



The African Military in the 21st Century

Report of the 2007 Tswalu Dialogue

3 – 6 May

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Front cover image:

A Ugandan soldier in the foreground during the largest military exercise ever held between East African Community nations and the United States, August 2006. Photo courtesy of Roger S. Duncan.

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1. The Summary and Report

1. The Summary and Report

The Tswalu Dialogue¹ was established in 2002 as a premier African forum to discuss issues of concern to continental development and security.

The 2007 Dialogue focused on the likely roles, shape and structure of the African military of the twenty-first century. There are a number of reasons why this topic is important.

First, security and stability is an essential prerequisite to development. Second, there remain security threats to a large number of African countries and many African militaries face short- or medium-term threats. Third, the African Union (AU) has undertaken to perform a range of security-related tasks on the continent, including diplomacy, peace support operations and humanitarian assistance. The African Standby Force (ASF) introduces, in this regard, another important aspect of co-operation in organizational and doctrinal matters. These responsibilities will undoubtedly increase in the future as Western militaries are unlikely to provide even a small percentage of the peacekeepers that the continent will need. Fourth, the number of democracies in Africa has increased substantially over the past quarter-century, raising new challenges about the practice of civil-military relations. And fifth, there are related concerns about the ability of African militaries – like their counterparts elsewhere – to deal with 21st century security issues: notably, terrorism, rebuilding failed states, and employing the appropriate technological tools.

Day One: Thursday 3 May 2007

Rory Stewart emphasized the impotence of international interventions from the Balkans to East Timor and particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. The key problems were not lack of planning, poor leadership, limited troop numbers or financial resources. Instead, the fundamental structure and norms of Western bureaucracies and societies are unsuited to nation-building. International actors almost never articulate a single objective or provide a coherent theory of nation-building. In Afghanistan, over sixty countries pursue contradictory policies. Even a single country such as the United States can dramatically change its political and economic objectives in Iraq, for example, from removing Saddam, to a highly ambitious project of creating a liberal democracy, to trying to leave and declare a victory, within a few months. The theories that underpin these missions are often unconvincing. They are characterized by the hasty and inappropriate application of ‘lessons learned’ from previous conflicts (many of which are contradictory) and highly simplistic assumptions about complex and opaque political processes.

This is exacerbated by the culture of the international soldiers, diplomats and development workers, who are generally uncomfortable with the compromises and difficulty of local politics, serve on very short tours and have little understanding or sympathy for local culture. Government bureaucracies have intrinsic problems of ineffectiveness and inefficiency even in a domestic context. But

¹ The Tswalu Dialogue is held according to ‘RUSI Rules’ – the papers are on the record but the discussion is not for attribution. This report was prepared by Drs Greg Mills and Terence McNamee.

abroad, these problems are exacerbated by the absence of media, inspectors or elections to regulate their activities abroad. International institutions are not accountable to local beneficiaries. This encourages their pursuit of highly idiosyncratic and whimsical policies, which are often irrelevant or even abhorrent to the local population. These are often driven by short-term fads and fashions in development theory. Particularly disturbing is the inappropriate application of a 'business school' model to state development through listing the key sectors for the creation of state authority and governance, and mapping out a linear, systematic plan to achieve an end-state of institutional proficiency and prosperity. Such a 'technocratic' approach is dangerously blind to the often opaque, rapidly evolving and 'primordial' reality of the local situation. It attempts to apply an abstract bureaucratic solution to a problem which is fundamentally about political leadership and political culture. The result is often surreally comical.

Not only do the bevy of international consultants, NGOs, technocrats, aid workers, diplomats, soldiers and management consultants lack sympathetic and detailed knowledge of local conditions and operating systems, but their presence as foreigners is a catalyst for local rejection and even insurrection. Modern Islam and the post-colonial experience inevitably make countries less and less tolerant of the intervention of foreigners and particularly foreign troops in their internal affairs. In Iraq, the US-led coalition has become an 'inadequate antibiotic': strong enough to suppress some symptoms of civil war but not strong enough to eliminate the disease. Indeed, the very presence of the troops has encouraged the civil war to evolve into a civil war 'super-bug', increasingly elusive and intractable and out of reach of an international solution.

The international community must acknowledge the primacy of power and politics in fragile, impoverished countries emerging from conflict. Weberian bureau-

cratic reform is much less important than the political struggle to create a narrative of national identity. This process must fundamentally be led by local political culture and local politicians. The international community has to resist the temptation to micromanage and interfere. It will have to accept considerable sacrifices and compromises. Many of the objectives and values of the international community: democratization, security, human rights, development are not logically connected and in some cases are in fact mutually contradictory. Difficult choices will need to be made between cherished values, priorities set and there will have to be considerable tolerance for the often disturbing methods of local politicians. There is no sure recipe for nation-building and the process will always be bewildering, unpredictable, anarchic and painfully slow. The international community – and the military which is at the coalface of such operations – must accept local ways of doing things and to find the means to build local capacity while strengthening local legitimacy – a difficult and often contradictory task which, handled incorrectly, can undermine local efforts to strengthen identity and ownership.

The international community must recognize how little it knows and how little it can do. Such limitations are not transient weaknesses: they reflect fundamental elements of our bureaucratic and political culture and ideologies, which cannot simply be changed through a new policy initiative. We must learn to recognize the strength that already exists within local societies and their resistance to foreign pressure. We must acknowledge that we often lack the power, the consent or the legitimacy to intervene at all. When we do, we should be modest in our ambitions and cautious in our prescriptions. Yet optimism remains: we know less and can do less than we pretend but we know more and can do more than we fear.

Day Two: Friday 4 May 2007
Current and Emerging African Security Threats

Admiral **Richard Cobbold** ranged widely in his presentation, outlining the contemporary international landscape in the context of an increasingly globalized world. The main challenges he identified were the rise of asymmetric warfare and the development of effective strategies (including exit strategies) to combat asymmetric opponents; developing a consensual framework for humanitarian intervention; the impact of climate change on international security; and the potential for conflict arising from America's relative decline in power to, in particular, China and a renascent Russia. The rapid growth of the former's interests and involvement in Africa was identified as another potential trigger for conflict, as China seeks to meet its vast energy through exploitation of the continent's resources.

In his presentation on the current and emerging security threats and challenges facing the African Union, **Geoffrey Mugumya** provided an African perspective. He traced its historical trajectory from the core idea of Pan-Africanism and the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in the early 1960s; the 1970s' and 1980s' commitment to address mercenary activity on the continent and support liberation struggles; the fundamental shift in security challenges in the wake of the end of the Cold War; and the enormous implications for African security arising from globalization. Mugumya argued that this development has brought forth a new definition of defence and security which is especially pertinent to Africa. Previously, it was understood in terms of state survival and protection from external aggression, whereas now it is perceived in terms of ecological and environmental degradation, endemic poverty, access to medical and food resources, and so forth. He concluded by outlining how African leaders have responded to these new security threats, with conventions and treaties, ranging from the

African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone to the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the Africa Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.

Discussion

Three broad themes emerged from the discussion which followed. Firstly, as the security agenda has expanded dramatically in the post-Cold War world, and more specifically since 9/11, several discussants asked bluntly: what are African armed forces *for*? It was generally accepted that addressing human security issues – famine, HIV, displaced persons, and so on – is a prerequisite for African development, but there were contrasting views on the proper level of military involvement in these issues, and in particular concerns were expressed that the expansion of the security agenda threatens democratization efforts. It was suggested that the more you engage the military in development tasks, the greater the risk to civilian governance. The imperative for the military to remain apolitical was reinforced and so too was the necessity to exercise extreme caution before widening the military's role.

The second key theme was the tension between collective defence, as embodied in the African Union and the proposed African Standby Force, and the continuing preponderance of state-centric notions of defence and security. The weight of expectations on the African Union is enormous. But there is no clear consensus on how to build sufficient capacity and resolve the question of hybridity of AU forces. Moreover, there is perhaps an air of unreality surrounding African discussions of collective defence when one considers how problematic and tenuous even the most apparently stable of alliances – such as NATO – are in practice. Indeed, it was provocatively suggested that Africa may in fact be swimming against the tide in trying to forge such a comprehensive, continent-wide defence pact. Hard-nosed realism must be applied to answering the question of

whether there is sufficient political will to sustain an African military alliance.

A related issue is the apparent disconnect, highlighted by a number of discussants, between what the West believes Africa should be doing and how Africa wants to approach continental defence and security issues. The near universal desire for African solutions to African problems has not translated into agreement, between the West and Africa, on the way forward. What's more, doubt was cast on the relevance and appropriateness of 'Sandhurst or West Point military thinking and training' to the African context.

A third key theme which arose from the debate centred on what lessons African states are drawing from the Iraq and Afghanistan imbroglios. Specifically, does the demonstrable success of asymmetric warfare in those cases have implications for the way African states may choose to adapt or develop its force structures? Indeed, it was proffered by one of the discussants that this phenomenon has perhaps served to enhance African capabilities in relative terms.

In the past few years, with the rise of Al-Qa'ida and other extremist groups, we have witnessed the weakening of the state order. Some of the solutions adopted to address this crisis have only weakened the state order further. At the same time, in Africa, we are witnessing an increasing militarization of the continent – and this is a dynamic that is perhaps unique to the African continent. It was argued that the greatest challenge to Africa *from a security perspective* remains state-building – in other words, building effective governance and an accountable state. This task is severely undermined by endemic unemployment, which provides a near limitless supply of 'arms for hire'. It was robustly asserted that the challenge of state-building is still more important to the continent than terrorism, external intervention and even climate change, an issue which was recognized as a new, significant driver of conflict. In this regard, increas-

ing scarcity of resources due to climate change, especially water resources, represented a major and growing threat, which may serve as a catalyst to a new generation of African conflicts. Most alarmingly, it was observed by one discussant that 'climate wars' may be the trigger for destroying the African consensus on the inviolability of African borders. In the absence of collective responses to climate change, the spectre of national armed forces invading neighbouring states and capturing territory to secure access to water or energy supplies becomes very real.

Assessing the African Military

The session was chaired by **Barry Desker** and focused on the emerging threats to security on the continent, current military capacity across Africa and the military as one of many instruments of state that can be applied to meet the variety of challenges. Major General **Arnold Fields** observed that security is imperative if societies and nations are to realize their full measure of success in meeting the needs and expectations of the people. And as the impact of globalization continues – moving goods services, and cultures around the globe, enhanced by an incredible revolution in technology and communications – national security has rapidly become a global issue and no longer the exclusive concern of the sovereign state. National, regional, and continental concerns will prevail, but with considerable scrutiny and likely intervention by the international community. This very complex set of dynamics, together with the new 'terror' factor, has produced a climate that is unstable, unpredictable, and best described as asymmetrical. Military organizations of Africa, the super-powers, and elsewhere are at a cross-road in defining the best way ahead – the extent to which conventional doctrine and hardware are applicable to the contemporary battle space. The African military must adjust accordingly and will need the support of the international community. To

this end, certain social structures should be in place in order to help garner international willingness and confidence to invest in Africa's reconstruction. Democratic governance and a well-defined and transparent national security strategy will most likely be the minimum expectations of the donor community.

Brigadier General **Frank Rusagara** used the example of the role played by the Rwandan armed forces in the rebuilding of the state in the aftermath of the genocide in 1994. With the collapse of law and order, law enforcement agencies and judicial institutions had ceased to function; state administration had disappeared taking with it hospitals, schools and social services; economic infrastructure was non-existent; atrocities were continuing and a vulnerable and traumatized population were easy targets for crime and exploitation. The Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process, whereby the ex-combatants were re-integrated into the armed forces and general society, provided the foundation for the re-establishment of security and stability – a cornerstone for the rebuilding of the nation. The Rwanda model as a whole was effected through the traditional concept of *Ingando* (solidarity camps), which helped former combatants: overcome mutual fear and suspicion, and the temptation for revenge; talk about the history of the conflict; heal the wounds of hatred; accept responsibility for any harm done to each other; demystify negative perceptions of each other; build collective ownership of the tragedy that resulted from the conflict; and, agree on what the future holds for them. Admiral **Steve Stead** presented an argument for clear national interests to guide the capacity and capability of the military. This could be extended to the regional and continental levels, thereby providing material and infrastructural support to the Africa Standby Force and the regional brigades – given their increasing importance as an instrument for the preservation of African peace and security. The

current practice of deploying the military as a first resort on every occasion of instability, and expecting it to contend with all eventualities, should be re-assessed with the emphasis on an inter-departmental approach.

Discussion

In the discussion that followed, it was observed that the military now stood at a major crossroads about its future role. Globalization and new and complex human security issues have created an altogether more challenging – and confusing – security environment for Africa. It was suggested that this new security environment made it all the more imperative for African nations to define their roles within transparent national security strategies, founded on constitutionality and involving wide popular participation in the process. By doing so, the primacy of civilian state-building over military action would be reinforced.

Another central theme to emerge from the discussion were the challenges presented by limited resources and asymmetric warfare. African militaries need to define their roles to suit their budgets; it was unrealistic to expect the average African country with its scant budget to be able to finance all the functions expected of militaries generally in the current complex military environment, including classic defence against external aggression, regional peacekeeping (smaller states should not be expected to overstretch themselves by getting involved in regional peacekeeping) and asymmetrical warfare. Given the newfound prominence of the latter, there was rigorous debate on its implications for Africa and the tactics, techniques and doctrine that might be appropriate to the African context.

A third key point addressed by the discussants followed the presentation on Rwanda, namely should state building always precede military action or vice versa – is it possible to build state institutions in an insecure country? If not, does that mean that it is

up to the military to act first? Rwanda's military led the country in reconstructing what was a near failed state, with the collapse of nearly all institutions, after the 1994 genocide, and has successfully integrated the soldiers of the old Rwandese army and the Rwanda Patriotic Front into an entirely new army, with all the challenges of reconciliation which that entailed. This had set a precedent for a similar process among civilians. What lessons does Rwanda hold for the rest of Africa?

One final note of caution touched on the unfortunate tradition within African militaries to conceive their role as protecting the regime rather than the state or the people, which has led them to becoming embroiled in inappropriate internal operations. Given this historical proclivity, there was a danger that training an African Standby Force might backfire – by enhancing the capacity of states to use their militaries for the wrong ends, as Uganda had used its US-trained forces to invade the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The New Global Security Agenda: How Might we Deal with it?

General **Ved Malik** addressed the fundamental change in the concepts, paradigms and complexities of national, regional and global security. He attributes these changes to three key factors: first, the rapid advances made in science and technology, particularly information technology; second, the demise of bilateral international relations and traditional concepts of state sovereignty, which has been supplanted by globalization and new multilateral and regional frameworks; and third, the more liberal approach to security, which has moved beyond traditional defence related threats to encompass societal, economic and environmental dimensions. General Malik highlighted a number of new security threats and challenges, which he argued were more diverse and multi-dimensional than anything which has come before. These include not just insurgencies and cross-border terrorism,

but also environmental degradation, economic under-development and corruption, and diseases such as AIDS. He concluded with a number of observations on how we might approach these new security challenges. In doing so he emphasized the importance of speed of response to evolving crises; the need for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; and the role of information operations, which are increasingly vital because of the growing transparency of the battlefield to the public in our non-stop, globalized media age. He drew a final observation on counter-terrorism from his own experience in India, and highlighted the necessity to integrate a 'hearts and minds' element into the overall counter-terrorism strategy.

Discussion

In the brief discussion which followed General Malik's address, the friction between short- and long-term imperatives, and between hard and soft power, was emphasized as a core consideration in the new, post-9/11 security environment. It was suggested that there are three phases, which work in a sequential time-frame, that are more or less applicable to any counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency operation. The first is the necessary exercise of hard power, the second is the transition to limited soft-power instruments whilst maintaining a hard power component to be deployed if required, and the third is the full handover to civilian institutions. The unique Indian security context was discussed in relation to Pakistan and Sri Lanka, and the instruments India has used to ameliorate those two different conflicts were highlighted.

Assessing Continental Responses to Security Needs

The third and final session on the first day assessed African responses to continental security needs.

Lieutenant General **Daniel Opande** drew on his own extensive peacekeeping experience in providing a comprehensive record of recent regional and sub-regional missions on the continent in delivering peace and stability. Observations and lessons were outlined from the experiences of Liberia and Sierra Leone – two deployments which occurred under exceptionally difficult circumstances – and the extent to which those missions informed the AU mission to Darfur. He highlighted the myriad obstacles to achieving sustainable peace and security in Sudan, one of which was the problem of mandate – which in this case was wholly inadequate – the other insufficient equipment and resources. Another significant challenge General Opande identified was developing the ability to handle more than one peacekeeping mission at the same time.

Dr **Martin Rupiya** began by putting out a challenge to the Dialogue: identify what the African military *is*? He argued that, at present, too many people have unrealistic expectations of what African militaries can achieve; he stressed that they needed time to develop capabilities, doctrine and mandate. And the problem of finite resources had a severely limiting impact on their operational effectiveness. Dr Rupiya observed that one of the key drivers in motivating African states to reconsider how they structure their collective defence efforts was the US imbroglio in Somalia. The departure of US forces and explicit rejection of the idea of future African military operations in the wake of Somalia in 1994 forced Africa to get its house in order. He noted, too, that although the transition from the OAU to the AU has been successful, the whole question of sovereignty has – under AU structures – become problematic. Where the idea of territorial inviolability was sacrosanct under the OAU, it has weakened under the AU. Another problem identified was the reluctance of African countries to take the lead role in a mission and to release completely command and control to commanders from other nations. In respect of

AU relations with the UN, gaps were identified in terms of policy direction and harmonization, one recent example being Operation Artemis in the Congo and the AU.

Mr **Saki Macozoma** presented a view from the private sector, with particular reference to South Africa. He traced South African defence policy from democratization in 1994 to the present day, arguing that there was no meaningful threat assessment carried out in the mid-1990s, which partly explains some of the fundamental problems experienced by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) today. Mr Macozoma noted that the historical experience of the military meddling in politics is still a lingering issue in the minds of people and therefore South Africans and Africans in general, are largely wary of resourcing armies and giving them their support. The negative perceptions of the military in civil society is a fundamental challenge. In the case of South Africa, there is a widespread view that spending on the military is exorbitant, in light of the country's pressing socio-economic challenges – namely crime and AIDS – which most of its citizenry believe should take precedence. A question that arises is whether the SANDF will be able to draw on the best brains available in order to play the role it can potentially play in the state's development in the future.

Discussion

A central question posed at the outset of the discussion was what are the lessons learned – if any – in previous African missions and how are they being applied in Sudan? Pessimism was expressed, insofar as some of the mistakes of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Ivory Coast missions are being repeated. Indeed, and following on from Rory Stewart's opening address of the Dialogue, even the phrase 'lessons learned' came under scrutiny, so frequently has it been used glibly and as an excuse for not thinking adequately about whether cross-case comparisons are valid or

useful. It was suggested that ‘appropriate solutions to African problems’ might be a constructive replacement for that term.

The issue which produced the fiercest debate centred on appropriate mandates for African peacekeeping missions. It was noted that the peacekeeping instrument does not sit well with the UN Charter – it worked well during the Cold War but not in the post-Cold War era of complex emergencies, which demand a new international legal framework. To date, African peacekeeping mandates have been the product of ad hoc discussion rather than comprehensive assessments. There was sharp disagreement on whether to deploy missions in the absence of an agreement. The United Nations does not do this, the logic being that without agreement there is no clear frame of reference to guide the mission. The African Union, on the other hand, has an obligation to intervene in its constitution in whatever circumstances; the first imperative is to protect civilians. As such, missions like Darfur operate without an AU mandate, and thus the force turns to the UN Chapter framework for guidance and in particular the rules of engagement. That is the key, for without a mandate you cannot have set rules of engagement.

Another major issue to emerge in the discussion was over ‘gaps’ – who meets shortcomings in the essential needs: the AU or the UN and international community? It was asserted that some crises on the African continent are *international* crises – Rwanda, for instance – that cannot be confined to the continent: there is an international responsibility in such cases. There are also gaps between what AU leaders say and how they act – a lot more consistency and coherence are required.

One of the main challenges identified was the creation of effective conflict prevention mechanisms, which link with questions about what the AU’s role is in the setting of norms. What can the AU do by way of contributing to norm development – one suggestion was to begin professional monitoring of

the agreements they have made. A key point to acknowledge is that the AU does not have the resources nor will it ever have the full multi-dimensional peacekeeping capacity. African peacekeeping is entirely dependent on international funding, and thus we need to be realistic about what it can achieve. It was suggested that the AU is at the moment biting off more than it can chew.

The discussion ended with a powerful call for soldiers – who had been largely ignored in the discussion – *never to be taken for granted*. Peacekeepers must be trained and adequately equipped to exercise lethal force when necessary. We must not lose sight of that reality: they are soldiers. Whatever else they are tasked to do, that element will always remain part of their jobs.

The Military and State Rebuilding

Major General **Chris Brown** described the nature of international operations in Afghanistan as an example of state rebuilding, albeit an extraordinarily complex one. He began by outlining the political context in Afghanistan which prevailed when ISAF IX commenced in May 2006. This was a context in which the basic structures of democracy had been established, but in practice were largely unrealized. The aim was to stabilize the security situation to a point in which they, the intervening force, could hand over as much control to local authority as the situation would permit. One of the principal difficulties ISAF IX encountered were the expectations of the local populace, who were led to believe that ‘democracy’ would bring significant, tangible benefits – and this was largely not the case. He raised doubts over whether the acute emphasis of the international community on establishing democracy was wise or realistic, given the desperate condition of the state (after twenty-five years of war) and absence of a democratic tradition.

Brown highlighted the critical core of how ISAF IX was going to operate, and that was to concentrate efforts and activities on

those that received the consent of Afghans and was consistent with the objectives of the Government of Afghanistan. Of significant relevance to Africa, he noted that any attempt to categorize or phase a peacekeeping operation can be immensely problematic, as the experience of ISAF IX revealed.

The military aim was to get the Afghan government to grip and co-ordinate the situation – but the government was simply incapable of doing this. So under General Richards' direction, ISAF IX established what was in effect a national security council, the Policy Action Group, which was split into four sub-groups or pillars, answerable to President Karzai. They divided the country into what were termed Afghan Development Zones. Water drilling and road building projects would be rolled out in these areas with the military in the lead, so the average Afghan in the area would be seeing not only a military security effort but also a development effort led by the military. However imperfect, these efforts did have the effect of facilitating and underpinning, according to General Brown, the intent of ISAF IX in extending and expanding GOA authority into the regions. The rub was that the military could not do this without, simultaneously, being prepared to fight. And this was the case, as the Taliban re-emerged to thwart wherever possible ISAF IX's development efforts. The result was NATO's first and only brigade-sized battle to defeat the Taliban in a southern district of Afghanistan.

The message here was that boots on the ground were important – if not essential – to stabilizing the situation. The short-term support to stability operations involved a major joint-effort with numerous players, including indigenous forces and, amongst others, USAID. Indeed, it was of fundamental importance to create a competent and capable indigenous force. But one key question ISAF IX had to address is: what do you train the indigenous army to do? Peacekeeping, not war-fighting, is Brown's suggestion. He argues that, above all, establishing indige-

nous forces as the 'face of security' in the villages should be the number one priority, and that lesson is germane to the African context.

Brown highlighted the fact that there is no one template that can be rolled out and grafted onto environments of insecurity subject to international forces' involvement. He made no claims for the appropriateness to African states of the overall structure he and ISAF IX developed for Afghanistan. But Brown concluded by restating the critical issue – which is of relevance to Africa – that it must be decided who is leading and also the conditions whereby a determination can be made to hand over control to local authorities. In the context of a multinational operation, he reminds us that every nation will come with a clear set of guidelines on what they can do and what they can't do, and invariably this will present political and operational challenges that will never be entirely resolved. Instead, you will, as ever, have to work with the cards you are dealt.

Discussion

In the discussion that followed, Brown was challenged to explain the phasing of the Afghan peacekeeping operation and the factors that determined when transitions to different phases would take place.

It was suggested that seen from the Afghan perspective, what ISAF IX achieved was not sustainable – and the very nature of international action was transitory or temporary. As a consequence, Afghans were likely to view even successes with some circumspection. Is NATO, and for that matter the international community, not facing up to some hard truths about the population, whether it is the Afghans or any other people subjected to foreign occupation: they will take your money and may acquiesce temporarily, but will not shift allegiances fundamentally and permanently. The imperative to radically adjust the international community's commitment in terms of time-frame to a peacebuilding operation was stressed.

Realistic time-frames may be in the range of generations – twenty to thirty years. Is there the political will to sustain such long-term commitments? It was suggested that contributing nations' political will and local population support will depend greatly on whether information operations are firmly rooted in substance or not.

One of the discussants observed that there was an absolute imperative to not just concentrate on fighting the Taliban but in making the Taliban *irrelevant*. It was re-emphasized that the military aspect was in Afghanistan, and undoubtedly will be so elsewhere in the future, the *easy bit*. There are tremendous difficulties in striking the balance between an Afghan-owned process and the initiatives that we, whether ISAF IX or the international community, are introducing in the interests of the local population but are nonetheless *our* initiatives, not theirs. How can we be sure of their commitment, or buy in, to foreign-imposed initiatives? A related point was the balance between central ownership and rural/village ownership – this was a difficult and delicate task, involving a sophisticated public relations and branding strategy.

There was broad agreement amongst the discussants that there was something fundamental to the Afghanistan equation that was missing – and that was *the politics*. What that means in practice is that attempting to engage the Taliban is essential, at some point down the road, otherwise an ultimate political settlement will remain elusive. You have to be prepared to deal with and incorporate the former insurgents as they start to realize that their efforts are becoming irrelevant. Another central part of any final settlement was Pakistan – can we fix Afghanistan without fixing Pakistan? In this sense we need to begin to look at Afghanistan more as a regional issue.

It was observed by one of the discussants that in the context of asymmetric warfare that technology may be as much a hindrance as an asset. Theatre-level intelligence

capabilities were highlighted as critical, but at the same time we must recognize that in Afghanistan – and potentially in future peacebuilding or stabilization operations in Africa – the enemy is increasingly able to get below the threshold where we can turn to our advantage our technological ascendancy.

Day Three: Saturday 5 May 2007

The session on Day Three divided into two groups: 'The African Standby Force (ASF) and peacekeeping in Africa: What are the core challenges?'; and 'AFRICOM: What will it mean and do for Africa?'

Professor **Christopher Clapham** led the discussion on the historical experience of peacekeeping in Africa. Overall, he noted that there had been a dramatic change in attitude by African states to continental security matters, acting today where they would scarcely have been thinking a few years ago. He posed a number of key questions which stimulated a wide-ranging discussion on the role of the ASF:

- What can a military and peacekeepers achieve, since one should not think of peacekeepers being able to heal all of Africa's wounds?
- What is the political environment into which peacekeepers will be inserted, since conflict situations are deeply contested and an intervening force will inevitably benefit or disadvantage protagonists, most often the weak over the strong?
- What kind of peacekeeping operations might Africa be letting itself in for: traditional peacekeeping operations; 'holding the ring' for a settlement to take effect; wider peacekeeping in more fluid circumstances *à la* Somalia, in which it is easy to be dragged into extremely difficult circumstances; or peace enforcement in which there is a need to match commitment with the military agenda – such as with the

British intervention in Sierra Leone, Ethiopia in Somalia, and the French in Cote d'Ivoire?

Discussion

Two key additional questions shaped the discussion which followed: how will the ASF fit into this environment; and where should we be going overall with peacekeeping in Africa?

