Appendix

SELECTED SCENARIOS

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INTRODUCTION

We used scenarios throughout this study, both as analytic organizing constructs and as ways of framing our results. In this appendix, we present a much smaller set of nine future planning scenarios based upon the sum of the three regional analyses.

These nine scenarios do not represent fully the richness and diversity of the larger set used in the regional studies. Neither would we claim that this group spans the entire spectrum of possible—or even plausible—conflicts that the United States could confront over the next decade or two. Finally, they most assuredly do not constitute a best estimate of the most likely future contingencies.

Why, then, bother to produce and present these nine? There are, we believe, at least three reasons to do so:

- First, we found scenarios to be very useful in helping us understand the implications of our analysis. Scenarios are especially powerful for grappling with the "interaction terms" of the future security environment—the way various trends, factors, and events could intertwine to amplify or diminish one another or even to create a radically different situation from that which might be discernible from examining each element independently.
- The sheer number of scenarios developed by the regional studies could deter many readers from perusing them. This smaller set

is intended to postulate a wide range of interesting and important problems derived from that work but in a more digestible format.

- Finally, we believe that the nine cases found here, taken together, are a reasonable set to use as a screening tool for force planning. Force postures that appear robust across this set of scenarios will have passed a first test of their ability to cope with the multifaceted security challenges the United States could face in the next 15 to 20 years.[1]

The nine scenarios—which, again, were chosen to represent a cross-section of functional challenges rather than regional balance—describe:

- An opposed evacuation of United States and other Western citizens from a collapsing Egypt,
- The neutralization of nuclear weapons illicitly acquired by a rogue state (Algeria),
- An Iranian attack on Kuwait and Saudi Arabia,
- A clash between Greece and Turkey,
- Internal upheaval in Saudi Arabia,
- Russo-Ukrainian conflict,
- Large-scale humanitarian operations in a combat zone in the wake of an Indo-Pakistani nuclear exchange,
- Conflict between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan, and
- Unconventional Iranian aggression against Gulf Arab states.

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[1]Many other sets of scenarios could serve the same purpose; we make no claim as to the unique value of these nine except insofar as their basis in concrete and in-depth analysis of regional trends and dynamics gives them an especially firm claim to plausibility.

OPPOSED EVACUATION FROM A COLLAPSING EGYPT

Political-Military Context

Egypt is convulsed by internal instability, with the Egyptian government under siege from well-organized and well-financed anti-Western Islamic political groups. The government has not yet fallen, but political control has broken down, and there is a strong likelihood that the government will indeed collapse. There are large numbers of running battles between government forces and the opposition, with the level and frequency of violence steadily escalating.

U.S. citizens are being expressly targeted by the opposition, and many of the 17,000 or so Americans in Egypt—along with other Westerners—have taken refuge in the major urban areas. The Egyptian military has so far proved largely loyal to the government, but some troops—including army, air force, and naval units—have sided with the Islamic opposition, and the allegiances of many other elements are unclear. At least one crack armor brigade has joined the opposition en masse and is operating in the Cairo area. Security at airports and seaports is breaking down, with antigovernment elements in control of some. Opposition leaders have indicated that they will oppose any attempt to evacuate Western citizens with "all available means and the assured assistance of Allah."[2]

U.S. Objectives

Approximately 17,000 to 20,000 U.S., other Western, and friendly Egyptian personnel are now in direct danger as the host government nears collapse. These people are in need of rapid (48–96 hours) evacuation and rescue.

U.S. military objectives are to

- secure necessary aerial and seaports of embarkation to support evacuation operations,
- establish and secure collection points for evacuees,

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[2]An interesting variant of this scenario might involve a similar situation developing farther from salt water, thus making the use of naval forces somewhat more problematic.

- provide secure air and/or land transportation for evacuees from collection points to points of departure,
- deploy sufficient forces to overcome all plausible resistance, and
- limit damage to relations with existing—and perhaps surviving—government and avoid prematurely prejudicing U.S. relations with a future Egyptian leadership.

