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Thin Red Line: British Empire Rifles & Carbines, Ian D. Skennerton, Ian Skennerton Publishing - Arms & Militaria Press, 0949749907, 9780949749901, . .

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The SPIRIT of the OLD WEST is a website for those who answer the call of the OLD WEST! People interested in the history and artifacts of the Fur Trade, Civil War, Indian Wars, Cowboy and Native art and collectibles, shows, shooting, re-enactments, cool gear and looking good. For people who live, or like to travel in the old west, and who enjoy the western landscape and its wildlife. Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness!

Items of Interest to single shot rifle and cast bullet shooters from over forty arms magazines and journals, as the announcements appeared in past issues of The Single Shot Rifle Journal. This Gleanings list primarily is a bibliography of information for members' research endeavors, from publications whose interest it is also to make such information available.

"Disassembly/Reassembly of the Browning Model 1885 High Wall" Chick Blood, 4 pp. Finally someone addresses this problem, in American Gunsmith, June, 2004. Also available from the Archives for another \$10 ppd: a 10-pp. photocopy of the Browning Field Service Manual B-78, essentially the same action as the 1885.

"The Nepal Martinis" Ross Seyfried, 11 pp. in Rifle No. 215, and "Treasures of Nepal" Garry James, 7 pp. in the August American Rifleman. Descriptions of Martinis, muskets, artillery and unmarked Sharps 1853 slant breech rifles discovered in Nepal. An ad in the same issue of The American Rifleman offers them for sale by Atlanta Cutlery in Conyers, GA, (800) 883-0300, but they're not cheap.

"Martini-Henry Disassembly" 2-pp. illustrated reply to a letter-to-the-editor (Stuart Mowbray in Man at Arms, Vol. 26 No. 1, 2004) of how to clean off the cosmoline and dis-reassemble a large frame Martini Henry rifle. Mowbray's editorials always are worth reading, and in this issue it's the problem of who's holding the bag for your rifle stolen a century ago by somebody who's now dead. And those war trophies and Japanese swords now claimed by original owners.

"Holland & Holland Paradox, A reloading miracle" Ross Seyfried, 8 pp. of how to shoot a 750 gr. bullet in a paradox thin walled shotgun with rifled muzzle without bursting the barrels and get 5" groups at 100 yards. (The bullet is .001" smaller than the bore, so that there's minimal friction.) In Handloader No. 227.

"A Schmidt Ruben Sporter" Norm and Rocky Chandler, 7-pp. how-to-do-it conversion of the Swiss rifle; maybe the first such article in the literature, in May Accurate Rifle. An ancillary article, "Swiss

Precision", by Lawrence Rivard is a 7-pp. article in April Precision Shooting about getting the Schmidt Rubin to shoot accurately.

The October issue of Muzzle Blasts contains a 4-pp. description of leaving Pyrodex or black powder charge with patched ball in a muzzleloader for a year. The unburned powder corrodes the bore from hygroscopic absorption, but more severe corrosion around the patched ball leaves it almost impossible to dislodge, and an attempt to blow it out by igniting the charge would likely burst the barrel. Don't do it.

"Methods and Materials Necessary for Small-Scale Casting of Gun Mountings within a Historical Context" Eric Kettenburg, Part 1, General Considerations and Historical Context, 4 pp. in Muzzle Blasts, April, 2002; Part 2, Equipment, Materials and Preparation in May issue. Part 3 to follow. Deals with sand casting.

Concerns with the H&R 1873 Springfield Carbine. The answer to a query in the January issue of the American Gunsmith maintains that the Harrington & Richardson trapdoor carbines have soft receivers that stretch and loosen hinge pins, rendering the angle on the locking cam ineffective so that the actions pop open after repeated firing. Pedersoli reproduction parts imported by Navy Arms do not interchange with these. Original Cavely Trapdoors fired only a .45-55 cartridge anyway, so that the .45-70 is an overload. On the other hand:

"Pedersoli's Model 1873 Springfield" by David Anthony in the Jan-Feb issue of The Australian Sportsman is a 3-pp. article in praise of the reproduction trapdoor rifle and that the Pedersoli is "... made of much better steels and modern brass, far superior in quality than that used in the 1870s and '80s." However he doesn't say how he knows that to be true.

"Etching Firearms Marking" by Roger Ferrell, 3 pp. in the winter, 2002 (Issue No.97) of Gunmaker, journal of the American Custom Gunmakers Guild. It describes the marking of calibers on barrels or the restoration of original stampings on firearms by electrolysis, using a voltage transformer and stencils, both available from Marking Methods in Alhambra, CA. Etching eliminates the drawbacks of hammer stampings, but the transformer costs \$550 and reusable stencils about \$10 each. Couldn't someone devise a less expensive transformer of 110 V AC to whatever voltage DC?

"The Gunsmith Has a Friend in Washington, DC?" by Chick Blood is a 4-pp. article in February American Gunsmith on the procurement and use of patent drawings for repairing or making parts for little known firearms. Drawings are available for \$3 each from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 2011 Jefferson Davis Highway, Washington, DC 20231, (703) 308-0595, with checks made out to Commissioner, Patents and Trademarks. You must submit the patent number. Without that number the Patent Office can do a search, but depending on how long that takes, the cost can be considerably more.

"Determining Screw Pitch". A note in Brownell's Gunsmiths Newsletter from James Speicher's Custom Gunshop in Wabash, IN: "Years ago an old-time gunsmith showed me this trick to determine the pitch of the threads in a screw hole. Just take a piece of wood dowel, taper it and turn it into the screw hole. Remove the now threaded dowel and measure the pitch with a screw gauge."

"Stangenspargel" (Lance asparagus) David Schiller, describes a most unusual French "Mousqueton Modele 1854" 9 mm breechloader, wherein the vertical dropping breechblock secures a rimfire cartridge ignited by a hook-shaped vertical striker (apparently with a cam at its top) powered by the trigger guard as mainspring. The French used it as parade arm with 46-inch bayonet. Two specimens exist in European museums. If you can figure this out any better than I, you'll need to see the 5-pp. article, from February Visier. Most of it deals with French history.

"You CAN Do Something" Eric Value, 3-pp account of a buyer's legal ordeal in getting his money back for an altered sword from William Fagen of Clinton, Michigan. The lawsuit was successful, but a \$4750 sword cost the seller almost ten times that in legal fees. Did you know that a 5-day return policy means that the item must be back in the hands of the seller in five days, even if three of those

are on a holiday weekend? In the June issue of The Gun Report.

"A Prototype Colt Laidley Rifle - Death of a Salesman" Edward A. Hull, 3-pp. addendum to this rolling block rifle's story published in the December, 1967 The Gun Report. 52 rifles were made for Russian consideration and then the patent was bought by Eli Whitney for production of the Whitney-Laidley rifle. This article is in the March, 2000 issue of The Gun Report.

"Distinguiert; Blockbüchse System Frohn 1906" (Distinguished Dropping Block Rifle of the System Frohn) Walter Schulz, (in German) 2-pp description of Werner Biederstädt's newly manufactured SS hunting rifle, as a supplement to the description of his target rifle described in DMJ 8/1996, in Deutsches Waffen-Journal, January, 1998.

"Morris Fisher" Hap Rocketto, 9 pp. with bibliography, delightfully written overview of the US participation in the early Olympic free rifle competition and Fisher's subsequent participation in the New York shooting scene of the 1930s. The accidental discharge of a Belgian shooter's rifle almost killed several people, in August Precision Shooting.

"Long-Range-WM für Vorder- and Schwarzpulver-Hinterlader in Südafrika" Günter Kunz and Ulrich Kwade, a 3-pp description of the German team's participation in the recent long range championship match in South Africa. There's brief mention of the US victory and the high scores of US shooters (with names misspelled) in Deutsches Waffen-Journal, August, 1997.

"How do Bullets Fly?" by Ruprecht Nennstiel of the German Bundeskriminalamt in Wiesbaden is intended as "an introduction to the mysteries of exterior ballistics of bullets fired from small arms." 40 pp. (in English) in the April, 1996 issue of the Journal of the Association of Firearm and Toot Mark Examiners. (This one may be hard to find in the archives.)

"Rifleman Extraordinary" about the life and works of C.W. Rowland, two parts in Dec. & Jan. SS Exchange, reprinted from The Western Sportsman, Feb. 1940. (The Archives copy of that is from Jan and Feb Western Sportsman and also a reprint in Special Issue 2 of Precision Shooting in 1993. The author was Charles Beise, Rowland's contemporary.)

"Echos from Vol. III of The Rifle&#8221; by Roger Stowers is a running commentary from the Broadfoot May, 1887 - April, 1888 reprint of that journal. It's a Reader's Digest kind of most entertaining account of shooting history, in Precision Shooting of September, and it's "to be continued" into the 4th Volume of The Rifle (but not in the October issue.)

The July issue of Precision Shooting has some interesting articles: a product review of a spirit level that attaches to your rifle scope; an excellent continuing series of "Legal Liability of Gunsmiths"; and an answer by Dennis Hrusosky to a reader's letter, that talks around the question of why the accuracy of a .22 Hornet barrel on a rolling block action can't be improved.

A 4-page review of Andela Tool and Machine products, by Richard Kayser is in the May issue of Precision Shooting. Production data and relative rarity of the various models of the Ruger No. 3 rifles (which were discontinued in 1986) is an article in the Ruger Collectors&#8217; Journal, V. 16, No. 1, 1986.

