From Intra-State War To Democratic Peace in Weak States

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1.   Introduction[1]

The main purpose of this paper is to arrive at a set of guidelines for third party behaviour in post-conflict situations in weak states. More specifically, the focus is on successful conflict resolution processes and how mediators, donors and other external actors can help bring about stable post-conflict transitions, durable peace and systems of governance based on democratic norms and values. The paper does not unravel new academic findings. Rather, it combines selected recent findings in three separate social science fields—conflict resolution research, democracy research and state making research—in order to see if some general propositions can be inferred about what the former conflicting parties and, in particular, concerned external actors should do—and what they should not do—if they want to contribute to a peace that is as just and stable as possible, to legitimate systems of government and to respect for human rights in weak and war-torn states.

The logic behind joining these three strands of research is straightforward. Weak states are more prone to end up in intra-state (civil) war than are strong states. An intra-state war dramatically weakens the

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already weak state. Logically, a weak and war-torn state therefore runs a high risk of a return to war. In negotiated war termination processes a key issue is what political mechanism shall decide the future distribution of political power within the state. Democratisation and transitions to some form of democratic governance is increasingly being used in the context of conflict resolution processes.

Yet, our knowledge in general terms about whether and how democratisation is a good way to achieve stable peace after an intra-state war is scant. In part, we know so little because there are few examples. Democratisation is a relatively new phenomenon as a tool in conflict resolution processes. In part, observers and analysts have recently argued that the structural characteristics of weak and war-torn states may make it difficult for democratic transitions and democracy to work 'as intended'.

This challenges the view—particularly favoured by some in the North—of democracy as a virtually automatic peace-building and conflict prevention mechanism. The paper does not argue against democratisation and democracy as such, to the contrary. It does, however, caution against certain elements in the prescriptive jargon and political conditionalities related to democratisation that have been in vogue since the end of the Cold War among some donors and governments in weak states.

In line with the above, the paper begins by summarizing key findings about the broader relationship between democracy and civil war/civil peace. It then goes on to outline some of the structural anomalies of weak states, that is, anomalies in comparison to the 'ideal' Weberian strong state model; anomalies that may impact on the probability of success for democratic transitions to generate durable peace. The fourth section attempts to extract from peace and conflict research some general characteristics of a successful conflict resolution process, that is, a process that terminates one war and builds structures to prevent a new one from starting. On the basis of the findings presented, the final section infers some principles and guidelines for external actors, such as third parties and donors, who seek to further the causes of peace and democracy in weak states.

2.   Democracy and Internal Conflict: What Do We Know?

Linked to the end of the Cold War a wave of democratisation swept through Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, some parts of Asia and the Middle East, and the majority of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s (Huntington 1991).[2] The outcome of this process varied from genuine transformations and relative success to halted transitions, backslides to authoritarianism, military coups and state disintegration, with the large majority of countries falling somewhere between these extremes. In some countries, escalating and repeated political violence and outbreaks of armed conflicts followed in the wake of initiated transition processes (Chege 1995, Young 1999).

Research in this field has mainly studied democratisation as a conflict-generating process without a preceding war, but these findings are relevant, and probably even more so, when it comes to democratisation as a potential post-conflict and conflict-resolving device, a tool for bringing about durable peace after a civil war. This research has noted that states on in-between positions on the continuum from autocracy to democracy are more likely to experience armed conflicts than are mature democracies or autocracies (Mansfield and Snyder 1995). Democratic government is very open to protest, but also offers non-violent methods of voicing grievances and expressing protest. Autocracy represses the potential to mobilise for violent conflict. There is a trade-off between opportunity for rebellion and level of grievance which seems to explain the relative absence of violence at the end points of the continuum and higher frequency of violence in states that are transiting or located in the middle. In addition, democracy generates hopes

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[2] According to Huntington, the third wave of democratisation began in Portugal in 1974 and then spread through Southern Europe and Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s. For the sake of conceptual clarity, it has been argued that the present wave of democratisation closely related to the end of the Cold War should be referred to as a fourth wave (Ottaway 1997a).

and expectations, autocracy generates fear. This implies that democratic peace is both more just and more stable than autocratic peace.[3]

Recent quantitative research on democracy and intra-state wars supports these propositions; it also adds important clarifications. In-between forms of governance—sometimes referred to as *semi-democracies*—are, as noted above, more prone to intra-state armed conflicts than are other states. These findings suggest that political change, no matter the direction, increases the probability of armed conflict. However, such change alone does not explain the higher frequency of conflicts in semi-democracies, as the conflict propensity of semi-democracies does not seem to change over time. 'Consolidated' semi-democracies—in this paper referred to as *façade democracies*—where no significant political change has occurred for some time, are still more conflict prone (Hegre et al. 2001).

These findings have important theoretical and policy relevant implications. The dynamics and outcome of the latest wave of democratisation have raised questions that expose relatively unexplored theoretical frontiers. The empirical experiences of democratisation in weak states seem to be at odds with some of the assumptions and predictions found in mainstream theoretical works on democratic transitions and democratisation, as well as in policy-related documents influenced by these writings. This refers to the above-mentioned structural characteristics of weak states—characteristics that seem to impact negatively on the prospects for successful democratisation. These anomalies in relation to the Weberian ideal state are particularly relevant in a post-war situation when the war has made the weak state even weaker. Arguably, it may in such a situation be particularly difficult to find ways to overcome and outlast traditional

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[3] The logic behind the view that democracy is a powerful peace-building device after intra-state war is that a democratic society is based on overarching principles, such as the right of all parties to exist and have a say, mutually agreed rules for the contest for power, and a renunciation of violence as a method for resolving conflicts. As such it enlarges the number of possible outcomes beyond losing the war or winning it. A democratic system allows one party to win state power, while other parties remains safe and sound. The dilemma of the zero-sum game can thus be avoided if parties come to see state power not as a private possession, but as a common resource that offers protection and sustainable life conditions for all.

structures of power as well as the power structures that prevailed during the recently terminated war.

What are the possible consequences of these findings for external support to post-civil war democracy transitions? Most importantly, there appears to be a need to focus more on the *empirical context* in which the objectives of assistance are to be realised and where the process of democratisation must develop and survive in competition with other structures and interests in state and society (Harbeson 2000). For example, it has been suggested that the outcome of the current, often externally assisted, wave of democratisation might lead to a 'premature closure' of the transition process through the establishment of formal procedures and institutions before a real change in the nature of power has taken place (Ottaway 1997b). The transitional dynamics of the democratisation process disappears and instead façade democracy is entrenched, that is, a 'frozen' situation in which a democratic surface without much substance has been superimposed onto more or less unchanged power structures. Such a state of affairs is troublesome irrespective of whether the democratic transition follows after a civil war or not, especially in the light of the findings about the long-term aspects of the conflict propensity of semi-democracies.