It was noted that the ASF is a crisis intervention force, acting at short notice in a peace enforcement role. It is ultimately to be made up of five brigades (one per region), with the troops paid for by the national contributors and the bulk of deployment costs being met by foreign donors. Six scenarios have been envisaged for the ASF:

1. AU and regional organization military advice for a political mission.
2. AU and regional organization military observer mission co-deployed with the UN mission.
3. Stand alone AU and regional organization observer mission.
4. AU and regional organization peacekeeping force for Chapter VI UN and preventive deployment missions.
5. AU peacekeeping for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions – involving low-level spoilers as in many of the ongoing conflicts.
6. AU intervention such as in the case of genocide or where the international community does not act promptly.

Two sets of problems were identified with this approach: each at the tactical and strategic levels. Tactically, the discussion focused on capability issues relating to military interoperability, rules of engagement, financial support, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capability, airlift, and training and equipment. It was felt that local, African funding for missions was critical as it ensured a degree of local commitment as a 'statement of the priority assigned' by Africans –

and not simply the international community – to such missions. In reality, given the absence of theatre-level deployment capabilities by most African countries even acting in conjunction with each other, reliance on foreign assets would be inevitable. AFRICOM could, along with other actors, play a role in this regard.

The more difficult questions, however, existed at the political level in 'linking peace to politics'. The ASF could never be a substitute for diplomacy. Although, there was a need to link military intervention (holding the ring) with political action. Peacekeeping as a form of conflict management, mediation and resolution were inseparable. It was felt that there was no point to deploying an AU force in the absence of a political strategy to deal with the impasse that had led to the military intervention in the first instance. The ASF should be a prompt for diplomacy. Every likely current scenario for the deployment of the ASF according to categories five and six (above) would, too, probably occur *without* the consent of key local actors, placing diplomatic skill and political will at a premium. In Darfur, for example, Africa had essentially been a 'surrogate' to the political demands of the US.

Ms **Theresa Whelan** provided a macro-overview of the newly-announced US African military command – AFRICOM. She made the fundamental point that AFRICOM reflects an *evolution* in US strategic thinking; discussions on a functional and geographic unified command for Africa had been going on for decades within the Pentagon. The early debates on AFRICOM were linked to the Cold War rivalry in Africa and humanitarian considerations, but were given renewed urgency in the wake of 9/11. That event made clear that Africa was integral, not peripheral, to global security and US security in particular in the post 9/11 world. She addressed several of the myths and misconceptions about AFRICOM, including the view that its primary purpose will be to secure access to African oil, as well as ques-

tions about establishing a single headquarters or a distributed presence, covering the seams of the previous command structures, staffing the Command and the process of consultation with African states. Ms Whelan emphasized that building security capacity and aiding (where appropriate) the state-building process was at the core of AFRICOM, and as such the force which will constitute the Command will be non-kinetic.

Discussion

The robust debate which followed Ms Whelan's presentation revealed scepticism amongst the discussants on US intentions for AFRICOM, its prospects for success, and the extent to which AFRICOM constitutes a true partnership with African states.

One of the principal points of tension identified by the discussants was how AFRICOM would aid – or hinder – peacebuilding and state-building in Africa. Do the interests of African states collide or cohere with US interests? It was provocatively suggested that AFRICOM was far less about peacebuilding and mutual security interests than about establishing forward bases for launching US attacks on its adversaries or, at best, strictly aimed at ensuring that African states do not become terrorist havens that could mount attacks against US interests in Africa or elsewhere. This was strongly disputed, as was the suggestion that AFRICOM would lead to a series of US garrisons dotted around the continent; but it was widely recognized that there is a perception gap between African governments and populations and US' stated intentions. One discussant observed that there was a contradiction between the intent to establish a four-star commander in charge of AFRICOM and the plan to equip it with a non-kinetic capability.

It was emphasized repeatedly in the discussion that strong African states with good governance is America's best defence, which will be a key factor in establishing the range of capabilities that will be made available to

AFRICOM. But a powerful argument was made that the largely dismal record of the state-building enterprises US-led coalition military forces are involved in in Iraq and Afghanistan should cause military planners to re-assess the AFRICOM concept.

One discussant made the cogent comparison of Germany and Japan – both of which were reconstructed by Western (and Russian) militaries at the end of the Second World War. The central difference in those cases was that both the industrialized nations of Germany and Japan, their leaders and populations, *wanted* to a great extent to become like (above all) the US. Conversely, in Iraq and Afghanistan it seems palpably the case that their leaders and people *do not* want to be like America – hence the woeful performance of the state-building enterprises in those countries. The relevance for Africa is: what if the majority of African states and their populations do not want to live like Americans, they do not share American values and morals? What are the prospects for AFRICOM's success when it appears that Washington is transplanting an inappropriate template or model for the African context? Why do Western states continue to believe they can engineer societies from the outside when the record of previous attempts to do so is so abysmal? In light of these concerns, it was suggested that the whole underlying assumptions of AFRICOM have to be much more forgiving of and sensitive to local conditions and traditions.

One discussant reminded the delegates that the US military, despite its intent to cooperate with other elements of the US government more directly in promoting good governance, justice, the rule of law, and so forth in Africa, will 'stay in its lane' – *i.e.*, it is not seeking to get in the business of doing what the State Department and USAID are designed for. AFRICOM seeks to become a piece of the good governance equation – but just a piece, not the lead player. And it was essential to bear in mind that all too often the US finds itself in a Catch-22 situation – it is

damned if it does and damned if it does not: if it entirely ignored the governance agenda, it would be criticised for overly concentrating on the military aspect. And African countries must not be so naïve as to assume that the US is going to behave any differently than any other sovereign nation which pursues its own fundamental interest.

Another key component of the discussion centred on the power and weight of the US Department of Defense in relation to USAID and the State Department. It was noted by some discussants that the perception in Africa was that, increasingly, the face of the US on the continent is a military one, whereas the influence and presence of the State Department and USAID is diminishing. This view amongst Africans was reinforcing negative perceptions of US intentions and causing alarm about the prospect of increasing militarization of US foreign policy in Africa. The sheer size of a large US military component – the example of Djibouti was highlighted – was in itself a problem and added to the perceptual gap over intentions. Yet the reality, it was asserted, was in fact very different. The US intent was, on the contrary, to keep the military footprint as light as possible, which is one of the first principles of AFRICOM. Furthermore, State and USAID have the more significant financial and legal resources and leverage in deciding priorities and structuring the response to security issues in Africa. Moreover, it was noted that for the first time within a US overseas command, State Department and USAID officials will be integrated into the command structure.

Another core theme which emerged from the discussion is the process of consultation and negotiation, specifically the extent to which AFRICOM will be a true partnership with Africa, as Washington claims, or merely a consultative relationship, one which the US engages and consults on security only when it deems it in their interests to do so. The past record suggests that true partnerships with African states have proved impos-

sible to achieve, partly because the US possesses such disproportionate power in relation to Africa. The nature of US consultation was widely seen as critical; indeed, the process of consultation and how the relationship develops over AFRICOM before it is stood up is perhaps as, or even more, important than the end-state. This process will cement perceptions in Africa over whether African requirements and concerns have been adequately integrated into the final shape of AFRICOM. In this vein, a compelling suggestion was proffered that the consultation process represents a unique opportunity to 're-brand' America's image in the eyes of Africans. At present, there is marked scepticism and suspicion across the continent; but if there is genuine and high-profile consultations that can be marketed and promoted to Africans as a mutually beneficial *partnership*, it could result in a significantly rehabilitated image of the US in African eyes. What could allay some of the scepticism and bridge the perception gap between Africa and America in the interim is more information about how the consultation process is going – presently – and what precisely the combined efforts being undertaken are to bring peace and stability in Africa.

Day Four: Sunday 6 May 2007

Summary and Conclusions

Ambassador **Patrick Mazimhaka** reviewed the key themes emerging from the Dialogue. He highlighted a number of significant points of agreement amongst the discussants, including the need to establish common defence policy and structures and ensure human security in its broadest sense. Ambassador Mazimhaka noted that although the militarization of Africa was addressed in the discussions, the issue of small arms was notably under-examined, and he expressed concern that its destabilizing effect on African security is not fully appreciated. Another point of concern he highlighted was

the possible subversion of the ASF's role through undue influence by certain member states, whose agendas may clash with the collective will. A final key issue he addressed was the funding of peacekeeping missions, and in particular how that relates to questions of sovereignty and responsibility *vis-à-vis* the rest of the international community.

Ambassador **Johnnie Carson** provided a commentary on some of the broad trends in the changing global security context and the new security challenges: the rise of China and India, and the implications inhering from a future multi-polar world; globalization and the reduction of the barriers that divide nations; and transnational security threats, from asymmetric warfare and terrorism to complex emergencies and climate change. Like Patrick Mazimhaka, Ambassador Carson addressed the numerous challenges Africa faces in mounting significant, long-term peacekeeping missions, especially limited resources. African states have made important symbolic contributions but Africa's ability to act independently is severely hampered by lack of equipment, logistical support, and air-lift to make their missions enduring and ultimately successful. Also problematic was the absence of a clear mandate for missions and soldiers' rules of engagement, and strict guidelines for when and under what conditions to intervene. He ended by calling for problems to be addressed in a comprehensive and systematic fashion, lest the entire peacekeeping mechanism becomes tarnished in the eyes of the global community.

Dr **Greg Mills** identified the factors that shape militaries. These were categorised by Mills in two respects: those factors which remain the same this decade as they did in an earlier era; and those that are different this decade.

In the first category, military role and capabilities are defined by what a nation is and wants to be. It is a tool to deal with those threats in the way of achieving its goals as a society – roles which can be described as the

protection of the state and promotion of values.

Setting up the right structure and buying the right tools for the military's primary task depends on a clear assessment of future threats. Historically, prediction remains an art rather than a science, no different today as it was in the past. One only has to look at 9/11 to see how difficult prediction is. Equally, defence planning has to take into account the capabilities of likely foes and allies, though this, too, is a task fraught with suspicion, misperception and inaccuracy.

Preparing for the tasks that arise out of this threat-definition process remains problematic, too. There remain inexorably long lead times in the development of appropriate technologies (even though paradoxically these very technologies are supposed to make things easier to build), meaning that even if they do not want to, generals and admirals end up fighting the last war with the tools they have inherited for that task. Yet future defence and military needs can only, at best, partly be gauged by current experiences and extrapolations. Logistics remain all-important to military proficiency, today arguably more so than in the past, given the level of technologies involved.

In terms of these factors, military capacity and posture remain to offer a Clausewitzian aphorism, defined by politics and nationalism. What, in contrast, has changed?

First, the international environment is more complex and multi-disciplinary, and faster-paced. We are operating in a 24/7 hyper-media world, which can change perceptions faster and among a larger audience than any operation on the ground. The presence of more governmental and non-governmental actors (including private militaries) means that strategies for military and military-civilian co-operation are at a premium especially in the post-conflict peace-building phase of operations. The military cannot solve security challenges alone: at best, it can hold the line and apply pressure allowing

other economic, social, intelligence and developmental assets are brought to bear. The military is less likely today to be a decisive force for victory than ever before.

Second, some security drivers are different, with the emergence of new pressures of migration, climate change and water resource protection, energy and commodity security heightened by the economic rise of China and India, youth bulge and burgeoning urban populations notably in Africa, HIV-Aids, and terrorism of a transnational character. While 'international kleptomania' is as old as states themselves, increased pressures for foodstuffs and the growing power of non-state actors adds a layer of complexity to this threat.

Third, whether the emergence of a range of new state actors, notably China and India in Africa, makes life more difficult or easier for Africa is moot. The tradition of China's engagement suggests a concern less on Africa's needs than Beijing's, and the intersection between these may not always be to the best of interests of Africa's citizens rather than its elites. It highlights, again, the growing relevance of energy as a driver in considering security in Africa.

Fourth, the role and definition of security has changed, from state-centric to human security – even if the reality of its building blocks have not altered given the need for a strong, effective state to provide security, even human security. But the military have to deal with the consequences of the collapse or erosion of state capacity; the effects of which are potentially catastrophic for people, states and regions alike, as Iraq shows. And they also have to deal with the expectations of people fed by a global media but which have to be satiated at home.

Fifth, related to the above, the military are generally expected to do more with less. They are expected not only to be 'thought leaders' in military doctrine but in the theory and practice of state-building. In this they face a new very tricky challenge: engaging in the political affairs demanded by peacebuilding, a

role better suited to proconsuls and commissars rather than colonels and corporals.

Sixth, while the military remains a key tool – and sometimes the lead agent – for conflict resolution, they also have to be astute political actors in this regard. What does effective mediation require? It relates closely to peacebuilding. It requires helping local actors get where they want to go, not giving them an external solution. It demands even-handedness and perceptions thereof, knowledge of local conditions and actors (where the military's intelligence functions are important) and the application of time, effort, leadership and careful method.

Seventh, the very stuff that militaries depend on – people – has altered, as they have continued to do over the centuries. Today's generation is not only more technology-oriented, they inevitably might have different values. Today's 'iPod generation' – and whatever follows them – may however be less suited to tough military life. How this changes the role of the military within society is moot. It may well reinforce their classification as a distinct elite (or underclass) rather than a citizen force. The age-old warrior ethos of duty, honour and selfless sacrifice still exists – in varying degrees – amongst soldiers across the world. But widespread anti-militarism is prevalent in many states, including in Africa.

Eighth, whereas technology is seen as a great force multiplier, in today's asymmetric warfare environment we at least recognize clear limits to the balance between quality and quantity, technology and numbers. Nor should the role of bureaucratic process in military planning be a substitute for the effects of boots on the ground – the essential difference between the logic of accountants and admirals. Capacity, moreover, is more than just a sum of military assets. Contrary to the reasoning of bean counters, it incorporates the value of industrial prowess and human and physical infrastructure from skills to bases underpinning operational capability. And the overwhelming focus on

the need for new hardware has obscured the importance of having the right human software to get the job done – something the SANDF is all too aware of. Asymmetric warfare may in fact be to the *disadvantage* of African militaries, potentially emboldening and changing the balance between African populations/paramilitaries on the one hand, and militaries on the other.

Ninth, continental vision and regional initiatives play an increasing role in ensuring security, especially in Africa and the Middle East. The greater (at least rhetorical) engagement of the international community with matters of African development and security contrasts with the more active role by African-led and staffed peace support initiatives, mimicking the role of NATO in the Balkans, for instance. At the same time, we are today acutely aware of the limitations of collective defence (what Richard Cobbold referred to as ‘less than the sum of the parts’).

Finally, the traditional role of the African military has included domestic state-building, through the military’s ceremonial role inculcating a sense of pride and prestige as a national institution. Today, this has taken on a new dimension in terms of their expanding engagement as a key component of the criminal-justice system. Whether they should be doing this is moot.

So what does this add up to specifically for Africa?

- The military will be expected to do more with less – but the military needs to be discreet about what it takes on and what can be expected of it.
- Small is beautiful: we must be realistic

about what the military can achieve especially with regard to peacebuilding missions.

- Media (or information) operations are a crucial force multiplier.
- There is a growing role for technology especially in gathering intelligence, but technology cannot replace the need for boots on the ground.
- To deal with anti-military sentiment, the management of perceptions including branding is crucial.
- Finally, it is important to distinguish between the tactical and strategic issues facing African militaries in multinational operations: between questions of inter-operability, tactics, training, equipment, communications and so on; and the wider questions of mandate and of gearing the interventions towards political ends, as a tool of diplomatic action for example.

Discussion

In the brief discussion which followed the final session of the Dialogue, it was observed that AIDS was given scant attention over the previous three days. When, it was asked, will the catastrophic effect of AIDS on African human security be fully appreciated? The much newer threat of climate change was also highlighted, especially insofar as most African militaries are currently *not* prepared to deal with disasters emerging from it. The discussion ended on the specific issue of funding African militaries and peacekeeping missions, a subject that percolated during all sessions of the 2007 Tswalu Dialogue.

2. The African Context

The African Military in the Twenty-First Century

Martin Edmonds & Greg Mills

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Summary

It has only been in the past decade or so that the international community has seriously turned its attention to Africa and Africa's needs. No longer in isolation, left to its own devices, Africa is now more closely engaged with the international environment and has to learn how to adapt. This involves globalization, the competition for energy sources, international migration and population growth, protection of strategic resources, the impact of climate change, the penetration of digital information technology, the expanding role of the United Nations and the

International Criminal Court and with it, new international laws governing terrorism and crimes against humanity. Whilst Africa in the past could ignore these developments, it no longer can. What does this mean for the future of Africa's military?

Whatever Africa's military becomes within this new and challenging international environment, bearing in mind it affects each of the fifty-three states in subtly different ways, a number of fixed variables have to be taken into account: the sheer size of the continent; its geography and demography; the heterogeneity of its population, and its colonial and post-colonial, heavily militarized, past. As far as the future of Africa's military goes, the first step is to address the question of demilitarization and establish, within a democratic civilian regime, healthy civil-military relations, without which external investment and political interest would be reserved and guarded.

Assuming this is possible, and the indicators are that it is, with constructive outside help, African states can revisit their defence and security priorities and address those factors that have to be taken into consideration as the plan for the future. Central in all of this is the acceptance of the principle of collective security as manifest in the new African Union (AU), the Protocol on Peace and Security (PSC), and the establishment of an African Stand-by Force (ASF) made up of five regional brigades. The lead time for these peacekeeping brigades, supported by early warning systems and with outside finance and support, is 2010. Member states have already assigned some of their forces to these brigades, engaged in contingency planning, participated in joint training programmes

and, in the event of full commitment on everyone's part, can adjust their future military equipment requirements to collective security priorities.

Although outside financial and military professional assistance is both welcome and in some cases essential, the principle behind Africa's continental collective security initiative is that it is Africa's solution to Africa's problems. Although funding will be a problem, and all African militaries will have to make compromises and adjustments, the longer term future for African armed forces into the twenty-first century has a sound foundation.

Preamble

The former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld may have been off the mark about Iraq, but had a very novel observation about futurology. He said: 'As we know, there are known knowns. There are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns. ... We know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns, the ones we don't know we don't know.'

Such uncertainty makes devising appropriate policies and institutions to tackle future challenges a difficult task. It elevates risk and risk assessment almost to the level of a science. In this vein, the *2007 Tswalu Dialogue* focuses on what the African military of the twenty-first century, at least into the mid-term (2030), might look like and the roles it might perform. Beyond that time horizon, the Rumsfeld 'unknowns' cease even to be 'unknowns' and dissolve into the realms of obscurity, even non-existence. This topic is especially important in an African context, given the link between security, stability and development.

The Threshold for Twenty-first Century Africa

In conflict terms, Africa has become a much

more stable place, with the number of major conflicts today down to just four from a peak of over a dozen in the early 1990s. This reflects the progress in building democracies made during this time, though this has thrown up the challenge, too, of civil-military relations. But many African states face short- or medium-term threats. How might these change over time? Will African militaries, like their counterparts elsewhere, be able to deal with twenty-first century security issues, notably the threat of terrorism and rebuilding failed states, and devise, institutionalize and employ appropriate technological tools? This is a task requiring a continental focus, now that the AU has undertaken to perform a range of security-related tasks on the continent, including diplomacy, peace support operations and humanitarian assistance.

African militaries will depend on the nature of their environment within which they are expected to operate and to which they might have to respond. What might the world look like for Africa in the next twenty years? What will be the key drivers shaping global order? What might Africa's strategic, defence and security policy choices be in this environment?

Understanding Relative Certainties

Scenario planners talk of 'relative certainties' and 'key uncertainties' when trying to offer plausible futures. With some degree of relative certainty, then, one might expect to live in a world in 2025 where the following factors drive international relations.

The global economy is forecast to double by 2025, with *per capita* income at least 50 per cent higher. With this in mind, the first driver is that globalization will remain a positive force for integration and increasing prosperity, and its effects, of greater disparity in wealth between and within nations will also be a force for fragmentation and marginalization. This partly reflects the continued growth in key developing states, notably

China and India, but includes other big emerging markets, such as Vietnam, Mexico, Bangladesh and Indonesia. How well countries develop in this environment will reflect skills levels, especially technology and language, along with state capacity to run a modern economy.

A second, closely related, driver is thus the *nature* of engagement with the global economy. Globalization should not any longer be seen as a 'Western' force, but one led by a variety of emerging great powers. The extent and impact of a relative decline in the US economy, especially in terms of its balance of trade, is important in this context. So also will its reaction to competition from others, including China and India. More important, however, is that the world is an increasingly competitive place. Unless states possess comparative advantages, such as climate for food production, oil or minerals, they will have to measure themselves and their investor attractiveness not only against countries in their region but also much further afield.

A third factor is a likely high-cost energy environment. This has a variety of different impacts. First, it will cause increased global interest in hydro-carbon deposits and will give oil exporters a financial windfall, allowing them a variety of internal and foreign policy options. Such states include a number in Africa (where the net benefit of high oil prices is moot, since fewer than one fifth of African states export energy), and elsewhere, notably Russia, Kazakhstan and Venezuela. Second, high oil prices will make a small number of states very rich, but they will also leave many more potentially considerably poorer.

Energy demand is set to grow by 50 per cent globally in the next two decades, compared to 34 per cent between 1980-2000.

Much of this is likely to be driven by increased Chinese and Indian consumption. The effects of such trends also depend to a degree on whether or not there is an 'energy revolution', and on the extent to which the world can diminish its dependence on fossil fuels by finding and developing alternative and cleaner energy sources.

A fourth consideration concerns changing patterns of demography and migration, both internally and globally. Internally, more people will move to cities and more megacities will erupt. These will bring with them multiple stresses on infrastructures, services, crime and creating employment. This trend will also offer greater opportunities by becoming national nodes, linking them more easily with the global economy. Already, over 80 per cent of the world's populations live within 150 kilometers from the coast, making them simultaneously more concentrated, and more vulnerable to external intervention. Migration brings with it, of course, both opportunity and skills.

Migration is closely related to population growth, especially among those states whose economies cannot sustain increasing numbers of people. The critical rate of national growth is 2.3 per cent per annum, which, if sustained over a period of twenty years, will double a state's population within twenty years – internal wars, illegal immigration, improved life expectancy, fertility rates, longer life-span, and epidemics (such as AIDS), notwithstanding. The consequences of this are extensive for: the provision of housing; food sufficiency; education, medical and health service provision; and employment.¹ It also means that the average age of populations will be reduced further to well below twenty years. For example, each state in North Africa (the Magreb) and the Middle East (with the exception of Israel) has record-

¹ David E. Bloom, David Canning, and Jaypee Sevilla, *The Demographic Dividend: A New Perspective on the Economic Consequences of Population Change* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2003). They note that Sub-Saharan Africa is particularly burdened by population growth, where fertility rates in particular (an average of 5.9 children per woman) are persistently high.

ed a 2.3 per cent growth rate or more over the past twenty years. They show no sign of falling below that figure, despite the problems that an ill-educated, poorly housed, under occupied and under-fed juvenile population bring. The wealthier states of Europe, China and North America, however, have declining and steeply ageing populations. While these trajectories may be complementary over time, for the moment the developed North has proven increasingly protectionist and xenophobic, their fears about immigration also fuelled by concerns over Islamic radicalism.

Climate change is a fifth factor, one that potentially might exacerbate existing conditions of stress. Understanding its precise empirical impact demands, however, getting past the fashionable alarmism permeating this issue. But while there are doubts about its exact environmental effect, it is more certain that this movement will have a political effect in forcing a greater role for the state in regulation.

Related to climate change and the effects of global warming are their impact on agriculture and, most important of all, access to potable water. Evidence to date points to areas of existing desert expanding, forcing inhabitants already on subsistence levels to move. Weather patterns have become more aberrant and more difficult to predict. Periods of drought and flooding, never before recorded, are becoming commonplace, causing serious disruption to major areas of food production.

It has been predicted that access to water is likely to become a major source of conflict between states and communities. River courses pass across political boundaries and are open to diversion for irrigation, to damming for energy generation, and for industrial and commercial exploitation. Pollution of the higher reaches of rivers adversely affects those countries further downstream. With an ever-increasing demand for water to sustain life as well, water could well become a major cause of

conflict and war in the near future. These trends are particularly evident in parts of central Europe, the Middle East and South Asia, and parts of Africa, adding to existing tensions.

Access to strategic resources in a globalized world is essential to those states with expanding economies and populations with rising expectations, notably those populous states in Asia such as China, India and Indonesia. Water and oil are two such resources, the one providing the essential for sustaining life, the other to generate the energy that enables product manufacture, transportation, distribution, packaging and manufacture. The materials that enable the wheels of industries to turn in terms of manufactured physical products, are also important. Metals, ores, carbon compounds (including precious stones), many of which are scarce and difficult to extract, are not evenly distributed around the world.

Many of these strategically valuable materials, including those radioactive substances that make possible certain categories of weapons systems, are to be found in the developing world. These are both a blessing and a bind. It is a blessing since they are a source of external income and wealth especially to the developing countries; they are a liability as they are the targets of exploitation by both actors in the global economy and by powerful domestic interests. The problems of the former state of Katanga (copper ore) or, more recently, of Sierra Leone (diamonds) help illustrate the point.

Seventh is country-specific variance in their access to information technology. On the one hand, such technology will enable growth and empower populations. On the other, it makes weak governments vulnerable to transnational movements. In other areas of science and technology, some of which are closely linked to national security requirements, the gap between the leading scientific nations and the rest is widening. Such areas of science and technology as biotechnology, nanotechnology, and robotics

are moving ahead at an ever increasing rate, leaving much of the rest of the world, and more particularly the poorer states of Africa, falling technologically further and further behind.

An eighth factor, and one that promises some hope for the future, but more likely one that causes frustration, is the role of the international community or, in an institutional sense, the United Nations. The UN, through its Charter and the role of the Security Council, has the potential to enhance world security through its many humanitarian agencies as well as its capacity, if the political will is present, to intervene in interstate, and internecine, conflicts. The UN, however, is only as influential as the more powerful nations are prepared to provide both resources and backing. In the case of Rwanda, the UN, largely through the lack of commitment by the United States, proved supine, standing by whilst genocide was committed in 1994. With greater awareness that international security impacts on national security, there has, in recent years, been a sea change in attitudes towards greater UN involvement and intervention in international and domestic conflicts, particularly in areas such as Africa and the Middle East.

Closely linked to the United Nations whose endorsement of intervention in conflicts around the world confers a sense of legitimacy, is the enlarged role of international law. In addition to international conventions and Protocols governing Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law, and the Laws of War, arguably the most revolutionary development has been the establishment of the International Criminal Court in July 2002 – the result of the Rome Statute of 1998, even though seven states, such as the US, China, Iraq and Israel are not parties to it. These non-party states, as members of the United Nations, may still be referred to the ICC by the UN Security Council under

Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Those that are parties to the Rome Statute are bound by its articles. Their nationals and armed forces are therefore liable to prosecution for acts of genocide and other atrocities, as has already happened in the cases of Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Yugoslavia. Prosecution may yet happen in the case of Sudan and the situation in Darfur.²

A final driver concerns the continued likelihood of transnational terrorism, where there is a lower likelihood of military conflict between states but rather involving states and non-state actors. A number of factors contribute to the expansion of this phenomenon, not least for reasons identified above, where there have been expanding populations of poor, unemployed, ill- or uneducated, displaced and aimless youths. This multitude of youth has proved fertile recruiting grounds for terrorist movements that profess either an ideology or a faith that provides a sense of self worth, a purpose in life, a status and above all, an identity.

But it is not only religion or politics that are required to recruit and motivate terrorists. Poverty is also a strong motivating force, especially when the disparities in income and standards of living are presented to them day after day via television or through the Internet. More recently, the actions of the world's wealthier states, either by military force or by the commercial exploitation of the resources of poorer, more vulnerable, states, have drawn people to join both international and indigenous terrorist organizations. Finally, the development and execution of strategies and tactics of some terrorist groups that have employed asymmetrical means to considerable effect have given potential terrorist recruits confidence and optimism, the lure of martyrdom in the case of Islamist terrorists notwithstanding.

² Max Du Plessis and Christopher Gevers, 'Dafur goes to the International Criminal Court (Perhaps)'. *African Security Review* (Vol. 14, No 2, 2005), pp.23-25.

