride of their society, and the only such endeavour among the Basotho for three decades. It was also a mission which, unlike most of its counterparts in southern Africa, achieved a measure of success: in 1848, after 15 years of Evangelical presence, approximately 1,5% of Moshoeshoe's subjects had become church members, and half as many were catechumen. Between 3% and 3,5% of the population attended church regularly.[2]

1 Two travellers, Seidensticher and Martin, had independently reached Thaba Bosiu a few years earlier and had then carried on, never to be heard of again; Andrew Smith, *The diary of Dr Andrew Smith, 1834–1836*, vol I (Cape Town, 1939) pp 110–111.

2 Based on the report of the missionary conference held at Bethesda in May 1848, *Journal des Missions Évangéliques* (hereafter *JME*) 23 (1848), pp 361–381 and 401–427; Frédoux, 13 Oct 1852, *JME* 28 (1853), p 56.

Missionaries and chiefs

This relative success can be largely attributed to the paramount's active support of the mission – although, for political reasons, he could not always satisfy the missionaries' demands. Significantly, the other missionary success in southern Africa, namely that among the Ngwato, also occurred because of the support of their ruler, Khama. Both rulers used the new religion in order to strengthen their power. However, apart from this, the Sotho and Ngwato situations differed greatly. Khama's political identity rested on the Christian religion. He converted, and used the church itself to build and support his power: it became Khama's church.[3] In contrast, Moshoeshoe did not make use of Christianity to enhance his personal power, but rather to increase the cohesion of his polity. When the missionaries arrived in Lesotho, Moshoeshoe had already ensured his position as paramount by traditional means.[4] For this very reason, his support of Christianity was as much a liability as it was an advantage from a political point of view: he took advantage of the missionaries' presence to increase and even extend his control over populations away from the capital,[5] but the reforms he made in line with Evangelical demands caused much discontent among his subjects.[6] The ways in which Moshoeshoe and Khama supported Christianity also differed. Moshoeshoe did so by helping the missionaries establish their stations – encouraging people to move onto the stations.[7] He urged people to attend the missionaries' services and to pay heed to their injunctions,[8] and he made as many reforms as he could politically afford.[9] Although he never converted – except perhaps on his deathbed – he was clearly motivated by the belief that much of the missionaries' message was valid; but, unlike Khama, he did not attempt to control the church and make it his own instrument

3 Paul Landau, 'The making of Christianity in a southern African kingdom: Gammangwato, ca 1870 to 1940' (Ph D thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1992), pp 44 & 76.

4 Leonard Thompson, *Survival in two worlds* (Oxford, 1975), pp 58 & 211; Eugène Casalis, *Les Bassoutos ou vingt-trois années d'études et d'observations au Sud de l'Afrique* (Paris, 1859), pp 198–199; Casalis, 24 July 1837, *JME* 13 (1838), p 5.

5 Thompson, *Survival in two worlds*, pp 87–88; Maitin, 2 Jan 1844, *JME* 19 (1844), pp 374–375; Samuel Rolland, 20 April 1835, *JME* 10 (1835), p 302.

6 Casalis, 20 May 1841, *JME* 16 (1841), p 403. See also Thompson, *Survival in two worlds*, pp 91–93; Peter Sanders, *Moshoeshoe, chief of the Sotho* (London, 1975), pp 127–128; Claude-Hélène Perrot, *Les sotho et les missionnaires européens au XIXème siècle* (Dijon, 1970), pp 24–25. Casalis, 5 Sept 1839, *JME* 15 (1840), p 126; Casalis, 20 May 1841, *JME* 16 (1841), pp 410–412.

7 Thomas Arbousset, 30 March 1847, *JME* 23 (1848), pp 8–9.

8 Pierre-Joseph Maitin, 2 Jan 1844, *JME* 19 (1844), pp 374–375.

9 Casalis, 5 Sept 1839, *JME* 15 (1840), p 125–126; Sixth report of the missionary conference, 18 Nov 1840, *JME* 16 (1841), p 334.

of power. The PEMS missionaries remained in control of their mission, which was no doubt a far more comfortable situation for them than that experienced by the ministers of the London Missionary Society among the Ngwato.

The relationships between paramount, power, Christianity and tradition among the Basotho also partly differed from those among the Ngwato. In both cases, initially Christianity and tradition were largely viewed as opposites. However, when Khama embraced Christianity, it was a conscious act of breaking with the past for political reasons. Moshoeshoe, however, did not gladly reject Sotho tradition for such motives because, unlike Khama, he had reached power using traditional institutions and means. Also, the fact that the Sotho polity was a recent formation, whose identity rested on the Basotho being Moshoeshoe's subjects, led by the end of the nineteenth century to a somewhat unusual situation; the Evangelical missionaries themselves became part of Sotho tradition. They came to be viewed by the chiefs – especially by the third paramount, Lerotholi – as a way to enhance their prestige.[10] This was largely due to the fact that Moshoeshoe, as founder of the polity, had welcomed them.[11] The presence of missionaries in the vicinity of a chief thus became part of Sotho political tradition, and thus a mark of prestige.

Reception of Christianity

Despite the fact that the PEMS missionaries had a measure of success in Lesotho, in the early decades of their presence the Basotho's general attitude towards Christianity was very fluid – although this was not specific to the Sotho case. These shifts were often related to the Basotho's perception of Europeans, especially in the first decades of the missionaries' arrival. For instance, after some initial distrust, a number of Basotho soon changed their opinion of the Evangelicals' message.[12] This was largely the result of their favourable impressions of European culture in general.[13] Moshoeshoe, in particular, had been very impressed with the innovations introduced by the missionaries.[14] Conversely, the resistance to Christianity which occurred in the late 1840s to the early

10 Ernest Mabille, *JME* 67 (1892), p 464.
11 Herman Dieterlen, 28 Aug 1886, *JME* 61 (1886), p 419.
12 Casalis, *JME* 9 (1834), p 143; Arbousset, 20 Feb 1837, *JME* 12 (1837), p 298; Arbousset, 29 Dec 1843, *JME* 19 (1844), p 250; Casalis, 26 May 1834, *JME* 10 (1835), p 34.
13 Arbousset, 28 Jan 1834, *JME* 9 (1834), p 303; Casalis, *The Basutos*: *or twenty-three years in South Africa* (London, 1861), p 209.
14 Casalis, 4 Oct 1833, *JME* 9 (1834), p 135; Smith, *The diary of Dr Andrew Smith*, vol I, p 116.

1850s can partly be ascribed to the Basotho's disappointment with British policy, in particular with the boundary line between the Free State and Lesotho decided by Major Henry Warden.

The periods of widespread interest in Christianity were in fact quite short. They lasted a few years at most, and were usually followed by times of hostility or by revivals of traditional customs. Until 1837, the Basotho's reception of Christianity was in fact quite similar to trends which occurred elsewhere in southern Africa. Prior to 1837, most of the Basotho who had access to the missionaries' religious message displayed a variety of attitudes towards it. Some were indifferent, others were casually curious without taking it seriously. Still others were unsure about what to make of it; they wondered whether or not it should be regarded as valid and significant, and therefore be welcomed. This relative lack of interest in the Christian message can be ascribed to the fact that most Basotho were not fully aware of its implications. The ministers of the Norwegian Missionary Society met a similar reception among the Zulu, for instance. Torstein Jörgensen indeed ascribes Zulu indifference to the Norwegian missionaries' preaching to 'a lack of understanding, which again was due [...] to Zulu unfamiliarity with the subject spoken of'.[15]

Moreover, even at this early stage, some Basotho – especially the elderly at Thaba Bosiu – expressed reservations about the missionaries' message.[16] This had already occurred in December 1835 – very early indeed if one takes into account that, when the missionaries arrived, they did not speak any Sesotho, and had to learn the language before their message could be communicated. Their interpreter reportedly spoke neither Sesotho nor Dutch well and, most significantly, '... he allowed himself [...] to leave out of [their] preaching everything that Christianity contains that was in disagreement with the customs of his ancestors ...'.[17] Only by the middle of 1837 were the missionaries able to convey their message clearly in Sesotho, so that, prior to this time, the Basotho had virtually no access to the Evangelical views which were at variance with Sotho beliefs. However, in the mid-1830s whatever disapproval existed did not develop into outright hostility. It was only a minority of individuals who disliked the missionaries' message, perhaps the same number as those who were interested in it.

15 Torstein Jörgensen, *Contact and conflict: Norwegian missionaries, the Zulu kingdom and the Gospel 1850–1873* (Stavanger, 1987), p 236.

16 Arbousset, 3 Dec 1835, *JME* 11 (1836), p 143.

17 Arbousset, 19 Sept 1834, *JME* 10 (1835), p 97; original text: '... il se permettait [...] de retrancher de nos prédications tout ce que le christianisme renferme d'opposé aux mœurs de ses ancêtres, ...'

This period of relative indifference came to an end in 1837, when many Basotho began to be interested in Christianity. By the following year, people flocked to listen to the Evangelicals' message.[18] A number of Basotho converted. Among them were several of the most influential members of Sotho society, which was unusual for missions in southern Africa: among the Zulu, for instance, from the beginning it was only outcasts and refugees who were interested in Christianity.[19] This period of widespread interest in Christianity can be ascribed both to a greater availability of books,[20] and to the visions of a councillor of Moshoeshoe, Makoniane,[21] which had aroused interest in Christianity, and made it appear more familiar.

From 1841, however, the conversions which had occurred gave rise to widespread opposition to Christianity.[22] This resistance, which sometimes assumed a violent character, lasted throughout the decade and seriously impeded missionary work on the most recently established stations.[23] The situation of the Evangelical mission further deteriorated from 1848 until the early 1850s. A series of events occurred which caused existing opposition to take on new forms. For the first time, converts defected from the church, especially influential individuals.[24] There was a renewal of interest in customs which the missionaries condemned[25] and many Basotho enthusiastically embraced the syncretic millenarian movement led by the Xhosa prophet called Molageni in Sesotho and Umlanjeni in Xhosa.[26] However, this was followed by another short period of general interest in Christianity from about 1854 to 1856.[27]

Sotho attitudes towards Christianity remained very fluid during the 1860s, but by the following decade they had largely settled. Most Basotho had by then grown up with missionary presence, and the Evangelical message was no longer novel enough to excite their

18 Casalis, 3 Sept 1838, *JME* 14 (1839), pp 87 & 93.
19 Norman Etherington, 'Kingdoms of this world and the next: Christian beginnings among Zulu and Swazi', in R Elphick and R Davenport (eds), *Christianity in South Africa*: *a political, social and cultural history*, p 90.
20 Fourth report of the missionary conference, 10 Nov 1838, *JME* 14 (1839), p 180.
21 Casalis, 24 July 1837, *JME* 13 (1838), p 5.
22 Casalis, 20 May 1841, *JME* 16 (1841), pp 402–403.
23 Casalis, 4 March 1845, *JME* 20 (1845), pp 282–285.
24 Christian Schrumpf, 8 June 1849, *JME* 25 (1850), p 6.
25 François Maeder, 10 Jan 1853, *JME* 28 (1853), p 165; Prosper Lemue, 4 Jan 1854, *JME* 29 (1854), p 208.
26 Schrumpf, 13 Feb 1851, *JME* 26 (1851), p 169; Arbousset, April 1851, *JME* 26 (1851), p 323; Schrumpf, 1 June 1851, *JME* 26 (1851), p 373.
27 Report of the missionary conference held at Thaba Bosiu in April 1855, with reference to Morija, *JME* 30 (1855), p 339; Théophile Jousse, 15 July 1855, *JME* 30 (1855), p 442.

curiosity or for them to feel as much threatened by it as the previous generation. Only in 1919 did a period of widespread interest again occur, as a result of the influenza epidemic.[28]

Sotho reception of Christianity was also characterised by several other traits. Firstly, opposition to Christianity was rarely motivated by strictly religious concerns. Only in the late 1830s, during the first period of widespread interest in the missionaries' message, did some resistance occur because Christian ways clashed with what was perceived as the will of the ancestors. In 1838 Chapi, the *engaka* at Thaba Bosiu, criticised private prayer and schooling – quite probably literacy;[29] and in 1839, when Moshoeshoe's wife Mantsane died, her relatives opposed the paramount's wish that she should receive a Christian burial.[30] Later instances of hostility to Christianity were the result of either grievances against Europeans, or of the missionaries' demands which threatened the existing social organisation: the Evangelicals forbade polygamy and the exchange of *bohali* for church members. The opposition which occurred in the 1840s, following the first conversions, was motivated by such social concerns.[31]

Secondly, although many influential individuals were interested in Christianity and even converted in the early decades of missionary presence, especially in the 1830s and 1840s, by the end of the nineteenth century this had become very unusual. High-status Basotho needed the customs which the missionaries condemned in order to maintain their standing. The trend was accelerated by the resistance which occurred in the early 1850s, as many of Moshoeshoe's relatives and friends defected from the church.[32] Also, as the nineteenth century progressed, the proportion of women in the church increased.[33] Whereas in the mid-1830s women had shown very little interest in the missionaries' message,[34] by the end of the century, small churches were sometimes composed exclusively of women.[35] In 1924, women represented more than 80% of the church members. However, this

28 Report of the missionary conference held in 1919, *JME* 94 (1919, 1st semester), pp 303–304.
29 Casalis, 15 April 1839, *JME* 15 (1840), pp 1–3.
30 Casalis, 5 Sept 1839, *JME* 15 (1840), pp 125–126.
31 Casalis, 20 May 1841, *JME* 16 (1841), p 410.
32 François Daumas, 6 May 1849, *JME* 24 (1849), p 353; Report of the missionary conference held at Carmel in May 1850, *JME* 25 (1850), p 336.
33 Adolphe Mabille, 13 Feb 1893, *JME* 68 (1893), p 154; B Pascal, 2 May 1898, *JME* 73 (1898), p 879.
34 Casalis, 26 May 1834, *JME* 10 (1835), p 34.
35 E Mabille, 4 Feb 1890, *JME* 65 (1890), p 292; Report of the missionary conference held in 1901, *JME* 76 (1901, 2nd semester), p 40. A Mabille, 13 Feb 1893, *JME* 68 (1893), p 154; B Pascal, 2 May 1898, *JME* 73 (1898), p 879.

should not be interpreted to mean that women found Christianity particularly attractive. It is true that the church allowed women to gain greater social influence,[36] and this probably contributed to the phenomenon. However, the feminisation of the churches was mostly due to the fact that conversions of men were increasingly unusual, because the sacrifices required to join the church were heavier for them.

Thirdly, until the end of the nineteenth century, although Sotho attitudes to Christianity frequently varied from one station to the next, they did not follow a geographical pattern. In the mid-1880s, however, a distinct regional polarisation began to emerge – although the missionaries realised the importance of the phenomenon only in the mid-1890s. After the Gun War (1880–1883), many Basotho began moving to the mountainous northern areas of the country. This was partly due to concerns of security, but according to missionary reports the emigrants also wished to avoid the influence of the Evangelicals' religious message.[37] The central and southern regions of the country then emerged as areas where the missionaries had made most headway. There, congregations were relatively large and the missionaries usually met with little opposition,[38] whereas in the north, converts were few and strong aversion to Christianity was widespread.[39]

The adoption of Christian concepts and beliefs

Initially, the Basotho generally viewed Christianity as characterised by several aspects which were presented by the missionaries as essential, namely resting on Sundays, European clothing and architecture, and literacy. Resting on Sundays was probably the most easily adopted, because it had pre-existing equivalents: people had to refrain from agricultural work during some ceremonies.[40] Later, in the second half of the nineteenth century, European-style clothing and architecture became less strongly associated with Christianity, as they were gradually adopted by society at large. Literacy was probably the element which was the most closely associated with the new religion. Until the late 1850s, interest in the Evangelicals' message and enthusiasm for reading and writing went hand in hand.[41] The fact that

36 Women could direct prayer-meetings where there were no men to do so.
37 A Mabille, 28 May 1885, *JME* 60 (1885), p 404.
38 Dieterlen, 'Dans le haut Lessouto', *JME* 71 (1896), p 69; Dieterlen, July 1894, *JME* 70 (1895), p 21.
39 Dieterlen, 'Dans le haut Lessouto', *JME* 71 (1896), p 69.
40 Arbousset, 19 Sept 1834, *JME* 10 (1835), p 101; Casalis, 24 July 1837, *JME* 13 (1838), pp 6–7.
41 Daumas, 27 Oct 1843, *JME* 19 (1844), p 328.

reading gave access to the Bible was not the only reason for this, although it was why the missionaries emphasised literacy. The Basotho considered reading and writing to be integral parts of Christianity: religious activities in themselves. Some Basotho regarded them until at least the 1840s as magical, sometimes even when they had attended school and had some command of these skills.[42] Many people seem to have attributed protective properties to scriptures and spelling books, which they wore around their necks like other amulets.[43] This perception of literacy in religious terms can be ascribed to several factors. Firstly, teaching reading and writing was one of the missionaries' foremost priorities. Secondly, apart from spelling books, religious works were the only books available. Thirdly, reading and writing appeared quite extraordinary in their own right, and exerted a deep fascination.

Moshoeshoe's subjects were not entirely oblivious to the more theological aspects of Christianity however, even in the earlier years of missionary presence. Gradually, an increasing number of Basotho embraced several Christian concepts and beliefs.

Importantly, one of the Christian notions which was adopted most easily was that of a universal deity. Perhaps even as early as the 1850s, belief in the Christian god had become widespread among the general population, and was not restricted to converts.[44] Various, usually compatible, perceptions of the deity existed but the emphasis on them often shifted according to circumstances. In the mid-1830s god was perceived both as the creator of the world and as a judge responsible for people's fate in the after-life.[45] This latter notion was probably due to the missionaries' insistence on the existence of heaven and hell. By the late 1830s, during the wave of interest in Christianity, god was most often perceived in his role as creator.[46] Some converts had even adopted the concept – very popular in nineteenth-century Europe – of a deity who had harmoniously fitted the resources of nature to his creatures' needs, just as a craftsman delicately builds a watch: the concept of the Christian god as the 'watch-maker' of nature.[47] This can be ascribed to the fact that, in order to convince people of their god's existence, the Evangelicals argued that the existence of the world could not be explained without the notion of divine creator. In the mid-1850s,

42 Arbousset, 17 July 1839, *JME* 14 (1839), p 459.
43 Casalis, *The Basutos*, p 83.
44 Hamilton Moore Dyke, 15 Jan 1853, *JME* 28 (1853), p 123.
45 Arbousset, 19 Sept 1834, *JME* 10 (1835), p 101.
46 Arbousset, 26 June 1838, *JME* 14 (1839), p 56.
47 Rolland, 15 Sept 1838, *JME* 14 (1839), p 46.

the belief that the deity had intervened in the Basotho's favour during the Battle of Berea (December 1852) led to his being perceived primarily as a source of protection and peace.[48] In the late 1880s he was again mostly thought of as a good-hearted creator, to such an extent that many Basotho did not accept the belief that he could decide to refuse heaven to non-converts.[49] In that period, his character of judge had therefore come to be perceived as incompatible with that of good-hearted father. By the beginning of the twentieth century, Sotho perception of the Christian god seems to have changed radically. The deity was no longer perceived as good-hearted: some Basotho were fearful of him.[50] This was perhaps the result of the missionaries' greater insistence on hell as they tried to counteract the previous attitude. The changing perception of Sotho chiefs, who were quickly losing their people's respect, together with the fact that the Christian deity was symbolically associated with a ruler – by the use of the term *morena*, lord, or other metaphors – might also have contributed to the emergence of this fearful attitude.

Unlike the notion of universal god, other Evangelical tenets took decades to become common even among the Christians. For instance, the notion that suffering was to be regarded as good because it was the will of god was reportedly shared by a few converts in the mid-1850s, and appears to have been common among church members only in the mid-1860s. Other Christian elements acquired greater importance as the century unfolded. Prayers, which had always been common among the converts, began to assume a fundamental character in the late 1870s as a means to fulfil one's wishes and not simply for thanks-giving.[51] By the 1910s, the trend had become widespread among the evangelists.[52] At first, the missionaries were quite satisfied with these developments. However, they became displeased when the trends became more marked. They began to view the converts' attitude towards suffering as a form of fatalism, and their reliance on the power of prayer as laziness.[53]

The Basotho were motivated by different reasons in understanding, favouring, and adopting different Evangelical concepts. The fact that they adopted the notion of a universal god rather easily can largely be ascribed to their impression that this concept explained phenomena not

48 Dyke, 15 Jan 1853, *JME* 28 (1853), p 123.
49 A Mabille, 24 Nov 1887, *JME* 63 (1888), p 48.
50 Paul Ramseyer, *JME* 93 (1918, 1st semester), p 297.
51 Gustave Christmann, May 1879, *JME* 54 (1879), p 374.
52 Dieterlen, 21 July 1910, *JME* 85 (1910), pp 184–185.
53 Dieterlen, 21 July 1910, *JME* 85 (1910), pp 184–185.

addressed by known myths, particularly the existence of inanimate matter: it filled a gap in the existing world-view.[54] Usually, however, the contrary happened: most of the Christian notions which were accepted had traditional equivalents, and were understood in terms of these existing beliefs and concepts, or at least by analogy to them. For instance, during the early decades of missionary presence, the Basotho often thought of sin as a form of sickness.[55] In this context, the death of Christ could be understood as a sacrifice meant to cure mankind of sin, because sacrifices were the ordinary way of dealing with illnesses.[56] In the 1830s and 1840s, even the missionaries were perceived in terms of pre-existing notions. They were viewed as being similar to *lingaka*,[57] although people were doubtless aware of important differences between Sotho *lingaka* and the ministers. On some stations, at least, the Evangelical ministers were also perceived as chiefs.

Moreover, in the 1840s during times of epidemic, the missionaries and sometimes their converts were often seen as witches, and blamed for the outbreaks. Christianity itself was then thought to be a form of sorcery.[58] In the same period, even when there were no epidemics, a number of Basotho also thought that ministers or church members bewitched people in order to convert them.[59] These opinions probably resulted from the converts' odd behaviour in terms of the existing ideas and world-view. In order to become members of the church, the Christians had to fulfil the missionaries' requirements and renounce most of what was considered desirable by the rest of society, especially the exchange of *bohali* (cattle for marriage), polygamy and initiation. To the Basotho who had little or no knowledge of Christian doctrines, these decisions made no sense. Initially, these Basotho seem to have explained the phenomenon away as insanity. Isolated Christians sometimes complained that their fellow-villagers thought them insane. By the early 1840s, however, in some areas, converts who often were of high social status were becoming too numerous for this explanation to remain tenable. The idea of oddity which insanity entailed was difficult to reconcile with relatively large numbers and with respectability. Widespread rumours that Christianity was a form of sorcery were last

54 Casalis, *The Basutos*, p 238–240.
55 Arbousset, 5 Nov 1839, *JME* 15 (1840), p 208; Arbousset, 7 Sept 1844, *JME* 20 (1845), p 111.
56 Arbousset, 29 Dec 1841, *JME* 17 (1842), p 207; Casalis, 15 July 1843, *JME* 19 (1844), p 125.
57 *Lingaka* (sing *engaka*): persons called upon to either prevent or deal with problems and misfortunes (sickness and drought, for instance) mainly by the use of magical substances and sacrifices to the ancestors.
58 Rolland, 7 March 1842, *JME* 17 (1842), pp 369–370; Seventh report of the missionary conference, 20 May 1842, *JME* 18 (1843), p 44; Rolland, 10 Aug 1843, *JME* 18 (1843), p 407.
59 Schrumpf, 4 June 1844, *JME* 20 (1845), p 56; Prosper Lautré, 11 Jan 1847, *JME* 22 (1847), p 407.

reported in the 1840s. However, during the rinderpest epidemic of 1897, the notion of sorcery resurfaced, this time not directed at the missionaries, but at the British administration: many Basotho thought that government officials had been poisoning the herds' water.[60]

In addition, some Christian notions were adopted by the Basotho because they were found attractive, this motivation often existing simultaneously with those already mentioned. A fairly good test of which ideas were deemed appealing is whether or not they were present in syncretic movements. The movement led by the Xhosa prophet Molageni in 1850 to 1851 is particularly revealing in this respect, because it was welcomed enthusiastically, in Lesotho. The beliefs held by his Sotho followers confirmed the Basotho's predilection for the idea of a universal deity, especially as creator, and for the possibility of an everlasting blissful after-life, both of which were already evident in the statements previously quoted by the missionaries. Molageni's movement further revealed that the notions of divine judgement and punishment in themselves appealed to the Basotho, provided that the damned were those who had given up existing customs and the elect those who upheld them.[61] The phenomenon also showed that many Basotho had been impressed by the stories of miracles performed by Christ,[62] as well as by the promise of general resurrection.[63]

Pre-existing religious elements which had not been criticised by the missionaries became very important in the Basotho's view of Christianity. In particular, this was the case with dreams. They had already had great significance in 'traditional' religious life, because they were believed to be the way in which the ancestors communicated with the living. Consequently, they began playing a part in the Basotho's perception of Christianity very early. By the 1830s already, some people dreamt of the Christian afterworld – of heaven and hell.[64] Such dreams sometimes motivated conversions.[65] The missionaries did not condemn those who converted under these circumstances, and they even appear to have ascribed these dreams to divine intervention.[66] Presumably as a result of this tolerance, by the 1880s many Basotho had viewed dreams as personal callings, and considered them

60 Pascal, 11 Aug 1897, *JME* 72 (1897), p 600.
61 Schrumpf, 13 Feb 1851, *JME* 26 (1851), pp 169–170.
62 Schrumpf, 13 Feb 1851, *JME* 26 (1851), pp 169–170; Arbousset, April 1851, *JME* 26 (1851), p 323.
63 Schrumpf, 13 Feb 1851, *JME* 26 (1851), p 169.
64 Rolland, 18 Jan 1836, *JME* 11 (1836), p 169.
65 Arbousset, 6 Sept 1856, *JME* 32 (1857), p 43.
66 Report of the missionary conference held at Morija in April 1853, *JME* 28 (1853), p 294.

necessary to conversion. They might even have perceived dreams as an integral part of conversion.[67]

In addition, Sotho understanding of Christian concepts and beliefs was heavily influenced by the missionaries' religious practices. This is particularly striking when one compares perceptions which developed after Anglican and Catholic missions settled in Lesotho to those which had existed before their arrival. The practices of these churches had a profound impact on some of the views of Evangelical converts. This is most obvious in their understanding of baptism and consequently conversion. The Evangelical missionaries only administered baptism to adults and adolescents when they believed that they were converted, that is, when they thought that these Basotho had been completely transformed, 'reborn' by the holy spirit. Moreover, the Evangelicals only baptised the candidates after they had undergone long preparation. By contrast, other churches administered baptism to young children, which implied that the ceremony had transforming properties of its own, and even that it was necessary for salvation. Baptism could no longer be seen merely as the ratification of a change which the person had already achieved by other means – the holy spirit – as the PEMS missionaries believed and implied by their practices. Probably as a result of this perception, from the 1870s onwards, the ceremony began to acquire great significance for the Basotho, who sought it actively for its own sake.[68]

Although many Basotho adopted several Evangelical tenets, other Christian notions were largely rejected, even by converts. This was especially true of the idea that Christianity constituted a set of beliefs incompatible with 'traditional' ones, and which consequently required that converts should reject their previous world-view. From the outset, the Basotho regarded the missionaries' religious notions as compatible with their traditional ones, the validity of which were beyond doubt.[69] This was one of the reasons for the initial lack of widespread hostility towards the Evangelicals' preaching: their message was not perceived as a threat to the existing world-view. Naturally, the missionaries made it clear that they viewed traditional beliefs as incompatible with theirs. Some converts did accept this, but they were a minority.[70] Most church-goers were not ready to doubt the beliefs which they had grown up with, and which they had hitherto considered universal truths. At the same time, they adopted many of the missionaries' tenets and found

67 Dieterlen, 16 Sept 1889, *JME* 65 (1890), p 12.
68 Report of the missionary conference held at Bethesda in May 1879, *JME* 54 (1879), p 332; Ramseyer, 23 Nov 1917, *JME* 93 (1918, 1st semester), p 171.
69 Casalis, 30 May 1835, *JME* 11 (1836), p 19.
70 Casalis, 5 Sept 1839, *JME* 15 (1840), p 123; Rolland, 7 March 1842, *JME* 17 (1842), p 365.

themselves adhering to both religions.[71] This attitude seems to have been even more general among the converts of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries than it had been in the 1840s and 1850s.[72] Missionaries of a later generation often commented on the Sotho's adherence to both traditional beliefs and Evangelical practices. However, they believed that converts of previous generations had been closer to the Evangelical ideal, and there may well have been more to this perception than myth.

In the early decades of Evangelical presence, congregations were smaller than they were at the end of the nineteenth century. Early missionaries were therefore in a better position to influence their converts' thinking. This is substantiated by the fact that certain Evangelical notions were accepted by early converts but largely rejected by later Christians. This was especially so in the case of guilt. The missionaries viewed a sense of guilt as a first step towards conversion because they considered it the logical consequence when one was aware of one's sins. They consequently strove to instil it, and initially they often succeeded[73] – especially from the mid-1840s after they had begun using the term *lechualo*, which meant conscience or remorse.[74] Some converts even felt personally guilty for Christ's death. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, PEMS missionaries complained that Sotho converts appeared to feel little guilt.[75]

Evangelical concepts and beliefs were not always either accepted – if understood in terms of pre-existing ones – or rejected: they sometimes also had an impact on the Basotho's beliefs and world-view by modifying 'traditional' notions. This was especially evident in people's perception of their ancestors. In the 1850s Casalis wrote that the Basotho feared them.[76] By the late 1880s, however, most people had come to perceive the ancestors as compassionate, and thought of them more fondly.[77] This was similar to the converts' view of their deity and of their relationship with him, and probably resulted from the influence of these Christian notions.

Several Sotho views stand out because they developed very gradually, becoming widespread by the end of the nineteenth century, and thus constituted long-term trends in the Basotho's perception of

71 Rolland, 18 Dec 1844, *JME* 20 (1845), pp 210–217.
72 Dieterlen to his mother, 9 March 1895, *JME* 71 (1896), pp 219–220; Henri Marzloff, 13 Jan 1905, *JME* 80 (1905, 1st semester), pp 181–182.
73 Rolland, 18 Jan 1836, *JME* 11 (1836), p 169.
74 Arbousset, 7 Sept 1844, *JME* 20 (1845), p 109.
75 Dieterlen, July 1894, *JME* 70 (1895), p 17.
76 Casalis, *Les Bassoutos*, p 311.
77 Jousse, *La Mission fran*çaise évangélique au sud de l'Afrique (Paris, 1889), vol I, p 53.

Christianity. They are also remarkable for the fact that, although they emerged for different reasons, they were closely related, and probably reinforced one another.

The first of these perceptions was the Basotho's view of conversion. As suggested by the fact that dreams had acquired great importance, attitudes towards conversion became increasingly passive. In the early 1840s, some Basotho understood the notion in a way that was similar to the missionaries' perception: conversion was seen as a process which required both the intervention of the holy spirit and the participation of the prospective Christian. However, this view never became dominant. By the mid-1850s many of the Basotho who were interested in Christianity seemed to find the notion problematical, and were confused about what the missionaries expected should happen to them.[78] Throughout the nineteenth century the Basotho increasingly considered the part they had to play in their own conversion as minor, and viewed it more and more as the Christian god's responsibility. By the 1880s, people had often believed that signs such as dreams were necessary, and that one who wished to convert could only wait patiently for them.[79]

The belief that conversion necessitated signs such as dreams also revealed the perception that conversion was one critical moment, a turning point in people's lives. It is unlikely that the Basotho literally thought so, but the importance which they attached to dreams does suggest that they often believed that conversion was not as gradual as the Evangelicals ministers believed. The missionaries might have unwittingly encouraged the development of this perception by the fact that they classified people as either 'heathen' or 'Christian' – despite the fact that the notion of catechumen revealed their belief that conversion was in fact a gradual process. This view of conversion as being sudden rather than gradual probably reinforced – and was reinforced by – passive attitudes towards it. In fact, conversion had come to be seen as an *event*, something that *happened* to a person, rather than a *process* in which one could be *involved*.

The development of these passive attitudes can probably be ascribed to several reasons, and it is unclear which was the most important. The diminishing influence of the missionaries – as a result of the greater number of converts – probably contributed to the phenomenon in the long run.[80] At the same time, Evangelical doctrines themselves unwittingly encouraged such passivity. This was naturally true of the

78 Louis Cochet, 29 Dec 1857, *JME* 33 (1858), p 166.
79 Dieterlen, 16 Sept 1889, *JME* 65 (1890), p 12.
80 Dieterlen, *JME* 80 (1905, 2nd semester), pp 341–342.

concept of undeserved divine grace, but other doctrines probably facilitated the importance lent to dreams. PEMS missionaries did not believe that these signs were required for conversion, nor that their occurrence constituted conversion. On the contrary, they viewed conversion as a long process during which one became painfully aware of one's sinful state; a change of personality had to occur[81] and a deeper understanding of Christian beliefs had to be reached through the working of the holy spirit. However, this meant that the missionaries were of the opinion that believing in their god was insufficient to be deemed a Christian, and that one had to undergo an unusual personal experience. This encouraged the Basotho to think that conversion required special signs, such as dreams.

A second development was that, by the end of the nineteenth century, the Basotho had come to view being a Christian as synonymous with belonging to the church. The converts considered this both necessary and sufficient to ensure their place in heaven[82] – whereas others often believed that being church-members was not even necessary because god was too good-hearted to condemn them to everlasting torment.[83] The converts' perception was mostly due to the fact that, ever since the 1830s, someone who regarded himself or herself as converted tried to join the church. The missionaries' acceptance of such individuals into the church when they considered them to be converted also encouraged this perception. Moreover, the changing understanding of baptism resulting from other missions' policies probably also played a part in this development.

Thirdly, converts developed an approach which the missionaries termed 'formalist': Christianity came to be lived as the observance of a series of rules, usually prohibitions.[84] Because they believed that most 'traditional' Sotho customs were incompatible with their god's laws, the PEMS missionaries had stressed very heavily that Christians should abstain from them. People were accepted and allowed to remain within the church only if they submitted to its mostly prohibitive rules, which required important sacrifices. Consequently, refraining from the practices which the missionaries disapproved of soon became in the eyes of the Basotho virtually synonymous with Christianity. As they then came to equate 'Christian' with 'church member', they viewed Christianity as following church rules – especially the converts, who

81 Daumas, 14 Oct 1839, *JME* 15 (1840), p 168; Schrumpf, 1 April 1845, *JME* 20 (1845), p 377.
82 Report of the missionary conference held at Leloaleng in Jan 1897, *JME* 72 (1897), p 212.
83 A. Mabille, 24 Nov 1887, *JME* 63 (1888), p 48.
84 Report of the missionary conference held at Leloaleng in Jan 1897, *JME* 72 (1897), p 212; Paul Germond, 5 June 1898, *JME* 73 (1898), p 550.

were most directly affected by Evangelical prohibitions. The development of such 'formalist' attitudes was probably facilitated by the fact that it correlated with the traditional notion that one had to abide by a number of practices in order to avoid angering the ancestors.[85]

These trends in the Basotho's views of Christianity shared a common feature: they all represented increasingly binary perceptions. Thus, conversion had essentially become a critical moment, a switch between the only two possible spiritual states – convert or non-convert – which respectively had become equated with the status of church member or non-church member. Church members had no reason continuously to try to achieve the deeper state of piety which the missionaries desired; following church rules was of primary importance for such people to ensure that they remained in this category.

The binary understanding of Christianity and, especially, what it meant to be a Christian was accompanied by a related development among Evangelical converts: community formation. Two major stages can be distinguished in this process. Firstly, a distinct Christian culture had emerged. This culture was not merely evident in the converts' different life-style and customs. Evangelical religious beliefs had become mostly a matter of cultural transmission between converts, rather than of individual interpretations of the Bible or of the missionaries' sermons. Initially, in the late 1830s in particular, Christian notions had stimulated much discussion among the Basotho who took them seriously enough to attend church. People were particularly interested in the concepts of a universal god, sin, conversion, the holy spirit, and in the reason for Christ's death.[86] As they grappled with these ideas, the Basotho displayed much individual creativity in an effort to understand them, usually by means of analogies and metaphors. By the mid-1850s, however, this creativity had largely subsided. Instead, when individuals became interested in Christianity, church members provided them with relatively fixed metaphors, especially for these newly-interested people to express the experience of conversion.[87] Only a few of the earlier variety of metaphors and perceptions had been retained, perhaps because the Christians had found them most effective in convincing the missionaries that they were converted. These images and perceptions thus became crystallised as cultural forms, which were available to condition the experiences of later converts. Although the missionaries

85 Casalis, *Les Bassoutos*, p 318.
86 Arbousset, 19 Sept 1834, *JME* 10 (1835), pp 101 & 104.
87 Cochet, 29 Dec 1857, *JME* 33 (1858), p 166; Jousse, 28 Dec 1856, *JME* 31 (1857), pp 128–130.

most probably played an important role in this process by showing their preference for some forms rather than others, it largely resulted from interactions within the congregations. This can be contrasted with what occurred in Natal, where, on the contrary, the Kholwa were trying to emulate the large European population around them.[88]

The process of community formation among Evangelical Christians reached a second and final stage at the end of the nineteenth century. Conversions of people who came from non-Christian families had by then become increasingly rare in proportion to church membership. Together with the incompatibility between the customs of converts and non-converts – particularly with respect to marriage – this situation resulted in Evangelical congregations being mostly composed of second- or third-generation Christians. Church members, who had always formed a group distinct from the rest of society by virtue of their culture, thus became distinct with respect to heredity as well. This strengthened their sense of a Christian, Evangelical, identity and apparently resulted in fairly strong in-group loyalties: by the 1910s young people who were the children of church members were scornful of converts who came from a non-Christian background.[89] By the beginning of the twentieth century, Evangelical Christians had become a fully-fledged community, with distinct lifestyle and customs, a specific culture transmitted along hereditary lines, in-group loyalties, as well as beliefs and understandings of Christian notions which, although once varied and highly personal, had begun to crystallise half a century earlier, and could therefore be considered to have become tradition. Moreover, this community had become partly independent from the missionaries in so far that its leaders – ministers and evangelists – increasingly came from its ranks,[90] and that the Evangelical church was largely self-supporting financially.[91] This made Evangelical Basotho unique among Sotho Christians, because neither Catholic nor Anglican converts were in this situation. The Catholic church still relied very heavily on outside funding for its financing, and it had no Sotho priests. The Anglican church was still much smaller. This situation soon changed, however. In the following decades the Catholic mission grew considerably – mainly due to the opening of

88 Norman Etherington, *Preachers, peasants and politics in southeast Africa: African Christian communities in Natal, Pondoland and Zululand, 1835–1880* (London, 1978), pp 164–165.

89 Report of the missionary conference held at Hermon in April 1913, *JME* 88 (1913, 1st semester), p 337.

90 Report of the missionary conference held in 1918, *JME* 93 (1918, 2nd semester), p 256; Daniel Couve, 4 May 1925, *JME* 100 (1925, 2nd semester), pp 29–30.

91 *JME* 94 (1919, 1st semester), p 299.

numerous schools, to its substantial financial resources and to the chiefs' support. By the 1930s, it had already become comparable to the Evangelical church, which never regained its former pre-eminence.[92]

92 Victor Ellenberger, *Un siècle de Missions au Lessouto*, pp 422–427.

Urban land claims in South Africa: the case of Lady Selborne township, Pretoria, Gauteng

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Racial discrimination and segregation have been integral components of South African history since the arrival of white settlers. By conquest and expansion, indigenous people were displaced. Despite this, the legal system continued to allow the possibility, however remote, that African landownership could expand. After 1913, however, the situation altered because the Natives Land Act passed that year drastically restricted African access to land. From that time onwards, African landownership was increasingly curtailed, and by the time of the Nationalist election victory in 1948, a plethora of legislation applied racially discriminatory restrictions both in rural and urban areas.

But after that date, the government introduced more exhaustive and meticulous racist legislation which impacted directly on the lives of all 'non-white' South Africans – 'Coloured', Indian, Malay, Chinese and African. Thus,

> although the Group Areas Act of 1950 did not introduce a new concept, it provided for unprecedented state intervention in property rights and empowered the authorities to impose a nationwide system of control which attempted to ensure that all South Africans could live and trade only in segregated areas. To make segregation absolutely enforceable, the Population Registration Act of 1950, introducing compulsory race classification, was enacted. It was followed shortly afterwards by the Group Areas Act, which the prime minister, Dr D F Malan, described as the ''essence of apartheid'' .[1]

As succinctly expressed by Du Pré, the Group Areas Act

1 M Festenstein and C Pickard-Cambridge, *Land and race*: *South Africa's Group Areas and Land Acts* (Johannesburg, 1987), p 6.

> did not just move people from one area to another – this Act destroyed communities; closed churches and schools; demolished houses, churches and school buildings and closed sports grounds; uprooted congregations and dispersed church members, and scattered families and friends … Many of the old people never made it out of their homes. They died before the furniture trucks arrived and the bulldozers rumbled in.[2]

The ideology underpinning the Act and its supporting legislation was to separate totally every racial group from the other. Urban areas were the particular target, for there were suburbs and townships in which 'mixed' groups of people resided. Blacks, whites and 'Coloureds' were not even to live close to one another, but had to be separated by wide stretches of land. 'Black spots' among white areas were anathema. Under the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 the task of investigating suitable group areas was given to the Land Tenure Advisory Board (established by Act 28 of 1946). Among the duties of the Board was to 'advise' the Minister which races should inhabit which areas and which areas should be declared for the habitation of certain races only. In 1955 this Board was replaced by the Group Areas Development Board and its powers were considerably extended. In time the Board came to be charged with a real function to develop and establish separate group areas, and it had the authority to expropriate properties (Section 16 of Act 68 of 1955). Until 1965 the Group Areas Act was administered by the Department of the Interior, thereafter the Department of Community Development was given that responsibility.

Alan Mabin has attempted to explore the genesis of the Group Areas Act and to tease out some of the links between urban planning and compulsory segregation. He investigates also the threats which the Group Areas legislation held for urban autonomy in South Africa and how the powers of local government were reduced. Massive central government interference occurred in the 1950s and 1960s, upsetting not only the traditional roles of various organs of state authority (for instance cities, towns and provinces) but undermining also basic human rights such as freedom of movement and ownership of property among others.[3]

The purpose of this article is not to continue the debate on these theoretical issues, but merely to expose the fate of the residents of Lady Selborne, an African township near Pretoria, founded in 1905 and destroyed by Group Areas legislation in the 1950s and 1960s. One of

2 R H du Pré, 'The return of the dispossessed: claims to properties expropriated under the Group Areas Act in Port Elizabeth in the 1960s and 1970s', unpublished paper presented to the South African Historical Society conference, July 1997.

