

# The State of Things

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## Table of Contents

<b>Halachic Thinking and the Trolley Dilemma</b>	3
<i>Yosef Reich</i>	
<b>My Big Fat Greek Morality</b>	13
<i>Isaac Manaster</i>	
<b>The Donne and the Bard</b>	21
<i>Yosef Sokol</i>	
<b>Was the Second Iraq War Legal?</b>	29
<i>Yudi Ness</i>	
<b>Can Iraq Democratize?</b>	45
<i>Cheskie Rosenzweig</i>	
<b>On the Question of Religion's Role In Policymaking</b>	51
<i>Ephraim Soloveitchik</i>	
<b>Measuring Religious Observance Among Orthodox Jews</b>	73
<i>Yosef Sokol</i>	
<b>A Primer on Induced Pluripotent Stem Cells</b>	87
<i>Isaac Manaster</i>	
<b>Religious Orientation's Interaction With Psychology</b>	95
<i>Moshe L Miller</i>	



## Halachic Thinking and the Trolley Dilemma

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### ABSTRACT

*The trolley dilemma, which pits the act of killing one person against the saving of five, has often been used to test various moral theories and judgmental mechanisms. Numerous studies have shown that the normative response, across cultures, is the utilitarian one which prefers to save the lives of the many even at the cost of sacrificing the individual. The literature indicates that there may be underlying psychological and neurobiological bases for much of moral judgment, lending credence to the idea of an innate human 'universal morality.' In this study, it is hypothesized that despite such claims, the moral framework which may prevail in a specific culture can significantly affect the response to the trolley dilemma. Specifically, Orthodox Jews, who adhere to a rigid rule-based system called Halacha, may be less likely to choose to sacrifice the individual, due to the prohibition against killing. An experimental survey was devised to see if Halachic priming (via a Halachic thought-problem) would influence respondents' moral choices as they relate to the trolley dilemma. Upon analysis, the data showed that those respondents who had received a primed questionnaire differed significantly in their response to the trolley dilemma, more favoring the passive approach which costs the lives of the many but does not violate the proscription against murder. This finding supports the hypothesis that culturally-based deontological thinking can play a significant role in the weighing of fundamental moral principles. Implications and directions for further research are discussed.*

The trolley dilemma is a favorite of both philosophers and moral psychologists when studying human moral instincts. First put forward by philosopher Philippa Foot (1967) and expanded upon by J.J. Thomson (1985), the trolley dilemma pits utilitarian reasoning, which values net outcomes, against rule-based deontological systems, where one may not violate the rules no matter what the end. The scenario is one of a trolley hurtling down a track towards five

unsuspecting people, who will certainly be killed if the trolley's path is not altered. The operator of the trolley has only one alternative, and that is to turn the trolley onto a lesser-used side-track. However, there is one person there as well, who will be killed if the conductor changes tracks. The essential question is: granted that it is wrong to kill, is it right to choose to turn the trolley toward the single person in order to save five lives? Utilitarianism would dictate that it is worth killing one person in order to save five, while a deontological system would not allow the conductor to take any action (such as turning the trolley) that would be tantamount to murder.

The general trend in research in the area of moral psychology has been to demonstrate an underlying common moral sense, with indications of psychological and neurobiological mechanisms, that exists universally in human beings. Indeed, many studies carried out until now have reported that there is an almost universal and cross-cultural normative response to the trolley dilemma, namely, that across populations tested the response has consistently been in accordance with the utilitarian approach. In one such study, subjects from both Eastern (Taiwan) and Western (United States) cultures were presented with many variants of the trolley dilemma. Regardless of background or religious upbringing, the respondents favored the utilitarian over the deontological approach, which seems to support a theory of a "universal moral belief system" (O'Neill & Petronovitch, 1998).

Further supporting the idea of an innate human morality, Cushman and Liane have argued that there are distinct psychological mechanisms involved in moral judgments, related to the activation of specific cognitive moral evaluative processes (2009). They claim that these psychological mechanisms give rise to morality. It is when these mechanisms conflict that there is a 'moral dilemma,' which can only be resolved by the application of extra-moral logic or principles. Furthermore, in a web-based study across a large population sample, Hauser and Cushman et al. found that in addition to a universally common response to the

trolley dilemma, respondents were unable to justify the reasons for the various judgments they made across different variants of the trolley dilemma (2007). This suggests that the evaluative process is not based on explicit moral codes, but on some underlying or implicit system.

To further examine mental processes occurring during moral evaluation, an fMRI study was conducted to study brain activity in subjects presented with the trolley dilemma and a similar variant, the 'Footbridge' scenario. In the Footbridge scenario, one can throw a man off a footbridge into the path of the trolley to stop it before it kills the five innocents. The results of this study showed that people refused to throw the man off the bridge, while agreeing to turn the trolley. The fMRI data indicated intense brain activity in regions associated with emotion when subjects were presented with the foot bridge scenario, and far less activity when presented with the trolley dilemma. The authors suggest that it is this engagement of the emotional centers of the brain which influences these divergent responses; that is, the emotional salience of the scenario plays a large role in the making of moral decisions, and not necessarily well-reasoned moral judgment (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley & Cohen, 2001).

In an additional study of the neurobiology of morality and emotion, Koenigs and Young et al. investigated subjects with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), who had displayed inhibited emotional processing (2007). When presented with emotionally salient variants of the trolley dilemma, where direct harmful action would be taken against a specific individual, the subjects were significantly more likely than normal to sacrifice the individual for the sake of the many. When presented with the regular or impersonal trolley scenario, which involves the less-involved throwing of a switch, these subjects responded in a normative manner. This further corroborates the idea of fundamental biological and mental processes which control for much moral judgment.

Based on the literature, one would be tempted to conclude that morality is really a construct of underlying

psychological and neurobiological phenomena independent of explicit, logical moral reasoning. An interesting possibility presents itself: perhaps in a culture or individual with a heavy bias towards deontological reasoning, there will be a significantly different approach to the trolley dilemma. That is, that those people or cultures trained to think in a rule-based manner will choose not to kill the individual, regardless of how many other lives are saved. Such a finding would significantly modify the universality of morality which the data presented until now might suggest.

An ideal population for such study exists in the Orthodox Jewish community, where life is lived according to *Halacha*, a rule-based code for all manner of moral as well as day-to-day conduct. However, many people within that community may not think Halachically at all times, so a prime to induce Halachic thinking (namely, a Halachic problem) will be introduced, and the results compared to a control group (within the same community) that is not primed. It is hypothesized that those who are primed to think within a Halachic mind-set, when surveyed, will favor the rule-based approach to the trolley dilemma. In other words, the Halachic imperative not to kill will supersede any possible gain, even that of saving many other lives.

## Methods

### *Participants*

A total of one hundred and ninety-four subjects participated in the experiment, in two distinct time periods; the earlier set consisted of 80 subjects, and the latter set consisted of 114 subjects. Of those 194 subjects, 135 identified as male, 27 identified as female, and the rest did not self-identify. 78 subjects (64 males, 12 females) received the primed questionnaire and 86 subjects (71 male, 15 female) received the non-primed questionnaire. The mean age of the primed group was 27.8 (S.E. 1.48), and of the non-primed group 28.8 (SE 1.53). All of the subjects were self-identified members of the Orthodox Jewish community. No incentives were offered for participation in the study.

### *Apparatus*

The questionnaires were printed on standard 8.5" X 11" paper stapled together. The primed questionnaire was 6 pages long, the non-primed 5. There were six questions pertaining to the trolley dilemma, and sixteen questions subsequently for a religious profile. Respondents wrote their answers in pen or pencil on the questionnaire. The data was then entered manually into SPSS for statistical analysis.

### *Design*

The experiment was a between-subject design, with random assignment into the prime and no-prime groups via random distribution of the two sets (primed and non-primed) of questionnaires. There were two levels of the independent variable: Halachic prime and no prime. The dependent variables - the response to the trolley dilemma and the "Halachic or Moral" question - were each measured on a six point scale.

### *Procedure*


The questionnaire was distributed at random by lab assistants to members of the Orthodox Jewish community. The respondents were given instructions to read the pages of the survey in order, and allowed to take the survey to their homes for completion. Non-primed subjects were presented with the trolley dilemma and asked what course of action the trolley driver should take. The response was to be on a scale of 1 to 6, with 1 meaning turn the trolley into the individual, and 6 meaning take no action and allow the five to be killed. Primed subjects first read a passage concerning the law prohibiting a son from drawing blood from his father, and asked what they would do if they were a doctor and their father requested for them to draw blood for donation. The standard trolley dilemma immediately followed. Both groups were then asked if they had responded based on Halachic or moral reasoning, again on a scale of 1 to 6. Both groups were then presented with a scenario from the Talmud which approximates the trolley dilemma, wherein the Talmud rules that one may not give up one person to save a group of

travelers from bandits. The subjects were asked if they had been aware of this ruling before answering the trolley dilemma, and whether that knowledge had influenced their previous responses. A 16 question religious profile followed.

## Results

The primary question of interest was whether or not the Halachic prime was effective in causing a significant variance in the response to the trolley dilemma. An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the mean response of the trolley dilemma in the Halachic prime and no prime conditions. There was a significant difference in the scores for the Halachic prime ( $M=3.70$ ,  $SE=.22$ ) and no prime ( $M=4.26$ ,  $SE=.20$ ) conditions;  $t(172)=-1.865$ ,  $p < .01$  (one-tailed) (fig. 1 below). These results indicate that the Halachic prime was effective in affecting the subject's moral reasoning to the point of differing significantly from the normative response to the trolley dilemma.

**Fig. 1 - Mean responses to the trolley dilemma for the prime and no prime conditions**




To measure the effectiveness of the Halachic prime at inducing Halachic thinking, an additional t-test was conducted to compare the mean responses to the "Halachic or moral reasoning" question across the prime and no prime groups. There was a significant difference here as well, with the prime group ( $M = 3.58$ ,  $SE=.24$ ) giving a significantly



lower, i.e. more Halachic thinking, response than the non prime group ( $M = 4.11$ ,  $SE = .20$ ) (fig. 2 below).

**Fig. 2 – Relative sizes of “Trolley” and “Halachic or Moral” responses for the prime and no prime conditions.**



These results more directly reinforce the conclusion that the prime/no prime variance in the response to the trolley dilemma actually followed the hypothesized sequence - that is, the Halachic prime induced a Halachic mindset, which subsequently affected the subject's response to the trolley dilemma.

A final analysis was performed to confirm that the variance in trolley dilemma response was indeed related to the change in Halachic thinking. A Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was computed to evaluate the relationship between self-reported Halachic reasoning and response to the trolley dilemma. There was a significant positive correlation between the two variables,  $r(194) = .61$ ,  $p < .05$ , which indicates that there is a significant positive correlation between Halachic thinking and moral judgment in regard to the trolley dilemma. Specifically, these figures suggest that those who think Halachically are more likely to take the deontological approach to the trolley dilemma, in contrast to the normative, utilitarian response.

To control for extraneous variables affecting trolley dilemma responses between the prime and prime groups, a Levene Test for Equality of Variances was performed on several variables, to test “Familiarity with the caravan case ( $p = .69$ )”, “caravan case familiarity affecting answer” ( $p = .24$ ), “years in yeshiva” -Jewish academy, generally at least partially devoted to studying Halacha - ( $p = .16$ ), “importance of religion to subject” ( $p = .17$ ), and “age” ( $p = .95$ ) were all found to have no significant correlation to being in the primed group. Only the trolley response itself ( $p = .064$ ) and “Halachic or moral reasoning” ( $p = .087$ ) were significantly correlated to Halachic priming.

### *Discussion*

This study set out to explore the possible link between a Halachic mode of thinking and response to the trolley dilemma. Specifically, it was hypothesized that Halachic thinking would shift the normative, utilitarian response to the trolley dilemma to a more deontological response. The data confirms this hypothesis, with the Halachically primed group ( $M=3.70$ ,  $SE=.22$ ) scoring significantly lower (less likely to turn the trolley) than the non primed group ( $M=4.26$ ,  $SE=.20$ ).

It appears that the Halachic prime was successful in putting the subjects into a Halachic frame of mind, which is a fundamentally rule-based framework. The consequence of the Halachic mindset is the application of a deontological perspective to problems such as the trolley dilemma, which pits net outcome against rigid rules. When primed to think Halachically, the rules are more heavily favored.

This study was performed on a very small subset of the general population; namely, Orthodox Jews. To further validate these results, study of other population with highly ritualized and rule-based systems would be ideal. Furthermore, the study did not compare Orthodox Jews to the general population, only Orthodox Jews who had been primed Halachically against those who had not. It is possible to claim that Halachic culture itself would not affect attitude

to the trolley dilemma; namely, that non primed Orthodox Jews may respond in the same way to the trolley dilemma as the general population. Were this to be true, it would greatly reduce the importance of this study's finding - it would not be the culture that shapes one's moral judgment, but a very specific and temporally dependent priming stimulus.

Researchers interested in studying this cultural effect may want to study other rule oriented cultures to see if the effect presented in this study is borne out in other populations. Confirmation from observant Muslim or Catholic populations, among others, would lend a greater degree of external validity to our hypothesis. Furthermore, research that would compare the moral judgments of such cultures to those of the population as a whole, without any deontological priming, would confirm that is indeed the culture that shapes attitudes, not a specific priming stimulus.

The results of this study have fascinating and far-reaching implication in the study of human moral judgments and social norms. The data to this point had suggested that there is some sort of innate, universal 'moral math' that is unrelated to cultural milieu. However, our data suggests that moral judgments can be influenced significantly by a prevailing cultural moral scheme, such as Halacha. This knowledge may be useful to those involved in communal or therapeutic work in populations with highly rule-based systems. As neat and tidy as it is to claim that all moral reasoning is essentially grounded in psychological or neurological processes, it seems that there may in fact be fundamentally different judgments of moral 'good' or 'truth' across cultures.

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## My Big Fat Greek Morality

Isaac Manaster

What is moral? What is just? Greek tragedy seeks to answer these questions. The tragedy often focuses on a protagonist pitched between two impossible choices. Both of these options have grave consequences, and neither choice is clearly correct. The purpose of the tragedy is not to portray how to successfully resolve a difficult situation, as the protagonist has almost no chance of leaving his dilemma unscathed. Rather, the tragedy offers its audience a unique opportunity: an insight into decision making. Sophocles' *Antigone* and Aeschylus' *Oresteia* are two tragedies that detail many difficult moral decisions. The characters Antigone and Ismene in *Antigone*, as well as Agamemnon and Athena in the *Oresteia*, struggle as they contemplate choices which seemingly have no right answer. These characters are not alone in their moral dilemmas. Through the storyline of their plays Sophocles and Aeschylus weigh in on their respective tragedies moral questions as well. By watching these characters struggle to make a moral choice amidst options that are uncompromisingly terrible, the Greek tragedy is able to contrast different approaches to morality in search of the answer to the question "what is moral"?