The Meaning for Africa

If the above amounts to a world in which some states, regions and peoples are getting richer and others increasingly are becoming marginalized, Africa will be faced with both opportunity and increased stress. Globalization offers the potential for economic and social growth and development; but it is also a threat from those whom it does not accommodate. This is particularly salient for Africa's youth, who already comprise 50 per cent of sub-Saharan Africa's 750 million people. Their response and how they might channel their frustrations will be important. Religion might well feature prominently in this development, even though this is not entirely a function only of globalization. It is also one of persistent levels of high birth rates promulgated by particular beliefs, in particular Islam, that see human reproduction as both a duty and a boon.

Since countries get rich by making or doing things and selling them, this also highlights the need for African countries to pursue an appropriate development model. Those countries with a set of better policies, including good governance, universal education and open economies are the more likely winners from globalization, but this will not necessarily ensure development. This will, in particular, require investment in both 'soft' and 'hard' infrastructure: people and communications. Migration is likely to figure strongly as an interface, as Africa as a whole will have to work hard to attract, develop, grow, and retain relevant intellectual, practical and innovative skills.

The rise of China, India and others is one fresh factor in this policy mix. Asia might offer an appropriate African development model. It could also break the Western aid model of external engagement with the continent, relegating democracy and good governance as conditionalities in preference for managed economic growth. But adopting this model will demand more than just an ideological or cultural adjustment; rather it

needs a substantial leap in capacity. And more than a new aid regime, countries will benefit, as China and others in Asia have done and as Chile did before them in the 1970s and 1980s, when they make themselves attractive, stable, secure and fair places in which to do business.

Radical climate change, if it occurs, might affect Africa badly, increasing water stress to affect as many as one-quarter of its people. It might also make some already climatically marginal states completely dysfunctional and unsustainable without external assistance. Tighter regulations may also play out negatively for those Africans accessing global markets by air for their high value exports, for example, given the carbon footprint that this would involve. The sheer scale of the African continent can be seen as both an asset and yet a liability. It is an asset in that it affords a degree of security from external, non-African, intervention or interference. It is a liability in that long distances have to be traveled to meet the demands of widely distributed populations.

But perhaps the most challenging of all scenarios for African states is the one where there are no dramatic changes, no radical opportunities, but instead constant progress towards a foreseeable outcome; one that has not been conspicuously kind to Africa over the past half a century. It is one of increasing differentiation between African states, given variances in the way in which they have engaged with globalization.

What is conspicuous, however, is the degree to which the rest of the world has relatively recently turned its attention to Africa and Africa's problems. It is not a question of altruism, but of 'enlightened' national self interest, as the attention the Chinese have given Africa in recent years demonstrates. This new focus is not merely a consequence of the world's wealthier states, the so-called G8 countries, acknowledging Africa's predicament and the need to act, and act generously, within their eight UN Millennium Development Goals, but a realization that in

a globalized world Africa's economic prosperity is in everyone's interests and not merely those of the African states.³ This means not merely promoting the economic development of the continent but more pertinently being prepared to intervene when and where internecine conflicts threaten the continent's stability.

Indeed, as Rumsfeld might have put it, how well Africa does in this environment is partly determined by what we do, what others might do, what we get others to do, and of course, what we can persuade others not to do. Given these uncertainties and the environmental factors that will most likely influence what happens to Africa in the next twenty years, it is pertinent to ask what might Africa's strategic policy choices be and in particular what factors will likely shape its military institutions, their roles and posture.

What Shapes the African Military? *Geographical Scale*

Before giving consideration to Africa's armed forces, a number of fixed variables have first to be established before turning to those that are of an independent nature. These fixed variables are based on geographical and geopolitical factors, those that essentially set the parameters of the African continent and which African armies have to accommodate. Put simply, the continent of Africa is huge and varied. The second largest of the five continents, it covers around 22 per cent of the world's land area and, north and south of the Sahara, is home to approximately 800 million people. The expansive landmass covers the Sahara, the world's largest desert and contains the Nile, the world's longest river. Most of Africa is desert, though the conti-

nent as a whole is basically divided into three regions: a Northern Plateau; a Central and Southern Plateau; and the Eastern Highlands. Africa is home to fifty-three nation-states and a countless number of ethnic, racial and tribal communities.

To put the scale of the continent into perspective, one country alone, Sudan, occupying one million square miles, is equivalent in land area to 25 per cent of the whole of the continent of Europe, including Scandinavia. Darfur alone, currently the focus of UN and AU attention, is the same size as the whole of France for which a hybrid force of 26,000 peace-enforcing troops has been dispatched. Aside from the rigours of Africa's climate and topography, distances are immense, making communications and transportation extremely difficult. From a military perspective, the deployment of military task forces, with their dependence on logistical support, represents an expensive, lengthy and complex undertaking without substantial strategic air- and sea-lift, both of which are well beyond the resources of most, if not all, of Africa's fifty-three states. Further, pheric distance, the time that it takes to bring effective force to bear against an adversary, is extensive, giving insurgents or invading forces both opportunity and time to annex and control ground.⁴ For this reason, armed forces concentrate on urban areas, especially capital cities and urban areas, where there are fewer handicaps and disadvantages. This in part explains why a relatively small military force can successfully effect a military coup.⁵

Continental Geo-political Heterogeneity Geopolitically, there is a wide cultural, racial,

³ Gleneagles Summit Documents, 2005. *Africa*. London, FCO, 2005. Accessed at <http://www.g8.gov.uk/servelet>.

⁴ Stanislav Andreski, *Military Organization and Society* (London: Routledge, 1968).

⁵ Simon Baynhan, 'Civil-Military Relations in Post-Independence Africa', *South African Defence Review* (No. 3, 1992). Reproduced from a paper presented at a Conference on Civil-military Relations in Post-settlement South Africa, CSIR Conference Centre, Pretoria, 23 April 1992, p.4. Accessed 29 July 2007 at <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/SADR3/Baynham.html>

ethnic, religious, linguistic, disparity among Africa's fifty-three nations. Though one continent, it is far from homogeneous and, at least in economic terms, increasingly differentiated between those more successful and prosperous globalizers, the big states, fragile units and the commodity-rich states, each with different development prospects. The political boundaries separating one African state from another are a by-product of nineteenth century European colonialism and not, for the most part, a reflection of natural boundaries between ethnic groups or evident geographical features. Nor did these separations reflect the fact that many African ethnic groups were nomadic, accustomed traditionally to moving across national borders. Again, this has direct implications for Africa's armed forces, since it falls to the armed forces and border guards to protect the sovereign integrity of states, few of which reflect either geographical and economic logic or social realities. Furthermore, the cosmopolitan nature of ethnic groupings that transcend political authority have proved to be a source of tension and conflict within and between African states. They are likely to remain so until a balanced degree of economic prosperity, spearheaded by the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the encouragement of a thriving private sector, is enjoyed by all.

Colonial and Post-Independence Experience

The last fixed variable that affects Africa's militaries is that of their respective colonial and post-colonial experiences.⁶ In spite of these experiences or, indeed, because of them, the state in Africa has assumed a central importance, within which 'armed forces

operate of necessity from within the state itself'.⁷ Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain have all left their mark not merely in the political systems they either bequeathed on granting African states independence, but more especially the structures, traditions and ethos of the armed forces they left behind. In the case of France, that influence has been maintained post-independence, and has had an effect of helping to keep the military away from domestic politics or political interference.⁸

Those African states that won their independence by force of arms have tended to adopt the characteristics of those states that gave them assistance, or transposed the guerrilla structures and ethos that had served them well. It has been the source of some concern, however, that whilst these civil-military traditions served the colonial powers reasonably well at home, they failed in many cases to prevent Africa's military from intervening in politics and instigating a military *coup d'état*.⁹ Military regimes or not, it is notable that many of Africa's military have since retained relatively close contact with their former colonial masters, not just in the training of staff officers and NCOs, but in their choices of the military weapons with which they are equipped.

African De-militarization: The Bottom Line

The fundamental issue regarding Africa's military in the twenty-first century is how well the political process has been de-militarized in African states. The future of Africa's military depends from the state of civil-military relations in 2007 and the continued influence or otherwise of the post independence years when most of Africa was ruled by, or

⁶ Martin Edmonds, *Armed Services and Society* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988), pp.18.

⁷ Christopher Clapham, *Third World Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).

⁸ Baynham, *op cit*, p.15. Baynham noted that Paris has retained standing French garrisons in almost every Francophone African state, including Djibouti, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, and Senegal.

⁹ This was especially the focus of S.E. Finer's book, *The Man on Horseback* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962).

Reason for Leaving Office	1960-69	1970-79	1980-89	1990-99	2000-04	Total	(Proportion)
Overthrown in war, coup, or invasion	27 (72.9%)	30 (68%)	22 (59.4%)	22 (36.4%)	4 (16.6%)	105	51.4%
Assassination (not part of coup)	1	1	1	2	1	6	2.9%
Died of natural causes or by accident	2	3	4	3	0	12	5.8%
Retired voluntarily	1	2	5	9	8	25	12.2%
Lost election or left office	0	0	1	12	3	16	7.8%
Other (interim regime, or impeachment)	6	8	4	14	8	40	19.6%
All regime transitions	37	44	37	62	24	204	

Source: A. Goldsmith, 'Donors, Dictators, and Democrats.' *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 39, 3, 2001. Adapted from R. Southall, and H. Melber, (Eds). *Legacies of Power: Leadership Change and Former Presidents in African Politics*. Pretoria: Human Science Research Council, 2006, p.2.

dominated by, military forces.

Throughout the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, much of the African continent had become militarized. Relatively few states succeeded in avoiding a military coup and those that did had to find some form of accommodation with the military regime and their armed forces. As can be noted from the table above, between 1960-2004, there had been 105 violent overthrows of African regimes, more than half the total of regime changes during this period, though this has declined signifi-

cantly as a percentage since 1990 and even further since 2000.

Aside from the implications of these military adventures for civil-military relations, and their effect on democracy and accountability, the militarization of society generated a culture of violence, had implications for gender structures and equality, and stimulated the growth and proliferation of armed gangs, warlord formations, death squads, guerrilla armies and proxy forces of all kinds.¹⁰ Before all these African states can

¹⁰ Eboe Hutchful, 'De-militarizing the Political Process in Africa', *African Security Review* (Vol. 6, No 2, 1997). Accessed 30 July 2007 at <http://www.issafrica.org/Pubs/ASR/6No2/Hutchful.html>. p.3.

therefore progress into the twenty-first century and benefit of globalization, they would have first to exercise the influence and effects of militarization from within, de-militarize, and restore effective civil governance, stability and the rule of law.

It is not the task of this paper to assess how African states can go about the process of demilitarizing. Among a number of models that might be considered, however, Huntington's concepts of 'objective' and 'subjective' controls, or a combination of both, would arguably serve African states well.¹¹ Nevertheless, any number of other problems would have to be addressed simultaneously, including: 'economic mismanagement; weak national integration; ethnic and class conflict; abuse of human rights; etc.' – that is to say, all those issues that gave cause for the military to intervene in the first place. As Eboe Hutchful ruefully observed, 'demilitarization can only be sustained when these fundamental problems have been solved'.¹²

The challenge has been, and remains, formidable.¹³ If African states, and the continent as a whole, are to interact with the rest of the world and the process of globalization, and are able to respond to those environmental influences listed above, they will first have to restore *and sustain* civil supremacy over the military, within an appropriate constitutional and institutional framework. They will have to address the relationship between the military and the political process and lay down

the rules regarding the military's participation in that process. The sensitive issue of the armed forces' professional autonomy, salaries and conditions of service would also need to be established. Finally, the role and mission of the armed forces would have to be clearly defined, including their involvement or participation in regional and international defence arrangements as well as issues of internal security.¹⁴

The demilitarization of African states, given their background and social and economic circumstances, and the creation of a democratic regime in which the military are sub-ordinate to civilian control, has required a strategy that carries the military along with democratic forces. As David Chuter has observed, 'The restructuring of the security sector of many African countries, particularly those that have emerged from an authoritarian or violent past, demands a visionary and integrated transformational strategy capable of ensuring the country's security institutions do not regress into previous behavioural patterns'.¹⁵

A number of guidelines have assisted this process over the past decade or so, with some success. First, the rift between the military and the rest of society has had to be bridged through communication and interaction, especially between the military and the national economy.¹⁶ With small armies and limited budgets, regional defence and security arrangements have provided a means by

¹¹ Samuel Huntington, *Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Random House, 1957).

¹² Hutchful, *op cit*.

¹³ A. Assensoh and Yvette Alex-Assensoh, *African Military History and Politics: Coups and Ideological Incursions 1900-Present* (New York: Palgrave, 2001). The authors offer a projection of what bodes for Africa in the light of past military incursions into partisan domestic politics.

¹⁴ *Ibid*.

¹⁵ David Chuter, *Defence Transformation*, (Pretoria: ISS Monograph 49, August 2000). Although this study does not specifically refer to African states (though the author alludes to them in his Preface) it does provide a guide to the basic issues that any state and its military have to take into account when engaged in a defence transformation process. Essentially, the transformation process involves four transformation processes: Cultural, Human; Political; and Organizational.

¹⁶ Eboe Hutchful, *op cit*. G.C. Biddell, 'A Principle Lesson of Civil-Military Relations'. Paper presented at a Conference on Civil Military Relations, The American University 4-6 May 1995.

which states can rationalize both their own defence structures and their levels of defence expenditure. With the AU's principle of non-interference, regional defence pacts have provided a way to optimize individual states' defence spending and for some of them to commit forces to an ASF and also become involved in continental peacekeeping (as well as democracy protecting) operations.

The demilitarization process within Africa has been assisted by external support, not so much in providing funding for the military *per se* (though the IMF and World Bank have addressed issues of reforming defence budgets) but in assisting in the resettlement and retraining of ex-military and ex-non-state combatant personnel. More important, however, is the financial assistance African states have received from the international community (with substantially more promised) towards their economic and social development, the effects of which have already helped to reduce the underlying causes of conflict and tension that had bedevilled African states in the past. The argument that armed forces are necessary to maintain law and order within African states thereby loses its saliency if the population at large have a sense of national political, social and economic progress, their standards of living are improving, and there is evidence of sound accountable governance.

The critical questions are how successful Africa's demilitarization process has been over the past decade; how enduring will the results of that process be; and what are the residual effects of Africa's militarization that could endure? The success of the demilitarization process to date can be gauged from the reduction in the number of African states where the military rule.

Whither, then, Africa's Military?

From an ontological perspective, today's

African militaries are built on three fixed variables: geography; geo-politics; and colonial and post-independence (mostly militarized) experience. There are, however, a host of independent variables that will also shape Africa's armed forces and which will point their direction into the first quarter of the twenty-first century.

Defence and Security Policy

What are African armed forces for? At independence, one of the first African institutions of state to be established was the military. They were the symbol of sovereignty and independence and, by inference, the guarantor of territorial integrity and national security. They were also incorporated within each state's constitution, defining their functions and the legal limits of their authority. Most constitutions also identified what was considered to be an emergency and the conditions under which the armed forces legitimately might intervene.¹⁷

As the second half of the twentieth century unfolded, however, the armed forces of African states became more the problem rather than the solution to national security, as one state after another experienced military interference or a military coup. Constitutions were suspended or rewritten and militaries soon became embroiled in internal politics and governance. Poor governance, corruption, a lack of economic growth and internal strife and abdication by the military, for which the reasons are multifarious, led over time to the restoration of civilian rule in most of these states, with roughly only four military dictatorships remaining today.

Established civil-military relations in African states remain conditional; the evidence today suggests that African armed forces are better focused on defence against external threats, including terrorism, peace-

¹⁷ Finer, *op cit*. Finer argued against Huntington that under these circumstances it was the armed forces' professional duty to intervene and take over government.

keeping and nation-building than on internal politics. There would appear to be some evidence also that many African armies assume an internal security function in association with other security organizations, such as police, border guards and intelligence services. The threat of terrorism, both indigenous and sponsored from outside, would also engage Africa's armed forces, principally in the protection of vital strategic assets.

Although there has been a return to more traditional military functions, the factors mentioned above regarding the scale of African states, the difficulties of the terrain, communications and logistics set strict limits on what can be achieved. Furthermore, limited defence budgets, an over-emphasis on expensive advanced military equipment ill-suited to counter both internal and external threats, and poor levels of training, pay and professionalism further diminish the credibility of the African armed forces in their external defence and peacekeeping roles.

Set against these limitations has been the proliferation of small arms amongst non-state forces that represents an enduring threat to peace and stability both within African states and across regions. The problem has been recognized within parts of Africa, as evidenced by an ECOWAS summit in Abuja, Nigeria, in November 1998, where Mali proposed a three-year moratorium on the import, export and manufacture of light weapons in the West-African sub-region.¹⁸ The issue has also been taken up in the UN as part of the fight against organized crime. For as long as inexpensive small arms are readily available throughout Africa, one priority for the military will continue to be internal security and the containment of war lords, armed criminal gangs, bandits, and political insurgents.

Collective Regional Security

The defence of sovereign territory, however, is a major undertaking for which the initiatives taken by the AU to establish a permanent stand-by force offers some hope for the future. In 2000, the Brahimi Report on UN Peacekeeping operations¹⁹ presented a strong critique of UN peacekeeping operations; to a degree it opened up the path for serious discussions among the members of the AU to address the requirements and characteristics of a stand-by force to act when and where threats to peace and stability in Africa surfaced. In 2002, all fifty-three African states signed up to a Protocol to establish a Peace and Security Council (PSC) to be supported by a Commission, a 'Panel of the Wise', a continental Early Warning System, a Stand-by Force, and a Special Fund. The PSC is a continental collective security commitment, bolstered by the AU's Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact, adopted in 2005: to promote co-operation between the member states in areas of non-aggression and common defence; to promote peaceful co-existence in Africa; and to prevent conflicts of an inter-state or intra-state nature.

As Paul Kagame, the President of Rwanda, has recently asserted, 'it is important to note that in the New Africa the concept of peace and security has been rendered more holistic by incorporating in them good governance and development. The New Partnership for Africa's Development and its African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) are the principal chosen instruments for development and good governance.'²⁰ This goes some way to meet the conditions noted above regarding the future of Africa's civil-military relations and continued progress with its Disarmament, Demobilization and

¹⁸ Margaret E. O'Grady, 'Small Arms and Africa' London, Campaign Against the Arms Trade, September, 1999. Accessed at <http://www.caat.org.uk/publications/countries/Africa-0999.htm>

¹⁹ Report of the Panel on UN Peacekeeping Operations (The Brahimi Report) New York, UN, 2000. See especially the chapter on rapid deployment standards and 'on call expertise'. Accessed http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations

²⁰ HE Paul Kagame, *The First Nelson Mandela Annual Lecture*, RUSI, London, 18 September 2006.

Reintegration (DDR) processes.

The African Union Stand-by Force

The African Stand-by Force (ASF), one of the principal organs of the PSC, is currently evolving. Its role is to enable the PSC to perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and intervention in member states in cases of gross violations of human rights. Already, the AU has independently carried out peace support missions in Burundi, Darfur, the Comoros (during the elections), and intervened in Togo and Sao Tome Principe to reverse a military seizure of power.²¹ Questions have been raised about the effectiveness of these interventions, but the important point is that they have been undertaken and that the AU has laid down a marker of its future intentions.

The long-term essence of the ASF has been captured by Timothy Murithi, who noted that, 'The AU intends to achieve much more in terms of integrating African Defence Forces and reducing overall costs that individual countries have to spend in financing their own military forces. This would, in effect, herald the creation of a Pan-African Armed Force The AU plans to have its own Pan-African Stand-by Rapid Reaction Force composed of 15,000 troops by 2015.'²²

How effective the stand-by force will be remains to be seen in the longer term, as will the number of African states that have signed up to the Protocol and will contribute to the Stand-by Force. Currently, five sub-regional brigades of up to 3-4,000 troops are envisaged, formed from the states within each region. These are located separately in the North, East (EASBRIG), West (WASBRIG),

Centre and South, with a Headquarters and Military Staff in Addis Ababa.²³ Reportedly, WASBRIG has 6,500 troops already assigned to it and EASBRIG has 3,000 troops, plus a planning cell in Kenya. The Northern, Central and Southern brigades, however, have yet to make any significant practical progress, hindered by either a lack of political co-ordination or political instabilities within some of the constituent states.

According to Jakkie Cilliers, the critical problem facing the ASF is funding, though financial help has been provided to date from the European Union, and USAID in the form of its Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a multilateral programme to train and equip peacekeeping troops.²⁴ Nevertheless, the funding of the ASF will continue to be a problem for the AU, though in the longer term the economic growth of the continent, itself a by-product of improved security and stability, may help alleviate the situation.

Military Equipment and Weapons Technology

The levels of equipment among the fifty-three signatories to the AU PSC vary widely. At the advanced military equipment end of the spectrum, states such as Egypt, South Africa, and Algeria can field a full spectrum of land, sea and air third and fourth generation weapons. At the other end, several states cannot afford even the most rudimentary of military equipment. This disparity need not prove a problem so long as Africa's military collectively focuses its main effort on peace and stability within the continent itself. There is no obvious incentive for African states to entertain military adventures abroad, except possibly in support of United

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Timothy Murithi, *The African Union: Pan Africanism, Peacebuilding and Development*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005). p.83.

²³ AUSF, <http://www.africa-nion.org/.htmroot/AU/Departments/PSC/Asf/documents.htm>

²⁴ Steve Mgobo, 'African Peacekeeping Force Development Continues Despite Funding Challenges', *World Politics Review*, 21 December 2006.

Nations and international peacekeeping operations and the protection of offshore assets and meeting obligations incumbent in UNCLOS Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), which is a potentially sensitive issue. Even then, the contributions can be made on behalf of the continent as a whole by those more advanced African states that have the professional military capacity to operate alongside the more advanced states in the world.

On the fair assumption that Africa's armed forces have their time fully occupied within the continent itself, future requirements should, ideally, be to improve the provision of logistics equipment and force mobility, rather than succumbing to the temptations of the latest high technology weapon systems that in the past some African states have failed to resist to their cost.²⁵ Projections of what military systems either states, or the ASF, will recommend for acquisition in the next decade, are hard to make. Applied logic in these matters does not always apply, though doubtless both individual African states and the AU will be the target of the world's arms manufacturers.

One future consideration that is worthy of note is the possibility of Africa becoming self sufficient in weapons manufacture. Already, many states have the production capability for small arms and ammunition and South Africa and, to a degree, Egypt have a mature arms industry. Whether or not there is scope for collaborative or joint arrangements with the world's arms industries is a moot point, especially since African states through the AU are increasingly oriented towards a common defence and security policy, rather than one based on individual state security.

Military Training, Recruitment and Retention

Africa's history of wars of independence, insurgencies, guerrilla warfare, internecine conflict, and even genocide has meant that there are many among the population who are experienced in fighting and armed conflict. There are many today still attached to armed gangs, warlords, religious groups, bandits and so on and who may well have held on to their personal weapons. In terms of foot soldiers, there is no shortage of manpower within the continent. The same cannot be said for naval or airforce personnel, partly because navies have never figured prominently in a land-oriented continent, and air forces require a level of technological and scientific competence that is generally beyond most African states, since the level of education is inadequate for the task.

These constraints mean that the African military of the next decade or so has to operate within the capacity it can generate for itself. Already, the US is helping with training African forces in peacekeeping and ASF members have begun to establish their own training centres for both officers and troops, such as the Kenya Peace Support Training Centre, Ghana's Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, the Rwanda Military Academy, and Uganda's Senior Command and Staff College. These are in addition to each state's own military academies and schools. The more personnel who pass through these ASF-oriented training centres, the greater the credibility of the AU's PSC ambitions will become.

Future Civil-Military Relations

As has been noted above, the future of Africa's military depends heavily on

²⁵ One example immediately comes to mind – the Nigerian acquisition (which was never paid for) of two squadrons of Jaguar ground attack aircraft from the United Kingdom in the 1970s. The aircraft proved beyond the capability of the NAF to operate and they stood unused deteriorating for years on the periphery of Lagos airport. Ghana's acquisition of an advanced frigate in the 1960s was another example, until President Nkrumah was deposed and the vessel never delivered.

improved civil-military relations within, and between, the member states. Most states have a long history of militarization, military involvement in politics, military coups and *golpe de estados*, and military governance, coupled with periods of internecine warfare, genocide and civil strife. These experiences will take not just a decade or so to eradicate, but a minimum of a generation or more finally to be excised from people's memories. Close, and sensitive, attention has to be paid, not by just a few, but by all the African states if the ambition of an 'African renaissance', or a 'New Africa', is to be realized. Each African state's experience of the military is different and the solution to its future civil-military relations has to be understood and approached *sui generis*. For the same reason, the solution will be different in each case. The success of DDR in this respect could prove crucial.

Extra-Continental Foreign Involvement

This is not about African armies being involved overseas, but of foreign military interest and involvement in Africa. With the world's attention turning towards Africa since the G8 Gleneagles 2005 Conference and the financial undertakings promised (though not always carried through) by the world's richest nations, the performance and behaviour of Africa's military will come under ever greater scrutiny. Some of this will be manifest in foreign states, possibly those with past colonial links, taking a closer interest in African militaries. This is not a bad thing, since it introduces a constraint on those militaries again harbouring ideas of intervening in politics. For example, the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) is engaged in helping the nascent Sierra Leone army, while the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) is giving support to ECOWAS, and WASBRIG. None of this, however, addresses the proliferation of private security companies that overseas companies engage to provide protection for

their operations and investments within the continent.

Conclusion

To recapitulate, there are things we know, things we know we don't know, and those we do not know we don't know. However, we do know enough about the international environment and continental context within which Africa's military will have to operate in the future to make some cautious predictions.

If Africa's civil-military relations can be brought under democratic control, the prospect for both African states and their militaries will improve substantially. It will not merely strengthen the rule of law and bring greater stability, but will help attract overseas investment and foreign government support. The status of the militaries within African states will be enhanced through their involvement in the ASF, the more so if it can be demonstrated that, collectively, African armies can bring about peace and stability within and among its members.

Nothing succeeds like success; although early operations by the AU forces have not been conspicuously successful. Some fundamental weaknesses have been exposed, such as AU peacekeeping operations in the Sudan but the prospect of the UN/AU hybrid force proving effective in Darfur may well boost confidence for the future. The experience gained through African armies operating alongside overseas peacekeeping forces could not only provide valuable tactical and operational experience, but also give useful insights into the sorts of military equipment, such as communications, intelligence gathering, mobility, logistic support, etc. best suited to Africa's future defence and security needs. The task the 20,000-strong UN/ASF force plus 6,400 police faces is about as difficult as it could be. They are taking on 'fighting centred on ancient rivalries over water, grazing rights and dowries ... [and] across a province which has only a handful of roads. The fight-

ing has become so localized that it would take battalions of well-armed peacekeepers to quell'. It has been described as, 'a morass of enmities in a hostile landscape',²⁶ involving 'a patchwork of rebel groups and feuding tribes that has spilt over into Chad and the Central African Republic.'²⁷

The UN/ASF operation in Darfur aside, none of this restructuring of Africa's civil-military relations is possible without the continent's economic growth and the amelioration or eradication of the causes of conflict that so bedevilled the past. The situation, however, resembles a Catch-22 situation: economic growth depends on peace and stability within the continent to attract the nec-

essary overseas investment; but peace and stability is only possible if the military are subject to civil democratic control. If civilian governance proves weak, distanced, inept or corrupt, the military might again be persuaded to intervene, and history will repeat itself.

For Africa, and the future of its military, the AU, with its PSC and ASF, offers the best and most promising prospect. It must be hoped that not only the Africans themselves, but also the international community, agree.

The authors would like to thank Rear-Admiral (rtd) Steve Stead and Chris Maloney for their assistance in the preparation of this paper.