The January issue of The American Rifleman has a capsule history of the Savage Arms Company; a product review of the cast iron NEI bullet molds (positive); another of the Navy Arms Creedmoor rifle (mediocre accuracy and the scope mounts shoot loose); and some black powder bullet lubes that let you shoot a thousand shots without cleaning.

The November issue of Precision Shooting carries Richard Kayser's report on the Coors Match, complete with descriptions of rifle-scoped "schuetzen" pistols built on dropping block actions, and two new rifle actions. One is a Clerke falling block that opens by means of a long lever sticking up from the left side of the one-piece stock, and the other is a Chuck Pfitzer rifle in which the block is allowed to drop by cocking the hammer.

Apparently the 31-year-old John Browning had three designs for a single shot rifle action. The first became the Winchester 1885 Single Shot Rifle, the second never was patented, and the third had a camming breechblock as in the 44-1/2 Stevens action. Details are given in "Browning's Mystery Single Shot" by Richard Rhodes, in Rifle No. 136.

The June issue of The American Rifleman carried a product review of a reproduction thick side Hi-Wall with .45-70 Douglas barrel, made by Single Shot, Inc. and marketed by Montana Armory in Big Timber, Montana. It sells for \$995 and has some improvements over original Hi-Walls (shotgun buttstock and smaller firing pin hole).

The last three issues of Precision Shooting seem to be unusually concerned with lead bullet shooting. In the April issue: "Getting the Most out of Inexpensive Rimfire Ammunition" by John Gammuto; "Learning to Shoot the Schuetzen Rifle" by Richard Kayser (Part 1: molds, lubes, and background); and a letter from Rich Weber to Merrill Martin about lapping rifle bores. In the May issue: Kayser's "Bullet Casting, Lubrication, and Storage"; and a five-page description of production of the Meacham Tool and Hardware Company's Hoch action, and its plans to reproduce the traditional Farrow action. In the June issue Kayser's "Rifles and Loads"; and a Warren Greatbatch report on the "Quarter Bore Corps" at ASSRA matches.

The NRA publication Man at Arms (Nov-Dec, 1990) has a thought provoking article by Norm Flayderman, excerpted from his 4th edition of Flayderman's Guide to Antique American Firearms. He maintains that the collecting field is drying up, that mint condition arms are going to demand ever higher prices, and that lesser condition arms are going to become ever more desirable as their availability diminishes. In other words, the "good old days" of gun collecting are over. His coat of arms carries the inscription "In hoc plus quam posui" or "I've got more than that in it!"

The October issue of Visier, the German arms journal (which since the recent events in Germany, has joined with the East German journal of the same name) carries a six-page article about twenty European arms companies that also manufactured automobiles. Mentioned also is the Stevens company in the US that made cars from 1901 to 1927. Was that how Harry Pope was involved with automobiles?

The November issue of the same journal was even more interesting, and has an article about what happens when a 45 ACP and .357 Magnum are fired underwater. The pistols do not blow up because of water in the barrels, but yet are lethal to several meters from the muzzle. Side effects are ruptured eardrums if you happen to be underwater with them, and finger wrenching recoil from the mass of water in the barrels. Don't try it. Three other articles in the same journal deal with single shot target and dueling pistols, a German report of the 1990 Coors Schuetzenfest, and the Werndl rifle. A bonanza issue.

The Rifle of May-June has a couple of relevant articles: "Harvey A. Donaldson - Pioneer Benchrest" by Sam Fadala in the "Famous Riflemen" column, and "Long Live the 3240" by Mike Nesbitt. Both are interesting reading and the latter gives some loads. The July-August issue of the same journal carries a two-page layout in its "Custom Corner" of a Ruger No. 1 conversion to side-lever action. The gun-maker is John Madole, P.O. Box 517, Jamestown, KY 42629.

The rookie rat Enfield collector got an email today from the noted British Author and Armourer Mr. Peter Laidler and I almost fell out of my chair. Mr. Laidler asked for me to send some of my old manuals to him for his reference, I can't tell him or you where I got them because I might be extradited to the UK and then transported to Tasmania.

I have never seen the omission of the safety catch mentioned in any literature, EMER's, handbook etc etc. If this was a deliberate policy during the war, especially to what we called a 'SR item' (a safety related item) it would have been noted as '...as a wartime expedient ...' like the instructions that related to the wartime expedient cocking pieces (that we STILL used to see occasionally) Could it be that it was omitted during its life abroad? We used to have a large list of these odd wartime

relaxations in standards but even in the heat of war, I never saw this matter in the small arms notes for armourers. Maybe your RAF or BAOR notes mention it. I would like to have this for reference in our tech. library if you have it

We didn't Base Workshop service our small arms annually as such but we did have a small team of Armourers, called the UEI team (for unit equipment inspection team) that would descend on units, say, twice every three years and give them a complete inspection. This used to keep the unit Armourers on their toes too!

As respected authors, they cannot behave as we do and still expect to sell copies of their books. We make no money from our hobby and it costs us nothing to portray ourselves as fools/idiots/rats or whatever. They on the other hand, must maintain some credibility in order to sell the next book. I have seen both of them withdraw from internet discussion boards due to the fact that there are people that take delight in swinging a stick at the tall poppy. An attempt at humour is the chink in the armour that is exploited, therefore they not allowed to enjoy the game.

I believe only now... after it has, as usual with Ed, gone too far, do we see who has exposed themselves for who they are.... "to the public". Beneath all of the cuts and pastes there is a man with a seriously damaged inner child, as evident from his last post to Tiki..... HE'S NOT HEARING IT nor does he WANT to stop. His posts and continual digs speak VOLUMES for his insatiable appetite for attention, whether good or bad is irrelevant... it's attention. Any additional response to his last, referencing "tongue bath " or "exposing someone", will only continue to fuel his ego to carry on with it. And... that's EXACTLY what has been going on. To every reference he has made to "exploding coachwood", "RAT" or whatever else he can paraphrase, there has been a choir of supporting retorts that have just brought him to the brink of support seeking ecstasy, feeding whatever it is that won't allow him to see when he's reached enough is enough..He has to be told. Personally... I don't see him giving it up. His more recent NON-ENFIELD posts clearly indicate the guy NEEDS to be NEEDED and SUPPORTED. If he stops now, it will only be to admit he has carried on too long....And that would take the admission of having done something wrong and Ed's not having any of that.

‘The Martini-Henry rifles did great mischief.’[1] It is with typical British understatement that Bandsman Joseph Bands, of the 90th Light Infantry, describes the effects of the Martini-Henry rifle at the final battle of the Anglo-Zulu war, at Ulundi, on the 4th July, 1879. The Martini-Henry was in fact one of the most devastating weapons available at the time, due in particular, to its very high calibre and was to prove a real ‘man-stopper.’ The soldiers had such confidence in the Martini-Henry that it led to Edward Hutton, 3/60th Rifles remarking on the battle of Gingindlovu that ‘we all had the utmost confidence in our rifles, which were at that time the most perfect weapons in the world.’[2] However, the reputation of the rifle through the years has not always been so glowing. Historians have often emphasised its faults during the Zululand campaign, perhaps in an attempt to explain how veteran soldiers of the greatest Imperial power of the day could be defeated by a nation of perceived ‘savages’ on the slopes of the mountain of Isandlwana. Indeed the Natal Mercury commented on the British invasion force that ‘This army could not be beaten the world over.’[3] This perhaps epitomises the feeling amongst residents of Natal, Colonial officials and high-ranking British officers. They were over-confident, stemming in part from the faith they had in their firearms.

Much historiography has reasoned that there must have been an abject failure of British equipment or personnel involved to bring about a defeat as catastrophic as Isandlwana. In particular the ammunition myth has emerged as a convenient explanation for both historians and Chelmsford in light of the battle.[4] More recently however, as historians have re-addressed the issue, there is real appreciation for the quality of the Zulu army. This was an opinion voiced most strongly by the eminent David Rattray asserting that, ‘it was a great Zulu victory.’[5]

It is difficult to find soldiers from the Zulu war criticising their Martini-Henry as a poor weapon. Certainly there are minor criticisms regarding jamming and the smoke produced but generally accounts are full of praise.[6] It is perhaps only in the light of the Sudanese campaign in the

mid-1880s that the Martini-Henry began to gain bad press, in particular for over heating and jamming. Extensive source material is available on the Martini's testing and performance evaluation during the Sudanese campaign from War Office documents. Skennerton[7] documents the changes in British war material and Temple & Skennerton[8] have produced a thorough treatise on the Martini with much detailed information. Norris-Newman[9] was the war correspondent accompanying Chelmsford but produces little information on the Martini. Smith-Dorrien published an autobiography[10] and this is useful, as he was one of the few survivors of the battle of Isandlwana and documents the ammunition problem. Lieutenant Chard and Surgeon Reynolds both leave accounts of Rorke's Drift, but it is Henry Hook VC who leaves us with the specific details of soldiers' activities. The glaring weakness in any examination of Zulu war literature is the lack of written Zulu sources. Only Bertram Mitford records narratives of a warrior at Isandlwana & "nearly as possible in his own words." [11]

The trouble with many secondary works is that many authors have not fired the weapon they comment upon. Firing the Martini-Henry is essential to understanding the weapon and its intricacies. As far as possible contemporary accounts have been followed whilst using secondary works from Lock & Quantrill, Greaves and Knight to illustrate or contrast points about the rifle. Guy's work on firearms in the Zulu Kingdom[12] proved valuable in establishing Zulu use of the Martini during 1879. David Rattray and Rob Caskie have proved an inspiration for much of my interest in the Zulu war and their works and help are extremely useful, with their intimate knowledge of the Zulu people. Neil Aspinshaw was enormously helpful and gave me the opportunity to closely examine and fire the various Martini-Henry rifles.