3.   Weak States and Democracy: Understanding the Anomalies

Max Weber's definition of the state remains a benchmark for most contemporary social science analysis. According to Weber, the defining properties of the state include the following: unchallenged control of the territory within the defined boundaries under its control, monopolization of the legitimate use of force within the borders of the state, and the reliance upon impersonal rules in the governance of its citizens and subjects.

In addition, we know that strong states are more legitimate in the eyes of its citizens than are weak states. Such legitimacy seems to rest on a kind of social contract between key actor groupings in society (state, market, civil society), a contract that has at least the following three criteria: a) the state's use of violence is limited and predictable; b) the state contributes to or

guarantees minimum levels of socio-economic well-being and physical security of the citizens, and c) citizens have a measure of control over the polity, how power is exercised and by whom (Wallensteen 1994, pp. 63-64).

Where the state is strong, national security is viewed primarily in term of protecting the state from outside threats. Strong states have a single source of authority that commands broad legitimacy among the population. The idea of the state, its institutions and its territory are all clearly defined and stable in their own right.[4] Approved mechanisms for adjustment, change and transfer of power will exist, and will command sufficient support so that they are not seriously threatened from within the state.

As we move down the strong—weak continuum towards the weak end, there is an increasingly domestic agenda of threats to the authority of the government of the state. The government rules more by power than consensus and its authority is contested internally.[5] From a security perspective, the principal distinguishing feature of weak states is their high level of concern with domestically generated threats. Citizens feel threatened by the regime in power or *vice versa*.[6]

The term 'weak state' is somewhat ambiguous, but we argue that a weak state is characterised by 1) lack of societal cohesion and consensus on what organising principles should determine the contest for state power and how that power should be executed, 2) low capacity and/or low political will of state institutions to provide all citizens with minimum levels of security and well-being, 3) high vulnerability to external economic and political forces, and 4) low degree of popular legitimacy accorded to the holders of

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[4] For an elaboration of these concepts, see Buzan (1991).

[5] It is worth pointing out that the overwhelming majority of armed conflicts today are intra-state in character and are taking place in the developing world. Out of a total of 33 on-going armed conflicts in the year 2000, 14 took place in Africa and 14 in Asia (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2001, pp. 629-644).

[6] This internal weakness will in the long run also make the state more vulnerable to external threats, not least from neighbouring states. An example from the late 1990s is DR Congo.

state power by portions of the citizenry.[7] The lack of legitimacy is a logical result of the preceding three characteristics.

The Role of Legitimacy

Holsti argues that legitimacy is the critical variable when attempting to explain the relative weakness and strength of states. (Holsti 1996, pp. 82-98). Legitimacy is conceived in two dimensions: the vertical and the horizontal. Vertical legitimacy establishes the connection, the 'right to rule', between society and political institutions and regimes. It is thus the belief by the population in the rightfulness of the state and its authority to rule the state. If the claims to authority are not accepted by large segments of the population, then either the claims have to be changed or the rulers have to convince the disaffected that the claims are indeed legitimate. In times of social upheavals and rapidly changing ideas, bases of legitimacy seldom last. However, where legitimacy claims and popular expectations overlap or coincide, the state gains significant strength, as rule is based on consent.

Horizontal legitimacy concerns the limits of and criteria for member-ship in the political community that is ruled. It refers to the nature of the community over which formal rule is exercised, to the attitudes and practices of individuals and groups within the state towards each other, and ultimately to the state that encompasses them. If the various groups and communities within the state accept and tolerate each other, horizontal legitimacy is high. However, it fails to develop or is destroyed when one or more group systematically and over a period of time dominates, oppresses or threatens the security of other groups and communities. Sudan is one example where such measures have been frequent. However, the phenomenon is not exclusive to authoritarian states, see, for example, the case of Northern Ireland. A political system that institutionalises exclusion sidelines 'the other' in access to power or wealth or even the right to exist.

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[7] A few general overviews of the concept and the underlying problematic exist (Job 1992; Ayoob 1992, 1995). Some authors use it in a developmental/institutional sense (Myrdal 1968,

Those excluded find it hard to extend loyalty either to other groups or to the state (Holsti 1996, pp. 106-107).

Thus, vertical legitimacy is about responsible authority and voluntary subordination, horizontal legitimacy is about mutual acceptance and tolerance at elite and mass levels. The two dimensions interact: lack of horizontal legitimacy within society may lead to the erosion or withdrawal of loyalty to the state and its institutions. The relationship may also be reversed: dubious vertical legitimacy may create, maintain, or exacerbate horizontal legitimacy. Linked to both dimensions of legitimacy, we would here like to introduce the term *legitimacy gap*, with reference to the difference between what citizens perceive they have a right to expect from their state in terms of security, participation, distribution etc., on the one hand, and what the state is willing or able to do for its citizens, on the other. The wider the legitimacy gap, the greater the risk for intra-state violence.

States may thus be placed on a continuum of strength, where the great majority of states most of the time fall somewhere between two extremes. At the weak extreme are states where central government authority has failed or collapsed, that is, states where there is no or little public order, where the leadership commands limited authority or loyalty and a variety of groups and factions have armed themselves to challenge the regime or to resist attempts to establish order and integrate the community. Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, DR Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and the Sudan are examples of states that are or have been in this category. Yet, state strength and legitimacy are variables, not constants. Over time, states move on the continuum in various directions (Holsti 1996, p. 90).

Patrimonialism *vs.* Weber

Closely related to legitimacy is the issue of *patrimonialism*. The term was coined by Weber to characterise a situation in which the objective interests

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Thomas 1989), others emphasize the security dimension and the internal security dilemma (Buzan 1991), while others again focus on state/society relations (Migdal 1988).

of the state are indistinguishable from the subjective interests of the ruler or the regime in power.

As a rule, the formal state apparatus has been weak in many post-colonial states in terms of structure, resources and performance throughout the post-independence period. The legitimacy and authority of a leader at any given level within the state has instead to a great extent been a function of the efficiency of the patrimonial network he or she controls. Thus, the distinction between objective/collective state interests, on the one hand, and the leader's subjective/private interests, on the other, is blurred. In a patrimonial system rulers base their claim to power, their authority and legitimacy on powerful, but informal structures of vertical patron-client relationships, with rewards going top-down and support going bottom-up in the system.