3 A Mabin, 'Comprehensive segregation: The origins of the Group Areas Act and its planning apparatuses', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18,2 (1992), pp 405–429.

the principles enshrined in the present South African constitution is the possibility for the restitution for loss of rights in land.[4] This constitutional right is governed by the Restitution of Land Rights Act (22 of 1994) and its amending Land Restitution and Reform Laws Amendment Act (63 of 1997). The basic premise is that in order for a claim to be considered by the especially established Land Claims Court (which has the status of a High Court) there has to be proof that the claimant was dispossessed of a right in land (without adequate compensation) as a result of racial discrimination subsequent to 19 June 1913 (Natives Land Act). There is no legal redress for dispossession prior to that date. The claims process with regard to rural areas is quite straightforward and a number of cases of restitution have been adjudicated by the court. When it comes to urban land claims, however, the issue is complex because so many of the suburban stands which are being claimed have changed shape as a result of development: there are new houses and new owners. The problems raised are intractable. Are the new owners and tenants (of some 50 years) now to be dispossessed and the original owners permitted to return? How much are these properties worth in monetary terms today? What was the compensation of the time and was it adequate or not? The Truth and Reconciliation Commission brought horrifying stories of personal violence and torture to light. The texts of the more insidious and silent destruction of communities, families and properties are no less shocking.

The story of Lady Selborne is just one of these. The township is unusual in the history of South African urbanisation in being an area in which Africans could hold title to land. Lady Selborne was 292.78 ha in extent and was situated against the south slope of the Magaliesberg some 10 km north-west of Pretoria's city centre. The present suburb of Suiderberg is on the site. Established in 1905 as a freehold township for 'coloured' people, Lady Selborne was 'honoured'[5] to be named after Lady Beatrix Maud Cecil, whose husband had succeeded Lord Milner as High Commissioner for South Africa and Governor of the Transvaal and Orange River colonies until unification in 1910.

From the outset, the residents of Lady Selborne were politically sophisticated and resisted the ever-enveloping tentacles of state control over their daily lives. As segregation and apartheid tightened their grip on Africans, they fought determinedly to retain their long-held status as

4 Section 25(7).
5 Transvaal Archives, Pretoria, (TA) GOV828 PS17/65/05, Le Fleur to Lord Selborne, 8 November 1905.

landowners. It was a battle they eventually lost. Having established an 'African' and communal identity in an urban environment, the inhabitants of Lady Selborne were scattered in the early 1960s – sub-divided into various 'ethnicities' and forcibly removed to a variety of remote 'homelands', 'Bantustans' and semi-rural townships – as a consequence of the Group Areas Act and related legislation.

Lady Selborne began when a group of 'coloured' people organised a syndicate to purchase Portion 16 (Portion of Portion A) of the farm Zandfontein 317JR through their agents, Thomas le Fleur (chairman of the South African Political Association) and C M de Vries. After transfer into the name of De Vries on 26 September 1906, 440 plots were made available at £11 each.[6] Because of the target market, small stands and low prices, on its establishment the Transvaal surveyor-general called Lady Selborne 'practically a location'.[7] Lady Selborne did not develop as an all-'coloured' (or mixed-race, as the term is understood today) township and the racial composition was mixed with many Africans and a few whites choosing to settle there. Almost from the very moment of Lady Selborne's proclamation, African rights to urban land were continuously curtailed in South Africa. But being exceptional and regarded legally in the same way as a 'white' suburban area, Lady Selborne was not affected by the Natives (Urban Areas) Acts of 1923, 1937 and 1945 which restricted African residential rights in urban areas. Thus Lady Selborne fell outside the ambit of a 'native location', 'native village' or any of the other formal racially-based components of the South African urban landscape before the Second World War. However, in 1936, when the Pact government introduced a new suite of segregationist legislation, by Government Notice 946 of 3 July 1936, Lady Selborne was approved as a 'place of residence for natives' by the Minister of Native Affairs.

Until the 1950s, Greater Pretoria was an urban conglomerate, consisting of a number of autonomous local authorities. From 1905 until 1908 the residents of Lady Selborne managed their own affairs. They established two committees: the Health Committee dealt with matters pertaining to public health and sanitation, while the Village Committee took care of public works. In 1908 Lady Selborne became

6 F J Nothling, 'Die vestiging van gekleurdes in en om Pretoria, 1900–1914', *Archives Year Book for South African History*, vol 1. (Pretoria 1984), pp 74–75; *Pretoria News*, 2 January 1905; Deeds Office, Pretoria, Farm Register JR20 7026/06, J Booysen to C M de Vries.

7 TA GOV828 PS17/65/05, 21 November 1905.

part of the Pretoria Suburbs Health Committee[8] but retained the organisational structure of two residents' committees. In 1912, when the Innesdale Town Council came into being, the African residents of Lady Selborne at first wanted to maintain their separate existence, but joined Innesdale when the new local authority agreed to take over responsibility for sanitation and other health services. In consequence, the Lady Selborne Health Committee was disbanded.

However, the Village Committee continued to exist and its relationship with the Innesdale authorities was generally amicable.[9] But in the 1920s Lady Selborne made a number of unsuccessful applications to be granted its own independent Village Board or Health Committee.[10] Perhaps in anticipation of this, in 1925 the boundaries of Innesdale were altered to exclude Lady Selborne (Administrator's Proclamation 255 of 16 June 1925) and until 1928 the township was controlled by the Daspoort Health Committee on the same basis as the Innesdale arrangement. In 1928 the Daspoort Health Committee was converted into the Hercules Village Council and in 1931 Hercules was upgraded to a Town Council, of which Lady Selborne remained part.[11] At the time of this upgrading to separate municipal status,[12] the support of Lady Selborne was required.

In order to obtain this backing, Hercules promised to reduce the cost of the sanitation service (because the ground was unsuitable for constructing septic tanks and french drains there was a nightsoil and waste water collection service) and Lady Selborne joined the new local authority. For a time this was a smooth association and regular meetings were held when Lady Selborne's interests were affected. However, when Hercules raised sanitation costs (which the working class Africans could ill afford), the affiliation became strained; there was less contact and within a year or two communication had ceased.[13]

Lady Selborne's grievances against Hercules mounted because the African township had no channels for institutionalised authority or representation. It was in an anomalous position. Although better off than other African urban areas because people held title to their land, residents had no voice in their local government. Because Africans could neither vote for, nor hold office in, white local authorities in the

8 R C de Jong, 'The need for total removal': an exploratory survey of the urbanisation of Africans in Pretoria, with particular emphasis on the townships that disappeared during this process', *Research by the National Cultural History Museum*, 4 (1995), p 61.
9 Central Archives, Pretoria (CA) NTS4552 928/313, vol 3.
10 CA TES4134 19/269 Report of the Departmental Committee, 1949, pp 61–63.
11 CA TES4134 19/269 Report of the Departmental Committee, 1949, pp 61–63.
12 CA NTS4551 928/313, vol 1.
13 De Jong, 'The urbanisation of Africans in Pretoria', p 61.

Transvaal, Lady Selborne had no representation within Hercules although it paid rates to the municipality. Nor did it have the administrative status or structures of a 'native' area in terms of any legislation. Without democratic recourse, Lady Selborne's residents believed that they were being exploited and that their rates were being used to benefit the small number of white Afrikaner – also working class – residents of Hercules. Initially there was a stalemate, then vociferous complaints surfaced and matters eventually came to a head in 1940.

Attempts were made to resolve the impasse. A public meeting was held in Lady Selborne on 29 November 1940; a deputation from Lady Selborne visited the Acting-Secretary of Native Affairs on 11 January 1941, there was a meeting with the Hercules council (27 January 1941) and a round-table conference – which included Native Senator J D Rheinallt Jones – also took place. During these discussions, Hercules suggested that Lady Selborne be administered as a 'native' urban area and have a governing Advisory Board. But this would have meant that the township would suffer the same restrictions as a 'location' and residents opposed this. Being anxious to retain its current status, Lady Selborne wanted either to be excised from Hercules as its own municipality or to become a separate ward within Hercules with rights equal to the others.[14]

Because the case of Lady Selborne was so exceptional and the rights of urban Africans so circumscribed, the government could not comply in law with any of Lady Selborne's demands, and despite the attempts at rapprochement, the relationship between the suburb and Hercules worsened. The town council temporarily established a Native Affairs Department to liaise with Lady Selborne, but the experiment was a failure.[15] In the event, on 1 May 1949 Hercules disappeared as a separate local authority and became part of the city of Pretoria.[16] When this took place, the City Council of Pretoria came to an agreement with Hercules that their African neighbours in Lady Selborne would be removed.[17]

The date is significant. In 1949 the National Party government was new, having been narrowly elected to power the previous year, and it is highly likely that the agreement between the Pretoria City Council and Hercules to destroy Lady Selborne formed part of the political trade-offs of the time. Pretoria promised Hercules that it would take

14 CA NTS4551 928/313, vol 1.
15 CA NTS4552 928/313, vol 3.
16 De Jong, 'The urbanisation of Africans in Pretoria', p 61.
17 *Debates of the House of Assembly*, 16 April 1956, cols 3619–3630.

steps to eliminate overcrowding in Lady Selborne (instead of the optimum 6 000 or 7 000 people, there were some 30 000) and to improve sanitation, recreation and social welfare provisions. There was also a pledge to reduce the 'excessive land values' in Lady Selborne, but essentially the deal was that 'it will be the endeavour of the Pretoria City Council to remove the said township'.[18] Lady Selborne's land values were indeed very high owing to the suburb's desirable location close to the centre of Pretoria and the ability of owners to rent accommodation extremely profitably. The Departmental Committee appointed in 1947 to consider a number of African urban settlements noted that while values in Lady Selborne were £500 per stand, prices in the adjoining 'European' areas were only £90 to £250. In 1949 the average municipal valuation of a sub-divided stand in Lady Selborne was £235. Naturally, these properties were rated in terms of their municipal valuation, thus fuelling Lady Selborne's contention that it received few services and little attention considering the high rates owners paid to the local authority.[19]

In passing, it is worth recording that not only were the residents of Lady Selborne being exploited by their local authority, but there are large numbers of recorded instances of overcharging on bond rates, and of dealings with unscrupulous money-lenders. A consequence of the high bond rates was that once Lady Selborne residents received payment for their properties after expropriation or sale in the 1960s, much of the compensation money was spent on repaying outstanding bonds. Many of Lady Selborne's landlords depended on their properties for their livelihood and financial exploitation was extremely detrimental.[20] Pressure for urban accommodation was so great that rents in Lady Selborne were extremely high. While the average African rent in Pretoria in 1944 was £1/8/0, in Lady Selborne it was £2/6/0. At the time, the average family income in Lady Selborne was £9/6/6 and the essential minimum expenditure per family was calculated at £13/11/8.[21]

Because accommodation close to employment opportunities was so difficult to find, those urban areas in which Africans were legally allowed to reside soon became overcrowded and insanitary.[22] As a result of ongoing subdivisions and particularly the influx of people

18 18 CA TES4134 19/269 Report of the Departmental Committee, 1949, pp 64–65.
19 CA TES4134 19/269 Report of the Departmental Committee, 1949, pp 64–65.
20 CA NTS4551 928/313 vol 1; Vols 3 and 4 contain a list of every property, owner, valuation and bond in the mid-1950s.
21 M R Blair, 'Selected budgets', *Race Relations* 14(4), pp 164–165.
22 D Gelderblom, and P Kok, *Urbanisation: South Africa's challenge*. Vol 1: *Dynamics* (Pretoria, 1994), p 89.

during the Second World War, by the mid-1950s there were more than 1 600 stands in Lady Selborne (from an original 440), almost all of which were owned by Africans. In the 1950s it was estimated that the population was between 40 000 and 50 000, including approximately 50 whites, 240 Indians and 1 000 'coloureds'.[23] By 1960 there were apparently more than 30 people living on each stand. Most people lived in a single room in six-roomed houses, the back-yards of which were fringed by rows of shacks providing further accommodation.

The land claims procedure has elicited details about the kind of accommodation which existed in Lady Selborne. Many people had large houses, consisting of six or eight rooms. This allowed space for family life and children often had their own bedrooms. Outhouses for tenants were common, claimants record having up to 21 rooms in the yard, as were garages and covered verandas. Apart from generating income through letting rooms, most claims also tell of selling food to make more money. Although the population density was extremely high and conditions no doubt insanitary (sewage was still in the form of pails and water obtained mainly from on-site wells) it does not appear that Lady Selborne was as overcrowded as a modern urban African township or squatter camp.

The residents of Lady Selborne had a strong sense of community. Approximately ten thousand children attended Lady Selborne's ten primary schools and two high schools.[24] Each year there was a commemoration of the sinking, in February 1917 in the English Channel, of the *Mendi*, a South African troop ship carrying African soldiers. Funds were raised for bursaries to send promising Lady Selborne students to further their education at Fort Hare. There were a number of churches and clinics, most of them – like the schools – run by churches and missionary societies. There was an organised political culture. Sefaka M Makgatho, a teacher, newspaper proprietor and estate agent who lived in Lady Selborne, was a founder member of the Transvaal Native Congress, a forerunner of the African National Congress (ANC). From 1917 to 1924 Makgatho presided over the ANC and led two local civil disobedience campaigns. On 16 December 1930 Lady Selborne was prominent in responding to a Communist Party call for 'pass' burnings. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s Lady Selborne was the stronghold of the ANC in Pretoria.[25] After a period of inactivity,

23 M Horrell, *The Group Areas Act: its effect on human beings* (Johannesburg 1956), p 47; CA NTS4552 928/313 vol 4.

24 T Lodge, 'Political organisations in Pretoria's African townships' in B Bozzoli (ed), *Class, community and conflict: South African perspectives* (Johannesburg, 1987), p 401.

25 Lodge, 'Political organisations', pp 402–407.

in 1955 the ANC was revived in Lady Selborne as the now entrenched National Party began to implement the various strands of its apartheid policy.

Although the Group Areas legislation was extremely sinister, initially Lady Selborne was unaffected because this law did not apply to any designated 'native area'. (The Group Areas Act 41 of 1950, Section 3.3.c, specifically excluded 'native areas' as defined in the Native Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936 and the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945.) However, when it became apparent that loopholes in the law (Lady Selborne was one example) thwarted the implementation of the Group Areas Act, these were systematically closed by amending legislation. In addition, the policy of establishing 'homelands' or 'Bantustans' for the various African 'ethnic groups' impacted on Lady Selborne. Dedicated to the destruction of Lady Selborne even before the Group Areas legislation was passed, the City Council of Pretoria (unlike Johannesburg and a number of other municipalities) actively co-operated with the organs of the central government to end the suburb's existence and in this way Lady Selborne was increasingly threatened. In the unsettled atmosphere of insecurity over land tenure, in addition to growing opposition to escalating state control, there was extreme concern regarding employment, because the government had instituted apartheid legislation which linked urban residential rights to employment.

With the prospect of eviction and the curtailment of personal liberty, political agitation in Lady Selborne grew. In the 1950s and early 1960s Lady Selborne was an important site of urban resistance and the government's stratagems to include the suburb within the ambit of Group Areas legislation should also be seen as a way of crushing African defiance of apartheid and state intervention generally. In response, ANC membership accelerated, and later, the Pan African Congress gained a following. In 1954 a 'Resist Apartheid Campaign' was launched and in 1956 and 1957 the ANC was active in mobilising women's anti-pass protests; the following year Lady Selborne enthusiastically joined the bus boycott; in 1959 there were vociferous protests against the pass laws and in 1961 a significant anti-republic stay-away was arranged. Throughout this period, unprovoked police raids occurred and meetings were disrupted by force of arms.[26] The volatile situation which resulted throughout the 1950s encouraged gangsterism and protest. Violence was a common occurrence.[27]

26 University of the Witwatersrand, Manuscript Collection, Ballinger Papers, A410 B7.2.5.33; C2.1.48; CA SAP550 15/7/57.

27 Lodge, 'Political organisations', pp 407–413.

These events should be seen against the background of expanding white Pretoria and the active co-operation of the City Council with the central government in applying Group Areas legislation. In the post-war economy of the 1950s, Lady Selborne was no longer isolated and was becoming engulfed by white (principally Afrikaner) working-class suburbs such as Hercules. As Horrell explains: 'According to the tragically usual pattern, Europeans living in these [neighbouring] areas are using the machinery of the Group Areas Act to attempt to have the Non-Whites removed'.[28]

The process of dispossessing freehold landowners from Lady Selborne proceeded year by year. On 23 October 1953, Dr H F Verwoerd, then Minister of Native Affairs, outlined a schedule to eliminate 'undesirable' African settlements. While the first targets would be African squatters, he made it clear that dispossession of African landowners would follow.[29] The following year, the Natives Resettlement Act No 19 provided for the removal of 'Bantu' from any area in the magisterial district of Johannesburg or an adjoining magisterial district and their settlement elsewhere. Hereafter, the threat to re-zone Lady Selborne was a reality as its population could be relocated at any time by proclamation. More was to follow. In 1955 the Natives (Urban Areas) Amendment Act 16 in Section 3 empowered the government to abolish African freehold rights, but referred to these as being specifically in a 'location', a 'native village' or a 'native hostel'. Lady Selborne, as a 'place of residence for natives' rather than any of the categories above, was actually excluded, although this was not appreciated at the time.

In June 1955, in the belief that it had the power to do so, the Group Areas Board began the process of transferring Lady Selborne to whites and called for objections against this. Unanimous opposition came from Lady Selborne residents and their white liberal allies, expressed at a meeting on 31 May 1955. Firstly, the immense physical effort in establishing Lady Selborne was mentioned. From being a water-logged marsh, it was 'one of the best native townships in South Africa' and contained 'some of the finest houses in Pretoria'. This had been accomplished through 'hard labour, toil, sweat and almost blood'. Secondly, it was the encroachment of the white suburbs which was to blame, not the prior existence of Lady Selborne. 'We are being exposed to a great humiliating injustice', the people claimed. In addition, there were good relationships within the township and outside. These should

28 Horrell, *Group Areas Act*, pp 47–48.
29 CA NTS6485 87/313(S)(5); De Jong, pp 42–43.

not be destroyed, but instead, 'fostered and nursed for the general good of all freedom and peace-loving South Africans'. Then, removal would be a breach of faith and a blight on the memory of Lady Selborne, 'a magnanimous and great daughter of South Africa'. Removal would be morally wrong. There were practical reasons as well. Transport to Pretoria was already difficult and removal further out would worsen the situation, with a negative effect on worker productivity.[30]

Three months later, in September 1955, the question of turning Lady Selborne into a white area was discussed at a high-level meeting between the Pretoria City Council and Dr H F Verwoerd and Dr W M Eiselen, the Minister and Secretary for Native Affairs respectively. In terms of Group Areas legislation, each municipality was made responsible to the national government for the identification and planning of group areas within its area of jurisdiction, and getting rid of Lady Selborne was therefore Pretoria's responsibility. But the city needed help from the central government in passing the necessary legislation – for legally, at that time, Lady Selborne was well entrenched.[31] At this meeting Verwoerd explained that there was no legal difficulty in getting rid of tenants and squatters; it was the landowners who could not be as easily dislodged. However, he assured the Pretoria Council that he would find a way.[32] Soon rumours about this meeting came to the ears of the Lady Selborne Village Committee. A public meeting was held on 10 October and on 28 October a letter to the Town Clerk of Pretoria from Committee Chairman S P Makgathlo asked for detailed reasons why Lady Selborne had to be removed, what would happen to freehold rights, and what compensation would be payable.[33] No response is on file.

On 1 February 1955 the Group Areas Development Act 69 commenced. This established a Group Areas Development Board to assist disqualified persons to dispose of their properties and to re-establish themselves elsewhere, and to co-operate with local authorities in developing new townships for displaced people. By February 1956, the Pretoria City Council had made its decision on racial zoning and reported to the Group Areas Board. The die was cast. Pretoria was to become an all-white city and Lady Selborne would be re-zoned for white occupation. But the legal obstacles had not yet been removed by the central government and legal counsel pointed out that Lady Selborne fell outside the scope of the Group Areas Act, with the

30 CA NTS6485 87/313(S)(5); De Jong, pp 42–43.
31 G H Pirie, 'Urban population removals in South Africa', *Geography* 68, 4 (1983), p 347.
32 CA NTS4552 928/313.
33 CA NTS4552 928/313 vol 4.

consequence that the Group Areas Board thus had no power or authority over it. In terms of Section 3.c of the Act, no area which included whole, or in part, a 'location', African 'village' or 'hostel' or urban area approved for the 'residence of Africans' – ie Lady Selborne which had held this status since 1936 – could be legally included in a 'group area'. Lady Selborne had won a victory in that the Group Areas Board was forced to adjourn, under protest that no planning of Pretoria could be done without including Lady Selborne.[34]

But Parliament acted quickly to overcome the legal obstruction presented by Lady Selborne, and two months later passed a short Act designed specifically to bring Lady Selborne within the ambit of the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 by providing that the Act could apply to an area approved for the 'residence of natives'.[35] In debating the issue, the Minister of the Interior confirmed that '[a]ll this Bill is doing is to empower us to take Lady Selborne into consideration in connection with the planning of group areas in Pretoria'. After that, the Council moved quickly and in March 1956 a survey of all property owners in Lady Selborne was made and a schedule drawn up so that properties could be identified, valuations determined and compensation settled.[36] As though it were not sufficient a hardship to be deprived of home and community, the Bantu (Prohibition of Interdicts) Act 64 of 1956 made every personal situation worse. In terms hereof, when ordered to be removed, no African could initiate an interdict or any other legal process for the stay or suspension of such removal.

On 19 June 1956 at a Group Areas Board committee meeting, Dr W F Nkomo wanted to know details about what kind of formal, compensatory freehold rights people evicted from Lady Selborne would receive. In terms of the legislation, owners were entitled to similar rights elsewhere, but Nkomo could get no answers about place or conditions of title.[37] Proclamations 150 and 151 of 6 June 1958, *Government Gazette* 6067 finalised the group areas position in urban Pretoria by decreeing that while some suburbs were gazetted for immediate white ownership and occupation (ie within one year), Lady Selborne was included in the list – section (n) – but without a given time-frame. There seemed to be no definitive plan for Lady Selborne and residents remained in limbo.

On 12 June 1959 the last legal hurdle to destroying Lady Selborne was overcome with the publication of Government Notice 889

34 Horrell, *Group Areas Act* p 48; *Debates of the House of Assembly*, 16 April 1956.
35 Group Areas Amendment Act 29 of 1956; *Debates of the House of Assembly*, 16 April 1956, cols 3619–3630.
36 CA NTS4552 928/313 vol 4; Schedule of all Lady Selborne landowners vol 4, 2 March 1956.
37 CA NTS4551 928/313 vol 2.

(*Government Gazette* 6235) which repealed Government Notice 946 of 1936. This meant that Lady Selborne was no longer defined as an area approved for the 'residence of natives' in terms of Section 9.2.h of the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945. Until then, Africans in Lady Selborne required approval from the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development in order to sell their properties to whites (Article 8.1 of Act 29 of 1945). If each stand-owner in Lady Selborne had done so, this would have created administrative chaos.[38]

Also in 1959 came the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act 46, which decreed that black South Africans were not a homogeneous group of people, but belonged to eight separate national units on the basis of language and culture. The residents of Lady Selborne, who had bonded into a suburban community over fifty years, were surveyed by ethnic group so that they could be separated from each other and obliged to live in various 'homelands'. In 1950 there were 1 000 Sotho (Northern Sotho, Tswana and Southern Sotho), 321 Nguni, 5 Venda, 167 Shangaan, 125 'Coloured', 97 whites and 6 Indians, who among them owned 1 696 stands.[39] This legislation had the effect that it became illegal to remove the residents of Lady Selborne as a community *en bloc* to another area. They would have to be atomised into their ethnic groups and accordingly reside in certain areas designated for that ethnic group.

Lady Selborne's residents and supporters pursued every avenue to preserve the suburb and its lifestyle. In 1960 they made a last-ditch stand. In July a Committee of Investigation (Group Areas Board) was appointed to discuss Lady Selborne[40] and objections were called for. They were vehement. On 5 August, the Lady Selborne Village Committee protested against the loss of freehold title, property and improvements and the financial hardship which would follow. It pointed out the township's robust community life, its easy access to employment and city amenities and the uncertainty because no details of where evicted people would be moved to had yet been forthcoming.[41] The Black Sash took up the cause, arguing on 10 August 1960 that ethnic divisions were repugnant, that fairness and justice were lacking.[42] A day later the Pretoria Action Council for Human Rights added its voice, also dismayed by the violation of fundamental human rights, the wanton destruction of homes and property and the financial

38 CA NTS4551 928/313, vol 2, 21 and 23 January 1959; CA NTS4565 1076/313.
39 CA NTS4551 928/313, vol 2, 12 June 1959.
40 Transvaal Archives (TA) TRB 2/1/12 4/5/14; *Transvaler*, 29 July 1960.
41 CA BEP138 G7/137/12.
42 CA BEP138 G7/137/12.

loss which would ensue. The Council also warned that if the evictions went ahead, there would be resentment against authority and the 'white man' owing to the 'theft of the most precious possession' – legal title to land.[43] The Methodist Church, the Progressive Party and the Pretoria and District Coloured Vigilance Association made submissions in similar vein.[44]

With these protests before it, in November 1960 the Group Areas Board's Committee of Investigation met. Dr G Lowen, counsel for Lady Selborne, argued that Lady Selborne's removal on account of its being overcrowded or unhealthy were 'hypocritical red herrings'; the real intention was to remove freehold title to land from Africans in Pretoria. Doing so, he warned, would arouse feelings of 'utter despair, despondency and bitterness in the people of Lady Selborne'.[45] The government was unmoved.

The year 1961 was a time of crisis for Lady Selborne. Legal channels were becoming exhausted and other avenues to halt what seemed to be the inexorable annihilation had to be found. As a last resort, in February, the Liberal Party arranged to petition Mr Dag Hammerskjoeld, Secretary-General of the United Nations, to ask the South African government to abandon its racist plans to turn Lady Selborne into a white township.[46]

Lady Selborne's fate was sealed in a report dated 5 September 1961 to the Minister of Community Development from the Secretary, J J Marais. He strongly recommended that, with immediate effect, Lady Selborne (and Eastwood and Highlands) be proclaimed full white suburbs. He felt that the matter was proceeding too slowly and needed to be brought to finality. Increasingly, Lady Selborne was an unacceptable 'black spot' in Pretoria's rapid western expansion, and until it was removed and all group areas properly in operation, the City Council of Pretoria could neither plan nor budget adequately. Alternative accommodation was becoming available. Indians and Chinese people were catered for, and, for Africans, the Bantustan of Ga-Rankuwa (32 km north of Pretoria) was already in a position to receive them. There they could own land and build houses and Ga-Rankuwa was close to a planned 'border industry' which would provide employment. The City Council had suitable housing available for

43 CA BEP138 G7/137/12.
44 CA BEP138 G7/137/12.
45 *Rand Daily Mail*, 4 November 1960.
46 *Rand Daily Mail*, 15 February 1961.

tenants in Atteridgeville and Vlakfontein (Mamelodi). Marais argued in addition that the government needed to make an example of Lady Selborne to show that it was in earnest about its policy of separate residential areas for different population groups.[47] But the government also needed to show that it would not be intimidated by outside interference. Marais was concerned about the Liberal Party's 5 000-signature petition which was on its way to the United Nations with the request that South Africa be instructed to give up its plans for Lady Selborne. Quickly, therefore, Lady Selborne's removal had to be a *fait accompli* before the United Nations got involved.[48]

Proclamation 104 of 20 October 1961 (*Government Gazette* 98) followed swiftly. It read that Lady Selborne, as defined in paragraph (a) of the Schedule, 'shall, as from the date of publication hereof, be [an area] of occupation and ownership by members of the White group and proclamation 150 of 1958 is amended accordingly'. This proclamation dealt the final blow to the landowners of Lady Selborne and expropriation and sales in terms of the legislation took place within the next few years.

All the properties in Lady Selborne were acquired by the City Council of Pretoria. The title deeds which record the dispossession of Lady Selborne's residents fall into two broad categories: expropriation and sale. Properties were expropriated in terms of Section 24 of the Group Areas Development Act 69 of 1955 and Section 38 of the Community Development Act 3 of 1966. As far as sales were concerned, some owners negotiated with the City Council of Pretoria. While it could be argued that strictly legally these sales were 'voluntary', they can all also be considered 'enforced' in that the seller was not selling in a free market. He/she/they had no option but to sell to the Council in terms of its pre-emptive rights in this regard, in terms of Section 20 of Act 69 of 1955, and in terms of the Delegation Agreement with the Group Areas Development Board first signed in 1958. Other sales were instigated by the Council in terms of Section 12.1.c.i which empowered the Council (as agent of the Board), with the approval of the Minister either generally or specifically, 'to acquire by purchase, exchange or otherwise any immovable property whether situated in a group area or elsewhere'. These sales can also not be

47 The wording is: 'Van die grootste belang is egter die feit dat deurmekaarboerdery in hierdie gebied op grootskaal heers. Proklamering as volle Blanke groepsgebiede op hierdie tydstip sal die uitwerking hê dat die Regering dit erns is met sy beleid om afsonderlike woongebiede vir die verskillende bevolkingsgroepe te bewerkstellig.'

48 CA BEP138 G7/137/12.

considered 'voluntary'; the only option was expropriation under possibly more disadvantageous conditions.

The majority of properties changed hands between 1962 and 1969. By 1973, the process was completed. It is impossible to trace what happened to each owner after eviction from Lady Selborne. No doubt some removed themselves as soon as the transfer of property had been concluded, while others hung on until the last minute and the bulldozers and police moved in. In addition to financial hardship, the community spirit, political voice, and social facilities by way of hospitals, churches and schools were also obliterated. Neighbours were scattered far from one another and the voice of urban dissent faded away. The community of Lady Selborne was not moved as a group. Tenants acquired council and other housing (or site-and-service) wherever this was available. If of Sotho (or Tswana) 'nationality', the dispossessed were permitted to purchase land in Ga-Rankuwa; if not, they had to rent whatever was available in one of the municipal locations around Pretoria, such as Atteridgeville, Saulsville or Vlakfontein (Mamelodi).[49] Indians were obliged to move to Laudium or another 'Indian group area'; 'Coloureds' to Eersterus or other 'Coloured group areas'. Even where they were entitled to rights of ownership, many people did not have the money available after repaying their outstanding bonds. To add to the misery, many Lady Selborne residents were unaware of the exact conditions of their dispossession. Most of the population was not well educated and, ignorant of the law, did not have detailed information about their rights. They accepted cash for their properties, repaid their bonds and had very little left to invest in any kind of property elsewhere.

Although brutally executed by means of bulldozers, dogs and police the evacuations from Lady Selborne were not energetically contested. A decade of struggle had taken its toll. The dominant emotion among residents was fear, particularly by the old (who lost their ability to raise income from renting accommodation) and the young (who lost their right to employment in Pretoria).[50] Accommodation for the evicted was desperately insufficient; there was a general shortage of housing around Pretoria and in Ga-Rankuwa, because only in November 1961 did the construction of any houses begin there.[51] All the new accommodation for

49 CA NTS4551 928/313, vol 2; CA BEP138, 22 June 1961.
50 Lodge, 'Political Organisations', p 411.
51 De Jong, 'The urbanisation of Africans in Pretoria', p 46.

evicted residents was far smaller than that they had enjoyed at Lady Selborne. And once out of the Pretoria municipal area, Africans were at the mercy of the Department of Bantu Administration.[52]

Obtaining suitable housing was only part of the problem of eviction. No designated African, 'Coloured' or Indian residential area was as close to Pretoria as was Lady Selborne. Even when the conditions of property acquisition were reasonable, people were forced to live much further away from their places of work and transport costs were far higher.[53] Disposable income, never adequate, was reduced still further. Ga-Rankuwa was a considerable distance on the north side of the Magaliesberg, and the townships which served Pretoria, such as Mamelodi, away on the east. People were poorer because of the higher costs involved in getting to work and they experienced more difficulties in finding employment. Those who took advantage of purchasing property in Ga-Rankuwa found themselves further disadvantaged in 1972 when Bophuthatswana become 'independent' and only Tswana citizens could hold title to property.

Feelings of humiliation and degradation as a result of being forced to move were common. Neighbours were split into different ethnic groups, confusion and bitterness resulted. The Land Claims procedure has exposed individual narratives of hardship and despair. Claimants tell of being 'beaten by the police because we did not want to move to an unknown destination', of having to abandon the larger items of furniture, 'leave fences, trees, rockeries, fowl runs, electricity … and go to a rural area with no amenities … to be robbed of a title deed which my Daddy and mother worked very hard for in their lifetime, is not only sad but a traumatic experience'. Many deaths occurred after removal, people – particularly the elderly – gave up hope. Some committed suicide. Families were damaged in other ways too, often the lack of privacy in the small 'match-box' alternative housing caused friction. Family members were scattered. Schooling was disrupted. Humiliated by being removed in rubbish carts, ordered about by young white officials, 'we were spiritually broken down' … 'the nightmare of apartheid planners plunged us into poverty, homelessness and broke my elderly parents'; 'bulldozers, armed policemen with dogs turned us into refugees'. And the conse-

52 *The Pretoria News*, 22 June 1961.
53 *The Pretoria News*, 22 June 1961.

quence, 'the creation of modern slum areas, infested with crime, drug traffic, gang warfare, poor or no education …'

Lady Selborne was the largest Group Areas dispossession project in the Pretoria area. By taking over the township, the City Council gained what it thought would be valuable suburban land (worth £2 063 925 in 1960)[54] and presumably appeased the white Afrikaner ratepayers of Hercules who had been promised the destruction of Lady Selborne more than a decade earlier. The victory, however, must in some respects have been a hollow one, for only in the mid-1970s was the Council able to take transfer of the whole township of Lady Selborne and start to redevelop it. Lady Selborne began anew as the much smaller white suburb of 'Suiderberg'. With every African-owned dwelling razed to the ground, it was as though Lady Selborne had never existed. The layout of the township was totally obliterated and the old design of square blocks was replaced by crescents and cul-de-sacs; traditional street names such as Le Fleur, Bulawayo, Maraba and Liberty, were replaced by streets named after Boer victories in the Anglo-Boer War, such as Belmont, Bergendal and Sannaspos. Suiderberg was a failure initially. It took many years before whites were able to settle there and it remains sparsely populated.

Not only did an African township in Pretoria disappear with Lady Selborne, but the scattering of its residents emasculated the growing African political coherence and opposition which had once been in evidence. After the banning of the ANC and other restrictions on African political activity, the vital political culture of Lady Selborne was either dissipated or went underground. The African working class people of Pretoria – some of whom were unaware of their 'ethnic' origins – were strewn into bleak, treeless 'homelands' and municipal townships.[55] Racial tension and prejudice were increased, housing and transport deficiencies were exacerbated and cumbersome and expensive state administration was brought into being.[56]

54 CA LDE3952 TALG 21-4-3.

55 Festenstein and Pickard-Cambridge, *Land and race* pp 20–22; Horrell, *Group Areas Act* pp 152–153.

56 See also: A J Christopher, 'Apartheid and urban segregation levels in South Africa', *Urban Studies* 27, 3 (1990) pp 421–440; A J Christopher, 'Before group areas: urban segregation in South Africa in 1951', *South African Geographer* 18, 1–2 (1990/1), pp 85–96; A J Christopher, 'Changing patterns of group-area proclamations in South Africa, 1950–1989', *Political Geography Quarterly* 10, 3 (1991), pp 240–253; A J Christopher, 'Urban segregation levels in South African under apartheid', *Sociology and Social Research* 75, 2 (1991), pp 89–94;

The Land Restitution process offers former Lady Selborne residents the opportunity to claim compensation for their properties. Many of the original residents have, of course, died but their heirs can claim. Legal proof of inheritance has to be provided, by way of marriage or birth certificates, death certificates and wills (or affidavits), as does evidence of how many claimants there are and whether siblings all agree to the procedures. For a suburb like Lady Selborne, there are full records in the Deeds Office and copies of title deeds have to be provided. These administrative details take time; many people have lost touch with other family members and, indeed, there are instances where the restitution procedure has divided families rather than uniting them, some feeling that matters should be left well alone, while others are anxious to redress inequities and, by the same token, obtain compensation from the state which would enable them to have a start in life. Many people would like compensation by way of money, others would be happy with preferential treatment when it came to housing elsewhere, others want to return to their own homes in Lady Selborne and have the present owners evicted, in the same way as was their fate in the 1960s. The Land Claims Court has stated that it would prefer to deal with communities as a whole in these cases (ie all of Lady Selborne, rather than individuals), so there are more delays as every last document is collected by claimants before the Court will consider the claims. Moreover, claims have to appear in the *Government Gazette* and a time frame for objections has to be set. Restitution is not therefore an easy option, but it enables the dispossessed not only to have a chance of redressing the ills of the past, but also gives the community of a small and forgotten suburb the opportunity to tell their story.

H Cluver, *Survey of Lady Selborne* (Johannesburg, 1954); T R H Davenport, 'African townsmen? South African Natives (Urban Areas) legislation through the years', *African Affairs* 68, 271 (1969), pp 95–109; L R Dison and I Mohamed, *Group Areas and their development, including land tenure and occupation* (Durban, (1960); A Lemon (ed), *Homes apart: South Africa's segregated cities* (Bloomington, 1991); T Lodge, *Black politics in South Africa since 1945* (Johannesburg, 1983); A Mabin, 'Comprehensive segregation: the origins of the Group Areas Act and its planning apparatuses', *Journal of Southern African Studies,* 18, 2 (1992), pp 405–429; P Maylam, 'Explaining the apartheid city: 20 years of South African urban historiography', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 21, 1 (1995), pp 19–38; C Murray and C O'Regan (eds), *No place to rest: forced removals and the law in South Africa* (Cape Town, 1990); A Odendaal, *Black protest politics in South Africa to 1912* (1984); L Platzky and C Walker, *The surplus people: forced removals in South Africa* (Johannesburg, 1985); J Robinson, 'Administrative strategies and political power in South Africa's black townships 1930–1960', *Urban Forum* 2 (1991), pp 63–77; P Smit, and J J Booysen *Swart verstedeliking: proses, patroon en strategie* (Pretoria, 1981); D M Smith (ed), *The apartheid city and beyond: urbanization and social change in South Africa* (Johannesburg, 1992); E Unterhalter, *Forced removal: the division, segregation and control of the people of South Africa* (London, 1987).

'He possessed intimate access to the President': Piet Grobler, Kruger's confidant [1]

J C H Grobler

Introduction

In this article the relationship between P G W (Piet) Grobler and President Kruger is discussed. The quotation in the title is from the work *Why Kruger made war* by John Buttery, which appeared in 1900. Buttery, the senior assistant editor of the *Standard and Diggers' News* in the two years immediately preceding the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902) was well known to the president's inner circle. As representative of this semi-official government mouthpiece (the newspaper was subsidised by the Transvaal government as a counter to the other English language, pro-imperialist newspapers like *The Star*), Buttery had access to influential people in government circles. Despite this, Buttery was by no means a Boer supporter and he placed the blame for the war squarely on the shoulders of the Boer leaders.[2] His objective perception of the relatively unknown Piet Grobler is illuminating, particularly as regards Grobler's dealings with Kruger. The remarkable relationship of confidentiality between the president and Grobler is put under scrutiny in this article, because Grobler's achievements were due in large measure to Kruger's support. Indeed, Grobler's fortunes were very closely linked to those of the president. The article does not aim to focus on Grobler's career as Under State Secretary, but in the course of the discussion on the Kruger-Grobler relationship, Grobler's official as well as his informal role will naturally receive some attention.

1 This article was written originally in Afrikaans and has been translated into English by Bridget Theron, Department of History, Unisa.

2 JA Buttery, *Why Kruger made war* (London, 1900), pp 2-4, 230.

Youth and early career

Piet Grobler was born on 1 February 1873 at Boekenhoutfontein near Rustenburg, in the original farmstead owned by Paul Kruger, later to become state president. Piet's mother, the president's niece, was the daughter of Kruger's sister. Little is known of Piet's childhood. He received his basic education at a farm school but this did not quench his thirst for knowledge. He was friendly with Tjaart Kruger, the president's youngest son, and through Tjaart's mediation it was arranged that Piet should go to Pretoria where he would further his education at the *Staatsgymnasium* (State Gymnasium). It was also agreed that Piet would board with the Krugers. In 1889 he moved to Pretoria where he received a warm welcome from the president, despite the fact that it had been years since the two had last met. In the official presidential residence Piet was treated very much as one of the children.[3]

At the gymnasium Grobler made good progress. He had a natural feel for languages and a keen interest in history. In 1891, at the age of 18, he entered the civil service as acting first clerk in the Department of Education.[4]

Grobler's career in the civil service of the South African Republic (SAR) was marked by a particularly rapid climb through the ranks. This progress can be ascribed to three main factors. Firstly, it should be remembered that Grobler was related to the president and that there was an exceptional bond and a very close understanding between Kruger and his great-grand nephew. None of Kruger's other relatives had such a meteoric rise as Piet Grobler. Secondly, Grobler was hardworking and capable. Thirdly, circumstances favoured him. In 1893, after years of dissatisfaction that so many Hollanders held senior positions in the civil service, the First Volksraad had taken a decision that where possible, *'zonen des lands'* (sons of the soil) should receive priority in all state appointments.[5] As Grobler was a republican citizen by birth, this was also to his advantage.

It is important to note that all appointments in the SAR administration were made by the *'Regeering'*, the 'Government', and in the republic this was the responsibility of the State President and the State

3 J C H Grobler, *Politieke leier of meeloper? Die lewe van Piet Grobler, 1873–1943* (Melville, 1998), pp 1–2.
4 *Ibid, Politieke leier*, p 2.
5 Transvaal Archival Depository (hereafter TAD), EVR 52, Minutes, First Volksraad decision, art 474, 27 June 1893, p 644.

Secretary. Thereafter the appointment had to be approved by the First Volksraad.[6]

In May 1892 Grobler's acting appointment became a permanent post. As a matter of fact Dr W J Leyds, the State Secretary at the time, gave the instruction that only Grobler's permanent appointment should be ratified – other applications, including that of Dr N Mansvelt as Superintendent of Education, would have to wait until the budget had been approved by the First Volksraad.[7] At this juncture Leyds obviously did not share Kruger's opinion on Grobler's potential. This is a clear example of the preferential treatment enjoyed by Grobler.

In September 1893, after a successful application for a transfer, Grobler resumed his career in the State Mining Department. The flourishing mining industry promised better opportunities for the ambitious young official. Again Grobler gained quick promotion and by February 1896 he was the responsible clerk in the head office, being appointed over the heads of more senior and experienced officials on several occasions. In Pretoria only the Head of Mines, C J Joubert, and the assistant head, D P Liebenberg, were senior to him[8] – a remarkable distinction for a young man of only 23 years of age. The signs were already there that the president had earmarked his young relative for greater things. Indeed, in the course of 1894 Grobler also acted for a while in the capacity of private secretary to Kruger[9] and although he had long since moved out of the presidential home, he was a frequent visitor there.

In March 1896 Grobler decided to visit England and Europe and when he submitted his request for leave it was recommended by his head, Joubert, on the grounds that the trip would be *'in belang ... van de jonge Transvaalers'* (in the interests of the young Transvalers). The necessary leave was accordingly granted.[10]

Grobler left for England and the continent in March 1896 and he was back in Cape Town again on 30 June. While in England he met a number of influential British statesmen, including the Secretary of State for the

6 See C F Nieuwoudt, 'Die ontstaan en ontwikkeling van die uitvoerende gesag in die ZAR' (Unpub D Phil, UP, 1963), pp 268–70.