Constraints

The evacuees are widely dispersed in heavily populated areas. Strict rules of engagement (fire only when directly threatened) must be maintained to avoid unnecessary conflict with Egyptian forces and minimize casualties to Egyptian civilians. The Egyptian government's operations against the rebels present major uncertainties in determining the friendly or hostile status of host-nation forces at the lowest levels (individual aircraft, ships, air-defense batteries, and ground-force units from platoon size up). The aerial and seaports of debarkation are not secured. Basing access is available only in Israel and Turkey.[3]

NEUTRALIZATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ALGERIA

Political-Military Context

Despite the efforts of the Islamabad government and various U.S. national agencies, several (two to five) nuclear weapons were successfully smuggled out of a disintegrating Pakistan. Intelligence reports that approximately 12 hours ago, these weapons were delivered—disassembled—to a remote Algerian air base near the city of Tamanrasset and immediately transferred to a well-defended storage facility in the rugged foothills around Mt. Tahat. It is believed that the weapons could be operational and under control of the radical fundamentalist government in Algiers in five to seven days.

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[3]A potentially interesting variant would deny access to Turkish bases for anything except transit stops for civil aircraft evacuating civilians from Egypt.

U.S. Objectives

The U.S. National Command Authorities (NCA) have ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to conduct operations as soon as possible to

- seize and extract all nuclear weapons and/or weapons components from Algeria to friendly territory, and
- defeat Algerian forces as needed to accomplish this goal.

The Algerian air force is expected to contest any violation of national air space. The weapon storage sites are defended by armored units up to brigade size along with advanced radar- and infrared-guided surface-to-air missiles.

Constraints

A high level of operations security must be held until the operation is under way. It is necessary to operate with limited basing and support within the area of responsibility. Operations can be mounted from a carrier battle group in the western Mediterranean and from the United Kingdom.[4] Weapons and components are stored in deep underground hardened facilities. The use of nuclear weapons is not permitted. Operations should be as limited in size and scope as possible to decrease potential adverse political-military responses by other regional powers.

IRAN VERSUS THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL, 2010

Political-Military Context

Iran, determined to reassert its role as the dominant power in the region, directs its ongoing military buildup toward achieving a credible power-projection capability against its trans-Gulf neighbors, by restructuring its forces into a smaller, more professional military. By the second decade of the 21st century, these efforts have resulted in a force with considerable amphibious, airborne, and air-mobile ca-

[4] A variant would allow access to the United Kingdom and Corsica.

pabilities against the Gulf Arab states. With Russian and Chinese help, Iran also completes development of nuclear weapons and has a small arsenal of warheads, which it can deliver via ballistic missile against virtually any capital in the region.

In 2010, internal upheavals in Saudi Arabia and several smaller Gulf Cooperation Council states present Tehran with the opportunity to exercise its muscle. In a series of rapid moves, Iranian marines attack and secure the Ras Tanura port, and air-mobile forces leap inland to establish an airhead at Dhahran, into which infantry forces begin flowing. Smaller amphibious operations take control of Bahrain and parts of Qatar. Multiple Iranian heavy divisions drive through Shi'ite-controlled territory in the southern part of a divided Iraq and into Kuwait; their objective is to link up with the forces further south in Saudi Arabia.

Iranian submarines and missile boats have sortied into the gulfs of Arabia and Oman, laying mines, patrolling, and essentially taking control of the Strait of Hormuz. Land-based launchers for supersonic, sea-skimming antiship missiles are deployed along the Iranian coast and on several islands near the strait, and long-range strike aircraft, equipped with similar missiles, are reported on alert. Iran also has an inventory of hundreds of advanced naval mines and thousands of older models.

Iran's arsenal of several hundred medium-range ballistic missiles and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs)—some dozen of which are equipped with nuclear warheads and many others with chemical payloads—is dispersing or has been deployed into protected caves.

U.S. Objectives

The U.S. NCA have ordered the JCS to conduct operations as soon as possible to

- defend Kuwaiti and Saudi territory,
- halt attacking Iranian forces and eject them from occupied territory, including that of Bahrain and Qatar,

- deter Iranian use of NBC weapons and eliminate Iranian NBC capabilities, including production and development,
- open the Strait of Hormuz,
- evict Iranian forces from Saudi oil facilities and minimize damage to those facilities, and
- help stabilize the friendly Saudi government.