These states often show a hybrid political system in which the customs and patterns of patrimonialism prevail along side with modern state features. The characteristic feature of neo-patrimonialism is thus the incorporation of a patrimonial logic into bureaucratic institutions. The ruler ensures the political stability of the regime and personal political survival by providing security and selectively distributing rewards and services (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997, pp. 61-63). African politics are particularly characterised by neo-patrimonial norms of political authority and forms of governance. The late Mobutu Sese-Seko of then Zaire and President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya are frequently cited examples of neo-patrimonial authority (Barkan 2000, p. 230).

Chabal and Daloz argue that the state in Sub-Saharan Africa has oftentimes not become structurally differentiated from society and, hence, the formal structure of the state ill-manages to conceal the patrimonial and particularistic nature of power. This façade has little authority in the eyes of segments of the population. Power is personalised and legitimacy continues primarily to rest on selective practices of redistribution, in spite of changes in the formal political structure (Chabal and Daloz 1999).

So, one may ask with some justification, what is it that is so bad about patrimonialism? After all, systems of patronage in weak states, not least in Africa, often constitute a formidable societal force: they have survived colonialism, communism, failed attempts at socialist transformation, the onslaught of structural adjustment and the Cold War. In addition, they are often grounded in what appears to be basically sound political cultures of consensus-seeking, non-violent conflict resolution and a nuanced balance between notions of rights and responsibilities among societal actors. Even if these 'good' features have become perverted over time, the above would still seem to constitute an argument for making patrimonialism part of the solution, instead of just labelling it as one basic cause of the problems in these states.

However, in relation to durable conflict resolution, stability, justice and broadly legitimate and democratic systems of rule, there are at least three serious problems with patrimonial systems. First, they are exclusive. Often lacking in both will and resources, leaders do not or cannot co-opt all segments of the population into the system. The fact that some are excluded from power, influence and wealth makes patrimonial systems both conflict-prone and undemocratic. Second, they tend to reward loyalty and obedience instead of efficiency and creativity, with productivity and resource growth as important victims. Third, patrimonial systems often employ 'bad' forms of corruption that are simply not acceptable to the citizenry at large.

This adds up to a call for an alluring but elusive paradox we term *Weberian patrimonialism*. Can weak states adopt systems of rule that link something new to something old, that is, systems that combine modified Weberian principles with 'good' aspects of patrimonialism? One recent problem in this respect is that after the Cold War patrimonial structures have become more difficult to sustain due to reduced external resource flows, with the result that both the formal and informal structures of political authority and legitimacy are often being eroded, while democratisation at the same time has become an almost permanent feature of donor conditionalities. As noted earlier, this may lead to premature

closure and façade democracy or to warlordism, outcomes that are potentially or overtly conflictual and inherently undemocratic.[8] Premature closure of the democratisation process and the ensuing entrenchment of façade democracy would again turn the post-Cold War state into an effective instrument for precisely the clientelism, corruption, malpractices and conflict potential that democracy was supposed to help eradicate.

Understanding Politics in Weak States

How do these structural characteristics shape the formation of politics and policies in the weak state? What range of choices do political actors have within this structural predicament? The political leadership of the weak state faces a fundamental dilemma. The state must be strong to build more unity within the society, construct national identities and create legitimacy by providing security and other services. Yet, the political leadership does not have the resources and/or the will to accomplish these tasks. Sectarian interests win out over national ones and power holders often resort to predatory and cleptocratic practices or exacerbate social tensions between groups in society, which only adds to these tensions and erodes loyalties. The weak state is thus caught in a vicious circle. "Everything it does to become a strong state actually perpetuates its weakness", Holsti (1996, p. 117) argues.

Job notes that governments in weak states are preoccupied with the short-term because their security and their physical survival are dependent on the strategies they pursue for the moment. Consequently, it is rational for regimes to adopt policies that, for example, utilise scarce resources for military equipment and manpower, to perceive as threatening opposition movements demanding greater participation, and to regard as dangerous communal movements that promote alternative identifications and loyalties. Often the choice is presented to and by regimes as one entailing a trade-off between the advantages and hopes of prosperity under conditions

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[8] On warlordism in Africa, why it arose and how it works, see Reno (1998).

of order and the disadvantages of unregulated democracy and disorder (Job 1992, p. 28).

To understand politics in the weak state context, Chabal and Daloz argue, one must consider the ways in which individuals, groups and communities seek to instrumentals the resources that they command within the context of political and economic disorder. Disorder in many African states, for example, should not be viewed merely as a state of failure or neglect, but should also be seen as a condition that offers opportunities for those who know how to play the system. The failure of the state to be emancipated from society may have limited the scope for good government and sustainable economic growth, but the weakness and inefficiency of the state has nevertheless been profitable to political elites and probably even more so to European and North American economic actors. The clientelist networks within the formal political apparatus have allowed the elite to raise the resources necessary for providing their constituencies with protection and services in exchange for the recognition of their political and social status. The instrumentalisation of the prevailing political disorder may thus function as a disincentive to the establishment of a more properly institutionalised state on the Weberian model as well as to the implementation of a democratic political system. "Why should the African political elites dismantle a political system which serves them so well?" (Chabal and Daloz 1999, p. 14).

In our view, the important merit of the above arguments is that they point to the highly negative potential of patrimonial structures. Undeniably, these structures pose problems for durable peace, legitimacy and for addressing the so-called national question, that is, for the processes of state formation and nation-building. However, we caution against seeing this as a zero-sum game: *either* the holders of state power pursue a genuine national interest in the Weberian sense *or* they completely succumb to the structures of private, sectarian interests. Such is not the case. Rather, we argue that every state, weak or strong, has both Weberian and patrimonial structures. This, too, is a continuum and the balance between the two types of structure

should be understood as a variable, not a constant. Neither enlightened leadership nor popular pressure from below should be underestimated. Many weak states have made considerable moves towards greater legitimacy. In addition, when legitimacy is really low, even minor improvements in degrees of rule of law and good governance may generate major improvements in terms of closing the legitimacy gap.