The Anglo-Zulu War, 1879, came about for complicated reasons. The British were pursuing a policy of Confederation in South Africa, encouraged by Lord Carnarvon, the Secretary of State for Colonies. He summoned Henry Bartle Frere to be British High Commissioner, who arrived in South Africa in April 1877. Shortly after, the Boer state of the Transvaal was annexed to Britain by Theophilus Shepstone, Secretary for Native Affairs, without a shot being fired.[13] This now meant that the British inherited the problem of the "disputed territory" between the Zulu kingdom and the Transvaal, a dispute in which they had previously supported the Zulu claim.[14]

The Zulu kingdom, bordering British Natal to its south and west and the Transvaal to its north and west (Fig. 1), was built on a system forged by Shaka, Chief of the Zulus from 1816 until his assassination in 1828. The Zulu were moulded by Shaka into a powerful military force and "he absorbed many of the other groups in the area into the new Zulu military kingdom." [15] Shaka gave the Zulus their identity and customs which would last, in that form, just 63 years until the battle of Ulundi. Shaka was succeeded by his brother Dingane, whose reign coincided with the arrival of Voortrekkers in the region.[16] The Zulus were taught a powerful lesson at Blood River, when attacking a defensive position manned by Boers with muskets. This lesson was to manifest itself in Cetshwayo's order to attack the British on the move when not fighting from prepared positions, where their Martini-Henry rifles would take their toll.

King Cetshwayo, King of the Zulus at the time of the British invasion in 1879, was crowned in a curious irony by Shepstone in 1873. Shepstone failed to continue with his support of the Zulus and claimed the "disputed territory" for the British Empire. With the policy of Confederation underway, it was probably inevitable that war would come, but the British procrastinated, leading the Zulus on and in March 1878 set up a Boundary Commission to establish rights over the disputed territory. This was largely the doing of the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, Henry Bulwer, and the Commission found largely in favour of the Zulus.[17] Cetshwayo was restoring the military character of his nation, while Frere also had a new commander-in-chief of the army in South Africa, Lieutenant-General Frederic Thesiger, who replaced the incompetent Lieutenant-General Arthur Cunyngham, and concluded the ninth Frontier war with a British victory. Frere undoubtedly felt that Thesiger could provide quick victory against the Zulus, removing their military power and advancing the plans for confederacy. The modern breech-loading Martini-Henry would afford the British far superior arms to the Zulus and gave them full confidence of victory. Writing to Carnarvon on February 17th 1878, "Frere laid particular stress on the destructive power of the new breech-loading Martini-Henry rifle against the massed rushes of the "Kaffirs" &ndash;

tactics that he assumed the Zulus would repeat in any future war.&rsquo;[18]

The Zulu chief Sihayo provided a catalyst for an ultimatum; the stoning to death of two of his wives in full view of the Natal bank of the river. The ultimatum was issued without the sanction of the British Government on 11th December 1878, demanding total disbandment of the Zulu army and numerous changes to their way of life.[19] Lieutenant-General Thesiger assumed the title Lord Chelmsford on his father&rsquo;s death, and on 12th January he invaded Zululand with his artillery, wagons, natives and redcoats armed with Martini-Henry Rifles. The war was to prove significant for the British, not least for the implications it had in South Africa, throughout the Empire and at home. The Anglo-Zulu war was the litmus paper upon which the Martini-Henry would be tested as an effective weapons system for the British army. After many years of testing on training grounds it would be put to the test on a major Imperial campaign. The Martini-Henry was Britain&rsquo;s tool of empire at the time of the Zulu war, as the British army served to enforce ideas of British Imperialism across the globe.

The Secretary of State for war, Edward Cardwell, remarked on 5th September 1874, &lsquo;I think everything has been done to secure that the Martini-Henry shall be issued in as perfect condition as possible to the troops. I agree with Sir John Adye, that the time has come for the issue, and approve the course which he suggests.&rsquo;[20] Issues of the rifles and ammunition commenced in October 1874, having been first approved on July 17th 1874. The rifle had been adopted by the British service in 1871 and the issuing ended a ten year process of design, development and trial, after it had been agreed that the British army should be armed with breech-loading rifles in 1864. It was the first breech-loading rifle carried by the British Army and was the product of a prize-winning competition set up by the War Office to find the best weapon available.[21] The result was that Mr Frederick Chevalier de Martini&rsquo;s action and Mr Alexander Henry&rsquo;s barrel were combined, and the Martini-Henry rifle was born. The Martini-Henry Mark II, as carried by the majority of the soldiers during the Zulu War, had these specifications; 4ft 1½&rsquo;&rsquo; in length, weighed 9lbs and fired black powder 0.45 calibre, 480 grain, Boxer Mark III cartridges.

This work will cover various aspects of performance of the Martini-Henry during the Zulu war and, in particular, attempt to separate the myths from the realities about the rifle. The rifle undoubtedly had certain flaws, but whether these flaws were serious enough to contribute to British defeats in the war is questionable and will be looked at in Chapter 1. The question of its reliability has certainly come under extra scrutiny as a result of the disaster at Isandlwana and the search for excuses in its wake. Chapter 2 will show that partly as a result of experiences in the Zulu war, the rifle would receive numerous developments in its short time as the standard issue rifle for the British army before it was replaced with the Lee-Netford magazine rifle in 1888. However, the Martini continued to serve Colonial troops and many were converted to .303 calibre.[26] Finally, in Chapter 3, the effects that the Martini-Henry had, as a consequence of bringing victory in the Zulu war, will be scrutinized. When considering the effects of the Zulu war it is important to remember that the fall out encompassed both the defeat at Isandlwana and the ultimate victory. Many consequences for the British stemmed from the defeat at Isandlwana rather than the final victory at Ulundi.

&lsquo;I am inclined to think that the first experience of the power of the Martini-Henrys will be such a surprise to the Zulus that they will not be formidable after the first effort.&rsquo;[27] Lord Chelmsford thus confidently embarked on his invasion of Zululand. The Martini-Henry was a devastating weapon; its calibre is akin to an effective modern-day elephant gun. The soft-lead Boxer cartridge would flatten on impact, inflicting terrible wounds and causing huge trauma. Ian Knight describes its impact in detail;

Arthur Howard of N battery, Royal Artillery, present at Rorke&rsquo;s Drift due to sickness, describes the effects of their Martini-Henry rifles; &lsquo;when struck by the bullets, the niggers would give a spring in the air and fall flat down.&rsquo;[29] It is perhaps understandable that Chelmsford wanted to fight the Zulus in the open; at Isandlwana he got the fight he desired.

Bartlett says of Chelmsford that &lsquo;Whilst he had been out picnicking, he had got the battle he wanted, the fight in the open, the Martini-Henry and the bayonet against the assegai. Unbelievably,

the assegai had won.”[30] In the early hours of 22nd January 1879, Chelmsford made the fateful decision to split his force. He took over half the men and four of the six 7-pounder guns and marched from the camp at Isandlwana to support Major Dartnell, scouting to the south-east, who had reported a Zulu force too large for him to engage without reinforcements.[31] While he was away the camp was completely annihilated and he was to remark on his return; “I can’t understand it, I left a thousand men here.”[32] Chelmsford, buoyed by his early, but minor, victories had underestimated his enemies. Perhaps he had overestimated the advantage the Martini-Henry gave his soldiers?

The fact alone of superiority in our weapons tended to produce a feeling of confidence, and at the commencement of the Zulu campaign I do not think many officers felt the necessity of forming laagers, or even of entrenching, where artillery and Martini-Henry rifles were opposed to assegais and muzzle-loading small-arms.[33]

Arthur Harness describes the feeling of the British officers in Zululand, including Chelmsford, but this was based upon a profound underestimation of Zulu capabilities. Cetshwayo also desired battle in the open, so that he could deploy the infamous “horns of the buffalo” tactic. The British High Command were undoubtedly aware of this, but simply did not believe that two encircling horns consisting of 4,000 men each, could be deployed five miles apart as they were at Isandlwana. The battle completely changed British tactical thinking; from then on they would fight only from fixed positions. They had learned valuable lessons from Isandlwana and Rorke’s Drift. The Martini-Henry did indeed give them an extreme advantage but that advantage was made yet greater when fighting from prepared positions. The main tactical blunder made by Colonel Pulleine, 1/24th, who had been left in charge of the camp at Isandlwana, was that his firing line was both too extended and too far from camp. This was in order to cover the swathes of “dead” ground in front of the camp, which afforded an attacker huge cover. The topography of Zululand means that areas such as these are common and a weakness in any firearm is an inability to clear such “dead” ground. (Figs. 4 & 5)

Aside from tactical miscalculations, a number of issues came to light during the Zulu war regarding the performance of the Martini-Henry. One considerable problem was that the barrel was liable to “foul”, not an inherent problem with the rifle but rather the black powder used in the Boxer cartridge. (Fig. 6) Once the barrel became fouled-up this led to increased recoil, which was already viewed as significant. Cleaning of the barrel, however, can be undertaken in around thirty seconds, significantly reducing the fouling. Sergeant Major Davies reported to the conference on Martini-Henry rifles in 1873 that he “finds considerable recoil” and that although he “has not seen men cut about the face, hands have been injured.”[34] The increased kick can certainly lead to inaccurate shooting, particularly amongst new recruits or nervous men and this was brought up by Lieutenant Sharp. “The recruits and bad shots complain but the men get used to it. Nervous men also complain.”[35] The recoil is not shoulder breaking and the soldiers would have got used to it quickly. The recoil was perhaps a factor behind John Dunn’s remarks about the shooting of the British infantrymen at Gingindlovu explaining that “they were firing wildly in any direction.” He goes further;

The number of rounds that the British infantry at this time could be expected to fire individually differed greatly from the actual number of volleys they would fire during a battle. British tactical principles encouraged a steady, well aimed volley where “the sudden crash of the volley created the impression in the minds of those on the receiving end that it was more destructive than it actually was.”[37] A modern, experienced user of the Martini-Henry could be expected to fire up to 10 aimed rounds a minute but it was more likely that the 24th were firing at a much slower, steadier rate. British soldiers at this time went through a sixteen-day programme in musketry training.