²⁶ Jonathan Clayton, 'New force faces morass of enmities in a hostile landscape', *The Times*, 1 August 2007, p.29.

²⁷ James Bone, 'UN Approves 26,000 peacekeepers for Dafur after years of slaughter'. *The Times*, 1 August 2007, p.29.

The African Military: Assessing Continental Responses to Security Needs

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Three years after the Cold War ended in 1991, Africa was invited to participate in the international security system with a *restricted* military role that was confined to conflict situations on the African continent. Western powers withdrew from deploying troops in Africa following the harrowing events of late August to October 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia, when eighteen US Rangers were killed and their cadavers dragged through the streets. The images, captured live on camera, were beamed into living rooms around the world and evoked the writing of several books and a film, *Black Hawk Down*. Its effect on US external (security) policy towards Africa was severe. Within six months, Congress formally passed legislation result-

ing in the formal disengagement of troop deployments in Africa.

From March 1994, Washington delegated that responsibility to Africa's political leaders and its representative organization, the then Organization of African Unity (OAU). Africa quickly provided the theoretical underpinnings to her newfound responsibility through the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), a document that was released to coincide with the transformation of the OAU to the African Union (AU) in early 2000. Contained in that seminal document were claims and inferences that a region of fifty-three member-countries had succeeded in achieving the harmonization of both foreign and security policies as well as the establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF) with a capacity to undertake Chapter Six-type United Nations Peacekeeping tasks by 2005 and by 2015 complex emergencies and enforcements.¹

Examining the reality of Africa's military capacity and environment, however, shows that an elite pact between the West and the AU is inadequate in addressing the military challenges facing the African continent. What types of military are available on the continent and what is the effectiveness of each? Which groups, actors or states constitute the bad or good guys? What complementary role has the West defined for itself regarding participation in conflict resolution in Africa? And finally, is there a contingency plan if the assumptions underpinning the 'theoretical handover of power' to Africa are wrong?

This paper briefly discusses the com-

¹ See: <http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/Documents.htm> pp. 1-30.

bined challenges posed by these questions, focussing specifically on what the decision to delegate military responsibility to Africa has meant in practice. First, it gives a background of the nature of war and conflict that has characterized the African continent since the early 1990's, then it examines the type of military, which has emerged as part of the third wave of democratization² gripping over two-thirds of the countries on the African continent and asks whether the new security organization is equipped enough to confront existing threats. It also critically investigates the notion of the CADSP before analyzing whether the external military initiatives on the continent have strengthened or weakened the evolving ASF concept. The paper concludes by arguing that the decision to 'invite' Africa to police her own conflict scenarios threw her in at the deep end and that the set-up lacks the political cohesion, will and military capacity to make good on the public statements made so far. The main reasons for this include:

1. The lack of a (regional) collaborative military tradition on a continent that only removed the final outreaches of oppressive colonialism as late as 1994. In this regard, despite comments to the contrary pressing for a United States of Africa, the region remains politically divided and still has some considerable way in establishing effective regional security structures, key components of the ASF.
2. An examination of 'the military' in each of the emerging states after decades of one-party state politics and 'strong-man' syndrome have led to partisan structures that lack a 'national' character and therefore no local national legitimacy and support. Stated differently, many states actually have factions and

former rebel groups still transforming to national militaries under arms, creating challenges of representation and general acceptance.

3. The CASDP is a document whose perspectives are clearly too ambitious and do not reflect realities on the ground.
4. The entry points and presence of the West on the military question after the 1990s in the form of the US African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), French Reinforcement of African Military Capacities (RECAMP) and British Military Advisory Training Teams (BMATT) and EU military involvement and later, the 'military' competition between China and the US in Africa have all specifically supported the CASDP and ASF. Further, even where the initiatives are from the same alliance, such as the West, they are largely uncoordinated with each other, sometimes making them act in competition.

1990s: Western Departure from Africa and Conflict Typology

The period leading up to the end of the Cold War and the 'military' withdrawal of the West from Africa opened the lid on many simmering ethnic, regional and territorial conflicts on the continent. In that security vacuum left behind, Africa experienced its first genocide, exacted over 100 days during April to June 1994 in Rwanda, whereby an estimated 800,000–1,000,000 people died because the international community was not willing to intervene and Africa was unable to marshal enough forces. The result was inter-state wars, internal protracted struggles and genocide on a scale hitherto unseen. These conflicts raged in Algeria; the Mano River Union in West Africa, involving Liberia, Guinea, Somalia, Sierra Leone and later Ivory Coast; Northern

² Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, (University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). This was at the root of replacing the majority of post-decolonization one-party states and ushering in the multi-party politics and democracies during the 1990s.

Uganda; Angola; Mozambique; Burundi; Rwanda; Zaire-later renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo); Central African Republic; Sudan; Ethiopia and Eritrea among others. The impact produced an estimated 25 million internally displaced peoples (IDP), and over 9 million refugees.³

A feature closely tied in with these conflicts was the requirement for African states to transform under various conditionalities, including the creation of a multi-party political democracy. Consequently, the twin ill-winds of renewed and more ferocious conflict and demands for internal political and socio-economic reform left many states floundering.

The result was that Africa experienced collapsed states and very weak central governments in areas, such as Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, CAR, Mozambique, Chad, Liberia, Lesotho, DR Congo, Sudan, and Sierra Leone, allowing rebel movements to capture power. In many instances, intervention in the conflicts produced interim arrangements that provided a basis for peaceful elections and the building of institutions, including national armies. More specifically, some of the governments were belligerents while some rebel groups played as spoilers. This left the majority of emerging states with little or no capacity to address the conflict that is now characterizing African conflicts.

Therefore, as the continent was delegated military responsibility, its constituent parts were in fact themselves undergoing fundamental and institutional change. To emphasize the example, Africa's three largest states: Algeria, Sudan and DR Congo are either part of or in the process of ceasefires, interim arrangements or emerging from major internal conflicts. Each has their armies undergoing change, suffer strained national integration and can be considered ill prepared for the overbearing demands of regional (AU) CASDP and ASF tasks.

The CADSP⁴

The context in which the CADSP emerged and what the document purported to represent has also been found to be problematic over time. First, there is still no region globally that has achieved the comprehensive harmonization of foreign, security and defence policy unless within a federated state. Not even the impressive EU has attained such a high level of policy co-ordination. Second, the policy is based on the establishment and effective performance of Regional Economic and Security Structures (RECs). The latter have always been in the founding documents of the OAU but were not operationalized until the theoretical opening of space in the late 1990s. Hence, of the existing five pillars – the RECs – these have been challenged by a sixth, the East African Community (EAC) and a seventh, the Cairo-based East and Southern African Economic and Commercial Community (COMESA). This has not only rendered the clear deadlines with timelines of coming into action as set out by the AU redundant but has now created ambiguities with multiple memberships in organizations by several countries. Third, some of the RECs have taken the AU call to establish the ASF legs seriously whilst others have not. For instance, while attempts are being made in West, Eastern and Southern Africa, there is still much to be done in Central Africa and virtually nothing is happening in the North, which has resulted in confusion and the resignation of some countries in the Horn region from existing RECs. Finally, there is still a conceptual ambiguity over whether or not the AU should have encouraged the creation of RECs over the alternative of a loose but centrally controlled Standby Brigade stationed in Addis Ababa at AU Headquarters with a capacity and reach to be deployed within seventy-two hours to any part of the continent.

Finally, the ASF has so far only received 6 per cent of the US\$60 million annual sub-

³ Basic Facts: Refugees by Numbers 2006 edition, pp.1, 2 & 4, at <http://www.unhcr.org>.

⁴ <http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/Documents.htm> pp. 1-30.

scriptions paid by AU member countries. The rest of the required resources have to come from either willing countries and partners either on the continent or beyond, effectively neutralizing any ability for the AU to establish itself as an independent military entity in the international system. The Global Fund, a facility that has been responsible for funding AU commitments in Darfur of late, has been an active contributor. Meanwhile, budgetary estimates and implications of AU Peacekeeping Missions in Burundi, Darfur and Somalia stand at several hundred million dollars, far outstripping what Member States are able to provide. Much more significantly, the continent is unable both to equip forces and produce the military hardware required for harsh theatres, such as Darfur. The alternative has been to turn to outsiders for assistance, a decision that only confirms the continent's lack of preparation in undertaking an independent military function.

The External Dimension

In the period immediately following the West's announcement to pull out militarily from the continent and the genocides in Burundi, Rwanda and later DR Congo, the US government launched in 1996 an initiative to support African military capacity, ACRI. This was designed to train up to brigade level units that could be used against further pogroms. This came after British military capacity-building efforts were initiated in Zimbabwe in the 1980s and later extended to Namibia, Mozambique and South Africa. The French also offered pre-positioned equipment and logistical materiel 'dumps' in former French colonies as well as training support for select units. Finally, the EU deployed a mission in the DR Congo, and the Scandinavian countries assisted towards finding a solution to the Ethiopian-Eritrean war.

At least two preliminary points can be made on these Western external military involvements. First, the initiatives were not targeted for harmonization, and are hence at

variance, with the AU, CASDP or ASF agenda. Secondly, at least from the viewpoint of Africans, ACRI does not speak to RECAMP or BMATT or even EU military efforts in Africa. And much more to the point, the external interventions have not pooled resources to be made available to the AU based on an assessment of demands and gaps from the ground.

Finally, in more recent times, the battle of China versus the US in Africa has arisen. The competition for influence, resources (oil) and of course for pre-positioning against terror post-9/11 has further marginalized any independent African military action. This has, yet again, reduced them to act as minor proxies in the wider agenda of both superpowers, while undermining the broader African security agenda.

The reality of the external initiatives is that they have acted more to divide African Member States than unite them, forcing any indigenous military operation ultimately ineffective.

Conclusion

There is as yet no military capacity on the African continent that can be centrally deployed under the auspices of the AU in response to conflict scenarios that threaten both continental and global peace and security. This brief contribution highlights some of the circumstances that explain why there is little or no military capacity on the African continent.

While the AU has created an impression of political willingness, capacity and effectiveness within two years of the initial agreements, its partners are undermining the very core of its foundations. Furthermore, the nature of the African state, the implications of the Third Wave and subsequent conflicts demand the West and other international players to return to the African peacekeeping agenda and not leave this in the hands of an emerging institution that is itself hostage to the whims of fifty-three leaders and diverse regions.

The Challenges of Peacekeeping in Africa

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Introduction

Peacekeeping in Africa is both more important, and more hazardous, than anywhere else in the world. It is a task to which the United Nations, the African Union, regional organizations within Africa, and individual states both from the continent and outside it, have devoted an enormous amount of effort, with results that have varied from highly successful to completely disastrous. This brief paper seeks to set out some of the challenges that must be identified and met if peacekeeping in the continent is to achieve its maximum possibilities, while at the same time avoiding mistakes that can only damage the objectives which peacekeeping is intended to serve.

The Challenge of Military Force

Peacekeeping involves the limited and selective application of military force, in the service of the wider political goal of achieving peace. The place to start is with the recognition that military force is itself a very distinctive instrument of policy, which is in some

respects extremely effective, and in others virtually useless. This paper certainly does not subscribe to the mantra that 'military force settles nothing': it does though, on the contrary, believe it can settle a great deal, notably by removing from the equation opposing military forces that are deemed to be a threat to peace, and by imposing, at least temporarily, a common structure of control over areas at risk. The maintenance of what is essentially a policing force may equally, under suitable circumstances, serve to deter or prevent the re-emergence of peace-threatening groups within territories in which open conflict has been brought to an end.

On the other hand, one does not have to look far to identify objectives that military force cannot achieve. It is not suited to bringing about the deep-seated changes in attitudes and structures that are usually needed to control or reverse the conditions that brought about conflict in the first place, and there are likewise circumstances in which the injudicious use of force, or even the mere presence and identity of the peacekeeping forces themselves, may promote a reaction against the would-be peacekeepers, and lead to them becoming part of the very problems that they had been intended to control.

This is not, it should be emphasized, a matter of the *amount* of force that the peacekeepers are able to deploy. Even some of the largest and best-equipped military forces in the world have found themselves struggling to cope with situations in which the application of force does not provide an appropriate response to the problems that they face. It is, rather, a matter of working out whether these problems are ones that can be handled

through the selective application of force, and then if so, working out the most effective way to apply it. Indeed, peacekeepers with relatively small amounts of force at their disposal may be less likely than their more militarily powerful counterparts to fall into the trap of assuming that military force will in itself guarantee success, and may as a result give more careful consideration to the relationship between the objective that they seek, and the means available to achieve it.

The Challenge of Africa

It is no coincidence that the demands on peacekeepers should be at their greatest in Africa, since this is the continent in which the difficulties of maintaining stable political order are most acute. Africa is an extremely difficult continent to govern, simply because of its huge distances, generally dispersed populations, weak infrastructure, and extremely uneven distribution of resources.¹ All of Africa's rulers, whether pre-colonial, colonial or post-colonial, have faced essentially the same problems in exerting effective control over this large and poor landmass and its often mobile peoples, and it is safe to assume that they will continue to do so. The extremely problematic nature of many of the states artificially created by colonialism, and bequeathed to the continent's new rulers at independence, has only exacerbated the difficulties, which are necessarily at their most acute in those parts of Africa where peacekeepers are most likely to be needed. This is not to say that *all* of Africa's problems are the result of inherent structural weaknesses that lie beyond the hope of remedy. On the contrary, there are frequent cases in which these problems have been caused, or at the very least greatly exacerbated, by specific failings – such as corrupt, incompetent or dictatorial rule – that can in turn be rectified by improvements especially in the quali-

ty of governance that lie within plausible reach. In such situations, peacekeepers may be able to play a very valuable role in securing the conditions under which better forms of government can be put in place. It does, however, imply that great care needs to be taken, *before* deploying peacekeepers, to assess whether the situation is one in which they can actually make much difference.

This is not the point at which to go into the diverse kinds of conflict that have led (or might lead) to the deployment of peacekeepers in Africa. The critical point is that peacekeepers cannot be expected, and should not be used, to compensate for deep-seated difficulties in the governance of Africa, or indeed of particularly problematic parts of it. Peacekeeping involves the tactical insertion of limited force into a specific situation, and requires very careful appraisal of that situation in order to work out whether it is one that their presence can help to manage, and if so in what way. Many of the greatest failures in the deployment of peacekeepers result from their being asked to take on tasks that lie well beyond their capacity. Later in this paper, some of the different kinds of situations in which peacekeepers have been deployed will be disentangled, and the possibilities and problems which each of these are liable to give rise to.

The Challenge of Politics

Since peacekeeping involves the use of force in support of political objectives, it is essential for it to be accompanied by a clear understanding of the politics of the situation in which it is used. This applies especially to the appreciation of the internal politics of the conflict that has given rise to a call for peacekeeping. It is not enough to assume that since peace offers massive benefits to by far the greater number of the people in the area in which the conflict has taken place, the peace-

¹ See Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* (Princeton University Press, 2000).

keeping mission will be assured the level of local support that is essential to its success. Even though peace *does* normally bring enormous benefits (compared with the appalling costs of war) to the great majority of people, it is naive to assume that this will assure the mission the conditions in which it can operate successfully.

For a start, there is the obvious problem of ‘spoilers’: particular actors in the conflict who stand to gain from its perpetuation – very often because they have grown wealthy and powerful through the crude exploitation of lootable resources – and who will then seek to frustrate the peacekeepers at every turn. Where they have been able to use the position that they have established in the course of the conflict to build up a core of followers who see their own survival as depending on that of their boss, there may be no alternative to the need for the peacekeeping force to take them on and destroy them: fortunately, the forces at the disposal of ‘warlords’ or straightforward criminals are usually too poorly disciplined and trained to present much of a threat to a reasonably well-organized professional military, while the ties that bind these forces to their chief are so dependent on his ability both to inspire fear, and to provide immediate benefits, that they are likely to fall apart once the boss himself is removed.

This is, however, by no means the only or even the major challenge. In cases – and there are many – where the conflict results from ‘grievance’ and not merely ‘greed’ (to take the familiar dichotomy suggested by Paul Collier),² it is essential for the peace settlement which the peacekeeping force is intended to sustain to take full account of these grievances and provide credible ways to meet them. A peacekeeping force that has as its effective mission the maintenance in power of a government that has itself lost legitimacy is unlikely to achieve very much,

and will readily be identified as a source of conflict rather than a way of resolving it.

Beyond this, moreover, it has to be recognized that *all* peacekeeping missions *necessarily* have a political context which will in turn serve the interests of *some* local participants more than, or even directly at the expense of, those of others. Whatever the system of government is that the mission supports, or helps to bring about, this will be a government that is run by certain people (and in turn, usually, certain groups within the population as a whole), rather than – or at least to a greater extent than – by others. It is, as a result, absolutely critical for those who are charged with deciding whether to despatch a peacekeeping force to a particular conflict situation, or with determining the mandate or terms of reference that it will be expected to implement once it gets there, to take a very clear-headed view of what the overall impact of its arrival will be on the local political situation.

One question that is always worth asking is: Which are the groups within the conflict situation that the peacekeepers seek to control that would welcome their arrival (and even actively seek it), and which are the groups that look on the projected deployment of a peacekeeping force with suspicion, or indeed actively threaten it? This in turn provides a rough-and-ready indicator of the balance of local political forces that the peacekeepers will confront, and in turn the scale of the challenge that they are likely to face. It is almost axiomatic that the local participants who most eagerly await the peacekeepers’ arrival will be those who are losing most heavily from the current dispensation, whereas those who see themselves as being in the ascendant will be likely to regard the peacekeepers as depriving them of the fruits of victory. Arriving peacekeepers will therefore find themselves – regardless of their protestations of neutrality – cast in the role

² Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’, Oxford: Centre for the Study of African Economies, Working Paper 2002/01, 2002.

of protectors of the weaker side. This is certainly no reason for them *not* to intervene: the group currently in the ascendant may well be brutal, even genocidal criminals, whose hold over the population is maintained by force, and whose removal or neutralization is essential to local and regional security. It does, however, provide would-be peacekeepers with a means of assessing the situation that they face, and help them to ensure that they can deploy a force sufficient to achieve their goals. On occasion, it may force a reluctant recognition that any peacekeeping force is liable to get dragged into one side or the other of local conflicts that it can do little to contain.

One familiar way of seeking to defuse the problem of political partiality is to insist on internationally supervised elections, as an essential part of the overall settlement which the peacekeepers are deployed to guarantee. This has the great advantage that it ensures that the government that emerges from the settlement will be one that enjoys the greatest level of legitimacy and popular support, which will then greatly ease the political standing of the peacekeeping force whose mission is, implicitly at least, to sustain that government. Such elections often do indeed have an extremely important role in establishing effective and legitimate governments, which are the key to subsequent reconstruction. They nonetheless need to be subject to a very careful appraisal, both of the basic structure of the political differences that have given rise to the conflict in the first place, and to the specific ‘sequencing’ of elections with other elements in the peace process. In the first respect, where the conflict reflects major social fault lines dividing the population, the effect of the election may merely be to entrench these differences, and make lasting reconciliation all the more difficult to achieve: all that will happen is that the peacekeepers will be cast in the role of supporting the electorally dominant group, and will therefore be seen as enemies by the minority. In the second respect, it is now clearly estab-

lished that when elections are allowed to take place *before* the stabilization of the security situation, and where the major contenders in the election are the heads of armed factions, the effect of the election will simply be to entrench their power over an electorate that is forced to vote for the warlord who is in a position to do them most damage if they fail to support him. This will in turn leave the peacekeepers in an extremely invidious position.

There are potential political problems, too, from the side of the peacekeepers themselves. In some cases, the very composition of the peacekeeping force may be unacceptable to some local participants, or signal that it is likely to favour one side rather than the other. Neighbouring states, which are most directly affected by conflicts that threaten regional instability, are also most likely to be regarded as pursuing interests of their own under the guise of peacekeeping. Former colonisers, or other states with longstanding historical connections with the conflict area, or evident economic interests in it, are likewise in an invidious position. If the costs of peacekeeping mount, in terms of money or more sensitively of human lives, the states or organizations responsible for sending the peacekeepers may well withdraw their support.

The Challenge of Analysis

All of this points to the need for critical *thinking*, as the key to successful peacekeeping operations. Every situation differs, and each needs to be approached through a thorough and well-informed appraisal of the specific problems and opportunities that it offers. There is no fixed set of rules that can be applied to each case, and that will then automatically generate the correct answers. It is, however, useful to distinguish between different types of peacekeeping operation, which provide at least an initial set of criteria for applying to each case, for which the categories suggested by a recent book,

Understanding Peacekeeping,³ are most helpful. This indicates five forms of peacekeeping, each of which may be illustrated by current or recent examples in Africa, and each of which presents rather different challenges.

1) Traditional Peacekeeping

Traditional peacekeeping involves the insertion of a neutral force into a frontier zone between combatants, usually following a war and subsequent ceasefire. The role of the peacekeeping force is to guarantee to each side that the other will respect the terms of the ceasefire, by acting as a 'trip-wire' between the two sides, pending the conclusion of a permanent settlement. In such cases, the peacekeepers are deployed with the consent of both parties, they are expected to remain strictly neutral between them, and they are required to exert only minimal, if any force. The most obvious (indeed only) example of such an operation in Africa at the present time is the UNMEE force on the frontier between Eritrea and Ethiopia.

Operations of this kind are at least relatively straightforward, but (for that very reason) are rare in Africa. They are almost necessarily deployed in the context of mediation between rival neighbouring states, they involve the policing of geographically limited areas (normally the frontier between the combatants), and they imply the presence on each side of disciplined national armies subject to government control. The great majority of African peacekeeping situations are by contrast vastly more fluid. The major threat that they face is that the balance of political advantage that the operation confers on the combatants may change over time, leading one side or the other to contest the role of the peacekeepers, possibly resulting in the withdrawal of the peacekeeping force and a return to war.

2) Managing Transition

The function of peacekeepers in these situations is to 'hold the ring', following the negotiation of a political settlement to a conflict *within* a particular state, in order to ensure that the parties to the settlement abide by its terms, during the often very sensitive period during which the terms of that settlement are being implemented. The role of the peacekeepers is much more extensive than in the case of 'traditional peacekeeping'. They are normally required to extend a presence throughout the national territory, and to supervise potentially difficult operations such as the encampment and disarmament of the rival armed forces (which will necessarily involve at least one and possibly more insurgent forces, which may or may not be reasonably well disciplined), and the holding of elections which normally form a key component in settlements of this kind. The two most straightforward examples of such operations in Africa are the (largely British) Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Zimbabwe in 1979/80, and the UNTAG mission in Namibia in 1989/90. In each case, this was a transition from white minority to African majority rule, though in each case also there were serious dangers to the successful implementation of the settlement, and UNTAG especially had to cope with a controversial security crisis. Apparently analogous but potentially very different settlements have been reached to civil wars between African participants, in which the solidity of the settlement and the role of the peacekeeping force have been very much more uncertain. The extreme example of failure in such circumstances remains the UNAMIR I mission in Rwanda in early 1994, which had been deployed on the assumption that the Arusha Accord represented a genuine settlement, and entirely failed to cope when the falsity of this assumption was revealed. Angola in 1991/92 provides another tragic case.

³ Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams & Stuart Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004).

The key requirement for the deployment of peacekeepers in managed transitions is then an extremely hard-headed analysis of the robustness of the settlement that has been reached, the level of commitment to it of the parties concerned, the potential challenges to the settlement that may emerge under different scenarios, and the sources from which these may come. It is then necessary for the international organization or consortium of states sponsoring the peacekeeping operation to ensure that they have the forces on the ground required to respond effectively to any challenge to the settlement. To deploy a mere token force in situations where a real force may be needed is to risk an appalling breakdown that negates the entire settlement, leads to a resumption of conflict on a scale much more bitter than before, and undermines the credibility of peacekeeping operations much more widely.

3) Wider Peacekeeping

'Wider peacekeeping' is a term employed by Bellamy *et al.* to cover a wide and fluid range of situations, in which indeed they include UNAMIR I, even though this was initially conceived as a case of straightforward transition management. This form of engagement characteristically occurs in the context of ongoing violence, either in the absence of any ceasefire at all, or where such a ceasefire is fragile and poorly implemented. It almost always involves situations of civil war, rather than inter-state conflict, even though in some cases (such as DRC) external forces may also be engaged in support of domestic factions. In such cases, the roles of peacekeepers are multiple, complex, and extremely uncertain. They may involve the disarmament or separation of combatants, the protection of civilian populations and refugees, providing a security umbrella for the deployment of humanitarian relief (and the protection of external non-governmental organizations engaged in its delivery), and at times the provision of security for elections, the holding of

which is contested by some of the conflicting parties. In the case of missions that are formally mandated by international organizations, the terms of the mandate are liable to change rapidly in response to unforeseen circumstances, and there is liable to be a problem of ensuring that the mission on the ground has the capacity to cope with the demands made on it. The initial US intervention in Somalia in 1992, and the subsequent UNOSOM operation, provide examples.

Missions of this kind raise in the starkest form the challenges of military force, and the dangers of attempting to use peacekeeping in a futile attempt to deal with the deep-seated problems of African governance, that have been raised earlier in this paper. It is not argued outright that such missions should *never* be attempted. There may be occasions when the insertion of a peacekeeping force into a situation of ongoing conflict may provide a catalyst around which a settlement can be formed. It is, however, urged that operations of this kind should be pursued only after the most careful analysis of their possibilities and perils, and in the full understanding of the risks of failure, with fallback positions in the event of worst-case scenarios. They require in particular military forces that are sufficiently disciplined, flexible and well-equipped to be able to cope with circumstances well beyond those that were originally envisaged. This is not the kind of situation into which to send poorly-trained peacekeepers on a 'hope for the best' basis.

4) Peace Enforcement

'Peace enforcement' operations involve the deliberate deployment of external forces in a combatant role, designed to impose peace by the defeat of rival forces that are regarded as threatening it, often under the terms of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which authorizes the use of force under specific circumstances. It may very plausibly be asked whether such operations can properly be designated 'peacekeeping' at all, since

they amount to 'war fighting', albeit of a limited kind, directed towards a goal which usually commands a high level of international support. Bellamy *et al.* include in this category the UN force in Congo (ONUC, 1960-64), and the UNOSOM I and II and UNITAF operations in Somalia, which would be regarded as cases of 'wider peacekeeping'. A much clearer African example is the British intervention in Sierra Leone, which effectively destroyed Foday Sankoh's Revolutionary United Front (RUF-SL) forces, as well as a number of other outfits like the West Side Boys. As a straightforward fighting force, composed of highly-trained units under a single national command, this proved vastly more effective in this particular role than the much larger UN peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone at that time, which encompassed contingents drawn from different national armies, with a much wider mandate and more restrictive terms of reference. The SADC-authorized and South African-led intervention in Lesotho provides another example.

Operations of this kind can be planned and executed in conventional military terms, avoiding many of the problems that affect 'peacekeeping forces' in the normal sense of the word. They may however raise acute problems of sovereignty and intervention, and can rarely be dissociated from the hegemonic role of the state – normally either a neighbour or a former colonial power – which takes the lead. They usually involve explicit or implicit military support for a specific government or political faction against its domestic foes, and easily arouse suspicions that the intervening force is merely seeking to protect the interests of the sending state, or of its local allies, within deeply contested situations. The deployment of the French force under '*Operation Turquoise*' in Rwanda in 1994 fell foul of all these problems. In short, what such operations gain in terms of military simplicity, they are likely to lose in terms of diplomatic ambivalence, and they can properly be regarded as a form of

'peacekeeping' only when they are subject to a specific and limited goal, and to the clearest international authority. Once the objective of defeating the 'peace-threatening' opposition has been achieved, moreover, they are subject to the familiar problems of 'wider peacekeeping' or 'peace support' operations.