7 TAD, SS 3282, Incoming correspondence, file R 4448/92: Leyds – Supt of Education, 11 May 1892, p 104; Grobler, *Politieke leier*, p 4. For more on the influence and role of Leyds see L E van Niekerk, *Kruger se regterhand. 'n Biografie van dr W J Leyds* (Pretoria, 1985).

8 Grobler, *Politieke leier*, pp 4–6.

9 *De Pers*, 25 April 1894 and 3 October 1894.

10 TAD SS 5272, Incoming correspondence, file R 2380/96: Grobler – State Secretary Internal Affairs, 6 March 1896, pp 165–166; Head of Dept Mines – State Secretary, 6 March 1896, p 159.

Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, with whom he conducted a lengthy interview. Although the discussion did not really bear any fruit, Grobler apparently made a favourable impression on Chamberlain. The *Weekly Press* reported: 'We have reason to know that Mr Piet Grobler greatly impressed Mr Chamberlain when he saw him at the Colonial Office … and Mr Grobler defended the Transvaal Government in the language of a very outspoken character, but in a way that won Mr Chamberlain's respect.'[11] Elsewhere by this time Grobler was already being referred to as 'a leading and influential burgher of the Republic'.[12]

For the next two years Grobler continued working in the Department of Mines and on occasion he even stood in as acting assistant Head of Mines.[13] One newspaper was even undiplomatic enough to declare: 'It is pretty well-known that to him [Grobler] and to Mr D P Liebenberg are ascribable the present efficiency of the Mynwezen Kantoor.'[14] The head himself, C J Joubert, is not mentioned.

Be that as it may, the president and the Executive Council followed Grobler's career with interest. In February 1898 Kruger was reelected as president by an overwhelming majority over his two more progressive opponents, Piet Joubert and Schalk Burger. Kruger's handling of the Jameson Raid (1895–96) gave his popularity a dramatic boost. For Grobler, whose fate was by now so closely aligned with that of Kruger, it was a personal triumph. Kruger's resounding victory should be attributed in part to the fact that the British pressure on the SAR increased after the abortive Jameson Raid. It stirred up a wave of antagonism from the burghers which was of great political advantage to the status of president and the ideals for which he stood.[15] Kruger's policy was focused primarily on making the independence of the Transvaal inviolable, and with the mandate he had received from the voters he could now pursue this goal more vigorously. Clearly the influence and status of the republic overseas was a vital ingredient in his plans.

In May and June 1898 the civil service was reorganised and a number of new senior officials were appointed, while others were given new posts. State Secretary Leyds was named as the new Envoy Extraordinary of the SAR overseas. Ex-President F W Reitz of the

11 *The Weekly Press*, 23 July 1896; Grobler, *Politieke leier*, pp 6–10.
12 *The Standard and Diggers' News* (London edition), 11 June 1896.
13 Grobler, *Politieke leier*, p 10.
14 *The Standard and Diggers' News* (Weekly edition), 4 June 1898.
15 Grobler, *Politieke leier*, pp 10–11.

Orange Free State succeeded Leyds as State Secretary.[16] Both Kruger and Leyds favoured the choice of the Free Stater Abraham Fischer (MEC) for the post ahead of Reitz, but Fischer was not interested.[17] The brilliant young jurist, J C Smuts, was appointed State Attorney. Grobler introduced Smuts to Kruger and in fact recommended him for the position.[18] The Under State Secretary of External Affairs, C van Boeschoten, was named *chargé d'affaires* to the overseas legation and consequently a new Under Secretary had to be found. On 4 June it was announced that Piet Grobler was to be the next Under State Secretary of External Affairs – a move which was dubbed 'a source of gratification to burgher and *uitlander* alike'.[19] On 1 July 1898 the 25-year old Grobler took over the responsibilities of the Under State Secretary.[20]

Grobler's appointment was criticised in some quarters. Leyds for example wrote: *'de benoeming van Piet Grobler was vir mij een verassing'* (the nomination of Piet Grobler was a surprise to me). He saw H C ten Haaf, the first clerk, as the logical successor to Van Boeschoten.[21] T J Krogh, the Under State Secretary of Internal Affairs in fact blamed Leyds for not making the necessary arrangements for the appointment of a new Under State Secretary before his departure for Europe.[22] It is well known that at the time (1898) Leyds was one of the few officials who still enjoyed the full confidence of Kruger and that the president usually followed his advice. J S Smit, Government Commissioner of Railways, was highly dissatisfied with *'de willekeurig aanstelling van Doppers – Verbeeld u Piet Grobler OSS van Buitelandsche zaken ... waar moet dat heen!'*[23] (the indiscriminate appointment of Doppers – imagine, Piet Grobler as Under State Secretary of External Affairs – whatever next!). Like the president, Grobler was also a member of the *Gereformeerde Kerk* (Reformed Church) and was thus a 'Dopper'.

16 *Ibid*, pp 11–12.
17 D S Jacobs, 'Abraham Fischer in sy tydperk, 1850–1913', *Archives Yearbook for SA History*, II, (1965), pp 272–273; K van Hoek, *Gesprekke met dr W J Leyds* (Pretoria, 1939), p 22.
18 W K Hancock, *Smuts I: The sanguine years, 1870–1919* (Cambridge, 1962), p 68; J C Smuts, *Jan Christian Smuts* (London, 1952), p 38.
19 *The Standard and Diggers' News* (Weekly edition), 4 June 1898.
20 *The Weekly Press*, 2 July 1898.
21 TAD, Leyds Archive (hereafter LA) 252 (iii), General correspondence: Leyds – Krogh, 28 July 1898, unnumbered (typed copy).
22 TAD, E 32, LA, M film A 553, box 69: Krogh – Leyds, 3 September 1989.
23 *Ibid*, M film A 556, box 78: Smit – Leyds, 6 November 1898.

The merits of Grobler's appointment can be debated at length. He was certainly a capable official and by 1898 was proficient in four languages – Dutch, English, German and French – and he was extremely well read.[24] Added to this he was a born and bred Transvaler, yet the question arises whether he did not, as in the past, enjoy preferential treatment. Did the president perhaps play a role in his appointment? Although Kruger is often accused of nepotism – and not without grounds[25] – it is unthinkable that he would knowingly have appointed an unsuitable, ill-equipped person into this highly responsible position. What is certain is that by 1898 Kruger dominated the Executive Council and his wishes were usually honoured. J S Smit, who frequently attended *ex officio* sittings of the Council, wrote that the president had become *'een outocraat in letter en geest'* and that he evidently *'voor niemant en niets een oor ... hebben maar zaken of dengen thuis klaar gemaakt'* (an autocrat literally and figuratively ... [who] ... does not take advice from anyone at all but makes up his mind at home about matters and things). In the Executive Council Schalk Burger was the only man who sometimes opposed the president. Piet Joubert avoided all confrontation and according to Smit even Reitz (who together with Kruger comprised the 'Government') offered little resistance.[26] If Kruger had wished to appoint Grobler, he would have had his way. 'Piet', when all is said and done, was the 'favourite nephew *[sic]* of President Kruger.'[27]

Nevertheless, Grobler also enjoyed support outside the Council. *De Volksstem* alleged that he was appointed by the government *'op versoek van verschillende Volksraadsleden'*[28] (at the request of various members of the Volksraad), while *The Weekly Press* declared that 'we do not remember an occasion upon which an appointment has met with such universal approval from old and new alike ... as a promising and rising Transvaaler he [Grobler] has few compeers.'[29] Furthermore, the acting British Agent, Edmund Fraser, told the British High Commissioner, Sir Alfred Milner, that Grobler's appointment 'has been hailed with approval, excepting for his extreme youth, by *all* sections of the Press'.[30] Despite all this positive comment, it can safely be assumed that had Kruger *not*

24 Grobler, *Politieke leier*, p 4.
25 See N J van der Merwe, *Marthinus Theunis Steyn*, I (Cape Town, 1921), p 158.
26 TAD, E 32, M film A 556, box 78: Smit – Leyds, 6 November 1898.
27 *The Weekly Press*, 27 July 1898.
28 *De Volksstem*, 29 June 1898.
29 *The Weekly Press*, 2 July 1898.
30 Imperial White Book, no 543: Fraser – Milner, 28 June 1898, p 533. (My italics.)

supported Grobler, at that time he would have stood little chance of being appointed as Under State Secretary.

Under State Secretary of External Affairs

At the age of 25 years Piet Grobler was thus a senior official with a salary of £1 000 per annum.[31] Further promotion in the foreseeable future was out of the question and he now had to prove that the confidence the president had shown in him was justified. A lengthy discussion of Grobler's conduct as Under State Secretary is not the issue here; as indicated in the introduction, the focus falls instead on the relationship between Kruger and Grobler. For this reason only incidents which illustrate the nature and the significance of this relationship will receive attention. Emphasis will be placed particularly on the indirect impact that Grobler was able to exercise on Kruger behind the scenes. There is more than adequate proof that he did indeed fill an exceptional position of trust and by 1899 he was one of the few officials in Pretoria (State Attorney Smuts was another) who had almost daily contact with the president. Edmund Fraser, for example, wrote in August 1898 that 'he [Grobler] … enjoys the Prest's confidence, having been present as a listener, each time I have interviewed the President'.[32]

Because of the nature of his position, Grobler was required to correspond on an almost daily basis with foreign powers. He also had to be in close contact with the legation in Brussels, so he was able to keep abreast of developments in international politics.[33] In addition to the Free State with whom Grobler naturally had frequent contact, dealings with Great Britain took up most of his time.

When Grobler began his new post the relationship between the republic and Britain was already extremely tense. Immediately after the abortive Jameson Raid (1896) there appeared to the casual observer to be a temporary lull, but this was misleading. The Transvaal was an independent state as far as internal affairs were concerned, but in terms of article iv of the London Convention of 1884, external affairs fell under the sovereignty of Britain. With the exception of the Free State boundary, the Transvaal was already completely encircled by British territory. For Britain it was now a question of whether the

31 *Staats-Almanak ZAR, 1899*, p 41.
32 TAD, Photocopies (hereafter FK) 1097 Milner Papers (Oxford no 3) Private correspondence: Fraser – Milner, 26 August 1898, p 430.
33 Grobler, *Politieke leier*, pp 15–16.

Transvaal could be incorporated by peaceful means or whether this would have to be effected by force of arms.

The first opportunity where the young Under State Secretary was able to make a contribution by preventing a serious confrontation with Britain and at the same time helping Kruger to avoid a parlous situation, was the Bunu incident. When the Swazi king Bunu murdered his senior headman and a number of other Swazi people in April 1898, the republic decided to summon Bunu to court – in terms of the Swaziland Convention of 1894 the SAR had been granted a measure of control over Swaziland. Without any legal grounds, Milner objected strongly to the Transvaal proposal and threatened possible action against the republic. Due to the mediation of Grobler, Reitz and Smuts a serious crisis was averted when they succeeded in persuading Kruger to back down on the Bunu matter and withdraw the decision to take him to court.[34]

Grobler also initially believed that he would be able to make a contribution towards improvement of the strained relationship between Transvaal and Britain. The fact that quite apart from being related to Kruger he also had easy access to the president, gave more weight to Grobler's suggestions and recommendations than his youth and inexperience really warranted.

After a visit of three months to England, Milner returned to South Africa with the fixed intention of bringing the 'Transvaal question' to a 'final solution'. Nevertheless, there were still influential people who believed that the threatening war could be averted. Early in 1899 the Capetonian John X Merriman proposed a peace plan, namely that a South African conference should be held to iron out political problems and other matters of common interest, but he did not wish to have his name linked to the peace initiative. He therefore used his friend, E A Lippert, the dynamite concessionaire, as mediator to test the reaction of the Transvalers.[35]

Lippert arrived in Johannesburg in January 1899 and before going to Pretoria he had discussions with Johann Rissik, the Surveyor General. Lippert considered Rissik to be knowledgeable about 'men and matters at Pretoria', so he asked Rissik his opinion on whom he (Lippert) should take with him to the president 'in order to avoid misunderstandings, and whose support might influence him (Kruger) … he strongly

34 See TAD, FK 1106 (Oxford no 7) Protocol Swaziland: Fraser – Milner, 2 September 1898, pp 763–764; N G Garson, 'The Swaziland question and a road to the sea, 1882–1895', *Archives Yearbook for SA History*, II, (1957), pp 362–372.

35 P Lewsen (ed), *Selections from the correspondence of John X Merriman, 1899–1905* (Van Riebeeck Society, no 47), p 2.

recommended young Piet Grobler … as a man who would be best, and who would speak up to the old man with most influence. I found this opinion endorsed in Pretoria'.[36] After Lippert had informed Grobler of his intention and had received Grobler's support for the proposals, they went together to the president.

In an interview of about two hours during which Grobler did not only listen attentively but also, as Lippert puts it, 'emphasised and supported me on all points', it appeared that although Kruger concurred with the Merriman proposals, he was against an official South African conference. Nevertheless, he was prepared to meet Merriman privately. The meeting in Pretoria, which was also attended by Grobler and the Free Stater Abraham Fischer, apparently went favourably and agreement was reached in principle that a conference should be held. It did not, however, take place because the Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, W P Schreiner, was against the idea because the British government was not consulted in the discussions – something which Merriman feared from the very beginning.[37]

Besides Merriman there were also other Capetonians who tried to avert the impending war, including the influential politician, J H (Onse Jan) Hofmeyr. It is widely known that the Bloemfontein Convention of May–June 1899 failed primarily because Milner and Kruger could not agree on the Uitlanders' franchise qualification. Milner wanted to grant full citizenship to all foreigners after residence of five years while Kruger was prepared to allow them the franchise after seven years.[38] In June Hofmeyr made an attempt to persuade the Transvalers to make further franchise reforms. He met with some success but renewed pressure from Britain convinced Hofmeyr that more concessions were necessary from the Transvalers if the franchise issue was to be resolved.[39]

Hofmeyr now decided that come what may, he would go himself to negotiate with the Transvalers.[40] However, he would first go to Bloemfontein to discuss the new Cape proposals with President Steyn. On 1 July he and A J Herholdt, the Cape Minister of Agriculture, departed for Bloemfontein.[41] On the previous day, in great secrecy,

36 *Ibid*, Lippert – Merriman, 10 January 1899, p 5.
37 *Ibid*, Lippert – Merriman, 10 January 1899, pp 6–9 and Merriman – Mrs A Merriman, 25 January 1899, p 15; TAD, SSa 1050, Outgoing Telegrams, no T 243/99: Reitz – Merriman, 8 April 1899, p 253 and T 271/99: Grobler – Prime Minister, Cape Town, 21 April 1899, p 281.
38 Grobler, *Politieke leier*, p 25.
39 *Ibid*, pp 26–27.
40 J H Hofmeyr & F W Reitz, *Het leven van Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr* (Cape Town, 1913), p 593.
41 South African Library, Cape Town, J H Hofmeyr Papers, box 8c (i): Hofmeyr – Fischer, 30 June 1899, unnumbered (copy); Van der Merwe, *Steyn*, I, p 219.

Grobler and Smuts also went to the Free State capital. On 2 July the Capetonians discussed the new proposals with the Free Staters and the two Transvalers. A memorandum containing Hofmeyr's new suggestions was handed over to Grobler and Smuts and they promised to strongly recommend the proposals to Kruger and the Executive Council. They could, however, not guarantee that everything would be accepted by the government.[42] Then Grobler and Smuts had to try to arrange an invitation for Hofmeyr and Herholdt to visit the Transvaal. This was no easy task because since 1890 the relationship between Kruger and Hofmeyr had been far from cordial – Kruger was critical of Hofmeyr's earlier friendship with Rhodes.[43] Hofmeyr would only go to Pretoria if he could be sure that he was welcome there.[44]

On that same night (2 July) Grobler, Smuts and Abraham Fischer departed for Pretoria. Initially the Executive Council was not keen to invite Hofmeyr and company to Pretoria and when it appeared that the necessary invitation would not be forthcoming, Hofmeyr sent a personal telegram to Grobler strongly underlining the importance of his visit.[45] Grobler, supported by Smuts and Fischer, now spared no effort in persuading the Executive Council to extend the invitation.[46] On 4 July, without committing himself, Grobler informed Hofmeyr that it was difficult to *'beslist te zeggen of Uwe komst de door u gewenschte resultaten zal hebben'* (say unequivocally whether your arrival will bring the results which you seek) but added that *'samespreking tussen vrienden [kan] misschien heilzame gevolgen hebben'*[47] (discussions between friends will perhaps have a healthy impact). As a result of Grobler's efforts, Hofmeyr and Herholdt left that same day for Pretoria.[48]

During the discussions which followed in the Executive Council, Hofmeyr's proposals were accepted almost unchanged, so that the SAR's franchise offer differed very little from the conditions that Milner had suggested in Bloemfontein.[49] Further discussion on the

42 Grobler, *Politieke leier*, pp 27–28.
43 Hofmeyr & Reitz, *Hofmeyr*, pp 594–595.
44 Van der Merwe, *Steyn*, I, pp 221.
45 SA Library, Cape Town, J H Hofmeyr Papers, box 8c (i): Hofmeyr – Grobler, 3 July 1899, unnumbered (copy).
46 Grobler, *Politieke leier*, p 28.
47 TAD, SSa 840, Incoming correspondence, T 383, file Ra 3601/99: Grobler – Hofmeyr and Herholdt, 4 July 1899, p 167.
48 TAD, SSa 840, T 383, file Ra 3641/99: Government Secretary – State Secretary A, 4 July 1899, p 166.
49 M J Hugo, 'Die stemreg-vraagstuk in die ZAR', *Archives Yearbook for SA History* (1947), p 130.

franchise issue is irrelevant here except to mention that it played a significant role in the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War.

From what has been given above it is clear that in the course of 1899 Grobler acted increasingly not only as an influential confidant of Kruger but also as a mediator between the president and other leaders. Indeed, with Leyds overseas, Grobler and State Attorney Smuts emerged as Kruger's foremost advisers from about August 1899. Reitz was plagued by health problems and his influence with Kruger began to wane. From about August, for example, Fischer liaised directly with Grobler and Smuts and even sent them a special code system '*voor gebruik met U [Smuts] en Grobler*'[50] (for the use of you [Smuts] and Grobler]).

On the eve of the war Buttery made comment on the relationship between Kruger and Grobler and the influence which Grobler was able to exercise behind the scenes on the formulation of policy:

> For reasons that are not familiar to Europe, Piet Grobler comes easily first of what may be called the Lesser Lights of Fallen Krugerism. Indeed, during the last twelve months of storm and stress he came very much to the front at Pretoria … and the affection in which he was held by Oom Paul made him a person of no little importance, even apart from his official standing … and as he possessed intimate access to the President, and was implicitly trusted by him, I have no doubt that he communicated many of his mistaken notions to the head of State, who would absorb them without question.[51]

Kruger certainly trusted Grobler but the suggestion that he would follow Grobler's advice blindly can surely be rejected.

War and Europe

On 11 October 1899 the Anglo-Boer War began. As Under State Secretary, Grobler had sometimes attended sittings of the Executive Council when matters involving foreign issues were discussed. Now, just prior to the beginning of hostilities, he and Smuts were coopted as members of the Council.[52] It is impossible to determine with any certainty why this decision was taken. Perhaps it can be attributed to the fact that Piet Joubert, Schalk Burger, Piet Cronjé and Jan Kock, who were all generals, were on commando and this meant that the only council members who were still in Pretoria were the president, Reitz and A D W Wolmarans. To address the war crisis it was presumably decided to make the two young officials, both of whom had already

50 W K Hancock & J van der Poel (eds), *Selections from the Smuts papers*, I (no 123: Fischer – Smuts, 24 August 1899), p 303.
51 Buttery, *Kruger*, pp 230–232.
52 W J Leyds, *Vierde verzameling* (corresp 1900–1902), II, Annexures TT, p 171, note 1.

proved themselves, members of the Council. As far as can be established, at 26 years of age Piet Grobler was the youngest ever full member of the Executive Council.

In the extremely tense times which followed the outbreak of war, Kruger was to rely even more on the support and assistance of his young relative. Indeed, Grobler became almost indispensable to Kruger. On 3 October, when Commandant General Piet Joubert requested that Grobler be appointed as his representative in Pretoria to help with the military administration,[53] Kruger did not want to accede to Joubert's request because *'ik hem* [Grobler] *ook in andere zaken ieder oogenblik nodig heb'*[54] (I also need him for other matters at all times).

The fact that Grobler was compelled to remain in Pretoria while his family and friends took an active part in the military operations, was a great disappointment to him. Despite the fact that he abhorred violence he tried on a number of occasions to go to the front. At the beginning of February 1900 Grobler heard from Fischer that President Steyn was considering sending Fischer to the Stormberg front. Steyn wanted Grobler to accompany him so that he could later give Kruger first-hand information about the military situation in the eastern Cape. In addition, the approximately 800 Cape burghers at Stormberg were keen to meet representatives from both republics.[55] Grobler asked Fischer if he would write personally to Kruger in the hope that this would improve his chances of being granted the necessary permission.[56] But once again Kruger was reluctant to do so; he saw *'hoegenaamd geen kans om Grobler nu te laten gaan'* (absolutely no chance of letting Grobler go now), because Wolmarans was ill and Reitz was suffering from rheumatism which meant that he was unable to attend Executive Council meetings on a regular basis.[57] Grobler did not, however, give up the idea completely and asked Fischer if he would please approach Kruger again should he plan to visit the commandos, adding that: *'ik kom dan mischien los maar als u mij niet helpt is er geen sprake van'*[58] (I may then be freed to go but if you do not help me there will be no question of it).

Why was Kruger not prepared to grant Grobler leave to go to the front? There is no evidence that the president wanted to protect Grobler for personal reasons. Indeed, many members of Kruger's family were

53 TAD, KG 346 (i) Telegram books, no 3, 4 October 1899: Commandant General – State Secretary.
54 TAD, KG 332 (v) Incoming Telegrams: State President – Commandant General, 5 October 1899, p 364.
55 TAD, LA 716 (a) War telegrams, no 16 of 3 February 1900: Fischer – Grobler.
56 *Ibid*, no 18 of 3 February 1900: Grobler – Fischer.
57 TAD, LA 716 (c), War telegrams, no 16 of 6 February 1900: President Kruger – President Steyn.
58 TAD, LA 716 (d) War telegrams, no 29 of 7 February 1900: Grobler – Fischer.

fighting in the war. But it would appear that with most of his close confidants on the front, the president was relying increasingly on Grobler's presence and support.

On 21 February 1900 General Sir Redvers Buller began his fourth attack on the Tugela lines and on 27 February the Boer resistance in Natal collapsed completely.[59] Piet Joubert then sent an urgent request to Kruger to come personally to the front to help rally the fleeing burghers. Kruger reacted immediately, and accompanied by Grobler, arrived in Glencoe on 1 March. According to Grobler, after Kruger had addressed the assembled burghers they were imbued with new courage and their march back to the Biggarsberg was reasonably orderly.[60]

Meanwhile the vanguard of Roberts's army was advancing steadily towards Bloemfontein and it was deemed necessary and urgent that Kruger visit the commandos that were deployed between Roberts and the Free State capital. Kruger and his entourage arrived in Bloemfontein on 5 March. During this visit Grobler acted as a makeshift secretary. He and Kruger stayed with Steyn in the presidential residence while the other officials and military leaders who were part of the entourage went to the Free State Hotel and the Royal Hotel. Grobler was clearly in a confidential role here. The president and Grobler immediately held discussions with Steyn and Fischer. From Pretoria Reitz and Wolmarans kept Grobler informed about matters which the Transvaal was anxious that the two presidents should discuss, such as plans for the defence of Bloemfontein and certain differences of opinion between Transvaal and Free State military leaders. On 6 March Kruger and Grobler went to the Boer laagers that were deployed on the Modder River, where Kruger addressed the burghers. Back in Bloemfontein further discussions were held and it was decided to send a deputation (officially an 'Extraordinary Legation') to Europe to try to set up links with one or more of the powerful states. The deputation was to comprise Fischer (chairman), C H Wessels (OFS) and A D W Wolmarans (SAR) while J M de Bruijn would be the secretary.[61]

By 9 March Kruger and Grobler were back in Pretoria and on 13 March Bloemfontein was occupied by Lord Roberts.[62] The seat of the OFS government had been hurriedly moved to Kroonstad the previous day. On 17 March Grobler again accompanied Kruger when he attended a large meeting of the war council at which it was decided that in future

59 C J Barnard, *Genl Louis Botha op die Natalse front, 1899–1900* (Cape Town, 1970), pp 132–147.
60 Grobler, *Politieke leier*, pp 46–47.
61 *Ibid, pp 47–48.*
62 Van der Merwe, *Marthinus Theunis Steyn*, II (Cape Town, 1921), pp 11–12.

only mounted commandos would be used and the wagon laagers would be disbanded.[63]

By this time it was already well known that Grobler, who was literally every day at Kruger's side, was one of Kruger's trusted confidants. This is well illustrated in the following incident. At the end of March 1900 Commandant General Joubert died. A few days later it was decided that generals Louis Botha and Koos de la Rey would jointly hold the post in an acting capacity until the burghers could appoint a successor. Botha was prepared to act under De la Rey or any other suitable person, but insisted that there should only be one commander-in-chief. He thus asked his friend, State Attorney Smuts, to use *'u en Piet Groblers invloed'* (your influence and that of Piet Grobler) so that a satisfactory arrangement could be made.[64] The matter was then discussed with Kruger and on 14 April Botha was appointed as Commandant General of the ZAR forces.[65]

At the beginning of May 1900 every available man was needed for the war effort because the SAR itself was now under direct threat from the advancing British forces. This time the president did not refuse Grobler's request and on 1 May he departed for Mafeking as an ordinary burgher, where he joined the Rustenburg commando under Commandant P S Steenkamp. He took an active part in the fighting which culminated in the relief of Mafeking on 17 May 1900. The Boer commandos then retreated to Ottoshoop where Grobler received instructions to return to Pretoria immediately.[66]

Shortly before Grobler's arrival in the capital it was decided to evacuate Pretoria and as in the case of Bloemfontein, to offer no resistance to Roberts. The seat of government was to move to Machadodorp in the eastern Transvaal. Furthermore it was crucial that the aged president should not fall into enemy hands.[67] It is possible that this decision was the reason why Grobler had to return to Pretoria so suddenly.

In reaction to a personal request from Kruger it was decided that Grobler should go to Machadodorp with the government. For the next few months, from the end of May until 12 September 1900, Grobler, his wife Lydia and their three year-old daughter Annie lived in a railway

63 *Ibid*, pp 12–13.
64 TAD, A 1, J C Smuts Collection, Public Papers (SA), vol 96, file 141: Botha – Smuts, 4 April 1900.
65 Barnard, *Louis Botha*, pp 153–154.
66 Grobler, *Politieke leier*, pp 49–50.
67 C Beyers, 'Laaste lewensjare en heengaan van President Kruger', *Archives Yearbook for SA History*, I (1941), p 24.

coach – first at Machadodorp and later at Nelspruit.[68] D N R van Hoytema remained in Pretoria as acting Under State Secretary of External Affairs.[69]

Because the winter at Machadodorp was too cold for the president, he moved to Waterval Onder. Grobler and the other members of the Executive Council travelled every morning to Waterval Onder to attend sittings of the council. On 28 August the seat of government was moved to Nelspruit[70] and on 10 September 1900 the Executive Council – President Steyn was also present – decided to grant Kruger six months leave to go to Europe where pleading the Boer cause would be among his commitments. At Kruger's request, Grobler was to accompany him.[71] Two days earlier it had been decided that the president's party would comprise the following people: Dr A Heymans (personal physician), H C Bredell (security official), F C Eloff (private secretary) and Grobler who initially was merely included as the president's companion. Kruger's personal valet was to be A Happé.[72]

On 26 September 1900 Grobler and his family departed for Europe on the *Herzog 'om een en ander te bespreken in verband met de aankomst van President Krüger'*[73] (to discuss a number of matters in connection with the arrival of President Kruger), and on 24 October they landed at Naples.[74] Shortly afterwards Grobler held *'eenige conferenties'* (some discussions), mainly concerning the president's impending arrival.[75] Grobler was keen to accompany the other members of the deputation to Marseilles to meet Kruger, but there were insufficient funds, so Wolmarans wrote to Leyds explaining that

> *Aangezien het voor ZH Ed zekerzeer aangenaam zoude zijn den heer Grobler dadelijk bij zich te hebben, stel ik voor zijne onkosten, voor deze reis voor rekening der Regeering te doen komen, vooral omdat de Uitvoerende Raad besloten heeft Grobler op te dragen ZH Ed in Europa te vergezellen.*[76] (Because it will certainly be pleasing for His Excellency to have Mr Grobler with him immediately he arrives, I suggest that his

68 See TAD, LA 512, Correspondence Montagu White with people in Europe: Grobler – White, 22 February 1901, pp 33–35.
69 Grobler, *Politieke leier*, p 50.
70 Beyers, 'Laaste lewensjare', pp 24–25.
71 A copy of the relevant correspondence and the Executive Council decision concerned are to be found in LA 329 (i), Accounts, Secret Service correspondence, file G 797V, 23 January 1902.
72 *Ibid*, Government Office, Nelspruit, 8 September 1900.
73 TAD, A 185, GCBO Noome Accession: Diary of Meindert Noome, 26 September 1900; Leyds, *Derde Verzameling* (corresp 1900) I, p 321, note.
74 TAD, A 1135 JM de Bruin Accession: Diary entry, 24 October 1900.
75 *Ibid*, 27 October 1900.
76 TAD, A 250, Special Deputation OFS and Transvaal, vol B, Letterbook: Wolmarans – Leyds, 8 November 1900, p 169.

expenses for this journey be made payable to the account of the government, particularly in view of the fact that the Executive Council decided to issue Grobler with instructions to accompany His Excellency in Europe.)

The outcome of this was that Grobler was given an advance of £40 and on 22 November he was able to accompany Leyds, Fischer and Wessels to welcome the president on board the *Gelderland*.[77]

Because Grobler was attached to the president's 'bureau' he was constantly in Kruger's company for the first few months. His duties included general supervision, arranging interviews and, in consultation with Leyds, corresponding with the press. His '*diensturen voor Spesiale Tegenwoordigheid*' (hours of duty for 'special attendance') with the president were from two until five in the afternoon.[78]

Initially the plan was to make Kruger's base in The Hague, but because his eyes were giving him a great deal of trouble it was decided that he should go to Utrecht where he would undergo an operation. On 22 January 1901 Kruger and his entourage left for Utrecht but Grobler and a staff of four were instructed to remain in The Hague to keep the office running.[79]

While he was heading Kruger's 'bureau' in The Hague, Grobler's work included a wide variety of duties. For example, the office frequently received enquiries from people whose family members and friends were fighting for the Boers and of whom they had not received news. Then, too, attempts to raise funds and to spread propaganda for the Boer cause took up a great deal of Grobler's time. He also had to hold regular discussions with Leyds and the members of the deputation on the course of the war,[80] in which the Boer fortunes were becoming progressively worse. Despite his heavy workload Grobler often made the time to visit Kruger — not only to exchange pleasantries but sometimes also to resolve a difficult issue – as is illustrated in the following incident.

According to Bredell it was expected that the president could live for another six to ten years and Bredell and Dr Heymans felt it was wise to discuss their future prospects if they were expected to care for him. They felt that it was their duty to stay with the president even if he decided never to return to South Africa, but could not do so unless proper financial provision was made for their future. The president was only prepared '*£1 000 aan den Dokter en mijzelven geven*' (to give

77 Beyers, *Laaste lewensjare*, p 29; Grobler, *Politieke leier*, p 52.
78 TAB, LA 602, Section R, Letter copybook: Agenda of affairs, 11 November 1900, pp 20–21.
79 Grobler, *Politieke leier*, pp 52–53.
80 *Ibid*, pp 53–54.

£1 000 to the doctor and myself), which Bredell described as 'laughable'. As so often in the past, Grobler was called in to talk to Kruger. Grobler discussed the issue with him on 27 June 1902 and the president agreed *'ieder een min of meer aannemelijk bedrag toe te staan'* (to allow each a more or less acceptable amount) for the two men and Happé. But the next day Kruger changed his mind again and as a result Bredell had to *'op nieuw aan Grobler [sein] over to komen, die twee dagen moest blijven, anders was er geen goed einde aan de zaak'* (again ask Grobler [by telegram] to come over, which meant staying for two days without which there would not have been a satisfactory resolution of the matter). Thereafter adequate provision was made for Bredell and company. The details were laid down in a notarial contract.[81]

During their stay in Europe Grobler and Bredell decided to write down Kruger's memoirs. After the president, who saw the idea as vanity, had reluctantly given his permission in August 1901, they immediately set to work on the project.[82] In the months that followed Grobler visited the president regularly, first at Hilversum and later in Utrecht. In the first part Grobler and Bredell made almost exclusive use of Kruger's recollections. The president related these and they made notes which they later collated.[83] Gradually documents were also used and thus the character of the biography changed. Despite the first section, when it was completed the work was certainly not an autobiography.[84] The book was finally finished in October 1902. The first edition was in German and this was followed by editions in English, Dutch and several other languages. Most of the proceeds of the publication were used for the needy women and children in the ex-republics, while the authors received even less than the president.[85]

The significance of this publication lies primarily in the valuable information on Kruger's youth and his early formative years as a statesman, information which would otherwise have been lost to posterity. It has only limited value as an academic source.[86]

The Anglo-Boer War ended with the signing of the Peace of

81 H C Bredell, A G Oberholster (ed), *Dagboek* (Pretoria, 1972), 5 June 1902, p 82; 16–22 June 1902, p 83; 23–30 June 1902, pp 83–84.

82 *Ibid*, 13–14 August 1901, p 45; 18 August and 24 August 1901, p 48; 25 August 1901, p 49.

83 *Ibid*, 8 March 1902, pp 62–63; 29 March 1902, p 70; 3 April, 1902, p 72; 27 April 1902, p 78; 21 May 1902, p 79.

84 H C Bredell & P Grobler, *Gedenkschriften van Paul Kruger, gedicteerd aan H C Bredell en Piet Grobler. Geautoriseerde Nederlandsche uitgave bewerkt door Frederik Rompel* (Amsterdam, 1902).

85 Bredell, *Dagboek*, 5 September 1902, p 87; Grobler, *Politieke leier*, p 56.

86 See Leyds's assessment of the *Gedenkskrif* in TAD, LA 253 (iii), General outgoing corresp: Leyds – FV Engelenburg, Pretoria, 28 August 1902, unnumbered (typed copy).

Vereeniging in Pretoria on 31 May 1902. This was a very sad day for Grobler and his fellow republicans. Although his future was uncertain he was in no doubt at all that he would indeed return to the Transvaal one day. However there were certain problems which prevented him from doing so right away. In addition to the ongoing work on Kruger's memoirs he could not abandon his duties in the office in The Hague immediately, and without the necessary permit from the British authorities he was unable to enter British territory.[87]

In October 1902 the president moved to the south of France and at the end of August Grobler resigned officially as a member of the presidential staff.[88] He and his family then settled in Paris, and while he waited impatiently for the necessary documentation to return home, he made the time to visit the president regularly. Christmas of 1902 for example was spent with the president.[89] There were apparently many problems in arranging a permit for Grobler and it was only on 11 April 1903 that he and his family were finally able to leave Southampton for Cape Town on the *Dunottor Castle*.[90]

Conclusion

Thus an important phase in Grobler's life drew to a close. At the relatively young age of 30 years he had already achieved a great deal. But although he had proved to be a capable official and administrator he owed much of his rapid progress to Kruger's support. He would now have to face the future without his beloved president, his sponsor and patron. There still was to be limited contact now and then through the post and Grobler could find some comfort and resignation in the fact that the old statesman could end his last days in the loving care of Dr Heymans, Bredell and Happé. But when he bade Kruger goodbye he must have been painfully aware that the farewell was final.

President Kruger died in Clarens, Switzerland on 14 July 1904. His death was a very personal loss for Piet Grobler and, appropriately, he was a member of the committee which made the funeral in 16 December in Pretoria a very moving and ceremonious occasion.[91]

In conclusion, how much weight did Grobler's opinion really carry with Kruger? This is a difficult question to answer because there is very

87 Grobler, *Politieke leier*, pp 56–57.
88 TAB, LA 285 (v) Legation, Accounts, file GZR 4165a/02 in GZR 7542/00: Grobler – Leyds, 28 August 1902.
89 Grobler, *Politieke leier*, p 57.
90 Bredell, *Dagboek*, 16 March 1903, p 93 and 11 April 1903, p 94; Grobler, *Politieke leier*, p 57.
91 TAD, A 787, G S Preller Collection, vol 158: Kruger SJP, 1852–1912, p 292; C J Uys, *Paul Kruger van die wieg tot die graf* (Cape Town, 1955), p 20; Grobler, *Politieke leier*, p 61.

little written evidence to gauge his influence. It also has to be accepted that most of Grobler's advice and suggestions were given to Kruger in an informal manner in the course of private conversations. What is certainly true is that Grobler was often, almost as a final resort, summoned to 'talk to the president' if a matter seemed bound to fail or a crucial decision had to be made.

After the war Piet Grobler embarked on a life in politics. In 1910 he was elected unopposed as the member of parliament for Rustenburg. As a convicted rebel leader he had to step down from his seat in 1915 but in 1921 he won again in Rustenburg and from 1924 to 1938 he served as a minster in the Union Cabinet. He died in Pretoria on 22 August 1942.

The voice of the 'people'? Memoranda presented in 1947 to the Sauer commission by 'knowledgeable' Afrikaners

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1 Introduction

In March 1948 arguably one of the most significant commission reports in the history of South Africa appeared in final form. This was the Report of the colour question commission of the Re-united National Party,[1] commonly known as the Sauer commission, after its chairman, Paul Sauer, Member of Parliament for Humansdorp and later cabinet minister. The Sauer report which outlined the apartheid policy, should be seen as the culmination of uncoordinated Afrikaner efforts since the mid-1930s to formulate an alternative race policy to segregation which was widely regarded as ineffective. The foundations for the final formulation were laid *inter alia* by ideas emanating from the Afrikaner Union for Racial Studies,[2] theories expounded by anthropologists, the recommendations of a commission appointed by the Cape Re-united National Party to investigate a future policy towards the coloured people, policy statements by politicians such as D F Malan and M D C de Wet Nel, and decisions taken in 1944 at the People's congress regarding the racial policies of the Afrikaner.[3]

Although there is a considerable body of literature on the deployment of apartheid after 1950, the crop is less abundant on the formation of the policy in the late 1940s. Revisionist historians have quite rightly challenged Afrikaner and liberal historiography which explains the emergence of apartheid merely in terms of ideology and race. The emphasis has shifted to the effects of segregation and apartheid on capitalist development, particularly with regard to the African

1 *Verslag van die kleurvraagstuk-kommissie van die Herenigde Nasionale Party*
2 *Afrikanerbond vir Rassestudie.*
3 *Volkskongres oor die rassebeleid van die Afrikaner.*

labour supply.[4] Dan O'Meara's analysis on this aspect has perhaps been the most elaborate. According to O'Meara the Sauer report, encapsulating apartheid policy, meant that the interests of all capitalist groups were secured through measures which would make exploitation of African workers possible in every way.[5]

Subsequent studies have focussed on control measures envisaged by the Sauer report.[6] The most comprehensive revision of interpretation of the Sauer report as a 'grand scheme' or 'blueprint for all classes among Afrikaners' has come from Deborah Posel. She has challenged O'Meara (and others) indicating that the Sauer report indeed reflects some ambiguities, even contradictions. Posel argues that some apartheid intellectuals (the so-called 'purists') envisaged total separation, in order to stop African urbanisation even if that were to have serious implications for the economy in terms of African labour supply. The second group, defenders of so-called 'practical apartheid', did not differ from the 'purists' as far as the broad principles of apartheid were concerned, but they ruled out the possibility of complete economic segregation since the African labour force was indispensable for the farms and industries. African urbanisation, strictly controlled, should be allowed to continue.[7]

A more recent critique on revisionist analysis has come from Aletta J Norval, who has approached the emergence of apartheid formulation from a linguistic perspective. Norval questions the comprehensiveness of revisionist analysis (including Posel's), claiming that this work has actually reduced apartheid to a policy of influx control without accounting for the rich conceptualisation of apartheid which really distinguishes it from its predecessor, segregation.[8]

None of the above-mentioned authors had access to the Sauer commission's extensive documents. This article, based largely on the

4 See Deborah Posel, *The making of apartheid 1948–1961: Conflict and compromise* (Oxford, 1991), pp 1–18 for a historiographical overview of the literature on the emergence of apartheid.

5 Dan O'Meara, *Volkskapitalisme: class, capital and ideology in the development of Afrikaner nationalism 1934–1948* (Johannesburg, 1983), chapter 12.

6 For example Ian Evans, *Bureaucracy and race: Native administration in South Africa* (Berkeley, 1997); Doug Hindson, *Pass controls and the urban African proletariat* (Johannesburg, 1987); Posel, *The making of apartheid.*

7 Deborah Posel, 'The meaning of apartheid before 1948: conflicting interests and forces within the Afrikaner Nationalist alliance', *Journal of Southern African Studies,* vol 14, no 1, Oct 1987; *The making of apartheid.*

8 Aletta J Norval, 'Searching for a method in the madness: apartheid and influx control', *South African Historical Journal,* no 29, Nov 1993; *Deconstructing apartheid discourse* (London, 1996).

original documents in the M D C de Wet Nel collection, attempts to show the sociological dimension of apartheid thinking, pointing to the multiclass complexion thereof. It also endeavours to prioritise the needs of a representative sample of the constituents of the nationalist Afrikaner policy makers. It will show that these needs were multi-dimensional, striving towards material security as well as cultural identity and political fulfilment. To that extent the analysis will supplement some of the more tentative conclusions of Posel, while also further exemplifying apartheid conceptualisation (as investigated by Norval) from a variety of sources.

In November 1946 D F Malan, leader of the Re-united National Party (referred to as the National Party for the remainder of the text), suggested that a commission should be appointed to formalise a race policy for the National Party and he specifically mentioned the coming parliamentary election as one of the reasons why such an action should no longer be delayed. Early in the next year the commission was announced with Paul Sauer as chairman, M D C de Wet Nel (secretary) and G B A Gerdener, E G Jansen, J J Serfontein the additional members. The Rev C B Brink and Dr P van Biljon were also originally commissioned but owing to heavy workload were unable to attend meetings. Brink later resigned.