Constraints

U.S. forces face limited access to the region. On the peninsula itself, only a handful of Saudi and Omani bases are considered sufficiently secure for sustained operations. Limited forward basing is available in Kuwait. Diego Garcia is available, and support operations can be undertaken from Egypt.[5]

GREECE AND TURKEY CLASH

Political-Military Context

By the early 21st century, tension between Greece and Turkey will have been a fixture of the strategic environment in the eastern Mediterranean for more than 200 years. Indeed, the revival of regional competition in the Balkans has provided new flash points in the relationship between Athens and Ankara.

In 2003, a crisis arises over the alleged mistreatment of Turks in Greek Thrace. As friction—including several minor border skirmishes that flare when small groups of refugees attempt to flee from Greece to Turkey—increases, the two countries conduct simultaneous and overlapping exercises in the Aegean and begin reinforcing the border regions. Several incidents in and over the Aegean—surface-to-air and surface-to-surface targeting radars locking on to aircraft and ships; a Greek and Turkish frigate suffering a minor colli-

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[5] An interesting variant would permit combat and support operations out of Israel. For a discussion of the potential value of access to Israeli facilities across a range of Persian Gulf contingencies, please see Zalmay Khalilzad, David Shlapak, and Daniel L. Byman, *The Implications of the Possible End of the Arab-Israeli Conflict for Gulf Security*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-822-AF, 1997.

sion while playing "chicken"—further increase anxieties and animosities. Finally, a major demonstration by ethnic Turks in Greek Thrace turns into a riot, and Greek paramilitary troops intervene, firing into crowds and killing several dozen Turks.

Denouncing the "genocidal policies of the Greek government," Turkey responds by launching a sudden but limited thrust across the border into Thrace aimed at seizing key centers in which the Turkish population resides—in essence establishing a protected safe haven. Greek forces try to hold this invasion at the border, and Athens declares a 12-mile territorial-waters zone in the Aegean, effectively closing Turkish access to the Aegean. The Greek air force attacks Izmir and other Turkish cities, and the two countries also clash in and over the Aegean.

Objectives

The U.S. NCA have ordered the JCS to conduct operations as soon as possible to

- protect U.S. forces in the region from attack by either combatant,
- protect the lives of U.S. citizens in the two countries,
- limit escalation in the immediate term, and
- terminate the conflict and restore the prewar territorial status quo in Thrace and the Aegean.

Constraints

Basing for U.S. forces is obviously not available in either Greece or Turkey. Indeed, forces already in the region—at Incirlik and on Crete, for example—may need to be withdrawn or protected. Basing is available in Italy, Israel, and Egypt. Nonlethal or minimally destructive means of neutralizing military facilities and systems will be especially useful.

INTERNAL UPHEAVAL IN SAUDI ARABIA

Political-Military Context

In 2005, the central leadership of the Al Saud is being wracked by a host of internal challenges to their rule over the Kingdom. A series of rapid successions to the throne (three kings in the decade following the death of Fahd), each accompanied by internal power struggles and positioning, has substantially weakened family solidarity and, with it, the effectiveness of rule over the Kingdom.

This weakening contributed to the propagation of a number of fissures within Saudi Arabia. First and perhaps foremost, the slipping grip of the Al Saud permitted the survival and expansion of a younger generation of extremely conservative religious leaders who have come to reject openly and forcefully the traditional alliance of the religious authorities with the Al Saud, citing the royal family's corruption, mismanagement of the kingdom's affairs, and subservience to the United States. Through an extensive internal network built up through local mosques, they use popular pressure in an effort to compel the older religious establishment 'Ulema to break with the Al Saud, delegitimizing the monarchy's principal basis for rule. Other strata of Saudi society, including much of the business and academic communities, are equally frustrated with the growing ineffectiveness of the Al Saud in running the country.