This section has identified some problems related to democratisation, democracy and the consolidation of weak states. It is implied that some of the prescriptive political jargon employed in the context of democratisation processes in weak states may be counterproductive under certain circumstances.[9] We do not argue that these advice and recommendations are invalid *per se*, that is not the point. The point is, rather, that there is growing evidence that these and other examples of democratisation prescriptions must be further probed and problematised in the context of an historically-informed understanding of prevailing empirical realities.

Before turning to the issue of how external actors can assist such a process, it remains to review the post-conflict complication. What do we know about successful conflict resolution after intra-state war in weak states? How does that impact on the arguments raised so far in this paper?

4. Successful Conflict Resolution: A Phased Process[10]

Intra-state armed conflict was, especially in the past, frequently seen as a zero-sum game: other outcomes than winning or losing were inherently atypical. The arguments raised were, for example, that the conflict issues were too intractable, the goals too incompatible and the values at stake completely indivisible, leading to strong polarisations that impeded

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[9] We suggest that such simplistic jargon includes statements such as: 'Support to civil society promotes democracy; Support to opposition parties promotes democracy; A multi-party election is the key yardstick by which democratisation should be measured; Elections should be held as soon as possible; Corruption must be eradicated if democracy shall work; State apparatuses should be slimmed; Democracy will be promoted by the unleashing of the forces of market economy'; and others.

[10] This section draws on Ohlson (1998) and other research on intra-state conflict resolution carried out at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research in Uppsala.

negotiated compromise solutions to intra-state war. [11] Zartman (1995, p. 332-33) argues that this zero-sum approach reflects a Cold War perspective. He notes that analysts are today more prone to see intra-state war as something that can be traced back to its origins in legitimate grievances and 'normal politics gone bad', and that such wars can and should be resolved through negotiated compromise.

Even so, there are specific problems related to issue polarization with intra-state wars. As Fischer (1993, pp. 247-48) has noted, protracted social conflicts are often rooted in the frustration of basic needs, such as denial of recognition, participation or distributive justice. When two actors get stuck over one or more intractable and seemingly indivisible issue, conflict resolution becomes more difficult. This is often the case with intra-state conflicts. Such problems make the shift from unilateral to bilateral strategies, from confrontation to cooperation, and from 'winning' mindsets to 'reconciling' ones all the more difficult. Any other outcome than victory or defeat/elimination implies that the parties must co-exist without resorting to violence—most often within the borders of one state—after a settlement. This is a crucial difference from inter-state wars. In the case of the latter, states can take a dissociative position after a war, i.e., they can agree to minimize their interactions in the future. This is not a viable option within a state, unless partition is stipulated in the settlement.

Nevertheless, and challenging the view that intra-state wars necessarily involve indivisible stakes, Stedman (1991, pp. 4-10) notes that some form of negotiated settlement was reached in 27 out of a total of 68 civil wars during the period 1900-1989. Further on the durability of negotiated solutions, Licklider (1995, p. 685) found that in about 50 per cent

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[11] According to some databases on armed conflict and studies of war termination, intra-state wars, more often than inter-state wars, end in victory or defeat, see Wright (1942, Vol. 1, Appendix XX), Modelski (1964), Small and Singer (1982), Pillar (1983), Stedman (1991), Licklider (1995), Walter (1997). However, definitions and codings are determined slightly differently in some of these studies and, more recently, analysts have noted that peace agreements have become an increasingly common war termination method since 1990 (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2001; Wallensteen 2002, pp. 88, 90, 135).

of the cases of negotiated solution to civil war, the war was not resumed.[12] The statistics look even better for successful peacemaking if the post-Cold War period is singled out for study (Licklider 2001; Wallensteen 2002, p. 135). These data illustrate that compromises can be reached in intra-state wars, and that this happens more frequently than is perhaps commonly believed.

Three Phases

Conflict resolution can usefully be seen as a phased process. The phases in a conflict resolution process overlap, in time and substance. Yet, a phased approach makes sense analytically. Each phase has certain key characteristics and critical elements (Walter 2002). In addition, developments during one phase influences the potential for action in the next one. Some phases shift naturally from one to next, other phase shifts are more like a forked road: the process arrives at a crucial breakpoint, calling for a choice between alternative courses of action. One such breakpoint is the shift from fighting to talking (or from fighting to talking and fighting). Another is the signing of a peace agreement. On the basis of these arguments on phase shifts and breakpoints, the following three general phases are distinguished: the *dialogue phase*, which precedes a peace agreement; the *implementation phase*, when the stipulations of the peace agreement are carried out; and the *consolidation phase*, when consequences and changing circumstances resulting from the implementation of the agreement are to be internalised and accepted by peoples and elites.[13]

Phase 1: Dialogue

On the dialogue phase, Zartman (1989) has pointed out that there occurs a moment when a given conflict is ripe for resolution. A conflict resolution

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[12] Licklider's calculation is based on the premise that the same war, e.g. the same sides and the same issues, is not restarted within five years of settlement. It is to be noted that both Stedman and Licklider have downplayed the certainty of their results on settlements and their durability, mainly due to problems of coding, definition and interpretation.

[13] It goes without saying that for analytical purposes it would also be necessary to divide each of these three phases, and in particular the dialogue phase, into sub-phases. For the purposes of this paper it is sufficient to stick with the three 'meta-phases' identified.

process usually begins when at least one of the belligerents for one or another reason perceive the war as deadlocked. This tends to call for negotiated compromise instead of continued military confrontation. When belligerents decide to abandon unilateral strategies that seek to win the war and defeat the enemy and instead switch to a bi- or multilateral strategy of finding a negotiated peaceful solution to the conflict, then behavioural *change* has taken place. A central objective is thus to search at different levels of analysis for ways of explaining such intra-party changes, subsequently leading to changes in conflict behaviour. The reason is obviously that the cost-benefit calculations of the parties to the conflict somehow come out differently than earlier. The fear of continuing the war becomes greater than the fear of compromise and peace. But what explanatory factors tend to instill the belligerents with a perception of ripeness? What factors cause behavioural change? What factors sustain the search for a negotiated solution?