The *modus operandi* of the commission was twofold: firstly, people were consulted countrywide on the race issue by means of a questionnaire; secondly, the expertise of selected people on certain specialised areas was utilised, resulting in the appointment of ten subcommittees and a number of study committees *(studiekomitees).* The subcommittees covered the following aspects of the race issue: anthropology, history, education, missionary work, economics, social services, administration, judiciary, urban Africans, and agriculture and labour. Prominent Afrikaner academics, politicians, church leaders and jurists served on these subcommittees.[9] It is, however, interesting to note that the commission (at least at the beginning of its investigation) also had experts outside traditional Afrikaner institutions in mind: Sheila van der Horst, for instance, was considered for the subcommittee for agricultural and labour

9 Institute for Contemporary History, University of the Orange Free State (hereafter INCH), PV 18, C R Swart collection, 3/1/52, M D C de W Nel – D F Malan, 10 March 1948. Nel signed the letter but the names of the other Sauer commission members also appear on it. See also P W Coetzer (red), *Die Nasionale Party, Deel 5: Van oorlog tot oorwinning, 1940–1948* (Bloemfontein, 1994), pp 492–499.

issues. It is not known whether she was eventually approached and what her response was.[10] The Sauer commission decided not to tour around the country to gather evidence, but rather to arrange meetings with people. If the whole commission was not available for interviews, one or two members would perform this duty.[11]

My main focus will be on the questionnaire sent out on 21 June 1947 and the memoranda sent in by respondents. These memoranda reflected the views of a cross-section of society, though almost exclusively people of Afrikaner origin. Secretary Nel studied the responses on the questionnaire, as well as some other memoranda which he requested people with expert knowledge of certain matters to draw up, summarised these and submitted them to the rest of the Sauer commission. In the meantime the subcommittees and study committees also completed their reports, and the nett result of all these contributions was a provisional (also called a semi-final report). This provisional report was scrutinised by another panel of experts, before it was finalised and submitted to D F Malan by March 1948. All that was left was to summarise and adapt the full Sauer report to suit the needs of an election pamphlet.

Although a wealth of correspondence, circulars, memoranda and other documents on the workings of the Sauer commission is to be found in the private collection of Nel, there are unfortunately also some significant gaps in the documentation. The minutes of only one of the meetings of the commission have been preserved and the report of only one subcommittee could be traced. Unfortunately copies could also not be found in the collection of E G Jansen and C R Swart.

2 The circular of 21 June 1947

2.1 Contents of the circular

The circular, in the form of a letter, signed and probably also compiled by the secretary of the Colour question commission, M D C de Wet Nel, indicated that the Federal Council *(Federale Raad)* of the National Party had commissioned the party leader *(hoofleier),* Dr D F Malan, to appoint a commission to design a comprehensive race policy, based on apartheid. This policy should have a general as well as a particular

10 University of Pretoria, M D C de W Nel collection (hereafter UP, Nel coll), 67, Nel-J J Fouché, 10 July 1947; INCH, E G Jansen coll, 1/22/3/1, *Komitee insake kleurvraagstukke,* notule nr 1, 16 April 1947.

11 INCH, E G Jansen coll, 1/22/3/1, *Komitee insake kleurvraagstukke,* notule nr 1, 16 April 1947.

focus on the Africans, Coloureds and Asians as separate groups and also on their mutual relations.

Recipients of the letter were requested to co-operate with the Sauer commission by sending in memoranda containing their views and recommendations on the race question for perusal by the commission. A draft scheme, or outline, containing no fewer than 22 points for consideration (each point containing three or more subsections) was included. This was supposed to guide respondents by indicating issues such as the magnitude of the problem, necessity of a solution, political representation, social organisation, administration, labour and economic issues, and education.

However, the elaborate nature of the outline possibly scared off quite a number of proposed respondents, particularly rural Afrikaners who were not used to completing questionnaires. Many respondents replied that they could not find time to send in a memorandum and most of those who did reply did not adhere to the scheme, indicating that they preferred not to comment on all points due to insufficient knowledge of the particular aspects.[12] There is nevertheless also evidence that in some cases lack of response was due to other reasons. The Member of the Provincial Council for Marico, P W Joynt, bluntly explained to Nel: 'I have neither time nor inclination to bother with kaffirs, coolies and hotnots (Coloured people).'[13]

2.2 Recipients of the circular

De Wet Nel sent copies of the circular of 21 June 1947 to all National Party members of the House of Assembly and the provincial councils; all members of the head committee *(hoof raad)* in each province; all chairmen and secretaries of district councils *(distriksbesture)* of the National Party in all four provinces, all well-disposed *(goedgesinde)* lecturing staff members of all the universities and teachers from a large number of schools; also other 'experts and interested' persons in the country as well as in Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) and Namibia (then South West Africa). This last category, unspecified, constituted a considerable number of Afrikaners, mostly farmers and inhabitants of towns, the occupations of whom could not be determined readily, but who were presumably in most cases ministers of Afrikaner churches,

12 INCH, PV 18, C R Swart coll, 3/1/48, circular, 21 June 1947.
13 *'Ek het nie tyd, en lus om met kaffers, koelies, en hotnots te peuter nie.'* Nel coll, 30, P W Joynt-Nel, 21 July 1947.

missionaries of the NG Sendingkerk and middle-class professional people. By 29 July 1947 Nel mentioned that he had despatched approximately 1 700 circulars, and in March 1948 he mentioned a figure of approximately 5 000. The latter could have included every circular which Nel had sent out since the commission had been constituted, and does not necessarily mean that such a large number of people were asked to respond to the 21 June circular which requested people's views on a new race policy.[14]

According to Nel, about 500 memoranda were submitted by respondents. In his opinion most of these were short and factual; others were of a particularly high scientific standard. However, in the Nel collection only 36 memoranda of which the contents could be analysed, were found. Since the full commission assembled only five times in the period of its existence, one can assume that the preparatory commission work was done by the secretary. Thus Nel probably made a selection of the most representative memoranda and disposed of the rest. What his considerations and criteria were, is not known. A notable feature of the secretary's method of selection is that he kept some of the replies of respondents who did not offer an opinion on the matter (in most cases explained as due to lack of time). These included prominent academics such as Proff Geoff Cronjé, H P Cruse, J L Sadie and J J Müller, and Afrikaans ministers such as Rev W N van der Merwe, D G Venter and T F J Dreyer.

3 The issues addressed: broad categories

As indicated above, most responses did not adhere to the fixed scheme prepared by the commission. In order to make justifiable conclusions from the memoranda which Nel and his colleagues utilised in their efforts to formulate a future race policy, I classified issues addressed by respondents into broad categories. Ten such main categories were identified, and some other issues that received less attention are also indicated. These categories are listed below in the order of importance to respondents.

Respondents' occupations have been identified as far as their home addresses and titles allowed. For the purpose of this study they are divided into four main groups: farmers, academics, ministers and

14 INCH, PV94, Jansen coll, 1/22/3/1, M D C de W Nel-Jansen, 29 July 1947; PV18, C R Swart coll, 3/1/52, M D C de W Nel-D F Malan, 10 March 1948.

missionaries, other. The 'other' group constitutes people in towns or cities with no indication of their professions. In each category below the proportion of attention each main issue received from each occupational category has been indicated as a percentage.

Category	Farmers %	Academics %	Ministers/ missionaries %	Other %
1 Physical separation of the races (including motivations for such separation)	**25**	**8**	**25**	**42**
2 A definite policy towards Coloureds and Indians	**0**	**8**	**38**	**54**
3 The creation of own administrative bodies for Africans	**20**	**20**	**20**	**40**
4 The education of Africans	**22,2**	**22,2**	**11,1**	**44,4**
5 The importance of white leadership in the development of the apartheid policy	**22,2**	**22,2**	**33,3**	**22,2**
6 Development in own geographical areas as *sine qua non* for Africans' development	**22,2**	**0**	**33,3**	**44,4**
7 Labour issues in 'white' as well as 'African' areas	**0**	**33**	**17**	**50**
8 The economic (particularly industrial) development of African areas	**0**	**17**	**33**	**50**
9 Development of the philosophy of 'own' ethnic identity	**17**	**33**	**17**	**33**
10 Social control	**33**	**17**	**17**	**33**

Other issues mentioned to a lesser extent in memoranda were: the detrimental influence on race policies of foreign ideologies such as communism; the need for whites to be informed about race issues and to make sacrifices in order to make apartheid workable; the role of religion in African communities; housing for Africans; need for educated Africans to uplift their own people; importance of apartheid indoctrination; influx of Africans to 'white' urban areas.

That the majority of respondents preferred not to make use of the commission's scheme, but rather to choose their own priorities, has been beneficial to the analysis of the memoranda in the sense that it has brought forward the issues important to these people spontaneously, without compelling them to respond to questions on issues that were less urgent or perhaps more embarrassing to them. That, of course, does not mean that the investigation will give the researcher accurate results in all respects. The sample remains relatively small, particularly when the large number of responses that were apparently discarded by the secretary of the Commission are taken into account. In addition one should consider that the selection of the memoranda was a subjective one, made by the secretary of the Sauer commission. On the other hand, it should be stated that proportions within the sample do not differ drastically in terms of numbers, which means that fairly valid deductions could be made regarding preferences expressed by various professional groups.

The sample shows that farmers, academics and ministers/missionaries when grouped together formed the majority of opinions expressed in seven out of the ten main categories. Arguably these professional groups can be regarded as the most significant opinion formers in the sample, whether the secretary (Nel), who had made the selection, realised it or not. The preponderance of particular issues among the professional groups shows that in the case of farmers category 10 (social control) and category 1 (physical separation of races), were the burning issues; in the case of academics category 9 (the development of the philosophy of 'own' ethnic identity) and category 7 (labour issues in 'white' as well as 'African' areas) were most important; to ministers/missionaries the issues of category 2 (a definite policy towards Coloureds and Indians) and category 5 (the importance of white leadership in the development of the apartheid policy) enjoyed preference.

The responses by the different social groups were not completely predictable. It is surprising that a larger percentage of ministers/

missionaries did not express themselves on the question of religion in African communities; instead, a definite policy towards Coloureds and Indians received more attention from this group. Since white farmers through their representatives in agricultural societies and in parliament had traditionally been pressing for a larger supply of African farm labour, one would also expect that farmers would have been keen to address the question of farm labour. Admittedly this matter was implicitly related to the issue of social control in the minds of the farming respondents and they might have reflected their needs in a different way. It is also noticeable that proportionately less attention than could have been expected, was given by academics to the matter of education to African people.

Another observation concerns the degree of sophistication of the responses received. Obviously an assessment of such a qualitative factor may be subjective, reflecting personal preference, and therefore may have relative value. There are nevertheless some criteria which will be generally accepted by any skilled analyst, for instance knowledge of the subject, capability of arguing logically, and the ability to express oneself clearly. The more sophisticated memoranda adhered to all these requirements or at least to most of them. Applying these general norms, it was found that less sophisticated responses only equalled sophisticated ones in category 10 (social control). In only two other categories (category 1 and category 9) the less sophisticated answers constituted more than 40% of the total. There is also no clear-cut correlation between sophistication of response and professional groups. In some cases farmers' answers were more thoughtful and better presented than those of some of the clergy.

4 The issues addressed: individual voices

The high priority which physical separation of races and the principle of white guardianship (the two issues were in fact interrelated) enjoyed among respondents is evident. The attitudes of respondents differ merely with regard to the degree of paternalism expressed. Some views reflect a more humane disposition than others, but the central idea revolved around separate development of Africans under white auspices – by implication Afrikaner leadership.

The maintenance of 'white Christian civilisation' was a prerequisite for any form of race arrangement in South Africa. White Christian civilisation should survive in South Africa, 'not because we are white,

but because we are the exponents of the Christian civilisation …'[15], J J du Toit, senior lecturer in the Faculty of Education of the University College of the Orange Free State, maintained. The Reverend W J Wentzel (a missionary) of Thaba 'Nchu articulated a view held by Afrikaners for many years to come, namely that white people in fact helped to preserve African societies: 'The arrival of whites with their Christian civilisation was a true blessing for the blacks in South Africa. What would have happened to the smaller black tribes if the Voortrekkers did not end the power of the tyrant Dingane?' [16]

Linked to Christian responsibility was that of white guardianship. The Reverend T F J Dreyer declared: 'I am a very strong proponent of the Voortrekker standpoint: guardianship over coloured races and opportunity granted to them for self-development in their own spheres of life.'[17] Several other memoranda confirmed this sentiment. J J du Toit expressed the opinion that apartheid was essential so that the white races as guardians could preserve their identity in order to exercise their guardianship. According to Du Toit the Africans, as a result of prolonged exposure to Western civilisation, would in course of time develop into a 'cultural people' (apparently the equivalent of intellectually developed people in this particular case). At that point in time white guardianship would become redundant. Nevertheless, the process of adopting Western civilisation should be gradual and should never be forced upon the African people, according to Du Toit.[18] A widely expressed notion, not only among Afrikaners but also in broader colonial circles, was that development in African societies should take place under white auspices. D L Ehlers of Ermelo articulated this view as follows: 'In each of the existing areas [for Africans] the African people should be taught under supervision and guidance of white experts to explore and develop the natural resources to their fullest extent.'[19] F P Smit interpreted the principle of guardianship as not only in line with the aspirations of the

15 *'Nie omdat ons blank is nie, maar omdat ons die draers van die Christelike beskawing is.'* UP, Nel coll, 67, J J du Toit, 22 July 1947.

16 *'Die koms van die Blanke met sy Christelike beskawing was vir die Nie-Blankes in S A 'n ware seën. Wat sou van die verskillende kleiner Naturellestamme geword het as die Voortrekkers nie die mag van die dwingeland Dingaan verbreek het nie?'* UP, Nel coll, 67, W J Wentzel, no date.

17 *'Ek is 'n baie sterk voorstander van die Voortrekker standpunt: voogdyskap oor gekleurde rasse en geleentheid aan hulle om hulle self te ontwikkel op eie terrein.'* UP, Nel coll, 67, T F J Dreyer, no date.

18 *'Apartheid is noodsaaklik omdat die blanke rasse as voogde hul identiteit moet bewaar teneinde hul voogdyskap te kan uitoefen.'* UP, Nel coll, 67, J J du Toit, 22 July 1947.

19 *'In elkeen van bostaande [sic] gebiede moet die naturelle onder toesig en leiding van blanke deskundiges geleer word om die natuurbronne behoorlik te ontgin en te ontwikkel.'* UP, Nel coll, 67, D L Ehlers, no date.

majority of whites in South Africa, but also as an expression of Article 22 of the Act of the League of Nations and Article 76 of the Charter of the United Nations Organisation.[20]

All these ideas had one common denominator, namely that equality between white and African in terms of political, social and economic rights would be devastating to peaceful co-existence. The Reverend T F J Dreyer probably spoke on behalf of all respondents when he expressed himself as '[one] hundred percent against any form of equality'.[21] Another respondent, the Reverend W J Wentzel, raised a point which was often to be mentioned in later years, particularly by conservative Afrikaners when criticising white liberals. 'Curiously enough, these campaigners for equality are not keen to live among the non-whites; they are even less prepared to see that their children marry non-whites.'[22] Although most respondents appeared to regard racial equality as detrimental to white interests, at least one person provided an alternative motivation: M W Retief of Cape Town argued that equality would in fact mean suppression of the African people.[23] 'African people will have the opportunities in African areas to rise to the highest positions,' he wrote. 'There they will be able to be clerks in offices, and postmasters and teachers and town clerks and magistrates and shopkeepers and merchants and building and transport contractors. If they are not separate they will never learn and develop to fill these important occupations.' This was not an entirely new argument, since Dr W W M Eiselen, widely regarded as one of the main architects of apartheid, expressed similar ideas. According to this theory, racial integration would result in Africans being dominated by whites in a white-controlled society, while total segregation would offer the opportunity for Africans to develop to their full potential without competition by whites. In earlier years the liberal Alfred Hoernlé had theorised along the same lines, although he had found the possible solution to discrimination, namely total separation, not practical.[24]

The paternalism of Du Toit and others represents a milder, more humane form of racial domination. He and some other Afrikaners

20 UP, Nel coll, 67, F P Smit, no date.

21 UP, Nel coll, 67, T F J Dreyer, no date.

22 *'Wat eienaardig egter is, dat hierdie kampvegters vir gelykstelling nie self tussen die Nie-Blankes graag wil woon nie, nog minder sal hulle sien dat van hulle kinders met nie-blankes sal trou nie.'* UP, Nel coll, 67, W J Wentzel, no date.

23 *'In naturelle gebiede het die naturelle die geleentheid om tot die hoogste posisies op te klim. Hulle kan daar klerke in kantore wees, en posmeesters, en onderwysers en stadsklerke, en prokureurs en magistrate, en winkeliers en handelaars, en bou- en transport kontrakteurs. As hulle nie apart is nie, kan hulle nooit leer en ontwikkel om hierdie belangrike betrekkings te vul nie.'* UP, Nel coll, 67, M W Retief, 18 Aug 1947.

24 J P Brits, *Op die vooraand van apartheid: die rassevraagstuk en die blanke politiek, 1939–1948* (Pretoria, 1994), p 86.

believed that Africans would eventually, in an evolutionary way, reach the same level of civilisation as whites. Another category of respondents had a different view. I D van der Walt of Eureka, Cecilia (near Ficksburg), a man who apparently had a philosophical background, maintained that there was no possibility of a synthesis of white and African cultures and that 'according to biological laws cross-fertilisation could only be successfully achieved when two species were homogeneous' *('volgens biologiese wette kan kruisbestuiwing met sukses gedoen word net tussen gelyksoortiges'),* which implied that the level of development should be equal. That was his rationale for a policy of apartheid. Besides, Van der Walt clearly belonged to the school of white thinkers who would regard intelligence quotient (IQ) as a norm for determining the level of civilisation of people. He suggested that before addressing the race problem, large-scale IQ tests among all race groups should be undertaken. The average IQ of African people should provide insight into the nature of future dealings with these people as a group. Van der Walt did not beat about the bush: Africans should be controlled in all spheres of life.[25]

Even more crude and also preoccupied with Biblical prescriptions applicable to the Afrikaner volk were the thoughts of the Member of the Provincial Council for Zoutpansberg, M G du Plessis. He could find no evidence in the Word of God that the 'heathen' *(heiden)* should be educated (he regarded almost all of the nine million Africans of South Africa as 'heathen'). Du Plessis's reasoning runs as follows: 'Nowhere in the Word of God do we find that an educated person will accept the Gospel of Christ more readily than will an uneducated one. The world shows the opposite: the intellectual upliftment which we offer to the heathen makes him less receptive to the Gospel. Yet, we continue to do this. Our question should be: how can we best make the heathen subservient to God? Yet, our question is: how can we best make the heathen subservient to ourselves? That is why we imagine that we cannot cope without the heathen, we think apartheid is impracticable. The Gospel says it can and should be done.'[26]

25 *'Ons sal ook besef dat hy fisies sowel as geestelik onder kontrole moet wees en dat self[s] sy massa bewegings onder leiding van die witman moet geskied.'* UP, Nel coll, 67, I D van der Walt, 29 Nov 1947.

26 *'Nergens in die Woord van die Here staan dat 'n geleerde mens die Evangelie van Christus meer geredelik sal aanvaar as 'n ongeleerde nie. Die wereld* [sic] *wys die teenoorgestelde. Die verstandelike opheffing wat ons aan die heiden toebring maak hom dus minder ontvanklik vir die Evangelie. Tog hou ons aan daarmee. Ons vraag moet wees: hoe kan ons die heiden die beste diensbaar maak aan God? Maar ons vraag is: hoe kan ons die heiden die beste diensbaar maak aan onsself? Daarom verbeel ons vir ons dat ons nie sonder die heiden kan klaarkom nie, ons dink apartheid is onuitvoerbaar. Die Skrif sê dit kan en dit moet.'* UP, Nel coll, 67, M G du Plessis, 12 Sept 1947.

The argument of some apartheid thinkers that total separation was not practical at that point in time, had a strong economic basis. F P Smit summed it up in the following words: 'Total segregation within the foreseeable future is not desirable: (a) The economic life of the races is so intertwined and they need each other so desperately, that segregation will bring about a total disruption; (b) South Africa's financial resources are not sufficient to afford a migration of the peoples *(volksverhuising)* or to mechanise the 'white' areas, or to establish an adequate new industrial system for the African areas.'[27] The Reverend J J F van Schoor of Louis Trichardt had similar ideas: '... we cannot implement apartheid 100%, because the household, business, the farmer and the mine needs the non-white.' He was also in favour of labour depots on the borders of African areas to supply farmers and the mining industry with the required labour force.[28] In accordance with the broader debate among apartheid ideologues about the labour issue, some individuals responding to the Sauer commission's circular made it clear that complete apartheid should remain the ideal, and that the sooner white areas could cope without African labour, the better. The African labour force should be withdrawn gradually from white areas, which in turn would mean that whites would have to make sacrifices in order to cope without African labour. Contrary to Smit's views one of the respondents reckoned mechanisation should have been an option, while another also thought that white labour (possibly supplemented by white immigrants), would be a means of solving this problem.[29]

Smit also doubted whether total separation was possible on political grounds. Even if it were possible, it would have been undesirable to grant a substantial degree of self-government to Africans within the foreseeable future, he argued. 'Their [the African people's] governing practices are not sufficiently developed for modern national government. The tribal system tends towards autocracy and for democracy in the European sense they are not yet ready,' he wrote. Smit's gradualism was challenged by Du Toit: 'The ideal form of separation would be a bifurcation *(tweedeling)*: one connected area for blacks, separate from the white area. Such an area should later develop into an

27 *'Algehele segregasie binne afsienbare tyd is onwenslik: (a) Die ekonomiese lewe van die rasse is so deureengevleg en hulle het mekaar so nodig, dat segregasie 'n algehele ontwrigting sal teweegbring; (b) Die kapitaalkrag van Suid-Afrika is nog nie voldoende om 'n volksverhuising van miljoene te bekostig, om die blanke gebiede te meganiseer of om 'n voldoende nuwe nywerheidstelsel vir die naturellegebiede in die lewe te roep nie.'* UP, Nel coll, 67, F P Smit, no date.

28 *'... ons kan nie apartheid 100 % invoer nie, want die Huis* [sic]*, die besigheid, die boer en die myn het die nie-blanke nodig ...'* UP, Nel coll, 67, Rev J J F van Schoor, 8 Aug 1947.

29 See for instance Nel coll, 67, J J du Toit and D L Ehlers.

own independent state (in the course of centuries).' The idea that Africans should eventually administer their own regions was also espoused by D L Ehlers. In his view all the African areas that were more or less independent could be incorporated into the Union of South Africa and represented by their own people in parliament. The University of Pretoria academic and cultural leader Professor T J Hugo envisaged 'an own African state in South Africa with a large degree of autonomy, except for foreign policy where the Union government will have an exclusive say'. If in Europe Denmark could exist alongside Germany, Germany alongside Holland and Belgium, Spain alongside Portugal for so many centuries without conflict, why could different peoples each with their own ideals not co-exist in South Africa, he asked.[30]

Economic aspects of 'own development' received relatively little attention, and memoranda which touched upon the subject mostly revolved around agricultural and industrial development. Those who responded, more or less agreed that the African people should be afforded the opportunity to develop their own areas and that African farmers needed to be trained to cultivate farming land. White expertise was required as far as soil and water conservation was concerned.[31] One respondent, G H van Rooyen, who claimed to have a profound knowledge of the African reserves, gave a lengthy description of poor conditions in these areas blaming the Native Affairs Department fully for the deterioration. 'The reserves have already been turned into deserts as a result of the laxity of the Department,' he wrote. A new, dynamic approach to the rehabilitation of the reserves was required. 'Field-workers and not office-clerks are required urgently to address the problem scientifically and sensibly. Failing to do so would inevitably result in large-scale influx to cities.' Van Rooyen then suggested what F P Smit thought was not practical, but in fact was to follow within a few decades: a (forced) migration *(volksverhuising)* of the Africans. His idea was that all the Africans of the Transkei, Free State and Basutuland should move to the northern parts of the

30 *'Hul regeringsgebruike is nog nie genoeg ontwikkel vir moderne staatsbestuur nie. Die stamstelsel neig tot outokrasie en vir demokrasie in Europese sin is hulle nog nie ryp nie.'* (Smit); *'Die ideale skeiding sou wees 'n tweedeling: een aaneengeslote gebied vir naturelle, apart van die blanke gebied. So 'n naturellegebied behoort dan later tot 'n eie onafhanklike staat te ontwikkel (i.d. loop van eeue)* (Du Toit); *'... 'n eie naturellestaat in S.A. met 'n groot mate van outonomie, behalwe ten opsigte van sy buitelandse beleid waar die Unieregering alleen seggenskap sal hê.'* (Hugo). UP, Nel coll, 67, F P Smit, J J du Toit and T J Hugo (no date). Similar views were expressed by W J Wentzel, A M van Zijl, 15 Sept 1947 and C A Hollenbach, 12 Oct 1947.

31 UP, Nel coll, 67, F P Smit, A M van Zijl and J J F van Schoor.

Transvaal and Zululand, while whites should inhabit the rest of South Africa.[32]

The need for their own industries in African areas, was also mentioned.[33] Contrary to Prof T H le Roux's vague and idealistic notion: 'It is of utmost importance that the non-white takes up his rightful place in the economic life of the country,'[34] S Viljoen and the Rev Wentzel had more practical considerations in mind. Viljoen deemed decentralisation of industries very necessary in order to halt the uncontrolled flocking together *(samedromming)* of Africans in cities, whereas Wentzel logically tied it to job opportunities.[35] Of the respondents who addressed the issue, only F P Smit wondered about the costs of such undertakings. He speculated about the possibility of granting white capitalist entrepreneurs the opportunity to develop these industries but warned against 'large-scale exploitation' *(grootskaalse uitbuiting).* This was of course similar to one of Dr H F Verwoerd's objections in years to come, to the recommendation of the Tomlinson commission regarding the economic upliftment of the homelands.[36] Smit suggested that concessions to white developers could be granted for smaller undertakings, but for larger ones a new form of trade association was required – one in which investor, entrepreneur and the African people of the area would each possess a share. In addition, home industries should be investigated and encouraged.[37] C A Hollenbach, who according to his own communication, had been working for a life time with African workers in the building industry, had some revolutionary ideas compared with those of other respondents. He was not only of the opinion that African people should be allowed to perform skilled labour, but that they should also not be restricted from establishing their own shops, restaurants, tailoring shops, garages, etc. In his own words: 'allow those with

32 *'As gevolg van die laksheid van die Departement is die reserwes alreeds in woestyne omgeskep.'* And further: *'Veldmanne (en nie kantoorklerkies nie) is dringend nodig om die vraagstuk wetenskaplik en oordeelkundig aan te pak. Word dit nie gedoen nie, is grootskaalse toestroming na die stede onvermydelik.'* UP, Nel coll, 30, G H van Rooyen, 1 Aug 1947.

33 For example UP, Nel coll, 67, Ehlers and Wentzel.

34 *'Dis v.d.* [sic] *grootste belang dat die nie-blanke sy regmatige plek inneem in die ekonomiese lewe v.d.* [sic] *land.'* UP, Nel coll, 67, T H le Roux, 3 Dec 1947.

35 UP, Nel coll, 67, S Viljoen, 26 Jan 1948; Wentzel.

36 For an analysis of the Tomlinson report, see Adam Ashforth, *On the 'Native question': A reading of the grand tradition of commissions of inquiry into the 'Native question' in twentieth-century South Africa* (Ph D thesis, Oxford University, 1987), chapter 6.

37 UP, Nel coll, 67, F P Smit.

ambition and who are successful a better life than the lazy, ignorant or self-satisfied unskilled kaffirs'.[38]

The urbanisation of Africans during the war years evidently had an impact on Afrikaner thought, particularly that of the urbanised Afrikaner. Despite the humane nature of some memoranda regarding the need for a better life for Africans in the cities and towns, social control over these urbanised Africans underpinned most ideas. Increasing urbanisation among African people in the cities bothered F P Smit and he partly blamed continuing arbitrary wage increases for the problem. He rejected the theory that high wages would increase the country's buying power, which in turn would be beneficial to the producer, arguing that the high wages enabled Africans to waste money on 'worthless novelties … and to work for a month and then loaf for the next month. That means a lowering of production which in turn raises costs of production'.[39] Smit's suggestion that the numbers of unemployed Africans in cities and towns should be reduced was echoed by a minister of Louis Trichardt, and his practical recommendations were certainly not drawn from Scripture. 'Nobody without a job should be allowed into a town or city – 9 o'clock in the evening a bell should ring signalling that all black or yellow people should be out – those who have jobs should carry a pass, and should live in town or urban locations with their families.'[40] Passes for African people were also favoured by J D Malan of Nelspruit in order to control their movement, though J J du Toit thought that passbooks should be replaced by a new system of identification which should apply to both Africans and whites.[41]

Decent living conditions for urban Africans were generally mentioned by a number of respondents, but none contained more detail than Du Toit's memorandum. He warned against slum conditions which could potentially be 'a hot-bed of epidemic diseases which could be fatal to white and non-white'.[42] He envisaged hygienic, simple, practical, efficient and aesthetical locations which would conform to the best

38 *'En laat die wat ambisie het en suks[es]vol is 'n betere lewe voer as die lui, onnosele of tevredene* [sic] *ongeskoolde kaffers.'* UP, Nel coll, 67, C A Hollenbach, 12 Oct 1947.

39 *'Waardelose blinkgoedjies … en om 'n maand te werk en die volgende maand leeg te lê. Dit beteken dat produksie verlaag en produksiekoste verhoog word.'* UP, Nel coll, 67, F P Smit.

40 *'Niemand mag in 'n dorp of stad kom wat nie werk het nie – saans 9 uur moet 'n klok lui en al wat swart of geel is moet uit – vir hul* [sic] *wat werk het, moet 'n pas dra, en moet in dorp- en stads lokasies met hul families woon.'* UP, Nel coll, 67, Rev J J F van Schoor.

41 UP, Nel coll, 67, J D Malan, 31 July 1947; J J du Toit.

42 *' 'n Broeines van epidemies wat noodlottig kan wees vir blank en nie-blank.'* UP, Nel coll, 67, J J du Toit.

African tradition of hut building. He even specified: 'To my mind the rondavel [a round hut] with a thatched roof, arranged in concentric circles would be ideal.' Du Toit also showed concern about recreation for urban Africans, and suggested 'native games … like those played in the mine compounds'. Apart from that he thought that films could be used to good effect, 'but the type of film shown should not evoke crime'. He also prescribed youth organisations to cultivate good habits among the urban African youth. However, it should not be an imitation of the 'Boy Scouts' or 'Voortrekkers' [an Afrikaner youth movement], 'but should rather be in line with native life. The uniform should be typical of the black person – a red blanket or something similar'.[43]

These Afrikaner thinkers were particularly concerned with cultural identity and education. The development of the African peoples' own heritage was often accentuated. 'Because it is the non-white's birth right to live here, I am of the opinion that it is advisable and beneficial in general if we enable him to live his life according to his own customs,' A M van Zijl wrote.[44] Without nurturing their own culture, 'cultural impoverishment' (*kulturele verarming*) would inevitably follow, according to S P van der Walt. 'Each race has its own musical instruments, its own pipe, its own traditions. Racial pride of own possessions should be emphasised and the whites' appreciation of it be encouraged.'[45] There was, however, no doubt in the minds of the respondents that the 'development of the own' should be directed by Afrikaner thought. Foreign influences, particularly emanating from communist sources and the English churches were seen as highly detrimental and should be warded off through all possible means.[46] As one respondent saliently spelled it out: 'We should protect the non-white against foreign evils and dogmas by eliminating economic adversities which form the breeding ground for foreign, dangerous dogmas; by censoring literature and films properly; and by making positive propaganda for the Christian Afrikaner viewpoint in the form

43 *'M.i. is die rondawel met grasdak, in groot konsentriese kringe gerangskik die ideaal'; 'naturelle-spele … soos in die myn-kompounds gedoen word'; 'maar die tipe prent moet nie 'n prikkel tot misdaad wees nie' ; 'maar moet meer aanpas by die naturelle-lewe. Die uniform moet tipies v.d. naturel wees – 'n rooi kombers of so iets.'* UP, Nel coll, 67, J J du Toit.

44 *'Daar dit die geboorte reg van die nie-blanke is om hier te woon, beskou ek dit as raadsaam en van algemene voordeel as ons hom in staat stel om sy lewe te lei* [sic] *volgens sy eie gewoontes.'* UP, Nel coll, 67, A M van Zijl.

45 *'Elke ras het sy eie musiekinstrumente, sy eie pyp, sy eie volkstradisies. Die rassetrots op hierdie eie goed moet benadruk word, die blanke waardering daarvoor geprikkel word.'* UP, Nel coll, 67, S P van der Walt, no date.

46 UP, Nel coll, 67, M W Retief.

of proper, constructive, healthy literature – a native newspaper to begin with.'[47] One respondent suggested that Africans should be involved in the research and recording of their own cultural heritage but was quick to add 'and he (the African person) should be taught not to evaluate his situation in terms of European criteria.'[48]

Though specified as point 17 in Nel's circular a significant number of memoranda contained no reference to education. Given the strong overtones of inferiority bestowed upon the African people by many of the respondents, it is not surprising that many regarded the education of Africans as a waste of time and money. There were nevertheless some strong sentiments to the contrary. 'Education of the native, based on the Christian national view of life can never be a threat to the whites; ignorance, however, can. Therefore no form of education for which the non-white is sufficiently mature should be withheld from him. If the Afrikaner does not offer this [education], somebody else will, and in that case probably from a perspective that is hostile or unsympathetic [towards the Afrikaner].' More facilities for African education should be created, but education should be separate (no '*deurmekaarboerdery*').[49] Prof T H le Roux, well-known philologist made it clear that education should take place in separate institutions to avoid social equality.[50] Education in the vernacular should be introduced, and the Africans' own culture should be cherished. The Afrikaans churches should control African education.[51] All these suggestions became familiar rhetoric within the Christian-national vocabulary. Added to this, the significant qualification followed: 'Education for the [African] masses should be focussed essentially on technical, agricultural and/or domestic science education – in order to conform to their own culture and natural ability. Biased aversion [by Africans] to 'practical' education and preference for 'academic'

47 *'Die nie-blanke moet teen vreemde euwels en leerstellinge beskerm word deurdat ons ekonomiese wantoestande, wat die teelaarde vir vreemde gevaarlike leerstellings is, uitskakel; lektuur en rolprente behoorlik sensureer; positiewe propaganda vir die Christen-Afrikaner se standpunt maak in die vorm van behoorlike, opbouende, gesonde lektuur – in die eerste instansie* 'n *naturelleblad.'* UP, Nel coll, 67, J J du Toit. The need to indoctrinate the black masses through a magazine in the indigenous languages is also stressed by M W Retief.

48 *'en hy* [the African person] *moet geleer word om sy toestand nie in terme van Europese maatstawwe te probeer meet nie.'* UP, Nel coll, 67, F P Smit.

49 *'Opvoeding van die naturel, gebaseer op die Christelike, nasionale lewens- en wêreldbeskouing, kan vir die blanke nooit 'n gevaar wees nie, onkunde wel. Daarom behoort geen vorm van onderwys waarvoor die nie-blanke ryp is, aan hom weerhou te word nie. As die Afrikaner dit nie gee nie, gee iemand anders dit tog, en dan bes moontlik uit 'n standpunt wat die Afrikaner vyandig of onsimpatiek gesind is.'* UP, Nel coll, 67, J J du Toit.

50 UP, Nel coll, 67, T H le Roux.

51 UP, Nel coll, 67, F P Smit; Rev J J F van Schoor.

training should, where necessary, be discouraged in a tactful way.'[52] C A Hollenbach reiterated the point from a different perspective, namely that school education frustrated African people because it made them believe they were entitled to white collar office jobs. Since these were not readily available, they had to fall back on manual labour. More technical schools *(ambagskole)* were needed.[53] These suggestions, particularly the idea of education in line with Afrikaner thinking, epitomised the broad philosophy which underpinned Bantu education for a considerable period in later years.

Point no 1 of De Wet Nel's draft scheme *(werkskema),* 'Scope and significance of the colour question,'[54] clearly distinguished three subsections: 'Coloured question', 'Indian question' and 'native question'. However, the majority of responses ignored the threefold nature of the issue as stipulated in the circular, preferring to focus only on the Africans. Those who made the distinction were almost unanimous in their verdict that the Indian people should be repatriated.[55] One respondent probably represented the majority sentiment by adding 'no matter what it would cost the Union [of South Africa]'.[56] These words echoed the statement in parliament in March 1946 by the Transvaal NP leader, J G Strijdom.[57] But the views of Afrikaners (both NP and UP members) as well as those of many English speaking whites on the subject of South African Indians had been forged and nurtured long before the 1940s. Indians were described as non-assimilable and the competition of Indian merchants in business was dreaded. Afrikaners were actively discouraged from buying from Indians.[58]

A policy towards the Coloured people seemed to be less clear cut to Nel's correspondents. Though one extremist thought that it would be a good idea if Coloureds were absorbed by Africans,[59] at least two others expressed concern that Coloureds might be swamped by Africans and that they should receive protection from African competition in their

52 *'Die onderwys vir die massa moet oorwegend tegnies, landbou- en/of huishoudkundig wees om by eie kultuur en volksaanleg te pas. Bevooroordeelde teësin vir 'n ''praktiese'' en voorliefde vir 'n ''akademiese'' opleiding, behoort, waar nodig, op taktvolle wyse bestry te word.'* UP, Nel coll, 67, J J du Toit.

53 UP, Nel coll, 67, C A Hollenbach.

54 *Omvang en betekenis van die kleurvraagstuk.*

55 UP, Nel coll, 67, Rev J J F van Schoor; J J du Toit; D L Ehlers; J D Malan.

56 *'Al kos dit die Unie wat ook al.'* UP, Nel coll, 67, J D Malan.

57 J L Basson, *J G Strijdom: Sy politieke loopbaan van 1929 tot 1948* (Pretoria, Wonderboom-uitgewers, 1980), p 490.

58 P W Coetzer and J H le Roux (eds), *Die Nasionale Party, Deel 4: Die 'Gesuiwerde' Nasionale Party, 1934–1940* (Bloemfontein, INEG, 1986), pp 73–76.

59 UP, Nel coll, 67, Rev J J F van Schoor.

traditional areas.[60] Though most of the memoranda contained only a paragraph on the Coloured people, the Rev J de Villiers of Claremont who, according to his own communication, had been working among the Coloured people for more than 33 years, devoted his whole submission (four pages) to the Coloured people. De Villiers, probably influenced by the massive anti-communist propaganda of the Afrikaans press, was of the opinion that the interests of the more educated elite among the Coloured people should be considered. What counted for him was that they were still anti-communist, but he warned that this could easily change if proper provision were not made for Coloureds in future policy. Although he mentioned that many Coloured people who lived in newly built segregated residential areas were quite content with their environment, he also believed that to force highly civilised Coloured people currently living in white areas into Coloured areas, would be grossly unfair. He feared alienation of Coloured people from white Afrikaners. 'The way Afrikaners treat the better class among the Coloureds on trains, buses and in public places and shops causes anger towards the Afrikaners.' He also advised that Nel's commission should make contact with Coloured leaders.[61]

Some other respondents also hinted at befriending the Coloured people, though these thoughts were tentative and not clearly articulated.[62] In one of the memoranda the idea of an own Coloured area, 'somewhere in the Western Province' *('iewers in die Westelike Provinsie')* was mentioned, though the respondent admitted that it would be difficult to separate the Coloured people from whites.[63]

There were also those who quite rightly expressed reservations as to whether an investigation into the race question should be launched by a political party. Two academics, Dr J Chris Coetzee of the Potchefstroom University and Dr W van H Beukes of the University of Pretoria were convinced that the race issue should be elevated above the level of party politics. Dr N J van Warmelo of the Department of Native Affairs had a similar view and declined an invitation to serve on a subcommittee for anthropology.[64] Earlier, in February 1947, the Rev J G Strydom, General Secretary of the Mission *(Algemene Sendingsekretaris)* of the Dutch Reformed Church in the Free State in a letter to

60 UP, Nel coll, 67, S Viljoen; Nel coll, 30, J G Bastiaanse, 29 July 1947.
61 UP, Nel coll, 67, Rev J de Villiers, 29 July 1947.
62 UP, Nel coll, 30, Rev J D Jansen, 31 July 1947; 30, J Fourier, 9 Aug 1947.
63 UP, Nel coll, 67, D L Ehlers.
64 UP, Nel coll, 30, J Chr Coetzee-Nel, 28 Aug1947; 30, W van H Beukes-Nel, 6 Aug 1947; 30, Nel-N J van Warmelo, 22 July 1947; Van Warmelo-Nel (undated note on Nel's letter).

DF Malan, also advocated an investigation outside the sphere of party politics.[65]

5 Some conclusions

Although the circular of 21 June 1947 can be regarded as the first phase of the commission's work, it does not mean that the commission's proceedings followed a sequential pattern. More than one action was undertaken at a time and the outcome of the memoranda did not necessarily determine how the process would develop further. Between April and December 1947 the commission met five times (twice in Pretoria and three times in Cape Town).[66] In November 1947 Nel sent some of the shorter memoranda (undoubtedly those from people who responded to the circular of 21 June to E G Jansen requesting him to circulate them also among other members of the commission. Nel also summarised those views that, according to his judgement, were most important and made copies available to other commission members.[67]

A perusal of Nel's summary[68] reveals that although the essence of most of the memoranda reflected in the contents of his resume, those opinions which deviated from consensus of opinion, were simply ignored by him, probably because they reflected a minority standpoint and also because they did not fit into the framework of mainstream apartheid thinking. The secretary obviously did not deem it necessary to waste the committee's time with minority opinion. That is why his 'summary of views' *('saamgevatte beskouinge')* contained no reference to consultation with Africans or Coloured leaders or suggestions to allow African people to do skilled work and to establish their own businesses in white areas.

Evaluating the significance of the shorter memoranda responding to the Sauer commission's circular of 21 June 1947 logically implies a comparison with the contents of the final report which appeared in March the following year. How did the views of the 'ordinary' Afrikaner on the street (and perhaps also the 'less ordinary' but nevertheless not involved in active politics) on race relations influence the apartheid 'blueprint'? When the submissions of individuals and subcommittees other than those who received the general circular of 21 June are closely studied, the resemblance between certain of these and the final

65 UP, Nel coll, 67, Rev J G Strydom-D F Malan, 21 Feb 1947.
66 INCH, PV18, C R Swart coll, 3/1/52, Nel-DF Malan, 10 March 1948.
67 INCH, PV94, E G Jansen coll, 1/22/3/1, Nel-Jansen, 17 Nov 1947; UP, Nel coll 67, '*Die kleurbeleid van 1948*'.
68 *Saamgevatte beskouinge uit kortere memoranda*.

Sauer report is obvious. In particular the report sent in by the two Stellenbosch academics N J J Olivier and B I C van Eeden corresponds closely with the Sauer report, except for the judiciary and mission aspects, which it did not address in particular, and also issues surrounding the Coloureds and Indians whom they explained did not fall within the ambit of their assignment.[69] Then there is the report by the Cape HNP on a policy towards the Coloured people which undoubtedly inspired the final report,[70] as well as the memorandum by Theo Wassenaar, chairman of the Native Affairs Committee *(Naturellesake Komitee)* of the Transvaal Agricultural Union, which provided important guidelines for the regulation of the African labour force between the agricultural and industrial sectors.[71] Dr W W M Eiselen's memorandum encapsulates the essence of apartheid principles expressed by other writings, without containing much detail.[72] In fact, the papers which were presented at the People's Congress *(Volkskongres)* of 1944 and the conclusive report which was drawn up also contained some of the essential elements of the final Sauer report.[73]

Considering this evidence, one may possibly have some reservations about the influence which the responding memoranda following the circular of 21 June 1947 had on the final apartheid product. What cannot be denied is that the ideas expressed in them show a considerable degree of correspondence with the contents of the final report, especially where general principles of racial separation and domination are concerned.