5) Peace Support Operations

The final category, peace support operations, involves the deployment of an internationally authorized force, as part of a much broader process of state reconstruction in the aftermath of civil war. The military are there in order to ensure that an initially fragile peace process does not collapse, at the hands perhaps of disgruntled faction leaders or demobilized former fighters, while the economy is rebuilt, a shattered domestic administration is put back in place, and a new national military force is trained to replace that fragmented (and possibly discredited) in the course of the preceding war. The establishment of an elected national government within a democratic political order is normally an essential prerequisite to ensure the legitimacy of the continued external engagement. The UN and British presence in Sierra Leone effectively turned into a peace support operation after the defeat of the RUF and other factions, while the continued large-scale UN presence in Liberia provides a further example.

Peace support operations are in principle relatively unproblematic, and are frequently essential if some framework of order is to be restored to a shattered state. The potential hazards that they face are likewise fairly clear. First, of course, is the need for them to retain sufficient force to deal with a real threat, should one arise: it is all too easy for a force in what appears to be a peaceful situation to become complacent, and not least for the states and international institutions responsible for maintaining it to assume that it is safe to draw down the force available, especially for financial reasons. Serious

problems may arise quickly and unexpectedly, and a rapid reaction capacity is essential. Second, difficulties may well arise in the relationship between the peacekeeping force and the government that it is there to protect. While at the outset, the government will certainly need the force, over time it is likely to want to flex its own muscles, and find itself placed under an onerous degree of dependence on the peace support operation, in its civilian as much as its military manifestations; the peacekeepers, for their part, have to maintain support for the political *order* established by the peace process, without being drawn into operating on behalf of the particular *regime* in power. The incumbent government, like any government, is likely to attract opposition over time, and the peacekeeping force cannot allow itself to be dragged into situations where it serves as the regime's private army, and is used against its legitimate domestic opponents. Finally, peace support operations are by their nature open-ended, and the point at which they can safely be run down or terminated is problematic. It is a feature of *all* peacekeeping opera-

tions, even 'traditional' ones like UNMEE, that they continue for an often much longer period than was originally envisaged, and in the process place continuing strain of the finances and military forces of the states and international organizations that send them.

Conclusion

It will be clear from this paper that the challenges facing peacekeeping missions, especially in Africa, are virtually endless. This is emphatically *not* to say that they should be abandoned. On the contrary, they offer an essential mechanism for helping to bring peace to parts of the continent that desperately need it. This paper concentrates on the 'challenges', and hence implicitly the problems, of such missions, because that is what it was commissioned to do. Its conclusion is that peacekeeping is most likely to make a positive contribution to the security of Africa if it is entered into with a very clear understanding of the different tasks that it may be expected to perform, and of the difficulties that it is liable to face in doing so.

Peacekeeping Experiences in Africa from Organization of African Unity to the African Union: An Analytical Historical Perspective

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Introduction

Since the birth of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and more particularly with the collapse of the bi-polar world order at the end of the 1990s, the issue of peace, security and stability in Africa has remained a major pre-occupation. Over the course of time, the security situation on the continent has been marked by the collapse of state institutions as exemplified by developments in countries like Liberia, Somalia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); an increase in communal conflicts, emerging mainly from rising tension in inter-group rivalry and the collapse of old patterns of relationships, as well as the social fabric upon which any community thrives; conflicts over ownership, management and control of natural resources, *despite the African continent being endowed with enough natural resources to cater for the needs of all its peoples*; proliferation and the stockpiling of small arms and light weapons; the rise in the activities of terrorists, mercenaries, warlords, irregular militia and other transnational organized criminal groups; and new forms of security threats, including money laundering, human trafficking, drugs, cyber-crimes, etc.

The culmination of collective efforts by OAU Member States to provide for a robust peacekeeping capacity in Africa can be demonstrated by examining these four components: the history of the challenges to peace and security in Africa and early

responses (1963 – early 1980s); the nature and content of transformation strategies in the area of peace and security during the transition from the OAU to the AU (1990s); the steps taken by the AU to realize a new peace and security architecture; and the evolving framework of peacekeeping operations and its challenges.

Peacekeeping, for which the foundation was laid under the now defunct OAU, is gaining a new currency with the AU. Although the scale of its activities may be limited in the sense that African people, especially women and children, face devastating consequences of conflict when whole economies and physical and social infrastructures are often destroyed, deepening the development gap, peacekeeping is nonetheless important and it has come a long way.

The Charter of the United Nations confers on the Security Council the ultimate responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Whilst this is the established political practice, as based on existing international law and conventions, the world has witnessed a new evolution in the domain of peacekeeping. This is particularly virulent in those areas and regions where action by the Security Council has been perceived to be too slow to respond to local situations endangering peace and security. That evolution, underpinned by efforts by regional organizations to engage in limited peacekeeping operations as stop gap measures, is comparatively more manifest in Africa. The AU was born in September 1999 into a situation of devastating conflicts and recurrent crises in various parts of Africa in addition to inheriting the unfinished tasks related to conflict management from its pre-

decessor. In the extreme case of Somalia, the OAU left it to the AU to take up the gigantic task of helping the Somalis revitalize the edifice of the State.

Historical Overview of OAU Efforts

From the OAU's inception, conflict resolution and the preservation of peace, security and stability have remained the major preoccupations for African leaders. The Charter of the OAU provided for the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration (CMCA). The Commission had jurisdiction only over inter-state conflicts and remained indifferent to internal strifes. Although the Commission made efforts to operate, it did so within a rather negative environment. Many OAU Member States were unwilling to resort to the procedure of arbitration and other measures as provided for under the CMCA. In addition, the members bound each other to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each Member. Therefore the Commission was blocked at its very infancy.

Given the ineffectiveness of the CMCA, African leaders resorted to other methods of conflict resolution, but on a more or less ad hoc basis. This recourse saw the phenomena of Elder Statesmen, African Heads of State, Ad Hoc Committees and Eminent Persons frequently being called upon to resolve inter-state disputes. The results were not satisfactory as the continent continued to be afflicted by conflicts. In fact, the last phase of the OAU witnessed the advent of numerous internal conflicts on the continent, including Somalia, Burundi, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the DRC. Further, it left in limbo the then long-running internal conflicts in Angola, Mozambique and Sudan. It was in that context that significant efforts were deployed to equip the OAU with a more robust organ to deal with conflicts.

The Cairo Declaration on a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution

OAU efforts to address the scourge of conflicts on the continent took a turning point in June 1993, when the 29th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, held in Cairo, Egypt, adopted a declaration establishing, within the OAU, a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. The decision to establish the Mechanism was reached amidst a growing awareness that there was no way Africa could improve its socio-economic performance in the years following the end of the Cold War given how fraught with wars, conflict and political instability it was. In this respect, it is worth recalling that three years earlier, in July 1990, the 26th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, that took place in Addis Ababa, adopted the 'Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World'. In that declaration, the Heads of State and Government noted that:

No single internal factor has contributed more to the present socio-economic problems in the Continent than the scourge of conflicts within and between our countries. They have brought about death and human suffering, engendered hate and divided nations and families. Conflicts have forced millions of our people into a drifting life as refugees and internally displaced persons, deprived of their means of livelihood, human dignity and hope. Conflicts have gobbled-up scarce resources, and undermined the ability of our countries to address the many compelling needs of our people.

In establishing the Mechanism, the Heads of State and Government clearly wanted to bring a new institutional dynamism to the process of dealing with conflicts on the African Continent by enabling speedy action to prevent and, if necessary, manage and ultimately resolve conflicts when they occur. According to the Cairo Declaration, the Mechanism had, as its primary objective, the anticipation and prevention of conflicts. In

circumstances where conflicts had already escalated, it was to be its responsibility to undertake peacemaking and peacebuilding functions in order to facilitate the resolution of these conflicts. In this respect, civilian and military observer/monitoring missions of limited scope and duration were deployed. The Assembly was of the view that the emphasis of the OAU Mechanism on anticipatory and preventive measures as well as concerted action on peacemaking and peacebuilding would obviate complex and resource-demanding peacekeeping operations, which African countries could find difficult to finance and sustain.

In the event conflicts degenerated to the extent of requiring collective international and complex intervention and policing, the assistance or, where appropriate, the services of the United Nations would be sought. In this case, African countries would examine ways and modalities through which they could make a practical contribution to such a United Nations undertaking and participate effectively to peacekeeping operations in Africa. The Assembly thus requested the Secretary-General of the OAU to undertake a review of the structures, procedures and working methods of the Mechanism, including the possibility of changing the name to 'Central Organ'.

Like its predecessors, the Mechanism did not prove all that effective in the preservation of peace and security in the continent. Although the Mechanism made some achievements, it was faced with very serious constraints, which limited its capacity to perform its mandate. It faced many challenges in dealing with conflict situations in Burundi, Comoros, Rwanda, Liberia and others. These constraints infringed on the Mechanism's mode of operation, the membership of the Central Organ, its methods of work and decision-making process, and the lack of a clear framework governing the relations regional groupings. The factors that undermined the effective functioning of the Mechanism were both endemic in its nature as well as external.

The lack of political commitment to effectively implement decisions on conflict issues, inadequate funding and logistical support as well as the absence of information networks among others rendered the Mechanism handicapped. Given these fundamental weaknesses, the role of the OAU remained peripheral in a number of major conflicts, including, in particular, those in Southern Sudan and Somalia. In addition, the inability of the Mechanism to effectively respond to crisis, especially in situations of *coups d'état* and other political fallout, further contributed to its demise.

The New Peace and Security Architecture of the African Union: Building the Capacity of the AU to Undertake Complex Peacekeeping Missions

Once the weaknesses of the Mechanism were acknowledged, the doors were opened for far-reaching reflections and reforms to enhance security within and between the Member States. It became clear that there was need for a more robust and proactive mechanism, particularly in view of the new political dispensation ushered in by the establishment of the African Union. The new efforts concentrated on various issues such as the need to put in place a new architecture for peace and security for the continent and with it the dimension of peacekeeping. These concerns culminated in the adoption of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union.

The PSC, as provided in the Protocol, is to be supported by the African Standby Force (to deal with peace-support operations), the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), and the Peace Fund (to garner the necessary resources for the promotion of peace and security). In addition to the PSC Protocol, the peace and security architecture includes the African Union Non-Aggression and Common

Defence Pact adopted by the 4th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, held in Abuja, Nigeria in January 2005; the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), adopted by the 2nd Extraordinary Session of the Union, held in Sirte, Libya in February 2005; as well as other security instruments of the Union, such as the Treaty establishing the African Nuclear Weapons Free-zone (the Pelindaba Treaty), and the Convention for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. While previous efforts concentrated on conflict resolution, the new architecture provides for a holistic approach for the promotion of peace and security in Africa.

The adoption of the PSC Protocol and its subsequent entering into force in December 2003 was a culmination of the concerted efforts since the early 1990s to equip the continent with a more robust apparatus for preserving and enhancing peace and security. The central objectives of the PSC are to anticipate and prevent conflicts; promote and implement peacebuilding; develop a common defence policy for the Union; coordinate and harmonize continental efforts in the prevention and combating of terrorism; and promote and encourage democratic practices, (good governance and the rule of law, protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, etc.)

Making Peacekeeping Work in Africa

The fiasco of the first peacekeeping venture undertaken by the OAU in Chad in 1979-1982, coupled with the heinous tragedies in Rwanda and Burundi in the 1990s, provided a new momentum for the need to build the continent's capacity in the area of peacekeeping. The operation in Chad furnished the first occasion ever for the OAU to mount a peacekeeping operation. It differed from all other instances of OAU military involvement in conflict management in that it was more complex than the ceasefire observation missions that the Organization had been deploy-

ing previously. With the exception of the lead country Nigeria, there was a lack of co-operation from many African countries. Among the other countries which were supposed to provide units to the neutral African force, including Congo, Benin, and Guinea, only the Congolese contingent composed of 550 troops showed up in Chad on 18 January 1980.

The lessons learned from the Chad operation included the fact that the effectiveness of peacekeeping was commensurate with the capacity and political will of the troop-contributing countries and the centrality of co-operation by the neighbouring countries. The lack of a clear mandate, and concept, particularly with regard to logistics, operation and troop-generation, further demonstrated the inexperience of the OAU, and showed that peacekeeping was not a picnic but rather a complex and expensive operation, which many African countries could not afford. The Chadian experience later informed decisions on how best to deal with peacekeeping, especially at the level of the African Chiefs of Defence staff (ACDS).

The first ACDS meeting, which took place in Addis Ababa 3-6 June 1996, emphasized that the primary responsibility of the OAU should lie with the anticipation and prevention of conflicts in accordance with the relevant provisions of the 1993 Cairo Declaration. It also recognized that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, particularly in the area of peacekeeping rests with the United Nations Security Council. At the same time, the meeting recognized that certain exceptional circumstances can arise which may lead to the deployment of limited peacekeeping or observation missions by the OAU. Subsequently, as reflected below, the 2nd ACDS meeting took place in Harare from 20-22 October 1997 to further the work initiated by the first meeting. And long after, the third meeting of the ACDS, and including the participation of governmental experts from AU member States, took place in Addis

Ababa from 15-16 May 2003. Notably, the third meeting came in the wake of the decision taken by the Assembly of the Union at its Maputo Summit held in July 2003 relating to the operationalization of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.

In order to enable the OAU to better undertake peace support missions, the Meeting saw the need for strengthening the military Unit of the General Secretariat. It also recommended that the OAU continue to co-ordinate closely with Sub-Regional Organizations in its peace support operations, taking advantage of existing arrangements within the sub-regions. The Meeting accepted the principle of standby arrangements and earmarked contingents on a voluntary basis, which could serve either under the aegis of the United Nations or the OAU or under sub-regional arrangements. In this regard, the Meeting recognized the need for proper preparation and the standardization of training.

Inspired by the role played by the Monitoring Mission of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS-ECOMOG) in Liberia in 1990 and in Sierra Leone in the late 1990s, there grew a strong desire for the continent to take on matters of peace and security.

The 2nd ACDS Meeting in Harare, from 24-25 October 1997, convened to consider the recommendations, observations and proposals of the Group of Military Experts. Discussed among others were the concept of peace support operations (PSO); the applicable procedures and adequacy of structures for PSO; the need for standard and adopted training in the field of PSO; the command and control of OAU PSO at various levels; the command and control of joint OAU/UN and OAU/Regional Organization operations; the planning and structure of PSO communications; the capacity building of Africa and the OAU General secretariat in the field of PSO; and the logistic support and financing of OAU PSO.

The discussions allowed the ACDS to

make substantive recommendations covering the modalities of the concepts, training and liaison; command, control and communications; and budget and logistics of OAU's 500-man standby observer force as contained in the Report of the Secretary General submitted to the 7th Ordinary Session of the Central Organ held from 20-21 November 1997. On the concept, the Meeting recommended, among other things, that all PSOs in Africa should be conducted in a manner consistent with both the UN and the OAU Charters and the Cairo Declaration; and that the concept should be firmly linked to the operationalization of its Early Warning System (EWS), including a network linking each of the Early Warning cells of the various sub-regional organizations in Africa.

In regard to procedures for the conduct of PSOs, the Meeting recommended, among other things, that the OAU should use existing UN references and adapt them to unique continental and organizational factors, and must also develop its own Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), for use by Member States in training and preparation for peace operations. In addition, it recommended that OAU Member States, individually or as part of sub-regional organizations, should supply the Conflict Management Division with the same data on strengths, tables of equipment, etc. In addition, it recommended that the OAU should identify about 500 trained military and civilian observers (100 from each sub-region) as an appropriate starting point for standby capacity. The Meeting recommended that training should be conducted in accordance with UN doctrine and standards. The ACDS recommended that Centres of expertise for PSOs training should be established. The OAU was also to conduct simulation exercises at the organizational level and joint exercises at the sub-regional level under its auspices. The Meeting also recommended a command, control and communications framework for OAU PSOs taking into consideration the OAU Charter and the Cairo Declaration. The

proposed framework excluded peace enforcement operations.

Within the General Secretariat, the Military Staff of the Field Operations Unit also held extensive deliberations with the African Defence Attachés and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). These efforts resulted in a document entitled, 'Draft Plan for Implementing the Recommendations of the Second Meeting of Chiefs of Defence Staff', which was prepared pursuant to the Decision of the 68th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso from 4-7 June 1998. At the 68th Ordinary Session of Council held in Ouagadougou from 1-6 June 1998, the Secretary General submitted a report on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Central Organ that captured the essence of the discussions at the Central Organ level.

These provisions were based on the assumption that the UN Security Council will fully assume its responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and security on the Continent. It should be stressed that after a short period of reluctance from the Security Council to undertake peacekeeping operations on the Continent, especially after the Somalia debacle in October 1993, the situation has witnessed positive developments. The UN is now undertaking its largest peacekeeping operations in Africa (Sierra Leone). It is also undertaking peacekeeping operations in Ethiopia-Eritrea, the DRC and Western Sahara. However, even in the best of circumstances where the UN fully assumes its responsibilities on the Continent, the AU has no option but to develop its civilian and military missions of observation and monitoring of limited scope and duration. Therefore there is the need to revisit the OAU's earlier decision for the establishment of the 500-man standby observer force. The rationale for this proposition was that there are low intensity conflicts in which the UN will not be involved as they can be dealt with by the Regional Organization, such as the

Comoros; and even in the case of conflicts where the UN has decided to deploy a peacekeeping mission, the procurement and logistical requirements are such that there is a long delay before the mission becomes operational. Pending that actual deployment of the UN mission, there can be the need for a provisional deployment, in order to ensure that the peace process is not derailed. A classic example of this situation was the deployment of the OAU Neutral Investigators in the DRC in 1999-2000 prior to the deployment of MONUC; in some conflict situations in which the OAU had played a lead political role, and in which the UN has subsequently assumed the responsibility for the deployment of a peacekeeping mission, there can still be the need for the AU to maintain a peacekeeping role in the peace process by co-deploying an AU mission, such as in the Ethiopia-Eritrea peace process. The AU should take into account the new developments arising from the recommendations of the Brahimi Panel, which was convened in 2000 to 'assess the shortcomings of the existing system and make frank, specific and realistic recommendations for change'. While, on the one hand the recommendations generally offer opportunities for closer UN-AU co-operation, they also fundamentally affect the ability of the AU and its Member States to fully and effectively participate in the UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS), and peacekeeping in general.

The Concept of African Standby Force and the Future of Peacekeeping in Africa

The Constitutive Act, particularly, its Article 4(h) which provides for the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect to grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, clears the way for rapid deployment of PSOs in Africa by removing the historic roadblock to collective security on the continent— that is, the principle of non-interference in the inter-

nal matters of a Member State. One of the fundamental principles of the AU today is that interference is not non-indifference. The PSC Protocol was built on this new paradigm of collective security in Africa, which inspired the conceptualization of the ASF in its Article 13.

The *raison d'être* for the establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) was to endow the PSC with a sound mechanism for rapid deployment of peace support missions. As its name suggests, the ASF is based on the concept of a Standby or 'ready to go' arrangement. The Protocol provides that such Force or arrangement be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components based in Member States. The ASF is mandated to take action in the following areas: observation and monitoring missions; other types of peace support operations; intervention in a Member State with respect to grave circumstances or at the request of a Member State in order to restore peace and stability in consonance with Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act; preventive deployment (to prevent crises before they escalate); peacebuilding, including post-conflict reconstruction, disarmament, and demobilization; humanitarian assistance and any other functions mandated to it by the PSC.

The ASF is based on the concept of regional brigades. Each of the five regions in Africa is to establish a brigade, which can be deployed at any time. The legitimate mandating authority for the deployment of a brigade is the Peace and Security Council of the AU, in conformity with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. This means the command Headquarters shall be at the Headquarters of the African Union.

Envisaged ASF Deployment Missions' Scenarios

Six main scenarios have been envisaged for the deployment of the ASF:

Scenario 1: AU and Regional Organization

Military advice to a political mission;

Scenario 2: AU and Regional Organization Military Observer mission co-deployed with the UN mission;

Scenario 3: Stand-alone AU and Regional Organization observer mission;

Scenario 4: AU and Regional Organization peacekeeping force for Chapter VI of the UN Charter and preventive deployment missions;

Scenario 5: AU peacekeeping for complex multidimensional peacekeeping mission—low level spoilers (as in many of the ongoing conflicts);

Scenario 6: AU intervention, e.g., in the case of genocide, or where the international community does not act promptly.

It should be noted that each scenario shall be determined by the situation on the ground. The decision on which brigade to deploy shall also be guided by analysis of the crisis and the best scenario.

Conclusion

While the peace and security agenda set out in the overall AU framework, including the NEPAD programme reflects the collective aspiration of Africans, the AU leadership is keenly aware that these objectives cannot be realized in the short term. A number of potential challenges must be addressed in the short to medium term.

First, it is envisaged that the ASF will respond to diverse operational environments varying from situations requiring preventive deployment to enforcement operations. Therefore, an African Stand-by Force will require careful strategic planning and incremental build-up from national to sub-regional levels.

Second, the development of a common doctrine will be particularly challenging. Much will depend on the nature of the operational environment and development of a common concept of operations, at least at sub-regional levels. This is compounded by

the fact that the operational environment in which the ASF will operate is not stagnant. As more civil wars are resolved, the nature of the threat emerging from the national level will change, possibly resulting in a return to a murkier operational environment dominated by low-intensity conflicts generated by intra and inter-communal conflicts.

As part of the effort to overcome some of these challenges, it may be more rewarding to create a division of labour, in various aspects of PSOs, particularly among Member States with a tradition of contributing to peace missions. This might provide a first level of preparation toward the creation of a Stand-by Force. Experiences acquired from participation in African peace operations have shown (even if informally) that certain countries have particular skills and a higher level of preparedness in specific aspects of PSOs. For example, it is assumed that the Nigerian and Guinean armed forces are more effective as a crack force for peace enforcement while the Ghanaian army is believed to be more experienced in traditional peace-keeping.

Specialization and training should cover activities along a spectrum – from peace-keeping to reconstruction, including preventive deployment, peacekeeping, enforcement operations, disarming of armed groups, training of military and police personnel and assistance toward overall institutional reform and provision of logistical support through these phases. Training should also be targeted at Member States that not only have the capacity to contribute troops to peace operations, but that have a track record of contributing to peace operations and can make them available when the need arises.

Not least, and perhaps a central pillar of the whole African philosophy of preserving peace and security in the continent, is the need to enhance per capita freedom, democratic space, enjoyment of human rights and protection, and access to the opportunities for self-development through out the continent. These aspects should be promoted

around each individual, with the progress being measured at each individual level. The conflicts ravaging the continent and its people and their economies are directly linked to deep-seated deprivations that the populations live on a daily basis. Now, with no space large enough for the affected populations to address those deprivations in a peaceful manner in most cases, protracted violent conflicts become inevitable. The net result is the resort to more expensive methods of managing and resolving those conflicts, whereby enormous quantities of human, financial, logistical and technical resources, otherwise to be devoted to socio-economic development, are absorbed into operations to restore peace and security.

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Peacebuilding in the Context of the Rwanda Defence Forces

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Introduction

The peacebuilding process in the context of the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF) must be appreciated in light of developments in post-genocide Rwanda. However, the RDF integration that preceded the peacebuilding was an already established practice by the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) during its struggle for Rwandan inclusivity and as a war strategy to weaken the enemy morale.

After the 1994 genocide, when the Government of National Unity took over, Rwanda was in utter anarchy. About one million Rwandans were killed and the rest of the population was displaced. Over two million people had sought refuge in neighbouring countries, and many more were internally displaced. There were countless numbers of orphans, widows, thousands of handicapped people and generally a very vulnerable and traumatized population.

Law and order had completely broken down. Large scale atrocities were still going on in parts of the country. All national law enforcement agencies and judicial institutions had ceased to exist and the system of administration of justice had come to a complete standstill. Social and economic infrastructure was in a state of collapse. All economic indicators showed a desperate situation, with the inflation standing at close to 1000 per cent, and most economic activity having ground to a complete halt. Neither schools nor hospitals were functioning. The civil service had been decimated or its membership had fled into exile.

A cloud of insecurity loomed over Rwanda, as the former soldiers and the militia re-organized themselves, intent on continuing their genocidal campaign with the support of the then Zaire, now Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Military Integration as a Conflict Management Strategy

One method of reaching lasting peace is to ensure participation by all competing factions in a new government, hence the establishment of the Government of National Unity. Another aspect of ensuring lasting peace is the full integration of the ex-military into the new national army. In Rwanda, the military led the way and provided the example of the effectiveness of peacebuilding that could be replicated elsewhere.

Basically, there are three models of peacebuilding. The first is the consent-based model, which is based on comprehensive negotiated settlement of conflict between two parties conducted under third party

supervision. The government forces may absorb guerrilla forces or may merge the two warring factions to form a single national force. It is important to note that the peacebuilding is usually conducted after cessation of hostilities though the security situation may remain fragile.

The second model is complete demobilization where the government decides to downsize its military through the normal channels of peacebuilding but does not include former enemy combatants in its forces. Examples include Ethiopia's complete demobilization of the former government forces in 1991 under the DERG after the defeat of Mengistu Haile Mariam.

The third is the coercive model of peacebuilding, which involves forced disarmament of insurgents and is usually carried out by external intervention under a United Nations mandate. An example of this is the failed forced disarmament of Somali warring factions in 1993.

The Rwandan Model of Peacebuilding

Rwanda's model of peacebuilding is based on consent, where ex-combatants were fully integrated in the spirit of the 1993 Arusha Peace Agreement between the RPF and the Government of Rwanda. Protocol III of the Agreement provided for integration of the RPA into the Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR).

Unlike in the classic Consent Model, RDF integration was a continuous process, that is, before, during and after cessation of hostilities. The Rwanda model was effected through the traditional concept of *Ingando* (solidarity camps). The *Ingando* in Kinyarwanda means a military encampment or assembly area (RV) where the troops traditionally received their final briefing while readying for a military expedition abroad. The briefing included, among others, reorganization of the troops and allotment of missions and tasks.

In such gatherings, the individuals were

reminded to subject their interests to the national ideal and give Rwanda their all. This meant that whatever differences one may have, the national interests always prevailed since the nation of Rwanda is bigger than any one individual and ensured prosperity for all. That was the idea behind the institution of *Ingando*.

The objectives of the *Ingando* is to help the participants, who today also include members of the greater society – *i.e.*, students, grassroots leaders, opinion leaders, teachers, released prisoners, etc – overcome mutual fear and suspicion, and temptation to revenge; talk about the history of the conflict; heal the wounds of hatred; accept responsibility for any harm done to each other; demystify negative perceptions of each other; collective ownership of the tragedy that resulted from the conflict; and, agree on what the future portends for them.

Ingando employs the concept of problem solving workshops (PSW), as a participatory conflict management strategy. PSWs are designed as the best method through which a protracted conflict such as Rwanda's may find sustainable resolution. PSWs encourage the parties to analyze their conflict, its causes, the parties' attitudes towards each other, and their post-conflict relationship.

Steps Taken in *Ingando*

The first step is to help the ex-combatants and the RDF to unburden themselves emotionally. This can be achieved by allowing them to talk about the conflict and its history. What the parties feel about the conflict and about each other is an important barrier that must first be removed. When the parties are not able to first talk about the conflict and their feelings about it, they will never be able to talk about mutual solutions and the future. The command's challenge is to ensure an atmosphere in which the parties get to know each other and respect each other's dignity as persons at all times.

The second step is joint military rede-

ployment of the former adversaries. This deployment provides further opportunity for the participants to continue learning about the conflict and further facilitate bonding between the troops through demystification of any differences and misperceptions they may harbour about each other. An example of joint deployment may be provided by the war in DRC in 1998-2002, after about 39,200 were integrated in the RPA. After their tour of duty in the DRC, or while on leave, the break enabled the ex-combatants to return to their communities. While on leave, they influenced their communities with their example of being fully integrated.