The minority Shi'a population, concentrated in the oil-rich Eastern Province around Qatif, is increasingly restive as well. The Shi'a see opportunities to pressure for greater local authority and rights as the Al Saud struggles, but also fear the consequences to themselves of a conservative Sunni-Wahhabi success against the Al Saud. Their response to these twin threats is to organize and coordinate their political activities while expanding contacts with outside patrons, an activity that is far more possible now in the wake of a growing breakdown in Saudi internal security.

Events escalate as the opposition religious figures stage large demonstrations, often coordinated at several locations throughout the Kingdom. Efforts by internal security forces to quell the demonstrations prove ineffective. The National Guard is called in, resulting in a mix of poor crowd control and high civilian casualties. The Shi'a sectors of the Eastern Province are especially hard hit by the Guard in

a preemptive effort to suppress any "subversive" activity there, resulting in hundreds of deaths. Elsewhere, several mosques used by demonstrators for refuge are attacked. These attacks are widely publicized by the opposition, along with reports that U.S. military advisors are now directing Guard activities.

Rioting breaks out in several additional cities spanning over half a dozen Saudi provinces. Well-known businesses and residences of Saudi royals are targeted, along with American commercial interests. The establishment 'Ulema, breaking with their traditional support for the Al Saud, issue a public decree demanding that the king cease all violence against his subjects. National Guard forces now appear fragmented and paralyzed as reports of civil violence mount, word of the 'Ulema decree spreads among its ranks, and instructions from Riyadh become confused and contradictory.

The Shi'a take this opening to organize against any further attack and position themselves in the turbulent political environment. Breaking out arms caches, including stockpiles of Iranian origin, they begin to seize control of key oil installations from Western and Saudi management personnel in an effort to, in effect, hold them hostage. The Shi'a also move to gain control of key port and other facilities at Ad Dammam. Many non-Western expatriate laborers, resentful of past Saudi treatment, cooperate actively and passively in these efforts. Western Aramco personnel are encouraged by Shi'a leaders to leave or "face the consequences of supporting the corrupt and criminal regime." Street executions of Saudi management personnel are reported.

The Saudi Arabian Land Forces, Royal Saudi Air Force, Air Defense Force, and Royal Navy are still abiding by previous orders from their commanders to remain in a stand-down posture. However, the royals of the officer corps are becoming increasingly fearful of events and are pressuring Riyadh to take decisive military action. The attitudes of the rank and file are far less clear. Splits are apparently emerging from within the ruling elite over how best to restore order, resulting in further paralysis of decisionmaking in Riyadh.

Senior members of the Saudi General Staff have been in contact with their American military counterparts. The Saudis have expressed grave concerns that the situation is getting dangerously close to

chaos and that the military must move now to restore order. They are prepared to act but confide that they will not be able to restore order throughout the entire country quickly. They request both U.S. political support in the undertaking and U.S. military assistance in the oil sectors of the Eastern Province, in recognition of their own limited capability to restore order there without risking severe damage to the facilities and high casualties to the remaining foreign workers. The Saudis also express concern that Iraq and Iran may well seek to take advantage of the current situation and argue that a U.S. presence in the north would deter this until the Saudi military restores order.

U.S. intelligence reports that Iran appears to be redeploying some air and missile forces, and increased Iranian naval activity is reported in the Gulf. Tehran, meanwhile, is warning that it would view any "outside interference" in Saudi affairs as a "grave provocation to the Islamic Republic" and has threatened Riyadh with "grave consequences" if it escalates its use of military force against the Shi'a.

U.S. Objectives

The U.S. NCA have ordered the JCS to conduct operations as soon as possible to

- protect the lives and property of U.S. citizens in Saudi Arabia,
- deter or defeat any outside intervention in Saudi Arabia,
- assist Saudi authorities in protecting key economic and military installations, including oil facilities, ports, and air bases.

Constraints

Basing in Saudi Arabia is obviously highly problematic at this time. Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman have all concluded that any direct military cooperation with the United States under these circumstances would be impossible for them politically, as have Egypt and Jordan. Turkey is willing to host only support forces, not combat units. European leaders are adopting a "wait-and-see" attitude and will not support military action at this time.

Only Kuwait has come forward to offer full access to its bases and facilities.