The question can be asked whether it was necessary at all to gauge public opinion, particularly in the light of the existing general expositions of apartheid policy at the time. Would the construction of such a policy by a few experts not have been sufficient and more effective? To my mind the commission followed the appropriate road for its purposes. The idea of consulting 'nationalist-minded' Afrikaners

69 UP, Nel coll, 67, '*Voorstelle i.v.m. 'n rassebeleid vir die H.N.P.*' and letter B I C van Eeden and N J J Olivier-Nel, 2 Dec 1947.

70 INCH, PV94, E G Jansen coll, 1/22/3/1, '*Verslag van die kommissie aangestel deur die H.N.P. van Kaapland insake beleid van die Nasionale Party teenoor die kleurlinge*'.

71 UP, Nel coll, 67, '*Naturellewette, kommissie van ondersoek*', compiled by Theo Wassenaar, no date. This is the only memorandum by any Agricultural Union presented to the Sauer commission. Posel's work creates the impression that the Sauer report was based on reports by institutions such as the SAAU. This is not the case. See Posel, 'The meaning of apartheid before 1948', pp 123–139.

72 UP, Nel coll, 67, '*Gesigspunte in verband met ons kleurvraagstuk*' (Dr Eiselen), no date.

73 See INCH, PV94, Jansen coll, 1/53/2/2, papers by G Cronjé, J G Strydom, J H Greyvenstein, and also '*Besluite van die Volkskongres*' [1944].

outside the traditional political sphere not only offered to the party leadership the opportunity to gain potentially useful insights for policy formulation, but was also in line with the party's tradition of considering its constituencies at grass roots level, something which the United Party failed to do with devastating consequences in the long run. It was National Party political acumen at its best. Airing their views on important national issues *(landsake)* might have reminded the older generation of the 1940s of the petitions *(memories)* which the citizens of the old ZAR had sent in to express their views on public matters, and which had played an important role in the formation of state policy.

From the perspective of apartheid formulation the memoranda reflect a specific group mentality which had been shaped in the wake of increasing industrialisation and African urbanisation since the outbreak of the Second World War. Afrikaners, who had just begun to feel the impact of the Afrikaner economic movement which delivered them from the bondage of poverty and inferiority, felt as threatened by the 'black peril' *(swart gevaar)* as in the past, and the Sauer commission offered a unique opportunity to the individual to contribute to a new dispensation in which white supremacy, which would inevitably be transformed into Afrikaner supremacy, would be guaranteed. But at the same time the majority of respondents also showed their commitment to granting to the Africans and Coloureds, freedom to develop to full 'nationhood', built on the foundations of Afrikaner Calvinist thought. The precondition was that that process did not interfere with the political, cultural and material interests of 'white South Africa'. That was in line with the Afrikaner's traditional conception of democracy and fairness, now also confirmed and formalised by a younger generation of articulate intellectuals.

Finally, these memoranda, as briefly mentioned at the beginning of the paper, also reflect the multifarious complexion of apartheid thinking. There is no evidence in the memoranda or in the rest of the Sauer commission documents that the interests of a particular group or class were given preference to others. Recent interpretations of apartheid have placed a heavy emphasis on the regulation of African labour through means of influx control, as Norval has indicated. Total or selective apartheid have been interpreted solely or mainly in terms of the needs of capitalism. Though the consistent provision of a cost-effective African labour force was covertly and overtly mooted in the Sauer documents, the 'voice of the people' of the 1940s had more to say than that.

Reconstructing the middle ages: some Victorian 'medievalisms'[1]

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'History often sneaks itself into our present by enriching our language.'[2]

One of the few unequivocal statements which can be made about the nineteenth century medieval revival is that 'it was complex in its origins and diverse in its manifestations'.[3] 'No period was used so promiscuously and unhistorically in the nineteenth century as the Middle Ages'.[4] If the Victorians did have another historical field which occupied their consciousness as much as the medieval period, it was undoubtedly the seventeenth century. Although the'Whig' rhetoric with its inherent belief in the success of the 1688 revolution occupied an ideologically dominant position in politics and public life, current debate could not be isolated from a view of the past, even if it had, in the course of the eighteenth century as Roy Strong suggests, diluted and softened to the extent that opinions that could never be expressed publicly in 1795 became harmlessly nostalgic in the 1850s.[5] As Burrow noted, commenting on the ideological intensity of the visual iconography expressed in Yeams's picture *When did you last see your father*?: 'Cavalier and Puritan, High Church and Dissent, were still two cultures, confronting each other across a table … As the historian Lecky said, ''We are Cavaliers and Roundheads before we are Liberals and Conservatives'' '.[6] If Yeams and his contemporaries captured the visual

1 This article was presented as a paper with the same title to the Unisa Medieval Association in August 1999. My thanks to members of this seminar series who provided suggestions and additions.
2 D K Simonton, *Greatness: who makes history and why* (London and New York, 1994), p 4.
3 R Chapman, *The sense of the past in Victorian literature* (London, 1986), p 33.
4 R Gilmour, *The Victorian period: the intellectual and cultural context of English literature, 1830–1890* (London, 1993), p 45.
5 R Strong, *And when did you last see your father? The Victorian painter and British history* (London, 1978), p 136.
6 J W Burrow, 'A sense of the past' in L Lerner, (ed), *The Victorians* (London, 1978), p 123.

political iconography of their age, it was the historian T B Macaulay who personified the 'Whig interpretation of history', which had, as its stated aim, 'to praise those accounts of the English past which celebrated it as revealing a continuous, on the whole uninterrupted and generally glorious story of constitutional progress'.[7] Macaulay became the perfect spokesman for this practical secular centre of English opinon and the ultimate representative of Victorian culture.[8] Leaving aside the intense presentness of the past of the 1688 revolution for a moment, the uppermost 'historical event' in English minds in the first half of the nineteenth century was the French Revolution, already highlighted in the British literary imagination by Edmund Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France* published in 1790. Macaulay, writing 40 years later, was deeply aware of his role and considered that his narrative 'had a deep significance for this first readers, watching the nations of Europe sink one by one from convulsive anarchy back into despotism and seeing, in the recovered unity, as much as in the prosperity of England, a triumphant vindication of the historic English way'.[9] For the revolution, points out Bedarida, 'had never reached England. The Establishment in England had held its ground, the English proletariat never rose in rebellion... the country experienced no barricades, no rivers of blood, no lasting hatreds. For Macaulay, the explanation lay in history and he appointed himself its spokesman. If England knew no revolution in the nineteenth century, it was because she had carried out her own revolution in the seventeenth century'.[10]

Eighteenth-century historians, writing during the enlightenment, have been seen as having a negative view of the middle ages. Nevertheless, as Strong has demonstrated, the medieval iconography of the romantic period was considerable, as evidenced for instance in Benjamin West's series of paintings of Edward III from 1787–9.[11] England's foremost narrative historian of the same period, Edward Gibbon, was not, contrary to popular belief, completely indifferent to the middle ages which he overlooked in favour of his main research topic, the history of the Roman Empire. Gibbon, writing before the French Revolution, certainly saw the decline of Rome as history's sternest moral lesson, but his initial researches into writing history

7 J Clive, *Not by fact alone: essays on the reading and writing of history* (New York, 1989), p 126.
8 G L Levine, *The boundaries of fiction: Carlyle, Macaulay, Newman*, (Princeton, 1968), p 79.
9 G M Young, *Portrait of an age: Victorian England* (London, 1936), p 89.
10 F Bedarida, *A social history of England, 1851–1990* (London, 1991), p 82.
11 Strong, *And when did you last see your father?*, pp 79–85.

included ideas on biographies of Edward III and Henry V.[12] However, there can be no getting around the point, notes Roy Porter, that Latin Christendom was, for Gibbon, in a ferment produced by the mixing of Rome and the Goths, post-barbarian Europe progressed slowly and took centuries to recover. Chivalry for Gibbon was mere barbarity: 'if heroism be confined to brutal and ferocious valour, Richard Plantagenet will stand high among the heroes of the age'.[13] Thomas Paine, who argued so vigorously for human rights in his 1791 work *The rights of man*, pointed out that monarchy in England had been initiated by 'a French bastard landing with an armed banditti and establishing himself King of England against the consent of the natives, is in plain terms a very paltry rascally original. It certainly hath no divinity in it'.[14]

The earliest origins of what Simmons terms 'reversing the conquest'[15] are traceable to the reign of Elizabeth I when, as McDougall noted, Alfred the Great effectively ousted Arthur as the greatest early king of Britain.[16] Both McDougall and Simmons concur that the nineteenth-century idea of 'Teutonic' racial superiority as embodied in a broadly defined 'Anglo-Saxonism' was given its greatest impetus by the publication of Sharon Turner's *History of the Anglo-Saxons* published between 1799 and 1805 and his second set of volumes entitled *History of the manners, landed property, government, laws, poetry, literature, religion and language of the Anglo-Saxons*, published from 1814 to 1825. Turner's expertise lay in his knowledge of Anglo-Saxon sources, contemporary documents and insight into the language, culture and literature of the middle ages, starting with *Beowulf* as an example of Anglo-Saxon culture.[17] Turner's detailed investigation was in distinct contrast to that of Henry Hallam, who produced his *View of the state of Europe during the middle ages* in 1818 and still adopted an enlightenment approach and judged the medieval period by the standards of his own day.[18] For Hallam, the period of time before the twelfth century was 'so barren of events worthy of remembrance, that a single sentence or paragraph is often sufficient to given the character of entire generations, and of long

12 R Porter, *Edward Gibbon: making history* (London, 1988), p 60.
13 *Ibid*, p 146.
14 Quoted in J Sambrook, *The eighteenth century: the intellectual and cultural context of English literature, 1700–1789* (London, 1986), p 96.
15 C A Simmons, *Reversing the conquest: history and myth in nineteenth-century British literature* (London and New Brunswick, 1990), p 25.
16 H A McDougall, *Racial myth in English history: Trojans, Teutons and Anglo-Saxons*, (Montreal, 1982).
17 Simmons, *Reversing the conquest*, p 55.
18 R Hale, *The evolution of British historiography* (London, 1967), pp 38–9.

dynasties of obscure kings'.[19] Turner had begun the unravelling process of 'reversing the conquest' and establishing English customs as superior. He was followed by Sir Francis Palgrave (best remembered as the famous editor of the *Golden Treasury*) who approached legal matters according to the property rights of Saxon England and gave the Norman conquest period little influence on English law. 'Traditionally, the Normans had been ancestors of the aristocracy, and Palgrave's history portrayed them as ruffianly adventurers.'[20] This early nineteenth century knowledge of the conquest period was extremely slight and unsystematic as evidenced by early reviews of Walter Scott's *Ivanhoe*. Augustin Thierry's *Historie de la Conquete de L'Angleterre par les Normandes*, first published in 1825, was the first full-length study of Britain in the Anglo-Norman period, and thus had a strong influence. However, due to the limited research available, Thierry's organising principle came directly from the *Ivanhoe* text, and he stressed the paramount importance of distinction between 'free' Saxons and 'usurping' Normans, a concept based on Scott's sense of Saxon identity after the conquest.[21]

Not all English historians agreed with this view. Carlyle whose *French Revolution* had contributed towards setting the scene for the 'Whig' historical tradition in 1837, continued his politically correct publishing career with *Chartism* in 1839. Carlyle reversed Thierry's binary opposition of Saxon and Norman and transferred the idea of 'progress' from Saxons to 'new Normans'. While the Chartists called for an end to Norman domination, Carlyle contended that England actually needed new Normans whose authority was not based on inheritance but on merit.[22] Carlyle's Norman world was one in which laissez-faire was replaced by strong, involved government: the working man was not left to starve.[23]

Chartism was not the only controversial issue in the early Victorian Britain of the 1830s and 1840s. In 1845, leading churchman John Newman, having left the Church of England for Roman Catholicism, published his *Essay on the development of Christian doctrine*. The consequences of the 'Newman controversy', as it was soon labelled, were extremely far-reaching for both the established Church as well as the growing evangelical movement. At the centre of religious con-

19 A D Culler, *The Victorian mirror of history* (New Haven, 1985), p 153.
20 Simmons, *Reversing the conquest*, p 63.
21 *Ibid*, pp 91–2.
22 *Ibid*, p 97.
23 *Ibid*, p 99.

troversy for historians, however, was not Newman or his followers, but the medieval figure, Thomas Beckett. Beckett could be an historical figure from almost any perspective, either as maligned saint or ordinary individual, a good Saxon Englishman or a corrupt Norman as historians like James Robertson and Eric Stanley demonstrated. Robertson rejected asceticsm, claiming that the very vocation of monasticism was un-English. A celibate priesthood was a particular abomination and most of the exponents of mid-nineteenth century 'Anglo Saxonism' were staunchly Church of England and included in their ranks well-known figures such as Charles Kingsley and Edward Freeman. In Kingsley's opinion, for instance, the Roman orders were virtually equivalent to emasculation.[24]

For MacDougall, the second half of the nineteenth century was the apogee of Englishmen's confidence and pride of achievement as Victorian historians allowed their enthusiasm for their Anglo-Saxon inheritance to reach unprecedented heights. Moving beyond Britain into the empire, Kingsley, as professor of modern history at Cambridge, used his post to espouse the cause of Anglo-Saxon protestantism in a rhetoric of universal mission in keeping up 'Teutonic traditions' worldwide.[25] J R Seeley, who succeeded Kingsley, viewed the empire as being united by 'blood and religion' in his 1883 text, the *Expansion of England*, and Bishop William Stubbs, professor of modern history at Oxford from 1866 to 1884 who had the greatest confidence in all English institutions with Teutonic origins and reached back to the medieval period for teaching material, considering seventeenth-century constitutional issues as too politically close to contemporary life. Stubbs' ideas were embodied in his substantial work, the *Constitutional history of England*, published between 1874 and 1878. As well as giving precedence to their own politically correct versions of the past, Stubbs and his generation, as the first professional university historians, placed matters of religious ideology over empiricism when it came to writing their narratives. J A Froude for instance maintained a staunch anti-Catholic stance and justified the English protestant presence in Ireland according to inferior Celtic, Catholic racial characteristics. This approach was clearly evident in both Froude's main works, *History of England* published in 12 volumes between 1865 and 1870 and his imperial history *Oceana* in 1886. It was not until the end of the Victorian period that this essentially Protestant-

24 *Ibid*, p 130.
25 McDougall, *Racial myth in English history*, p 102.

Teutonic connection was challenged by Lord Acton, Seeley's successor at Cambridge. Acton, in contrast to his predecesssor, held a firm belief in a Catholic-Teutonic constitution as the highest guarantee of freedom. As founder of the *English Historical Review* in 1886 and first editor of the *Cambridge modern history*, and in the context of the nineteenth-century German influence on a more scientific historiographical approach, Acton stayed faithful to an ideological view of the mythical relationship between primitive Teutonic rights and the development of an 'English' constitution.[26] Despite Macaulay's emphasis on social history, politics remained the dominant theme for English historians; anything else was not considered professional as Freeman showed in his criticism of J R Green's *Short history of the English people*, first published in 1874.[27]

Lerner has recently pointed out that 'the interweaving of history and fiction is an exercise of power in textual portrayals'.[28] The crucial fiction for nineteenth-century British historians was Walter Scott's novel *Ivanhoe* which enchanted the whole Victorian generation with ideas of ancient beauty, antiquity and mystery.[29] Through this text, Scott effectively invented the historical novel as a genre, thereby inciting a wholly new interest in the past, and 'in the customs and manners and personalities of ages remote from the civilised present'.[30] Scott's ideology was ultimately a type of Whiggish conservatism which 'would have shocked those earlier Tories, Swift and Johnson because it was based on complete acceptance of the 1688 revolution'.[31] As an enlightenment writer, Scott, like Gibbon, was highly critical of medieval paradigms which he associated with feudal barbarism. Against this world he juxtaposed his own rational anti-Jacobite culture as the encapsulation of all that was representative of progress.[32] The pervasiveness of *Ivanhoe* was stressed by Thierry's history in which he used the Saxon-against-Norman motif in an avowedly ideological direction. Carlyle took this up, but in contrast to both Scott and Thierry he confronted the political issues directly and used the Saxon-against-Norman motif as a direct means of exploring the social reality

26 *Ibid*, pp 110–112.
27 P Burke, *History and social theory* (Cambridge, 1992), p 6.
28 L Lerner, *The frontiers of literature* (Oxford, 1988), p 94.
29 Young, *Portrait of an age*, p 80.
30 A Hook, 'Introduction', Walter Scott, *Waverley* (Penguin edition, 1985 (1814)), p 10.
31 A Calder, 'Introduction', Walter Scott, *Old mortality* (Penguin edition, 1975 (1816)), p 37.
32 G Kelly, 'Romantic Fiction', in S Curran (ed), *The Cambridge companion to British romanticism* (Cambridge, 1993), pp 211–212; A Day, *Romanticism* (London, 1996), p 126.

of England. Hence, Carlyle's key historical fiction *Past and present*, published in 1843, made use of the Saxon and Norman construct but with the declared objective of providing serious social analysis.[33] Carlyle rejected Thierry's reading of history where progress was reached by a Saxon revolutionary undercurrent working against the power structure. For Carlyle, the creation of a vigorous new power structure was in itself a source of social improvement and the possibilities for new Normans as Chartists had direct resonance with the reign of Richard I.[34]

Culler, in his seminal work on this topic, describes Victorian medievalism as 'peculiarly static'. The middle ages seem not to have been related by their admirers to the present by any process of historic change, but were simply set over against the present as an ideal or paradigm. Carlyle's *Past and present* was, for instance, not a reflection in the 'Victorian mirror of history', but rather a reverse image, an 'image of what was not'.[35] The tradition which John Ruskin inherited in the 1840s was that of a hideous present juxtaposed against a glorious past. Culler views this as the key principle for Ruskin's influential *Seven lamps of architecture*, published in 1849.[36] Like most literary traditions of the Victorian age, Culler finds it difficult to define the identity given to Ruskin and his colleagues as 'pre-Raphaelites' and states unequivocally that 'it is fairly certain that the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood would never have given themselves that name if they had had any idea of the trouble it was going to bring upon them'.[37] The clearest explanation offered by Culler is his suggestion that the early pre-Raphaelite pictures were distinctly modern *because* they were medieval'.[38] For D G Rossetti, the medieval world became a template for an exploration of the psychological preoccupations of the Victorian present. This was 'not a harmonious cathedral which happy workmen have created as the expression of their hierarchical view of society, but a dark wood or an oppressive chamber in which pale-faced lovers speak wanly of their frustrated passions'.[39] In similar vein, Polhemus has re-examined John Millais's preoccupation with child subjects noting that Millais 'made the child a crucial Victorian subject of faith, erotics and

33 Simmons, *Reversing the conquest*, pp 93–94.
34 *Ibid*, p 96–97.
35 Culler, *The Victorian mirror of history*, p 160.
36 *Ibid*, pp 167–169.
37 *Ibid*, p 218.
38 *Ibid*, p 225.
39 *Ibid*, p 231.

moral concern'.[40] These insights were, at one level, a direct reflection of Victorian attitudes, behaviour and preoccupations.

These questions of repressed sexuality in mid-Victorian reconstructions of the world have been at the centre of scholarly debate in recent decades. Tennyson, suggested novelist John Fowles in 1968, was 'in full flight from Freud'.[41] While recent analyses of both Tennyson and Morris suggest a 'sexual unwholesomeness' underlying their narratives expressive of 'gothic resonances',[42] these interpretations are at one level attempts at modern psychoanalysis which are attached outside of any temporal grounding. They can also be seen as marginal to the core issues in Victorian medievalism, when conceptualised in its broadest possible historical terms. Tennyson's Camelot in the *Idylls of the king* clearly involves an intensive and extensive use of sources as the basis for its construction and forms and sexuality, while important, constitutes only one set of moral dilemmas for the framework of the narrative.[43] What is crucial about Tennyson's text is that it disregards the earlier nineteenth-century dilemma between Arthur and Alfred and transposes Arthur into a constructed 'high middle ages' that has very little temporal framework and which was viewed by Victorian readers as the authoritative version of the Arthurian legend. William Morris's 1858 collection of verse *The defence of Guenevere and other poems* was, suggests Rebecca Cochran, either ignored or vehemently criticised. At one level this was a clear reaction from contemporaries who disapproved of Morris's association with the pre-Raphaelites who were widely perceived as unorthodox in sexual matters. More fundamentally, perhaps, was the fact that that Morris's reading audience was partially familiar with the Arthurian legend as an idealised medieval past.[44]

If the 'Victorians' were concerned with reconstructing an idealised past they were also fully engaged in constructing an idealised present. Thomas Hughes, contemporary of both Tennyson and the Pre-Raphaelite artists, published his enormously popular *Tom Brown's schooldays* in 1857, the same year as Tennyson's first volume on

40 R M Polhemus, 'John Millais' children: faith and erotics: the Woodman's Daughter (1851)', in C T Christ and J O Jordan, (eds), *Victorian literature and the Victorian visual imagination*, (Berkeley, 1995), p 289.

41 J Fowles, *The French lieutenant's woman* (London, 1968), pp 31, 35.

42 See for instance S Prickett, *Victorian fantasy* (Hassocks, 1979), p 97.

43 See for instance D Staines, *Tennyson's Camelot: the idylls of the king and its medieval sources* (Ontario, 1982), pp 28–9.

44 R Cochran, 'William Morris: Arthurian innovator', in D N Mancoff (ed), *The Arthurian revival: essays on form, tradition and transformation* (New York and London, 1992), pp 75–77.

Arthur. This text rapidly became the definitive version of Thomas Arnold's public school philosophy which included, among other concerns, a loosely defined 'manliness' as a behaviour code for the sons of gentry in the aftermath of the 1832 Reform Bill. While Vance has pointed out the immense complexities of the terms 'Christian manliness', first used in a pamphlet published by the Rev S Pugh in 1867, and 'muscular Christianity', as used by several prominent individuals of the Victorian period, he agrees with other scholars that Hughes's narrative was a proxy for the school literature of the later nineteenth century.[45] As Gillian Avery notes: 'the Tom Brown boy and his traditions of manliness … for the best part of a century it was a world which rallied the young male.'[46] Although Arnold was seen as an innovator in introducing history as a school subject, this approach was already outdated as it was based on the premise that history was by necessity that of the ancient world as it could be studied from original authorities who were literary historians. For Arnold, no contemporary historian came close to the ancients, and he himself had supported the introduction of ancient history as a new university subject at Oxford in 1830 and at Cambridge in 1831.[47] Hughes himself does not seem to have subscribed to this view and his ideas of the past were distinctly focused on 'Teutonic' traditions which had developed in the middle ages. Tom Brown acquires his manly virtues which lead him and his fellows to the far corners of the empire partly from being born and bred 'a Wessex man, a citizen of the noblest Saxon kingdom of Wessex'.[48] In his 1859 text *The scouring of the white horse* Hughes re-emphasised the importance of Saxon origins in British history where he has one of his narrators stress the value of the *Anglo-Saxon chronicle* as a source which 'people sneer at … nowadays, and prefer the Edda, and all sorts of heathen stuff'.[49] To reinforce Simmons's argument again, for Hughes, Alfred (the Teuton) was a European of inifinitely greater stature than his contemporary Charlemagne (the Frank).[50] Hughes's ideas of Teutonic virtues as evident in the upper classes of the mid-Victorian period were reinforced by his contemporary, Charles

45 N Vance, *The sinews of the spirit: the ideal of Christian manliness in Victorian literature and religious thought* (Cambridge, 1985), pp 1–2, 136–142.
46 G Avery, *Childhood's pattern: a study of the heroes and heroines of children's fiction 1770–1950* (London, 1975) p 166.
47 R Jenkyns, *The Victorians and ancient Greece* (Oxford, 1980) pp 60–61.
48 T Hughes, *Tom Brown's schooldays* (Wordsworth edition, 1993), p 4.
49 T Hughes, *The scouring of the white horse: or the long vacation ramble of a London clerk* (London, 1859), p 52.
50 Simmons, *Reversing the conquest*, p 195.

Kingsley. Susan Chitty sees Kingsley's concern with 'manliness' as a limiting factor in his appreciation of literature.[51] This manliness meant a proficiency in blood sports only attainable by the members of the upper classes, ideas which Hughes associated with Arnold but which have much wider associations with the later Victorian period.[52] *Hereward the Wake* (1866) is a 'carefully researched historical novel which shows a deep knowledge of the *Chronicle* and a vivid picture of what life was like in England during the conquest'. Hereward was, however, a hero after Kingsley's own heart; 'he symbolised the spirit of bulldog English resistance to the French invaders and their monks. … In him Kingsley saw reflected the spirit of the schoolboy of his own day'.[53] Lewis Carroll's 'Anglo Saxon' was somewhat different. In his excellent analysis of Carroll's 'nonsense', Francis Huxley examines the use of Anglo Saxon words as part of the game of nonsense. 'This game we may call Anglo-Saxon attitudes.' The 'Jabberwocky', for instance was first construed in 1855 with a glossary of 'Anglo Saxon terms', a dialect which formed the putative language in which the poem was written.[54] Francis Huxley has also noted the impressive level of research into Saxon place-names evident in the *Alice* texts.[55] Returning once more to the Victorian occupation with the present, Roger Sale has suggested that Carroll's sense of 'loss' in the later novel is more indicative of a personal withdrawal into obscurity, characteristic of the 'Victorian Age'.[56]

Escape from the social reality of this 'Victorian Age' became of paramount concern for its contemporaries when faced with unease of the new order. Victorian medievalism can be viewed in this context as a powerful social nostalgia for the shared and ordered life of the feudal system, contrasted with inadequate poor relief, commercial greed and the anarchy of uncontrolled competition.[57] A definitive textual example was William Cobbett's *History of the Protestant reformation in England and Ireland*, published between1824 and 1826. For Cobbett, the Norman conquest had interrupted the natural process of civil law which secured property originating in labour by making the monarch sole proprieter. Poor relief was thus a form of property and if it was

51 S Chitty, *The beast and the monk: a life of Charles Kingsley* (London, 1974), pp 158–9.
52 B Haley, *The healthy body and Victorian culture* (London, 1978), p 108.
53 Chitty, *The beast and the monk*, p 245.
54 F Huxley, *The raven and the writing-desk* (London,1976), pp 63–70.
55 *Ibid*, p 103.
56 R Sale, *Fairy tales and after: from Snow White to E B White* (Cambridge, Mass, 1978), p 117.
57 Burrow, 'A sense of the past', pp 130–131.

denied, all property was jeopardised, and with it the very foundation of society. The new Poor Law was not a new form of that ancient right, it was an outright denial of it. By prescribing the kinds of conditions it did – workhouses and dissection – the law in effect condemned the indigent to slavery or death.[58] Cobbett's writing was an instance of the persuasive power of nineteenth-century rhetoric. Although his work pre-dated the 1832 Anatomy Act, a belief in the legality of pauper dissection was widely circulated as a result of the influence of this texts. These alterities in society were reiterated by Augustus Pugin in his 1836 publication, *Contrasts*. Pugin had converted to Roman Catholicism in 1835 and associated the Gothic revival in architecture with all that was positive in pre-Reformation English society. Pugin, like Cobbett, emphasised the social difference between the relief of poverty in the middle ages and the modern Poor Laws. In Pugin's sketches for his text, as Yates comments in some detail: 'The noble monastic buildings are replaced by a utilitarian workhouse; a diet of beef, mutton, bread and ale by one of bread and gruel; the poor person in his quasi-monastic habit by a beggar in rags; the master dispensing charity by a master wielding whips and chains; decent Christian burial by the dispatch of the corpse for dissection by medical student; and the discipline of an edifying sermon by that of a public flogging.'[59] In a sense, Pugin was responding to the systemisation of all areas of society, perhaps most obvious in the penal and health systems, which marked distinct changes from the medievally-constructed 'ancien regime', changes which Foucault rooted in the late eighteenth century. In this context, Pugin was a product of the 'Romantic' rather than the 'Victorian' period. At the same time, the mid-nineteenth century obsession with the body – as demonstrated by concerns over dissection – was a distinct outgrowth of the Gothic genre contained in the fictions of the 1830s and 1840s. It was no coincidence, suggest some scholars, that detective fiction emerged during this period, conveying the Victorian interest in criminal underworlds.[60]

Nineteenth-century imaginative expression in English fiction was not necessarily influenced by Cobbett, Pugin and the novelists for social

58 G Himmelfarb, *The idea of poverty: England in the early industrial age* (New York, 1984), p 211.

59 N Yates, 'Pugin and the medieval dream', in G Marsden, (ed), *Victorian values: personalities and perspectives in nineteenth-century society* (London, 1990), p 65.

60 See D Porter, *The pursuit of crime: art and ideology in detective fiction* (New Haven, 1981), pp 11–12; J Black, *The aesthetics of murder: a study in romantic literature and contemporary culture* (Baltimore, 1991), pp 19–20.

reform as represented as a genre loosely termed the 'condition of England' novel,[61] but rather, as the reaction to William Morris had indicated, by the ideas and images conjured up by Scott, Tennyson and Kingsley. Though representations of 'masculinity' for instance, were redefined in response to the tensions and dissensions of the industrial revolution,[62] Mark Girourd has shown in his extensive analysis of Victorian and Edwardian 'chivalry' that the dominant visual images of the period were those of a romanticised medievalism rather than a harsh reality.[63] Even Kingsley's working-class sympathies, fired by his reading of Carlyle, were overshadowed by his constant awareness of his role as a 'gentleman as well as a clergyman'.[64] By the mid-nineteenth century, as Gilmour has noted, 'the medieval dream eventually lost its edge of theological controversy and faded … into the everyday furniture of the Victorian imagination. In painting and literature after 1850 medievalism became domesticated and in the rediscovery of Arthurian legends, Saxon and Norman, Catholic and Protestant, Past and Present became reconciled'.[65] As Simmons comments of the later nineteenth century

> despite all the interest shown in the past, nineteenth century Britain had never become a society in which Anglo-Saxon texts were best-sellers, or where ordinary families would describe themselves as part of the ''Teuton kindred''. The historically-based nationalism of the Liberals was an assumption not based on the reading of history as much as on an acceptance of the myth of an enduring English spirit … (revealing) itself in much-read novels, in poetry and the visual arts, and in the popular press.[66]

The curious love-hate relationship of the Victorians between romanticism and reality was well summed up by one of its society's greatest critics, Oscar Wilde: 'The nineteenth century dislike of Realism is the rage of Caliban seeing his own face in a glass.[67]

The vast quantity of literature published in the Victorian period, suggests Walvin, gives us a vital clue to the nature of that era.[68] A survey of domestic reading habits reveals that up to 89% of working-class homes had books by 1840. During the course of the century, the

61 The 'condition of England' genre usually includes the following novels: Disraeli's *Coningsby* (1844) and *Sybil* (1845), Charlotte Brontë's *Shirley* (1849), Charles Kingsley's *Alton Locke* (1850), Charles Dickens's *Hard times* (1854) and George Eliot's *Felix Holt* (1866).

62 D Rosen, *The changing fictions of masculinity* (Urbana and Chicago, 1993), pp 154–55.

63 M Girouard, *The return to Camelot: chivalry and the English gentleman* (New Haven, 1981), pp 70–78.

64 *Ibid*, p 132.

65 Gilmour, *The Victorian period*, p 50.

66 Simmons, *Reversing the conquest*, p 170.

67 Quoted in Culler, *The Victorian mirror of history*, p 160.

68 J Walvin, *A child's world: a social history of English childhood 1800–1914* (Penguin Books, 1982), p 124.

content of these books changed from being religious to secular, with popular texts in the later decades being represented in the 'penny dreadfuls' in contrast to the tracts of the earlier 1800s.[69] Only in the strictest Quaker homes was imaginative literature forbidden, and, by the 1860s and 1870s, simplicity was eroded by worldliness and entertainment replaced the earlier attempts to prescribe codes of behaviour and conduct.[70] While the writing of popular authors such as Hughes and Kingsley is traditionally perceived as being marketed at a middle-class audience, research in recent decades suggests that working-class leisure, including reading habits, is more complex than a superficial glance would indicate.[71] Victorian children, both middle and working class, had much wider literary tastes than a simple and rigid class division and working-class literacy, suggests Hopkins was perhaps more widespread than has been supposed.[72] At the same time, literature for children was moving from the more ideological texts of the middle part of the century to a straightforward 'adventure' genre in the period from 1870. Robert Louis Stevenson's work, suggests Cawelti, is indicative of a need for 'grown up' adventure heroes.[73] *The black arrow*, published in 1888, can perhaps be viewed in this context though its inclusion of the well-circulated doggeral of the War of the Roses, 'the Cat, the Rat and Lovell our Dog/ ruled all England under the Hog', is arguably as problematic for the medieval historian as the 'Jabberwocky'.[74]

With the growth of consumer leisure and marked changes in material conditions between the 1870s and 1914, there was a gradual contraction of the working week and the working day, leaving more available time and money for leisure.[75] A new working-class interest in the past was catered for in Britain by outings as museums and castles were opened to a wider public. Particular buildings, such as Carnarvon Castle, became associated with the public face of the Victorian

69 D Vincent 'Reading in the working-class home', in J Walvin and J K Walton (eds), *Leisure in Britain: 1780–1939* (Manchester, 1983), pp 211–215.

70 F M L Thompson, *The rise of respectable society: a social history of Victorian Britain, 1830–1900* (Fontana, 1988), pp 254–255.

71 See for instance J Baxendale, 'Peter Bailey, leisure and class in Victorian England', in M Barker and A Beezer (eds), *Reading into cultural studies* (London and New York, 1992), pp 35–6.

72 E Hopkins, *Childhood transformed: working-class children in nineteenth-century England* (Manchester, 1994), p 138.

73 G Cawelti, *Adventure, mystery and romance: formula stories as art and popular culture* (Chicago, 1976), pp 40, 141.

74 The verse was not thoroughly re-examined until the publication of Josephine Tey's novel, *The daughter of time* in 1951.

75 J Walvin, *Leisure and society: 1830–1950* (London, 1978), p 62.

monarchy, though it was Edwin Landseer's 'highlands' which provided the most clearly identifiable depicted landscape for royalty under the public gaze.[76] Medieval archaeology, suggests Paul Bahn, had long focused on ruined castles and abbeys, and these images of an older past were given new impetus during the 'Gothic revival'.[77] At the same time, the period from 1860 to 1920 was also the 'golden age' of archaeology, including a wide panaroma of ancient prehistory, pioneering finds, human ancestors, famous sites and the greatest names in the history of the subject. In this context, Scandinavian medievalism was given a new framework when, in 1880, the Oseberg Viking ship was excavated and given a ninth-century dating. This vessel was replicated and sailed the Atlantic in 1893, reaching Newfoundland after 28 days at sea. The Oseberg vessel was subsequently displayed at the Chicago World Fair in 1893, thus effectively providing visual evidence of European contact with America several centuries before Columbus.[78]

By the late Victorian period, 'history' had clearly moved into the space of public experience and pageant. As imperial historians such as Seeley and Froude sought to expand the empire through their narratives, the written and visual iconography of the 'island story' of Britain, comments MacDonald, was the paramount patriotic myth of the New Imperial age, having very little to do with Froude and Seeley, for instance,[79] Seeley had extended the 'home-nation' as a set of organic English national, racial and ethnic characteristics to include the empire abroad,[80] so too did the literary and visual conceptions of the 'British' empire expand. The iconography, comments MacDonald, has very little to do with fact, but a great deal to do with metaphorical or imaginative reality.[81] Crucial to the imperial myth-making process was the glamourisation of soldier heroes. The medieval flavour used in such descriptions is clearly evident. As Robert Giddings has pointed out, there was nothing more inflammable to the public imagination than the press reports in 1898, which provided an 'imperishable picture of the Christian martyr Gordon surrounded in Khartoum by a sea of

76 R Ormond, *Sir Edwin Landseer* (London, 1982), p 144.
77 G Bahn (ed), *The Cambridge illustrated history of archaeology* (Cambridge, 1996), p 54.
78 *Ibid*, p 131.
79 E Boehmer, *Empire writing: an anthology of colonial literature, 1870–1918* (Oxford, 1998), pp 73–7; 112–115.
80 B Schwarz (ed), *The expansion of England: race, ethnicity and cultural history* (London, 1996), p 3.
81 R H MacDonald, *The language of empire: myths and metaphors of popular imperialism 1880–1918* (Manchester, 1994), p 51.

shrieking heathens'.[82] The attention given to individual heroes was a reflection of the Victorian concern with 'great men', a worship of self-discipline in myth if not necessarily in reality and the production of biographies of recent heroes, which stressed the qualities of their personality as much as their deeds.[83] Soldier heroes argues Dawson were portrayed as performing 'dangerous and daring exploits during wartime, in furtherance of a *quest*'.[84] Clearly this type of romanticised hero-worship required a public audience. *The Times* of 14 November 1857 reported the events in India, placing Sir Henry Havelock at the centre as a product typical of a middle-class which believed its time had come 'without a single drop of Norman blood in their veins'.[85] As Kipling commented some decades later 'it was above all things necessary that England at breakfast should be amused and thrilled and interested, whether Gordon lived or died, or half the British Army went to pieces in the sand'.[86] The reports in the press of desperate military actions were reinforced by Lady Butler's influential battle paintings with their depictions of last stands and desperate heroism against impossible odds, reminiscent of the kind of hand-to-hand combat during medieval battles.[87] A more specific medieval iconography was provided by Caton-Woodville's painting, 'The Charge of the 21st Lancers at the Battle of Omdurman, 1898', which showed a cavalry officer meeting in combat with a 'Saladin' in medieval armour.[88]

The South African or Anglo-Boer War marked a high point in this late Victorian set of images of the kind of chivalrous behaviour embodied in war. Often spoken of retrospectively as the 'last gentleman's war' the reality of the conflict was almost completely interwoven with late Victorian euphemisms of 'gentlemanly behaviour' and a 'British' code of conduct as expressed for example in the work of popular writer Arthur Conan Doyle.[89] The rhetoric of the public school, especially that

82 R Giddings, 'Cry God for Harry, England and Lord Kitchener: a tale of Tel-el-Kebir, Suakin, Wadi Halfa and Omdurman', in R Giddings (ed), *Literature and imperialism* (London, 1991), p 201.

83 I Pears, 'The gentleman and the hero: Wellington and Napoleon in the nineteenth century', in R Porter (ed), *Myths of the English* (Cambridge, 1992), pp 217–218.

84 G Dawson, 'The imperial adventure hero and British masculinity: the imagining of Sir Henry Havelock', in T Foley, et al (eds), *Gender and colonialism*, (Galway, 1995), p 46. My italics.

85 *Ibid*, p 53.

86 Quoted in J O Springhall, 'Up guards and at them', in J McKenzie (ed), *Imperialism and popular culture* (Manchester, 1986), p 56.

87 P Usherwood and J Spencer-Smith, *Lady Butler: battle artist, 1846–1933* (Gloucester, 1987), p 70; J W M. Hichberger, *Images of the army: the military in British art, 1815–1914* (Manchester, 1988), pp 82–3.

88 McDonald, *The language of empire*, p 31.

89 I have examined this theme in some detail in a recent paper, entitled 'The imperial sentiment which prevails: writing to and from Natal, c 1900–1910', presented at the Poetics and Linguistics Association Conference on the Semantics of War, University of Potchefstroom, March 1999.

contained in sports and games, had, by the time of the war, reached a peak in its exemplification of Victorian 'chivalry'[90] and 'by 1900 generations of boys were growing up for whom compulsory games were a commonplace school tradition rather than a radical break with the past, ... there was now a considerable group loyalty to the widespread appeal of muscular Christianity, exemplified in G A Henty's public-schoolboy heroes'.[91] Although Henty did write several stories based in the middle ages, it was quite clear from the majority of his texts that this school-boy literature was aimed at the needs of the late nineteenth-century 'new imperialism' and the future participation of public school boys. Medieval 'History' (and I use both inverted commas and the capital H deliberately) as recorded by Henty, provided a medium for a specific range of attitudes about the role of contemporary Victorian England in a wider world. Thus, in such geographically disparate narratives as *The lion of St Mark: a tale of Venice in the fourteenth century, A knight of the white cross: a tale of the siege of Rhodes* and *In freedom's cause: a story of Wallace and Bruce.*[92] Henty's heroes are 'true, honest and brave', have the characteristics of Victorian school prefects and possess the ideal characteristics needed for a typical administrator or soldier in the modern empire.[93] Such values could be easily transferred to the imperial context of late Victorian times and Henty was quite blatant in his avowed missionary task to 'inculcate patriotism' in his texts.[94] In similar vein, suggests MacDonald, were Doyle's 'medieval' romances, *The white company* and *Sir Nigel*, published in 1891 and 1905. These texts 'locate the myth in the distant past of the fourteenth century, and use that past to substantiate and justify the present glory of empire'.[95] As Isabel Quigley aptly points out, 'Arnold had hoped to turn out Christian gentlemen; the later Victorian public schools wanted able administrators'.[96] This kind of ability was perceived as both mental and physical. Recruitment efforts during the South African War had shown that there were serious bodily imperfections among prospective working-class soldiers. The eugenics debate which intensified in the

90 The links between sport and empire have been examined in J A Mangan, *Athleticism in the Victorian and Edwardian public school* (Cambridge, 1981). See also J A Mangan, *The games ethic and imperialism: aspects of the diffusion of an ideal* (London, 1986), pp 35–6; D Birley, *Land of sport and glory: sport and British society, 1887–1910* (Manchester, 1995), pp 155–156.

91 J Springhall, *Coming of age: adolescence in Britain 1860–1960* (Dublin, 1986), p 119.

92 *The lion of St Mark* was published in 1889, *In freedom's cause* in 1895 and *A knight of the white cross* in 1896.

93 G Arnold, *Held fast for England: GA Henty: imperialist boys' writer* (London, 1980), pp 36–42.

94 J Bristow, *Empire boys: adventures in a man's world* (London, 1990), p 147.

95 MacDonald, *The language of empire*, p 71.

96 I Quigley, *The heirs of Tom Brown: the English school story*, (London, 1982), p 87.

wake of these findings stressed, among other concerns, that the maintenance and defence of the empire required a strong 'Anglo Saxon' race.[97]

The impact of these multiple images of an essentially masculine imperialism on girls and girls' fiction has yet to be fully explored though some scholars have suggested that an idealised image of femininity was also conveyed in the 'chivalric' theme. Thus, this literature 'instructed young readers in what was socially acceptable without introducing troublings of sexuality'.[98] The imperial stereotypes of gender were adopted by girls' authors who were quick to place girls in passive roles in the empire, juxtaposing them against the active roles pursued in the masculine world.[99] The dominant middle-class female role in the imperial context, suggests Davin, was to ensure the growth of the British population against other colonial competitors and the birthrate became a matter of national importance by the late Victorian period.[100] While the realities of women's contribution to the late nineteenth century imperial project were far more complex, including both complicity and resistance,[101] a passive, motherhood-linked stereotype prevailed in literature for girls at least up to the early twentieth century.