In Sophocles' *Antigone* the title character is faced with a tragic dilemma: Antigone's brother Polyneices has died a traitor to Thebes, and the Thebian king Creon has forbidden his burial. Antigone loves her brother dearly. She even values him above her own fiancé, because while she may be able to find a new husband, her brother is irreplaceable. In addition, Antigone is loyal to her religion. Therefore, to ignore the sacred rites of burial which should be accorded to Polyneices would be a sacrilege to Antigone as a sister and as a woman of piety. Yet Creon's ruling means that the consequence of burying Polyneices is certain death. Antigone's conclusion about her brother's fate is quick and definitive. Antigone will bury Polyneices in defiance of Creon and without fear of his punishment. Her logic is

simple and she explains it to Creon upon her arrest: “Yes, it was not Zeus that made the proclamation; nor did Justice, which lives with those below, enact such laws as that, for mankind. I did not believe your proclamation had such power to enable one who will someday die to override God’s ordinances” (Lines 494-499). Antigone is guided by religious motives; the gods’ morality determines her moral code.

Ismene is Antigone’s sister, and so she too is torn by the fate of Polyneices. The Chorus describes Ismene: “Before the gates comes Ismene shedding tears for the love of a brother.” (Lines 579-580) Yet despite her feelings toward her brother, Ismene does not take Antigone’s route. Ismene is well aware of her family’s past. She and Antigone are the surviving daughters of Oedipus, the former king of Thebes whose hubris, in spite of the advice of those around him, brought him to a horrible fate. Antigone, like her father does not second guess her decisions. Ismene, however, has painfully absorbed the lessons of her family’s fate, which is why she tells Antigone “Consider, sister, how our father died” (Line 56). As a daughter of Oedipus, Ismene knows that she cannot trust herself. While it may be horrible for her as a sister to see Polyneices remain unburied, Ismene is unwilling to act lest she perpetuate her family’s obstinate and self-destructive nature. With this in mind Ismene takes a different approach to the question of Polyneices’ burial. She tells Antigone “I do indeed beg those beneath the earth to give their forgiveness, since force constrains me, that I shall yield in this to the authorities. Extravagant action is not sensible.” (Line 74-78) Ismene has decided to allow society to dictate her sense of morality and justice. “I will not put dishonor on them, but to act in defiance of the citizenry, my nature does not give me means for that.” (Lines 90-92)

The storyline in *Antigone* suggests the ethical view of Sophocles. Creon, the will of the state manifest, reconsiders his judgments against Polyneices and Antigone after an encounter with the prophet Tiresias. He admits “I am afraid it may be best, in the end of life, to have kept the old accepted laws.” (Lines 1190-1191) Creon has accepted that it is not the

state which should determine justice, but the gods. In consequence, it appears as though Ismene has mistakenly relied upon a misguided society for her sense of morality. Nevertheless, although Sophocles vindicates Antigone following the gods' morality, Ismene does play an important role in critiquing Antigone's approach. Antigone's hasty suicide at the play's conclusion reveals that Antigone still bears the characteristics of her father Oedipus, something which Ismene accuses her of. Although Antigone rightfully sought after the gods' morality, she still is seen as having placed too much trust in herself. Ismene is therefore correct to reject Antigone's extremism. Through Antigone's continuation of Oedipus' flaw, Sophocles makes an important critique on morality. While through the play's conclusion Sophocles concedes that morality belongs to the purview of the gods, the inherent flaws in Antigone as a woman who takes up the banner of the gods' morality raises an important issue: even when man does dedicate himself to the just morality of the gods, man's own personal flaws are no guarantee that he will enact them properly.

Aeschylus' *Oresteia* trilogy chronicles the impossible moral choices of several characters as the curse of the House of Atreus, a murderous cycle of revenge, comes to its eventual conclusion. The spark which ignites the trilogy's circle of revenge is found in the first part of the trilogy, *Agamemnon*. At the play's beginning Agamemnon, commander of the Greek expedition, is prepared to set sail to Troy and sack that city in order to avenge a grave insult—Paris, a prince of Troy, has abducted Helen, the wife of Agamemnon's brother Menelaus. However, with his armies massed, Agamemnon is not able to set sail because there is no wind in the sea. Artemis, goddess of the hunt has focused her wrath on Agamemnon after he slew one of her sacred deer, and she will not let the Greek horde set sail. Through the prophecy of Calchas, Agamemnon learns that the fleet will not be given wind for sailing until Artemis is appeased through the sacrifice of Agamemnon's daughter Iphigenia. Agamemnon, a man who loves his daughter is crushed. This is an

impossible choice for him to make. “An unbearable fate will fall on me if I disobey but how can I bear to slaughter my own daughter, the glory of my house?...How Can I Choose? Both Ways are full of evil!” (Lines 206-211.) Agamemnon the commander and Agamemnon the father come into conflict in this choice. The sacrifice of Iphigenia is the only way for the fleet to set sail. Surprisingly, Agamemnon quickly comes to a decision. In a matter of a few short lines Agamemnon concludes “what must be must be. Let it be for the best.” (Lines 216-217.) Agamemnon chooses the fleet over his family. His methodology is not to evaluate the morality of his two conflicting agendas. His quickness in arriving to a decision suggests that he only had one real choice the entire time. Agamemnon’s short speech decrying his two choices was not an evaluation of his options; it was a discussion of his choices’ consequences. Agamemnon is a leader and a pragmatist. His slogan in judgment is “what must be must be.” Agamemnon is able to sacrifice Iphigenia so easily because his vision of justice operates outside of the right and wrong of a decision. Agamemnon is ultimately concerned with the outcome of his choices above all other considerations.

Agamemnon’s merciless sacrificing of Iphigenia motivates Agamemnon’s wife, and Iphigenia’s mother, Clytemnestra to treacherously murder him upon his successful return from Troy. Agamemnon’s son Orestes avenges his father by murdering his mother Clytemnestra. Orestes is then pursued by the Furies, chthonic gods of vengeance, for murdering his mother. Following the advice of his patron god Apollo, Orestes flees to Athena to resolve his conflict with the Furies. Upon the arrival of Orestes and the Furies, Athena procures the Furies’ agreement to deliberate over the case of Orestes. Athena now becomes a judge and with the fate of Orestes in her hands, a character beset by a difficult choice. Orestes and the Furies both have powerful claims. There are many reasons to view Orestes as innocent: he rightfully avenged his father, he was guided by an Oracle, and he also received purification. Still, as the Furies incessantly accuse,



Orestes committed matricide, a crime too grave to go unpunished.

Athena, like many of the other characters in the *Oresteia*, is asked to evaluate the morality of two conflicting positions. However, Athena's mandate is unique because her task is not to evaluate a new dilemma introduced into the trilogy. Athena simply revisits the moral question which Orestes faced himself, a moral issue which the audience has already considered. However, Athena's judgment does provide something new to the play: Athena represents a novel approach to justice. Her role is to revisit the issues of the case which she is judging and to consider Orestes's action's carefully. Athena is concerned with the judicial process. When the two parties speak, she carefully listens. After listening to the strong accusations of the Furies she proclaims "There are two sides to this, it is only half heard" (Line 428). Athena seeks to guarantee a judicial process which takes into account all perspectives. Athena's concern with the judicial process is reinforced by the fact that although Athena could have rightfully deliberated the case herself, as agreed upon by the Furies, Athena felt that the claims of both parties must be judged by a jury, a novelty introduced in the *Oresteia*. By forwarding Orestes' case to a jury, Athena perpetuates the judgment of Orestes for another round. His fate will not be decided without proper consideration.

Athena, through the invention of the trial by jury addresses the issues faced by many characters. First, the trial by jury stands in sharp distinction to the *modus operandi* of Agamemnon. Agamemnon is a pragmatist concerned primarily with the outcome of a decision, not the merits of two competing positions. Which is why Agamemnon is able to quickly, albeit unjustly, make the decision to sacrifice his daughter Iphigenia in order to reach his desired outcome: launching the Greek fleet. Athena's move to create a trial by jury is an act which removes her control over the case. The use of a jury is a statement that Athena is concerned only with the 'how' of justice, and not the result. Although Athena's decision to introduce a trial by jury lessons her

control over Orestes' fate, it cannot be confused with the position taken by Ismene. Ismene, due to her family's past, does not trust her ability to judge difficult situations at all. She therefore defers to society. Although Athena's decision is initially not to decide Orestes case, this is not because she is afraid to make difficult choices. When her jury of twelve is split over the case's outcome, Athena makes the deciding vote. Athena trusts her own sense of judgment; she just believes that the process of justice is enhanced when a case is judged not by one lone individual, but many competing perspectives. Interestingly, the approach of Athena does incorporate some of the values of Antigone. Antigone is concerned with the justice of the gods. She could never abide by Creon's ruling that Polyneices go on without a religious burial. Athena's trial, the gods play a central role: Athena mandates the trial, and Apollo serves as an expert witness. Also, Antigone is not so much concerned with the outcome of her choice, but in the morality of her decision. She knows that Creon can easily unbury Polyneices. Her only desire is to do the correct action. This is the fate of the jury member. He does not determine the case's outcome, but he is able to proclaim what he considers right and wrong.

Aeschylus favors Athena's approach to justice. Her trial by jury successfully ends the bloodshed within the House of Atreus, and acts as a conclusion to the *Oresteia*. In the beginning of the Trilogy, justice took the form of a vendetta. The *Oresteia* graphically demonstrates how this is a failed way to promote justice as violence only begets more violence. Even before the introduction of Athena, the *Oresteia* suggests that a new approach to justice is necessary. Additionally, through Athena's resolution of the House of Atreus' seemingly endless cycle of vengeance, Aeschylus demonstrates the power of the trial by jury and a commitment to the process of justice. With a jury both sides can live with the case's outcome because they know they were both given a fair chance. Athena tells this to the Furies, "It was an honest verdict, there is no disgrace." (Line 796)

Sophocles concludes Antigone with the admission of

Creon, the symbol of the power of the state, that the gods and not man must determine morality. Likewise, Aeschylus, through his usage of Athena and Apollo to conclude the curse of the House of Atreus demonstrates that he too agrees that morality is determined by the guidance of the gods. However, although Sophocles admits that justice is found by following the morality of the gods, he also acknowledges through the choices of Antigone and Ismene man's inability to trust himself to justly bring about the will of the gods. *Antigone* therefore concludes with the question of how to arrive at justice unresolved. Aeschylus' trial by jury seeks to answer this question. The jury is characteristic of its inventor, Athena because it carefully deliberates a case based on its merits. The jury also relies on the judgment of many points of view. Having many jury members decide a case addresses the concerns of Ismene by diluting the personal flaws which may taint the perspective of one juror. Aeschylus therefore is suggesting that objectivity and plurality are the best defenses against the type of bias which Sophocles' fears. With stories of severe consequences and impossible choices, the Greek tragedies seek to confront, rather than avoid the process of decision making. By threading together the evolution of justice in the works of Aeschylus and Sophocles a more just approach to decision making, the trial by jury emerges as the best choice when confronting a moral quandary. The legacy of the Greek tragedies investigation into moral choice has been the promulgation of the trial by jury into Western democratic societies throughout the ages. As promised by the tragedies, the jury's decision is often pitched between tragic consequences, but as illustrated by the development of the trial by jury in these works, the trial by jury remains the best approach to confronting the conundrums of life tragic moral choices.



## The Donne and the Bard

*Yosef Sokol*

It is never fair to compare a poet to Shakespeare. That said, we may still wish to consider what an examination of the similarities and differences between John Donne and William Shakespeare will reveal. Donne is the unchallenged master of metaphysical poetry. Therefore, instead of comparing him to the other metaphysical poets such as Andrew Marvell and George Herbert it may be more interesting to compare and contrast his writing with that of some of the “The Bard’s” sonnets. *Prima facie*, the many important distinctions between the two, including both their contradicting use of rhythm and their differing focuses, obscure possible similarities. However, it will be seen that there are underlying commonalties and profound similarities between the works of the two.

Before looking for possible similarities it is prudent for us to examine the differences between these two masters so that any similarities we will be suggesting will be in proper context. “The Flea” by Donne and “Shall I Compare Thee to a Summer Day” by Shakespeare reveal much about their respective styles.

### The Flea

*By John Donne*

MARK but this flea, and mark in this,  
 How little that which thou deniest me is ;  
 It suck'd me first, and now sucks thee,  
 And in this flea our two bloods mingled be.  
 Thou know'st that this cannot be said  
 A sin, nor shame, nor loss of maidenhead;  
 Yet this enjoys before it woo,  
 And pamper'd swells with one blood made of two ;  
 And this, alas ! is more than we would do.

O stay, three lives in one flea spare,  
 Where we almost, yea, more than married are.  
 This flea is you and I, and this  
 Our marriage bed, and marriage temple is.  
 Though parents grudge, and you, we're met,  
 And cloister'd in these living walls of jet.  
 Though use make you apt to kill me,  
 Let not to that self-murder added be,  
 And sacrilege, three sins in killing three.

Cruel and sudden, hast thou since  
 Purpled thy nail in blood of innocence?  
 Wherein could this flea guilty be,  
 Except in that drop which it suck'd from thee?  
 Yet thou triumph'st, and say'st that thou  
 Find'st not thyself nor me the weaker now.  
 'Tis true ; then learn how false fears be;  
 Just so much honour, when thou yield'st to me,  
 Will waste, as this flea's death took life from thee.

This poem shows many of the qualities that make Donne both famous and infamous. His humorous and almost too clever comparison of sexual congress with the mixing of blood in a flea is an excellent example of his famous metaphysical conceits. The poem reveals much of Donne's style. The subject is one that many poets write about with words both dramatic and passionate. Donne, however, uses playful and witty metaphors while maintaining a distinctive intellectual distance. It is impossible to imagine sixteen year old girls reading this poem under oak trees, sighing to themselves. Poems like this made Dryden write of Donne in 1693: "He affects the metaphysics, not only in his satires, but in his amorous verses, where nature only should reign; and perplexes the minds of the fair sex with nice speculations of philosophy, when he should engage their hearts, and entertain them with the softnesses of love."

The second Donneian characteristic revealed in "The Flea" is the combination of simple normal speech rhythms and tense and tough patterns in his words. This raw and blunt

quality of Donne's stood in sharp contrast to the smoothness of contemporary poetry. For this 'crime' Ben Jonson remarked that "Donne, for not keeping of accent, deserved hanging" (Andrews).

Now we will turn to Shakespeare and examine his most famous sonnet.