In the third step, the RDF continuously facilitates exploratory dialogue through the office of the Civil-Military Co-ordination Office (J5) at the RDF Headquarters. Here, the J5 is more analytical and the participants are encouraged to analyze their conflict as a mutual problem. This process includes analyzing why the conflict began; why each reacted to it the way they did; and, coming to terms with their mutual losses and responsibilities. The J5 ensures that no blame is apportioned. This stage can be emotional but is crucial and must be passed through, because in the end this ensures a win/win solution.

The fourth stage is when the integrated ex-combatants meet and re-evaluate the whole process. In their testimonies, they may admit to having been convinced that there is a way out mutually, to having developed doubts about the process, or also to having received contradictory reactions from their constituencies about the process.

During the November 2006 International Peacebuilding Course at the RMA Nyakinama where he was a guest speaker, Maj. Gen. Paul Rwarakabije (Ex-Commander FDLR), who is now integrated in the RDF and is a commissioner in the RDRC, provided an example of successful integration. His testimony was fostered on the conviction that there was a way out of the conflict.

Participation in *Ingando* recognizes the dignity and humanity of the participants as equal Rwandans. Irrespective of their roles in the Rwandan conflict, the *Ingando* forms the starting point to conflict resolution. *Ingandos* were initially meant for integrating ex-combatants into the national army and society during and after the Rwandan liberation war. This entailed mixing the ex-FAR and the RPA officers and men and gave them an opportunity to talk about the Rwandan conflict.

The integration of the ex-FAR and militias continues to date. Between 1995 and 1997, a total of 10,500 ex-FAR officers and men were integrated in the RPA. And between 1998 and 2002 a total of 39,200 ex-FAR and militia were integrated in the RPA.

Immediate security dividends from Rwandan peacebuilding in 1997 was the transformation of the counter-insurgency strategy into a political and social effort that would in a short time break the ex-FAR and militia insurgents operating in and out of the country. The soldiers were integrated and became stakeholders as responsible citizens and breadwinners for their families.

The peacebuilding pay-offs include, among others, promoting stability and initial reconciliation between conflicting parties. In the case of the RDF, the ex-combatants moved from being tools of violence into being economic assets, *i.e.*, war resources were channeled into socio-economic development. The integrated ex-combatants allow for human capital development in their skills and talents, thus providing suitable conditions for societal reconciliation by becoming valuable stakeholders. Peacebuilding also becomes a facilitator for military professionalism, which enhances effectiveness and healthy civil-military relations and societal reconciliation.

Conclusion

For peacebuilding to succeed there must be political will from the leadership. The peacebuilding process must also work on the psy-

chology of the actors – the very essence of the *Ingando* as PSWs – and must be locally driven and owned, and not imposed. The international partners can only complement local initiatives.

In justice and reconciliation, the society must be prepared to accept the ex-combatants also as ‘victims’ of the conflict and not spoilers, but partners in post-conflict reconstruction. Therefore, there are no losers, and it is a win-win outcome.

In Rwanda, the RDF peacebuilding initiative provided the example of an integrated institution and served as a role model to the rest of the society (that is, if former antagonists can integrate, why can’t civil society?). To quote a colleague, ‘Demobilization and re-integration are about people’. Since the

military is about ensuring security and peace, we are indeed core development partners. We, in the military, must understand this cardinal role in our societies.

The late Edward Azar, an American-Palestinian scholar in conflict management, once observed, ‘Peace is development and trying to resolve conflict without addressing in general the question of underdevelopment, in a general sense, is futile.’ Development itself is therefore a conflict management strategy.

Further, as Archbishop Desmond Tutu said: ‘You can only be human in a human society. If you live with hate and revenge, you dehumanize not only yourself but your community. You must forgive to make your community whole.’

Why AFRICOM?

Theresa Whelan

Theresa Whelan is Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa, United States Department of Defense. Her office is responsible for Department of Defense policy for all of Sub-Saharan Africa. Ms Whelan brings to her position fifteen years of experience in the defence intelligence and defence policy communities, including twelve years focusing on African issues. Prior to assuming the DASD position, Ms. Whelan served as Director of the Office of African Affairs for two years.

‘This new command will strengthen our security co-operation with Africa and help to create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa. Africa Command will enhance our efforts to help bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa.’

President George Bush, 7 February 2007

[Creating AFRICOM] ‘will enable us to have a more effective and integrated approach than the current arrangement of dividing Africa between [different regional commands]’

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 6 February 2007

Introduction

Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for African Affairs, James Woods, used to begin his annual presentation to U.S. Army Foreign Area Officers (FAOs)

with a question: ‘Why is Africa important to the United States?’ The answers would range from the practical (natural resources) to idealistic (people yearning to be free of dictators) to the altruistic (prevent disease and save lives from humanitarian disasters). According to Woods, while those were sound reasons, he wanted to draw the FAOs’ thinking to the strategic level, so the answer was: ‘Because it’s there.’

That’s a simplification, but Africa’s place in the world cannot be overlooked. As the second-largest continent in the world – 11,700,000 square miles (22 per cent of the world’s total land area) with an estimated population of 690 million people (roughly 14 per cent of the world’s population) – it’s geographically and demographically important. It’s economically important as well: by 2005, economic growth was averaging 5 per cent and there were tens of thousands of U.S. jobs tied to the African market; Africa possesses an estimated 8 per cent of the world’s petroleum; and it is a major source of critical minerals, precious metals, and food commodities. It is also politically important: of the ten elected members of the UN National Security Council, three are elected from the General Assembly by African nations.

Africa’s strategic importance has been reflected historically in ways that have sometimes been less than a blessing for the continent. It sits astride millennia-old trade routes; the possession of its resources and even its people have been fought over by many nations both ancient and modern, a ‘fight’ which continues to this day, albeit in less stark terms as that which occurred during the so-called ‘scramble for Africa’ of the 19th century. The legacies of that colonialism con-

tinue to haunt the international community. There is perhaps a magazine or newspaper article written somewhere in the world every week that draws a parallel between what happened during the ‘scramble’ and the alleged manoeuvring between modern powers for access to African natural resources, be they oil, minerals, timber, or fish.

Africa remains a rich, vibrant and diverse place with an ever-increasing strategic significance in today’s global security environment. President Bush’s recent decision to establish AFRICOM is a direct recognition of Africa’s importance as well as a sincere hope that America and the many nations that make up Africa will continue to strengthen and expand partnerships to the benefit of all.

A command focused solely on Africa will have no impact on the sovereignty of African nations. In fact, AFRICOM’s success will be contingent upon its ability to foster important friendships and effective partnerships with the many nations in Africa.

U.S. military engagement on the African continent is not new. For many years African nations have worked with U.S. government agencies coordinating humanitarian assistance, medical care, and disaster relief. We also have undertaken joint military exercises and training programs to assist partner nations in the professional development of their military forces.

Africa’s growing importance is the imperative behind the creation of a command focused solely on Africa. It is a command that will be like no other in U.S. history. The intent is to create a command that is as unique and diverse as Africa itself. Doing so will require better integration of U.S. government capacity building efforts across the spectrum of U.S. agencies. One of the Deputy ‘Commanders’ will be a senior-level State Department official. Other senior-level civilian representatives from numerous U.S. agencies will collaborate to help African nations tackle the security challenges related to humanitarian assistance, disaster relief,

disease, poverty, deforestation, building partnership capacities, civic action, etc.

The Unified Command Plan

To understand the concept behind a unified command, one must understand the Unified Command Plan (UCP), and how the Department of Defense does business around the world. It is defined as:

The document, approved by the President, which sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatant commanders; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general geographical area of responsibility for geographic combatant commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders.

The Unified Command Plan (UCP) is regularly reviewed and updated and this includes, when appropriate, modifications to areas of responsibility or command alignments or assignments. As of January 2007, there were nine Unified Commands, stated in law and the latest UCP. Five were regional responsibilities, and four have functional responsibilities. With the advent of AFRICOM, there will be six geographic COCOMs.

The Development of the UCP

Following the Second World War, the United States adopted a new system of defence organization under a single Secretary of Defense. The system established the U.S. Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and new commands composed of more than one military service. These new ‘unified commands’ were intended to ensure that forces from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps would all work together.

The geographic areas come under ‘Unified Commanders,’ who exercise command authority over assigned forces. The Commanders are directly responsible to the National Command Authority (the President and the Secretary of Defense) for the performance of these missions and the prepared-

ness of the command.

The present division of Africa among three commands (European Command - EUCOM, Central Command - CENTCOM and Pacific Command - PACOM) was driven by historical, cultural, and geopolitical factors. Responsibility for North Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya) was assigned in 1952 to the European Command, given those nations' European cultural linkages and their perceived relevance to the increasingly important Middle East. As the Cold War grew in complexity and the United States and the Soviet Union maneuvered for influence among the newly independent African states, the UCP was revised in 1960 to include Sub-Saharan Africa under the AOR of Atlantic Command (LANTCOM). Shortly after, in 1962, a new command, Strike Command (STRICOM), was formed and assigned oversight of Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia which continued until 1971 when STRICOM became Readiness Command (REDCOM) with a revised AOR that did not include Sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, between 1971 and 1983, Sub-Saharan Africa was no specific Command's responsibility. It was not until 1983 that Africa was divided among the three commands: EUCOM, CENTCOM and PACOM.

In 1983, the UCP was again revised in order to recognize Africa's growing strategic importance to the both the United States and Europe in the context of the Cold War. European Command was given responsibility for all continental African nations save Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia. These nations were seen as having closer ties to the Middle East and were deemed Central Command's responsibility. This left island nations off the eastern coast (Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and The Comoros) within the Pacific Command; those off the western coast were assigned to Atlantic Command. This division, as one might imagine, led to difficulties co-ordinating U.S. activities and thus gave rise to the

first thoughts of creating a single, unified Africa Command.

With the end of the Cold War the strategic paradigm the U.S. had used for nearly fifty years to understand and respond to the global security environment gradually became less and less relevant. No place was this more apparent than in Africa where Africa's strategic importance to the U.S. had been defined almost entirely in relation to U.S. Cold War security objectives. In the absence of the Cold War, U.S. national security policy makers in the 1990s struggled to understand exactly where and how Africa fit in the security context. The initial answer was that Africa's security challenges manifested no direct threat to the U.S., militarily or economically (given the assumption that the collapse of the bipolar division of the globe would now allow free market-based access to world commodities) and therefore were relevant to the U.S. primarily in a humanitarian context. However, the events of 9/11, combined with 20/20 hindsight made clear that Africa was integral, not peripheral, to global security in general, and U.S. security in particular, in the post 9/11 world.

This was a world in which catastrophic threats to a nation-state's security were not simply confined to rival nation-states with the capacity to build large sophisticated conventional militaries with the means to deliver WMD. Rather, such threats could come from anywhere in the world, including from among the poorest, least developed, and least secure countries on the planet. If a small group of terrorists operating out of an undeveloped country in Central Asia could inflict more damage on the U.S. in a few hours than the entire Japanese Imperial Navy did at Pearl Harbor, the U.S. could no longer afford to prioritize its security concerns using traditional conventional power-based criteria. To further complicate matters, it became clear that non-state actors could now be just as dangerous, if not more so, as an aggressive state-based power. In this post 9/11 world, African



The Geographic Unified Commands as of January 2007

security issues could no longer be viewed as only a humanitarian concern. Cold, hard ‘real-politik’ dictated a U.S. national interest in promoting a secure and stable African continent.


Security and stability in Africa however, are not merely a function of developing competent military and police forces. Experiences in Africa and the Balkans in the 1990s and in Afghanistan and Iraq over the last 5 years have made clear that those tools only provide security and stability on a temporary basis. Sustainable security and stability are dependent on good governance, the rule of law and economic opportunity. Those elements of security, in turn, have a symbiotic relationship with such things as health and education. If a secure and stable Africa is in U.S. national interest, then the U.S. would need to take a holistic approach to addressing the challenge. Additionally, in the new, more volatile, fluid and unpredictable global security environment, the old adage about an ounce of prevention being worth a pound of cure does not simply

make sense from a resource perspective but also from a risk mitigation and management perspective.

AFRICOM

It is in this context that former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld asked his military and civilian staff to re-examine the merits and feasibility of establishing a stand-alone Unified Command focused exclusively on Africa. Africa’s direct relevance to U.S. national security demanded that DoD re-think the Cold War based structure that artificially divided the

continent among three different commands that were frequently distracted by responsibilities in their primary geographic regions. Keeping Africa divided among three commands would mean that, at best, Africa would remain a secondary and sometimes even tertiary concern for those commands. As such neither the commands, nor the military services that supported them with personnel, would deem it a priority to develop a large body of personnel with knowledge and expertise on Africa. It also meant that the bureaucratic barriers created by the ‘seams’ between the commands would continue to present challenges to coherent and efficient action in the areas where the ‘seams’ met.



The Transformation of the 3 Unified Geographic Commands to AFRICOM

The fact that the 'seams' ran through key areas of conflict and instability on the continent made them even more problematic. Additionally, the establishment of the African Union (AU) and its ambitious program for a continent-wide multi-lateral security architecture created further complications for DoD's command seams, as EUCOM found itself working more and more in CENTCOM's back-yard in Addis Ababa with the AU. Further, both CENTCOM and EUCOM struggled to deal with emerging African stand-by brigade structures that cut across their respective areas of responsibility.

Beyond simply mandating a re-look at the way lines were drawn on the DoD map, the Secretary also directed that the effort involve members of the U.S. government inter-agency, in particular, the State Dept and USAID, and that the team consider innovative organizational constructs as well as mission sets for a command dedicated solely to Africa. The former Secretary believed that if DoD was going to establish a command for Africa it needed to be a twenty-first century command, not a twentieth century command and it needed to be tailored to address the unique security challenges of the continent.

Secretary of Defense Gates has since embraced the effort, stressing that the command should 'oversee security co-operation, building partnership capability, defense support to non-military missions' and expressing the importance of moving away from an 'outdated arrangement left over from the Cold War.'

The result of the inter-agency study team's work was a proposal for a Unified Command for Africa that would concentrate its efforts on prevention rather than reaction. Its primary objective would be to contribute DoD's expertise in the security arena in support of U.S. diplomacy and development efforts to 'prevent problems from becoming crises, and crises from becoming catastrophes.' In that context the command would help build the capacity of African countries

to reduce conflict, improve security, deny terrorists sanctuary and support crisis response. In order to do this, the traditional military J-code organization structure designed for combat operations would need to be fundamentally changed to incorporate an integrated civilian/military architecture that would emphasize and facilitate non-kinetic missions such as military capacity building training, security sector reform and military professionalization, as well as support to the humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and medical assistance efforts of other USG agencies. The study team also recommended that the command not be developed in a U.S. vacuum but rather that the specifics of its mission, design and even possible location be informed by consultation with international partners. Particular importance was placed on consultation with African partners to insure that it would be appropriate to the African context. On 7 February 2007, President Bush publicly announced his direction to DoD to develop and stand up a Unified Command for Africa by the end of September 2008 based on the principles outlined by the inter-agency study team.

AFRICOM Myth vs Reality

The AFRICOM development process has begun, as has the international consultation process. The next 18 months will see flesh put on the bones of the AFRICOM skeleton. However, there is already much uninformed and sometimes sensationalist speculation about the command which has led to numerous misconceptions, especially regarding its structure and purpose. In many ways, the creation of this command is an historic opportunity to 'catch-up' with Africa's quickly evolving continental and regional security architectures and their increasing capacities to synergize African efforts in both the governmental and non-governmental spheres to address security challenges all over the continent. It is an opportunity to strengthen and expand U.S. and African relationships in such

a way that our combined efforts can help generate a lasting peace and stability on the continent.

Location, Location, Location

There has been much speculation about the location of the command and the type of facilities that the command would require. Some believe the creation of AFRICOM means DoD will be establishing military bases for U.S. army, navy or air forces on the continent. That is most definitely not the case. In the last seven years DoD has engaged in a major global force restructuring project involving the withdrawal of U.S. troops from bases overseas. The creation of AFRICOM will not alter that process. Africa Command will be a staff headquarters not a troop headquarters. Consequently, the intent is to establish staff personnel presence in locations on the continent that best facilitate partnership with African nations and institutions based on consultations with those nations and institutions. AFRICOM will not be accomplishing its mission if the physical presence of the command itself becomes a burden to host nations. For that reason, as well as for force protection considerations, the command footprint in any given location will likely be relatively small and discrete. As is the case currently, U.S. military personnel involved in training or exercises in Africa would deploy to the continent from their home bases in the U.S. for the duration of their training mission. Such mission lengths are usually measured in terms of weeks.

Who's in Charge?

Another concern/criticism that has been raised about the establishment of AFRICOM is that it will attempt to usurp African leadership on security issues on the continent or it will militarize U.S. foreign policy in Africa. Neither assertion is true. With regard to leadership on the continent, DoD recognizes and applauds the leadership role that individual

African nations and multi-lateral African organizations are taking in promoting peace, security, and stability on the continent. This is exactly the type of initiative and leadership needed to address the diffuse and unpredictable global security challenges the world currently faces. The purpose of AFRICOM is to encourage and support such African leadership, not discourage and suppress it. U.S. security is enhanced by African nations being able to address and resolve emerging security issues in their countries, regions and across the continent on their own. It would be counter-productive for AFRICOM to take actions that undermine that goal. AFRICOM is intended to complement, not compete with the African Union. Its mission will be to facilitate the African Union's efforts to develop the capabilities and mechanisms across the continent needed to promote and sustain peace and stability.

The 600 Pound Gorilla?

The next charge that is frequently levied is that the creation of AFRICOM represents the militarization of U.S. foreign policy. This is hardly the case, particularly if one examines the facts. Africa Command is merely the logical next step in a course set almost a decade ago as the US began to increase its emphasis on supporting trade, development and health initiatives on the continent. US health and development programs for Africa currently total nearly 9 Billion and include such major initiatives as the Millennium Challenge Account, the African Growth and Opportunity Act, PEPFAR (the largest program in the world sponsored by a foreign government to combat HIV/AIDs) and President Bush's recent initiative combat malaria. In contrast, US security assistance programs on the continent amount to no more than \$250M, or 1/36th of the non-security related programs in any given year. Despite newspaper headlines and uninformed rhetoric to the contrary, the facts and figures show that trade, health, development

and governance issues and programs, not military programs, dominate the landscape of US policy toward Africa today and will continue to do so in the future. The creation of a DoD command for Africa will in no way change this US policy focus.

AFRICOM, just like EUCOM, CENTCOM and PACOM today, will be a key supporting organization in the implementation of US foreign policy as articulated by the Secretary of State. The creation of a single U.S. DoD point of contact for Africa will simply allow for the better synchronization and coordination of DoD efforts to help build security capacity in Africa with State and USAID efforts to improve governance and development capacity and opportunities. The inclusion of State Department, USAID, and other U.S. government inter-agency personnel in the command structure improves the Command's capabilities by injecting knowledge and expertise into the organization but not authority. Inter-agency personnel detailed to AFRICOM will be there to help AFRICOM conduct its mission on the continent. They will not be conducting the missions of their home agencies. The traditional lines of authority in these agencies and between these agencies and US Embassies in Africa will not change nor will the presence of inter-agency personnel in AFRICOM dilute or undermine the independence of their home agencies.

'It's About the Oil.....'

Many pundits, both inside and outside Africa, have asserted that AFRICOM's primary purpose will be to secure U.S. access to African oil. Much has been made of the fact that the U.S. currently receives roughly 15 per cent of its oil from Africa and that percentage is projected to grow over the next five to ten years. That said, the U.S. is far from the only beneficiary of African oil. Given the nature of the global oil market, African oil production is important to all oil consuming nations. While Africa's growing importance as a glob-

al oil producer is certainly a factor in the continent's strategic significance, it was not, as has been explained previously in this paper, the rationale for the creation of AFRICOM. It would not, therefore, be AFRICOM's mission to provide security for African oil or, for that matter, any other African natural resource. Rather, AFRICOM will work to help African nations develop their own capacities to protect their natural resources to insure they are not illegally exploited and diverted, thereby undermining economic development potential while possibly fueling conflicts or even terrorism. If African nations have adequate capability to protect their own natural resources, then the global market system will be sufficient to ensure international access to them as needed.

It's also important to note that oil is not the only natural resource worth protecting in Africa. The international press focus on African oil obscures the importance of other natural resources, particularly the more mundane, such as timber and fish, to African economic potential. For example, coastal African nations lose billions of dollars of resources annually to international illegal fishing. The extent to which AFRICOM could help such nations develop maritime security capacities to protect their territorial waters could contribute to those countries' economic health, a key component of long term stability. DoD's involvement in helping African nations protect these more environmentally friendly natural resources is not unprecedented. In the 1980s and early 1990s, there were several U.S. security assistance programs that focused on helping African militaries build the capacity to protect their fisheries resources and even their game parks.

'Show me the money!'

So if AFRICOM is not going to base U.S. troops, sailors or airmen in Africa, or secure and control African oil fields, then the question arises as to what exactly this command

will look like and what specifically will the command and its staff do? To begin with, AFRICOM, unlike existing U.S. Unified Commands, will be structured and staffed so as to emphasize and facilitate security capacity building and civil/military activities, the bulk of the command's mission. An initial working draft of the command's mission statement reads as follows:

US Africa Command promotes US National Security objectives by working with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen stability and security in the area of responsibility. US Africa command leads the in-theater DoD response to support other USG agencies in implementing USG security policies and strategies. In concert with other US government and international partners, US Africa Command conducts theater security co-operation activities to assist in building security capacity and improve accountable governance. As directed, US Africa Command conducts military operations to deter aggression and respond to crises.

This working draft mission statement places emphasis on what the February 2006 DoD Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), refers to as 'anticipatory measures.' In other words, AFRICOM's primary objective will be, as the QDR put it, to '...prevent problems from becoming crises and crises from becoming catastrophes.' Given AFRICOM's mission emphasis on prevention versus reaction, one of the most significant organizational structure innovations currently being developed for the command is the creation of a major command element called the Directorate for Civil/Military Activities. This element will be separate from, and equivalent to, the traditional operational element of the command. Further, for the first time, DoD will have a non-DoD civilian as a senior official in AFRICOM's chain of command. A State Department Senior Foreign Service officer will lead the Civil/Military Activities Directorate and serve as one of at least two deputies reporting directly to the AFRICOM Commander. This Civil/Military Activities directorate will be staffed by both military

and civilian personnel, with a large percentage of the civilians coming from other U.S. government departments and agencies such as State Department, USAID, Treasury, Justice, Energy and Homeland Security to name a few. European and Africa partner nations may also be invited to second personnel to this component of the command at some point in the future.

The new Directorate will oversee all of AFRICOM's capacity building assistance at the bilateral and multi-lateral level. Areas of focus will include security capabilities (both land and maritime), medical skills, command, control and communications, disaster relief, and security sector reform/restructuring (such as being done in Sierra Leone, Liberia and DRC). In particular, the Civil/Military Activities Directorate will be the primary interface with the African Union on developing ways in which AFRICOM can provide effective training, advisory and technical support to the development of the African Standby Force. State Department leadership of, and presence in, this Directorate will also enhance AFRICOM's ability to support such State Department-funded endeavors as the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, a mainstay of the U.S. effort to build peace support operations capacity in Africa. Additionally, the integrated approach AFRICOM will facilitate will allow DoD's various military exercise programs in Africa such as the AFRICAN ENDEAVOR communications exercise, Joint Combined Exchange Training exercises, and MEDFLAG exercises to be more effectively synchronized with African Standby Force development goals.

The Civil/Military Activities Directorate will also co-ordinate AFRICOM's modest humanitarian assistance and civic action projects as well as HIV/AIDs prevention programs with other U.S. government agencies that have the lead in the development and health sectors. This type of coordination/co-operation has already proven

effective in the Horn of Africa, where Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa has worked closely with USAID and regional African governments responding to flood emergencies and conducting civic action projects such as digging wells and building schools in places where development agencies have identified critical needs. AFRICOM will build on this success.

DoD, working through EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM currently has existing programs in many areas. AFRICOM will continue to execute those programs and, over time, seek to use its leverage as a stand-alone Unified Command to gain additional resources to strengthen and expand them, as well as develop new ones to address emerging African security needs.

Importantly, an AFRICOM ‘presence’ in Africa (as opposed to a military base) is the means by which the Department of Defense can more easily consult with our friends on the continent, collaborate on important initiatives that promote security and stability, and learn from our African hosts about how Africans view their own challenges, opportunities, and remedies for helping the continent achieve its full potential.

Conclusion

As illustrated above, the United States presently enjoys thriving security, economic, and political relationships with most of the

countries on the African continent. We want to continue to build on that. In that sense, the creation of Africa Command finally brings DoD in line with the rest of the US government and US policy toward Africa. DoD’s development of an Africa Command to streamline its Cold War legacy organizational structures with regard to Africa, is a logical step in what has been and will continue to be, a long journey for both the US and Africa – a journey toward a more stable, peaceful and prosperous world. The security challenges of the Twenty-first century demand that Africa be an integral, not peripheral, element of that world in a security context, as well as in political and economic contexts. Consequently African countries should be partners in the journey, as this journey will only be successful if we share the road and help each other along the way. This idea of partnership has characterized the US approach to security challenges in other parts of the world, which is one reason why the US has had geographically focused commands for those other regions for some time. In that context some might argue an Africa Command is long overdue. Whether it’s overdue or right on time, the Africa Command is a concrete manifestation of the US commitment to establish a serious long term partnership with African nations to address the issues that present challenges to our mutual security interests in this new century.

3. International Lessons for Africa

Modern Peacebuilding

Rory Stewart

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On 10 January 2004, I was sitting in my office both as a British Government Official and deputy-Governor of a province in Southern Iraq. This was unusual. The US-led invasion had toppled the Iraqi government but no new Iraqi government was yet in place, so I had been placed as the acting Governor. About a week earlier, elections had taken place and an Iraqi Governor had been appointed. No sooner had he been appointed than a large crowd gathered outside the building carrying huge banners saying, 'Death to the Governor'. The Governor demanded that we clear the crowd, but we explained that the crowd had permission to demonstrate: they had freedom of expression and freedom of association and ignored him. About half an hour later, the crowd surged forward towards his office; his police cordon opened fire on the crowd, killing five people and wounding twenty. We persuaded

the Governor and his police to go home, and placed a company of British troops to defend the building. Towards six in the evening, however, the crowd began to dissipate and the British troops returned to base. A few hours later, though, some Iraqis broke into the Governor's building and looted it. They smashed all the windows and stole all the furniture and computers. The following day, we went to see the Governor. My military colleagues explained that neither the British public nor British politicians would want to see soldiers being killed defending an empty building, that property was less important than life. The Governor replied, 'you wouldn't let the crowd loot your building would you?' And he was correct. From that moment onwards, any trust between the coalition forces and the Iraqi Governor was completely lost. And indeed this was one of the fundamental reasons for the collapse of security in that province.

Although there was a lesson to be learned, it was not a simple lesson. Of course things could have been done differently, and going forwards, things were tried differently. And, part of the problem was my lack of experience. But the problems went deeper than that. We knew a great deal about the crowd and had sympathy for their grievances, since the Governor was, in fact, all the things the banners said – corrupt, violent and nepotistic. For example, a hundred of his first cousins were in the police force, most of the jobs in government were given only to his own Albu Muhammed tribe and his view on security was basically similar to that of Saddam's. We were also concerned by British domestic opinion and by the BBC television cameras which were filming our response to

the riot. The fundamental problem, though, was that we could not define the conditions under which coalition forces were prepared to kill Iraqis, or prepared to allow their own soldiers to be killed. People claim that the looting, which took place in Baghdad in April 2003, occurred because there were not enough troops on the ground or because State Department planning was ignored. But the planning, which US State Department produced in its famous 'Future of Iraq Projects' report after hundreds of hours of consultations and hundreds of interviews with Iraqis, only stated that there was a possibility of looting after the invasion and the military should be prepared. What they did not say, however, was that there would be total and catastrophic looting three days before the Marines had even made it into the centre of Baghdad. Furthermore, the problem was not a lack of troop numbers. In al-Amara, there were enough British troops with good training from Northern Ireland, good doctrine and good morale who were confident with what they were doing. The problem was that they simply did not believe that their priority was to defend the Iraqi Governor's building against the crowds. This was probably also true for the US Marine corps in Baghdad in early 2003.