To some extent the romantic medievalism of the nineteenth century continued into the period after the South African War, as the 'new imperialism' continued to dominate British politics. Rudyard Kipling, the 'imperial laureate' (the description is MacDonald's), although associated with the underclasses on the imperial frontiers, was nevertheless concerned with a respect for and reinforcement of 'the law' rather than an emancipating social improvement mythology of 'progress'.[102] *Puck of Pook's Hill*, published in 1906, further illustrates this theme where neither Saxon nor Norman is exempt from the due processes of justice.[103] There were marked changes, though, in the literature of the Edwardian period in contrast to that of the previous century. Wullschlager concludes his fascinating study, *Inventing wonderland*, as follows:

97 A Vrettos, *Somatic fictions: imagining illness in Victorian culture* (Stanford, 1995), p 124.
98 K Reynolds, *Girls only? Gender and popular children's ficton in Britain, 1880–1910*, (Philadelphia, 1990), p 67.
99 S Mitchell, *The new girl: girls' culture in England, 1880–1915* (New York, 1995), p 22.
100 A Davin, 'Imperialism and motherhood' in F Cooper and A L Stoler (eds), *Tensions of empire: colonial cultures in a bourgeois world* (Berkeley, 1997), p 88.
101 S Ledger, *The new woman: fiction and feminism at the fin de siecle* (Manchester, 1997), p 63.
102 J Briggs, 'Transitions (1890–1914)', in P Hunt (ed), *Children's literature: an illustrated history* (Oxford, 1995), pp 177–8.
103 R Kipling, *Puck of Pook's Hill*, London, Macmillan, 1910, p 48.

> where the Victorians had escaped into a fantastical vision of childhood for solace and distraction, the Edwardians went one stage further and attempted to play at childhood in their own adult lives. The fashions of the day were for the great outdoors: for hearty, tweed-clad men, smoking pipes, tramping across the Downs, for plunging into cold rivers, disciplining boys, shooting animals and building empires; among Edwardian legacies are Baden-Powell's boy scouts … and garden cities.[104]

The Boy Scout movement, started in 1908, although aimed across class lines at all boys, remained firmly within the ambit of the British empire. As R H McDonald noted, it simply opened up 'new frontiers' for imperialism.

Baden-Powell also drew on an extraordinary collection[105] of 'chivalric' images, as Giroud has noted, including a repeated depiction of St George as a knight in armour slaying the dragon. Giroud begins his comprehensive investigation of 'chivalry' with a date from the post-Edwardian era – 1912. The stylised reporting of events in that year – specifically the 'heroic' death of Scott's party in the Antarctic and the supposed masculine 'heroism' shown in the sinking of the *Titanic* – was, he argues, an instance of the intense romanticised medievalism of the Victorians. For Giroud, the first half of the First World War was also still characterised by 'chivalry' as the ultimate code of honour and it was only as the war became increasingly de-romanticised from 1916 that the images changed. Acutely aware of the subjectivity of history, Andrew Lang commented in 1914 that Macaulay, although 'the ideal representative of the English mind and character', had nevertheless 'imperfect sympathies'.[106] The Victorians underwent a further deconstruction process with Lytton Strachey's Freudian analysis *Eminent Victorians* in 1918,[107] and by the 1920s, individuals who had grown up in the late Victorian period were able to view the earlier nineteenth century through twentieth century psychology. 'Manly Christianity' also underwent a thorough and irreversible deconstruction in the period after 1918 although it survived in the works of 'Victorians' such as John Buchan.[108] Buchan himself was not however, unaware of the revolutionary changes of his own twentieth century, and, as he wrote in his 1924 biography of Walter Scott, 'I do not suggest the severe doctrine that no man can write intimately of sex without forfeiting his

104 S Wullschlager, *Inventing wonderland: the lives and fantasies of Lewis Carroll, Edward Lear, J M Barrie, Kenneth Grahame and A A Milne* (London, 1995), p 146.
105 R H MacDonald, *Sons of the Empire: the frontier and the Boy Scout movement, 1890–1918* (Toronto, 1993), p 77.
106 A Lang, *History of English literature: from 'Beowulf' to Swinburne* (London, 1914), pp 645–646.
107 M Mason, *The making of Victorian sexuality* (Oxford, 1994), p 16.
108 Vance, *Sinews of the spirit*, p 175.

title to gentility, but I do say that for Scott's type of gentleman to do so would have been impossible without a dereliction of standards'.[109]

109 Quoted in G Himmelfarb, *Victorian minds* (London, 1968), p 251.

Searching for gems: the Kimberley Papers at Oxford University

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Until recently, the extensive collection of papers of John Wodehouse, the first Earl of Kimberley, was in private hands and virtually undisturbed. On 12 December 1991, almost 90 years after his death, the papers were purchased at Sotherby's by the Bodleian Library, Oxford University, for about £40 000.[1] Additional funding came from the Radcliffe Trust, the Friends of the Bodleian and the Friends of the National Libraries. The collection comprises practically all Kimberley's surviving political papers with the exception of a small collection of diplomatic correspondence in the British Library (Add Mss 46692-4) dated 1856–1858, while he was minister plenipotentiary to Russia. There are also eight volumes of Kimberley's later correspondence in the National Library of Scotland (Mss 10242-9). Because of its considerable size, the sorting and cataloguing of the Oxford collection was a slow process and the Kimberley Papers only became available to researchers in 1995, the same year in which Elizabeth Turner's comprehensive inventory to the collection appeared.[2]

The collection is very large, comprising no less than 589 volumes arranged into 13 main sections. Section 7, Kimberley's papers while he was Secretary of State for the Colonies, is the most important for South African researchers, but the others are also listed here for the sake of clarity. Sections 2–10 are volumes of Kimberley's correspondence (both outgoing and incoming). The papers in these sections are arranged according to the offices Lord Kimberley held. Within each section, the letters are arranged alphabetically according to correspondent.

1 Political diaries, 1862–1901
2 Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, 1852–6, 1859–61

1 I am indebted for this information to Colin Harris, archivist in the John Johnson Reading Room for Modern Papers, New Bodleian Library, University of Oxford.
2 Elizabeth Turner, *Papers of John Wodehouse, 1st Earl of Kimberley (1826–1902)*, unpublished inventory, University of Oxford, 1995.

3 British minister at St Petersburg, 1856–8
4 Mission to Schleswig Holstein, 1863–4
5 Lord Lieutenant of Ireland 1864–6
6 Governor of Hudson's Bay Company, 1868
7 Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1870–4, 1880–2 (Mss Eng c 4074–4203)
8 Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1882
9 Secretary of State for India, 1882–6, 1892–4
10 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1894–5
11 Chancellor of London University, 1899–1901
President of University College, London, 1881–7
12 Miscellaneous political correspondence (received while out of office) 1870–1902
13 Personal correspondence & papers, 1843–1902

While on study leave in Britain in 1996 I was privileged to be able to consult the Kimberley Papers. They are a veritable treasure-house for South African historians of the 19th century and bring many new perspectives to an important era in our history which has been fairly thoroughly researched already.[3] The latter part of the 19th century was a watershed period in South Africa, a time when the discovery of diamonds heralded the development of a capitalist economy which then accelerated even more dramatically when gold was discovered on the Witwatersrand. It was a time when Britain's attitude towards her colonial possessions was also undergoing change. Imperialism was gathering momentum. In the face of growing international competition and grave economic straits, the Home Government had to look towards shoring up British influence and maintaining paramountcy in the empire.[4] But this had to be done with as little strain on the imperial

3 C F Goodfellow's *Great Britain and South African confederation 1870–1881* (Cape Town, 1966) is the classic work on British confederation attempts in South Africa the 19th century. Important works on the same period include J J Oberholster, 'Die anneksasie van Griekwaland-Wes', *Archives Yearbook for South African History*, 8(1945) and more recent publications such as Rob Turrell's *Capital and labour on the Kimberley diamond fields 1871–1890* (Cambridge, 1987), W H Worger's *South Africa's city of diamonds: mine workers and monopoly capitalism in Kimberley, 1867–1895* (New Haven, 1987) and C Newbury's *The diamond ring: business, politics and precious stones in South Africa 1867–1947* (Oxford, 1989). None of these academics had the benefit of seeing Kimberley's important new collection. Nor indeed did M C van Zyl, the author of the authoritative *Die protesbeweging van die Transvaalse Afrikaners 1880–1881* (Pretoria, 1979), when he researched the circumstances under which Britain (with Kimberley heading the Colonial Office) withdrew from the Transvaal Colony and reinstated Boer independence in 1881.

4 See for example A Atmore & S Marks, 'The imperial factor in the 19th century: towards a reassessment', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, vol 3, no 1, 1974, pp 105–139.

purse as possible. When Kimberley took over in the Colonial Office in 1870 as Secretary of State for the Colonies, the idea that the answer to Britains dilemma lay in a confederation of the states and colonies in South Africa, had already gained support in British parliamentary circles. But this was not matched by support for the scheme in South Africa. Ten years later, after two successive Secretaries of State, Carnarvon and Hicks Beach, had tried and failed to implement the policy, it fell to Kimberley to declare that confederation was a dead letter. Britain had already spent enormous sums of money in South Africa: the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, the most expensive British military foray into the region to date, had cost the British taxpayer no less than £4,5 million.[5] In 1881 the Home Government abandoned the idea of confederation and withdrew from the Transvaal, its pride severely dented. Many of the diehard British imperialists were mortified and their forebodings of gloom took on even greater significance a few short years later when gold was discovered in the very region which Kimberley and Gladstone had delivered back to Kruger and his Boer republic.

Kimberley, himself a student at Oxford University in his earlier years, served two terms as Secretary of State for the Colonies in Gladstone's Whig Cabinet. Although not, it seems, a particularly popular[6] nor an intellectually brilliant man, Kimberley was 'conscientious and painstaking ... a peculiarly solid and trustworthy statesman.'[7] Goodfellow sees him more as being responsive to the pressures brought to bear upon him by the British public, parliament and the cabinet, rather than being a creator and an innovator.[8]

During his first term of office, from July 1870 until February 1874, Kimberley became embroiled in a number of crucial South African issues. The mineral revolution was well under way and the economy of the country was undergoing rapid change. One of the first problems he had to address was the controversy surrounding the ownership of the recently discovered diamond fields in the area which later became known as Griqualand West. Indeed the diamond mining town of Kimberley, where some of the most precious gems were discovered,

5 Public Record Office, Kew (PRO),CO/48 (Colonial Office, original correspondence, Cape Colony) vol 490, Frere–Hicks Beach, Cape Town, 9 June 1879; J Benyon, *Proconsul and paramountcy in South Africa: the high commission, British supremacy and the sub-continent 1806–1910* (Pietermaritzburg, 1980), p 165.

6 *Dictionary of South African biography* (Cape Town, 1972), vol 2, p 852.

7 Goodfellow, *Great Britain and South African confederation,* pp 32, 187.

8 *Ibid*, p 208.

was named after him.[9] More light can now be shed on the decisions which emanated from Downing Street in these years, because included in the Oxford collection is Kimberley's correspondence with key role players such as the Governor of the Cape Colony and High Commissioner of South Africa, Sir Henry Barkly,[10] the first premier of the Cape Colony, John Molteno, and Richard Southey, the avid expansionist and highly unpopular Lieutenant-Governor of Griqualand West. Kimberley's correspondence with Barkly is particularly important because all major policy decisions concerning South Africa were relayed from the Colonial Office through the High Commissioner.

Kimberley was also closely involved in the appointment of Robert Keate (who was the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal at the time) to arbitrate in the dispute over the ownership of diamondiferous land. The controversial outcome, the so-called Keate Award, later led to the British annexation of Griqualand West as a Crown Colony on 27 October 1871 and the appointment of Southey to administer the area.[11] Kimberley had been reluctant that the Home Government take on this added burden in South Africa, and permission to annex was only grudgingly given on the understanding that Barkly made it clear to the Cape government that it would as soon as possible accept its incorporation.[12] After all, wrote a peevish Lord Carnarvon some years later, the English taxpayer could hardly be expected to go on paying for the expenses and liabilities of a troublesome Griqualand West.[13] The Keate Award and the annexation of Griqualand West had other crucial implications too, not the least for the Tlhaping and Rolong, who thereby lost the ownership of the land they had traditionally held.[14] It also angered the two independent Boer republics, stirred their dormant national sentiment and subsequently placed Kimberley's successor, Lord Carnarvon, in a taxing and embarrassing situation over the claims

9 'You will, I hope', wrote Kimberley, 'be able to prevent the capital with which you have been good enough to associate my name, from becoming the scene of any acts which its namesake would not be proud of.' Oxford University (OXF), Kimberley Papers (KP), Mss Eng c 4078, Kimberley–Barkly, Downing Street, 4 September 1873.

10 OXF, KP, Mss Eng c 4076–4078.

11 OXF, KP, Mss Eng c 4078, Kimberley–Barkly, Downing Street, 24 April 1873.

12 British Blue Book (BBB) C 459, 1871, Kimberley–Barkly, Downing Street, 18 May 1871, pp 172–173.

13 Confidential Print (CP), African 83, no 28, Carnarvon–Barkly, Downing Street, 4 August 1875, pp 190–191. Carnarvon writes that the correspondence of his 'predecessor' (Kimberley) makes it perfectly clear that 'the annexation was sanctioned upon the passing of the resolutions by the Cape Parliamant … [which are] … morally binding.'

14 K Shillington, *The colonisation of the southern Tswana 1870–1900* (Johannesburg, 1985), pp 53–55.

made by President J H Brand of the Orange Free State, to some of the richest diamond-mining areas.[15]

During this same term of office Kimberley also took the decision to allow Barkly to steer the Cape Colony towards responsible-government status. This was a highly significant step. One of the main reasons why Kimberley had supported this constitutional move was that it was 'an obviously indispensable preliminary to the formation of a self-governing confederation; the Cape was to take the initiative in this formation, and she could hardly do so while still possessing only representative government'.[16] On 15 June 1872 the requisite bill was duly passed by both Cape Houses. But in the years which followed John Molteno proved to be one of the Colonial Office's most stubborn opponents, delaying and indeed playing a major role in aborting its plans to confederate the South African states and colonies. Molteno was finally replaced in February 1878, in the fond hope that he would be more tractable,[17] by the eastern Cape politician J G Sprigg. All these important developments can now be reappraised by studying Kimberley's correspondence in the Bodleian Library.

In April 1880, rather against expectations, the Liberal Party came to power again in Britain. Disraeli made way for Gladstone and Kimberley took over from 'Black Michael' Hicks Beach at the helm of the Colonial Office. In this, his second term, Kimberley directed colonial affairs until December 1882. Again he was thrust into the maelstrom of events in South Africa. In the Transvaal Colony, which Britain had annexed in April 1877, matters were far from satisfactory. Shepstone's administration had been an abject failure. Owen Lanyon, brimming with prejudices about his new subjects, had assumed office in March 1879. He soon antaganised more or less everyone with whom he came into contact. He had nothing but contempt and loathing for the republicans and they in turn chafed under his rigid, dictatorial administration and criticised him at every opportunity. The Transvaal had been bankrupt in 1877 when Britain had taken it over, and when Kimberley returned to the Colonial Office he found that the financial state of the colony was

15 OXF, KP, Mss Eng c 4077, Kimberley–Barkly, Downing Street, 8 January 1872 and 7 July 1872; Mss Eng c 4078, Barkly–Kimberley, Cape Town, 11 September 1873 and 23 October 1873. See also Goodfellow, *Great Britain and South African confederation*, pp 98–101.

16 OXF, KP, Mss Eng c 4076–4077, correspondence Kimberley–Barkly, 1871 and 1872. See also C W de Kiewiet, *The imperial factor in South Africa: a study in politics and economics* (London, 1965), pp 12–13 and Goodfellow, *Great Britain and South African confederation*, p 43.

17 De Kiewiet, *The imperial factor in South Africa*, pp 174, 238; Goodfellow, *Great Britain and South African confederation,* p 154.

little better.[18] Furthermore, the Boers were making it clear that they had taken more than they could stomach. Deputations to Britain to plead for the reinstatement of their independence had failed to bring any improvements.[19] In a number of equally fruitless petitions drawn up over the years while under British control, they had complained *inter alia* that pre-annexation promises had not been kept and that the 'dummy legislature' comprising an ineffectual group of Lanyon's appointees gave them no representation at all. Their refusal to pay taxes (something they had in any case been loathe to do even while independent) grew to worrying proportions.[20] When Lanyon tried to coerce them to pay up, resistance surged.

Curiously, as becomes very evident in Lanyon's private papers, and is underlined in the correspondence of Major-General Sir George Pomeroy Colley (the British military commander and High Commissioner for South Eastern Africa) to Kimberley, the British authorities in South Africa who were directing Transvaal affairs in 1880, were not unduly worried.[21] Possibly this complacency was instilled by the particular brand of anti-Boer sentiment so frequently (both privately and publicly) expressed by British officials such as Wolseley, Lanyon and Colley. They frankly felt that the Boers were too cowardly to fight.[22] The Boers meanwhile had been encouraged to learn that Gladstone's pre-election Midlothian speeches emphasised that colonies should be granted self-government. This was a refreshing change from the monotonous assertions by the likes of Bartle Frere, Garnet Wolseley and Owen Lanyon, all of whom had loudly insisted that Britain would

18 Lanyon argued, with some justification, that the poor state of the Transvaal finances was due to the cost of the war which Wolseley had waged in 1879 against Sekhukhune and the refusal of the Boers to pay their taxes. See for example BBB, C 2584, 1880, no 73, Lanyon–Wolseley, Pretoria, 14 February 1880, pp 150–153.

19 Van Zyl, *Die protesbeweging van die Transvaalse Afrikaners,* pp 20–44 and 72–91.

20 TA (Transvaal Archives), Administrator of the Transvaal Colony (ATC), Lanyon–Kimberley, Pretoria, 28 November 1880.

21 See for example TA, Lanyon Collection, A596, vols 14–16, letters to his father Charles Lanyon, in which he makes frequent reference (even as late as Christmas 1880) to all being quiet in the Transvaal and the situation well under control. Compare also OXF, KP, Mss Eng c 4139, Colley–Kimberley, Pietermaritzburg, 12 July 1880: Colley feels that cavalry regiments 'could safely be spared' and Colley–Kimberley, Pretoria 25 August 1880, in which he decides to 'abandon three of our minor posts in the Transvaal' and has 'no reason … to doubt the safety of withdrawing an infantry regiment'.

22 Wolseley, for example, wrote: 'They [the Boers] are cowards pure and simple … their courage will evaporate in tall talk as it has hitherto done': quoted in A Preston (ed), *The South African Journal of Sir Garnet Wolseley 1879–1880* (Cape Town, 1973), p 243. Lanyon frequently expressed similar sentiments, for example TA, A596, vol 14, Owen Lanyon–Charles Lanyon, Pretoria, 12 December 1880, p 191. See also Van Zyl, *Die protesbeweging van die Transvaalse Afrikaners*, p 167.

never, under any circumstances, agree to surrender her control of the Transvaal. Wolseley, arguably the most outspoken of all British imperialists, a man who wanted 'to gallop through everything as if he was a God Almighty',[23] even went so far as to proclaim that the annexation 'cannot and never will be undone'. He was categoric that 'as long as the sun shines in the heavens' the Transvaal would 'for ever' be an 'integral part of HM dominions.'[24]

Despite this, the republicans became increasingly insistent in their demands that Britain take cognisance of their grievances and restore their independence. In mid-November, what Colley euphemistically called a 'slight disturbance in the Potchefstroom district of the Transvaal',[25] should have alerted Lanyon, Colley and Kimberley that Boer resistance was not going to subside in the face of advancing British troops. With their confidence boosted by their military successes at Bronkhorstspruit and Laingsnek, Boer resistance culminated in the battle on Majuba Hill on 27 February 1881 and the death in action of Colley. Gladstone and Kimberley then took the decision that Britain should relinquish control at Pretoria.[26] Kimberley was later to claim that a fair measure of blame for this 'most untoward event',[27] a war which Colley had himself admitted was ill-advised and had 'added to the embarrassment of the Government at a time when they must already have anxieties enough',[28] lay with Owen Lanyon, who had not kept the Colonial Office fully appraised of the extreme gravity of the situation.[29] The Kimberley Papers at Oxford have proved vital in my assessment of the validity of this accusation.[30]

In the collection there is also an exciting wealth of new information

23 Quoted in Van Zyl, *Die protesbeweging van die Transvaalse Afrikaners*, p 127.

24 Hove Library, Wolseley Papers, SA 1, Wolseley–Frere, Pretoria, 9 December 1879, pp 190–191; see also OXF, KP, Mss Eng c 4144, Kimberley–Gladstone, Downing Street, 1 June 1881 and Van Zyl, *Die protesbeweging van die Transvaalse Afrikaners*, pp 126–127.

25 OXF, KP, Mss Eng c 4140, Colley–Kimberley, Pietermaritzburg, 15 November 1880. The incident concerned the refusal of a man called Bezuidenhout to pay his tax. The skirmish which followed prompted Colley to venture on 29 November 1880 in a letter to Kimberley, that 'matters in the Transvaal are not looking as well as we could wish …'

26 OXF, KP, Mss Eng c 4197, Papers relating to South Africa, 1880, March 1881–April 1881 re war in Transvaal.

27 OXF, KP, Mss Eng c 4142. See also British Library (BL), WE Gladstone Papers, Add Mss 44225, Kimberley–Gladstone, Downing Street, 22 December 1880, p 262.

28 OXF, KP, Mss Eng c 4140, Colley–Kimberley, Mount Prospect, 31 January 1881.

29 *Ibid*, Kimberley–Colley, Downing Street, 2, 7 and 20 January 1881.

30 Work is presently in progress on a doctoral thesis, *Puppet on an imperial string*: *Owen Lanyon in South Africa, 1875–1881*, University of South Africa. Despite the slur on his name, Lanyon's opinion was subsequently sought regarding the Royal Commission's proposed boundary line 'between the Transvaal Boers and the native tribes': OXF, KP, Mss Eng c 4199, Minute by Sir Owen Lanyon to Colonial Office, 10 May 1881.

on the motivation behind the controversial decision to pull out of the Transvaal: Britain's so-called 'peace with dishonour'. The Oxford papers will also open new debate on Kimberley's determination to 'work the thing out', with the express proviso that the Transvalers be prepared to accept British suzerainty.[31] The decision to withdraw was greeted with stunned disbelief and shock by many Britons, Tories and Whigs alike. Queen Victoria was distraught and 'did not feel inclined to approve' the terms of the peace settlement which she saw as placing Britain in a 'humiliating position' ... 'Can not the terms be modified?' she asked imperiously.[32] But it was not to be. Kimberley sent a placatory telegram back to the Queen (whom he subsequently privately referred to as being in a 'tetchy state of mind' about the outcome in the Transvaal) with a view to 'defending the terms of the peace' and putting her tetchy mind at rest with the news that Britain had retained suzerainty over the area.[33] Carnarvon, Kimberley's predecessor as Secretary of State for the Colonies, was another who was horrified and he gloomily predicted disaster in South Africa ere long: one of his more perceptive opinions on South African affairs.[34] This and other uncomplimentary opinions on the Whig policies in South Africa did not, however, go unanswered. Kimberley reacted sharply to some 'uncalled-for remarks' by Carnarvon in the *Pall Mall* periodical, and wrote to Prime Minister Gladstone: 'Did you ever see a more foolish letter than Carnarvon's! ... this is not a moment for him to impugn others when we are reaping the bitter fruits of his policy in South Africa.'[35]

The British press had no alternative but to try to put up a brave front. *The Times* of London nonchalantly declared that 'the Empire is big enough without the Transvaal'.[36] *The Illustrated London News* was less sanguine about the 'wretched business' and put it all down to the annexation 'blunder' and the fact that the 'strength of the Dutch population has been underrated... and now', it claimed, 'we are reaping the harvest of folly which some time since, we sowed for ourselves.' It also had grave fears that there might be a backlash which would 'stimulate into fresh activity the latent antipathy of Dutch settlers over

31 OXF, KP, Mss Eng c 4143, Gladstone–Kimberley, London, 17 March 1881; Mss Eng c 4159, Kimberley–Robinson, Downing Street, 24 March 1881. In this latter note Kimberley defends the peace agreement as one 'every one is glad of but no one can be proud of ... it was the least of evils ... the dangers ahead were most serious ...'

32 OXF, KP, Mss Eng c 4143, Queen Victoria–Kimberley (telegram),Windsor, 22 March 1881.

33 *Ibid*, Kimberley–Gladstone, Downing Street, 22 March 1881 and 10 June 1881.

34 Quoted in Goodfellow, *Great Britain and South African confederation,* p 202.

35 OXF, KP, Mss Eng c 4142, Kimberley–Gladstone, Wymondham, 25 December 1880.

36 *The Times,* London, editorial, 21 July 1881.

the entire extent of our South African possessions.'[37] This same idea, that the bitterness of the Cape and Free State Afrikaners after the war might bring the 'prospect of immediate trouble', also comes to light in the Kimberley Papers and is thus another interesting issue which can now be reappraised.[38]

Among Kimberley's voluminous papers covering events in South Africa after 1880, there is a great deal of significant information on the aftermath of the Boer rebellion in the Transvaal Colony. There are a number of important papers on the workings of the 1881 Royal Commission of Inquiry into affairs of the Transvaal, the cooperation and mediation of the Orange Free State's President Brand and the circumstances surrounding the signing of the London Convention of 1881.[39] There is also correspondence, much of it not previously seen elsewhere, between Kimberley and other prominent role players (in both Britain and in South Africa) such as Gladstone, Courtney, Hicks Beach, Wolseley, Frere, Bulwer, Colley, Wood, Lanyon, Joubert, Brand and the newly appointed High Commissioner for South Africa, Robinson.[40]

For historians who are interested in the progression of British colonial policy in South Africa over the crucial years during which Lord Kimberley, Lord Carnarvon, Sir Michael Hicks Beach and Lord Kimberley (for the second term) were in control at the Colonial Office, the Oxford collection is a vital one. Studied on its own merits, it is certainly an important archival resource; studied in conjunction with the Carnarvon Papers in the Public Record Office and the British Library [41] and the Hicks Beach Papers at Gloucester,[42] it becomes even more crucial in any assessment of the interaction between Victorian, imperial Britain and a South Africa in the process of momentous socio-economic and political change.

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37 *The Illustrated London News,* London, editorials, 5 February 1881 and 5 March 1881.

38 OXF, KP, Mss Eng c 4159, Robinson–Kimberley, Cape Town, 21 February 1881.

39 See for example OXF, KP, Mss Eng c 4199, Miscellaneous papers, Colonial Office,1880–2. There is also information in this file on pro-Boer public meetings held in British centres such as Westminster, Birmingham, Bradford and Darlington during March 1881, calling for an end to hostilities and the restoration of Transvaal independence.

40 See for example OXF, KP, Mss Eng c 4142–4145 (correspondence Gladstone, including his motivation for the withdrawal of Frere); 4141 (correspondence Courtney and Frere); 4183, 4465 (correspondence Hicks Beach); 4074, 4195 (correspondence Wolseley); 4133 (correspondence Bulwer); 4139, 4140 (correspondence Colley); 4167, 4168 (correspondence Wood); 4185, 4199 (correspondence Lanyon); 4159, 4160 (correspondence Robinson).

41 There are two extensive collections of Carnarvon Papers. Those in the Public Record Office, Kew, are catalogued under the reference 30/6. In the British Library, London, they are to be found in Add Mss 60757–61100.

42 At the Gloucestershire Record Office, Gloucester, the Sir Michael Hicks Beach Papers are catalogued under the reference D 2455.

Book reviews/ Boekbesprekings

Africa/Afrika

Richard Cope, *Ploughshare of war: the origins of the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879* (Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 1999), x + 288 pp glossary, illus, maps, bibliography, index. ISBN 0 86980 944 X

Although the Anglo-Zulu War was fought over 120 years ago, there seems no end in sight to the proliferation of books on all aspects of the struggle. Even now at the turn of the century, when interest should logically be concentrated more on the South African War, books, both scholarly and popular, continue to appear. A glance at a recent catalogue shows entries for almost as many books written in 1999 on the Anglo-Zulu as on the South African War.

With the military aspects of the war continuing to dominate public interest it is understandable that most books dealing with the Zulu concentrate on battles. Yet, over the years there has also been a steady stream of studies examining the outbreak of the war, its conduct and repercussions on the Zulu, and its long-term impact on the kingdom and society. Strangely, however, a detailed scholarly work concentrating solely on the causes of the war, long-term as well as short-term, has not appeared. Instead students of the war have had to rely on chapters in books on Natal and Zululand or specifically on the war, on general works such as John Laband's *Rope of Sand: the rise and fall of the Zulu kingdom in the nineteenth century* (Johannesburg, 1995) or on unpublished theses, such as Phil Kennedy's doctoral study, 'The fatal diplomacy: Sir Theophilus Shepstone and the Zulu kings, 1839–1879' (Ph D, UCLA, 1976).

In 1962 Richard Cope, a young postgraduate student at the University of Natal, was encouraged by Edgar Brookes to remedy, this lacuna. He completed a Master's dissertation which sought to examine the causes of the war in the context of the relationship between Shepstone and Cetshwayo. Nearly 40 years later this early research has resulted, via a University of the Witwatersrand doctoral thesis, in a profoundly scholarly examination of the intricate and interlinked developments in southern Africa which led inexorably to war. His book provides abundant evidence of a most thorough, indeed exhaustive, study of the documentary sources relating to the war and its background. Dr Cope would be the first to agree that this is a solid empirical study. He remains essentially an historian of the old school, and this is not meant disparagingly, and readers of *Ploughshare of war* can rest confident that he has provided them with a clear, dispassionate discussion of the unravelling of events in the 1870s. While he takes note of the importance of economic and other factors in the events leading to January 1879 and of the developments within the Zulu kingdom, the work is essentially a study in the relationships between people from very different cultures and ideologies.

Central to this book – as it was to the original dissertation – is the relationship between Shepstone and Cetshwayo. Shepstone's role dated back to the virtual beginnings of the imperial presence in the colony of Natal and in the second chapter Dr Cope sets the scene with an account of the origins of the 'Shepstone System' in the region. This is followed by an analysis of the politics of the Zulu kingdom before the civil war of 1856 elevated Cetshwayo to a position of power. The rest of the chapter examines the provenance of the Zulu border dispute with the Transvaal

and the uneasy relationship between the two men until the accession of Cetshwayo as king and his controversial coronation by Shepstone in 1873.

Dr Cope uses this ceremony as a backdrop to the conflict which developed between 1873 and 1879. He points to the fundamental misunderstandings about the meaning of the coronation which led both Shepstone and Cetshwayo to entertain conflicting expectations. Yet, as he notes, whatever interpretation Cetshwayo may have had, by inviting Shepstone to acknowledge him he had 'given hostages for fortune and facilitated future British intervention in the Zulu kingdom' (p 40).

Previous accounts of Shepstone's policy towards the Zulu kingdom tended to place an emphasis on his changing priorities after he became administrator of the Transvaal in 1877. In his third chapter, however, Cope argues that Shepstone was, from at least 1875, working towards the annexation of the kingdom. In that year he was already accusing Cetshwayo of leading a 'black conspiracy against the whites of South Africa' (p 52). The remainder of the third chapter examines the associations between the various, often colliding polities in south-east Africa – Zulu, British, Boer, Swazi and Pedi.

The fourth chapter on Carnarvon's confederation policy and the fifth chapter on the annexation of the Transvaal close what can be viewed as the background half of the book. The remaining chapters see the action surely moving towards the outbreak of the war. In chapter six, Cope looks at the hardening of Shepstone's attitude towards the Zulu kingdom once he had become the administrator of the Transvaal. He points out that what is often overlooked is that Shepstone's commission also empowered him to annex any territory bordering on a British colony and argues that Shepstone believed that the take-over of Zululand would be as straightforward as the Transvaal had been. In the following chapters he outlines developments from 1877 to 1879. Cope deals with the negotiations over the border with the Transvaal in meticulous detail and he portrays a Shepstone increasingly determined to overthrow Cetshwayo as he realised that he would not be able to domiate the outcome of the land dispute; and a Cetshwayo viewing Shepstone's attempts to control this process with growing alarm and anger. By the end of 1877, war seemed inevitable to Shepstone and during the year which followed he worked towards this end.

Shepstone, suggests Cope, had a willing disciple in the high commissioner, Sir Bartle Frere and the remainder of the book moves Frere to centre stage in the direction of events leading to conflict. Shepstone's manipulations are again illustrated in detail and Cope shows a man obsessed with the need to overthrow the kingdom – an obsession which, allied with his belief in his own righteousness – 'enabled him to sweep all obstacles, moral as well as material, from his path' (p 205). Cope shows that Shepstone was able to persuade even opponents of his policy towards the Zulu, such as the Natal lieutenant-governor, Sir Henry Bulwer, and, temporarily, Bishop Colenso, that the ultimatum was necessary.

In conclusion, *Ploughshare of war* will become an indispensable work to anyone wanting to unravel the tortuous and intricate developments culminating in the Anglo-Zulu War.

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Ben Fine and Zavareh Rustomee, *The political economy of South Africa: from mineral-energy complex to industrialisation* (Johannesburg, Witwatersrand University Press, 1996), vii + 278 pp, ISBN 1 86814 296 5

Ben Fine, a well-known academic commentator on labour and economic matters in South Africa, is Professor of Economics at the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London. His co-author, Zavareh Rustomjee, was Director General

of the South African Department of Trade and Industry at the time of writing the book.

The authors make the valid point that the discipline of political economy is underdeveloped in this country and their own contribution goes some way to address this situation. A historical dimension is integral to their approach and they go back to the inter-war years to identify the economic and political factors which meshed to determine the path of the post-war development and its implications for the current economic dispensation.

They move away from the generalities in the race-class debate and white ethnic dualism to focus more on the expression of these interests in economic activity itself. Of particular interest here is their analysis of the structure, organisation and mode of functioning of the commercial world.

The presentation is nuanced and acutely aware of historical trajectories. The authors identify three overlapping phases in the development of the capitalist class. The 50s saw the steady growth of Afrikaner capital, its interpenetration with Afrikaner capital in the 60s and their combined increased collaboration through the state from the 70s onwards This created the conditions for a concentrated economic strategy on the part of the state. However, as a result of sanctions under apartheid, disinvestment and social unrest a fully coherent industrial policy failed to mature.

Nevertheless, certain productive and infrastructural capacities have been built up around its core sectors. These need to permeate the economy as a whole in order to begin to address the basic needs of the poor. In such a process, runs the argument, the interests of labour should be paramount, otherwise the most likely outcome would be that only a small segment of the black population would benefit.

The presentation underscores the fragile economic underpinnings of wider political projects such as nation building and social upliftment. Mainstream economists would in all likelihood differ from the authors' left-leaning analyses, but for historians concerned about the shifting impact of the economy on political and ultimately social life, there is much to reflect upon in this book.

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Jan-Bart Gewald, *Herero heroes: a socio-political history of the Herero of Namibia 1890–1923* (Oxford, James Currey, Cape Town, David Philip and Athens, Ohio University Press, 1999), v + 310 pp, index. ISBN 0-8214-1257-4

Namibian historiography has progressed in leaps and bounds over the last two decades. It is encouraging to note that this includes the work of social historians who are also casting their 'historical nets' beyond South Africa and becoming interested in a wider social history of southern Africa. Jan-Bart Gewald's *Herero heroes* adds to a growing number publications in this field of research. Although the book has its origins in a doctoral thesis conferred by the University of Leiden, the author is by no means a novice historian, and has published widely on a range of topics. *Herero heroes* was first published in 1996 by CNWS Publications in Leiden under the title of Gewald's thesis, *Towards redemption: a socio-political history of the Herero of Namibia between 1890 and 1923.*

As the title suggests, Gewald outlines the social and political history of the Herero. In particular, he focuses on the struggles of this marginalised indigenous community to retain their identity under the pressure of colonial influence: firstly that of the Germans who occupied the region from 1884, followed by that of the South Africans who defeated the Germans in 1915. The author has consulted a wide range of archival and secondary sources which he has used to produce a well-written and well-structured piece of academic work. The text is organised chron-

ologically and each chapter is discussed within a particular time frame.

The origins of Herero society can be traced back to AD 1100 when the ancestors of the Herero established themselves in central Namibia as crop-cultivators and pastoralists. Gewald provides an overview history of Herero society up to 1891 when Samuel Maharero succeeded his father Chief Maherero Tjamuaha. He describes this event in great detail and explains how Samuel Maharero became paramount chief.

Considerable attention is paid to the effects which disease and natural disasters had on Herero society. Gewald devotes a full chapter to the rinderpest disaster which ravaged the entire southern African region. Under the heading 'The curse of Kahimemua', he describes how, prior to his brutal execution, the chief of the Ovambanderu people, Kahimemua Nguvauava, cursed the Germans and the land as a whole, when he predicted the outbreak of rinderpest among the cattle, followed by war (p 110). A year later Kahimemua's predictions were realised.

Namibia is a semi-desert country and Gewald highlights masterfully how a combination of environmental factors and natural disasters such as disease, drought and famine, effectively altered and reshaped the course of Herero history during the colonial period. Central to Gewald's study is the role of the rinderpest in undermining Herero society. He views this disaster as a major factor in precipitating the decline of Herero independence. The aftermath was devastating and led to land losses, relocation, poverty and famine. This effectively destabilised Herero society to such an extent that it allowed the Namibian-bound German military forces to subject some Herero communities to German colonial rule. Rinderpest affected not only Namibia, but the entire southern African region, which included South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe. Gewald sums up the effect of rinderpest on Herero society as follows:

> Rinderpest did not merely kill cattle; it was the death knell of an independent Herero society as a whole. Following rinderpest, Herero society lost its land, people and cattle, and sank into further debt. It became dependent on the colonial state for, in the form of reserves ... settlers for credit and employment, and on the mission for religious guidance (pp 139–140).

At the turn of the century southern African societies were at war with colonial forces. In South Africa, the South African War or Anglo-Boer War ended in 1902 and two years later, colonial Namibia was engaged in its own war against the Germans. In January 1904 the Herero-German conflict broke out and ended effectively four years later when the last Herero prisoners were released (p 141, fn). Gewald devotes considerable attention to the war effort and explains its commencement as following 'a series of misunderstandings' (p 141). To attribute the origins of the Herero-German war in Namibia solely to 'a series of misunderstandings' raises questions and must be a point of criticism of an otherwise focused debate.

The penultimate chapter entitled 'The histories of the Old Testament teach us', deals with the reconstruction of Herero society with the help of the Rhenish Missionary Society. Many Herero communities found solace in missionary Christianity and used it to their advantage to rebuild and re-establish themselves as a viable society.

In conclusion, Gewald states that 'Herero society was refounded [and] ... came together to create ... a single Herero identity' (p 289). On this point, Gewald fails to explore whether or not the death of Samuel Maharero in 1923 sparked some kind of Herero nationalism. The book is in essence a well-disguised biography of Samuel Maherero. To my knowledge, it has no immediate rival and as far as I know, has elicited favourable reviews from several critics and historians. The author acknowledges that he has written a

'history of the male elite' and challenges historians to research 'other Herero chiefs, chiefdoms, councillors, evangelists, women and children' (p 289) to provide a more complete history.

The book is very reader-friendly and is embellished with maps, photographs, statistics and a useful index. Overall, the author and publishers ought to be congratulated on bringing out a good scholarly publication which highlights aspects of the history of the Herero people of Namibia within a specific time frame. The book is somewhat expensive, but will be useful for students, historians and the wider public interested in Namibian history.

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P J Greyling, *Pretoria en die Anglo-Boereoorlog: 'n gids tot geboue, terreine, grafte en monumente. Pretoria and the Anglo-Boer War: a guide of buildings, terrains, graves and monuments* (Pretoria, Protea Book House, 2000), 128 pp, photos, maps, addenda, index. ISBN 1-919825-01-0

This slim soft-covered book is a veritable mine of useful information for anyone who is interested in the history of Pretoria. More particularly, it is obligatory reading for those who have been bitten by the Anglo-Boer War centenary bug. Modestly billed as a **guide,** it provides instead a number of excellent little cameos on the homes, public buildings and many of the personalities of the capital of the Transvaal both before the occupation by the British on 5 June 1900 and in the period thereafter until the signing of the Treaty of Vereeniging in Melrose House on 31 May 1902. As it moves methodically through the streets of the 'rose-bowered town' (in the words of a Pretoria resident during the war, Mrs T J Rodda) there is a numbered map of each area to guide the reader to the historic site. Most of the important places have been photographed and these have been reproduced in full colour. There are also a few contemporary black and white photographs of the original buildings that have since been demolished.

In addition to descriptive entries on the public buildings, terrains, graves and monuments which the title promises, there is much more. The homes of prominent Boer War personalities such as Jan Smuts, Sammy Marks, Thomas Beckett and Eddie Bourke are also identified and there are useful notes on a number of important themes in Pretoria's Anglo-Boer War history, notably the occupation of Pretoria in June 1900, the military government of the town thereafter, and some of the skirmishes which took place on the outskirts of the town and in the nearby Magaliesberg Mountains. Three particularly well-chosen documents are reproduced at the back of the book: the Boer ultimatum to the British government on 9 October 1899, Conyngham Greene's response on behalf of Britain and finally, the Peace Treaty of Vereeniging 31 May 1902, complete with copies of the signatures which were put to the agreement.

Although the book is proudly marketed as being 'fully bilingual', and the advantages of this are undeniable, it is also one of its flaws. The text is printed in two columns, with the Afrikaans text on the left and the English alongside, which in itself is something of an irritation when the eye moves from one page to the next. This also means that a page of, say, four photographs, has eight captions, often printed one underneath the other, giving the layout a cluttered feel and making it quite an exercise to find the correct caption in the appropriate language. Added to this, the original text was obviously in Afrikaans and the English translation is rather stilted, with little feel for the history. On p 106 there are 'gold-diggers' in Pilgrim's Rest instead of prospectors (p 106) and the buildings of Pretoria's *Staatsartillerie* which are *waardige getuies van 'n stukkie ryk militêre geskiedenis* are 'evidence of a promising part of the ZAR's military history (p 95). But mistakes like these are minor irritations

in a book that is, after all, a guide to historic sites, and which provides the reader with a great deal of accurate information. It has no lofty literary pretensions and reads pleasantly enough. It should be most useful to tour guides, and will certainly have many of us setting off to discover old buildings, graves and ruined forts that we have somehow been aware of in our midst all these years.

The work was compiled at the request of the Friends of the War Museum of the Boer Republics, Bloemfontein, as part of a project to produce a series of regional books on the Anglo-Boer War, the first of which appeared in 1998. The author explains that the original request was to produce a guide to cover the whole of Gauteng, but that it soon became clear that Pretoria's rich history of the period was more than enough for a separate publication and a similar guide is being planned to cover Anglo-Boer War sites in and around Johannesburg. This will be eagerly awaited if it is as good as its Pretoria counterpart.