The circumstances that in the past have made intra-state wars ripe for resolution seem to fit the following characterization. The perception of ripeness is mainly the result of power politics, force and fear. It does not normally come from political goodwill, moral reassessment or a genuine change of mind. Instead, it emerges out of power-based pressures inherent in the conflict process itself. It would simply hurt too much to continue with the war. In some cases such pressure comes from a military stand-off between the belligerents—that is, what Zartman has referred to as a *hurting stalemate*. [14] In other cases it may come about because both parties know who would win and at what cost to oneself, such as the 2002 post-Savimbi settlement in Angola. External military pressure may also be brought to bear on one or more of the belligerents. An historical example is the pressure by Mozambique and Tanzania on the ZANU delegation at Lancaster House in 1980 to settle, mainly for fear of an overt South African large-scale military

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[14] For the original definition of the concepts Hurting Stalemate and Ripe Moment, see Zartman (1989, pp. 266-273). See also Zartman's revised definition, including the 'soft stalemate' (Zartman (1995, p. 18).

involvement in the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe war. Most often, however, external pressures are non-military in nature, such as diplomatic actions or economic and other sanctions in various forms. Often, several factors, military and non-military in nature, combine to produce ripeness.

The problem with ripeness and the behavioural change it produces is that, most often, while there is a more or less enforced change in conflict behaviour, the underlying conflict attitudes may remain unchanged.

The Peace Agreement

If the dialogue phase shall lead up to a mutually agreed peace agreement, then the power-induced 'negative' pressures that initiated the dialogue must be complemented with more constructive pressures that bring the levels of mutual fear and distrust down and instead generate increasing trust between the party elites. We will return to this issue in the next sub-section, since levels of trust are put to their most difficult test during implementation. But first, some notes on the agreement itself.

The signing of a peace agreement marks the end of the dialogue phase. The components that make up a peace agreement tend to be rather similar from case to case. There are *military* stipulations aimed at regulating the termination of armed violence, such as cantonment of troops, disarmament, demobilization, reintegration of former soldiers and guerillas into civilian life, release of prisoners, the setting up of new—often joint and slimmed—armed forces and a reduction of military spending. Then there are *political* stipulations aimed at regulating the distribution of political power, often including constitutional changes, an election law and elections (Wallensteen 1994, p. 165).

Yet, important details may differ, on procedural matters as well as substance. Will disarmament and demobilization take place before or after elections? Will there be external monitors of the cease-fire, the demobilization and the elections? What kind of electoral system shall be stipulated? Will all parties be guaranteed a share of power? Will elections

come before or after a new constitution is negotiated? Settlements vary considerably on these and other questions (Stedman 1996, p. 354).

There are at least three hypotheses on peace agreements. First, durable peace is, as a rule, not likely to be achieved if third parties through the use of leverage impose a settlement on the parties.[15] Agreements signed under pressure are less likely to hold than voluntarily signed agreements (Wallensteen 1994). Second, agreements that address the key conflict issues and concerns—as perceived by the parties at the time of the agreement—of the parties are more likely to hold than agreements that do not (Nordquist 1992, Ohlson 1998).[16] Third, an inclusive agreement, that is, an agreement that includes all the parties that have the potential to resume hostilities, is more likely to hold than one that does not (Hampson 1996).

Phase II: Implementation

Implementation of the stipulations in a peace agreement is a fundamental test of the sincerity of the parties and of the quality of the agreement. During this phase it is vital that the former conflicting parties' commitment to the agreement is underwritten by increases in *trust* and reductions of fear and suspicion between them. This suggests that horizontal relations between party elites with respect to military and political issues are central during this phase. During implementation, two issues are particularly crucial. First, do the elites of the primary parties feel physically safe and militarily secure? Second, can they agree on and/or implement a political mechanism to decide the distribution of political power?

It is important to note that the pressures from the dialogue phase should remain operative also during implementation. But these pressures cannot carry the peace through the implementation period on their own.

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[15] It is customary to talk about primary, secondary and tertiary, or third parties to a conflict. They are defined with respect to how they relate to the incompatibility. Primary parties are those in direct disagreement with each other (or fighting each other, if the conflict is armed). A secondary party is an actor that supports in some way a primary party (short of fighting, in case of an armed conflict). Third parties are actors that try to resolve the conflict, for example, mediators.

Positive pressures and constructive elements, some form of peace dynamic, has to be added in order to reduce mutual distrust and fear and sustain the perception of ripeness.

Following Zartman, we call the key feature of this peace dynamic *enticing opportunities*.[17] Such opportunities increase the perceived benefits, and reduce the perceived fear, of peace. Thus, the feeling of safety and security is enhanced, at the individual level as well as at the organizational level. Enticing opportunities come in different forms, such as immediate material benefits, constitutionally guaranteed rights of property or position or participation, an opportunity to gain power with legitimate and non-violent means, enhanced international prestige or domestic legitimacy, an inflow of donor funds, an opportunity to have a say, an opportunity to stay alive, etc. The enticing opportunities and the rewards they hold out can modify parties' perceptions of oneself and the other, of conflict goals, and of the conflict itself. Most often, external parties have a key role in prompting the perception of these opportunities and changes. Also, processes largely internal to the parties, such as leadership consolidation and the marginalisation of spoilers, are crucial.[18] These changes, then, are not caused by negative pressures and power politics generated by conflict dynamics, but rather represent attitude changes arising out of peace dynamics generated in the conflict resolution process. Enticing opportunities complement the negative pressures already in place, thus sustaining the changes in behaviour and causing a preparedness to live side by side within the same borders without resorting to violence. A learning-induced peace dynamic is set in motion, a dynamic that increases physical

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[16] Nordquist's finding concerns inter-state war, while Ohlson's refers to intra-state war.

[17] We acknowledge I. William Zartman as the father of this term. Zartman tabled two terms, 'enticing opportunities' and 'mutual enticement'—although in a slightly different context—in the discussions during a 1993 seminar at Uppsala university.

[18] The concept 'spoilers' was introduced by Stedman (1997). It refers to a leader, inside or outside the peace process, who sees the peace agreement as such a fundamental threat to his goals and interests that he becomes intent on sabotaging it.

and organisational security. Put differently, there is a gradual but genuine change of mind, not just a temporary and tactical change of behaviour.

On the choice of political mechanism, there is nothing in the academic literature to suggest with any degree of certainty that a particular political system is especially conducive to durable peace. There is no established, confirmed correlation whatsoever between polity and outcome. No conclusive causal pattern between type of political system—be it the electoral, the parliamentary or the executive system—and the outcome can be discerned (Licklider 1999 and 2001). However, some tentative findings exist. First, there is intuitive and some empirical support for the notion that simple majoritarian democracy is unwise in divided societies. Letting all major parties have some form of access to power makes more sense, particularly at the early stages of transitions from war to peace to democratic rule when fears and suspicions are still high. Proportional representation, decentralization and various forms of power sharing are conceivable (Sisk 1996, Hartzell 1999, Hoddie and Hartzell 2001). Another finding is that risk minimization is preferable to advantage maximization. Put differently, if the primary parties, in negotiating the nature of the political mechanism, search for a mechanism that will maximize their gains and their power if they come out the winner after its implementation, then the risk for a return to war is high. If the parties, on the other hand, seek to identify a political mechanism they can live with if they lose by it, then the risk for a return to war is reduced (Ohlson 1998, p. 182).