The rate of fire links in to an apparent problem with the over-heating of the barrel, as rapid fire can cause the barrel to become uncomfortably hot. When firing 40 rounds over the course of an hour, full military load, from a Mark I upgrade Martini; the barrel did become hot but not so as to affect the rate of fire. The black powder of the cartridge was also the source of the problem for the



over-heating of the barrel. This was a problem which the 1/24th had learnt to overcome while campaigning in South Africa by binding damp raw-hide on the barrel which would shrink to offer protection for the hand. Again this was a problem that had been previously mentioned at the conference on the rifle. 'I think it quite possible that the heating of the barrels on rapid firing, on a hot day especially, may prove a serious drawback to rapidity of fire. A barrel cannot be touched after 5 or 6 rounds on some occasions.' This was the verdict of Superintendent Fraser in September 1873. Indeed, he mentioned at the time that a leather shield may be a 'necessary addition'.<sup>[39]</sup> The soldiers of the 1/24th found this to be so, during their South African campaigns.

The cartridge was the main source of problems for the Martini-Henry in Zululand. Henry Hook VC explains his problems and the root cause was the cartridge. 'We did so much firing that they became hot and the brass of the cartridges softened and the cartridge chamber jammed. My own rifle jammed several times and I had to work away with the ramrod till I cleared it.'<sup>[40]</sup> The cartridges were 'made of sheet brass, 0.004 inch in thickness' and this was liable to cause one of two problems.<sup>[41]</sup> The thin brass would melt, causing a jam, as private Hook records or alternatively the rifle would 'cook' the round, discharging it early. When the cartridge melted to the barrel the extractor tended to tear the end off the cartridge meaning the soldier would have to work the cartridge out with his ramrod or knife. Taking the battles of Isandlwana and Rorke's Drift as examples, it is interesting to think about the implications of such a jam occurring. No soldiers from the firing line at Isandlwana survived the battle, therefore accounts are non-existent but the battle was fought in the middle of a 'hellish-hot day'<sup>[42]</sup> and the line was engaged for a significant period of time. It is easy to imagine that there were jams on that day, meaning an eight to ten yard gap in the firing line. With the fire less concentrated, the 'morale-crushing' effects of the volleys could be lessened, giving the Zulu army an opportunity to resume their advance. In contrast, at Rorke's Drift, the men of 'B' company 2nd/24th were defending an area the size of five tennis courts, and later in the night of only two tennis courts. They fought shoulder to shoulder, any jammed rifle had less impact, and much of the hand-to-hand fighting was done with bayonets. On top of this, especially in the hospital, soldiers may have had a spare rifle to use from a patient. The ammunition was kept safe, still and dry in the storehouse at the post, rather than being on the move, in the ball-bags of marching men. Colonel Redvers Buller VC, accompanying Colonel Evelyn Wood's column invading from the north, produced a memorandum on the Boxer cartridge, as his men carried their ammunition in bandolier belts, criticising it in comparison to the Snider ammunition<sup>[43]</sup>:

In addition, Buller notes that 'a good shower of rain would spoil at least one-third of the ammunition (Martini-Henry) exposed to it.'<sup>[44]</sup> Despite these apparent frailties in the Boxer cartridge, Evelyn Wood sent a cartridge to the Superintendent of the Royal Small Arms Factory from the field of Isandlwana and 'though it had been rather knocked out of shape, it entered the chamber without difficulty, and gave a muzzle velocity of 1,313 feet per second.'<sup>[45]</sup> Certainly there were flaws with the ammunition and the difficulties were largely ironed out by the introduction of the rolled brass cartridge described later, but the problems experienced in the Zulu war were accentuated by the barrel heating troubles. Clearly the rifle was still capable of firing ammunition which was out of shape, showing it to be less sensitive than many have given credit for.

The ammunition supply and the boxes that carried it have provided a long-running debate for historians and it is one of the most discussed and controversial aspects of the campaign. The idea that the defeat at Isandlwana came about through the front line running out of ammunition, due to tricky boxes and pedantic Quartermasters is a myth, as Adrian Greaves believes, stemming from Chelmsford's need for an explanation for the disaster.<sup>[46]</sup> The mere logistics of the battlefield seem to offer a more credible explanation. It is known, from archaeological evidence, where the firing line was and also where the ammunition would have been in the wagon park, in the saddle of the mountain. I believe this distance to be almost one mile distant to Pope's 'G' company on the right flank and comfortably more to 'A' company commanded by Cavaye on the left flank. (Fig. 7) This is a considerable distance when carrying ammunition boxes which weigh close to 80lbs<sup>[47]</sup> when ground between is covered with erect army

tents. Standard military practice of the time was to ‘strike’ a camp when under threat. That is, to kick out the tent peg so it collapses, thereby giving a clear field of view, no obstacles for one’s own troops and not affording the enemy any cover. Striking of the camp was not done at Isandlwana and this was reported to Chelmsford by Lieutenant Milne after he was sent to check the camp with his telescope. Chelmsford was seeking signs of normality after news of Zulu movements around the camp ‘and in that snapshot of the tents standing peacefully in their rows, Milne had given him just that.’[48] (Fig. 8) Given these considerable obstacles it is not impossible to imagine anything more than a slow trickle of extra ammunition making its way to the firing line.

Privates Williams and Bickley of the 1/24th described ammunition being taken out ‘by bandsmen and wagon drivers and other unarmed people about the camp.’ Despite this they go on to say that they kept firing ‘till they got short of ammunition.’[49] This suggests that the supply was not good enough to keep up with the rate of fire of the 24th. It supports the idea of logistical difficulties with individual men running over a mile with only the ammunition they can carry. Lock and Quantrill make the valid point that ‘With a wall of warriors only a few hundred yards beyond the firing line, the unarmed ammunition carriers must have been reluctant to venture in that direction.’[50] Williams and Bickley support the theory that attempts were made to get ammunition to the line but ‘the greater part never got there.’[51] Lieutenant Essex also mentions a mule cart being loaded to bring ammunition to the men, but this too would have had difficulty negotiating the tents.[52]

Lieutenant Smith-Dorrien was a survivor of the battle of Isandlwana attached to the Royal Artillery, and was to become a full General in the First World War. He documents the ammunition supply problem, noting that ‘no steps were taken until too late to issue extra ammunition from the large reserves we had in camp.’[53] However he also notes how he had collected numerous camp stragglers together ‘where we broke them [ammunition boxes] open as fast as we could, and kept sending out the packets to the firing line.’ However these packets contained just ten rounds each and would have soon been exhausted by the six companies of the 24th on the firing line, especially as these trips may have taken twenty minutes to complete. Adrian Greaves regards Smith-Dorrien’s claims with caution, as he ‘wrote of an ammunition box difficulty nearly fifty years after the event. He obviously forgot that a few days after the disaster he wrote ‘‘I was out with the front companies of the 24th handing them spare ammunition’’’. The myth grew to make an inexplicable defeat explicable.’[54] The issue of logistics in getting the ammunition to the soldiers in the line was a serious problem and it is conceivable that the Zulu advance could have been made possible by a slackening in the fire.

In sharp contrast was the situation at Rorke’s Drift, where not only was the battlefield tiny in comparison, but ‘boxes of ammunition were placed behind us.’[55] Further to this there is no mention of the difficulty in opening the ammunition boxes themselves at Rorke’s Drift. When discussing Isandlwana Donald Morris suggests that ‘there were no extra screwdrivers’ and that the lids were held down with copper bands and nine large screws, ‘frequently rusted into the wood.’[56] This is not wholly accurate. The boxes were held shut with one securing screw and ‘an arrow with the word ‘unscrew’ is painted on the lid.’[57] In the heat of battle these boxes could be smashed open with relative ease. It seems farcical that a lack of screwdrivers could be responsible for such a catastrophic defeat and it is more likely that logistics and lack of foresight left the line short of ammunition. In any case there was a Martini-Henry action tool (Fig. 9), one issued for every five rifles, which had two screwdrivers and all NCO’s at Isandlwana would have had one.[58] It is unlikely that extra ammunition in the firing line would have done anything but delay the defeat, as the extended firing line had been outflanked by the Zulu left horn, with the Zulu right horn already in position behind Isandlwana hill. Could the British troops have been unaware of these facts, as their view was obscured by smoke from their rifles?