This guide to *Pretoria and the Anglo-Boer War* was published by Protea Book House and it is appropriate here to offer this particular publishing establishment, under the direction of Nicol Stassen, a vote of thanks from those of us who think that books and particularly history books deserve to see the light of day. His book house – literally a converted house in Burnett Street, Pretoria – is always abuzz with activity as book lovers lose themselves in the maze of well-stocked shelves.

Stassen (a Pretoria University graduate in chemical engineering who also holds a Unisa degree in languages, including Russian), is passionately interested in history and is extremely knowledgeable about a wide range of important historical issues. He is acutely aware that what we know about the Anglo-Boer War needs to be published now while there is public interest in this period of our history. He also plans to make these books available in Britain and to the vast American market. While most other publishers have been reluctant to produce books for a comparatively small South African readership, Protea has produced new, improved editions of important works such as Albert Grundlingh's *Hendsoppers en joiners*, Van Wyk Smith's *Drummer Hodge* and the handy military history of the war by G D Scholtz. There are also works on local Pretoria heroine of the war, Johanna Brandt, including a reprint of her own *Kappiekommando*. The Boer War diaries of De Villebois-Mareuil and J D Kestell, and an edited version of the diary written in Pretoria by Bessie Collins are in preparation, as is a book on Pretoria during the war and one on General Ben Viljoen. Stassen apparently also has other Anglo-Boer War books in the pipeline, both for academic and for a wider readership, which he plans to publish before time runs out and the peace treaty is signed in Pretoria in 2002.

The only other South African publishers who have been prepared to put their backs to the Anglo-Boer War wheel are Jonathan Ball (who also collaborated with Protea to publish an Afrikaans abridged version of Pakenham's classic *Boer War*) and J P van der Walt, who has concentrated on more popular works about the war – an endeavour which also has great merit. In a society which is showing progressively less interest in the human and social sciences and indeed in reading anything at all, historians and all those people out there who are interested in knowing about our past must grasp at every available straw.

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R W Johnson and David Welsh (eds), *Ironic victory: Liberalism in post-liberation South Africa* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998), X + 420, bibl, index. ISBN 0-19-571684-1

This is a collection of nineteen essays on South African liberalism since 1994. The

various essays cover notions of liberalism, its status amongst South Africans and its usefulness in understanding contemporary politics, affirmative action, the press, education, the church, law, and the South African constitution. The main aim of the book is to explain why liberalism is seen as racist by many blacks in a country where its principles are entrenched in the new constitution.

A striking feature of South Africa's first fully democratic election in 1994 was that the Democratic Party (DP), the main political platform of South African liberalism and the successor to the Progressive parties which had an honourable history of opposing apartheid, was all but wiped out. It only polled a poor 1.7% of the vote and secured only seven MPs in a National Assembly of 400 members. The National Party (NP) with its dark and unsavoury past managed, by contrast, to secure 20.4% of the vote and returned 82 members (MPs) to parliament. It is ironic that many NP MPs who had supported apartheid, states of emergencies and detention without trial were returned to parliament, while most of the DP MPs who had opposed racial dominance failed to do so. The reason for this apparant contradiction was that South African liberalism had become a victim of the country's turbulent past.

Since the 1940s South African liberalism has been slandered, misrepresented and vilified by both the political left and the right. On the right the NP portrayed liberals as traitors and communists and ridiculed them as useful stooges of the communist cause, calling them impractical and naive intellectual dreamers. The liberals who had campaigned for the removal of race discrimination and the extension of full political rights to blacks were regarded by the NP as a Trojan Horse for communism.

For their part, African nationalists scorned liberals as agents of capitalism, maintainers of the dominance of white culture and underminers of the revolutionary struggle. They attacked the DP and its predecessors for participating in the parliamentary system, for criticising the armed struggle and for opposing international sanctions and the disinvestment campaign. Those actions labelled liberals, such as Helen Suzman, as racist agents of apartheid working to blunt the struggle. Thus both the NP and the African National Congress (ANC) accused liberals who wanted to speak to both sides of trimming, opportunism and cowardice.

As the white minority increasingly discovered the value of liberalism after 1994, right-wing enmity evaporated and many former conservatives now embrace the DP and liberal values. Among black intellectuals, however, the perception of white liberals as closet racists has become even more entrenched. As Prof W M Makgoba, a vehement critic of white liberals, puts it: 'One of the rudest things to do today is to call a South African, in particular a white South African, ... a liberal.'

Patrick Laurence concurs in his essay 'Liberalism and politics' that South Africa is awash with hostility towards and suspicion of liberals. According to him these sentiments often emerge in the transformation of institutions to bring them in harmony with the post-apartheid ethos. Liberals who dare to question this process are targeted for abuse. He refers to the 'Makgoba affair' at the University of the Witwatersrand as an example of antagonism roused against liberals.

The 'Makgoba affair' was the result of senior white academics who questioned the competence and integrity of Prof W M Makgoba, the then deputy vice-chancellor and a prospective candidate to become vice-chancellor of the University of the Witwatersrand. These academics were accused of resisting transformation and castigated with abusive epithets which smeared them as individuals and liberalism as a political philosophy. This contributed to the image of white liberals as hypocritical defenders of privilege.

M W Makgoba's essay 'Oppositions, difficulties, and tensions between liberalism and African thought' makes an im-

portant contribution to explain black intellectual perceptions of white liberals as racists. His central theme is that the DP had hijacked the liberal mantle and does not represent genuine liberalism. These 'liberals' are only driven in their cause by the protection of apartheid gained privileges and the acceptance of the consequences of inequality. According to Makgoba this subtle and sophisticated racism of white liberals is the greatest challenge to democracy in South Africa.

R W Johnson's essay 'The best of enemies? Black intellectuals and white liberals' is a direct response to Makgoba's criticism. He is of the opinion that the vituperation of white liberals is the result of their exposure of corruption, the pointing out of the weaknesses and failings of affirmative action, and its criticism of the ANC. Johnson also sees liberal refusal to accept the collective guilt of whites for apartheid crimes as an important factor in the rejection of liberalism. This refusal, according to Johnson, leads to emotional tirades from black intellectuals in which the term 'liberal' becomes detached from historical reality.

In the concluding essay,'Liberalism and the future of South Africa's new democracy', Johnson argues that although liberals find themselves embattled after 1994, their case is far from hopeless. According to him liberal-democratic hopes rest mainly on the constitution which is liberal in spirit, and this combined with political stability and economic growth could encourage liberal values to grow by a process of political osmosis. He also sees concerted pressure from the West contributing to the building of a South African liberal society.

Johnson concludes that the years ahead will be a testing time for liberals, but provided that they can keep their nerve, there will be no end in sight for their tradition.

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Gert Oostindie (ed), *Het verleden onder ogen: herdenking van de slavernij* (Amsterdam, Uitgeverij Arena/Prins Claus Fonds, 1999), 233 pp, notes, ISBN 90 6974 376 0)

The histories of the slave trade and the system of slavery in the colonised states between the seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries consist of frightening tales of human suffering and blatant inhumanity. Dutch traders and businessmen played a prominent role in the profitable slave trade, and slavery as such was introduced in Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles. The trade was officially abolished in 1807 when those colonies were under British control, but slavery in the Dutch colonies continued to exist until 1863, 29 years after England had abolished it and 15 years after the French had done so. The decision was delayed because the question of financial compensation – to the slave-owners, not to the slaves! – took a long time to be resolved. The Netherlands was no different from other nations with colonies where slavery was the predominant form of exploitative labour (the issue of compensation was resolved in the same way in other countries). Nor is the country at present different in its apparent unwillingness to come to terms with this part of its history. The lateness of the decision to abolish slavery (only Spain and Brazil responded to the problem later) and the obvious discrepancy with national pride in being a progressive nation, then and now, make the Dutch case a special one. The reasons for this case of collective amnesia are difficult to trace, and, given the focus of this publication, none is really offered here. It would make an interesting theme for a book on Dutch self-investigation of the past. What can be said with some degree of confidence is that processes which have influenced a shift in thinking on the impact of slavery, such as decolonisation, post-colonial experiences and globalisation, are recent developments or have increased in pace over the past two decades.

The publication of this volume is the result of growing and persistent dissatisfaction on the part of people from the former colonies (most of whom reside or have at one time resided in the Netherlands and are Dutch citizens) with the unresolvedness of the legacy of slavery. This dissatisfaction is expressed in a number of issues which finally appear to be receiving attention from politicians and official organisations (such as the 'Prins Claus Fonds' which made the publication possible). These include: a call for the official recognition of slavery as a crime against humanity by the government and a proper official statement from that government that there exists a national responsibility for the perpetration of this crime; a call for monetary compensation to the descendants of former slaves, along the lines of German and Swiss reparation to the descendants of the Jewish victims of the Holocaust; a visible symbol of identification, be it a national monument, a museum devoted to the study of slavery in the colonies, an exhibition on the scale of those organised in Liverpool and Bristol, or a cultural festival; an increasing awareness by the majority of the Dutch population of this part of their collective history, perhaps to be achieved by the re-writing of history books used in schools.

The editor and some of the contributors do not hide the fact that at the present there is no consensus among the various groups and organisations claiming to represent the interests of the Afro-Caribbeans in the Netherlands, nor do they ignore the fact that there are also people who believe that the establishment of a national monument will not address (or redress) more immediate problems, or who show no interest in the matter at all. It is evident that the above issues are intimately related, but that they should perhaps be addressed separately. A national monument dedicated to the abolishment of slavery can serve as a focus for the development of identity among the slaves' descendants, but it might not incorporate the majority of the Dutch population. Whatever form future initiatives are going to take, it is imperative that they are comprehensive and long-lasting. In this regard, the recent concern with the fading interest in keeping the memory of World War II alive should be a proper warning. After all, one is dealing here with national sentiment, a most unwieldy concept.

The volume is divided into two parts. The first part assembles contributions from the Netherlands, Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, while the second part includes contributions from the USA, South America, England, Africa and South Africa (Carl Niehaus; Nigel Worden). The inclusion of the international perspective is welcome, for it demonstrates quite clearly that the Netherlands was not exceptional in their 'unwillingness' to incorporate slavery as a crime against humanity and its legacies in their past and present histories. On this (admittedly Dutch) reader, however, the contributions in the first part had a more direct impact. This is perhaps the case because they strike a harmonious equilibrium between emotional involvement and common sense. Their voices make it difficult to ignore the seriousness of the issue. The views of outsiders, so to speak, can only complement the picture drawn in the first part, but they can never be a proper substitute for the kind of sentiments expressed there. In other words, although the quest for identity against the background of a destructive past is an experience shared by most people from the former colonies, no matter to which mother-country they belonged, the problems issuing from it have to be addressed on a specific national level.

The initiative to give official recognition to the growing dissatisfaction with national history as the constructed past of the majority (cf Frank Martinus Arion's contribution: those who are ready to accept the achievements of the past must also accept the corollary that much of what has been achieved was done by oppressing and exploiting others) is necessary and timely. One can only hope that

this work will reach a wide readership, and the least it can be expected to do is to set a discussion going on how to prioritise the various issues. Also, one needs to find a reasonable balance between international initiatives (the most interesting proposal in this regard is a series of similar monuments in countries which have benefited or suffered from slavery) and purely national requirements.

Altogether, this is an impressive collection of eloquent testimonies on the immediate problems resulting from the legacies of colonialism and slavery. There is sufficient balance and common sense in the presentation, the right instruments to further discussion rather than risking the danger that it will be stifled in the initial stages. Monetary compensation is obviously the most controversial issue, and it is perhaps no coincidence that organisations which make this a primary claim are not represented in the volume. It is dismissed without exception as being too problematic by most of the contributors. Both by nationals and foreigners the issue is sophisticatedly redrawn in the form of bursaries and increased opportunities to participate in education and professional life. The volume was produced after the French government had orchestrated a widely publicised series of celebrations dedicated to the abolishment of slavery in 1848. As some of the responses in this book make clear, the French government made no consistent effort to address the legacy of slavery. For the Dutch there remains an eminent opportunity to do something constructive in 2002 when the founding of the VOC will be celebrated.

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Fransjohan Pretorius, *Life on commando during the Anglo-Boer War 1899–1902* (Cape Town, Pretoria and Johannesburg, Human & Rousseau, 1999), 479 pp, bibl, index. ISBN 0 7981 3808 4

The Afrikaans version of this work, *Kommandolewe tydens die Anglo-Boereoorlog 1899-1902* (Human & Rousseau, 1991) was received with well-deserved acclaim, and awarded the Recht Malan Prize in 1992, the Old Mutual Prize in 1995 and the Rapportryers Prize for non-fiction in 1997. The Ernest Oppenheimer Memorial Trust provided financial assistance for the translation of this book into English, and in June 2000 it was runner-up for the prestigious Alan Paton prize for non-fiction. Because of the wide acclaim it has received, this outstanding work gives international exposure to the life of the 'ordinary' burghers who were combatants in this traumatic war. Pretorius spent 10 years researching the topic, showing the lengths to which an historian will go to ensure that all available material is consulted. In 11 chapters he has provided an exhaustive discussion of life on commando during the Anglo-Boer War.

The basic needs of the burghers on commando are discussed in the first chapter, and a detailed account is given of the problems experienced in the day-to-day supply of provisions during the different phases of the war. The role played by the government commissariat during this period is also scrutinised. In the following chapters the focus falls on the supply of clothing, tents, arms and ammunition. The author discusses potentially uninteresting subjects in such a lively manner that he retains the attention of the reader throughout. We are told, for example, that Boer women formed sewing circles and made clothes from the fabric, thread and buttons provided by the Supply Commission. This clothing was apparently sturdier than clothes supplied by the governments of the two Boer republics, and in a letter to the Middelburg work centre the women were assured that '… their labour ''stimulated our burghers to greater endeavour, courage and zeal'' ' (p 61).

A distinction is made between 'looting', when British supplies were confiscated after a successful attack, and the practice of *uitskud* during the guerilla phase of the

war, when burghers exchanged their rags with the uniforms taken from British prisoners of war. This provoked a mixed response from the British soldiers but often humour prevailed, as recounted by Pretorius: '… There stood the khakies, with their sunburnt noses and spotty faces, neatly lined up wearing old ragged clothes. In some cases their hair stuck out of the holes in their hats. Some of them were furious, while others laughed heartily at each other and at themselves' (p 73).

One of the many joys of this excellent book is the fine line between humour and the horror of war. Without under-estimating the physical and emotional devastation of the conflict, Pretorius maintains a balance between this and the will not only to survive, but to cling to normalcy under very trying circumstances. This is amply illustrated in chapters 4 and 5: 'In and around the laager' and 'Experience of the war situation'. Influenced by the South African weather, entire laagers were usually resting at about noon and boredom was common. Practical jokes were often played on comrades, and burghers who were easily frightened became the butt of pranks. To pass the time burghers would use improvised tools to make beautiful carvings from wood or bone. Card games were popular and Pretorius recounts various interesting incidents. There were also debating societies which discussed political and military policy and their gatherings were keenly attended. Mock courts with 'wild and woolly' (p 121) charges also enjoyed great popularity. Although books, newspapers and periodicals were hard to come by, reading was also important. Pretorius confirms the traditional view, based on a variety of sources, that the Boers were keen readers of the Bible.

In chapter 6, 'Religion on commando' is scrutinised and after a short but comprehensive summary of the various churches and congregations in the Boer republics, Pretorius analyses the piety of the Boers and the high priority afforded to all forms of religious fervour. Services held in the open veld were moving experiences but, according to several witnesses, the singing did not live up to expectation and European commentators were less than flattering about the 'Boer's vocal talents' (p 163). The war deepened the spiritual lives of many Boers and '… not only strengthened the faith of the pious, but also touched the indifferent ones' (p 172).

Military discipline was one of the major problems facing the Boer commanders. Chapter 7 looks at the way in which law was enforced while burghers were on commando. Pretorius discusses the differences in discipline between the Boer forces and their professional European counterparts, and studies the advantages and disadvantages of the lack of discipline in Boer ranks. In past wars and on hunting expeditions, the Boers had learned to rely on their own judgement and their attitude towards discipline was that: 'having complied with the law calling him into the field [of war], he yielded cooperation, not obedience.' (p 191). The burghers had not been trained or drilled to carry out orders and to obey their officers blindly. Their only formal training sessions before the war were the field-days or Bisleys held twice or three times a year. The field-cornets and commandants were often their close friends – democratically elected – and the burghers did not, therefore, regard these officers as their military superiors. Pretorius uses several very interesting examples to underscore this, and he also points out the extent to which the wagon laagers, especially during the initial phase of the war, hampered movement. Laagers had lost the protective function they had fulfilled in the nineteenth century.

In a 'Table of burghers on leave and absent without leave' (p 209) Pretorius clearly illustrates the inability of the authorities to enforce leave regulations, and also the discord among Boer leaders on this issue. During the guerilla phase of the war, commandos were transformed into battle units and self-interest gradually disappeared. This resulted in a dramatic improvement in military discipline but it never reached the point where officers

could at all times depend on the burghers. Pretorius takes a close look at looting, theft and alcohol abuse on commando and after careful analysis of the available documentation, he reaches the conclusion that pillaging cannot be ascribed exclusively to people from the lower classes. The Boer commanders went to great lengths to discourage looting, but with little success. In March 1900 President Paul Kruger expressed his profound disappointment at this moral weakness among his people. He compared the situation with that experienced in biblical times by King David who was twice defeated as a result of 'evil among his own people' (p 226).

In chapters 8, 9 and 10 the emphasis is on relations between fellow combatants; attitudes to and contact with blacks; and attitudes towards women. In these three chapters Pretorius once again shows the thoroughness of his research and his exceptional ability to analyse and interpret the material. He assesses the group solidarity of the burghers, the relationship between young and old, that between Transvalers and Free Staters, as well as Boer attitudes towards English-speakers, ex-colonials and foreign volunteers. The burghers were traditionally individualistic, but the war situation bred strong group solidarity: when a comrade was lost everyone was deeply affected. Corporalships of 12 to 18 men were spontaneously formed. Family groups, and often members of the same church congregations, joined the same corporalship. When faced by danger, conflict and quarrels were often settled beforehand so that the burghers could meet their foes with a united front.

Pretorius provides interesting statistics on the age of the burghers on commando (p 237). He looks into the role of the *penkoppe*, boys younger than 20, who took part in the war. Men in their 60s, 70s and, in some cases, 80s were often used for guard duties to release younger men for more active duty. The strong Boer tradition of patriarchal authority ensured that the younger burghers respected the elderly.

The author also includes an analysis of the role of the English-speaking burghers on commando, of whom little was previously known. In general, foreign volunteers did not impress the Boer leaders, and the rank and file held them in contempt for lacking the basic fighting skills taught from childhood to Boer children. Anti-Dutch sentiment was strong, and foreigners were often insulted or ignored by the Boers. Individual foreign volunteers were, however, usually accepted.

Another facet of the war which Pretorius handles well is the issue of social distinction. The burghers on commando reflected the social and economic profile of the Boers as a whole. There was no social distinction between the officers and the ordinary burghers. Officers were accessible to the extent that privacy became impossible and military information was often handled with insufficient secrecy. Pretorius also cites many instances of favouritism and nepotism. Changes in leadership are analysed, as are the implications of the rise of a new elite in Boer ranks, the so-called bitterenders.

The book also contains a detailed discussion of the attitude and contact between Boers and blacks. On commando the traditional Boer perception of white superiority prevailed, although black grooms, known as *agterryers* (literally, those who rode behind), were treated with a heavy-handed, paternalistic goodwill. In September 1899 Sir Alfred Milner, British High Commissioner in South Africa, and Joseph Chamberlain, British Colonial Secretary, agreed that the war between Britain and the Boer republics should be a 'white man's war' (p 266), but within weeks after the outbreak of the war, black scouts and dispatch riders were equipped with firearms by the British. As the war progressed the British also used black people extensively for non-combatant duties such as scouting and intelligence. The reaction of the Boers to this breach of promise, was one of shock, because the Boer tradition

was to keep indigenous people out of the white battle arena and to them the arming of blacks was unthinkable. According to the author, who gives a comprehensive analysis of the whole issue, the large scale participation of armed blacks and incidents such as the murder of 56 burghers at Holkrans on 5 May 1902, contributed directly to peace treaty of Vereeniging. Pretorius notes the voluntary and enforced assistance by blacks to the Boer commandos, as well as the role of blacks as collaborators. The part played by the *agterryers* is also discussed in detail and their important logistical contribution in battles and skirmishes is stressed. The *agterryers* were often assimilated into the commandos and their important role drew comment from 'friend and foe' alike (p 288).

In chapter 10 the attitude of the burghers towards women is scrutinised and this makes very interesting reading. Pretorius divides the chapter into a number of sections which deal *inter alia* with contact with women during the first year of the war; the attitude of the burghers towards the concentration camps; the support enjoyed by the burghers from the women in the field during the guerilla phase of the war; social intercourse during this phase and, finally, with morals on commando. He questions whether there were armed women on commando (apart from the few well-known exceptions). In this penultimate chapter Pretorius has done pioneer research and presents his findings to the reader in a clear, unadorned style that makes the book so eminently readable. In the Afrikaans version his many tongue-in-cheek asides contribute to the enjoyment of the work, but some of these have been lost in the English translation. The book is lengthy, but is so well written that this should not discourage the avid Anglo-Boer War reader.

The final chapter is entitled 'The bitter end' and here Pretorius focuses on the last desperate months of this war which had dragged on for two years and eight months. It was a war which was to influence all South Africans for many decades to come and has to a large extent shaped the destiny of this country.

The book also has useful endnotes which provide additional information, and the bibliography is an exhaustive list of sources consulted. The added value of the source list is that it can be used as a checklist of available publications and unpublished sources on the war right up to 1998. Despite the fact that an avalanche of new books on the war have since been published, *Life on commando* will certainly retain its place for generations to come.

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Nigel Penn, *Rogues, rebels and runaways: eighteenth-century Cape characters* (Cape Town, David Philip Publishers, 1999), viii + 195 pp, map, endnotes, index. ISBN 0 86486 386 1

Nigel Penn's interest in 'rogues, rebels and runaways' stretches back well over a decade – three of the five chapters of this highly readable and revealing book were published in academic journals between 1985 and 1990 – and he has thus displayed considerable vision in tapping into the historical dimensions of one of the most topical issues of modern South Africa: violence and criminality. In case we had any doubt, the world of the eighteenth-century Cape exposed through Penn's skilful narratives was an extraordinarily turbulent and ruthless one, in which innumerable forms of physical abuse were a constant menace and a far-from-uncommon experience for many people. Some of Penn's comments in his introduction, referring of course to his period, have an uncomfortably contemporary application: 'ordinary men and women would have been fortunate to avoid becoming either a victim or a perpetrator of this violence' (p 7). Indeed, the enduring popular image of the 'fairest Cape' of the allegedly

'uneventful' Company period is yet again exposed as vastly misleading.

It could be argued, of course, that the people who form the focus of this book – the brewer Willem Menssink, the rebel Estienne Barbier, the farmer Carel Buijtendag, and a collection of fugitives, criminals and *drosters* – were atypical individuals whose lives were so extraordinary that sound conclusions about eighteenth-century Cape society cannot possibly be drawn from their various recorded narratives. However, Penn's vast knowledge of the period is put to good use throughout the book, as he is constantly aware of the connections and tensions between individual and society, the exception and the norm, and the periphery and the centre. Through his meticulous research and close scrutiny of these 'unimportant' and 'superfluous' people, the wider context is brilliantly illuminated. As a result, *Rogues, rebels and runaways* is certainly one of the most significant texts – as well as one of the most accessible – yet produced on this relatively neglected period.

The fact that the last three chapters have appeared in other guises before ought not to attract censure, as their inclusion provides a far fuller picture of Cape society than would otherwise have been the case. It is in any case good to have easy access to this earlier work, and to be reminded of its ongoing significance.

The 'new' material (roughly two-thirds of the whole publication) is in the initial two chapters, the first of which, on Willem Menssink, is a *tour de force* of historical reconstruction and narration. A more improbable and wanton reprobate as Menssink is unlikely to emerge in any other than a southern African context; truth is indeed stranger than fiction. The web of entangled relationships, both domestic and within and beyond his brewery, make for bizarre but utterly absorbing reading. Any attempt at a summary of the various passions, schemes and activities of Menssink would not adequately do justice to the tale: but it is indeed a rich story, brimming with copious amounts of drama, tragedy, horror and farce. As Menssink's biographer, Penn must have enjoyed following the numerous tortuous and devious paths of his life.

If chapter 1 examines in great detail the machinations of an incomparable 'rogue', chapter 2 is a rather more conventional account of the lives and fluid identities of a wide range of 'runaways' on the northern frontier of the Cape over a period of about a century. Penn provides useful analysis of the precarious existence among *droster* communities, whose composition was often very mixed. Some of the descriptions of fugitive life are gruesome in the extreme, as the interests of refugees from the colony diverged markedly from those of the more established elements of colonial society; more gory murders than some depicted here defy imagination (for example, pp 82–85). Towards the end of the chapter, there is also a very valuable discussion of the 'Bastaard' and Oorlam (pp 92–99) 'categories', which fluctuated enormously through the period.

Critics might be suspicious of the author's attraction to the range of rather grisly and dubious individuals who form the subject of this book. There is no doubt that he flirts in positive terms with the romantic appeal that many of them offer. They were 'rogues' and 'characters' who possessed 'irrepressible qualities' (p 1) and who lived 'intrinsically fascinating human dramas' (p 2). Fugitives were the 'true pioneers of the colonial frontier' (p 98). Yet Penn's clear empathy with many of his diverse cast of characters is never excessive or indulgent; his judgments are astute and his analysis sober and balanced. Penn's achievement in combining story with evaluation is therefore considerable.

Penn is also, I think, slightly too defensive of his approach to the past. He mentions a colleague's 'amused scepticism of my style of writing' (p vii), and mounts a brief but very passionate crusade on behalf of historical narrative, citing even Hayden White (p 5) to give his cause

legitimacy. I would venture to suggest that, if history is to gain ground during these dark times, well-told narratives and well-grounded 'imaginative creations' which are 'constrained by the evidence' (p 5) will do far more to win new adherents to the cause than lengthy earnest tomes on worthy topics. Penn's superb narrative abilities do not only bring much light and life to the dim world of the eighteenth-century Cape, but they provide inspiration to all writers and readers of history. This is, above all, a hugely enjoyable book, and ought to have a wide readership; it deserves the largest possible audience.

Nicholas Southey
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Deneys Reitz (edited by T S Emslie), *The Deneys Reitz trilogy. Adrift on the open veld: the Anglo-Boer War and its aftermath, 1899–1943* (Cape Town, Stormberg, 1999), 560 pp, photos, map, consolidated index. ISBN 0-620-24380-5

This new addition to the ever-growing list of works on aspects of the Anglo-Boer War (South African War) re-publishes Deneys Reitz's three best sellers, *Commando*, *Trekking on* and *No outspan*, that were first published in 1929, 1933 and 1943 respectively. It is not the intention here to comment at length on the content of each work, but rather to see them as a joint publication, a fresh look at three lively accounts of consecutive slices of South African history written by a well-known 'son of the soil'.

Deneys Reitz, one of five sons, grew up in the Orange Free State where his father, F W Reitz, was president of the republic. Here he often saw eminent republicans such as Kruger and Joubert, come and go, and his father also hosted official visits from men on the other side of the political divide such as Sir Henry Loch and Cecil Rhodes. After a period of illness which forced his resignation, F W Reitz accepted an appointment as State Secretary of the South African Republic and the family moved to Pretoria, where the young Deneys became all too aware of the high tensions and drama of the impending war. As a 17-year old daredevil he seems to have enjoyed it all immensely, glorying in the 'rising excitement [and] the crack of rifles from the surrounding hills where hundreds of men were having target practice. Crowded trains left for the coast with refugees flying from the coming storm, and business was at a standstill.' He promptly joined the Pretoria Commando and with his new Mauser carbine and a bandolier of ammunition 'returned home pleased and proud'(p 14).

This is the prelude to Deneys's first story – a story of nearly three years of adventure experienced by a brave young man on commando for the entire course of the war. It is a stirring account – arguably the best personal account by a burgher on commando during the Anglo-Boer War, and certainly, in my opinion, the most readable. In his preface J C Smuts calls *Commando* 'a wonderful book – wonderful in its simplicity and realism, its calm intensity and absorbing human interest … [an] … intimate picture … [that] … gives us the inner truth of the war. We see how human beings react under the most terrible stresses to the passion of patriotism. … And the effect is all the more striking because the story is so simple and unadorned and objective' (p 9). High praise indeed from so eminent a critic and one who himself was also a combatant, albeit in a leading role, in the same gruelling encounter.

There are many interesting insights into the war to be gleaned from *Commando*, including the lack of Boer discipline, the rationale behind the shameful Boer plundering of Dundee, the burghers' attitude towards their *agterryers*, the growing demoralisation in the ranks, the 'numberless things' the British army trundled along with them, and the sheer incompetence of the Boer leaders in the first months of the war. Reitz is unequivocal

on this latter point; he makes no bones about the fact that 'no one treated our Commander-in Chief [Joubert] very seriously' (p 24), although Joubert's eloquent and determined successor, Louis Botha, was clearly of a different calibre. Nor did the young Reitz have any respect for the junior commanders under whom he fought: 'they were incompetent leaders' he writes, but they were 'true men nevertheless': which appears, for the ordinary burghers, to have been good enough.

Even after the sting of defeat, with the signing of the Treaty of Vereeniging on 31 May 1902, Deneys was stubbornly unrepentant. For him there was no whining. He refused to accept that victory by an army of 400 000 British soldiers meant disgrace to 18 000 burghers. Despite the protests of the little grey English officer sitting at a table under the trees at Balmoral, Reitz and his men fired away their remaining ammunition and smashed their rifle-butts before surrendering their weapons. Some burghers were prepared to sign the British allegiance agreement, but like his father and brothers, Deneys refused to do so, which meant that he had to leave the country and go into self-imposed exile.

Commando then gives way to *Trekking on* and the reader is able to follow Deneys Reitz's period of exile in Madagascar, his return to South Africa in 1905 and the three years he spent living with Isie and Jan Smuts, 'the two people to whom I owe most in the world' (p 211). Botha was a frequent visitor at the Smuts home and Reitz's political convictions became firmly entrenched: he was to follow Botha and Smuts and all that they stood for, for the rest of his days. Reitz then settled down to run a legal practice in the northern Free State town of Heilbron. But not for long. Never one to stand aside when trouble was brewing, he did his bit to help quell the 1914 rebellion before leaving South Africa to fight in the First World War in German West and East Africa in 'those strange half-forgotten campaigns ... against the far-off German colonies' (p 187). Unable to resist the lure of fighting in Europe in the 'greatest war in the history of the world', he rather surprisingly decided to join the British army in 1916 to fight, as he himself explains, 'not for the British but *with* the British', rising to command the First Royal Scots Fusiliers by the end of the war.

Of the three books *Trekking on* is perhaps the least appealing work to someone whose interest is focused primarily on events in South Africa. This is probably because it is also a more diffuse account and because it covers a rather mundane period (relatively speaking) of the author's life, sandwiched between the high adventure of a young daredevil in the Anglo-Boer War and his political career as a mature politician and a member of the Union cabinet under Smuts.

No Outspan is all about Deneys Reitz's public life and central to this is his keen interest in the conservation of South Africa's wildlife. In 1921 he was elected to parliament and became the Minister of Lands under Prime Minister Smuts. This gave him the opportunity to travel to the more remote parts of South Africa – something which he loved to do. After an excursion to the Sabie and Komati low-country area he realised that concerted action was needed if Kruger's dream of a nature reserve there was to become a reality. It was Reitz who drafted the original Bill which would eventually declare the Sabie reserve as the Kruger National Park, now a world-renowned nature sanctuary. In 1924 the United Party lost the election and it was left to the new Pact government to pass the legislation which Reitz had initiated, but as a member of the Board of Trustees he later took an active role in the development of the park and soon after his re-election as MP for Barberton in the 1929 election he bought a tract of land nearby which he called Sandringham and which is today part of a private game park adjoining the Kruger Park.

In *No outspan* Reitz also gives an interesting account of the economic and political crisis in South Africa in 1932, the

formation of the United Party and his own re-entry into the cabinet. In the election of 1933 he was returned unopposed as Member of Parliament (MP) for Barberton and his wife Leila became the first woman South African MP in the constituency of Parktown in Johannesburg. At the end of 1934 Deneys exchanged his portfolio for that of Minister of Agriculture and in this capacity he was instrumental in the building of the Vaal-Harts scheme as well as 'dotting the Union with other irrigation dams' (p 492). With war looming, Reitz was given the portfolio of Mines.

The final chapter of *No outspan* ends as the first chapter of *Commando* begins: with a first hand account of a crisis in South African affairs. This time it is the *impasse* in parliament and the cabinet over South Africa's participation in the Second World War. Reitz makes it an equally enthralling tale, with Smuts preserving an inscrutable 'sphinx-like silence' before the crucial sitting and Hertzog, 'caught in a mesh … pale and tense'. This has to be one of the best renditions of the incident which drew to a close with the formation of a new cabinet on 6 September 1939. General Smuts was to be the Prime Minister and Reitz was named Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Native Affairs. As Reitz so rightly says, 'all this may sound small beer to the outside world but to South Africa it was a mighty event, as vital to us as were the stones and frogs in the fable, and the country rocked on its foundations' (p 519).

This trilogy is not without flaws (like the unfortunate typo on p 11 which reads 1904 instead of 1894) but it is a wonderful read for anyone with the time and interest to wade through 544 pages of South African history. It tends to ramble on a bit in parts, because Reitz has a penchant for detail, but one can after all read each of the three books separately. Certainly in this trilogy one can see the Anglo-Boer War in close as well as in wider perspective, all of it from the pen of an intelligent man who is a good story-teller. There is a short but useful introduction by TS Emslie and there are also some new, very interesting photographs from the Reitz family collection. The useful *combined* index is an excellent idea on the part of the publishers.

Ever since I first laid eyes on this book I have been wanting to end this review on an unusual note: its cover! Emslie writes that he hopes 'that people often *will* judge a book by its cover'. This cover prompts one to do just that. Designer Joy Wrench brilliantly captures the very essence of the trilogy's composite title: *Adrift on the open veld.*

Bridget Theron
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Pamela Scully, *Liberating the family? Gender and British slave emancipation in the rural western Cape, South Africa, 1823–1853* (Portsmouth, NH, Oxford and Cape Town, Heinemann, James Currey and David Philip, 1997), xiii + 210 pp, map, tables, bibl, index. ISBN 0 85255 628 4

Pamela Scully has, during the last decade, published accomplished and pioneering work on the rural western Cape during the nineteenth century, and most particularly on the post-emancipation period. After graduating at the University of Cape Town, where her early work on criminality and social relations in the Stellenbosch district helped to establish her reputation as a young scholar of exceptional ability, Scully moved to the University of Michigan, where she developed an interest in questions surrounding the nature of colonial culture, gender, sexuality and identity. This has resulted in the publication of a number of articles in leading international journals in recent years, and this monograph, which is based on Scully's doctoral thesis, represents the culmination thus far of her concern with and exploration of the historical construction of race, gender and colonialism.

This study moves far beyond what other historians of Cape slavery have revealed about the political and economic shifts

that occurred during the emancipation period. It argues that amelioration in 1823 initiated a thirty-year period of fundamental recasting of family, gender and sexual relations among all the various communities that comprised Cape colonial society. Identity – or 'histories of identification' (p 2) – was deeply embedded in the construction of colonial society as the system of slavery unravelled and was dismantled; beliefs about the respective roles of women and men had to be renegotiated. Gender relations therefore 'formed a central component of the political and social imagination of ex-slaves, abolitionists and colonial officials' (p 3). These identities were often extremely fluid and ambiguous; importantly, they often crossed race and class lines, as newly emancipated people sought to define themselves within a changing political economy.

Liberating the family? is divided into three quite distinct sections. Part I, which 'provides a contextual background' (p 15), is concerned with the period between the start of amelioration in 1823 until the end of apprenticeship in 1838, and investigates the challenges posed by slaves to slaveholders during the period in which emancipation became a reality. Owners had controlled not only the labour of slaves, but also their bodies, identities and habits; amelioration and emancipation enabled slaves to repudiate their owners' authority and explore and demarcate new meanings for themselves and their relationships. Gender relations, family bonds, and boundaries between public and private spaces were all crucial areas of contestation during this period.

Part II follows chronologically from part I, and examines the decade from emancipation in 1838 to 1848. This was the decade in which personal connections between slaves were tested to their limit, because former slaves had relatively limited space in which to manouevre. Although the majority of ex-slaves were forced to work as dependent labourers on white-owned farms, they were frequently able to negotiate the terms on which they offered their labour. Legislation framed by the governing classes attempted to impose gendered hierarchies on Cape society; while gendered divisions of labour were certainly present, the forms which they took differed considerably from the assumptions made by the ruling classes. Scully shows that the attempts to shape post-emancipation Cape society were as much a 'massive cultural project to mold and reshape the work, leisure habits, and private lives of a whole class of people' (p 105) as anything else.

In part III, which fits rather awkwardly with the material presented before, Scully covers much the same chronological period as that of part II, though she does push through into the decade of the 1850s. The three chapters which comprise this section deal respectively with marriage, infanticide and rape, and the conflicting and ambivalent significance and meaning of these among the different colonial groups. These chapters are undoubtedly pioneering, but Scully's arguments are sometimes necessarily constrained by the nature of the evidence. She is only too aware of the difficulties of capturing accurately the opinions and beliefs of the subordinate men and women in colonial society, as her notes on methodology reveal (see especially pp 12–13). This comes through especially in these three chapters, where conclusions, though quite boldly put forward, are sometimes tentative. For example, in looking at the cases of six women who faced trial for infanticide, Scully acknowledges that, in the absence of the 'exact histories' of these women, 'it is difficult to write of their longings and feelings, of their cultural perceptions of the world around them' (p146).

One aspect of the book that does present difficulties is the density of writing and presentation. Perhaps it is more a reflection on this reviewer than the author, but the narrative lacks fluency and is seldom easy to read. The arguments are sometimes laboured and perhaps unnecessarily complex. Sadly, the many individual case

studies and the numerous glimpses offered into lives of individuals at the Cape remain rather solid and one-dimensional; the characters seldom come to life.

Nonetheless, this does not detract from the significance of Scully's achievement. Historians sceptical of the centrality of gender to historical analysis would do well to ponder and digest this challenging and persuasive monograph. The success of *Liberating the family?* is two-fold. It makes a major contribution to our understanding of post-emancipation society in the western Cape, raising many questions and opening new avenues of inquiry. At the same time, it is without question one of the most sophisticated analyses yet to appear of any period of South African history using gender as a key category of analysis. As such, it represents a very notable, indeed profound, historiographical achievement.

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Gerald Shaw, *The Cape Times: an informal history* (Cape Town, David Philip, 1999), xi + 378 pp, illus, bibl, index. ISBN 0864 86404 3

The Cape Times is South Africa's oldest and first daily newspaper, dating back to the edition of 27 March 1876. F Y St Leger, its founder and first editor, modelled the new paper on *The Times* of London as a journal of record. St Leger was also the founding father of the newspaper's vigorous tradition of independent journalism. The paper championed the ideals of the British empire. St Leger and his successor, Edmund Garrett, had an exalted conception of imperial duty and service. They deplored any corruption or abuse of imperial power and responsibility. *The Cape Times* was also supportive of Cape liberalism with its principles of a constitutional government, individual liberty and a non-racial franchise. Cape liberalism, with the support of *The Cape Times* did not, however, advocate social equality between black and white.

The Cape Times tradition of independent journalism, together with its role as public watchdog and supporter of Cape liberal values, were maintained by a succession of outstanding editors. One of the greatest was B K Long who was in the editorial chair from 1921 to 1935. During his editorship the paper did much to prod white complacency on racial prejudice by focusing on the poverty and misery of blacks and coloureds. For a paper circulating mainly in the white community, the *The Cape Times* gave significant space to black viewpoints. In January 1930 it exposed the torture of black prisoners by the police in Paarl. This led to the prosecution of the policemen in question but, in a classic example of the miscarriage of justice, they were acquitted by an all-white jury.

An outraged Long wrote an editorial, 'White justice?', in which he denounced the white jurymen of Paarl and accused them of perverting justice. One of the jurors, a Mr le Roux, successfully sued the *The Cape Times* for defamation and the court awarded him £100 plus costs. The paper also had to negotiate a settlement with the other nine jurymen, paying each £50 and their legal costs.

Long fought a lone battle against the Riotous Assembly Bill of 1930 which gave the government despotic power to deal with black agitation. Despite Long's efforts, whites remained apathetic about the suppression of the black majority. Long was, however, not a saint and was very much a man of his time and his quest for social justice did not entail social equality between races. He was, for example, prepared to accept a compromise which allowed the removal of blacks from the common voters roll in the Cape Province. Long, for whom politics was the art of the possible, felt that in an increasingly reactionary South Africa the non-racial Cape franchise was doomed. In an attempt to save some of their political rights he accepted the compromise to place black

voters on a separate voters roll with the right to elect three white parliamentary representatives.

Long's support of a separate voters roll for blacks did not make him a racist, but according to Shaw he cannot be acquitted of being an anti-semite. With him in charge, *The Cape Times* maintained a xenophobic attitude to Jewish immigration into South Africa.

Despite his shortcomings, Long was a brilliant editor, but even his admirers were occasionally taken aback by his rash and impulsive behaviour. He unleashed a controversy on 7 November 1929 when he maligned the deceased Sir J B Robinson, a gold and diamond-mining magnate. Long was furious that Robinson made no public bequests, unlike Rhodes who had founded the Rhodes scholarships. As a result the deceased magnate was denounced as mean, malignant, evil and as a domestic tyrant. According to Shaw the subsequent controversy was one of the most bitter and acrimonious ever to have raged in the columns of the *The Cape Times*. The Robinson affair caused Long immense embarrassment when, under the impression that Robinson had donated his art collection to South Africa, he made amends in a leading article. The only problem was that the Robinson collection had not been given to the nation.

The Long era came to an end in February 1935 as the directors of the *The Cape Times* felt restive about the shrinking profit-making of the paper. It was felt that the paper was too academic and dull and had to go down-market to become more profitable. Long also had the misfortune that Robert Allister, the general manager of the *The Cape Times*, who was an unpleasant bully and schemer, undermined him over many years. Although many of Long's political opinions can be judged negatively today, he was a courageous editor and a fine reporter who deserves a place in the pantheon of South African journalism. Long entered parliament in 1938 as a member of the United Party (UP). In September 1939 he delivered an outstanding speech in the House of Assembly that played a crucial role in convincing some wavering parliamentarians to support the motion to declare war against Nazi-Germany.

Long's successors, especially Victor Norton (1944 to 1973), maintained the paper's tradition of independent journalism. Norton was an outstanding editor and supported the ideals of Cape liberalism which, according to Anthony Delius, a poet and the paper's parliamentary correspondent, was a curious amalgam of Victorian liberalism compromised with colour prejudice. Norton's liberalism did, however, place him in outright opposition to the National Party (NP) government whose apartheid policies he opposed with vigour. Quoting Delius, Shaw states that Norton's criticism of apartheid in his leading articles were as powerful and biting as 'the crack of a long whip'. Norton had, however, to face the same constraints as Long, namely the difficult task of combining a critical stance to the country's reactionary racial policies with the desire to generate a profit for the paper's owners. This meant that *The Cape Times* could never stray too far from its white readers and advertisers.