Israel concludes that its strategic relations with neighboring Arab leaders would be directly jeopardized by visible military cooperation with the United States, although it is not opposed to U.S. military efforts to stabilize the situation in Saudi. Israel also expresses its concern over the disposition of Saudi high-performance fighters and the Saudi stockpile of long-range missiles and informs Washington that it cannot rule out strikes against these offensive threats to Israel in the event the Al Saud appears ready to collapse and be replaced by a more hostile regime.

WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

Political-Military Context

Russia has evolved toward its own variant of semiauthoritarian rule based on a strong president and market capitalism dominated by huge quasi-monopolist firms in key sectors. Fears of encirclement by hostile powers—aggravated by NATO's expansion to include Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia in 1999 and continued talk in the West about admitting the Baltic states and Ukraine to the alliance—are a growing source of pressure in Moscow's decisionmaking.

By 2005, Ukraine has made substantial progress toward building a bona fide state and a viable national economy, but the country remains poor by European standards and critically vulnerable to Russian pressure from a variety of sources, including critical dependence on Russian energy supplies, extensive Russian ownership in key economic sectors, penetration of Ukrainian offices by Russian intelligence, and dependence on Russian suppliers for arms and spare parts.

NATO has been weakened by the effects of enlargement and disputes among its members on a variety of issues, including containing Chinese expansion in Asia and deterring Iranian adventurism in the Gulf. Western Europe has established an energy community with Russia, from which it obtains an increasing share of its oil and natural gas.

Partly in response to rising unemployment linked to a worldwide recession and what is seen as a worsening international climate, an anti-Western nationalist candidate is elected Russian president in 2005. In Ukraine, the cyclical effects of the recession and the longer-term structural shifts in the economy are placing increasing strains on national unity. Western Ukraine remains strongly anti-Russian, a trend that has been reinforced by the increasing movement of labor back and forth across the borders with Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia and the development of low-wage but profitable factories in western Ukraine that subcontract to German-owned firms across the border. The eastern parts of the country, meanwhile, have stronger cultural and economic ties to Russia, and many there feel that they are being left behind as the western parts of the country exploit their European connections to grow relatively wealthier.

These strains increase to the point where regional authorities and groups in eastern Ukraine and the Crimea call for secession and union with Russia. These pro-Russian elements are small but both vocal and violence prone, and their calls are picked up by nationalists in Russia. The status of Crimea and Russian access to the naval base at Sebastopol become particularly emotional issues, given rising tension between Russia and Turkey and growing fear in Moscow of an alleged alignment between Ukraine and Turkey against Russia.

Within Ukraine, response to the secessionists is confused. Some favor permitting or even encouraging a split, which would enable the rump Ukraine to join its destiny to Western Europe more fully; others take a harder line on retaining unity. The result is policy paralysis and the sending of confused signals to Russia and the outside world. It is reported that Russia is providing support to secessionist terror groups, which have attacked a number of Ukrainian military and economic targets.

Ukrainian demonstrations—both for and against secession—quickly turn violent. Using loyal troops mainly from the western part of the country, Kiev attempts a major crackdown on secessionist forces in the east. Hundreds of pro-Russian demonstrators are killed and the conflict appears on the verge of escalating into a civil war.

Reaction from Moscow is swift: The nationalist Russian government announces that it has no choice but to occupy eastern areas of

Ukraine and the Crimea to restore order, protect the lives and property of ethnic Russians, and stop attacks on Russian-owned pipelines and other economic assets. When rioting and violence continue, Russia moves into Ukraine with its Immediate Reaction Forces—some half-dozen well-trained, highly mobile divisions. Russian air strikes neutralize much of the Ukrainian air force on the ground and begin attacking key Ukrainian military targets, although Kiev is spared in the initial onslaught.

Ukraine formally appeals to NATO, the United States, and the EU for help. U.S. intelligence indicates that, in addition to the Immediate Reaction Forces, Russia has deployed an additional 12 to 15 divisions, which could be in action within 10 to 14 days. Several hundred combat aircraft are forward deploying from around Moscow to reinforce the units already in the western sectors of the country.

U.S. Objectives

The U.S. NCA order the JCS to prepare to execute operations aimed at

- deterring further Russian aggression,
- restoring the territorial status quo, and
- having accomplished this, preventing the outbreak of a major civil war in Ukraine.