Perhaps one of the most important yardsticks in examining a rifle during a campaign is its range and accuracy. The Martini-Henry’s lack of time in action comes to the fore here as ideas of its most effective range changed through the war. Chelmsford’s Staff Officer, Crealock, had

noted that towards the end of the ninth Frontier war a company of 2/24th tried to cut off a Xhosa retreat and ‘at a distance of 1,300 yards were making good practice’ with their Martini-Henrys. This was the extreme range of the Martini-Henry and only superb marksmen could expect hits at that range although it was sighted to 1,400 yards on the increment sight bed. Volley firing was commenced at around 800 yards by the British army at this time, whilst they considered it to come into its most effective range at around 600 yards. The 1884 Field Exercises Manual stated that a trained soldier could be expected to hit a company at ‘open files’ at 800 yards ‘without wasting ammunition.’[66]

Despite the Martini-Henry proving itself both deadly and sturdy there were clearly issues highlighted on campaign in Zululand and the rifle was developed in light of this campaign and that in Afghanistan. The main issue was with the Mark III Boxer foil brass cartridge and on June 9th 1885 a new solid drawn brass cartridge was introduced for ‘immediate issue to Egypt,’[79] followed by a Mk II version thereof just over three months later. The change would significantly reduce the probability of jams, now that the brass was less likely to melt on the heated rifle. There were also changes to the ammunition boxes; in addition to Chelmsford’s insistence on campaign that extra screwdrivers should accompany ammunition wagons, Smith-Dorrien notes that it was ‘owing to this battle [Isandlwana] that the construction of the ammunition-boxes was changed.’[80] They were indeed altered in May 1881, but it did not constitute a change of pattern.[81] This was probably a response to the perceived Isandlwana ammunition crisis, after which Chelmsford insisted that ‘The regimental reserve boxes must have the screw of the lid taken out, and each wagon or cart will have a screwdriver attached to one of the boxes so that it may be ready for opening those in which the screw has not been taken out.’[82]

The barrel over-heating and becoming too hot to handle was addressed by the issuing of a leather hand-guard on 24th October 1885.[83] This had been an issue since the early days of Martini-Henry testing, in April 1874, and a hand-guard was suggested but shelved to a later date. ‘Considering that it would be an additional article of store, costing 1s. each, the committee consider that no supply should be ordered until further experience has been obtained with the arm in the hands of the troops.’[84] This experience was obtained in Zululand and it was introduced accordingly.

The Martini-Henry Mark III was introduced in August 1879, too soon after the end of the Zulu war for it to have had an impact on the modifications brought forward. The Mark IV version was designed largely with the Sudanese campaign in mind, but the issues in the Sudan had been previously raised in Zululand. The changes made were designed to improve extraction of the used cartridge and the new extractor was .5-inch longer and the extractor lever was 3 inches longer.[85] These changes were rendered almost pointless by the improvements already made to the cartridge. This was now a perfected version of the rifle which could only be bettered by a magazine rifle. The adoption of the Lee-Metford and Lee-Enfield magazine rifles by the British Army after 1888 meant that the Mark IV Martini-Henry was largely confined to use by Colonial troops, particularly in India. The advent of the Lee-Metford magazine rifle made single shot weapons obsolete and the lower calibre of the rifle made it far more user-friendly in comparison to the brute force of the Martini-Henry. Certainly experiences in Zululand and in the Boer wars heightened the need for smokeless ammunition in the British army.

British war material at this time seems to have been designed largely with Colonial wars in mind. The Hale rockets carried by the British forces in Zululand carried the instructions to aim the tube ‘at the savages.’[86] The high calibre and the devastating effect of the Martini bullet was undoubtedly aimed to create panic and crush morale amongst an enemy. Inevitably it was believed that the less disciplined armies faced in Colonial wars would be yet more over-awed by its power. Norris-Newman notes that they ‘gradually brought the Zulus to a stand, checked by the withering effects of that hail of bullets, which did such murderous execution as all their efforts could not prevail.’[87] Undoubtedly it is huge credit to the bravery of the Zulu army that they were able to face such devastating fire. It was this demoralizing fire-power in the hands of the Imperial infantry that gave Colonial officials such as Frere huge power to engage on such ‘personal imperial vendettas.’ In theory, large ‘backward’ armies could

be suppressed by relatively few soldiers equipped with the most modern service rifle, the Martini-Henry. Michael Glover believes that this advantage has been over-estimated because &ldquo;as long as a soldier had to fumble in his pouch for each round, he could not fire fast enough to keep off overwhelming numbers in close formation and willing to accept vast casualties, unless he was in close formation and given all round protection by the fire of his comrades.&rsquo;[88] At Rorke&rsquo;s Drift and at other major victories, they were in close formation, laagered or behind barricades. At Isandlwana they were not. The Martini-Henry was perhaps a poisoned chalice for Colonial officials, giving the feeling of complete superiority, but practically, not offering it. Disraeli was to admit after the war that he had given far too much leeway &ldquo;to petty colonial officials&rsquo;[89] and Emery notes that &ldquo;after entering office in 1874, Disraeli gave free reign in matters of Colonial policy to Lord Carnarvon.&rsquo;[90] This was indeed a decision he would regret. The Zulu war was to have a profound effect on British politics, changing Imperial policy at a time of heightened Imperial activity.

It was from the barrel of the Martini-Henry that the Zulu war was won. Many consequences of the war, certainly for the British, stemmed from the fallout from Isandlwana rather than the final victory at Ulundi on 4th July, 1879. It was to be a sad day for the Zulu nation and the end of an era for a nation forged a mere 63 years previously.

In Britain, the war was to have profound effect politically. Gladstone went on &ldquo;a passionate attack upon the idea of Empire&rsquo; during his Midlothian campaign.[91] He claimed that the Zulu Kingdom had been smashed &ldquo;for no other offence than their attempt to defend against your artillery with their naked bodies, their hearths and homes, their wives and families.&rsquo;[92] It was on the back of Imperial disasters in Zululand and Afghanistan that Disraeli&rsquo;s Conservative government was replaced by Gladstone&rsquo;s Liberals. Gladstone had been highly critical of both Britain&rsquo;s conduct and spending during the Zulu war which was a tremendously expensive campaign. During the Zulu War, the average cost to the government of each Martini-Henry rifle, including bayonet and cleaning kit, was £14/1/8d.[93] The Zulu war cost the British taxpayer a sum of £5 million and on top of this, 1,430 Europeans had been killed.[94] It has led Morris to remark that &ldquo;the warriors at Isandlwana had dealt Disraeli&rsquo;s administration a mortal blow.&rsquo;[95]

It is clear that the Martini-Henry broke the old Zulu order, whilst also causing great loss of life to the Zulu people. After the battle of Isandlwana, itself a Zulu victory, the Zulu losses were so great that in Cetshwayo&rsquo;s words: &ldquo;An assegai had been plunged into the belly of the Zulu nation.&rsquo;[101] The metaphorical assegai was thrust yet deeper at the battle of Ulundi and over the coming years the life blood of the old Zulu nation would continue to spill out. Sir Garnett Wolseley, who had been sent out to replace Lord Chelmsford as Commander-in-Chief but had arrived too late for the final battle at Ulundi, was responsible for the peace terms imposed by the British. The Zulu kingdom lost its king, its army and submitted to the authority of the Crown. Excessive petty kingdoms, thirteen, were created under chieftains who either owed their position to the Crown or disliked the royal uSuthu faction.[102] The old &ldquo;Boundary Commission&rsquo; was ignored with new boundaries to be respected. The old military system was to be abolished, those wishing to work in neighbouring territories were not to be obstructed and there was a trade embargo on arms.[103] &ldquo;From Wolseley&rsquo;s settlement came disastrous civil war&rsquo;[104] and the internal divisions created were compounded by the re-instatement of Cetshwayo in 1883 as the divisions within his old kingdom were now permanent. In the years after the Anglo-Zulu war it was to be Zulu fighting Zulu, tearing apart the kingdom they had fought so valiantly to defend.

Bartlett correctly asserts that the real losers were the Zulu people.[105] The Martini-Henry had completely changed Zululand and re-shaped the kingdom. H. Rider Haggard, who had been private secretary to Bulwer and aide to Sir Theophilus Shepstone remarked in his book, published three years after the end of the war, &ldquo;Cetywayo&rsquo;s rule, bad as it was, was perhaps preferable to the reign of terror that we have established, under the name of settlement.&rsquo;[106] Morris conservatively estimates that 8,000 Zulu warriors lost their lives in the war, this may be as many as 10,000, with around twice that number injured. The injuries left behind by the

Martini-Henry's devastating bullet must have been horrendous and without medical attention many must have perished.[107] When the rifle is fired with bayonet fixed, as would at Rorke's Drift, it quickly becomes fouled by the black powder. Any wounds that were inflicted with the bayonet would be likely to result in blood poisoning, especially as the Zulus would have had no adequate treatment.

The massive technological advantage and power of the British over the Zulus, encapsulated by the Martini-Henry, inevitably affects the post-Colonial views of the Colonial era; the powerful white man with a modern, breech loading Martini-Henry rifle, facing a 'bunch of savages armed with sticks.'[108] The Martini-Henry was a tool with which to advance the boundaries of Britain's Empire and it facilitated the cause of Imperialism. Brian Best believes that the Martini-Henry rifle 'immediately conjures up vivid images of a steadfast, back-to-the-wall soldier fighting on some sun-baked boundary of the Empire.'[109] This was undoubtedly a picture of Empire in contemporary Britain, as well as an image we would associate with Victorian years of Empire even today. However, the cause of Imperialism was severely dented by the Zulu war, and indeed by the Boer wars in South Africa that followed.