Phase III: Consolidation/Normalization

The borderline between phases II and III is more fluid than the other phase shifts. However, in the final phase the main issue is no longer to terminate one war, but to prevent another one from starting. If consolidation is successful, then the likelihood of using violence as a conflict resolution method is reduced. In a sense, we may call this a return to 'normal politics'. It is also close to the concepts of peace building and conflict prevention. The key term in this phase is *legitimacy*. This implies that vertical relations

between elites and masses—between polity and subjects, between states and societies—are vital in this phase.

Are large population groups still so dissatisfied that they are prepared to start a new conflict? Are there power-hungry leaders that can use remaining grievances to mobilize support for a new war? To what extent has the new system managed to close the legitimacy gap that caused the war? It is vital that the majority of citizens perceive that their situation has improved as compared to before and during the war. There must be concrete and manifest *mutual rewards*, such as improvements in political participation, distributive justice or increased manoeuvring space for cultural identity. There must be improvements in civil security and in the rule of law. There must be increased accountability and transparency in the execution of power. There must, eventually, be more or better roofs over ordinary peoples' heads and more food on their tables.

In sum, this section has so far argued that conflict resolution is a phased process and that certain objectives with respect to the conflicting parties and their inter-relationship are crucial in each phase.[19] Three key objectives were identified, one for each phase, namely: *change*, *trust* and *legitimacy*, in turn linked to the notions of hurting stalemate, enticing opportunities and mutual rewards, respectively. How can third parties contribute to the achievement of these objectives?

Third Parties in Conflict Resolution Processes

The primary parties to the conflict are the ones mainly responsible for negotiating, implementing and upholding a peace agreement. They will face the test of whether they can really accept the right of the other to exist and live peacefully with each other within the same borders. On the other hand, weak and war-torn states are all to some degree dependent on foreign

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[19] For clarity, it is underlined that the analysis offered above of a successful process is stylized and generalized so as to function as a 'least common denominator'. To understand the dynamics and outcome of any one particular conflict resolution process, the local specifics of that conflict—its actors, relationships, history, power balances, goals and behaviour, etc.—must obviously be added.

assistance. Many are subject to political, economic and other conditionalities in exchange for economic cooperation or political and/or military support. This means that external actors—for example, major global powers, national or international donor organizations and NGOs, regional neighbours or the United Nations—have a number of political, economic and military 'carrots' and 'sticks' at their disposal.

Third parties may facilitate communication and build trust between primary parties. They can influence belligerents by restructuring conflict issues, by showing how goals and perspectives can be modified and by suggesting alternatives and ways out in stalemated situations. They may also contribute to post-agreement implementation through, for example, technical assistance. Different types of third-party action are of importance during different phases. For example, economic sanctions or arms supply cut-offs may be effective prior to the dialogue phase, mediation/facilitation during dialogue, a peace-monitoring/peace-keeping operation or an election observer mission during implementation and debt relief during the consolidation/normalization phase.

Most of the literature deals with negotiation and mediation. The bulk of it has to do with the techniques, resources and instruments which third parties use in order to bring about a peace agreement during the negotiating process. Rothchild (1996, p. 233) has noted that the literature has given less attention to the pre-negotiating stage, and hardly at all dealt with the implementation stage. The concern here is to identify findings on the role of third parties both before and after the agreement is signed.

Stedman argues that a third party faces three challenges before and after an agreement: 1) to increase and sustain the primary parties' fear of continued conflict, 2) to reduce and maintain a low level of fear of settlement, and 3) to build strength for the middle ground by identifying, co-opting or marginalizing extremists (spoilers) who are not interested in peace, within or outside the primary parties. The principal tools for doing this are leverage and problem-solving abilities. Leverage refers to the ability of the mediator to alter the objective environment of the conflict and the

parties, in particular "the capacity of the parties to prosecute the war, the tangible rewards of choosing peace and the provision of personnel and services to reduce the risks of settlement" (Stedman 1996, p. 358). Problem-solving refers to the ability to devise solutions that to a sufficient degree meet the concerns, demands and goals of the parties. In this context Zartman has made the point that mediators have an important role to play in making belligerents perceive a given situation as conducive to a negotiated solution. The principal source of leverage by a mediator, he argues, is not the physical or power resources that a mediator controls or can add to a solution. It is, rather, the ability to reorient the perceptions of the parties away from unilateral and violent solutions using persuasion and the ability to produce an attractive outcome based on each party's perceived need for a compromise outcome (Zartman 1991, p. 312; Zartman and Touval 1992, pp. 254-56).

It has also been suggested that mediators must be powerful, multiple and coordinated in order to succeed. One proposition is that successful mediation must involve the key external patrons of the belligerents, that is, (former) secondary parties to the conflict (Zartman 1995, p. 341-42). Similarly, Hampson (1996) argues that third parties have to cultivate the belligerents' perception of a conflict as ready to be resolved through negotiation—it is not a perception that easily comes to them. This must then be nurtured by third parties throughout the implementation of an agreement via the provision of resources, staying power, commitment to peace and political will. Rothchild also argues the case for sustained, multi-level action, observing that coordination "among global, regional, state, and unofficial actors is crucial in implementing peace agreements and promoting a return to normalcy" (Rothchild 1995, p. 54).

Walter argues that resolving the underlying issues over which a civil war has been fought is not enough to convince the combatants to accept and implement a peace agreement. For settlements to succeed each group must convince its opponents that it will faithfully disengage its military force and share power. To end a civil war through a negotiated settlement, the parties

must therefore design credible guarantees on the terms of the agreement, a task made difficult without external assistance by third parties. Groups that obtain such third party security guarantees during the demobilization period following the signing of an agreement are, however, much less likely to renege on the agreement and return to war (Walter 1999). It has also been found that the presence of provisions for security enforcement by a third party in the peace agreement significantly increases the chances of maintaining peace (Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild 2001).