Constraints

EU and NATO response to the crisis has been tepid at best. The German government blames Ukraine for setting off the confrontation; privately, it regards partition of Ukraine as essentially a fait accompli that the West must accept and manage. The remainder of Western Europe appears inclined to follow Germany's lead. Within pre-1999 NATO, only the United States, Great Britain, and Turkey are urging a forceful military response.

Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary have also called for a strong Western response to defend Ukraine against Russian aggression. However, Warsaw in particular makes clear that its support is

contingent upon broad alliance support involving Germany and other European allies, as well as the United States; Poland does not want to stand alone as a forward U.S. base in a Russo-American war. There is a possibility, however, that a strong and forceful U.S. response could rally Poland.

LARGE-SCALE HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN A NUCLEAR COMBAT ZONE IN SOUTH ASIA

Political-Military Context

By 2005, the insurgency in Indian Kashmir has become unmanageable. Despite the best efforts of the Indian government, the insurgency has begun to spread into Punjab. Recognizing that it has been left behind in its conventional military competition with India, Pakistan sees these revolts as an indirect way of weakening its great rival and increases its material and diplomatic support, including training and sanctuary, to both insurgencies.

By early the following year, Pakistan's involvement—never precisely subtle to begin with—becomes highly visible when two Pakistani soldiers, acting as trainers for Kashmiri insurgents, are captured in an Indian commando raid on a rebel-controlled village. India warns Pakistan to desist from supporting the insurgencies and threatens dire consequences. Pakistan initiates diplomatic efforts to isolate India while increasing levels of covert support to the insurgents.

In the spring of 2006, India dramatically increases its counterinsurgency operations in both Kashmir and Punjab, and the rebels are pushed into precipitate retreat. Pakistan responds by infiltrating a number of special-forces teams, which attack military installations supporting the Indian operations. India mobilizes for war and launches major attacks all along the international border, accompanied by an intense air campaign. The Indian Army makes significant penetrations in the desert sector and achieves a more limited advance in Punjab, capturing Lahore and heading north toward Rawalpindi and Islamabad. A supporting attack from Kashmir is poised to go at the proper moment. Conventional missile and air strikes have done extensive damage to Pakistani military infrastructure, while India's air bases, in particular, have been hard hit by the Pakistanis.

The Pakistani military is not fully prepared for the magnitude and ferocity of the Indian offensive and suffers major setbacks. The air force is mauled in its initial engagements with the Indians, and the army's Strike Corps and the Headquarters Reserve are under extreme pressure on the desert front. Fearful that the Indians will use their emerging air superiority to locate and destroy the Pakistani nuclear arsenal and perceiving their military situation as desperate, Islamabad demands that India cease all offensive operations and withdraw from occupied Pakistani territory "or face utter destruction." India presses its conventional attacks while announcing that while it would not "initiate the escalation of the conflict," it would "surely respond in an appropriate and devastating manner" to any Pakistani gambit.

As Indian forces continue to press forward, Pakistan detonates a small fission bomb on an Indian armored formation in an unpopulated area of the desert border region; it is unclear whether the weapon was intended to go off over Pakistani or Indian territory. India responds by destroying a Pakistani air base with a two-weapon nuclear attack. Condemning the "escalation" to homeland attacks, Pakistan attacks the Indian city of Jodhpur with a 20-kiloton (kt) weapon and demands cessation of hostilities. India strikes Hyderabad with a weapon assessed to be 200 kt and threatens "ten times" more destruction if any more nuclear weapons are used. Pakistan offers a cease-fire in place.

Meanwhile, pictures and descriptions of the devastation in Jodhpur and Hyderabad are broadcast worldwide, and Internet jockeys—playing the role ham radio operators often have in other disasters—transmit horrifying descriptions of the suffering of the civilian victims on both sides. The United Nations immediately endorses a massive relief effort, which only the United States—with its airlift fleet and rapidly deployable logistics capability—can lead.