The current model of peacebuilding or state-building assumes the existence of ideal administrators, who come from abstract platonic universes to create peace or build a state. In the case of Iraq, this was Ambassador Bremer. In the case of Afghanistan in the early days, it was UN representative Lakhdar Brahimi. Today, it is President Karzai. These people are meant to be ideal Machiavellian princes, who are infinitely informed, flexible, capable, competent, charismatic and able to reshape a society into their ideal image of what that society is supposed to be. Such people, however, do not exist. One cannot just sit down and map out an ideal vision of society. Rather, in the case of Iraq, the process starts from a muddled, half-understood picture of what Iraq was like

under Saddam Hussein and probably an equally muddled and equally half-understood picture of what one's own society is like. Then a theory is formed of how one gets from one to the other. But what are the theories? What are the assumptions used? What are the lessons learned? And what are the objectives?

My experiences as a bureaucrat having served in the Foreign Service for ten years have shown that it is far from clear what these objectives are. The recent Commission Report on the Israeli actions in Lebanon, for example, starts from the assumption that there were clearly identifiable objectives. In this case, it was preventing rockets being fired into Israel and regaining kidnapped Israeli soldiers. And the criticism was the inability of the politicians and the military to devise a pragmatic plan to get from where they were to achieving these objectives. Perhaps government actually does work like this in Israel but it certainly does not work like that in Britain where even the overall objectives shift continually.

Tony Blair, the former PM, does not have an answer to why he invaded Iraq. Even his Cabinet did not know the answer to this question. The US-led coalition began with the idea of invading, toppling Saddam Hussein and getting out again as soon as possible. Donald Rumsfeld, the then US Secretary of Defense, said that within three months, the aim was to be down from 150,000 to 30,000 troops and to leave Ahmed Chalabi running Iraq. Six months later, I was sitting with the other provincial governors and all the two and three-star generals hearing from Ambassador Bremer that we were supposed in six months to privatize all the State Owned Enterprises, computerize the Baghdad Stock Exchange, reform the university curriculum, set up women's centres, recruit 45,000 more policemen, etc. In other words, the objective modestly described by Ambassador Bremer was to create a prosperous, democratic, peaceful Iraq at peace with itself and with its neighbours. Five months

after that, the objective was to try to get out again as soon as possible and declare a victory.

Economic policy followed the same path. The coalition began with an objective stating that they entered the country in order to create a free-market system and Ambassador Bremer had some very sensible observations. He pointed out, for example, that US\$10 billion was being wasted in Iraq on only two things: subsidizing oil and gas, and the ration card system. US\$5 billion a year is spent in Iraq on subsidizing oil, diesel and gas in an oil producing country. It makes the cost of diesel so cheap that people are smuggling it out of Iraq to sell it on the black market in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. This finances extensive criminal gangs and ensures that there are long queues at the petrol stations and that no Iraqis can gain access to their own fuel. Therefore, as far as the Ambassador was concerned, it was a no-brainer to cut US\$5 billion from the budget since Iraq is an oil producing country and the price of diesel and gas would, therefore, still remain low, and we could simultaneously get rid of the criminal black market.

Another US\$5 billion a year is spent on trying to provide rations to the Iraqi people. Every Iraqi family receives wheat, cooking oil, baby milk, kerosene, rice and a series of other commodities every month. Ambassador Bremer suggested monetizing the food basket and simply giving every family US\$300 a month in cash so they could buy their own food. This would get the government out of the business of supplying food, which it did not do very well and liberate the shopkeepers, making good business for farmers and increasing consumer choice. The only problem was 95 per cent of Iraqis in every opinion poll rejected these reforms completely out of hand and there was simply no way of getting these things passed in the current system and simply no way of implementing them in the security environment. So, the entire economic policy shifted from radical economic reform towards complete

stasis, where the coalition was essentially supporting the old fashioned import-substitution and industrialization policies of Saddam Hussein. Particularly, this meant I had to work out in my province and deal with 3,000 employees of the State Owned Enterprise for palm oil processing when all the generators and equipment had been looted and all the plantations had been destroyed by tribes who had released their camels into the plantations.

Lessons learned are always a constant theme wherever I have worked. In Bosnia, the lesson learned was that elections must not be held too soon otherwise a sectarian government will arise. Therefore, in Iraq, elections were delayed for two years until January 2005. But during that election, the extreme Islamist militia-dominated Sadrist Party in the Maysan province won three times as many votes as the next party in the province and in fact, right the way across southern Iraq. Later that year in October, another election took place there. But the party went on to increase their share of the vote from 85 per cent to 90 per cent across the south. In Bosnia, the lesson learned was that a heavy footprint was needed with enough people on the ground and enough UN administrators. But the lesson learned from Kosovo was to implement a light footprint. Therefore, in Afghanistan, a light footprint with 25–30,000 troops was aimed for every province instead of UN administrators. But the light footprint strategy was a catastrophe, and so the lesson learned here became to set up a direct Administration. So in Iraq, a coalition provincial Administration was set up and thirty year-old Englishmen were put in as Governors of provinces, which unsurprisingly failed.

Development workers have said that the fundamental problem in Iraq is the lack of security. If security can be created, then development can be created. But the military have argued that the fundamental problem is in fact the lack of development and that security cannot be created if there is no develop-

ment. Others have claimed that the reason coalition forces in Southern Afghanistan are being attacked is that they do not have jobs. If they were working building roads and were economically prosperous, they would stop attacking. But the reality is that when jobs are generated for them, they work on the roads during the day and then attack during the night. The interventionists have been thinking like Marxists in the sense they assume people's basic motivations are economic when in fact their motivations may well be religious, national, political or political-ideological.

Finally, one comes to the question of who are these ideal Machiavellian princes formulating these theories? There are three groups, who by and large represent the international community and each have their own particular limitations: soldiers, development workers and diplomats. Soldiers are recruited and trained to fight wars. They do not like politicians either at home or in the developing countries, where they operate. Development workers are also extremely unhappy working with politicians because they think both 'politics' and the 'military' are dirty words. They also believe their sole objective is to alleviate poverty. In the case of Iraq, they do not think that the country is poor enough to justify their presence. Diplomats are basically happier sitting in penthouse apartments in New York, drafting resolutions for the UN than sitting in small fly-infested offices in Southern Iraq. Meanwhile, the job on the ground involves incredible complexity of dealing with walk-ins from Iraqis claiming to be who they are not and affiliating themselves to one of numerous expanding political parties.

These international officials are often tagged as neo-colonials, which is not strictly true since although colonial governments were often very racist and oppressive, they were also professional and knew what they were doing. These neo-colonials, however, do not know what they are doing. For example, the British government in India in the

1920's and 1930's was full of people who had studied Indian languages, spoke them fluently, spent twenty or thirty years serving as district officers in remote districts. If they did not balance the budget or raise revenues, they had no money to spend, and if they did not keep security, they would be killed. Today, it is very different. The British come out with the United Nations, officials only stay for six months or a year, they do not speak the local language and they sit in defended compounds. If tax revenues are not raised, it does not matter because international aid assistance can be attained. If security is not kept, it does not matter because as soon as any crowd gathers outside the gates, helicopters can evacuate staff. And the officials are not worried about spending thirty or forty years on the ground in any particular country because they are already thinking about the next job posting at the UN in New York or how to climb up the ladder. Therefore, it is not surprising when an official at the Embassy admits to spending 70 per cent of his time on sending polished telegrams back to head office and not a great deal of time out in the villages; or in the case of a British diplomat, acting as a glorified travel agent ensuring visiting members of Parliament and Ministers have a good trip around the district.

The second side of the equation is that the international community is now full of people who have done MBAs, who try to apply their business language and theoretical models to countries that do not respond to the bureaucratic structures of trying to identify processes, drivers and outcomes. There are constant complaints that Afghans cannot plan, and fail to follow the bureaucratic procedures. In the example of President Karzai responding to a request for food in a particular province by putting wheat onto a helicopter, the international community gets very angry. They declare it is no way to run a country, that there are processes and bureaucratic systems in place and that this kind of request should be fed from the district coun-

cil up to the Minister, so that the Minister can allocate it within the budget. Yet, a question back to the international community is what do they think it means to be a politician? Part of the problem is that these people are technocrats and academics and they do not understand what politics means and what politicians need to do for them to remain in power.

On the other side, there are structural problems faced on the ground. There have been failures in the international community in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in East Timor and in Afghanistan. Yet, sometimes it sort of works and sometimes it does not, and it is quite difficult to know why because the international community is equally incompetent in all cases. One reason has a lot to do with the society in which the international community is dealing. In April 2004, for example, an election took place in Ar Rafai, a town of about 120,000 people in northern Dhi Qar. It was a good, ration card election where they elected ten people who were non-tribal, non-political, young technocrats with engineering degrees from Baghdad University. But four days after they took office, a Sadrist militia group commanded by a twenty-eight year old with five men walked into their office and abducted and tortured them. One of the Counsellors escaped and demanded that we act. So the Iraqi police were asked to intervene, but all 450 policemen in the province refused to move against the militia's group of five. Then, the Italian military were asked to intervene, but after the twenty-eight year old cleric fired a rocket propelled grenade, they went away. What was needed here was a political solution. Therefore, I gathered the Sheikhs of the major tribes, the police chiefs and the headmaster of the local school to ask their advice. The headmaster suggested that we just hold another election, the sheikhs said that they could not touch him because he was not from their tribe, the imam said we should forget it because the 'young man had had a difficult life'. I did not conclude from this meeting that the leaders did not

understand the principles at stake – everybody understood the principles of the rule of law and impunity. It was that nobody wanted to take political responsibility and/or take the risk involved in arresting this man and handing him to justice because they had no faith in the system or in the future. They just could not see the point. Part of the reason for this was that Saddam Hussein had drawn all the power of the country up into the centre and he had run the country through his security and intelligence services. Coalition forces were compelled to abolish the security and intelligence services and in their absence, everything collapsed and those provincial societies that had not been allowed to administer themselves for fifty years were suddenly being made to take political responsibility.

Added to this was the fact these men did not want foreigners in their country. One talks about the abstraction of the 'international community', but in the end, that just means foreigners. And in the case for Iraq and Afghanistan, this meant non-Muslim foreigners and often non-Muslim foreign troops in their villages and in their towns, which they do not like. It is not a question of how many jobs you provide, and it is not a question of sorting out the rule of law or the independent judiciary; they just do not want foreigners there.

Four or five years ago, the international community was telling itself a very convenient story that peacebuilding worked very well in East Timor, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and therefore would do so in Iraq. At some unconscious level, there was this idea amongst liberal interventionists that even at the time was considered a pretty peculiar story. It was a story that chose to ignore a completely different trajectory, which could have been taken and included Vietnam as well as much more recent incidents, such as Somalia and Rwanda.

Peacebuilding in Africa has to address the question of nationalism. This may in the case of Sudan have an Islamic context, but may, in the case of Zimbabwe, have an anti-

colonial context, yet it may also have echoes of Francophone Africa. For example, where are the French now? Are they in the position that they were in ten years ago? Can they present themselves anymore in a place like Cote d'Ivoire as neutral peacekeeping forces that come in and improve things? Are people in the world going to put up anymore with the idea of foreigners and internationals coming into their country and telling them what to do?

This realization strikes all the way through because this is what defines it. When people claim the problem in Iraq is the electricity, it is not. Yes, the electricity still does not work in Iraq and it does not work in Kabul, nor does it work in Kosovo seven years after the invasion and after US\$1 billion was spent on it by the international community. But the difference between Kosovo, Kabul and Iraq is that in Kosovo and Kabul, by and large, people give the interventionists the benefit of the doubt and assume that their inability to provide the electricity is because of their incompetence. In Iraq, they assume that it is a deliberate conspiracy to humiliate the Iraqi people. The Dean of the Science Faculty of Baghdad University asked why electricity was being deliberately withheld from the Iraqi people. I explained to him, that Iraq is generating 6,000 megawatts

of electricity and it costs US\$1.5 billion to create a 1,000 megawatt generating station. The demand is 12,000 megawatts. He replied that under Saddam Hussein, a single province could provide the electricity for the whole of Iraq. Now, if the Dean of the Science Faculty of the Baghdad University believes this, then surely so would 95 per cent of the people in the streets.

My sense coming out of my involvement, not in Africa, but in these other interventions in the last ten years is that the international community needs now to recognize how little it knows and how little it can do. It also needs to recognize the incredible strengths that exist within local societies, their own capacities to solve problems and that their most pressing need is to create a narrative of national identity after decades of conflict and civil war. This is fundamentally a challenge not for management consultants, not for technocrats, not for soldiers, not for development workers, not for diplomats but for the political leadership of the country concerned which needs to draw on all the intractable, subtle elements of history and tradition and bind them together into a sense of a nation. The best lesson for the international community is that of TS Eliot who said: 'The only wisdom is the wisdom of humility, humility is endless'.

Learning from Afghanistan

Chris Brown

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In thirty-three years of soldiering, Afghanistan was for me the most complex mission I have ever undertaken – far more complex than my experiences as a planner in both Bosnia and Kosovo. From my perspective, the military aspect of peacekeeping is the relatively easy part. But that is not the test: the real test is integrating the military component with all the other components that go – or do not go – toward making a successful peacekeeping operation. This latter point has acute relevance to African security today.

In peacekeeping, there is no template or instant recipe for success. Thinking like that will only guarantee problems being thrown at you during the peacekeeping mission, wherever it is, that you had not anticipated. And whilst that should not perturb any soldier, it must be understood that the challenge of a peace support operation is not its *military* complexity, it is the complexity of coordinating all of the lines of activity.

As a soldier, I come at issues from a security perspective but I will weave security into the other aspects that make up such a mission. It is important to set the political context for the situation in Afghanistan because at the time Headquarters ARRC

took over command of ISAF in May 2006, the country had already come quite a long way in the five years since the ending of the Taliban regime. Therefore, we had to build and pick up from where our predecessors had left off, not start from scratch in the same way we had done in Kosovo, for example. However, breaking into an existing mission has its own challenges, not least how to regain the initiative.

The challenge was that the international community and the emerging Government of Afghanistan had agreed an ambitious Afghan National Development Strategy for the country's reconstruction at the London Conference on Afghanistan in late January 2006, building on the plans set out in Bonn in late 2001. It became obvious early on that some of the time scales and targets in that plan were unrealistic. There appears to be a temptation in Western democracies to attempt to endow Third World emerging nations with First or Second World models of governance, economic systems and morality; this is inherently risky.

One manifestation was the decision at an early stage to give Afghanistan democracy. Presidential, National Assembly and Provincial Council elections had all taken place within four years of international intervention. There was a need to assist the Afghans to exercise (and be seen by the Afghan people to exercise) the authority they now had. In the initial stages of this (and any other) intervention the military may have been the logical focus for coordinating all lines of activity, but we need to make sure the capability exists to do it properly or else people very quickly point the finger and blame you for any failings. The sooner there

is a civilian authority capable of co-ordinating the rebuilding of a failed state, the better image of normality it presents, particularly to the international community whose donors will be looking for signs of progress and stability. Although that may necessitate an internationally imposed interim civilian authority, such as the High Representative in Bosnia, the goal must be to hand over the running of the national development strategy to the indigenous government, particularly where the country has been gifted democracy. Ensuring that the international actors were working to *their* plan as the Government of Afghanistan would also inculcate a sense of Afghan ownership. However, there was insufficient capability within the indigenous government; capacity building, particularly within the civil service at all levels of governance, was required. Democracy may be neither a tradition in the failed state nor a priority for those trying to rebuild it, but it will almost certainly be a priority for the international community whose money needs to be seen to create institutions in its own image. As a military force in such a complex situation, particularly one which has been in existence for some time, you play the hand you are dealt and make the best of it.

When Headquarters ARRC arrived in ISAF, the situation was further complicated by the fact that Afghanistan was effectively split in two from a security perspective: the US-led coalition operating in the east and the south, and NATO operating in the north, the west and in the city of Kabul. While the two forces were responsible for equal areas of land-mass, the coalition was about two and a half times larger than NATO forces. NATO forces mostly comprised provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs – a mix of military and civilian capabilities charged with extending the authority of the Government of Afghanistan through redevelopment and improved governance in which the military element was designed primarily for the security of the PRT); it did not include much

combat capability. This was very different to what had happened in the south, where a US economy of force mission was now being replaced by a combat brigade led by the Canadians with strong battle groups from Canada, Great Britain and the Netherlands. The US remained (and remains) dominant in the east, where the majority of the threat up until that stage had been. This split (not only geographic but also in terms of mission, ethos and rules of engagement) was confusing enough for the military, let alone the civilians who had to work with us.

ISAF IX under Headquarters ARRC commanded by General David Richards was charged with uniting the security function under NATO command (except the high-end counter-terrorist mission and the responsibility for funding and training the Afghan security forces which would remain under US command). With eighteen months to prepare, General Richards produced his draft command intent, which articulated right from the beginning that this was to be an operation in which the international military were not in the lead. His intent was therefore written around how to encourage, facilitate and support the other actors to deliver the sort of success needed within the framework of the Afghan National Development Strategy. Gaining and retaining the consent and support of the Afghan people was always going to be critical. The key to that was to make the average Afghan feel more prosperous under the Government of Afghanistan than under the Taliban. From this, it is clear that the mission's focus was not a conventional military effort. Rather, it was about extending and deepening the safety of the areas in which the Government and the International Community operated, looking toward handing over responsibility for security safely to the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police: our ticket home.

What was required was an effective means of co-ordinating all aspects of the Afghan National Development Strategy, but it was too late to revert to the UN mission

(UNAMA) for this, let alone the military. The government of Afghanistan was the obvious focus of responsibility for the co-ordination of all the elements that were needed in order to put Afghanistan back on its feet; however, it lacked the depth and the experience. The President was encouraged to demonstrate personal ownership and leadership by creating and chairing a Presidential Advisory Group (effectively a national security council) with an implementation team that was heavily underpinned by military officers and international civilian staff split into four sub-groups or 'pillars' responsible for what the military calls a 'line of operation'. The President agreed a series of objectives. This gave the actors the authority to go ahead with what needed to be done in order to take the overall campaign forward. ISAF plans officers provided horse power to develop objectives into executable plans. Engineer officers from the US Army Corps of Engineers and ISAF tied in reconstruction projects, focused on a concept of Afghan Development Zones (ADZs) which aimed to produce an area within which there was improved security with an Afghan face, increased development and better governance. The international military effort would not be fixed as had occurred for example in Helmand in the early summer of 2006, but would manoeuvre primarily outside the Development Zones to defeat insurgent threats and extend the ADZs.

We had a trial run at this concept in June 2006. On the back of a military operation in Farah, western Afghanistan, to deny safe haven to insurgents fleeing north from Helmand, water and road building projects were co-ordinated. The local Governor was encouraged to get the message across to the people. So what the average Afghan in this area saw was not just a military security effort, but military security backed up by development, construction and governance. It was complex and by no means perfect, but it set the scene for what was to follow.

In July, ISAF took over responsibility for

the south. NATO was now responsible for 87 per cent of the land-mass (up from 50 per cent). We reached broad parity in numbers between ISAF and the Coalition and we got our first real combat capability: the Canadian/ British/ Netherlands brigade. We then applied the ADZ concept to the south. In the initial phase these Zones were relatively small, focused around existing PRTs. Boots on the ground are important in a peacekeeping operation and, although in Iraq it did not take as many combat forces to defeat Saddam's army as some people had suggested, what was required was a surge in numbers after the combat operation in order to ensure security for the subsequent rebuilding of the country. Afghanistan was worse off in terms of boots on the ground per square kilometre than Iraq. In such a huge country the Taliban who had been kicked out in 2001 had gradually filtered back into this area and had offered security of a sort; the Afghan was torn between doing the right thing (supporting his government) and the Taliban to whom he had a natural affinity. ADZ expansion could not be achieved without a fight. The Taliban had identified Kandahar as their critical city and they had occupied this area of Pashmul in order to cut, or at least control, the ring-road, which was the main artery for all reconstruction and traffic into and out of Kandahar. And from intelligence we knew they intended to try to cut the ring-road to the east and north of the city as well. General Richards had always made it clear that we would pick our fights; this was NATO's first and only deliberate brigade attack. And it was multinational: a Canadian battle group in the north and US forces with Canadians in the east, US forces (including special forces) in the south and Dutch in the west concentrating on about 500 plus Taliban. The operation was heavily supported by air. Failure here would have had severe consequences: NATO would have been defeated in its first attempt to underscore its credibility; the Taliban would have succeeded in cutting off Kandahar; and the Government of

Afghanistan would be looking decidedly fragile.

Again, the military bit was (relatively) easy, although it proved challenging to bring to bear sufficient forces to achieve decisive defeat (the willingness to flex forces to where they were needed found some nations wanting). My challenge was to try and pull together all the activity that needed to come in on the back of the military operation to ensure not only a tactical defeat against the Taliban, but also to turn it to operational advantage by making the Afghans understand that it was in their interests to keep the Taliban out. This involved the co-ordination of all the other actors involved. Our approach had been to structure the HQ so that it had defined links, each headed by a one star officer, to the non-military pillars of the campaign. In the short term we were right up against Ramadan in order to achieve immediate impact and we were fast approaching winter in terms of housing reconstruction. It didn't work perfectly – it never will – but it sufficed. That effort continues to this day and will continue for as long as it takes.

On 5 October 2006, NATO ISAF took over responsibility for the east of Afghanistan. NATO was now the majority shareholder, but still with in excess of 10,000 forces under US command for the counter terrorist mission and the training and funding of the Afghan National Army. NATO needs to re-assess its approach to training the indigenous force. It is fundamental to the success of an operation like this and is equally applicable in an African situation. If the UN does not come over the horizon like the 7th Cavalry to relieve the AU force, the AU is left holding the baby. The only alternative is to create an indigenous security force. But NATO is not ready to fund it or really take responsibility for it.

What should the intervention force train the indigenous army to do? It is not a bad start to design the force for security operations as opposed to war-fighting: the conventional end of peace-keeping operations –

the relatively easy end, not try and get it to do what forces that have been doing peace-keeping for a long, long time can do. It should be the face of security in the villages, so that the more sophisticated forces can operate against the heart of the enemy.

What was achieved by the end of 2006 in Afghanistan was an improvement in the government's ownership and capability to co-ordinate the future of Afghanistan, plus an improvement in governance, reconstruction and security in the ADZs. However, Kabul remains just one of numerous competing demands for the average Afghan's allegiance; and Afghan allegiances change depending on who is the greater threat at the time. Most Afghans would say they are proud to be Afghan – as long as it does not involve taxation or interference in what they and their forefathers have done for centuries. So central government has to be reinforced by strong local governance.

In conclusion, there can be no universal peacekeeping template which is equally applicable, for example, to African situations as it is to Afghanistan. However, there are some principles which I believe Afghanistan underscores:

- International interventions should aim to hand control over to a civilian, ideally an indigenous, co-ordinating authority as soon as practical in terms of the security situation and the capability of the civil authority. That may mean that the mission of the international military force transitions from the provision of security to the training of an indigenous force and support of other lines of operation; the military need to be prepared for that.
- Success in a complex peace support intervention is not guaranteed by tactical success in one particular geographical area or aspect of the overall campaign: success is determined by integration and co-ordination of all the elements of rebuilding a failed state. In this

respect national force elements (and this applies equally to nationally-oriented IOs and NGOs) must not become fixed in geographic sectors at the expense of a theatre perspective.

- Breaking into an existing operation is difficult, particularly if the military are doing six month rotations; peacekeeping demands continuity and the military tend to be the worst in that respect.
- A multinational commander needs to know what his forces can and cannot do from the outset, and certainly before they actually get to the point of re-carding it.

NATO is still very much at a cross-roads in terms of whether it really wants to do this kind of complex peacekeeping outside of its traditional area. The AU also needs to be clear on its level of ambition and the resource implications. But I am an optimist in terms of Afghanistan. I really do believe that success is possible, not least because by and large the Afghan people, unlike the Iraqis, have had twenty-five years of civil war: they now want to make a go of their lives and the vast majority welcome the international community's efforts to help them.

More or Less as Given: Global Issues Impacting on Africa

Richard Cobbold

Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold is Vice President, Strategic Development, Duos Technologies International. Before joining Duos, Admiral Cobbold was the Director of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), a position he held from 1994 to June 2007. Cobbold is a fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society, a Governor of the London Nautical School, and served as a Specialist Adviser to the House of Commons Defence Committee from 1997 to 2007 and in the same capacity to the Foreign Affairs Committee in 2002.

Introduction

At least some of the subjects here described may not necessarily be at the top of most African agendas, but they are important globally and more or less directly to Africa. African issues that principally originate within Africa will not be discussed. These are certainly to be resolved primarily by Africans. What is perhaps slightly less obvious, is that the impact on Africa of all these other global issues has to be reconciled primarily by Africans.

The description of this selection of current great issues is necessarily brief and probably shallow; but it aims to stimulate more questions than answers.

The Reduction in Asymmetry

Globalization has happened, and is still happening; if something as pervasive as globalization can be said to be going to various destinations, then we are still unsure where they are. But there are clues and lots of ideas. The world is not yet flat, as Thomas Friedman

first suggested in 2005. One thing that is emerging is that there is an increasing symmetry about asymmetry.

The Military Case

What is meant by this may perhaps best be illustrated by a simple military example. A vital part of military capability is in command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. With these, there is a formidable capability available to state actors, but through the ingenious use of commercially available technology, asymmetric warriors – mostly non-state actors – can acquire a C4ISR capability that can approach or even surpass that available to symmetric warriors. This is especially so when the conflict is substantially a ‘war amongst the peoples’ to use a phrase much attributed to General Sir Rupert Smith. This counter-intuitive state of affairs may not continue indefinitely, nor is the obverse true that ‘industrial warfare’ will not have a role to play in future conflicts; but to put it into proportion, the US and UK fought ‘industrially’ for the first month after invading Iraq in March 2003 with great success, but have been fighting ‘amongst the peoples’ with some difficulty ever since. The point here is that the choice of whether or not to fight amongst the peoples may not rest with the symmetric warriors.

‘War amongst the peoples’, combined with a morally eager but politically challenging tendency towards humanitarian interventions, have led to conflicts where the military have not been able to produce a full victory by their own efforts. It is now twenty-five years since Prime Minister Margaret

Thatcher sought and brought back victory in the Falklands, in a campaign in which Britain suffered more casualties killed than in the current campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Falklands campaign lasted less than 100 days. It will come as no surprise to Africans that Iraqi civilians are being killed at a far higher rate than the coalition and allied militaries.

Now, if it is a commonplace notion that the military cannot, alone, get a full campaign result, they may be able to hold the ring whilst other agencies and actors do the stabilization, reconstruction and even reconciliation. But those others may not be able to do their bit because the four conditions of security are deemed not to exist. Just how much security is needed in such circumstances is a nice question. There are risks to be taken, and it is not axiomatic that all the risks have to be taken by the military. The process can resemble either a virtuous or a vicious circle. But once the endeavour slumps into a vicious circle, it is hard to change. For success, the military and the legitimate civilian authorities should be aligned in their intent. It is not certain that the West has done very well in this, but the key characteristic of an expeditionary strategy – quick in, do job, and quick out again – has gone, leaving the US and UK to play nineteenth century garrisons in twenty-first century conditions.