## **Shall I Compare Thee to a Summer Day**

*By William Shakespeare*

Shall I compare thee to a summer's day?  
 Thou art more lovely and more temperate:  
 Rough winds do shake the darling buds of May,  
 And summer's lease hath all too short a date:  
 Sometime too hot the eye of heaven shines,  
 And often is his gold complexion dimmed,  
 And every fair from fair sometime declines,  
 By chance, or nature's changing course untrimmed:  
 But thy eternal summer shall not fade,  
 Nor lose possession of that fair thou ow'st,  
 Nor shall death brag thou wand'rest in his shade,  
 When in eternal lines to time thou grow'st,  
 So long as men can breathe or eyes can see,  
 So long lives this, and this gives life to thee.

In this most famous of sonnets Shakespeare exhibits many of the characteristics that make him supreme among English writers. The beauty of the metaphor and the profound elegance of the rhythm strike the reader with their power. It is easy to see why the romantics worshiped Shakespeare. Unlike Donne's work, the inspired romance of Shakespeare's sonnets has surely had many young girls sighing under oak trees.

The two poems above reveal the dramatic contrast between Donne and Shakespeare. Donne appears to ignore beauty and romance in his quest for intellectual conceits and Shakespeare composes exquisite romantic verse and avoids the rough cadence of everyday speech with an Elizabethan

horror. However, even in these two poems there are similarities, and these will be illuminated in our discussion of two additional poems by these masters.

## **A Valediction Forbidding Mourning**

*By John Donne*

As virtuous men pass mildly away,  
 And whisper to their souls to go,  
 Whilst some of their sad friends do say,  
 “Now his breath goes,” and some say, “No.”

So let us melt, and make no noise,  
 No tear-floods, nor sigh-tempests move;  
 ‘Twere profanation of our joys  
 To tell the laity our love.

Moving of th’ earth brings harms and fears;  
 Men reckon what it did, and meant;  
 But trepidation of the spheres,  
 Though greater far, is innocent.

Dull sublunary lovers’ love  
 —Whose soul is sense—cannot admit  
 Of absence, ‘cause it doth remove  
 The thing which elemented it.

But we by a love so much refined,  
 That ourselves know not what it is,  
 Inter-assurèd of the mind,  
 Care less, eyes, lips and hands to miss.

Our two souls therefore, which are one,  
 Though I must go, endure not yet  
 A breach, but an expansion,  
 Like gold to aery thinness beat.



If they be two, they are two so  
 As stiff twin compasses are two;  
 Thy soul, the fix'd foot, makes no show  
 To move, but doth, if th' other do.

And though it in the centre sit,  
 Yet, when the other far doth roam,  
 It leans, and hearkens after it,  
 And grows erect, as that comes home.

Such wilt thou be to me, who must,  
 Like th' other foot, obliquely run;  
 Thy firmness makes my circle just  
 And makes me end where I begun.

## **The Marriage of True Minds**

*By William Shakespeare*

Let me not to the marriage of true minds  
 Admit impediments. Love is not love  
 Which alters when it alteration finds,  
 Or bends with the remover to remove.  
 O no! it is an ever-fixed mark  
 That looks on tempests and is never shaken;  
 It is the star to every wand'ring bark,  
 Whose worth's unknown,  
 although his height be taken.  
 Love's not Time's fool, though rosy lips and cheeks  
 Within his bending sickle's compass come;  
 Love alters not with his brief hours and weeks,  
 But bears it out even to the edge of doom.  
 If this be error and upon me prov'd,  
 I never writ, nor no man ever lov'd.

When reading these two poems, although the contrast is still obvious, some similarities may begin to appear. Both Donne and Shakespeare deal with the difficult subject of the spiritual and unearthly love of true lovers at war with the vicissitudes of their material temporal life. They both expound on how the platonic ideal of love is not bound or

affected by earthly change. Love is neither “Time’s fool” nor is affected by physical distance. Both Donne and Shakespeare make expert use of metaphor and conceits. Shakespeare uses Time as the ‘Grim Reaper’ in “Marriage of True Minds” and uses a summer day in “Shall I Compare Thee to a Summer Day” and Donne uses the flea in “the Flea” and the compass in “Valediction Forbidding Mourning.” They use these conceits in an attempt to deal with extraordinary and profound emotions and intuitive truths about life and love that cannot be expressed with simple concepts or words. To analyze these overwhelmingly intense emotions they use playful metaphors. Donne’s use of the flea and Shakespeare’s playful comparison of his lover to a summer’s day are attempts to avoid direct contact with the too powerful emotions they were attempting to reveal. Through their playful conceits they allow the overwhelming emotion of deep love to seep through in a more palatable form. In Donne’s Lamentations and in Shakespeare’s “Marriage of True Minds,” although there is some playfulness, the powerful intensity of the underlying emotion shines through. For both Shakespeare and Donne, the deep overwhelming understanding that philosophy (through the Platonic Ideals influencing both their understandings of love) and intuition bestow must be concealed within playful conceits.

To emphasize the underlying similarity of these two authors it is useful to highlight the metaphor Donne uses for true lovers’ love in “Valediction Forbidding Mourning.” In this poem he famously compares the relationship of lovers to a compass. Just as a compass has two legs and though one leg may move the other stays firm and therefore despite the movement their relationship doesn’t budge, human lovers with true spiritual love may move their physical bodies but their love for each other remains firm. This metaphor is among the most famous of Donne’s and is supposed to be a prime example of his ability to use surprising items for his analogies to profound concepts. Returning to Shakespeare, a careful reader of “Marriage of True Minds” will note that Shakespeare too makes use of the metaphor of a compass in

his description of love. Although the connection with Donne is not noted in his essay, Doebler comments on the interesting use of a compass as a metaphor for the immutability of the love of true lovers. He writes "In the Renaissance the compass is usually associated with the making of a circle, the ancient symbol of eternity, but in Sonnet ii6 the emphasis is more upon the contrasting symbolism of the legs of the compass. The love which does not alter "when it alteration findes" suggests a fixed foot, whereas the physical mutability of the lovers (the alteration later specified in "rosie lips and cheeks") implies a spreading foot. The stable foot of ideal love "bends with the re- mover", or foot spread out by Time, but-paradoxically-is not thus required actually to "remove" from its fixed position. The physical lovers are caught in a changing world of time, but they are stabilized by spiritual love, which exists in a constant world of eternal ideals."

The similarity of Doebler's understanding of Shakespeare's use of the compass to that of Donne's usage is remarkable. In both Donne and Shakespeare the moving yet unmoving compass is meant to symbolize the stability of the spiritual relationship of lovers despite the movement of the temporal lovers either in time or space. Although Doebler's interpretation may be subject to debate, as the actual usage of the word 'compass' in the poem: "Love's not Time's fool, though rosy lips and cheeks / Within his bending sickle's compass come" might simply be following the metaphor of the grim reaper as death who uses a sickle and can only strike within the circular compass of its reach. However, Doebler's explanation of Shakespeare's underlying concept and its similarity to that of Donne's is still striking.

In addition to the mutual usage of the veil of elaborate conceits they both utilize an additional veil. However, unlike the similarity of the first veil, the second veil contrasts the two masters. Donne uses tense rhythm and shocking metaphors to distract and avoid direct contact with the power of the overpowering emotions while Shakespeare uses his majestic and elegant structure to distract and conceal intense

emotions embedded in his poetry. This difference in techniques is one reason for their many obvious differences in style. One reason they used these different techniques may have been a difference in when they lived. Shakespeare would not have been able to get away with the style of Donne. Even in Donne's era his style was criticized, as noted above.

A final explanation for the differences between the masters is the difference in their ability. It is widely assumed that Shakespeare was a uniquely gifted writer. Therefore, the difference in method of concealment may be a result of Donne's inability to use Shakespeare's techniques for concealment. Not all poets are gifted with the ability to perform the wonders of "The Bard." However, despite their differences in ability and style the similarity between the two in their philosophical influence and the powerful emotions concealed behind their elaborate metaphors is still nothing less than remarkable.

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## Was the Second Iraq War Legal?

Yudi Ness

Throughout history, states have waged wars against each other. In earlier times, it was considered acceptable among states to engage in war for reasons other than self-defense. However, as time went on nations changed the way they thought about waging war. Especially after WWII, a war that led to millions of deaths and devastating destruction, nations realized that international law should somehow place restrictions on when states could go to war. Nations could not simply go to war anymore for reasons of conquest or national pride. Rather states came to agree that the only legitimate reason a state could go to war for was self-defense.

This idea was strongly reflected in the UN Charter. Article 51 of the UN Charter states, “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations...” Two schools of thought have emerged in interpreting this line. The “restrictionists” emphasize Article 51’s usage of the term “armed attack.” They say it implies that states can only engage in self-defense once an attacking nation has already crossed the target state’s borders. This type of self-defense is referred to in international law as reactive self-defense.<sup>1</sup>

However, another school of thought has emerged, the “counter-restrictionists,” who emphasize that the Charter says it will not take away the “inherent right” of self-defense, implying that the Charter accepts the manner in which international law had governed when nations could engage in self-defense, in the period prior to the passing of the UN Charter. Counter-restrictionists say that Article 51 legitimizes a state’s engagement in self-defense once it meets the requirements of the *Caroline* test,<sup>2</sup> a test established by U.S.

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<sup>1</sup> Sadoff, pp. 551-3.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., pp. 553-6.

Secretary of State Daniel Webster in 1837. The *Caroline* standard says that a state cannot engage in self-defense unless three conditions have been met. First, the threat of attack must be imminent, for example, the attacking state has its soldiers mobilized at the borders of the target state and are waiting to launch an attack. Second, there must be necessity, meaning that the target state can only defend itself through military means. It cannot defend itself through non-military means, such as economic sanctions or diplomacy. Third, there must be proportionality. People often assume that the concept of proportionality refers to the level of force used, namely that there must be “equality or symmetry between the quantum, intensity, or means of force used on the battlefield.”<sup>3</sup> However, this is only the definition of proportionality when applied *jus in bellum*. However, the concept of proportionality, within the context of *jus ad bellum*, refers to “the degree of force strictly required to satisfy the overall self-defense objective, namely, repelling a given threat.” Proportionality, in the context of *jus ad bellum*, limits the target state’s military objectives, as it has to pursue a more narrowly defined or tactical objective, as opposed to pursuing a more broadly defined or strategic objective.<sup>4</sup> For instance, the target state cannot take additional military action to deter the attacking state from attacking in the future. It can only use the force necessary to stop the current attack of the aggressor state.<sup>5</sup> Any reference made to proportionality throughout this paper, will be referring to its meaning within the context of *jus ad bellum*, unless indicated otherwise.

According to the counter-restrictionist interpretation of Article 51, the UN Charter merely reaffirms the *Caroline* standard, and hence legalized two forms of non-reactive self-defense (a general category of self-defense, which a target nation engages in before the attacking nation has crossed into its territory): interceptive self-defense and anticipatory self

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid., pp. 535-7.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., pp. 526-7.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., pp. 527.

defense (henceforth referred to as ASD).<sup>6</sup> Interceptive self-defense occurs when the attacking nation has already launched its attack, but has not actually crossed the borders of the target state. It also occurs when that attacking state has taken “ostensibly irrevocable” steps that will culminate in the launching of an attack.<sup>7 8</sup> ASD refers to the self-defense a nation engages in when an attack against it is imminent, although it has not actually begun yet.<sup>9 10</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> However, if the target nation engages in military action mainly for the purpose of self-defense, and that military action ends up incidentally having some non-self-defense effect, such as deterrence, then the target state has not violated the doctrine of proportionality. (Ibid.)

<sup>7</sup> Although the *Caroline* standard only makes direct reference to ASD, it certainly includes interceptive self-defense, as it applies even more restrictive standards on when nations can engage in self defense, than ASD does.

<sup>8</sup> Dinstein, p. 191.

<sup>9</sup> I can't find any historical example of a nation engaging in interceptive self defense. Dinstein (p. 192) quotes Israel's attack against Arab states in 1967 as a historical example of interceptive self-defense, as the Arab nations had taken “ostensibly irrevocable” acts towards launching an attack against Israel. However, although most legal scholars agree to Dinstein's definition of interceptive self defense as a case in which “ostensibly irrevocable” actions have taken place towards the launching of attack, they disagree with his citing of the 1967 war as an example of this type of self-defense. Most legal scholars understand that the Six-Day War was an example of ASD, as they hold, “ostensibly irrevocable” actions had not taken place at the time that Israel launched its attack. I will be following the majority of legal scholars' understanding of the Six-Day War (see fn.10).

Although I have not been able to find an actual historical example of interceptive self-defense, Dinstein mentions a hypothetical case that may illustrate the concept better. Dinstein explains that had America attacked Japanese planes that were in route to bomb Pearl Harbor in 1941, before they had reached Hawaii, then America would have been engaging in an act of interceptive self defense. This is because once the Japanese planes were already in the air; “ostensibly irrevocable” actions had taken place. However, since they would have not yet reached Hawaii, they wouldn't have crossed the borders of the target state.

<sup>10</sup> A historical example of ASD was Israel's attack Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, during the Six-Day War of 1967. Arab troops were mobilized on Israel's Sinai border. Furthermore, Egypt had recently kicked out UNEF, the U.N. peacekeeping force that had served as a buffer between Egypt and Israel since 1956. Also, Egypt had blockaded the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, an act that Israel had warned it would consider as an act of war. Additionally, threatening statements had been made against Israel by Arab leaders, e.g. Egyptian President Nasser said, less than two weeks before the war broke out, “Our basic objective will be to destroy Israel.” (Sadoff fn248). Israel interpreted all these events and statements as evidence that an attack was imminent, and hence launched a surprise air attack, in an act of ASD, against Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian airfields on June 5, 1967. (Sadoff 566-7).

In the aftermath of the horrific terrorist attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, the administration of President George W. Bush announced an ambitious agenda by which it would wage a “War on Terror,” known as the Bush Doctrine. The Bush Doctrine essentially says that as the U.S. attempts to stop rogue states and terrorists from threatening and attacking the U.S. and other nations, the U.S. would engage in preemptive self defense (henceforth referred to as PSD). PSD is an even less restrictive form of non-reactive self defense than ASD is, as it allows nations to engage in self-defense not only when an attack is imminent, but even when the attacking nation has merely acquired the weapons to use in an attack, or is in the process of developing them. In the case of PSD, that attacking nation may not be ready to attack for months, or even years.<sup>11</sup> In the White House’s National Security Strategy of 2002 (henceforth referred to as NSS), the Bush Administration spelled out its policies for engaging in PSD, as well as the legal justification for it. The NSS (15) says...

Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat – most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack. We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack U.S. Using conventional means... Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially the Use of weapons of mass destructions – weapons that can easily be concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning... To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.