Within 48 hours—after the cease-fire has been accepted by India but before it is firmly in place—the advance echelons of multinational, but predominantly American, relief forces begin arriving in India and Pakistan. Several Islamicist groups in Pakistan announce their opposition to the "Western imperial occupation" and warn of unspecified actions to drive them out of the country.

U.S. Objectives

The U.S. NCA have instructed the JCS to conduct operations to

- support the urgent provision of all necessary humanitarian relief to civilians in Jodhpur and Hyderabad,
- evacuate all U.S. civilians from both India and Pakistan,[6] and
- ensure that relief forces are protected in the event of any resumption of hostilities.

Constraints

The war has rendered many air bases in both India and Pakistan only marginally usable for airlift operations. U.S. citizens are scattered throughout both countries, and the host governments' attitudes toward their evacuation are not known. The cease-fire must be assumed as likely to collapse at any moment. The U.S. president has assured the nation in a broadcast address that only the "smallest practical number" of troops will be deployed on the ground in either India or Pakistan.

CONFLICT BETWEEN THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND TAIWAN

Political-Military Context

Mainland China's military power continues to grow through the first decade of the 21st century. By 2010, Beijing deploys forces that are considerably smaller, but much more modern, than those it fielded in the 1990s. China's navy was a particular beneficiary of budgetary largesse, with its amphibious capability being enhanced in particular. Other power-projection forces—including airborne and air-mobile army units, longer-range air forces, and ballistic and cruise missiles—also saw great improvements at the expense of traditional army divisions. China established itself as a global leader in developing and introducing directed-energy weapons.

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[6]This could degenerate into a variation of the first scenario above, the opposed evacuation from Egypt.

During this period, meanwhile, Taiwan's domestic political process has generated steadily increasing pressures for greater international recognition and a clearer domestic expression of de facto independence from Beijing. Taiwan's highly popular president, leading a largely pro-independence political coalition, continues to chip away at the legal fiction of "one China" in a variety of ways, without actually declaring independence.

Beijing reacts predictably, conducting "saber-rattling" exercises and hurling threats at the Taipei government and its "American puppeteers." In the face of ever-growing pro-independence sentiments on Taiwan and growing ties between the Taipei regime and the outside world—including what many commentators view as "virtual recognition" of Taiwan by Washington—Beijing decides in 2010 that it can tolerate the situation no longer. The Chinese military is instructed to compel Taiwan's acceptance of Beijing's terms for reunification, if necessary by invading the island outright.

The scenario begins as China deploys large naval forces into the Taiwan Strait and announces a total air and sea "quarantine" of the island to "prevent the introduction of nuclear-weapon components" that Beijing claims to have evidence are en route. Amphibious and airborne forces are used to seize, in *coup de main* fashion, several off-shore islands in the strait. The Chinese and Taiwanese air forces clash over the strait, and several aircraft are lost on both sides.

U.S. intelligence reports that large amphibious forces are loading in several ports in Fujian province, and elements of the 15th Airborne Army are prepared to go into action within 24 hours. Several dozen fighter and fighter-bomber regiments, including many of China's most modern aircraft, either have forward-deployed into Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong provinces or are preparing to move.

Taiwan announces full mobilization and asks the United States for direct assistance in repelling "Communist aggression." China warns Taiwan to stand down and declares its intent to resist "with all possible means" any "outside intervention in internal Chinese affairs."

U.S. OBJECTIVES

The U.S. NCA have ordered the JCS to

- deter or defeat any Chinese aggression against Taiwan,
- protect the lives of U.S. citizens in Taiwan, and
- prevent the use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons by any party to the conflict.

Constraints

Tokyo has informed the U.S. government that it will allow no combat operations against Chinese territory or against Chinese forces in international waters or airspace to be mounted from its territory. The Philippines will permit only noncombat operations.

UNCONVENTIONAL IRANIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST GULF ARAB STATES

Political-Military Context

Iran's internal political divisions continue between the ideologically driven religious authorities and the more pragmatic "realists," leading to an increasingly weakened Iranian state. Internally its economy continues to decline, with its ability to draw in foreign Western capital and expertise extremely limited. On the foreign-policy front, Iran continues to advocate many ideologically driven policies that are anti-U.S. and/or anti-Western in their orientation. Within the Gulf, Iran continues to have frictions with its neighbors, predominantly over their continued close cooperation with the United States and the consequences for Iran.