The Martini-Henry was a symbol of Britain's power and superiority over the Zulu. This is borne out by Chelmsford's reply to Cetshwayo's appeal for peace in the build up to Ulundi. 'If the Induna brings with him (1000) one thousand rifles taken at Isandlwana...he must bring the two cannon and the remainder of the cattle.'[110] The Martini-Henry was the face of British power and whilst they were still in the hands of the enemy Chelmsford would not consider peace. It is likely that Chelmsford knew Cetshwayo would not be able to return all the arms, now scattered over Zululand, and he wanted a final victory to restore British military honour.

It was Ian Knight who said that 'Ironically, Isandlwana had proved a spear-thrust in the belly for both the Zulu kingdom, and the Confederation scheme.'[111] The political attention it drew to South Africa meant that Zululand could never be annexed in the same way as the Transvaal had been. The Boers in the Transvaal took advantage of the divisions within Zululand to reclaim the disputed territory. However Gladstone announced that 'our judgement is that the Queen cannot be allowed to relinquish her sovereignty over the Transvaal.'[112] The Zulu war had shown that the British could be defeated and the Boers were unhappy at the decision, leading to the first Boer war. There was certainly unwillingness on the part of the British to become embroiled in another expensive, protracted colonial war and the defeat at Majuba led to the British backing down. The British, still equipped with their Martini-Henry rifles, fought in an antiquated style against the commando-style Boers, emphasising volley fire rather than individual marksmanship.

The service life of the Martini-Henry as the standard issue firearm for the British army was just 27 years. This was no slight on the quality of the weapon. Victorian technology was moving fast and the magazine rifle was always going to surpass single-shot weapons. It is difficult to find many reports from soldiers of difficulties with their rifles, although accounts from the firing line at Isandlwana are non-existent, so much of what is written of that battle is conjecture. Hook is the only soldier to report jamming[113] and he was involved in an action which required rapid fire followed by small delays. This would lead to fouling of the barrel and a hot barrel, causing jams, but he would have had a chance to quickly pull-through his rifle during a lull in the fighting.[114] Any modern weapon is liable to jam when subject to such rapid firing. Certainly the Martini-Henry was a far superior weapon to its predecessor, the Snider, reported by the 75th regiment at Newry in January 1876. 'Very superior weapon to the Snider in every way.'[115] Many historians look at the rifle from a modern perspective and certainly there were issues which came up during the Zulu war which were largely addressed in the coming years. It was a state-of-the-art arm for its time and was only held back by the fact that it was a single-shot weapon.

The simple fact that the Martini-Henry gave the British a feeling of such superiority in Zululand is more likely to have contributed to the defeat at Isandlwana rather than any of its failings. The Zulu victory at Isandlwana merely stiffened the British resolve for a total victory and victory did come, from the barrel of the Martini-Henry. Glover remarks of the Zulus after Isandlwana that 'They had destroyed a battalion of British regulars but they had learned a healthy respect for the

Martini-Henry.&rsquo;[116] Cetshwayo had embroiled himself in a war which he could never win. In winning individual actions, he provoked the British into reinforcing Chelmsford to an extortionate extent. Ulundi was to completely change Zululand and its structure and Wolseley&rsquo;s settlement plunged Zululand into internal strife for years to come.

It is significant that the Zulu war was embarked upon without the knowledge or approval of the British government in Westminster and the Martini played a crucial role in why that was the case. It afforded superiority in firepower that was completely unprecedented, allowing Colonial officials such as Frere to commence wars with relatively few troops, when facing a native, primitively armed opponent. Frere&rsquo;s decision was to contribute to the downfall of Disraeli&rsquo;s Conservative government, replaced by Gladstone&rsquo;s Liberals, leading to a distinct &lsquo;reigning in&rsquo; of Britain&rsquo;s entire Colonial policy.

A lovely object, bearing unit details and dates. 101 Squadron RFC was formed at Farnborough on 12 July 1917 operating the Royal Aircraft Factory FE2b. It served during the Great War in France as a night bomber squadron. 103rd Canadian Expeditionary Force Collar Badge Sweetheart Brooch 104 Coast Brigade Royal Artillery Printed Flash 105th Coast Brigade Royal Artillery Flashes 10th Battalion DLI Trench Art Letter Knife

From the same family as the other example listed. This one appears to be in bronzed brass; I am quite sure this is a deliberate patination rather than a natural age-induced toning (compare the two badges side-by-side as illustrated). Bronzed officers' Service Dress variants of this rare badge are the least frequently encountered, rarer indeed than the coveted silver examples. A lovely original badge.

A cabasset, the standard infantry helmet throughout much of Europe during the late 16th Century, and still in use during the English Civil Wars. Having a distinctive almond shaped skull with characteristic stalk-like projection resembling a pear and giving these helmets their name cabacette. Many of these were held in English church armouries from the time of the Armada, and examples were taken to the New World by the earliest English settlers, one has been found during excavations at Jamestown Island. This is a pleasing example, the rosettes and plume holder being restorations. In all a handsome example of munition armour of the late 16th Century.16th Century Gauntlet from Sir Walter Scott's Amoury at Abbotsford

In 2006 I was fortunate in being able to acquire selected items from the armoury of Sir Walter Scott at his house Abbotsford, near Melrose in Scotland. In addition to being a being a famous writer, Scott was also an antiquary who assembled an important collection of arms and armour. He was a contemporary and correspondant of Samuel Rush Meyrick, and indeed commissioned him to procure items for his armoury. The armoury is on public display at Abbotsford and is to be recommended to the student of arms and armour.

The gauntlet dates to the late 16th Century and is of steel decorated with brass-capped rivets. Though handsome, such gauntlets are not rare, however, one with such a provenance to an early and important collection of armour certainly is. This is the only item of European armour to have left the Abbotsford armoury and is likely the only piece that ever will. The gauntlet comes with a documented and verifiable provenance.

A very good example of this pleasing sword pattern. Having a uniform toned patina to the hilt mounts and scabbard, the blade is bright. The grip retains its shagreen binding. While the blade is unmarked, the scabbard bears the engraved cursive script mark of the manufacturer and Government contractor Wooley & Co of Birmingham. Of note is the presence of engraved initials WC to the knuckle bow and quillon terminal. Other distinctive features include a lanyard hole to the knuckle bow, and what may be another piercing the grip through the upper langet extension. The blade measures 33 inches, it is thought that many were officially reduced to this length following introduction of the 1796 Pattern sword. In all an idiosyncratic example in uncommonly fine condition.1788 Pattern Light Dragoon Sword

An example of one of the most elegant of swords ever carried by the British Army. The influence of Adam's neo classicism is immediately apparent. The hilt of this example retains most of its original gilding, and the blade is pleasingly blue-and-gilt. The scabbard lacks its chape, though these occasionally turn up in dealers' 'spares' boxes. The stitching has failed towards the bottom of the scabbard, and there is an old, though strong repair at this point. In all a rather pleasing example.  
1796 Pattern Light Cavalry Sabre

An attractive example of this iconic sword. It is perhaps an officer's sword as impressions in the grooves of the leather-covered grip suggest twisted wire was once present. The blade is in excellent condition with just a few edge nicks indicative of use. It is complete with its original scabbard. A very pleasing cavalry sword of the Napoleonic era.

A good example by and bearing the marks of Clemens Meigen of Solingen. Typical of imported blades found on Mortuary hilted swords of the period of the English Civil Wars. Blade 80cm excluding tang  
17th Indian Division printed Flash 17th Indian Division printed Flash 17th Indian Division printed Flash 17th Lancers Cap Badge 17th/21st Lancers Cap Badge 17th/21st Lancers Cap Badge 18 Boer War Stereoviews

I have collected stereoviews for some time now and highly recommend the field to you, there is simply no better way of getting a visual feel for this period, it is little short of time travel, seeing the Boer War in three dimensions, you will not be disappointed. Cards such as these are being traded individually elsewhere at between three and fifteen pounds each  
1803 Pattern Light Company Officer's Sword

The hilt conforms to the Pattern, and in addition to the bugle device also has a lanyard ring affixed. There is a little play in the hilt and two minor closed cracks in the Royal Cipher, though the grip binding is original, present and intact. The blue and gilt blade is by Thomas Bate, sword manufacturer to the Honourable Board of Ordnance, it has a few edge nicks and is patinated though not pitted. The original scabbard retains all its original fittings though has shrunk slightly and shows the usual knocks to the latter, stitching failures and losses to the polished surface of the leather. This detail however doesn't do justice to what is a scarce complete, untouched and attractive example of one of the most striking swords of the Georgian era.