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<sup>11</sup> The definitions of the different subtypes of non-reactive self-defense are based upon David Sadoff’s (pp. 529-30) interpretation. However, other legal scholars and political scientists define these terms differently. For instance Yoram Dinstein defines Israel’s attack on Egypt in the Six-Day War as interceptive self-defense (p. 192), which is really an example of ASD according to Sadoff’s definition.



The Bush Administration seems to be arguing that although the imminent test has been used as the legalizing standard for engaging in self defense in the past, it doesn't apply in the case of rouge states and terrorists with WMDs. Rouge states and terrorists specifically seek to attack the U.S. and its allies through the use of WMDs. The ability to easily hide WMDs, deliver them covertly, and use them without warning, makes it virtually impossible for a nation to defend itself once the attack is already imminent. Hence a target state must utilize PSD in order to fully defend itself. Since PSD is necessary to fully defend itself, PSD should replace the imminent test. This is so since the imminent test was merely a means of judging how long a target state can wait and still have time to fully defend itself. In the case of WMDs and rogue states, since an attack can be launched without warning, the imminent test will no longer give the state enough time to defend itself. The target state may already suffer a blow, before they realize the attack was even planned. A doctrine of PSD is now necessary to gauge how long a state can wait and still have time to defend itself.

In 2003, the Bush Administration applied this doctrine on a practical level. Based on intelligence that Saddam Hussein, the leader of Iraq, had acquired and developed WMDs and was willing to use them against other states or sell them to terrorists, America invaded Iraq to preempt Hussein from using his WMDs. The intelligence only noted that Hussein had WMDs. It didn't say an attack was imminent.<sup>12</sup> Nonetheless the Bush Administration held the attack was legal under international law. They held it was legal, amongst other reasons, because it was a form of ASD against a rogue state with WMDs, a form of self-defense made legal by the Bush Doctrine. It seems the Bush Administration

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<sup>12</sup> Some distinguish between the concept of preemptive self-defense and preventive self-defense, as they define preventive self-defense as preventing an attack that might not take place for a while, even a couple of years (Gill, pp. 361, 363). For the purpose of this paper, I will be using the term PSD, to refer to all types of self-defense that are less restrictive than ASD.

was utilizing the PSD argument as one of their reasons for starting the Second Iraq War (henceforth referred to as IWII) from various speeches made by President Bush and other top Administration officials.<sup>13 14</sup>

This paper will discuss whether the U.S.'s decision to engage in IWII on the grounds of self-defense was in fact legal according to the rules of self-defense as recognized by international law. Essentially the question is, does international law recognize the right of PSD when defending against a rogue state with WMDs? This paper will assume that ASD is already legal under international law, and the only question is whether PSD is also legal.<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, I will be assuming that America's justification, or at least one of its justifications, for engaging in IWII, was self-defense.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Pierson, p. 174; Hass, p. 222.

<sup>14</sup> In a speech at the Cincinnati Museum Center, on October 7, 2002, President Bush said "If we know that Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons today, and we do, does it make any sense for the world to wait to confront him as he grows even stronger and develops even more dangerous weapons?" Also, Vice President Cheney, in a speech in Nashville, in August of 2002, made similar statements. (Pierson fn.166) In these speeches, Bush and Cheney did not emphasize the fact that they needed to enforce UN Security Council Resolutions, but rather the fact that Hussein had WMDs, that he was planning on using them against the U.S. and its allies, and that he needed to be preempted. Hence it seemed they were making an argument of PSD, as opposed to merely enforcing Security Council Resolutions.

<sup>15</sup> I emphasize this point so much, that the Bush Administration used self-defense as a justification for the invasion of Iraq, since others have argued that this is not so. Sadoff mentions various scholars, with whom he agrees, who note that the U.S. justified its attack of Iraq as an enforcement of Security Council Resolutions, passed at the time of the First Iraq War, that Iraq had violated. Whatever the U.S. mentioned about self-defense were not legal justifications, but rather policy ones. (fn.214).

<sup>16</sup> See section 2-5 of Sadoff's article, where he makes note of the fact that some hold that even ASD is not legal under international law. Most notably, the restrictionist interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter, mentioned earlier in this paper, would argue that the UN Charter, a major determinant of the standards of international law, does not recognize the right of ASD.

Additionally, this paper will only deal with the legality of IWII with regard to whether the doctrine of self-defense was applied correctly in light of the rule of immanency. It will not be dealing with other issues of the legality of self-defense in this case, such as whether there was really necessity; meaning had all other non-military options of removing the Iraqi threat, been exhausted. Additionally, this paper is assuming that the intelligence about Iraq was correct. The intelligence had stated that Saddam Hussein had WMDs, although it never stated that an attack was imminent.

I will take two general avenues to answer this question. First, I will research whether customary international law recognizes a right for self-defense as the U.S. claimed existed in IWII. I will research whether there is historical precedent for states actually having engaged in, or recognizing the right of, self-defense in cases of attacks of non-immanent invasion, when facing rogue states or terrorists with WMDs. Second, I will analyze that even if there is no historical precedent for self-defense when attacks were not imminent, maybe from the point of view of the logic and theory of self-defense in international law, IWII should be considered legal.

## **Preemptive Self-Defense in Customary International Law**

The customs that nations adopt in dealing with other nations have always been a prime source for establishing international law. Hence, a good place to look for an answer is customary international law. The Bush Administration has argued that PSD should be legal when dealing with rogue states or terrorists who have WMDs. Therefore, any historical precedent used as a basis to understand the legality of IWII must be a case involving rogue states or terrorist organizations with WMDs. Therefore we will not be discussing customs that existed before the U.S. bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki in WWII, as WMDs didn't exist before this period. Furthermore, we will not discussed the

implications of the terms used in Article 51 of the UN Charter, as the Charter was written in a pre-atomic age (or at best when WMDs were fairly new and hadn't been anticipated by the drafters of the Charter).

I have picked two cases in history from which we can derive what customary international law has to say about the legality of IWII. The first case is the Cuban Missile Crisis, the event in October of 1962 in which the U.S.SR transferred nuclear missiles to Cuba that became operational during the crisis and were in shooting range of the U.S.. The Cuban Missile Crisis definitely involved WMDs, and perhaps a rogue regime. The second case is Israel's attack on Iraq's Nuclear Reactor, code-named Osiraq, in 1981. This is an especially good example as it involves WMDs, the same exact rogue state the U.S. attacked in IWII, and Israel made similar arguments the U.S. did before invading Iraq.

On October 15, 1962, the U.S. discovered that the U.S.SR had placed offensive missiles in Cuba. On October 22, President Kennedy announced that the U.S. would respond by establishing a naval quarantine around Cuba that would prevent the further entry of such threatening weapon systems.<sup>17</sup> The Cuban Missile Crisis would seem to serve as a good example for justifying IWII, as the quarantine America set up was a form of non-reactive self defense to a threat of WMDs that wasn't imminent. In fact, John Yoo and Robert Delahunty draw such a comparison.<sup>18</sup>

However, it seems to me that the two cases are different. Even assuming that America justified its quarantine on the grounds of PSD, it's not clear that one can compare the degree of non-immanency in the case of Iraq to that of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The U.S.SR had specifically engaged in a provocative move by transferring the WMDs to Cuba. Although the rational actor model of analyzing decision making in international relations may dictate that the U.S.SR

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<sup>17</sup> As opposed to the other views, mentioned in fn10.

<sup>18</sup> Chayes, p. 8.

just moved the missiles there for balance of power reasons, there at least existed a possibility that the U.S.SR would “go rogue” and attack the U.S.<sup>19</sup> Such a possibility did not even exist in the case of IWII.

However, even if one accepts the notion that the threat present in the Cuban Missile Crisis was just as non-imminent as the threat of Iraq leading up to IWII, or that the likelihood of attack during the Cuban Missile Crisis was much lower than before IWII, I still believe the two cases are different. During IWII, the U.S. justified the attack on the grounds of self-defense. Although the U.S. claimed it was enforcing Security Council resolutions passed during the Gulf War, and also sought further support from the Security Council in 2003, it also made a separate argument that it was attacking out of self-defense.<sup>20</sup> However, in the Cuban Missile Crisis, the U.S. did not justify the attack on the grounds of self-defense at all. Rather, after going to the Organization of American States (OAS) and getting them to pass a resolution ordering the removal of the missiles from Cuba, America justified the quarantine under Article 52 of the UN Charter which allows countries to use regional arrangements to maintain security. The OAS resolution also permitted the U.S. to conduct the quarantine under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty (The Inter-American Treaty of Regional Assistance), which allows for the use of self-defense even in cases where there is no armed attack.<sup>21</sup> That the U.S. avoided justifying the quarantine as an act of self-defense disallows the Cuban Missile Crisis as precedent for America legitimizing preemptive self-defense. Furthermore, it is clear from a statement of the Kennedy Administration that they specifically avoided this justification because the U.S. didn’t feel self-defense should be legalized in non-immanent attacks. Abram Chayes, the State Department Legal Adviser, reasoned “No doubt the phrase

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<sup>19</sup> Delahunty and Yoo, p. 853.

<sup>20</sup> From the movie *13 Days*, it is clear the U.S. considered the fact the U.S.SR may attack imminently, and not just move the missiles there for balance of power reasons.

<sup>21</sup> See fn. 14.

‘armed attack’ must be construed broadly enough to permit some anticipatory response. But it is a very different matter to expand it to include threatening deployments or demonstrations that do not have imminent attack as their purpose or probable outcome.”<sup>22</sup> This statement suggests that the Kennedy Administration specifically avoided using self-defense as a justification since they held it did not apply to attacks that were not imminent. Hence, not only is America’s quarantine of Cuba not a justification for IWII, but it may even serve as precedent to declare it illegal.<sup>23</sup>

The second case is the Osiraq Nuclear Reactor Attack. In 1981, Iraq was constructing a nuclear reactor, code-named Osiraq. Although Iraq claimed it wasn’t building the reactor to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons, Israel had evidence that it was. Furthermore, Israel had evidence that Iraq, a country which had always been hostile towards Israel since its birth, was planning to use this reactor to build WMDs to attack Israel. On June 7, 1981, the Israeli Air Force destroyed the Osiraq nuclear reactor.<sup>24</sup> Of all the historical precedents mentioned so far, this should seem to serve as the closest comparison to IWII. Israel was trying to preempt the threat of WMDs from the same exact rouge regime America attacked in IWII. Furthermore, Israel specifically justified its actions under the argument of ASD. Additionally, Israel made similar arguments that the U.S. did in IWII, namely that when WMDs are at stake, the time at which at a target state can engage in non-reactive self-defense should be extended from imminent, to preemptive.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Chayes, p. 63.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 65.

<sup>24</sup> Perhaps one could draw an additional distinction between the Cuban Missile Crisis and IWII. In the Cuban Missile Crisis, the U.S. never responded with any sort of real military action, as they did in IWII. Rather they only responded with quarantine. Hence one would only be able to draw a precedent from the Cuban Missile Crisis, if instead of having invaded Iraq, America would have established a siege around it, or some action of that nature. However, I don’t think this is a good distinction, since America was fully willing to attack any ships that did not abide by the rules of the quarantine.

<sup>25</sup> Sadoff, pp. 568-9.

I believe that Israel's attack on Osiraq serves as a good example to show how the American attack on Osiraq was illegal. Firstly, the most of the international community criticized the Israeli strike. Some went as far too even reject the entire legitimacy of the doctrine of ASD. Although other states did accept the doctrine of ASD in principle, as dictated by the *Caroline* standard, they felt the Osiraq case did not have the conditions to constitute it as a case of legal demonstration of ASD. Notably, America only criticized Israel for its failure to exhaust peaceful means of dealing with the nuclear reactor (there was no necessity), but did not take a position on the actual self-defense.<sup>26</sup> The almost universal condemnation<sup>27</sup> of the international community suggests that non-reactive self-defense is only legitimate in cases where an attack is imminent, even in a situation where WMDs exist. Therefore, America's legal justification for IWII was flawed. Furthermore, if the international community criticized Israel to such an extent when they merely engaged in an air strike, they would surely criticize a full blown invasion of Iraq in an effort to topple Saddam's entire regime, as existed in IWII.

It seems clear from our analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Israel's attack on the nuclear reactor on the Osiraq nuclear reactor that customary international law does not legitimize the use of PSD against a rogue state with WMDs. Furthermore, the fact that such a justification was not pursued or accepted in these cases allows them to serve as proofs against the Bush Administration's application of the doctrine of self defense under international law.

## **Legalizing IWII Based on the Logic of the Doctrine of ASD**

Up until now we have explored if there was anything within customary international law that would justify

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid., pp. 569.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., pp. 569-70.

preemptive war, especially in the case of WMDs. We failed to find any precedent. Now I will consider the argument, that even if there aren't any cases within customary international law that legitimize actions the U.S. took in starting IWII, maybe what the U.S. did should be legal for a different reason. This reason would be that based on the underlying logic of the rules of self-defense as recognized by international law, the imminent test should not apply in cases of rogue states with WMDs. This is because of the reasons mentioned by the NSS, discussed earlier in this paper, that WMDs are much easier to conceal, deliver covertly, and rogue states will use them without warning,<sup>28</sup> hence making it virtually impossible for states to defend themselves until they wait for the attack to be imminent, or even to realize the attack will take place until it has actually occurred. This argument is essentially saying that the imminent test was merely a means of assessing a point at which a nation will still have sufficient time to defend itself, and still have exhausted its other options, such as diplomacy and economic sanctions. The Bush Administration was arguing that in cases of WMDs and rogue states PSD is the only effective means of assessing a point at which a nation will still have sufficient time to defend itself, and still have exhausted its other options.

Although these are interesting arguments, I don't believe they hold up. In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Osiraq Attack, WMDs were at stake, as well as rogue

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<sup>28</sup> I don't believe America's sole position in that case was enough to say that the self-defense was legal. First of all, most nations did criticize Israel. Second, even though America did not criticize Israel regarding the self-defense, they didn't support it either. Rather they chose to avoid the whole question, and just declare the act illegal based on the grounds of necessity. Therefore, although one can't use the American response as a proof against the legality of PSD, one surely cannot use it as a proof for the legality of PSD either. Third, the fact that so many of the countries that supported Israel's right to self defense in 1967, rejected it in 1981, shows the weakness of Israel's claim that the Osiraq attack was legal.



nations.<sup>29</sup> Nonetheless America avoided justifying their attacks based on non-reactive self-defense. When America avoided this justification, it wasn't simply because they didn't want to rely on a new legal doctrine. Rather America avoided the PSD justification because it disagreed with the actual doctrine. This point is suggested from a statement of Abram Chayes, the legal advisor to the State Department during the Cuban Missile Crisis; "No doubt the phrase 'armed attack' must be construed broadly enough to permit some anticipatory response. But it is a very different matter to expand it to include threatening deployments or demonstrations that do not have imminent attack as their purpose or probable outcome."<sup>30</sup> The Kennedy Administration's legal justification for the crisis, as illustrated by Chayes's statement, suggests that they didn't feel WMDs changed the imminent test.<sup>31</sup> Furthermore, Israel who did justify its attacks in a very similar case, were condemned by most of the international community. The international community felt that PSD, even in defense of rogue states with WMDs, was not legal. Hence there is historical precedent that the international community has rejected the logic and theory that the U.S. espoused in its legal justification for IWII.