5. Transitions from War to Peace to Democracy: Some Normative Observations on The Role of External Actors

This paper has so far identified a number of academic findings related to two processes in weak states: war termination/peace making and democratisation. By reflecting on them taken together, this final section will offer some normative observations and recommendations concerning the role of outsiders. What should, or should not, concerned external actors do in order to further durable peace and legitimate systems of political rule? We first reiterate some general points made in the paper. We then proceed to make some specific observations about war termination/peace making and democratisation, respectively.

First, it is vital to understand the extremely hazardous and difficult nature of the transitions under study in this paper. Licklider makes us ponder the normal state of affairs in a post-war weak state: devastated agriculture, destroyed infrastructure, worthless currency, no commerce, no exports, no foreign investment, no jobs. To this can be added fear and dislike between groups, an abundance of arms and unskilled youths and soldiers floating around, no firm lines of political authority, no instruments of law and order and no legitimate government. It should also not be forgotten that the negotiated peace agreement is, at best, only the second preferred outcome among the formerly warring parties. If anything, these are conditions that start wars or lead to authoritarian rule, instead of ending wars and generating democratic governance. Arguably, it may be seen as

remarkable that so many peace agreements are reached and, even more so, that any of them lead to durable peace and legitimate rule (Licklider 2001, pp. 697-98).

Second, war termination and peace building—the ending of one war and the weaving of a societal fabric that can resist the start of a new one—is a process that advances in phases. While these phases overlap, certain aspects are especially vital in certain phases or for a particular phase shift, while other aspects play a more decisive role in other phases. It is also a fact that the way options are handled during one phase tends to limit or at least designate the number of choices available for the next phase. Finally, while almost every conflict resolution and democratisation process is in need of external assistance, it is also a fact that external involvement and resources always introduces bias and distortion. Therefore, former belligerents and external actors should go very carefully about how they seek to achieve the goals of promoting change, trust and legitimacy.

Third, while democracy is, by definition, a method of resolving societal conflicts in a non-violent manner, the route to it, that is, the process of democratisation, is a revolutionary and conflict-generating process. Like war termination and conflict resolution, democratisation involves dramatic shifts: new methods of deciding who is to have political power, new methods for exercising political power and often—and as a consequence—new balances of power and new power holders. It goes without saying that this is conflictual, particularly in a weak state where the hold on state power often comes across as the only route to influence and wealth.

Fourth, this paper has underlined that the structural conditions for moving successfully from democratisation to consolidated democracy are most often lacking in weak states. The process may therefore be halted or reversed, leading to façade democracy, renewed autocracy, warlordism, collapse of central authority or some other point on the so-called semi-democratic continuum. This risk is further underlined by the noted discrepancy between policy prescription and theory, on the one hand, and empirical realities, on the other. There is an apparent danger for an

unhelpful alliance, effectively in support of façade democracy, between complacent donors with a short-term interest and leaders or governments in weak states.

As a concluding general point, the paper suggests that prescriptive democratisation, using the constitutional engineering methods and political institutions of strong states as role models, often means that a political structure becomes superimposed onto a political culture that may have no intrinsic relationship to this structure. Yet, strong states are strong in part because their political structures do reflect the deeper political culture of their societies. Such harmony, it can be argued, generates political legitimacy, vertical and horizontal. If there is too much of disharmony between culture and structure, the transition may therefore fail.

Third Parties and Conflict Resolution

On the basis of the research findings presented, some lessons stand out. We label them here the six C's of third party peace making. Third parties should function as a Comprehensive, Cohesive, Capable and Creative Coalition of Peace Custodians. *Comprehensive* means that as many parties, actors and organizations as possible with leverage over the primary parties and the conflict situation should be in the coalition. It is of importance, as also implied by Zartman (1995, pp. 341-42) that there are no significant sources of military or financial assistance to any of the former belligerents outside the coalition or, at least, outside its reach. Former secondary parties, in particular, need to be included. Patrons of War must turn into Custodians of Peace. *Cohesive* refers to the fact that third parties must be well informed about the conflict and the parties to it, they must unite around what the goal of the third party effort is, they must share a similar analysis of the principal problems facing them and unite around a strategy for how to deal with these problems. *Capable* means that the coalition must be in possession of the resources needed for implementing the chosen strategy for as long as it takes, so as to be able to create and sustain an optimal and multi-level leverage. *Creative* suggests that there must be flexibility within the

framework set by agreement stipulations, goals, problem analysis and strategy. Everything does not have to be set in stone, there must be a preparedness to modify the script if that is conducive to goal achievement. To be member of a *Coalition* means that all members cooperate: they know the goal and they know what each has to, when and why in order to get there. Finally, to be a *Peace Custodian* means to take on a responsibility vis-à-vis the primary parties in conflict and that they, in turn, accept this as legitimate. This implies a commitment to peace that should take precedence over any non-altruistic motives third parties may harbour. The more a third party coalition gives priority to finding and help implementing a solution that the primary parties can live with, and the less priority it gives to its own preferred solution, should it be different, the better.

External Actors and Democratisation: Ten Reflections[20]

1. The arguments made in this paper do not in any way constitute an argument against development assistance to democratisation processes. To the contrary, they offer powerful arguments and incentives to continue and expand such assistance. However, donors must continuously pursue *reassessments* of how, with what purposes and with what effects its funds are spent. The risk of generating counterproductive outcomes—such as façade democracy, autocracy, warlordism or war—must be minimised.

2. Too much attention has in the past been paid to the exportation of a particular democratic structure to war-torn and formerly autocratic states. It is in most cases unlikely that an almost exclusive focus on multi-party systems and parliamentary elections is an optimal strategy for such states. It may be understandable that resources are invested in such measurable features of the democratic structures of the North. But, given the problems identified in this paper, less attention should be given to the specific mechanics and constitutional engineering of any one model of democracy

in a post-war weak state. Instead, donors would probably do better to focus on the empirical context and on the concept of legitimacy, vertical and horizontal, as the goal and philosophical point of departure for mapping out support to post-war democratisation processes. Political conditionalities should be modified, not abandoned. As a rule, they should refer to *norms and principles of democracy*—such as tolerance, rule of law, human rights, non-violent conflict settlement—rather than to specific political structures.