As late as the turn of the millennium, it all seemed relatively straightforward; the additional cost of interventions was low, the casualties were light, the fighting was over quickly, and the ventures brought (short-term) popularity to the intervening political leaders. It is no longer like this; indeed it has for some time found the ‘quick out’ element hard to achieve, and Britain still has troops in Bosnia, Kosovo and Sierra Leone, as well as in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Both US and UK want to get out of Iraq with some dignity and some credible declaration of ‘Job Done’, if not of ‘Mission Accomplished’. The insurgents and the ter-

rorists seem set to harry the coalition out of Iraq, so that it is perceived by the outside world, and particularly the Muslim world, to have been driven out defeated.

Afghanistan may be another story, and the UK Defence Secretary has called the NATO mission there a noble cause, and the former NATO ISAF commander, General David Richards, agrees with him. Iran is very different again, and one might ask thoughtfully whether or not a ground intervention there is out of the question.

The Move from Uni-Polarity

After seventeen years from the end of the Cold War, the world is no longer uni-polar, even in the security field where the US has maintained a pronounced dominance for longer. It is becoming, and already maybe is, bi-polar or even multi-polar. That is not to anticipate a US terminal decline and fall – far from it.

But after the 2008 Presidential Election, the new President will make changes, if change has not already happened by then. He/she will not isolate the US, but there will be a shift of style. There will be a real need for allies, and not just in the declaratory sense. Some sort of improved accommodation will be sought with the main European powers and others.

The slate of 9/11 has not yet been wiped clean, but the Global War on Terror – a label that is rather neuralgic to many outside the US – has claimed many casualties on both sides and particularly in the middle as hinted at earlier. The current wave of terrorism will though be reduced to the level of the noise of criminality, but it will take time – a generation or more – and will get worse, and spread further before it gets better.

If sustained economic growth gives the best long-term antidote to terrorism, so also will poverty and deprivation nurture it. From a global point of view, but not necessarily from an African perspective, the US, as the great economic engine, rather than as the

great military engine, may play a global lead in countering terrorism.

China

The second pole is China: not yet equal, but a pole nevertheless. China has the world's fourth biggest economy and it is growing relative to its competitors. A simple extrapolation of growth graphs indicates that China becomes the world's biggest economy in the mid-2040s. Now extrapolating graphs is at best an uncertain business, and one should not underestimate the resilience and latent energy of the US economy to surge ahead, nor the ambition and needs of the Chinese. The commodity needs of China – for oil, copper, cobalt, timber and more – are phenomenal and they look to Africa to meet much of them. There will be global scarcities and these will lead in one form or another to commodity wars.

Importantly, China has different values from the West and challenges the West's values. They reject the primacy and the potential ubiquities of democracies and human rights; they see societies populated by individuals, rather than individuals making societies. China seems to want, or need, to export their values in a way that is not particularly attractive to the West, but strikes a chord with many Muslims, who reject the West's consumerism (but maybe not Chinese consumerism), morality and emphasis on the importance of the individual.

China wants to be present and powerful in Africa for both economic and strategic reasons, and may have pressurized the US to take a renewed if late interest in Africa: an interest in which the new Africa Command is a powerful symbol and symptom.

China is undoubtedly boosting the capabilities and scope of its Navy, seeking out to the second island chain and beyond, and across the Indian Ocean to the African coast. They are not seeking supremacy in these seas over the US, but are sending a consistent message to the US that their suprema-

cy can be challenged locally and episodically. Their increasingly bold use of nuclear-powered submarines, their demonstration of an emergent anti-satellite capability, and their now overt pursuit of a carrier strike capability, all support this. This is the 'peaceful rise' as the Chinese describe it, and it is not for reversing, even if it gets to a different level. Sooner or later, there will be a confrontation with India in the Indian Ocean. Whether or not China's political system proves to be a strength or a weakness in the long run seems uncertain, but it is unlikely to affect whether or not China is acquiring polar status.

India

India is also an emerging pole, but perhaps less obtrusive than China. India is a stabilizing force and does not directly challenge Western values, though it can be sceptical of them. India is of course a massive democracy and has a newly impressive relationship with the US. India may yet scuffle with Pakistan, but large-scale hostilities are less likely now, partly because both India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons. Also India has perhaps grown past some of the long-standing rivalry with its neighbours. There is a touch of irony here, because this cross-border situation hints at a less bad proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and even good possession of them.

Terrorism with WMD

The consequences of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons need to be anticipated. Clearly, there will be great challenges for the diplomatic community, and the politicians will have to select from a menu of rather unattractive options. Pundits will pontificate, but all will need to take in that getting it wrong with Iran could have colossal repercussions.

One can speculate, and some will do so luridly, but one of the worst outcomes would be terrorist attacks with WMD, and particularly nuclear weapons. What would be the

point when the mayhem and murder caused by conventional weapons, used imaginatively and with an understanding of the vulnerabilities, may be so huge? The rationale would presumably be to produce even higher, more varied and more widespread peaks of terror than can be devised with Stanley Knives and large aircraft, the so-called Weapons of Mass Effect (WME). The plots of August 2006 to bring down ten or more aircraft operating from London Heathrow using crude explosives are just another example that thankfully came to nothing. But the statistics are not necessarily in our favour.

Such terrorism could directly and massively affect Africa, but in a continent already scarred by mass conventional killings, they are less likely to do so than in Europe or the US. It's a matter of whether there is the demand for extra terror, where terror is already common-place.

Europe

Is Europe an emerging pole? The answer is 'maybe'. Some may ask whether Europe is going nowhere, that the European project is stuck. There is inadequate consensus, and there is no enemy as there was fifty years ago, though terrorists snarl outside, and sometimes inside, the gates. The new Europeans come from avid nation states; older Europeans mostly seek to congregate together. But what Europe needs to achieve is the ability to look outwards effectively. To be coherent, Europe needs to re-create itself. Could Europe be one end – one pole – of a great transatlantic economic, diplomatic and political Alliance. Probably not without a real European defence structure, and Europe has a long way to go to be a real partner with the US (even if they wanted to). Operation *Artemis* in 2003 may have been a jewel in the Congo, but was by global standards very small. The EU's current big idea is the EU Battlegroups, but it may only be a big idea because Europe will find it hard consistently to bring them to full operational capability.

Russia

Russia is not yet a pole, but seems intent on re-creating the sustained challenges and unpleasantness of the Soviet era. Russia sees the West sneaking back not only through the old non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries, but also into the non-Russian republics of the former Soviet Union. With an economy not improving sufficiently fast or efficiently enough, Russia may be trying to punch above its weight but with a power below its aspirations.

NATO could re-discover a familiar role in once more confronting Russia. Russia has lots of nuclear missiles and increased defence spending, but as yet, inadequate military capabilities. Russia cannot be another China in Africa for more than a decade, and possibly does not want to be. But if their Navy goes back to 'blue water' operations frequently and on a large scale, then Russia may be on its way.

Major Conventional Wars

The West is focussed almost exclusively on counter-terrorism. That does not mean the West is doing too much, but it may not be doing enough of the right things, and may be putting insufficient emphasis on other necessary issues. One such issue is the need to think about a major inter-state, inter-alliance, conventional war that could escalate to nuclear, and having thought, to do what is necessary about it. It is not just around the corner, but maybe fifteen to twenty-five years ahead, just over the horizon for political forecasting and major defence system building. The first warning indicators may already be with us, for those who wish to see.

So why bother, some may ask, if you are up to your arm-pits in counter-terrorism imperatives? But that is the wrong question. It needs to be asked if the risk of being caught short can be avoided without having credible deterrence. It may be recalled with some satisfaction how the business of strategic deterrence during the Cold War seemed

to be mastered; but the Cold war has long gone and it cannot be perversely wished back. Deterrence against a major future conventional war may be a far trickier proposition, more multi-dimensional, and where the differing rationales and values of the antagonists are unfamiliar.

Information Warfare

Enmeshed within 'war amongst the peoples' is information war, a type of asymmetric conflict where Western democracies may struggle because they are constrained by laws, morality and the media; the last is of course a principal (and occasionally principled) actor in information warfare. Al-Qa'ida is said to spend some 25 per cent of its budget on information warfare, and that seems to be a good investment. In the sorry and yet-to-be-forgotten saga of the fifteen kidnapped British sailors and marines, the main Iranian effort was to get their message across to the Middle East media, not to the West. Why should the Iranians bother with the West, when the Western media was doing such a good job themselves as the victims and their command chain opened up a series of self-inflicted wounds.

Information warfare can be conducted over long and short timescales. Eventually, a nation's will to continue a struggle and to prevail can be determined by success in information warfare. But this may be a conflict in which one may never know it is engaged until it is realized too late that the strategy, doctrine and resources is lacking to be able to conduct it properly.

Admiral Mullen, the US Chief of Naval Operations, has said, perhaps a little tongue in cheek that he did not want to get operation orders with information annexes, but information orders with operations annexes. Information as a weapon is getting flatter, it is becoming more evenly available (as is disinformation, spin and propaganda), it is globalizing fast, and it can spread over Africa.

Climate Change and Security

And finally, the climate is changing and the globe appears to be warming. The change and the warming may well be accelerating and are hard to predict as they have to be considered in conjunction with existing long and shorter term cycles. There seems to be a growing consensus that the change and even the acceleration may increase, if enough is not done. A number of open feed-back loops could be found, for example the release of methane gas from the Siberian permafrost. Change will be hard to reverse, and the polluters will be intransigent as they press their own differing interests; if the major polluters do not take action, *i.e.*, doing something much more than just talking blandly, then all the efforts of other countries will have little effect beyond being worthy exemplars that will gradually become boring. Reversing climate change is different from not doing worse than is being done at present; it means taking radical steps. The US has to lead and act, and there is not much time, for pollution comes from those that are industrializing and those that are post-industrialization.

The Gulf Stream could vanish, as might Bangladesh. There will be some winners and more losers; many will be displaced and many will be discontented both amongst those who move and amongst those living in their destinations. Many commodities, including water, will become more scarce, both exacerbating old scarcities and uncovering new ones. The poorer will be the worse affected, but the forces of globalization will enable them to do something about it. Africa will be sorely affected. The two major causes of climate change insecurity will be migration and scarcities. Africa may need to look to itself for solutions; for those outside may not have the time, the resources or the inclination to help decisively.

The worse predictions assume that enough will not be done until too late. History is littered with examples of civilizations that have seen trouble coming but have put off taking decisive action until tomorrow.

So the worse predictions could be reasonable. We have got used to being able to snatch chestnuts from the fire at the last moment. The last moment may not be soon enough.

The New Global Security Agenda: How Might We Deal with It?

Ved Malik

General Ved Malik was Chief of the Army Staff of the Indian Army from October 1997 to September 2000 and concurrently, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee from January 1999 to September 2000. As Chief, he oversaw intensified anti-terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir and North East India and management of disputed border with China. In 1999, he planned, co-ordinated and oversaw execution of Operation Vijay to successfully defeat Pakistan's attempted intrusion in Kargil Sector. An alumnus of the National Defense College, New Delhi, he has written several papers on defense planning and security issues, and authored a book Kargil: From Surprise to Victory. He was a member of India's National Security Advisory Board for two years. Currently, he is President of the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) Institute of Security Studies and Honorary Advisor to the Centre for Policy Research.

Over the last few decades, a distinctive feature of the strategic and security related environment has been the unprecedented and sheer dynamics of the change in the concepts, paradigms and complexities of national, regional and global security. There are three main reasons for these changes. First, the rapid advances made in science and technology, particularly in the field of information technology; second, globalization, multilateralism, and regionalism are replacing bilateral international relations and also the strait-jacketed concept of sovereignty; and third, there is a more liberal approach to security, and awareness of the comprehensive nature of security. Comprehensive secu-

rity includes not only the traditional defense-related threats but also challenges in societal, political, economic, technological and environmental dimensions of security.

These changes are being understood better and more easily by liberal and stable democratic nations than nations ruled or dominated by the military or quasi-democratic countries.

National Power

The concept and doctrine of national power also has undergone change in the new global security environment. This is not just military but economic, political, cultural and technological power. Remember, greater emphasis on military power as compared to other components could not save the Soviet Union's collapse. The true mark of a great power today is strength in all areas. China is pursuing such a comprehensive power. There is a growing recognition that national security problems require integrated political, economic, social, military and diplomatic responses: both at national and international levels.

Trends and Statistics of Armed Conflicts

Trends and statistics of the last fifty years have shown that the armed conflicts around the world have been gradually moving down the paradigm scale of intensity as well as inclusivity. Potential nuclear war has given way to restrained nuclear deterrence. Total war, even a conventional war, has yielded to 'limited war', 'restricted war', and several types of 'low intensity conflicts'. There are several reasons for this trend, including the

fact that national attention has shifted towards developmental economics, commerce and trade issues. Global and regional trade and the economics of international finance have made more and more nations interdependent in a free market and export-oriented world. Also high-speed long-range communications have shrunk the world. Even the insular and inward looking nations have no options but to join 'internationalization' and 'engagement', thus reducing the chances of open or intense conflicts. Moreover, there is close monitoring of likely conflict situations and wars by the media. It ensures greater public accountability of the governments. And the maintaining of large standing armed forces and equipping them with the state of the art weapons and equipment is very costly. Besides, there is more likelihood of heavy casualties on account of greater lethality and reach of new conventional and non-conventional weapons. Also, the destruction of an enemy's military potential and occupation of large foreign territories are not easily attainable military objectives, even in asymmetric situations. This has been seen in Lebanon, Iraq and many other places. And lastly, the challenges of human development are a hot subject. It includes issues like human rights, international laws of war, protocols on nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and efforts to prevent collateral damage in conflicts.

Empirical evidence points towards a significantly lowered probability and duration of a regular, high intensity conventional war. Even less likely is a regional war. The force option has become more and more costly, and less and less effective. Ever since the US pre-emptive action in Iraq, much against the wishes of many of its European allies, the debate on unilateralism versus multilateralism has intensified. There is now increasing realization in the world, including in the US, that in any major conflict situation, there is no alternative to multilateralism to prevent conflicts or for conflict resolution. This does

not mean that any nation is prepared to compromise on its security or give up its efforts to become powerful. But these trends certainly have a strong impact on the emerging global security agenda.

So what are the new security threats and challenges? These are diverse and multi-dimensional. Currently, military threats do not lie as much in the armies invading across borders, but more often in the form of limited wars, insurgencies, and domestic and cross border terrorism, with higher technology and lethality. This includes the possible use of nuclear and biological weapons in the future. To maintain political stability and create a climate conducive for socio-economic development, intra-state security has acquired greater importance. And in security agendas, internal and external security has got enmeshed more than ever before.

Non-military threats include ethnic conflicts, religious fundamentalism and communalism, gun-running, drug trafficking and illegal migration of people, human rights abuses, environmental degradation and conflicts over access to natural resources like water and oil, economic under-development, corruption and bad governance, and even AIDS-like diseases.

As many of these security challenges are not solely of military nature, heavy reliance on military establishments, and preparation and use of large-scale military forces to meet these challenges, is often considered less necessary.

Role of the Military

The military has to be prepared for an elongated spectrum of conflict and security ranging from assistance to civil authority, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, counter terrorism, limited wars to a war involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. The military, therefore, requires very careful prioritizing of its roles and likely missions. It requires greater versatility and flexibility. It has also to synergize with other instruments of power,

and governance, which have a role in the enlarged security matrix.

Some Thoughts on the Nature of Wars

In the emerging security scenarios, it is difficult to identify political objectives that would justify a total war between nations. A war will be influenced by strong limiting factors, the most important of which would be the need to avoid a nuclear exchange. Increasing costs of weapon systems and problems of re-supply will impose their own dynamics in limiting the scope and direction of future war. So, even if a conventional war breaks out, it is likely to be limited in time, scope and space. The characteristics of such a limited war are likely to be limited political and military objectives; not to capture large territory but to cause domestic political/economic damage and international indignity; limited duration of war; limited in geography; and limited force levels.

Controlling ascent of 'escalatory ladder' by political and military leadership would be more important. Careful orchestration of military operations, diplomacy and domestic environment would be essential for its successful outcome.

Wars may no longer be taken to the logical conclusion of military victories as was the case in the past. Even the US and the multinational forces could not achieve a total victory in Gulf wars or in Afghanistan. The war would be conducted with the objective of achieving political success rather than a military victory. It must include politico-military conflict resolution and military exit. Therefore, a nation which can define achievable political goals clearly would have an inherent advantage.

In the emerging security scenarios, prior efforts to shape the conflict environment has become essential. It is necessary to create a favourable political climate for the application of force. Attaining the desired political results from a military campaign would be highly dependent on the

Government's ability to generate and sustain domestic support (public consensus) and international understanding.

How to Deal with the Key Challenges?

In the new security agendas, defining political goals and its translation into military objectives would be difficult, sometimes uncertain and indirect. The key military ideas pertaining to the end result such as victory, decision, or success, would have to reflect heavier political emphasis and attributes. The successful outcome of such a war hinges on the ability to react rapidly to an evolving crisis, which may often erupt by surprise. This would be a major challenge for the military. For the military is expected to be able to react quickly to the changing circumstances, in order to get into an advantageous position on the ground and to diminish incentives for escalation.

In the present age of transparency and openness, mobilizing and sustaining domestic and international support for military operations would depend on the ability of the military to operate in a manner that conforms with political legitimacy (fight a righteous war), e.g., avoiding human rights violations, civilian and military casualties, and minimizing collateral damage.

Political requirements and military objectives would need a heavy reliance on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance for target selection. Airpower, precision guided weapons, stand-off armaments and use of information would be the first choice weapons. Employment of ground forces across the borders may be discouraged or delayed.

Information operation becomes important due to the growing transparency of the battlefield. In order to achieve and retain the moral high ground and deny that to the adversary, political and military leadership would need a comprehensive media, public affairs and information campaign. This would have to be fully integrated and syn-

chronized with the planning and execution of the military operations. Psychological warfare has always been a part of classical war; it becomes more important now.

Counter-Terrorism

Terrorism is not just a military problem. In the worldwide counter-terrorism strategy, besides checking violence, an ideology that is irrational and not acceptable has to be isolated and targetted. Therefore, both hard power as well as soft power are needed: hard power to deal with armed terrorists, and soft power to deal humanely with societies, their culture, traditions and ethos. 'Ideologues' should, therefore, be included in the operational fight.

India has been one of the longest victims of terrorism. It has been handled successfully in many parts of the country. More importantly, terrorism has not been allowed to destabilize the nation, politically or economically.

India adopts a comprehensive approach to counter-terrorism. It believes that counter-terrorism can be effective only if there is a multi-pronged approach based on a national consensus. Its approach treats terrorism as a phenomenon with political, economic, social, perceptual, psychological, operational and diplomatic aspects. All these need simultaneous attention. The policy seeks a holistic approach to all these dimensions.

The security forces employ the principle of 'use of minimum force' during such operation and not the overkill required in war. The security forces not only fight militants and anti-social elements, but also reassure innocent people feeling insecure or neglected due to inadequate civil administration.

Along with sustained operations, civic action programmes are undertaken. In some areas, Indian Army formed Army Development Group and launched *Operation Goodwill*. The overall aim is to win hearts and minds of the populace. It is counter-productive to alienate hundreds and thousands in order to kill a suspect. At no stage can any nation afford to give a full licence to the security forces to operate freely. There is a requirement to clearly define their responsibility, authority, legality, and accountability.

tive to alienate hundreds and thousands in order to kill a suspect. At no stage can any nation afford to give a full licence to the security forces to operate freely. There is a requirement to clearly define their responsibility, authority, legality, and accountability.

Conclusion

To conclude, the new global security agenda is about comprehensive security and comprehensive national power. Security threats and security agendas have become more regional, if not globalized. We need regional and global co-operative security, a strong and more assertive United Nations.

There is a need to bridge the gaps between the traditional and new approach to security, between national development and security issues, through cross-cutting policy agendas, by establishing connections with related disciplines like international relations, regional studies, socio-politics and socio-political economy. The integrated security matrix involving internal and external facets makes it imperative that security policies include direct and indirect threats and challenges posed by adversarial countries, non-state actors, and other intricate factors that impact security in a global and regional framework.

Counter-terrorism is one of the more important security agendas. But there are no military 'end solutions' to terrorists or insurgency problems. The military can only create conditions wherein the adversary is compelled to come to the negotiating table. We need to develop multilateral institutions, and multinational co-ordination, required to counter terrorism. Blocking financial support, disrupting networks, sharing intelligence, and simplifying extradition procedures: these are measures, which can only be effective through international co-operation. The final solution – conflict resolution and military withdrawal – lies in the political domain.

Appendix



The African Military in the 21st Century

2007 Tswalu Dialogue, 3 May – 6 May

Hosted by Jonathan and Jennifer Oppenheimer
& organized by The Brenthurst Foundation
in conjunction with the
African Union (AU),

Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), London,
African Centre for Strategic Studies (ACSS), Washington,
S. Rajaratnam School for International Studies (RSIS), NTU, Singapore,
Dayan Centre for Middle Eastern and African Studies, University of Tel Aviv,
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), South Africa
and Business Leadership SA

Supported by the Government of Denmark

Participants

Adolphe Onusumba (the Hon), MP and Former Minister of Defence, DRC
Arnold Fields (Maj Gen USMC ret), ACSS, US
Asher Susser (Prof), University of Tel Aviv, Israel
Barry Desker (Prof), IDSS, Singapore
Bheki Masondo (Mr), National Intelligence Service (NICOC), SA
Chris Brown (Maj Gen), British Army, UK
Christiane Agboton Johnson (Dr/Ms), President of MALAO, Senegal
Christopher Clapham (Prof.), Cambridge University, UK
Daniel Opande (Lt Gen ret), Former Commander, UN Liberia
Dominic Medley (Mr), Head of Prism Group ISAF, UK
Frank Rusagara (B Gen), Commandant: Rwandan Military Academy, Rwanda
Geoffrey Mugumya (Mr), Director of Peace and Security Dept, African Union
Greg Mills (Dr), The Brenthurst Foundation, SA
Henri Boshoff (Mr), Institute for Security Studies, SA
Isaac Nkama (Mr), Dir Econ Affairs (Africa) Boeing Corp, Zambia
Jakkie Cilliers (Dr), Head: Institute for Security Studies, SA
Jeremy Astill-Brown (Mr), Regional Adviser, Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (DFID), UK
Johnnie Carson (Ambassador), National Intelligence Office for Africa, US
Jonathan Oppenheimer (Mr), De Beers Group, SA
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Larry Swantner (Col ret), USAF, US
Mac Alexander (B Gen ret), SA
Mahao Maaparankoe (Col), Lesotho Army, Lesotho
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Saki Macozoma (Mr), Standard Bank, SA
Shlomo Brom (B Gen ret.), Senior Fellow INSS, Tel Aviv University, Israel
Siegmar Schmidt (Prof/Dr), Landau University, Germany
Steve Stead (R Adm ret.), The Brenthurst Foundation, SA
Tandeka Nkiwane (Prof/Ms), UNISA, SA
Terry McNamee (Dr), RUSI, UK
Theresa Whelan (Ms), DASDI, Pentagon, US
Ved Malik (General rtd.), former Chief of Staff, Indian Army; Head: ORF, India
Werner Böhler (Dr) Konrad Adenauer Foundation (SA), Germany
Wiryo Sastrohandoyo (Amb), CSIS, Indonesia

PROGRAMME

THURSDAY 3 MAY 2007

11h30-12h00: Depart from Anglo Hangar
 13h00-14h30: Arrival; lunch and settling in
 17h15-18h00: Drinks
 18h00-19h55: Introduction, Greg Mills;
 Welcome, Jonathan Oppenheimer –
 followed by dinner

20h00: After-dinner keynote talk – Rory
 Stewart, *‘The Challenges and Dangers of
 Peace-Building’*
 (Chair: Jonathan Oppenheimer)

FRIDAY 4 MAY: MOTSE

07h00-onwards: Breakfast

8h30: *Session One - Current and Emerging
 African Security Threats.*

(Chair: Patrick Mazimhaka)

Presenters: Richard Cobbold (the
 international security environment);
 Geoffrey Mugumya (an African perspective).

This session should provide an overview of
 global and African security threats –
 projected into the future. Are these
 primarily inter- or intra-state in nature; are
 they ‘traditional’ or human in focus? What
 has been the impact of recent developments
 on African security, and what are the likely
 key drivers in the future?

10h45: Tea

11h00: *Session Two - Assessing the African
 Military*

(Chair: Barry Desker)

Presenters: Frank Rusagara; Steve Stead;
 Arnold Fields.

This session will address the following:

1. What operations are militaries
 currently involved in and why?
2. In what tasks should they be involved?

3. What is the current capability of the
 African military to execute these tasks?
 This should be looked at not only from
 a design/equipment point of view but
 also from the angle of training,
 professionalism and accountability.
4. Do these capabilities align with needs,
 both current and projected?
5. Is it possible to categorise Africa
 militaries?
6. What is the current capacity of the
 African military to absorb new
 technologies?
7. What is likely to be the impact of
 extraneous events such as HIV-Aids?
8. Is the African military prepared to deal
 with new threats, including terrorism?
9. What is the role for intelligence
 structures in this regard; does Africa
 have appropriate intelligence structures
 to deal with the likely tasks?
10. What are the relations with foreign
 militaries and donors; are these
 appropriate to the task at hand?

13h15: Group photo followed by lunch

14h00: After-lunch talk - Ved Malik, *‘The
 new global security agenda; how might we
 deal with it?’*

14h30: *Session Three - Assessing Continental
 Responses to Security Needs*

(Chair: Johnnie Carson)

Presenters: Daniel Opande; Martin Rupiya;
 Saki Macozoma

This session is intended to address the
 following:

1. What has been the record of the
 regional and continental bodies in
 delivering peace and security?
2. Are there the appropriate institutions –
 and resources?
3. Where are the gaps?
4. What has been the record of African

peacekeepers in Darfur; Burundi; and in the Congo?

5. How are others responding: in the developed and developing world?

15h30: Tea Break

15h45: Recommence discussion.

17h00: Pre-dinner drinks

18h00 -19h30: Dinner

20h00: After-dinner talk - Chris Brown, *'Afghanistan as an example of state rebuilding'*

(Chair: Richard Cobbold)

SATURDAY 5 MAY: MOTSE

07h00-onwards: Breakfast

Break-away into two groups: Session to run from 08h00-13h00 (with 10h30-11h00 tea-break)

Group One: Chaired by Patrick Mazimhaka (*Boma*) **'The African Standby Force (ASF) and peacekeeping in Africa: What are the core challenges?'**

Presenter: Christopher Clapham to be followed by discussion.

Group Two: Chaired by Jakkie Cilliers (*Motse Hall*) **'AFRICOM: What will it mean and do for Africa?'**

Presenter: Theresa Whelan to be followed by discussion

13h30: Lunch

Afternoon at leisure: Option of game drives followed by a walk or drive to the Dune for supper

20h30: Talk on Stars by Tswalu Staff
Retire to Motse for after-dinner drinks

SUNDAY 6 MAY: LEKGABA

07h00: Light breakfast

08h00: Depart for Lekgaba

09h15: **Summary Session**

(Chair: Michael Spicer)

Presenters: Patrick Mazimhaka; Greg Mills; Johnnie Carson.

This session is intended to consolidate the outputs of the previous sessions, including:

1. What types of regional and continental structures are required that are currently lacking?
2. What sort of assistance might best be provided by the external (non-African) community?
3. What will AFRICOM mean for Africans?
4. What do Africans have to do for themselves?
5. What has to be done to improve civil-military relations?
6. Is there a role for non-governmental agencies in providing African security?

10h15: Concluding remarks

10h40: Depart for the waterhole

11h00: Brunch at waterhole

12h00: Depart for the airfield

12h45– 13h15: Charter flights depart for Johannesburg