Another argument made to justify IWII on the grounds of logic and theory is based upon an argument John Yoo and Robert Delahunty make to justify the Bush Doctrine in general. Being that IWII was just a demonstration of the Bush Doctrine, we can apply Yoo's and Delahunty's argument to potentially justify America's invasion of Iraq. Yoo and Delahunty argue the Bush Doctrine is justified for the same

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<sup>29</sup> More civil and peaceful states, who think more rationally, such as the U.S., will only use them in very dire situations. History proves this point as the only time the U.S. used nuclear weapons was in WWII against Japan, against whom the U.S. had a clear right of self defense.

<sup>30</sup> The case of Osiraq clearly dealt with a rogue nation. However, even in the case of the U.S.SR, where the argument could be made that they were acting rationally, I mentioned early in the paper that the Kennedy Administration was clearly considering the possibility that the U.S.SR would "go rogue" and launch the missiles. Nonetheless they still avoided using the PSD justification.

reason humanitarian intervention, such as that of the U.S. and its NATO allies against Serbia in 1999. Just as in the case of Serbia, the objective was a protective one, namely to protect the population of Serbia suffering from genocide, the object of the PSD (and hence IWII) was to protect against potential victims of terrorists and rogue states. Yoo and Delahunty say the only difference is that in humanitarian intervention states protect the target state's population, whereas in PSD, states protect their own populations.<sup>32</sup>

I don't agree with Yoo's and Delahunty's comparison between humanitarian intervention in Serbia, and IWII. In the case of NATO's humanitarian interventions in Serbia, genocide was already underway against the Serbs. NATO was trying to stop the genocide from already occurring. In order to draw a valid comparison between Serbia and IWII, Saddam Hussein would have to have already landed an attack against some nation, in order for America to respond. Such a case would not be an example of PSD, nor any form of non-reactive self-defense. Rather it would be a form of reactive self-defense, a form of self defense recognized even according to the restrictionist interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter. Furthermore, this type of self-defense would be permitted even in the absence of nuclear weapons.

Another argument that could be made against utilizing PSD against rogue states is that it cuts off the ability of

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<sup>31</sup> Chayes, p. 65. See p. 10 of this paper for another reference to this quote.

<sup>32</sup> Perhaps one can argue that the Kennedy Administration avoided the PSD justification because nuclear weapon terrorism was less of an issue in the 1960s. However, had the Kennedy Administration been around in 2003, when nuclear terrorism was much more prevalent, they would have agreed to legalize PSD. I don't agree with this argument because it would seem that nuclear terrorism was more of an issue in the 1960s than it was in 2003 with Iraq. In 1962, it was clear that the U.S. had operational nuclear weapons in Cuba. However, before IWII, even the overly zealous U.S. intelligence reports said that Saddam didn't have nuclear weapons and probably would not get them until the end of the decade (October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate).

intelligence gathering. The Bush Administration was clearly worried about such a problem, since they clearly mention in the NSS, “To support preemptive options, we will: build better, more integrated intelligence capabilities to provide timely, accurate information on threats...”<sup>33</sup> Had the U.S. waited a longer time, they may have received better intelligence, which would inform them that Saddam Hussein was not a threat at all.

Another argument that could be against utilizing PSD against rouge states is that it will set a bad legal precedent. Even if PSD were only to be legalized in cases where it is known that the state with WMDs wants to use them to attack another state, it will still set bad legal precedent. States could justify attacking any state with WMDs aimed in the direction of another. Even though the WMD state is just aiming its weapons so as a means of deterrence, other states could claim there is a chance they will be attacked by the WMD state hence they have to defend themselves. Furthermore, states that have feuds with WMD states or just want to stop them from becoming too powerful can attack them under the guise of self defense. Richard Haass raises this concern; “A world in which preventive attacks became commonplace would be a world of constant conflict, as governments could justify early military action against rising powers (to nip them in the bud before they got too strong) or simply neighbors with whom there was a history of war (in order to catch them at an unsuspecting moment).”<sup>34</sup>

## Conclusion

The Bush Administration’s legal justification for IWII was flawed. We have proved that international customary law at best only recognizes non-reactive self-defense in cases where an attack against the target state is imminent, a condition that obviously did not exist in the case of IWII. Furthermore, the Bush Administration’s reasoning that the

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<sup>33</sup> Delahunty and Yoo, pp. 846-8.

<sup>34</sup> Haass, p. 222.

imminent standard should be waived in cases of rogue states with WMDs was also incorrect.

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## Can Iraq Democratize?

*Cheskie Rosenzweig*

Whether Iraq can become a democracy—or not has been the subject of debate among politicians in the political arena and among scholars in academic settings. Iraq is a country that seems to provide many hindrances to democratization and no aspects that promote it. Most competent scholars believe that it was not a very good idea to attempt to democratize Iraq.

According to Larry Diamond (2005), one of our country's leading experts on democratization, the single biggest mistake that landed us in the difficulty we're in now was the decision to have an American occupation of Iraq in the first place. His statement clearly does not speak well of the decision of the United States to invade Iraq or our chances for democratizing Iraq anytime in the near future.

In Diamond's view, many factors had detrimental effects that undermined the success of our democratization venture in Iraq. One of these factors was that Donald Rumsfeld led the invasion. This harmed our efforts in the following way: "When someone suggested that there would be riots in the streets if the civil servants didn't get paid, Rumsfeld replied that this could be used as leverage to get the Europeans in to pick up the burden" (Diamond, 2003). This does not sound like it is coming from an educated, rationally thinking leader. We needed to prevent this riot from taking place, not use it as leverage. The importance of the feelings and responses of the Iraqi public was overlooked when it should have been a matter of genuine concern. This poor leadership was one of the reasons for Diamond's feeling that our operation to democratize Iraq was doomed to fail.

It is also critically important, Diamond maintains, that we "articulate some sort of timeframe by which we envision being gone from Iraq – not a fixed deadline which traps us if things don't go as well as we hoped they will. But some sort of goal or schedule that becomes dependent on the

cooperation of the insurgent forces to suspend the violent struggle and try and secure the country”(Diamond, 2005). The most important aspect of having a timeframe is its connotations to the Iraqi citizens. They need to know when we will be out of their country. In order for the Iraqi people to want the democracy we are aggressively asserting on them, they need to understand that we are not there to take over their country and protect our own interests. We are there for them, that is, to promote their freedom and well-being.

The other crucial factors that have undermined our chances of installing a successful democracy are as follows:

One was to completely dissolve the Iraqi Army and just dismiss several hundred thousand soldiers. It's true, as defenders of this decision say, that the Iraqi Army had largely dispersed itself. But still, they could have been called back to bases. They could have been paid. They could have been vetted with some number of them selected to begin securing the country. We created a security vacuum and lost a lot of time by our decision to just basically disintegrate the entire backbone of security in the country. Secondly, we took the decision to launch a thoroughly radical campaign of de-Baathification. And it was necessary to purge some number of Baathist Party officials from public service in a variety of ways, particularly the government. But it went too far. It went so far that in some communities, the schools were left virtually without any schoolteachers because all of the teachers had been members of the Baath Party at the district level or above. And finally, when we started this occupation, it was with no clear indication of when it was going to end. And so Iraqis saw themselves really under indefinite occupation under the political administration of the United States. [Diamond, 2005]

On the eve of the invasion, without these three mistakes, we may have had a bigger chance, but even so, it would have been very difficult to create a consolidated democracy in a country such as Iraq. After we made these mistakes, along with others, like the failure to quickly reinstate an Iraqi

governing body, and “going to war with too small a force to assure a successful aftermath” (Diamond 2005), only pushed us further in the wrong direction. Our chances of establishing a democracy are not completely lost, for although the phenomenon of path dependence is strong, it is not compelling.

Seymour Martin Lipset, Guillermo A. O’Donnell, and Philippe C. Schmitter, all leading political scientists of our time, take a structural approach to explaining the probability of installing and consolidating democracy. “Structural approaches assume that economic development, political culture, class conflict, social structures, and other social conditions can explain particular outcomes of the transition” (Guo, 1999). Structuralists believe that in order to achieve a successful democracy social, political and economic requisites have to be attained. Since Iraq lacked all of them (the average citizen was poor, uneducated and had been living under an extreme autocracy), structuralists conclude that democratization will not be reached in Iraq in the near future. If this viewpoint is correct, it would have been inadvisable to invade to try to institute a democracy.

Other scholars argue that even in countries that do not exhibit the ideal economic and social situations conducive to democracy, it is possible for such countries to overcome these obstacles through the power of elite choice. This is the view of Giuseppe Di Palma, and several others, and with this understanding, our efforts in Iraq don’t seem as foolish.

Lawrence C. Mayer analyzes this argument between Lipset and Di Palma, and he evaluates the merits of both views — social and economic requisites on the one hand and elite choice on the other. According to Mayer, it is clear that a country’s social and economic status effects that country’s chances of democratizing to some extent, but if there is a strong elite, or group of elites, who make a decision, it can override whatever structural deficiencies adversely affect the chance of democratization. In this case, the U.S., perhaps with the help of elite choice in Iraq, could overcome whatever barriers seemed to hinder the

democratization process, and the hopes with which we went into Iraq were not completely unfounded.

Bruce Moon, in his analysis of elite choice viewpoint, states that elite choice is in itself a prerequisite, and this prerequisite was absent in Iraq, so even according to those scholars who believe that social requisites are not required because changes can come about from elite choice alone, in Iraq this would not help, because it also lacks this elite choice.

According to Moon, installing a democracy in places like Iraq, although it may be ultimately achievable, takes time. Under Moon's strongly statistically based analysis, taking into account the time it took similar countries to democratize, it appears that an average time for Iraq to democratize would be approximately fifty years. There are some exceptions, like Portugal and Albania, which transformed very quickly, but on average half a century was required. This is not what the U.S. had in mind when it entered Iraq. The United States was looking for a quick fix, which almost any scholar in the world would have told them they weren't getting. Moon says that Iraq is an extreme autocracy which further limits its chance for a speedy conversion. And it is not only an example of an extreme autocracy, but autocracy has been the form of rule for so long, that the current generation has absolutely no exposure to any form of democracy, further limiting the likelihood of its immediate acceptance, and presenting negative implications for whether future democratization can ever be achieved.

However, Moon does not consider a key element that makes the Iraq case different. This is the extent to which the U.S. was backing and pushing for democracy in Iraq. Unlike most of the other transformations in Moon's study, in Iraq the United States was an essential part of the Iraqi government for some time after the invasion, and because of this influence, the United States was a big part of what can be referred to as the elite choice process, and because of this, democratization was more possible in Iraq than it was in the other seemingly similar countries.



Looking at the position of the U.S. on the eve of the invasion, the American officials believed that they could take control of the government and turn them toward a democratic path. This is an enormous point that had the potential to cause Iraq to democratize. The U.S. however, never had the chance to use this properly, because when the troops entered and followed orders to not maintain social order and only guard the oil, they alienated the people from American occupiers. Until this point, the Iraqi people wanted change, any change, and this feeling of change is a big motivator, and the most important requisite of democracy. Hussein's regime was oppressive, and so many of the people were poor and unhappy. Any other form of government seems desirable at a point like this, and even with their Muslim background which is more supportive of a controlling and overbearing ruling body, change was viewed as desirable. However, the United States came in and appeared to be the enemy taking over their country with hostility. This angered the Iraqis and took away the power of the U.S. to influence Iraq toward democratization, because when the people turned further away from Americans, they turned further away from American values and agendas, namely, democracy. But at the outset democratization was not impossible.

In summary, there is a range of views as to whether our invasion of Iraq was futile or had some merit, but there is no one who says that the democratization process would have been easy. According to structuralist thinkers, the U. S. claim that it could democratize Iraq is logically indefensible and it is without any merit whatsoever. Perhaps the most supportive of the invasion would be those who follow an elite choice model of democratization, and even these scholars may be inclined to agree with Moon that even elite choice can be deemed a requisite that Iraq was lacking. However, others may argue that due to American influence this requisite of elite choice did exist. According to Diamond, on the eve of the invasion, democracy was possible, although remote, and would have taken some time even if all of America's decisions were the right ones. One is inclined to believe that

the U.S. may have had other motives besides democratization when they chose to invade, due to the preponderance of scholarly thought against the idea of the simple and swift democratization of Iraq.

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## On the Question of Religion's Role in Policymaking

*Ephraim Soloveitchik*

Thousands of religions are practiced around the world. It is self-evident that religion plays an important role in many people's lives. At the same time, there is widespread respect shown for democratic principles.<sup>1</sup> As I have argued in another work, it is quite feasible for democracy and religion to coexist, that is, it is not undemocratic for a religious group to influence government policy.<sup>2</sup> We still need to decide, however, how big a role the religion of the majority, or even a minority, should have in determining public policy. The objective of this essay is to examine this question. The goal is to determine the ideal relationship between religion and a democratic state.

To answer the question about religion's role we need, first, to understand the overarching conception of democracy. Robert A. Dahl and Alfred Stepan are two political scientists who discuss the fundamentals of democracy. Dahl's overarching conception of democracy is the preservation of political equality, while Stepan adds to this by requiring the preservation of "fundamental liberties which include, among other things, considerable protections for minority rights"<sup>3</sup> such as the religious freedom of minorities. Dahl provides philosophical arguments for his overarching conception of democracy, while Stepan does not. In this essay I attempt to provide philosophical justifications for Stepan's criteria. I critique both Dahl's overarching conception of democracy and defend Stepan's.

It is clear that religion can shape public policy in a democratic society. It already has done so.<sup>4</sup> But is this the

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<sup>1</sup> Sharansky (2008) writes: "The best evidence of the universal respect afforded democracy is that even the world's most undemocratic regimes insist on calling themselves 'democratic'" p. 3

<sup>2</sup> Soloveichik, "Can Democracy and Religion Coexist in Public Policy?"

<sup>3</sup> Stepan 2001, p. 216.

<sup>4</sup> See Ephraim Soloveichik, "Can Democracy and Religion Coexist in Public Policy?"

ideal way in which democracy should work? Judging from the vantage-point of democratic theory, should a purely secular state be the ultimate goal? When I speak of a secular state, I do not mean a political system that forbids all religion. Instead, I have in mind a society where the separation of church and state is complete.