Russian and Chinese attitudes toward the Islamic Republic have been mixed. Neither has adopted the hard line of the United States—both have sold weaponry to Iran—but they have not cultivated a close relationship.

The decade-long uninterrupted flow of relatively inexpensive oil from the region has further weakened Iran's position, both in terms of revenue generated and its seeming inability or unwillingness to di-

rectly challenge this situation. From Tehran's perspective, the Arabian peninsula states of the upper Gulf (most notably Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) have been conducting economic and political warfare against Iran underneath the umbrella of U.S. military power. The United States has in turn used its regional military power and security guarantees to ensure that the oil-producing states of the Arab Gulf adopt political and pricing policies designed ultimately to cripple Iran. Iraq, victim to the same strategy, has for the last several years been forced to comply with the pricing policies of the lower Gulf states, given its weakened condition and need for further rehabilitation.

While Iraq thus poses little immediate military threat to Iran, Tehran finds itself in an increasingly desperate internal and external situation that propels it to take extreme risks to alter these realities. It therefore decides to induce shock into the existing system by destroying or damaging as many commercial oil and gas facilities, shipping, and other high-value assets as it can inside the Gulf in an extremely intense but brief surprise strike.

This strike would be waged principally by aircraft, short-range surface-to-surface missiles, cruise missiles, and naval raiding parties. The strike would also include use of Iran's small submarine force against surface shipping. Military targets and engagements are avoided as much as possible in an effort to minimize initial losses when striking commercial assets. Extensive clandestine reconnaissance is conducted in advance to determine the disposition of American and other Western naval and land-based air forces inside and near the Gulf (and to time the campaign so that no carriers are in the Gulf or on station nearby) and to establish the precise locations of all anticipated commercial targets. Actual military preparations will be designed to mimic normal "background" as much as possible in the run-up to the strike and will take place against the general political backdrop of long-term tensions. The strike campaign is designed for a duration of 24 to 36 hours—long enough to inflict substantial damage but short enough to be completed before major U.S. defensive and offensive force can be brought to bear. The strike will be launched from the Iranian homeland and from a number of missile sites located on the islands of Abu Musa, Qeshm, Forur, and Sirri. In an effort to further concentrate its efforts (and perhaps sow divi-

sion within the Gulf Cooperation Council), all Omani territory and offshore facilities are excluded from attack.

Following the strike campaign, all aircraft will be dispersed throughout Iran, fixed missile sites used for strikes abandoned, and naval forces dispersed as much as possible, including to inland waterways, where feasible. Ground and civil defense forces will be put on alert to defend against anticipated air attack and to ensure effective crowd control in major population areas.

Iran's relatively large inventory of medium-range ballistic missiles will not be used in the initial strike but will be widely dispersed aboard land transports. The Iranian operational plan is to use these weapons only if necessary to wage a "war of the cities," targeting capitals and other major metropolitan areas throughout the peninsula. Like the strike in the Gulf, the attacks, if launched, would be massed and concentrated in time to maximize destruction and minimize the U.S. ability to interdict or defend against them.

Iran has a known chemical and biological weapon capability, including known tests of ballistic missile delivery. Tehran's nuclear arsenal is small, if it exists at all.

The scenario begins in 2005 when U.S. intelligence detects the final preparations for the shock campaign about 12 to 24 hours before it begins.

U.S. Objectives

U.S. NCA direct the JCS to

- defend against impending attack to minimize damage to commercial assets,
- protect heavily populated areas on the peninsula against the mobile ballistic missile threat, and
- develop options to eliminate remaining Iranian offensive capabilities.

Constraints

The primary constraint in this crisis is, obviously, time. Additionally, all European countries, including Turkey, deny transit during the brief crisis phase; Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Kuwait grant full access. Saudi Arabia grants U.S. airspace access for transit of U.S. forces to "exercise" in Kuwait, but no combat deployments are allowed into the kingdom for fear of provoking an attack that Riyadh is desperately trying to avoid.