3. Building on the previous point, it can be *dangerous to move to multi-party elections too fast*. This needs some further expanding on. We argue that, instead of early elections, a process of democratisation should in many cases begin by a consensus-seeking exercise, which sets out to create broad national cohesion around the rules of the political game. How should the country be run? How should power be exercised? How should decisions about this be made? And how should the problematic issues of the need for retribution and justice versus the need for stability be dealt with? Acceptable ground rules should be identified and codified jointly by all important actor groupings in society. Recent developments in post-war periods in Afghanistan, DR Congo and East Timor suggest that this approach to legitimacy creation is gaining ground in war-torn states and in the international community.

A problem with many power-sharing solutions is that they exclude actor groupings that did not participate in the fighting.[21] However, it is important in many cases to involve elements of the 'third force' in the search for a workable constitution and other ground rules. Third force political and societal actors—while often being less well-known than the leaderships of the ex-belligerents—often find it easier than the former conflicting parties to legitimately represent the grievances of large segments

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[20] An earlier version of these reflections were presented in a report on democratisation and violence prepared by the authors for Sida in 2001. The authors would like to thank the participants in the Sida seminar discussions for their valuable comments.

of a war-weary population. They may defuse tensions between the ex-belligerents or prevent them from making elite agreements at the expense of ordinary citizens. In other cases, it might be useful to initiate processes at other levels that parallel the formal peace negotiations and create positive synergy effects. During the four-year constitutional negotiating process in South Africa, for example, there were parallel processes that dealt with economic problem-solving and violence reduction (Ohlson 1998, p. 163). Similarly, as the Mozambican Rome Accords were implemented, parallel processes aiming at local level reconciliation took place in many communities. The peace process in Northern Ireland is another useful example. All the above takes time. Without a proper attention to process, the goal will be more difficult to achieve.

Yet, there is a major potential problem here. While there is empirical support for the above line of reasoning, there is also empirical support for the view that it is necessary to elaborate and specify in some detail the rules concerning the distribution of political power early, while there is still a perceived urgency to settle within the parties (Stedman 1996, Hartzell 1999). The two sets of recommendations do not need to be mutually exclusive, however. You may, for example, agree on firm transitional power arrangements while, say, a national conference, a broad-based reconciliation forum, a constitution-making conference or a 'Great Indaba' is empowered to hammer out constitutional or electoral laws. The basic point remains: no external imposition—rather, well-informed facilitation in the form of sticks and carrots—and, on the part of the ex-belligerents, a serious commitment to a compromise solution that everybody can live with.

4. The debate on whether the state or civil society should be supported in a democratisation process should be terminated if it has not already been so. It is not a zero-sum game. It is equally *necessary to support both societal organisations and the state*. Civil society needs support in order to function

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[21] See, for example, the 1991 Bicesse Accords and the 1994 Lusaka Protocol on the Angolan conflict.

as a watchdog on the state and as a vehicle for channelling popular demands towards the state. The state must be supported so that it can meet these demands and lay down the rules for societal interaction. It is futile for a child to demand a weekly allowance from a parent, if this parent is broke and unemployed.

5. In a similar vein, it makes sense to *support processes of decentralisation*, but only under certain conditions. Decentralisation in its many forms has the potential to bring political power and political accountability closer to the people and thus increase the sense of legitimate rule and meaningful participation in political processes among citizens. However, there are absolutely crucial caveats to this. First, there must be something to decentralise. You cannot decentralise something that was never centralised and workable. A state apparatus that is in effect an empty shell is pointless to decentralise. Second, decentralising a cleptocratic system will not solve anything. Decentralisation is pointless or counterproductive as a structure for increased legitimacy if it not filled with content. This means material resources and it means human capital, both of which are goods in short supply in a weak state. Donors can contribute substantially to alleviating such shortages.

6. Donors should, in general, seek to assist in doing something about the *negative dimensions of patrimonialism*. They are: political exclusion, the tendency to reward loyalty instead of efficiency and, thirdly, bad forms of corruption. We also argue in this context that political justice in many cases has pre-eminence over its close companion poverty eradication, at least if the goal is legitimacy and conflict avoidance. The logic behind this conclusion is simply that leaders at the head of any unjust political structure will always find a way of co-opting added material resources into their personalised patronage system. Put differently, more resources to a bad leader or to a bad system will not improve the performance of that leader or the distribution patterns within that system.

7. A crucial factor in democratisation processes is to manage the problem of the security sector and its role in the emerging political order. Soldiers and policemen must review their role and realise that they should be loyal guardians of the new political dispensation and protectors of the people. This is at the heart of so-called *security sector reforms* and it is crucial for democratisation to succeed. Another, and much less frequently discussed dimension of security sector reform is that it is essential to raise the material standing and social status of those that are ultimately to be the guarantors and defenders of the new legitimate and democratic order. Soldiers and policemen must be well-paid and proud of their work and their role. To use development assistance for such purposes, directly or indirectly, would probably be anathema to many development aid planners.

8. Items 4 to 7 above have this in common: they demand *more resources for and local ownership of the democratisation process*. Resources for the state must be generated in numerous ways. There is a particular need to support the emergence of a just taxation system, improved administrative capacities and the rule of law. But donor assistance is not only a question of direct resource transfers. They must be complemented by policy changes in other areas, changes that will create a more enabling environment for democratic reform. For example, codes of conduct for foreign companies interested in investing in the country, reductions in the for weak states so devastating agro-protectionism in the North and, more generally, improvements regarding barriers of trade. Such income generation is crucial for the authority and legitimacy of the state and of the new political dispensation. Citizens will give legitimacy to the reform process to the extent that it is perceived as their own process and to the extent that it contributes to improvements in their individual security and socio-economic well-being. The logic behind structural adjustment programmes and the majority of measures usually included in such programmes should thus be abandoned.

9. There should be a *regional dimension* when conflict resolution and democratisation are supported in a weak state. Borders between weak states are porous. Problems as well as solutions spill easily across them. Therefore, surrounding states may be quite decisive in determining the success or failure of any process of change, as the dynamics of the conflict and conflict resolution processes in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa exemplifies. A new balance between local, national and regional actors and interaction dynamics is a prominent feature of the post-Cold War world. Thus, regional interaction may promote non-violent solutions to transition-related conflicts.

10. The above nine reflections place a lot of *responsibility* on the weak state's internal actors. In effect, the 'conditionalities' implied can, in certain respects, be seen as profoundly more demanding than those belonging to the structural adjustment era. Similarly, the likelihood of successful donor support would increase if there were more of coordination and cohesion, and less of nationalistic chauvinism and ignorance, among donors. In other words, responsible behaviour by all concerned is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for successful transitions from war to peace to democracy.

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