Many are not aware of the fact, established by Stepan, that the separation of church and state in the United States is more complete than it is in most of the other democracies in the world. Yet, religious symbols are part of our country's cultural and national heritage. The words "In God we trust" are printed on American currency, and many states forbid the sale of alcohol on Sunday, because it is the day that Christians go to church. Religious influence in public policy can obviously extend beyond the use of religious symbols and the prohibition on the sale of alcoholic beverages. Government funding of religious education is a prime example of extended influence, because public funds would be used to support one or several religious ideologies. Stepan notes that religion shapes public policy in twenty-five western democracies — excluding the United States: "100% fund religious education in some way; 76% have religious education in state schools as a standard offering (many, but not all, with the option not to attend); 52% collect taxes for religious organizations; and 36% have established religions."<sup>5</sup> In a completely secular state, such practices would be non-existent.<sup>6</sup> Is secularism preferable to the scenarios above?

Before seeking to identify the ideal relationship between a democratic government and religious influence, we must understand the overarching conception of democracy. What does the term "overarching conception of democracy" mean? I believe that we can better understand the notion of

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<sup>5</sup> Stepan, "The Multiple Secularisms of Modern Democracies," nd, p. 4.

<sup>6</sup> See Epstein and Walker (2005), who write that a woman, Madalyn Murray O-Hair, "initiated several lawsuits based on First Amendment claims, including legal actions to have the words 'In God we trust' removed from U.S. currency and to prohibit astronauts from praying in space" p. 387.

an overarching conception of democracy if we use, momentarily, the Hebrew word *Ikkur* (root) in place of “overarching conception of democracy.” *Ikkur* is defined by a medieval Jewish philosopher, Rabbi Joseph Albo, as “a term applied to a thing upon which the existence and duration of another thing depends and without which it cannot endure, as the root is a thing upon which the endurance of the tree depends, without which the tree cannot exist or endure”<sup>7</sup> Rabbi Albo provides the following example of *ikkur*, as it pertains to religion. According to Rabbi Albo, religion means a divine law and is dependent on the existence of God. If there is no God, there is no divine law. Similarly, the overarching conception of democracy is the *ikkur* (root) upon which the idea of democracy depends. If a political state claims to be a democracy and passes a law or statute that contradicts the overarching conception of democracy — the *ikkur* (root) of democracy — that state is no longer democratic. Without an overarching conception of democracy we do not know what substantive rights a democratic state seeks to preserve; nor do we know what the state intends to accomplish. This fact was noted by a political theorist, who wrote: “Theories of substantive democracy have often been effectively empty because they do not specify the rights that democracy should maintain... Difficulties in specifying substantive rights lead some theorists to conclude that substantive democracy inevitably lacks operational meaning.”<sup>8</sup> Our goal now is to determine what the overarching conception of democracy is.

In his book *Democracy and its Critics*, Robert A. Dahl, one of the world’s leading democratic theorists, attempts to define the overarching conception of democracy. For him, it is the preservation of intrinsic equality. Dahl argues that democracy is superior to all other political systems, including the system of guardianship, because it

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<sup>7</sup> Albo 1946, pp. 55-56.

<sup>8</sup> Zucker 2001, p. 278.

alone preserves intrinsic equality.<sup>9</sup> What does intrinsic equality mean and how does one preserve it? Dahl defines intrinsic equality in the following manner: “To begin with, the principle implies that during a process of collective decision making, the interests of every person who is subject to the decision must (within the limits of feasibility) be accurately interpreted and made known. Obviously without this step, the interest of each ‘subject’ could not be considered, much less be given equal consideration.”<sup>10</sup> Dahl also notes that “Democracy ensures general freedom.”<sup>11</sup> This means that the preservation of intrinsic equality can only come about through the preservation, to the greatest extent possible, of political autonomy.

Why does Dahl choose only the preservation of intrinsic equality as his overarching conception of democracy? If I understand Dahl correctly, there are three reasons for his choice. First, Dahl believes there are no substantive rights that one can use to justify any political system, because it is impossible to prove conclusively the existence of substantive rights. His outlook stems from the fact that there is no universal agreement on the nature of any substantive right. Consider the following passage that Dahl writes as a critique of the system of guardianship: “We also saw that a satisfactory defense of such a claim would require an answer to one of the most difficult and contentious intellectual problems of our times: whether moral judgments can be intellectually justified, and if so, how?”<sup>12</sup> Second, the moral reason provided by Dahl for why democracy is superior to any other political system rests on “The Presumption of Personal Autonomy.” Dahl writes: “In the absence of a compelling showing to the contrary everyone should be assumed to be the best judge of his or her own

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<sup>9</sup> Dahl (1981) wrote: “When the idea of democracy is actively adopted by a people, it tends to produce the best state taken all around” p. 84. Best, according to Dahl, means the preservation of intrinsic equality (read on).

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., pp. 86-87.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 89.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 101.

interests.”<sup>13</sup> Therefore, everyone should be treated by the political system as intrinsically equal. The Presumption of Personal Autonomy stems from Dahl’s belief that there are no substantive rights. Since there are no substantive rights, no individual can determine what is best for his friend; he can only determine what is best for him. To the reader, Dahl must appear inconsistent. He rejects the concept of substantive rights, making it impossible to justify a political system based on such a concept; however, he himself justifies democracy by claiming that it preserves political autonomy. Isn’t the preservation of political autonomy a substantive right? Dahl escapes this dilemma in the following manner, and his explanation is the third reason why he chooses the preservation of intrinsic equality as his overarching conception of democracy. For Dahl, personal autonomy is not a substantive right, per se; rather it is a rule of prudence. Dahl’s view is expressed in the following passage: “the Presumption of Personal Autonomy could be best described as a rule of prudence...Because a prudential rule is a mix of moral and empirical judgments it displays the inherent messiness of a contingent statement that is not derived rigorously from axioms or empirical laws. Instead a prudential rule draws upon a flawed and imprecise understanding of human experiences. It displays all the imperfections of contingency. It admits of exceptions.”<sup>14</sup> <sup>15</sup> We will discuss and critique Dahl’s theory later in this paper. Let us first finish discussing his overarching conception of democracy.

Based on Dahl’s theory, the maintenance of intrinsic equality translates into the safeguarding of personal autonomy. The result is the following equation: the perpetuation of personal autonomy in a political society equals political equality. In order to ensure the preservation

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<sup>13</sup> Dahl, p. 100.

<sup>14</sup> Dahl, p. 101.

<sup>15</sup> Dahl also wrote “Fortunaely, however, the justification for democracy does not depend, in my view, on a specific answer to the intractable epistemological question about the nature of moral judgements.” (Dahl, p. 101).

of political equality, Dahl sets up eight constitutional guarantees. They are: “(1) freedom to form and join organizations; (2) freedom of expression; (3) the right to vote; (4) eligibility for public office; (5) the right of political leaders to compete for support and votes; (6) alternative sources of information; (7) free and fair elections; and (8) institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference.”<sup>16</sup>

Dahl is aware that no state can fully preserve the personal autonomy of all its citizens.<sup>17</sup> Therefore, according to Dahl there are no real democracies; instead there are polyarchies. Nevertheless, I will continue to use the word “democracy” for sake of clarity.

The practical implication of Dahl’s theory is the following: a democratic state can impose a specific religion on its citizens and still be considered a democracy. This is only true, however, if the political equality of all individuals is maintained. Though religious influence on government policy is democratic, Dahl does not consider religious influence in the public sphere, in any shape or form, to be a common good. Therefore, it logically follows that religious influence in the public sphere is not the ideal. Dahl’s view of what constitutes a public good proves the validity of this assertion.

Dahl writes: “You’re prescribing the common good as the goal toward which citizens should aspire in public affairs.”<sup>18</sup> Therefore, the public good must be something that is feasible to attain; otherwise it is unrealistic.<sup>19</sup> Dahl presents an adequate critique of those who maintain that the public good must be something that is beneficial for the entire populace. He argues that such a notion of the public good is impractical, because it necessitates a society where the good of an individual does not conflict with the good of his friend.

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<sup>16</sup> Stepan 2001, p. 216.

<sup>17</sup> Dahl, p. 84.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 282.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 284.



Dahl asserts that such a “conception of the common good is irrelevant to most political systems that have ever existed.”<sup>20 21</sup>

Before we determine the common good, “the goal which citizens should aspire in public affairs”, we must, according to Dahl, answer three questions: 1) “*whose* good ought to be taken into account?” 2) “*how* can the common good best be determined in collective decisions?” 3) “*what* is the substantive content of the common good?”<sup>22</sup>

Let us first state Dahl’s answer to the third question, because it enables us to understand the reasoning behind his answers to the other two questions. Recall that Dahl believes there are no substantive rights that we can use to justify a political system; we can only justify democracy, because it preserves the procedural right of political equality. Dahl follows the same methodology in defining the public good. He identifies the public good as something that furthers the political equality of the populace.<sup>23</sup> This answers the third question: “*what* is the substantive content of the common good” — quite nicely. The substantive content of the common good is the preservation of the procedural right of political equality. This outlook is applied to his first two questions.

Dahl answers his first question, “*whose* good ought to be taken into account?” by stating “that in a collective

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 284.

<sup>21</sup> Dahl (1981) writes: “If the notion of citizen virtue and the common good are to be relevant to the modern world, we have to situate them in the context of very large scale democratic systems, that is, in the context of polyarchy and the pluralism that accompanies it” p. 298.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 298.

<sup>23</sup> Dahl (Ibid) writes: “Following this line of thought, I now propose that an essential element in the meaning of the common good among the members of a group is what the members would choose if they possessed the fullest attainable understanding of the experience that would result from their choice and its most relevant alternatives. Because enlightened understanding is required, I would propose to incorporate opportunities to acquire enlightened understanding as essential also to the meaning of the common good. Still further, the rights and opportunities of the democratic process are elements of the common good” p. 308.

decision the good of all persons significantly affected by the decision should be taken into account.”<sup>24</sup> As we said above, Dahl’s concept of the public good is the preservation of political equality; therefore the public good is beneficial for the entire populace. Though Dahl critiqued those who believe the common good is beneficial for the entire populace, his critique was aimed at those who used substantive rights to define the public good. To base the common good on substantive rights is impractical, according to Dahl, because there are situations where a specific substantive right comes into conflict with another substantive right. Dahl, however, does not have this difficulty because he does not believe in substantive democracy; he believes in procedural democracy, and he accepts only one procedural right — political equality. The preservation of political equality is something that is beneficial for the entire populace, because it preserves personal autonomy. The preservation of personal autonomy enables everybody to pursue his own goals as long as the goals do not violate the personal autonomy of another individual. Therefore, Dahl does not have to deal with a conflict of substantive rights, because substantive rights are irrelevant as far as the political system is concerned. Nor does he have to deal with a conflict of procedural rights, because Dahl believes there is only one procedural right.

Dahl answers the second question, “*how* can the common good best be determined in collective decisions,” by stating that the democratic process, shaped by the procedural right of political equality, ought to determine how best to preserve the political equality of each individual. This too fits into his overall philosophy. If the only common good is political equality, the only way to preserve it is through the political process.<sup>25</sup> This answer is not justified on

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 306.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

philosophical grounds. It is a practical solution.<sup>26</sup> This also fits into Dahl's overall philosophy, because his conception of democracy is based on practical consideration and not philosophical justifications.

Dahl's conception of the public good, does not allow for religious influence in governmental policy. Dahl would not consider aid for religious education to be a public good for the following reasons: 1) religious education does not meet Dahl's definition of the substantive content of the public good, because it does not enhance political equality; 2) it is not a public good, because it does not benefit the entire populace.

I do not like Dahl's overall conception of democracy for several reasons. First, I am not convinced that there are no substantive rights. Second, I do not see a logical difference between the one procedural right accepted by Dahl and the substantive rights rejected by Dahl. Third, Dahl is inconsistent in applying his criteria of universal acceptance in determining the components of the overall conception of democracy.

Dahl feels that one cannot use substantive rights to justify a political system, because substantive rights can never be justified. He reasons that anything lacking conclusive logical demonstrations remains unproven or unjustified. Dahl is not the only one to adopt this view. Many legal theorists use this line of reasoning to reject the concept of universal morality.<sup>27</sup> These theorists base the legal system upon rules

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<sup>26</sup> See Dahl (Ibid. p. 306), where he writes the following: "The unit ought to govern itself by the democratic process. The unit ought also to be justifiable as a relatively autonomous democratic unit, in the sense that it satisfies the criteria for a democratic unit set out in chapter 14. Finally, it ought to include all adult persons whose interests are significantly affected, or if that is not feasible, the maximum number who can feasibly be included. The last clause generates new question, of course, but strictly theoretical answer to these are impossible. What they require instead are practical judgments sensitive to the particularities of time and place."

<sup>27</sup> The problem with the notion of universal morality is the following: it is of metaphysical origin whose existence is subject to debate. Many thinkers are bothered by the idea that there are concepts they cannot fully comprehend. They do not want to build a political system or system of punishment on abstract rules of justice and morality.

or regulations that are completely empirical, i.e. predictable and rationally explainable, to escape the philosophical dilemma of justifying substantive rights.<sup>28</sup> Because something cannot be intellectually proven, however, it does not mean that it does not exist.<sup>29</sup> Dahl, to be fair, never claims there are no substantive rights; rather, since they cannot be intellectually proven, he feels they serve no purpose in

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<sup>28</sup>This phenomenon is noted by Hart. He writes: “Some theorists, Austin among them, seeing perhaps the general irrelevance of the person’s beliefs, fears, and motives to the question whether he had an obligation to do something, have defined this notion not in terms of these subjective facts, but in terms of the *chance* or *likelihood* that the person having the obligation will suffer a punishment or ‘evil’ at the hands of others in the event of disobedience. This, in effect, treats statements of obligation not as psychological statements but as predictions or assessments of chances of incurring punishment or ‘evil’. To many later theorists this has appeared as a revelation, bringing down to earth an elusive notion and restating it in the same clear, hard, empirical terms as are used in science. It has, indeed, been accepted sometimes as the only alternative to metaphysical conceptions of obligation or duty as invisible objects mysteriously existing ‘above’ or ‘behind’ the world of ordinary, observable facts” (p. 81).

<sup>29</sup> This argument was stated in a classroom discussion by Professor Ross Zucker.