A very good George V example with his royal cipher incorporated into the blade etching. The scabbard chape and frog strap have been professionally restored to an extremely high standard. The blade is numbered, offering the possibility of identification of its original owner. A scarce sword dating to the short period 1910-1912.  
1887 Pattern Cavalry Officers' Sword

An antique Indian torador. The barrel bands have been professionally restored to the gun. There is silver koftgari decoration the muzzle and breech of the barrel, which also shows tonal evidence of its spiral construction. The stock has horn shoulders to the butt. The musket retains its original ramrod, these are commonly lacking on surviving examples.  
18th / early 19th Century Indian Matchlock Musket

An extremely rare and attractive item of early artillery equipment. Measuring approximately 7', it comprises a lacquered wooden shaft, with wrought match holder and conforming 'shoe' or ground spike. The match holder comprises an annulus carrying a number of smaller rings through which a burning match could be threaded securely, though allowing the gunner to draw it on as it burned down.  
18th Century Powder Horn

Manufactured by Wilkinson in 1911 and unit marked to the West Yorkshire Regiment. Aside from scorching damage to one grip face the bayonet is in very good condition. It retains its original frog, this being an uncommon General Service Buff Leather example officially modified to carry the P'07 bayonet by means of a small leather insert riveted into the throat.  
1907 Pattern Bayonet with quillon

An example of one of the most sought after of British bayonets, the P'07 bayonet for the SMLE in its original format, with hooked quillon. This is a 1913 dated example manufactured at Enfield. The

patina to the hilt is rather pleasing, and the blade is rust free, though it shows sharpening to the tip, and for some reason the back edge radius has been dressed off. Of particular note is the presence of what must surely be 'trophy' marks on one of the grips. A rather interesting example.1908 Parabellum Luger

A very respectable deactivated P'08 Luger. Manufactured by Deutsche Waffen und Munitionsfabriken AG in 1917, it bears unidentified unit marks to the front grip strap, S XIX, perhaps those of a Schutztruppe unit. It was discretely deactivated in 1997 and bears official Proof House deactivation stamps, though lacks certificate. It strips, cocks and dry-fires. A truly iconic firearm. Sorry, for sale within the UK only

Musketry Regulations 1909, a classic small arms manual, running to some 229 pages covering the Lee Enfield Rifles and Carbines of the period, as well as the No 1 Hand Grenade. The superb illustrations include photographs of soldiers wearing the little seen Broderick Cap. 1910 Musketry Regulations 1911 Royal Army Medical Corps Manual 1911 Royal Army Medical Corps Training Manual 1912 Pattern Cavalry Officers' Sword

An excellent copy of the 1909 Musketry Regulations as reprinted with amendments in 1914. Running to 320 pages and including illustrations, it covers in detail the service rifle, with other sections covering the Webley Pistol, small arms ammunition, the machine gun and Mkl hand grenade. The book is named to it's original owner 5240 D F Christfield, F Co, 28 London.

A Princess Mary gift box containing it's original Christmas / New Year card and an unusual card indicating the box to be one of a batch put into store in 1916 and ultimately distributed to the next-of-kin of men who were in the City Battalions when sent to France. Given the reference to men returning from Germany, I assume the issue to have been made in the post-Armistice German occupation period. The card also bears an interesting annotation verso. A rare example.1914 Princess Mary Gift Tin Bullet Pencil 1914 Princess Mary Gift Tin with original Contents

An excellent example.1914 Royal Flying Corps Training Manual 1914 Sam Browne Revolver Holster 1914 Trench Warfare Manual 1914 War Office Manual of Military Law 1914-15 Star Medal Trio, with silver ID Badge & 1914 Gift Tin 1914-1919 Trench Art Aluminium Ring 1914/15 Princess Mary New Year Gift Tin, Card & Pencil

As worn by workers at Ordnance munitions factories exempted from active service. Maker-marked and issue numbered.1915 Ordnance Munitions Worker's Badge 1915 Princess Mary Gift Tin New Year Card 1915 Psalms & Hymns for Soldiers in the Field 1915 Royal Scots / Gretna Railway Disaster Postcard 1915 Sergeants' Pattern Leather Sword Belt

An example of the Signalling and General Service Telescope ultimately re-designated the Scout Regiment Telescope and issued to amongst the obvious others, snipers. One of the most desirable of British military optical instruments. Optically and in every other regard this is an excellent example.1916 British Army issue Binoculars Case 1916 British P'13 Bayonet 1916 Cigarette Cards - Military Vehicles 1916 dated Army Cavalry Issue Spurs 1916 Dated Army Issue Webley Revolver Holster

In 1916 the Imperial German government introduced a scheme whereby individuals could donate gold for the war effort, commonly receiving in exchange an iron equivalent of their donated jewellery. This is an example of the watch chain given to those giving up their gold Alberts.1916 German 'Gold for Iron' Watch Chain

A very good complete pair.1918 dated Vickers Clinometer Sight Case 1918 dated Vickers or Lewis Machine Gun Tools & Spares Wallet 1918 dated WWI German Water Bottle 1918 Enamelled Silver Border Regiment Collar Badge 1918 First Field Dressing 1918 Humorous Postcard 1918 MkII Artillery Clinometer Sight 1918 MkIX Trench Periscope

That of Major Atkinson MC, RA. The Field Service Pocket book issued to each serving officer as an



essential reference to just about every aspect of the Service.1926 Infantry Training Manual - War  
1927 MkVII Drill .303 Rifle Round 1928 Army Cavalry Bit 1930's dated Kriegsmarine Bayonet Frog  
1930's-1940's Kwik-Lite Torch

Small Arms training Volume I, 1931. The 1920's and 1930's Small Arms Training Manuals are to my  
mind some of the most interesting and informative of their kind. This one covers in depth the rifle,  
bayonet and revolver. It runs to some 272 pages and includes an excellent range of  
illustrations.1931 Small Arms Training Manual 1934 18-pounder Artillery Manual 1934 German  
Badge 1934 German Third Reich Day Badge 1935 dated No2 Prismatic Binoculars

An example of the seldom encountered P'37 manufactured in white for Military Police use.1937 Rifle  
Training Pamphlet 1937 Rifle Training Pamphlet 1937 Rifle Training Pamphlet 1937 Small Arms  
Application of Fire Manual 1937 Small Arms Application of Fire Manual 1937 Small Arms Application  
of Fire Pamphlet 1937 SMLE Rifle Training Manual

A copy of the Field Service Pocket book issued to each serving officer as an essential reference to  
just about every aspect of the Service. Aside from a split to the covering of the top spine joint, a very  
good complete example containing 12 pamphlets.1938 Civilian Respirator with Shoulder Bag 1938  
dated German K98 Bayonet Frog 1938 Dated German K98 Rifle Oil Bottle

A good quality Royal Artillery silver ashtray by S Blanckensee & Sons of Chester, and assayed in  
1938.1939 3-inch Mortar Training Manual 1939 Active Service New Testament 1939 Active Service  
New Testament 1939 Active Service New Testament 1939 Annual Range Course Small Arms  
Training Pamphlet 1939 Army Volt Meter Pouch

A good strong and flexible example. The 1939 Pattern equipment of the Second World War is  
analogous with the P'14 of the First. It was a War-emergency issue, introduced as it was easier to  
manufacture than P'37 webbing at a time when demands were extremely high. It was issued to  
Army personnel early in the War, but is perhaps more commonly associated with the Home Guard.  
1939 Pattern Water Bottle Carrier

A lovely example retaining its original rank insignia almost certainly indicative of Home Guard issue.  
It is in an excellent size (being designed for wear over Serge Battledress, though seldom actually  
worn in this way, the wearer would purposely seek a garment labelled a size smaller than he would  
usually wear). With the addition of a Home Guard arm band this would display extremely well.1940  
dated Drill No36 Mills Grenade

One of my favourite manuals of the period. Do read the few paragraphs on the grenade as  
illustrated.1940 Military Training Pamphlet No33 - Fieldcraft 1940 Military Training Pamphlet No43 -  
Operations, Withdrawal 1940 North Staffordshire Regiment Sports Badge 1940 Other Services  
Water Bottle Carrier and Bottle

A worn though sound pair belonging to the Royal Engineer officer whose blouse is also listed. He  
has had belt loop added, a nice period feature. Minor moth, damage to one pocket lining, and some  
marks as apparent in the photographs. 30 inch waist.1940 pattern BD Blouse 1940 Pattern BD  
Blouse in a Large Size

An extremely rare original unopened packet with original (perished) contents, as found in the  
pocket of an RAF officer's tunic.1940's Gracie Fields Signed Photograph 1940's Gracie Fields  
Signed Photograph 1941 Aircraft Recognition Manual 1941 Ammunition & Explosives Manual 1941  
Anti-Aircraft Small Arms Training Pamphlet 1941 Army issue guide to Urdu

As used with the Vickers machine gun as a steam condenser can1941 Army issue Whistle 1941  
Army Map Reading Manual 1941 Army Tank Hunting Training Poster 1941 ARP Pamphlet - What to  
do about Gas 1941 British Army pamphlet 'The German Army in Pictures' 1941 Care of Explosives  
& Ammunition Manual 1941 dated Royal Artillery Officer's Dress Tunic

With matching serials and original frog  
1941 Khaki Bandage 1941 Khaki Bandage 1941 Leather Frog  
for the P'07 Bayonet 1941 Map Reading Manual 1941 Military Training Pamphlet No23 - Infantry Div  
Advance 1941 Military Training Pamphlet No23 - Infantry Div in Attack 1941 Military Training  
Pamphlet No46 - Camouflage 1941 More Pictures of the German Army Manual 1941 Motorcyclist  
Training Manual 1941 Pamphlet - Beating the Invader 1941 Pattern ATS Tunic and Skirt

Certainly one of the most sought after of Small Arms Training pamphlets.  
1942 Blacker Bombard Training Manual 1942 Blacker Bombard Training Manual 1942 Boys Anti-Tank Rifle Manual 1942  
Boys Anti-Tank Rifle Manual 1942 Boys Anti-Tank Rifle Pamphlet 1942 Bren Light Machine Gun  
Pamphlet 1942 Bren Light Machine Gun Pamphlet 1942 Bren Light Machine Gun Pamphlet 1942  
Bren Machine Gun Manual