During Norton's long editorship the English-speaking press found itself in the front line of opposition to the NP, especially as the UP in its capacity as the official parliamentary opposition became increasingly irrelevant. The government waged a war of attrition against the English-speaking press. It used numerous security laws to curtail and undermine their ability to report on apartheid. Delius's criticisms, for example, led to his permanent barring from the parliamentary press gallery. Despite these difficulties the paper did much to expose the cruelty and absurdities of apartheid. Yet *The Cape Times* was criticised by many on the left of the political spectrum as being too lukewarm in its opposition to apartheid. The reason for this was Norton's loyal support for the feeble and conservative UP. He always hoped that the NP would split and

that this could lead to a coalition between the UP and a dissenting element in the NP.

Apart from coping with the threats of the NP government, *The Cape Times* also had to deal with the uncertainty that corporate battles for the ownership of the paper had created. Yet, in spite of commercial and other pressures, Norton maintained editorial authority and independence to control the content and policy of the paper.

Norton was succeeded in 1971 by Anthony Heard whose editorship had its own share of unsettling corporate politics. These included an attempt by Louis Luyt to gain control of *The Cape Times* parent company as part of a covert operation by the NP government. The bid failed and, with Heard in charge, the paper became even more outspoken in its opposition to apartheid.

P W Botha took the criticisms of *The Cape Times* badly and personally attacked Heard in parliament. Although vilified at home, Heard gained international recognition for his courage in exposing apartheid crimes. In August 1987, as the paper's circulation and revenue slumped, Heard, as had been the case with Long, found that an international reputation was not enough to save him from dismissal. Many Heard admirers believed that he was removed as a result of his outspoken opposition to apartheid, an accusation firmly denied by the paper's management. Heard was succeeded by Koos Viviers who was also an outspoken opponent of apartheid until the birth of the 'new' South Africa.

Gerald Shaw, a former assistant editor of *The Cape Times*, must be complimented on an outstanding book. It is well researched, highly readable with its Cromwellian warts-and-all honesty. It is, however, obvious that Shaw has never been a sports writer. Tony O'Reilly, manager of the Independent Group which owns the *The Cape Times*, was a star of the 1955 visiting Lions rugby team, not that of 1970. This is, however, an insignificant error and the book is compulsory reading for those with an interest in journalism, or in South Africa's turbulent history. It is an especially important contribution to understanding the complex and ambiguous position of white liberal journalists in the past. Although the *Cape Times* occasionally faltered, it remained from its inception a flag around which honest people could rally to maintain liberal standards.

F A Mouton
University of South Africa

Hennie van Deventer, *Kroniek van 'n koerantman: 'n persoonlike perspektief op die jare na '80* (Kaapstad, Tarlehoet, 1998), 196 pp. ISBN 0-620-23333-8

During the apartheid era, the Afrikaans press was perceived as a willing lapdog of the National Party (NP) and the Afrikaner establishment. The reality was, however, far more complex and ambiguous, as Hennie van Deventer's memoirs indicate.

Van Deventer, an editor of *Die Volksblad* between 1980 and 1992 and a veteran of 35 years in journalism, is well-qualified to tell the story of the emancipation of the Afrikaans press in the 1980s. Being a journalist was all Van Deventer ever wanted to be. He joined the staff of Nasionale Pers's *Die Volksblad* in Bloemfontein in 1962, after the completion of his studies at the University of Pretoria. He immediately became one of the rising stars in Nasionale Pers's stable of journalists.

Die Volksblad was then the National Party's mouthpiece in the Free State, and a very loyal supporter of the party and its policies. This was a position which Van Deventer, as a politically conservative journalist, fully supported. His personal political pilgrimage from a conservative to being seen as a dangerous liberal by ultra-conservative Afrikaners, started in 1974. This was when he joined the legendary Schalk Pienaar, a leading 'verligte' and independent spirit, as a founding member of *Beeld*, a new Nasionale Pers daily in Johannesburg. *Beeld* was far more 'verlig'

and critical of the NP than its sister papers, especially *Die Volksblad*. Bart Zaaiman, editor of *Die Volksblad*, felt uncomfortable about the new paper's 'verligte' and provocative journalism. Apart from the influence of 'verligte' colleagues, such as Ton Vosloo and Johannes Grosskopf in Johannesburg, Van Deventer's political enlightenment was further encouraged by the year he spent at Harvard University as a Nieman Fellow in 1976.

Shortly before his fortieth birthday Van Deventer was appointed editor of *Die Volksblad*. Bart Zaaiman and the Free State Afrikaner establishment were unhappy about this and attempts were made to block the appointment. Zaaiman feared that Van Deventer's period at *Beeld* had tainted him with liberalism and that he would alienate *Die Volksblad's* readership. In contrast to his predecessor Van Deventer did use the paper to encourage political reforms, and to influence Afrikaners to change their mentality of superiority over and intolerance towards blacks. In this he fought an uphill battle as the Free State whites were very conservative and wary of the slightest change in attitude. The majority of whites simply did not care about the daily humiliations blacks had to endure. The reluctance to adapt to a changing world was bolstered by the founding of the ultra-conservative Conservative Party (CP) in 1982. The Free State became one of the CP's strongholds as it exploited and mobilised the unease over P W Botha's reforms. In this context, *Die Volksblad* became a lightning rod for conservative anger and *angst.*

The CP leadership thought of Van Deventer as a traitor to the Afrikaner cause. His pugnacious and unrepentant attitude aggravated the CP's resentment. As a result of this anger, a smear campaign developed against Van Deventer and his newspaper. An anonymous pamphlet was distributed, urging a boycott of *Die Volksblad* claiming that purchasing a copy of the paper was an indication of support for the African National Congress (ANC). For Van Deventer this campaign of vilification was made more painful by the fact that many in the CP leadership were former school and university friends. The paramilitary Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) also enthusiastically participated in hounding Van Deventer and his family with threathening telephone calls and letters. These were not idle threats as shots were fired at offices of *Die Volksblad*, and one of the newspaper's photographers was badly beaten by AWB thugs.

What made Van Deventer's position even more difficult was that, apart from the hatred of the ultra-conservatives, his impatience with the slow progress of reforms did not endear him to the NP government. This was aggravated by his attempts to make *Die Volksblad* more than an obedient servant to the NP. In addition his unhappiness with censorship also caused friction. Like his counterparts in the English-speaking press, Van Deventer was frustrated by the battery of legislation that restricted the free flow of information. Apart from this legislation there was also a culture that the Afrikaans press had to avoid news that could cause discomfort to the government and security forces. Any criticism of the Defence Force was, for example, seen as playing into the hands of the ANC. P W Botha, with his notoriously short fuse, did not take kindly to any criticism or advice. Van Deventer was a regular target of the 'Groot Krokodil's' anger and frustration. Because of the regular bolts of fury emanating from Tuynhuis, the presidential office became popularly known as 'kruithuis' among journalists. Free State NP politicians, who were used to *Die Volksblad* being a loyal praise singer of the party, also placed demands on the editor. One egotistical parliamentarian insisted on more flattering press photographs of himself. The 1980s were stormy and traumatic years for Van Deventer, but he felt vindicated when the majority of Free State whites supported F W de Klerk's reforms in the 1992 referendum.

The strength of this book is its honesty. Van Deventer does not romanticise or exaggerated the influence of the Afrikaans press in the apartheid era, and is not blind to its faults. He admits that he personally should have done more to expose the atrocities committed by the security forces.

Kroniek van 'n koerantman is spellbinding and essential reading for those who want to know more about the Afrikaans press, and its role in bringing about reform in South Africa.

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Chris N van der Merwe and Michael Rice (compilers), *A century of Anglo-Boer War stories* (Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball, 1999), 349 pp ISBN 1 86842 093 0

'When people ask me – as they often do – how it is that I can tell the best stories of anybody in the Transvaal (Oom Schalk Lourens said modestly) … the thing I say to them is a lie, of course … For it is not the story that counts. What matters is the way you tell it … Another necessary thing is to know what part of the story to leave out.'

Herman Charles Bosman, *'Mafeking Road'*, in *A century of Anglo-Boer War stories*, p 298.

Historians will also be interested in the part of the story which has been 'left out', but they will be pleasantly surprised by the wide range and diversity of the 34 stories included in *A century of Anglo-Boer War stories*, as well as by the description and discussion of different facets of the Anglo-Boer War. In this selection by Chris van der Merwe (Associate Professor in Afrikaans and Dutch Literature at the University of Cape Town) and Michael Rice (who is currently working as an independent educational and development consultant) 'quality' was the major concern, 'but sometimes … political and ideological significance also played a part' (p 9).

Civilian involvement in the Anglo-Boer War runs as a thread through this selection of poems and stories from the twentieth century. Some were originally written in English while others have been translated from Afrikaans. The different (and the similar) experiences of English-speakers, Afrikaners and blacks in the traumatic times of the war, form the backbone of this anthology. The introduction (pp 2–31) offers an excellent overview of the literature on the Anglo-Boer War and the book can be widely recommended if only for this. The excellent stories are an added bonus.

Short stories and excerpts from longer works by a wide range of well-known authors, for example Rudyard Kipling, Olive Schreiner, Stuart Cloete, and Herman Charles Bosman, are complemented by translations into English of the work by popular Afrikaans poets such as C Louis Leipoldt, Jan F E Celliers, Totius, and Eugène Marais, and authors such as F W Reitz, Gustav Preller, J van Melle, Toon van den Heever and others. In some cases the English reading public will, for the first time, be introduced to the work of prominent Afrikaans authors like J C Steyn, Elsa Joubert, Ettienne Leroux, Karel Schoeman and Christoffel Coetzee. Contributions by Sol Plaatje and A H M Scholtz illustrate that all communities in South Africa were affected by this war. Grover's 'I killed a man at Graspan', (p 154) pays tribute to the Australians and shows the horror of ordinary people caught up in a war which was not of their making. Thomas Hardy's 'Drummer Hodge' commemorates those who found eternal rest under 'foreign constellations' (p 157).

This collection of stories mirrors the changing attitudes to the war as the twentieth century progressed. In the first phase, directly after the war, English fiction was dominated by support for imperialism or antagonism towards it – sometimes couched in language which is today no longer considered politically correct. The South African author, Olive

Schreiner, for example, writing at the time of the Anglo-Boer War felt that the 'war was a squalid affair in which men died for dubious causes and women were left in ruins simply to endure' (p 18).

According to the compilers, the second phase of English writing about the war, from 1914 to 1945, propagated an 'implicit ideological commitment to the Union of South Africa' (p 19). The union of the two white groups was seen as the solution to South Africa's problems. In contrast, Afrikaans writing during the same period took the form of an increase in the publication of war diaries and fiction on the war. Van der Merwe and Rice find that these writings to a large extent confirm traditional Afrikaner views and perceptions on the Anglo-Boer War. The unconventional Afrikaans author, Van Melle, breaks out of this mould and uses universal human guilt as a theme, as illustrated in an extract taken from 'Revenge' (pp 190–198), translated by Madeleine van Biljon. Eugène Marais also avoids the typical themes on the war and he marginalises the role of the Boers so as to place the Bushmen on central stage: '… the narrator is more interested in Afrikaner cattle than in Afrikaner heroes' (p 21). A very positive point in favour of the stories selected by Van der Merwe and Rice, is that a wide variety of Afrikaner attitudes is reflected.

The third phase in English writing on the Anglo-Boer War – that since 1948 – exposes, according to the compilers, hidden sins of the past. Earlier, Herman Charles Bosman had touched upon issues of betrayal and the complexity of human motives, while Stuart Cloete had found conflict 'an excuse to tell a tale of high adventure against the background of the war' (p 24).

In the Afrikaans writing of the post-1948 period, Toon van der Heever portrays the suffering of black people in the war and 'historical facts are less important here than issues of general human relevance' (p 25). In contrast to English fiction of the time, religion plays a prominent part in Afrikaans fiction and excellent examples are included, such as J C Steyn's 'Peace' (pp 236–244) and an excerpt from 'The brunt of the war …' (pp 245–252) taken from *Die reise van Isobelle* (The journeys of Isobelle) by Elsa Joubert.

A very valuable contribution is the discussion of Christoffel Coetzee's *Op soek na Generaal Mannetjies Mentz* (In search of General Mannetjies Mentz). In this prize-winning debut work 'The real ''villian'' of the story is the war itself … There is clearly no such thing as a gentleman's war' (p 29). The strong 'historical basis' of this fictitious work has deceived a number of people. Van der Merwe and Rice describe this novel as 'a study in evil, which is always present but manifests itself more clearly in times of war as cruel, senseless violence and unrestrained sexuality' (p 30).

Jeanette Ferreira, the editor of *Boereoorlogstories* (Van Schaik, 1998) has also collected 34 stories on the Anglo-Boer War, but these were specifically commissioned and were written by established authors. In *A century of Anglo-Boer War stories* the compilers had to make their selection from a vast number of stories published over the last century. They are to be congratulated on the representative nature of their choice, although it is perhaps debatable whether it was necessary to include as many as four of Bosman's stories. This book is strongly recommended for all readers with an interest in the Anglo-Boer War. Appropriately, the compilers suggest that these stories will be 'interpreted and reinterpreted by every new generation' (p 31).

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J C Visagie, *Voortrekkerstamouers 1835–1845* (Pretoria, Unisa Pers, 2000) xxii + 362pp, bibl, illus, register. ISBN 1 86888 060 5

Soos tereg in die voorwoord staan, sou 'n mens eintlik van die geskiedskrywing oor

só 'n belangrike onderwerp verwag dat die vrae oor wie die Voortrekkers was en waarvandaan hulle gekom het, veel vroeër ondersoek moes gewees het. Waarskynlik was dit die omvang van die taak wat vorige navorsers afgeskrik het. Dit is dus aan die deursettingsvermoë van dr JC Visagie te danke dat hierdie stuk geskiedenis uiteindelik geboekstaaf is – seker die belangrikste werk wat die afgelope dekade oor die Groot Trek gepubliseer is. Dit sal ongetwyfeld 'n onmisbare toekomstige bron vir genealoë wees.

Vir so 'n omvangryke werk is dit belangrik om kriteria vas tel stel waarvolgens die persone wat in die boek opgeneem is, geselekteer is. Die jare 1836 tot 1838 word algemeen as die 'trekjare' beskou en om voorsiening te maak vir die 'agternatrekkers', is die navorsing tot 1845 uitgebrei. Slegs Voortrekkergesinshoofde en hulle vrouens is opgeneem; dus is persone wat na 1825 gebore is nie as afsonderlike items ingesluit nie. Daar het ook 'n vermenging plaasgevind tussen die sogenoemde trekboere wat as gevolg van ekonomiese redes geleidelik oos en noordooswaarts getrek het, en Voortrekkers. Die twee groepe is nie van mekaar te onderskei nie as gevolg van die gebrek aan dokumentasie. Alhoewel siviele kommissarisse en ampsbekleërs in die Kaapkolonie opdrag gehad het om lyste by te hou van diegene wat trek, is die lyste onvolledig en onnoukeurig, en moes die skrywer dit uit ander argivale bronne aanvul. Die plasing binne hulle breër familieverband van die mense wat uiteindelik in die boek opgeneem is, het eiesoortige probleme opgelewer, en die skrywer moes genealogiese navorsing doen in veral kerkregisters. Dit is egter juis die plasing van die genealogiese nommer by elke gesinhoof wat die werk so 'n kosbare bron van genealogiese inligting maak. Die skrywer het ook 'n opsomming gemaak van die name van die bekendste Voortrekkerleiers en die aantal gesinne wat saam met hulle getrek het, en 'n statistiese uitsteensetting word gegee van die aantal trekkers wat uit die verskillende distrikte en wyke in die Kaapkolonie getrek het. Hierdie gegewens is aangevul met vyf kaarte wat in 'n handige sakkie agter in die boek is: kaarte van die distrikte. Albany, George, Graaff-Reinet, Somerset, Swellendam en Uitenhage soos dit in ongeveer 1825 tot 1836 was. (Die kaarte alleen maak dit reeds die moeite werd om die boek te koop.)

Die alfabetiese beskrywende lys van Voortrekkerstamouers beslaan 294 bladsye van die boek. Elke inskrywing staan duidelik uit en gee, waar bekend, die persoon se genealogiese nommer (sy plek in sy breër familieverband, byvoorbeeld TREGARDT, Louis, b2c4, was die vierde seun, dws c4, van die tweede seun, b2, van die stamvader TREGARDT, altyd a). Dan volg daar by elke inskrywing, indien bekend, sy geboorte- en/of doopdatum, sterfdatum en met wie hy getroud was. Sy vrou word ook ten volle geïdentifiseer. Sy woonplek in die Kaapkolonie en sy trekdatum word aangegee, en ook waarheen hy getrek het. Aan die einde van die inskrywing volg 'n verwysing na al die bronne waaruit die inligting verkry is. Gelukkig was daar hier en daar foto's beskikbaar van die Voortrekkers om die boek kleurvol te maak. Die foto wat by die Louis Tregardt-inskrywing voorkom, se egtheid word egter steeds deur baie historici bevraagteken omdat hy reeds in 1838 oorlede is. Agter in die boek is ook foto's van plase of grafte van Voortrekkers.

Wanneer 'n trekker glad nie geïdentifiseer kon word nie, word dit so aangedui, maar daar volg wel gegewens oor sy huwelik en sy vrou. Soms word die term 'ongeïdentifiseer' afgewissel met 'ongeklassifiseerd'; die rede vir die gebruik van die twee verskillende terme is nie dadelik duidelik nie.

Die boek bevat 'n volledige bronnelys en, besonder waardevol, 'n register wat nie net na elke van in die boek verwys nie, maar ook na die verskillende plekname wat voorkom.

Hierdie boek getuig van omvangryke navorsing uit 'n groot verskeidenheid bronne. Dit was 'n baie groot taak vir een navorser om al hierdie inligting bymekaar

te bring, en dit is 'n besonder waardevolle toevoeging tot die Suid-Afrikaanse geskiedskrywing. Die boek word sterk aanbeveel by alle historici wat in die Groot Trek belangstel en ook by alle genealoë.

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General/Algemeen

K Theodore Hoppen, *The mid-Victorian generation, 1846–1886* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998), xix + 787 pp, plates, maps, tables, bibl, index. ISBN 0 19 822834 1

This is the third volume to appear in the 'New Oxford History of England' series, the first of which, *A polite and commercial people, England 1727–1783*, was published in 1989. The aim of the series, a successor to the prestigious 'Oxford history of England' series which appeared earlier this century, is to provide an account of the history of England in the context of the development of the state structure built round the English monarchy and its successor, the Crown in Parliament.

Despite the declared aim of the series, the two volumes which have previously appeared offer far more than an account of the development of England's state structure and *The mid-Victorian generation* continues in the same vein. The book has been written with three general contexts in mind – established industrialism, multiple national identities and public culture. These contexts are examined in four sections – part one examines society and the state; part two the fabric of politics; part three money and mentalities and part four England and beyond. The decision on the time span adopted for the book, from the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 until the defeat of Gladstone's first Home Rule bill in 1886, is that these years are commonly seen as the period of Liberal ascendancy in England with Gladstone the premier political figure.

To see how the state of English historiography has changed since the appearance of the volumes comprising the 'Oxford History of England' series, it is interesting to compare *The mid-Victorian generation* with Sir Robert Ensor's *England, 1870–1914* which was published in 1936.

The most striking difference is the changed stress on politics. Despite the said intention of this series to provide an account of the history of England in the context of the development of the state structure, *The mid-Victorian generation* departs in many respects from the markedly political structure of Ensor's work. In *England, 1870–1914* the interest in political figures and the importance attached to them in the 1930s is obvious from a glance at chapter titles such as 'Gladstone's prime'; 'The rule of Disraeli'; 'The ascendancy of Parnell' and so on. Chapters such as these offer detailed descriptions of political life and are very different to Hoppen's more nuanced political approach which places political developments in a wider context and casts doubt on previously held assumptions on the nature of the state and of politics.

While Ensor begins *England, 1870–1914* with a political discussion; Hoppen's concerns are with society. In detailed chapters in part one, he traces the changing face of English society in the mid-nineteenth century, looking at how industrialisation and the rapid spread of urbanisation had changed the condition of the agrarian interest, the middle classes and the working class. These chapters provide a thorough analysis of English society and the section concludes with an assessment of the nature of the Victorian state, relating its nature to what its functions were deemed to be, as well as to what it actually did for its people. By mid-century there were growing expectations of the state – although there were considerable differences of opinion on what these expectations should be. The consolidation of utilitarianism, however, and the reforming legislation of the period, ensured that

the state was playing a larger role in the lives of men and women – and of children too – than had previously been the case. And this despite the determination of leaders such as Gladstone to maintain a minimalist, non-interventionist state. It is only once he has thus set the scene that Hoppen turns to a discussion of political developments.

The next major difference between the approach of Ensor and that of Hoppen reflects changing views of identity in Britain between the 1930s and the 1990s. To Ensor, it was quite conceivable to write a history of England which virtually ignored the component parts of the United Kingdom or treated them as part of England. Although it proved impossible for him to ignore Irish developments, Scotland and Wales do not even merit a mention in the index. Such indifference, indeed arrogance, has become unthinkable in the 1990s with the resurgence of national identities in the United Kingdom. Hoppen, while acknowledging the fashioning of a British consciousness by Victorian times, accordingly discusses conditions and developments specifically in Scotland, Wales and Ireland.

Changed attitudes to gender are also strikingly evident in *The mid-Victorian generation*. While Ensor looked only at women's education and women's suffrage – of obvious importance in a work which covers the suffragette years – Hoppen includes in his brief, attitudes to women, the place of women in the family, marriage and divorce, sex, occupational opportunities and voluntary work and a whole range of other aspects. His section on marriage provides an extremely sympathetic discussion of gender relations and of the position of women in the family – of cardinal importance in a society which was only beginning to open diverse opportunities for women other than in marriage or service.

Taken all in all, *The mid-Victorian generation* is a worthy addition to the 'New Oxford history of England', offering a sensitive approach to a period of great complexity and of rapid social and political change. To a South African reviewer, a more detailed examination of imperialism would have been welcome, particularly of the fluctuating policies towards colonialism. But this is a mere quibble. Far more serious is the inclusion of a map of the British empire in the 1890s which includes the whole of southern Africa up to present-day Malawi in the South African Republic!

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Michael Howard and Wm. Roger Louis (eds), *The Oxford history of the twentieth century* (Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1998), xxii + 458 pp., bibl, illus, chronology, index. ISBN 0 19 820428 0

Globalisation has made world history fashionable and has led to a retreat from European histories in the undergraduate curriculum. The *Oxford history* has sensibly kept European history in part II under the title, 'The Eurocentric world, 1900–1945', but deliberately situates it within an international framework for the rest of the century. The Cold War has a section to itself and the 'Wider world' (part IV) is examined in nine chapters towards the end of the anthology, before the two excellent concluding chapters on the 'Close of the twentieth century' and 'Towards the twenty-first century'.

The main focus of the volume is mainstream European and American politics. The history of the 'rest of the world' is construed in terms of area studies, moving from East Asia and China to Africa and Latin America. Attention is also given to imperial history in chapters 8 and 24. The *Oxford history* is therefore a rather conventional history of Western hegemony in the twentieth century which reflects prevailing international power relations. This conception is encapsulated in Alan Ryan's discussion on the 'Growth of a global culture', in which he argues that

> ... the bleak truth is that the countries of the North Atlantic littoral have imposed on the rest of the world ideals of material prosperity and standards of economic rationality that have proved inescapable. It is an equally bleak truth that they have failed to export much else: a regard for human rights, the rule of law, representative political institutions, for instance; and that, in the process, much that was attractive and life-enhancing in the culture of non-Western societies has been destroyed (p 64).

Part I provides overarching and rather audacious chapters on demography, urbanisation, the expansion of knowlege, the international economy and global cultures, as well as physics and the visual arts. Each author has tried to cover these enormous topics in 10 to 15 pages, designed for a general readership. The synopses are often sophisticated and assume a good general knowledge of the literature in each field. Established scholars have attempted to offer state-of-the-art chapters which sometimes take up a central issue and often include photographs, graphs or tables. Some chapters are highly original, like Robert Skidelsky's 'Growth of the world economy' in 13 tightly argued pages which provides a rubric for understanding the development of Western capitalism from a liberal to autarckic economy in the first half of the century to a managed and then neo-liberal economy in the second half.

Other chapters also provide an analytical overview of the twentieth century. The first part of the book is therefore the most profound section because it reflects on the large historical processes that have shaped our divided world. The wide-ranging discursive approach is evocative and should help students of history to think more laterally about causation. Curiously, however, Norbert Lynton's chapter on modernism and the visual arts does not include any illustrations, while pictures of appropriate art works have been placed in other chapters instead.

Part II takes us into the more familiar world of the colonial empires, Europe and the two World Wars, the Soviet Union, the United States of America (USA) and Japan between 1900 and 1945. Here, the best chapters are written by Michael Howard (9) and Hugh Brogan (11). Howard telescopes his vast knowledge of war and society during the First and Second World Wars into a breathless précis. Brogan explains the rise of the USA and highlights some of its rich social history derived from the 'mixture of tradition and innovation' which characterised the American way of life in the first half of the twentieth century (pp 128–138).

James Patterson offers a sequel on America after 1945 in part III of the book. He links domestic and foreign policy in a discussion that moves flawlessly between the baby boom, Billy Graham, Greenwich Village and Cold-War politics (pp 164–175). Both Brogan and Patterson avoid the usual triumphalism of American history; their sense of irony combined with a honed knowledge of US society offers a satisfying 'outside' perspective on the 'American century'. The matching chapters on the Soviet Union (10 and 15) lack some of this intellectual verve and tend to be more conventional political histories, in the vein of Anne Deighton's rather uninspired narrative account of the 'Remaking of Europe' (chapter 16).

If one is looking for a 'World history', then part IV of the *Oxford history* comes nearest. Jonathan Spence's elegant assessment of China's century (chapter 18) is an excellent introduction to such a complex society, and in his inimitable way, Terence Ranger surveys developments in sub-Saharan Africa with perspicacity in chapter 22. Ranger examines a range of failed modernisations since independence and charts the remarkable continuities with late colonialism. 'African intellectuals', he argues, 'were embittered by the betrayal of both promises of democracy and promises of development' (p 271). In his view,

this was largely the result of white settlers frustrating African advancement. Ranger's concluding remarks about Africa's prospects will also be interesting to Africanists:

> ... one may have a qualified optimism. After decades of suppression, peasants and workers and entrepreneurs are finding their various voices. The development failures of colonialism and of the post-colonial state have ushered in a more modest, gradual and promising approach to change. There is reason to suppose that Africa in the twenty-first century can do more than relive in some yet more extreme form the calamities of the twentieth (p 276).

Connecting South and South, Alan Knight's chapter on Latin America (23) is an ambitious economic history of the region. He shows how Latin American states were increasingly integrated into world trade as they experienced lucrative – though dramatically fluctuating – export booms and how these made or deposed governments, both authoritarian and democratic.

Part V is in many ways a conclusion to the *Oxford history*. Wm Roger Louis looks at globalisation after the end of the Cold War (chapter 26). He focuses on the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the overthrow of apartheid in South Africa in 1994 as positive events in the world at the end of the twentieth century, since they represent victories for democracy. He contrasts these with genocide in Rwanda, war in the Balkans, terrorism in Oklahoma City in 1995, and the disasters of famine and disease in North Korean and Ethiopia, in a poignant survey of the 1990s.

And, finally, Ralph Dahrendorf anticipates what globalisation is likely to mean in the areas of economics, information, ideology and religion and class wars in the twenty-first century (chapter 27). He predicts a 'return to the tribe' – in Karl Popper's phrase – as regionalisms proliferate. His evocative theoretical speculation seems open-ended enough to allow historical forces to cross the fragile timeline into the new millennium.

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Andrew Roberts, *Salisbury: Victorian titan* (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999), xii + 938 pp, illus, bibl, index. ISBN 0 297 817 13 2

A striking aspect of the centenary celebrations commemorating the South African War of 1899 to 1902 is that the role of Lord Salisbury, the then British prime minister, has been ignored. For many, the South African War remains the war that was engineered by Joseph Chamberlain, minister for colonies, and Alfred Milner, British high commissioner in South Africa. The South African lack of interest in Salisbury is reflected for example, in his absence in the authoritative *South African Dictionary of Biography*. In contrast, the South African involvement of other British statesmen such as Campbell-Bannerman, Gladstone and Chamberlain, as well as numerous other personalities who, in comparison to Salisbury, could be considered minor, ensured their places in the *Dictionary*. What makes the omission of Salisbury even more startling is that Lord Randolph Churchill has an entry purely as a result of his controversial visit to southern Africa as a private citizen in 1891. That Salisbury deserves to be remembered is clear from Andrew Roberts's superb and highly readable biography. He argues convincingly that Salisbury was not coerced into the South African War, as he was in full control of his government and imperial policy. For the events leading up to, and the waging of the South African War to be placed in proper context, the role of Salisbury must be understood.

Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne-Cecil was the third Marquess of Salisbury and between 1885 and 1902 was three times British prime minister. What makes this

achievement even more impressive is the fact that for most of this period he was also the secretary for foreign affairs. He was the most successful and one of the most intellectual leaders of the Conservative Party in the nineteenth century. As premier he won three elections with overwhelming majorities.

During his lonely childhood there were few signs of Salisbury's potential brilliance. At Eton he was bullied so viciously that his father had to remove him when his health collapsed. His personality was marked by a deep sense of pessimism and fatalism (Roberts believed that this was brought on by clinical depression) and he contemplated with horror the concept of optimism which he regarded as 'essentially cowardly'. He was, however, self-confident, endearingly eccentric and blessed with a very good sense of humour. Premier of arguably the greatest power in the world at the time, he was a giant of a man with an enormous beard. He took his daily exercise on a huge tricycle, wearing a purple velvet poncho while cycling down The Mall in London.

Salisbury attended Oxford University which taught him what he liked – High Anglicanism, High Toryism and the political and social *status quo.* He was wary of attempts to extend the franchise as he feared that tyranny was the inevitable result of democracy. Salisbury's pessimistic view of humanity was deepened when his father tried to disinherit him for marrying Georgina Alderson, whose parents were solidly middle class. Apart from her social status the second Marquess was also unhappy with his new daughter-in-law's lack of wealth. This led to Salisbury being banned from Hatfield, the ancestral home, for seven years and forced him to earn a living as a journalist with the right-wing *Saturday Review.* His marriage was sublimely happy and his wife gradually lifted Salisbury out of his neurotic depression. He was also a loving and unconventional father who raised his children in a very relaxed atmosphere.

The death of his older brother, followed shortly afterwards by that of his father, meant that he inherited the Salisbury peerage and financial security. His new status as the Marquess of Salisbury led to his recruitment to Disraeli's cabinet in which he proved to be a highly capable minister as well as an effective politician. He was a powerful platform speaker and under his leadership the Conservative Party was built into an effective electoral machine. After fifteen years as a member of the house of commons he moved to the house of lords where he became the Conservative Party leader and the last prime minister to be a member of this chamber.

Salisbury was a cunning and ruthless political operator, especially when dealing with potential competitors. He used his nephew, Arthur Balfour, and Randolph Churchill to undermine and ridicule Sir Stafford Northcote, his rival for the leadership of the Conservative Party. As prime minister Salisbury was a firm believer in common sense and minimal state involvement in the way people ran their own lives. The essence of Salisbury's support for minimal legislation arose from his profound suspicion of any government's ability to do good. For him a successful government was one that did as little as possible. He also believed that the duty of statesmen was to provide good governance and to leave morality and upliftment to the Church.

Salisbury, however, was firmly committed to the expansion of the British Empire. He had an unsentimental view of the empire as the foundation of Britain's prosperity and power. For him the interests of Britain were always first and foremost. As he put it in blunt terms: 'If our ancestors had cared for the rights of other people the British empire would not have been made.' As an imperialist Salisbury did not subscribe to any master-race theory, and although he assumed that the British were superior to Africans and Asians, he considered it rude to say so. In addition he loathed jingoism, which he

saw as 'a large lunatic asylum at one's back'. At the same time he used it to expand the empire and to secure votes in elections.

A proud imperialist, Salisbury thought the British defeat at the Battle of Majuba on 27 February 1881, and the Pretoria Convention that gave the Transvaal some measure of independence under British suzerainty, a disgraceful capitulation to the Boers. Salisbury believed in the politics of prestige and the empire's humiliation left him with a strong desire for revenge. What made this defeat so galling was that he heartily despised Afrikaners. During a visit to the Cape Colony in 1851 he described them as in-bred, dishonest, brutal savages who were illiterate and stubborn slave drivers. Therefore he felt that the Uitlander issue was more than just the denial of franchise rights in the Transvaal. Roberts points out the irony that while Salisbury demanded political rights for the Uitlanders he introduced a tough Aliens Bill for Britain, with the intention of restricting the number of impoverished Polish and Russian Jews from entering Britain. This number of would-be immigrants was insignificant in comparison to the Uitlander influx into the Transvaal. But then Salisbury desired Britain's overall supremacy in southern Africa. This was something to which President Paul Kruger refused to accede. For Salisbury it was intolerable that the Transvaal should be allowed to grow in strength and become a greater threat to British paramountcy, especially if it was allowed to gain prestige by challenging the empire. If a puny state such as the Transvaal was allowed to twist the mighty British lion's tail, it would have negative global consequences.

Some historians have suggested that Salisbury was dragged into the South African War by Chamberlain and Milner, but this was not the case. Salisbury would have preferred to achieve supremacy by peaceful means, but if it took a war to erase the shame of Majuba, then so be it. For diplomatic reasons he hoped that the Boers would take the offensive first. In this he succeeded as the Boers presented Britain with an ultimatum. Roberts describes this ultimatum as one of the bravest, if most foolhardy, documents of the nineteenth century. Kruger played into Salisbury's hands. He had carefully manoeuvred the Boer republics into a position where Britain could act against them without any outside interference.

Contrary to British popular belief Boer resistance did not simply collapse. The war started with a series of humiliating defeats for Britain. The Boers, however, were mistaken if they expected Britain to give way as Gladstone had done in 1881. In Salisbury they had to deal with a very different type of politician, one for whom imperial prestige was a treasured asset. For his part, Salisbury underestimated the Boers' desire to retain their freedom. Even after the fall of the republican capitals the war continued unabated and the Boers adopted new guerrilla tactics.

Major sources of anxiety and frustration for Salisbury were the incompetence of the British generals, the obstinate Boer resistance and the rising cost of the war. He supported Britain's scorched-earth policy of razing farms and forcing Boer women and children into refugee camps. Boer resistance had to be crushed at all costs. He was not prepared to accept any compromise and made it clear in the house of lords that the war could only end if the republics accepted British supremacy.

The scorched-earth policy and concentration camps caused some unease in Britain. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, leader of the Liberal Party, accused the British army of applying methods of barbarism in South Africa and the tragic deaths of 20 000 Boer women and children and 12 000 blacks in the concentration camps. Roberts correctly argues that the high mortality in these camps was not the result of deliberate cruelty.

A comment on his analysis of the high death rate was published in *The Spectator* (2 October 1999) under the heading 'They brought it on themselves' in which em-

phasis was placed on the lack of Boer hygiene in the camps. This provocative and misleading headline (surely the brainchild of a sub-editor) attracted the attention of South African newspapers, but Roberts's sober and nuanced analysis avoids sensationalism. He emphasises that the Boers had a rudimentary understanding of modern science but makes it clear that there were numerous other reasons for the high death rate. The Royal Army Medical Corps had to cope with far more people than they had anticipated and could not treat all the sick people in the camps. In addition many Boer women and children arrived in the camps in a deplorable state of health. Starvation was aggravated by the shortage of supplies due to the Boer attacks on British lines and moreover, some camp sites were badly located.

Although there is much to commend Roberts's analysis of the camp deaths he does belabour the lack of Boer hygiene. It must be remembered that the death rate dropped drastically as the administration of the camps improved. This does not detract from Roberts's sympathetic but honest biography and he does not absolve Salisbury of any blame, concluding that he must bear the ultimate responsibility for what happened in the camps. Salisbury believed that any war was terrible and that the Boers should have thought of the consequences when they invaded Natal and the Cape.

In Salisbury's defence it must be stated that by 1899 he was sickly and tired. He intended to resign the moment the war ended, never expecting it to last as long. In 1899 his wife was seriously ill and Salisbury cared more for her than for politics, never truly recovering from her death in November 1899. The loss of Queen Victoria, to whom he was very close, in January 1901, was also a huge personal blow to him.

With the Boer surrender a weary Salisbury resigned as premier on 11 July 1902 and died a year later. The speed and ease with which his nephew Arthur Balfour inherited the premiership inspired the popular phrase 'Bob's your uncle'. Balfour's inheritance was, however, a ticking time bomb as Salisbury had left his nephew the war debt of a deeply divided party and an empire dangerously overstretched and isolated. The British statesmen of the first half of the twentieth century would find the empire a drain instead of a source of strength for Britain. In South Africa the war Salisbury had helped to orchestrate left a legacy of bitterness that poisoned local politics for generations.

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Kenneth S Rothwell, *A history of Shakespeare on screen: a century of film and television* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999), 308 pp, photographs, bibl, index. ISBN 0521 59404 9

Rothwell's project in providing a detailed chronology of the production of Shakespeare's works as 'moving images' is an ambitious one. Nevertheless, from its beginning in September 1899 with Dickson and Tree's production of excerpts from *King John* (p 1) to its conclusion with Branagh's lengthy *Hamlet* in 1996 (p 259) this book succeeds in presenting a comprehensive history of the celluloid presentations of Shakespearan themes.

Rothwell's approach throughout the text is to present specific productions in terms of individual directors. Thus the book consists, at one level, of a progression of renowned names in the history of cinema. Early twentieth-century innovators in placing Shakespeare on screen are given due space and this impressive list includes William Kennedy-Laurie Dickson, Sir Herbert Beerbohm (p 1) as well as those responsible for the electric developments demonstrated by the Kleine Optical Company (p 4) and John P Harris's unprecedented economic imput encoded in his 'nickelodeon' from 1907 (p 5). Progressing

through the first decades of the twentieth century, Rothwell moves, in his own words, with the cinema 'from nickelodeon to palace' (pp 20–27) and then highlights Mary Pickford's and Douglas Fairbanks's *The taming of the shrew* (1929), not, as is mistakenly believed, the first Shakespearan 'talkie' but clearly identifiable as the first *feature-length* talking Shakespeare movie (p 29, Rothwell's italics).

For Rothwell, the fourth and fifth decades of the Shakespearean century on film are dominated by the directorship of Laurence Olivier, whose influential war-contextualised *Henry V* of 1944, together with the post-war production of *Hamlet* in 1948 and *Richard III* in 1955, marked crucial turning-points in the history of screenplay and the general history of British cinema (pp 62–67). Included in the Olivier decades are the later productions of *Othello* (1965) and the television appearances in *The merchant of Venice* in 1969 and *King Lear* as recently as 1983 (pp 69–70). Rothwell concludes his pivotal third chapter by pointing out that 'on a 1998 British Film Institute list of 360 film classics released prior to 1981, only two Shakespeare movies were included and these were both directed by Olivier – *Henry V* and *Richard III* (p 71).

Rothwell then devotes a chapter to the directorship of Orson Welles, sub-titling this 'Shakespeare for the art houses' covering the important decade of the 1960s. A critical production here is Welles's *Falstaff,* made in 1966, which revolves around the Henriad scripts *(Richard II, Henry IV 1 and 2* and *Henry V)* taking as starting-point a quotation from *Henry IV, 2*, 'we have heard the chimes at midnight' (pp 194–219). Welles's contribution to cinema in 'Chimes' suggests Rothwell, is essentially a 'ransacking' of the subtext of the Henriad together with 'shards' from *The merry wives of Windsor* in which Falstaff as victim becomes a leading narrative thread. Rothwell concludes the chapter by noting that despite Welles's substantial contribution to Shakespearan cinema, he was, as director, unable to make a successful transition from 'art house to mall house' and this particular genre of screenplay was never part of the later twentieth century 'market commodity' scene (p 94).

The second part of this comprehensive text is modelled on the first part and, again, individual directors are highlighted as Shakespearan cinema moves from the medium of simple film to the sophisticated electronic web (pp 104–105). In this context, the 1970s were a decade of *angst*, dominated by Roman Polanski's blood-soaked *Macbeth*, released in 1971 (p 154). It is in this production that, for Rothwell, Shakespeare makes the final transition between the stage and modern mass communication and the boundaries between the original script and director's interpretation are permanently blurred (p 154). Polanksi's success in *Macbeth,* suggests Rothwell, lay in his substitution of Shakespearan text with a 'glittering array of visual and aural images. The soundtrack penetrates into the heart of the diegesis' (p 157). Polanksi's genius lay not in using Shakespeare, but in pointing the camera (p 160). Also included in the 1970s 'age of *angst*' is Charlton Heston's 1972 *Anthony and Cleopatra* which, in contrast to *Macbeth*, suggests Rothwell, defied stereotypes and refused to conform to a politically correct agenda (pp 163). Heston's production marked a renewal of Shakespearan cinema as it appropriated a new commitment to the original script (pp 163–4). In his next chapter, subtitled 'translation and expropriation', Rothwell continues this argument and examines screenplays produced in an international context (for instance the Russian-directed *Othello* in 1955) as well as alternative versions of Shakespeare which appeared in British cinema, for example Peter Greenaway's work on *The tempest*, presented as 'Prospero's Books' (pp 208–9). This chapter takes the debate into the 1980s as interpretations of Shakespeare moved to extreme comedy, often with little evidence of the original scripts (pp 228–9).

The 1990s are, for Rothwell, undoubtedly dominated by a single director, hence the subtitle of the final chapter, 'the age of Kenneth Branagh' (p 230). In his attempts to re-appropriate Shakespeare for a contemporary public, Branagh presents a 'shrewd merger of art and commerce' and, through these methods, 'resuscitated the Shakespeare movie just when everyone was announcing its death at the hands of television' (p 246). This can arguably be viewed as a series of acts of 'complicity with the agents of capitalist imperialism' as evidenced in the 1990 *Henry V* in which Branagh manages to produce an 'anti-war movie that also glorifies war' (pp 248–51). Rothwell's final comment on Shakepearan cinema is a criticism of Branagh's 1996 four-hour *Hamlet* in which 'stunt casting' distracts the audience from the main text and in which Branagh's Hamlet is nothing more than an 'hysterical student prince' (pp 254–58).

Rothwell ends his history by stating that he shares Peter Greenaway's belief that 'film is still in its infancy' (p 259). Nevertheless, this book is an extremely comprehensive account of the director's gaze behind the film camera and as such it fills a crucial gap in a wide range of disciplines including history, literature and media studies. Rothwell also provides a chronological list of film titles (pp 299–308) in addition to a a detailed filmography and index title which run to a 31-page appendix. These lists are invaluable to students, general readers and academic researchers of the themes contained in the main text.

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