<sup>30</sup>See [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euclid%27s\\_Elements](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euclid%27s_Elements): Euclid’s *Elements* (Greek: Στοιχεῖα) is a mathematical and geometric treatise consisting of 13 books written by the Greek mathematician Euclid in Alexandria circa 300 BC. It comprises a collection of definitions, postulates (axioms), propositions (theorems and constructions), and mathematical proofs of the propositions. The thirteen books cover Euclidean geometry and the ancient Greek version of elementary number theory. With the exception of Autolycus’ *On the Moving Sphere*, the *Elements* is one of the oldest extant Greek mathematical treatises<sup>[1]</sup> and it is the oldest extant axiomatic deductive treatment of mathematics.<sup>[2]</sup> It has proven instrumental in the development of logic and modern science.” Also see [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parallel\\_postulate](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parallel_postulate): “For two thousand years, many attempts were made to prove the parallel postulate using Euclid’s first four postulates. The main reason that such a proof was so highly sought after was that the fifth postulate isn’t self-evident unlike the other postulates. If the order the postulates were listed in the *Elements* is significant, it indicates that Euclid included this postulate only when he realized he could not prove it or proceed without it.

shaping a legal system. I, on the other hand, do not see the need to fully justify specific substantive rights, such as the evil of murder; to me they are axiomatic. Many argue we cannot establish a legal or political system on unproven axioms. I do not consider this to be a compelling argument. All sciences are based on certain axioms or postulates, e.g. the field of geometry is founded on Euclid's elements.<sup>30 31</sup> I do not see why the same cannot be true for morality. I recognize that others deny the axioms that I accept. Nevertheless, I still believe this attitude is correct; otherwise, one can justify an evil act by demanding proof of the substantive right that forbids this act. This is especially true if the act we consider to be evil is committed in a country where it is legal. Example: the extermination of the Jews in Nazi Germany.

The second objection I have to Dahl's overall conception of democracy is that I do not see a logical difference between the substantive rights he rejects and the one procedural right he accepts.

There is a practical and theoretical difference between procedural and substantive democracy. Zucker succinctly differentiates between the two: "When the majority, through the democratic process, commits a systematic injustice, is it being undemocratic or simply unjust? If it is undemocratic for a political system to be unjust, then a democracy must be

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<sup>31</sup>This argument is taken from Rabbi Joseph Albo who wrote the following: "Every Science makes use of principles and postulates which are not self-evident, but are assumed as true and borrowed from another science in which they are proved. Upon these principles are built all the proofs of the science in question. Thus the geometrician borrows the conception of line and point from the physicist. The arithmetician borrows the conception of substance and accident from the first philosophy. The first philosophy in turn borrows from the physicist the conception of the first mover. So every theoretical science necessarily assumes at the beginning certain principles and postulates which are proved in another science, as is explained in the Posterior Analytics. Upon these principles or upon the first principles (axioms) are built all the proofs occurring in that science" (1946, pp. 145-146).

morally committed to substantive justice, as part of what it means to be a democracy. But if it is not undemocratic to violate substantive rights, then a country need be committed only to preserving the electoral procedure in order to be a democracy. Thus, the nature of democracy's relation to justice underlies the central distinction between substantive and procedural democracy."<sup>32</sup> This distinction is true as far as Dahl is concerned; procedural rights, however, can also be based upon substantive rights. Recall that Dahl's overarching conception of democracy is the preservation of each individual's intrinsic equality. If we say that the preservation of intrinsic equality has inherent worth it is, in reality, a substantive right. With such an outlook, the difference in procedural and substantive democracy is not an issue of whether one accepts or denies substantive rights; rather, it is an issue of whether one accepts that there are substantive rights that exist outside the political system, which the political system is obligated to preserve through constitutional guarantees.

Dahl clearly believes that intrinsic equality is a procedural right — not based on any notion of justice — and not a substantive one. My problem with Dahl is that his logic is flawed. He justifies democracy by showing how it preserves intrinsic equality. By doing so, Dahl has turned the procedural right of intrinsic equality into a substantive right. Who has conclusively proven that all people are intrinsically equal? Dahl would likely respond he does not need to prove all people are intrinsically equal, because this concept is part of our cultural heritage. Consider the following passage: "The persistence and generality of the assumption of intrinsic equality in systematic moral reasoning could be attributed to the existence of a norm so deeply entrenched in all Western cultures that we cannot reject it without denying our cultural heritage and thereby denying who we are."<sup>33</sup> Is this not the same thing as saying that the truth of intrinsic equality is self-

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<sup>32</sup> Zucker 2001, p. 269.

<sup>33</sup> Dahl 1981, p. 86.

evident or axiomatic? Yet, Dahl denies the existence of substantive rights and claims that his procedural right of political equality is a practical solution for ensuring that the intrinsic equality of all individuals is preserved. Why does he not accept the existence of other rights whose truths are part of our cultural heritage and are worth preserving?

The criterion of cultural heritage can be applied to many substantive rights not acknowledged by Dahl, such as the evil of wanton murder and the obligations towards the wellbeing of our fellow human beings. Bolstering his argument that democracy is superior to all other political systems, Dahl, in his book, *On Democracy*, lists the benefits of a democracy: “avoidance of tyranny; essential rights; general freedom; self determination; moral autonomy; human development; protecting essential personal interests; political equality; and benefits that modern democracies produce such as peace-seeking and prosperity.” Why should we consider these to be benefits if we do not accept substantive rights? Who has proven without a shadow of a doubt that preservation of moral autonomy, human development and political equality is a good thing?

If Dahl, in justifying the superiority of democracy, is willing to acknowledge benefits that have intrinsic value, he should be willing to accept these benefits as individual substantive rights. Dahl operates on two distinct abstract planes. When it is useful for him to acknowledge inherent value, he does so, but faced with philosophical dilemmas of how to justify substantive rights and conflicting substantive rights, he says that there are no substantive rights. Dahl cannot have it both ways; he cannot justify democracy because it preserves intrinsic equality and provides other benefits without acknowledging that all these things are inherently worthwhile. Dahl is inconsistent in how he applies his criteria. He uses cultural heritage to adopt the procedural right of intrinsic equality, but refuses to acknowledge the substantive rights that exist outside the political system even though some of them are also part of our cultural heritage. His inconsistency causes him to draw an invisible line between procedural rights and substantive rights.

Dahl is also inconsistent regarding his criteria of public consensus. This fact is noted by Zucker: “The worldwide increase in the number of polyarchal democracies in recent years, from twenty-nine in 1969 to ninety in 1990, seemingly confirms that there is an emerging consensus on primary political rights. However, when polyarchies were in the minority and their rights were more debatable globally, American political scientists nevertheless included these rights in the definition of democracy. Now that economic rights are relatively more controversial than political rights, these scholars exclude economic rights as more debatable. There is an apparent inconsistency in their treatment of the implications of the controversiality of different categories of rights. If political rights could be included in 1969, when they were more controversial than at present, then economic rights should be includable despite their being more controversial than political rights. Although primary political rights may now be relatively less controversial than economic rights, they are still highly controversial.”<sup>34</sup>

What have we accomplished with our critique of Dahl’s overarching conception of democracy? If our critique of Dahl’s overarching conception of democracy is correct, the true overarching conception of democracy must include substantive rights. I believe that Stepan acknowledges the existence of substantive rights, and he defines democracy with those rights in mind. Our critique of Dahl confirms that Stepan’s overarching conception of Democracy is superior to Dahl’s.

How does Stepan’s overarching conception of democracy differ from Dahl’s? Stepan writes: “My colleague Juan J. Linz and I accept the eight Dahlian institutional guarantees as a necessary, but not as a sufficient condition of democracy. Not sufficient, because no matter how free and fair the elections, and no matter how large the majority of the government, the political society produced by such an election must write a constitution that itself is democratic in that it

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<sup>34</sup> Zucker 2001, pp. 287-288.



respects fundamental liberties which include, among other things, considerable protections for minority rights. Furthermore, the democratically elected government must rule within the boundaries of the constitution and be bound by the law and a complex set of vertical and horizontal institutions which help to ensure accountability<sup>35</sup>

We see from Stepan's definition of democracy that the fundamental liberties of minorities must be preserved for any system of government to be considered a democracy. These fundamental liberties consist not just of political equality, but of other rights, such as freedom of religion.<sup>36</sup> This means that Stepan is an adherent of substantive democracy, not procedural democracy.

Stepan's acceptance of substantive rights affects his conception of the public good. Contrary to Dahl, Stepan actually believes the common good can have substantive content. Therefore, the common good that is taken into account, is not necessarily beneficial for the entire populace — unlike Dahl who believes the common good must be beneficial for the entire populace. The reason Stepan does not require the public good to be beneficial for the entire populace is because he acknowledges the existence of various substantive rights. Once you acknowledge the existence of substantive rights you encounter scenarios where substantive rights conflict with each other, because of inherent contradictions between various substantive goods.<sup>37</sup> It is also possible for a common good that is based on substantive rights

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<sup>35</sup> Stepan 2001, p. 216.

<sup>36</sup> Stepan writes: "The key area of autonomy—from the government or even from other religions—that must be established for religious freedom is that individuals and religious communities, consistent with our core institutional definition of democracy, must have complete freedom to worship privately. More: as individuals and groups, they should also be able to publicly advance their values in civil society, and to sponsor organizations and movements in political society, as long as their public advancement of these beliefs does not impinge negatively on the liberties of other citizens, or violate democracy and the law, by violence" (Ibid, p. 217).

to be relevant only to a small segment of the populace. For example, distributive justice is only beneficial for the people receiving the money, and not the people losing the money. Even Dahl's conception of the public good, furthering the political equality of the populace, comes into conflict with Stepan's fundamental liberties. The constitutional provisions that preserve fundamental liberties infringe on the political power of the majority.

Given Stepan's conception of the public good, how would he answer Dahl's three questions regarding the public good? Stepan might well answer the third question — *what* is the substantive content of the public good? — by asserting the substantive content of the public good is the fundamental liberties the state must preserve in addition to ensuring that each political entity has the political ability to promote its personal interests. He would answer the second question — *how* can the common good best be determined in collective decisions? — by maintaining that, excluding the fundamental liberties, every political entity — even if it is a minority group — has the right to promote what they consider to be the common good. His answer to the first question — *whose* good ought to be taken into account? — would be: the advancement of any group's interests is considered a public good as long as they do not violate the rights of other citizens.<sup>38</sup>

Stepan accepts the substantive content of the public good. He also asserts that any political group can attempt to promote what they consider to be the public good as long they do not violate another person's fundamental liberties. Governmental funding for religious education, according to this logic, could be considered a public good. It appears that Stepan would agree with this conclusion as the following passage shows: "Democracy is a system of conflict regulation that allows open competition over values and goals that

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<sup>37</sup> This was pointed out by Dahl.

<sup>38</sup> Stepan 2001, p. 216.

citizens want to advance. In the strict democratic sense this means that as long as groups do not use violence, do not violate the rights of other citizens, and advance their interests within the rules of the democratic game, *all* groups are granted the right to advance their interests, both in civil society, and in political society. This is the minimal institutional statement of what democratic politics entails and does not entail. No more, no less."<sup>39</sup>

If we assume a government should assist its citizens in achieving the ideal of the public good, and if we can identify the practice of one's religion as a public good, then following political theory, we can reasonably conclude the government should assist its constituents in achieving the desired religious experience. This assistance can come in the form of religious symbols in the public sphere, or by providing monetary assistance to parents who wish to give their children a religious education, or by other means deemed feasible and appropriate.

Some people argue against government monetary or political support for a specific religion, because such actions give a state a religious identity, and this conflicts with democratic theory which instructs that there be a separation of church and state. They also argue for the adoption of a process of secularism, seeing it as a fair compromise for religious and non-religious parties. This argument is not valid, because secularism is not a fair compromise. First, secularism is in itself a religion or a philosophy. Second, secularism creates an atmosphere that is antithetical to religion.

I quote from two scholarly works whose research demonstrates the establishment of secularism as a religion and the creation of an atmosphere hostile to religion. The first work is *Defending Identity* by Natan Sharansky. In this book, Sharansky discusses whether religious identity is compatible with democratic theory.<sup>40</sup> His discussion centers on the state

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

of Israel, but his observations are relevant to our discussion.<sup>41</sup> The second work is *God on the Quad* written by Naomi Schaefer Riley, who discusses some of the prominent religious colleges in the United States and the effect they are having on the national character.<sup>42</sup>

One needs to look no further than Europe for examples of secularism turned into religion. Sharansky writes: “In Germany four states have banned teachers from wearing headscarves. Various towns in Belgium have banned the *niqab*. The Dutch government has imposed a total ban on the wearing of *burqas* and other Muslim face veils in public ‘in view of public order (and) the security and protection of fellow citizens.’ This is the first European countrywide ban on Islamic face coverings.”<sup>43</sup> Riley, in the introduction to her book, discusses the negative affect that secular attitudes have on religious students. She writes “Students who do arrive on campus their freshmen year with some traditional identity quickly find themselves a beleaguered minority both in the classroom where their beliefs are derided as contrary to the principles of tolerance and ‘diversity’... and in their extracurricular lives, where their sensibilities are constantly offended by what they regard as the amoral behavior of their peers and its tacit approval by college officials.”

These passages from Riley’s book are revealing; they

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<sup>40</sup> “I wrote this book to make the case for identity, I wrote it to explain why far from being the hostile enemy of democracy, identity is in fact necessary to sustain it, I wrote it to explain why maintaining healthy societies and securing a peaceful world necessitates that identity be framed by democracy and that democracy be anchored by identity” (Sharansky 2008, pp. 15-16).

<sup>41</sup> See Sharansky (2008, p. 144) where he writes: “Israel is a country founded on identity. It is also a country whose birth and survival were made possible through democracy.”

<sup>42</sup> The author’s goal, to be more exact, is to answer the following four questions: 1) “why have students chosen these schools?”, 2) “How is the curriculum different from that of secular schools?”, 3) “What is life outside the classroom like?” and 4) “How will these colleges affect students’ post graduation choices?”

<sup>43</sup> Sharansky 2008, pp. 112-113

show that secularism can be as oppressive as a tyrannical religion. Riley also writes that first, and most importantly, religious college students *want* to be in a religious environment. "Only a small minority of the students I spoke with claimed their parents told them to they have to attend a religious college."<sup>44</sup>

So far, we can make the following conclusions. 1) The right to receive religious training is a fundamental liberty. 2) The state should provide assistance for its citizens to enable them to enjoy their fundamental liberties, as long as they do not encroach upon the fundamental liberties of others. 3) Secularism is, to some extent, a religion in itself; to argue for a purely secularist state is, in some form, the same thing as arguing for a religious state. 4) Many people prefer to be educated in a religious school instead of a purely secular one; they are often happier in a religious environment of their choice. Therefore, the state should provide monetary assistance to those who want to attend a religious school, just as they provide monetary assistance to those who attend public schools.