Small Arms Training, Volume I, Pamphlet No4, Light Machine Gun, 1942. The standard training  
manual on the Bren. 40 pages of detailed text with numerous supporting illustrations. Essential for  
the collector of material related to this classic arm.  
1942 Bren Manual 1942 Bren Training Manual  
1942 dated Anti-Tank Grenade

Further images  
1942 Gas Training Manual 1942 Grenade Manual 1942 Grenade Training Manual  
1942 Grenade Training Manual 1942 Grenade Training Manual 1942 Grenade Training Manual  
1942 Grenade Training Pamphlet 1942 Grenade Training Pamphlet 1942 Grenade Training  
Pamphlet 1942 Hawkins Grenade Pamphlet Amendment 1942 Home Guard Regulations Vol II  
amendment No2 1942 Home Guard Regulations volume II amendments Nos 1-2 1942 Leather  
Jerkin

Small Arms Training, Volume I, Pamphlet No3, Rifle, 1942. The standard training manual on the  
No4 Lee Enfield including chapters on the No4T Sniper Rifle, the Sniper Sling etc. An essential  
period reference.  
1942 Lee Enfield Rifle Training Pamphlet 1942 Medal Ribbons Booklet 1942  
Military Training Pamphlet No23 1942 Military Training Pamphlet No23 - Infantry Div in Defence  
1942 MkIM Bren Light Machine Gun

An original copy of Small Arms Training, Volume I, Pamphlet No 13, Grenade, 1942. This was the  
standard training manual on the use of Grenades in the British Army. It includes details of all the  
patterns in use at the time, and includes the rifle cup discharger. Essential reference for the collector  
in this field.

Covering the Bren drum magazine  
1942 Small Arms Application of Fire Manual 1942 Small Arms  
Application of Fire Manual 1942 Small Arms Application of Fire Manual 1942 Small Arms Range  
Courses Training Pamphlet 1942 Small Arms Training Manual 1942 Small Arms Training Pamphlet -  
Application of Fire 1942 Small Arms Training Pamphlet - Range Courses (War) 1942 Small Arms  
Weapon Training Manual 1942 Snow Camouflage Mittens 1942 South African Steel Helmet

1942 Thompson Machine Gun Manual 1942 Thompson Machine Gun Manual 1942 Unexploded  
Bombs & Bomb Reconnaissance Manual 1942 Vickers Twin Radial Mounting Manual 1942 Washing  
& Shaving Kit Roll 1942 Washing & Shaving Kit Roll 1942 Webbing Ammunition Carrier 1942-43  
Spiritual Almanac for Service Men 1943 2 Lire Allied Military Bank Note 1943 2nd Infantry Division  
Slouch Hat

A scarce example retaining it's original factory-applied textured dark brown paint finish. The liner is  
dry, with a split, and there are some paint splashes on teh shell, though these could certainly be  
picked off. A good helmet in a scarce original late-War finish.  
1943 Australian Army Shell Dressing 1943 Australian Jungle Puttees 1943 Boiled Sweets, Salt & Matches Ration Tin 1943 Bush Shirt

An exceptional original third-variant MkI Airborne Troops steel helmet in near unissued condition.  
Aside from minor fine abbrasion to the paint the condition is not far from mint. An investment grade  
example of these extremely sought after helmets.  
1943 MkII Vickers Machine Gun Clinometer Sight  
1943 No2 MkIII Binoculars

Bought from the son of the veteran who wore this hat in Burma during WWII (along with his jungle cape also listed), an excellent slouch hat retaining its original and as yet unidentified woven silk flash. The hat retains its chin strap, is British made, 1943 dated and in a large size. An excellent example of these most sought after of hats.

A well used example to say the least. It is frayed, variously holed and the zip slider is lacking. It is however genuine, and retains both its tail and original label. One suitable for re-enacting or if wishing to make a display with a War-worn look. 1944 Field Craft Training Pamphlet 1944 Hair Brush 1944 Hair Brush 1944 Home Guard Postcard Photograph 1944 Indian Khkai Drill Trousers

Small Arms Training Volume I, Pamphlet No21, The Machine Carbine, 1944. The standard training manual on both the Sten and Thompson Machine Carbines at this period in the War. 28 pages including numerous illustrations. 1944 Sten and Thompson SMG Manual 1944 Thompson & Sten Manual 1944 Vickers Machine Gun Manual 1944 WAAF Battledress Trousers

An excellent example of the MkIV. An evolution of the MkIII, differing primarily in having the liner secured to the shell via a lift-the-dot fastener, allowing the shell to be used as a basin. Initially designed and introduced for issue in tropical theatres, it became general service issue post-War. This example is in superb condition. An excellent example of this Far East issue helmet. 1945 MkIV Steel Helmet

A personal thank you from the Divisional Commander Lieutenant Miles Dempsey 1945 Second Army Victory Thanksgiving Service Booklet 1945 Tropical Issue Map Case 1945 Tropical issue Shaving / Signaling Mirror 1945 Tropical Issue Signalling / Shaving Mirror 1945 Tropical Map Case 1946 dated Cotton Bandolier for .303 Rifle Ammunition

I have several pairs. Ideal for modification to resemble Wartime patterns for re-enacting purposes. Email your size requirements. 1950 dated Rifle Sling 1950's 17th Bn Parachute Regiment (9th DLI) Maroon Beret 1950's Cotton Rifle Ammunition Bandolier 1950's Cotton Rifle Ammunition Bandolier 1952 Signals Training Pamphlet 1955 Rifle & Bayonet Training Manual 1955 Sterling Submachine Gun Manual 1956 Sterling Submachine Gun Manual 1960's French Arms & Armour Auction Catalogue 1960's RAF Vulcan Aero Engine Starter Cartridge 1960's-1970's RAF Fast Jet Flying Helmet

An original MkIAM 'bone dome', G Type Flying Helmet and scarce M-Type Oxygen Mask. The G-type helmet isn't wired, and lacks the connectors for the mask, though these can be found. An iconic RAF flying helmet combination of the Cold War era. 1962 L1A3 Bayonet for the SLR Rifle 1967 Royal Artillery Code and Morse Notes 1970 RAF G-Type Flying Helmet 1975 Sterling Submachine Gun Manual 1977 Sterling Sub Machine Gun Manual 19th Century 'Brighton Bun' Campaign Candlesticks

An 8 inch example of these implements used by sailors for unpicking knots and the lays of rope prior to splicing. Commonplace with Royal Navy and other sailors during the age of sail, today examples are scarce and much sought after. 19th Hussars Cap Badge 19th Indian Division Bullion Flash 1st Anti-Aircraft Division Flash 1st Anti-Aircraft Division Flash 1st Anti-Aircraft Division Flash 1st Anti-Aircraft Division Flash 1st Canadian Army Engineers Flash

Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph is the autobiographical account of the experiences of "Lawrence of Arabia during the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Turks of 1916 to 1918. It is a truly unique work and most certainly a classic. This is a good copy of the first trade edition of 1935. 1st Guards Armoured Brigade Flash 1st Infantry Division Flashes 1st Infantry Division Flashes 1st Infantry Division North Staffordshire Regiment Flash 1st Infantry Division Patch 1st Infantry Division Royal Artillery Printed Flash 1st Infantry Division Royal Artillery printed Flash 1st Pattern F-S Fighting Knife with provenance

This week you are invited to take advantage on a 20% discount on invoice totals over £250. This offer applies to all listings other than those flagged as a New Addition. Simply follow the online

ordering process and if paying by cheque or bank transfer send payment of 80% of the invoice total. If paying by Paypal simply select this option and await our discounted invoice.

If you've been considering a purchase but wavering over price, now is your opportunity to take advantage of this time limited offer to sweeten the deal. 20mm Inert Round 20th Battalion Machine Gun Corps Photograph 21st Army Group GHQ Printed Flash 21st Army Group GHQ Printed Flash 21st Army Group LOC Troops / British Troops in France

A scarce original example 231st Infantry Brigade Flash 23rd (Southern) Corps Flash 24th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment Royal Artillery Flash 24th Independent Guards Brigade Group Flash 25th Indian Division Flash 27th Armoured Brigade Flash 28 ANZUK Flash 2nd Anti-Aircraft Division Flash 2nd Anti-Aircraft Division Flashes 2nd Anti-Aircraft Division Formation Sign

An excellent machine-embroidered felt example. 30 Corps printed Flash 31st Indian Armoured Division Flash 33rd Anti-Aircraft Brigade Royal Artillery Flash 33rd Indian Corps Flash 3rd Anti-Aircraft Division Flash 3rd Carabiniers Cap Badge 3rd Carabiniers Cap Badge 3rd Infantry Division Flash 3rd Infantry Division Flash 3rd Infantry Division Flash 3rd Infantry Division Royal Engineers 1940 Pattern BD Blouse

A rare original. 44th Division Flash 44th Division Flash 44th RTR North Somerset Yeomanry Cloth Shoulder Title 46th Division Flash 47th (London) Division Flash 47th (London) Division Flash 47th (London) Division Printed Flash 47th London Division Flash 48th (South Midland Division) Flash 48th Division Flash 48th Infantry Division Flash 49th (West Riding) Division Flash 49th (West Riding) Division Flash 49th (West Riding) Division Flash 49th (West Riding) Division printed Flashes 4th Anti-Aircraft Division Flash 4th Armoured Brigade Flash 4th Armoured Brigade Flash 4th Armoured Brigade Flash 4th Armoured Brigade North Africa Casualty Medal Group