A similar rationale can be used to argue for the display of religious symbols in the public sphere. The absence of religious symbols conveys one message, while the presence of religious symbols conveys another. It should be up to majority to decide whether religious symbols should be displayed, or not.

Finally, even if one does not consider religious training to be a fundamental liberty, one can argue the practical benefits of having the state provide assistance to parents who want to send their children to a religious school. Riley relates that "Religious college students generally seem to avoid the kind of trouble that puts secular campuses in the headlines. There are certain exceptions, of course, but on the whole, religious campuses are devoid of the alcohol, drugs, sexual activity, and violence that plague many secular universities."<sup>45</sup> The atmosphere in a religious institution is

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<sup>44</sup> Riley 2007, p. 70.

often better for those pursuing an education, from elementary school through higher education. It is practical for the state to assist students in attending a school that provides a better atmosphere for learning. I recognize that Riley's data is primarily culled from college campuses, and government usually funds public elementary and high schools. As Riley's book demonstrates, however, lower education is touched by the same problems seen on college campuses. "Many of these students have been in a high school where they are the only one who is a member of the Church of Jesus Christ, and they are tired of having to constantly defend who they are. They want to have fun without getting drunk. This is freedom for them. They come here and they can be who they want to be. They can live their principles."<sup>46</sup>

In this essay we attempted to show that the public good has a substantive content other than the preservation of political equality. We also used Stepan to argue that religious influence in the public sphere can be considered a public good. I then brought empirical data gathered by Riley and Sharansky to demonstrate the positive aspects of a religious identity. I also used their data to show that secularism can become a religion in itself, and a complete separation of church and state is, therefore, not really a fair compromise. Though I dealt primarily with the question of whether the government should provide funding for religious education, one can apply the same point of view to other issues regarding the separation of church and state. We are, however, left with the question of whether religious influence on governmental policy is the ideal state. It depends on how you define ideal. If the ideal is dependent on what makes people happy then whatever the majority decides is the ideal. If the ideal depends upon what's true, then religious influence in the public policy is only the ideal if the influencing religion is true. In a democratic society, the majority rules. Therefore,

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<sup>45</sup> Riley 2007, p. 170.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

whatever the majority decides should be the ideal as long as the fundamental liberties of the individual are not violated. This might not be an ideal in a philosophical sense, but it is clear it is the ideal for the present day democratic society.

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## Measuring Religious Observance Among Orthodox Jews

Yosef Sokol

### ABSTRACT

*Ritual observance is a major component of Judaism. Therefore, a scale designed to measure religious observance among Jews would be of potential value to the scientific study of religion in general and of Judaism in particular. Surprisingly, despite the recent increase in the number of psychological and sociological studies of religious Jews, there is currently no validated scale with which to measure Jewish religious observance. In this study we created and validated the Jewish Observance Scale (JOS). To validate the JOS and to provide examples of its usefulness, this study examines how the JOS varies among different Orthodox Jewish affiliations. Additionally, we explore how religious observance among Orthodox Jews correlates with the Religious Orientation Scale (ROS) (Allport and Ross, 1967) and other well-known measures of religiosity. The results show that the JOS has high construct validity. Specifically, members of the highly traditional affiliations score higher on the JOS than members of the more modern affiliations. The results also show that the JOS is a highly reliable scale with Cronbach Alpha levels of 9.1 and 9.3 for each of its two factors. In addition, the two JOS factors vary in an intriguing fashion when comparing their interaction with different affiliations. We suggest that the first factor is indicative of general orthodoxy while the second factor is more sensitive to the specific ways in which members of various affiliations within Orthodox Judaism adhere to daily religious requirements. We also show that observance was highly correlated with Intrinsic motivation from the ROS ( $r = .7$ ) and negatively correlated with Extrinsic orientation ( $r = -.4$ ). These results argue against the prevalent theory (Cohen, 2010) that religious Jews are more focused on social and ritual factors than other aspects of religion such as spirituality and connection to God.*

For well over a century, a great deal of research has been conducted on the subject of religion (James, Starbuck). To delve into this topic using the empirical method researchers have developed many scales attempting to

quantify specific areas of religiosity. Over time, a large array of validated and well constructed scales have been made available. However, since most researchers in this field have been either Christian or citizens in a country where the dominant religion was Christianity, most of the scales have been aimed at the Christian religion and have been validated on Christian subjects. A researcher looking for scales specifically designed for other religions such as Judaism may be surprised to find that there is a remarkable dearth of available, validated scales to measure even the most rudimentary aspects of religious thought and behavior.

Recently, there has been an attempt to focus on Judaism as a separate religion with its own psychological profile (Cohen & Hill, 2007; Cohen. et al, 2003;) including studies examining mental health in the Jewish community (Rosamarin et al, 2010). There is therefore a growing need in the research community to develop scales designed specifically for Jewish religious individuals.

One basic area where there is a need for scales is Jewish religious observance. Unlike Christianity, where belief is generally considered more important than observance (Cohen, 2010), observance of rituals is a very strong component in the makeup of the religious character of Judaism (Cohen, et al, 2003). Thus, the lack of a scale to measure the level of Jewish religious observance in a reliable fashion is surprising.

Currently, the only existing scale published and designed to measure Jewish observance is the “Student Religiosity Questionnaire”, developed in Israel (Katz, & Schmida, 1992). However there are a number of issues with this scale that make it unusable outside of Israel. For example, the scale includes items that are not relevant to non-Israeli Jews such as tithing (a Biblically proscribed practice that is only relevant to those who live in the biblical land of Israel).

The observance scale introduced in this study (from this point on referred to as the Jewish Observance Scale or JOS) was developed to create a reliable alternative to previous

scales made for the Jewish population. To validate the JOS, and to demonstrate some of its possible uses, this study explores the performance on the JOS of Jews from different Orthodox affiliations. A valid measure of Jewish observance should be able to differentiate between Jews of various religious backgrounds such as modern Orthodox and ultra Orthodox.

We additionally examined the relationship between Jewish observance, as measured by the JOS, and the well known Religious Orientation Scale (ROS) (Allport and Ross, 1967). The ROS measures underlying motivations for an individual's religiosity. An Intrinsically motivated person "lives his religion" (Allport and Ross, 1967) while an Extrinsically motivated person "uses religion for their own ends" (Allport and Ross, 1967). We hypothesized that a valid scale of Jewish observance would strongly correspond with intrinsic religious orientation, as measured by the ROS.

## **Method**

### **Population**

Psychology students from the Lander College Experimental Psychology class handed out surveys to their Jewish friends and/or relatives outside Lander College. One hundred and thirty nine surveys were completed by men and women from various Jewish affiliations and denominations.

### **Materials**

The JOS consists of 10 following questions:

- 1 - I follow the religious requirement for prayer.
- 2 - I say blessings before and after eating.
- 3 - I try to keep all the Fast days when I am obligated.
- 4 - I follow the laws of the Sabbath to the best of my knowledge.
- 5 - I follow the Kosher laws to the best of my knowledge.
- 6 - I try to learn Torah when I have time.
- 7 - I try to be careful about Sh'ma in its proper time every day.
- 8 - I try to pray with a congregation when I can.

9 - I follow the laws of Yom Kippur to the best of my knowledge

10 - I follow (or would follow when applicable) the laws of family purity to the best of my knowledge.

The questions were Likert scale items with response options ranging from 0 - 6. After completing the JOS the participants went on to fill out the Religious Orientation Scale (Allport and Ross, 1967). We also included a question asking participants how important religion was to them on a scale of zero to nine. This importance of religion question is a single item that has previously been shown to be highly correlated with intrinsic religious orientation. In some studies, the correlation between the importance of religion question, and intrinsic religious orientation has been reported to be above .8 (Gorsuch, & McFarland, 1972; Kirkpatrick 1988; ). We thus used this highly informative item as another way to validate the JOS.

At the end of the survey the participants were requested to choose the affiliation within Judaism with which they most closely identified. The types of religious affiliations were taken in part from JDate (<http://www.jdate.com>), a popular religious Jewish dating site.

The options for choosing an affiliation were: Not religious, Traditional, Chasidish, Yeshivish/Black hat (a highly traditional ultra-orthodox affiliation), Yeshivish/Modern (a somewhat more modern but still traditional orthodox affiliation), Modern Orthodox Machmir (modern orthodox stringent), Modern Orthodox Liberal, Conservadox, Conservative, Reconstructionist, Reform. In this study, we focused on the Orthodox population and we thus reported data from participants who are members of the four Orthodox affiliations.

## Results

SPSS version 17.0 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, USA) was used for all statistical analyses.

*Structure of the JOS*

The JOS was factor analyzed to help determine whether all items were part of a single underlying factor or whether the scale was made of distinct subcomponents. The Varimax rotated factor analytic solution revealed a two factor structure, explaining 79.5 of the JOS variance (See Table 1). The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was equal to 0.911. The KMO, created to compare the observed correlation coefficients and the partial correlation coefficients, should be more than .50 to be considered adequate (Kaiser 1974).

**Table 1 Factor Structure of the Jewish Observance Scale (JOS)**

	Factor 1	Factor 2
1 - I follow the religious requirement for prayer.	.443	<b>.779</b>
2 - I say blessings before and after eating.	.524	<b>.667</b>
3 - I try to keep all the Fast days when I am obligated.	<b>.731</b>	.435
4 - I follow the laws of the Sabbath to the best of my knowledge.	<b>.871</b>	.416
5 - I follow the Kosher laws to the best of my knowledge.	<b>.867</b>	.349
6 - I try to learn Torah when I have time.	.317	<b>.801</b>
7 - I try to be careful about Sh'ma in its proper time every day.	.337	<b>.839</b>
8 - I try to pray with a congregation when I can.	.233	<b>.848</b>
'9 - I follow the laws of Yom Kippur to the best of my knowledge.	<b>.840</b>	.194
10 - I follow (or would follow when applicable) the laws of family purity to the best of my knowledge.	<b>.794</b>	.443


Using those items in each factor that were above .65 we found that five items (3,4,5,9,10) made up the first factor and five items (1,2,6,7,8) made up the second factor. When

examined as separate sub-scales the individual Cronbach alphas for the first factor were .934 and for the second factor .917. The high Cronbach alphas of these individual factors should allow them to be used individually as separate sub-scales. These two components will be referred to as JOS 1 and JOS 2.

In the first analysis of the construct validity of the scale, we assessed the relationship between the subject's score on the JOS and their score on the question about personal importance of religion. There was a highly significant correlation between the two variables,  $r(121) = .824$ ,  $p < 0.001$ . There is thus a strong relationship between how important religion is to a person and how observant they are. While this correlation was high for both factors, the relationship between importance of religion and observance was slightly higher for the first factor [ $r(121) = .826$ ,  $p < .001$ ] than for the second factor [ $r(121) = .739$ ,  $p < .001$ ].

Self-identified affiliation is a commonly used measure for religion (Regnerus, 2000; Hadaway et al, 1993). Thus, we explored whether the two factors are tapping into different aspects of observance by examining how different religious affiliations within Orthodox Judaism scored on each factor.

**Figure**



The mean observance level of the Orthodox affiliations on the first factor were 5.96 (SE= .012) for

Yeshivish/Black Hat (YBH), 5.78 (SE= .088) for Yeshivish/Modern (YM), 5.63 (SE= .11) for Modern Orthodox Machmir (MOM), and 4.089 (SE= .74) for Modern Orthodox Liberal (MOL) (*see Figure*). Thus, the mean observance level differed in a predictable manner across affiliations, with the more traditionally Orthodox affiliations being more observant than the Modern Orthodox affiliations. However, other than the most liberal MOL group, the mean differences were quite small. An analysis of variance revealed that there were statistically significant differences between the groups,  $F(3, 127) = 4.5, p < .05$ , and post-hoc tests confirmed that only the Modern Orthodox Liberal group differed significantly from all the others (all  $p$ 's  $< .05$ ). There were no other significant differences between adjacent groups. This result shows that Factor 1 is a measure of general orthodoxy, and does not appear to differentiate between observance levels of most orthodox affiliations, other than the most liberal.

The mean observance levels of the Orthodox affiliations on the second factor were 5.2 (SE= .17) for YBH, 4.8 (SE= .22) for YM, 4.13 (SE= .24) for MOM, and 2.74 (SE= .61) for MOL (*see Figure*). Here, the mean differences between the affiliations appeared more pronounced than for Factor 1. An analysis of variance showed that there were statistically significant differences between the groups,  $F(3, 127) = 5.6, p < .05$ . As on the first factor, the most liberal MOL group differed significantly in observance from all others. (all  $p$ 's  $< .05$ ). Additionally planned comparisons revealed that unlike the first factor, the second factor was able to differentiate between the two middle groups, YM and MOM ( $p < .05$ ). The difference between BHY and YM did not reach significance,  $t(64) = 1.3, p > .05$ .

It appears that the second factor is more sensitive to the differences in observance between the Orthodox affiliations than the first factor. A 2X4 mixed design, ANOVA, with Affiliation as the between-subjects factor and the JOS Factors 1 and 2 as the within-subjects factor confirmed that there was a Factor X Affiliation interaction ( $F[6, 127] = 2.8,$

$p < .05$ ). This interaction shows that the mean differences on the second factor change more drastically across the affiliations relative to the first factor. There is thus greater variability between affiliations on Factor 2 relative to Factor 1.

In addition to the increased variability between populations on the second factor, there is likewise increased variability within affiliations for the second factor. For example, the variance (SE) for Factor 1 for the most Orthodox BHY group is .012. The variance for the same subjects for Factor 2 is .17 - more than a tenfold increase. Thus the observance of Orthodox Jews, other than modern Orthodox Liberal, does not vary greatly for the rituals measured by Factor One. However, there is variability both within and between affiliations in the observance of Orthodox Jews for the rituals measured by Factor 2. This finding makes Factor 2 potentially more useful for future studies interested in exploring the correlates of variability of religious observance among highly traditional Orthodox Jews.

To further assess the construct validity of the JOS we examined its correlation with ROS. The JOS religious observance score was compared to the scores on the Intrinsic and Extrinsic variables developed by Allport and Ross (1967) and the Extrinsic Personal and Extrinsic Social sub-scales developed by later researchers (see Kirkpatrick, 1990; Genia, 1993)

We found a highly a significant correlation between Intrinsic orientation and observance,  $r(139) = .784, p < 0.01$ . This correlation was very similar for Factor 1 ( $r [139] = .745$ ) and Factor 2 ( $r [139] = .726$ ). We found the opposite effect for Extrinsic orientation, where the correlation with observance was negative,  $r(139) = -.373, p < 0.019$  (Factor 1,  $r = -.355$ ; Factor 2,  $r = -.345$ ). Exploring Extrinsic orientation further, we found that there was no significant correlation between the Extrinsic Social subcomponent of Extrinsic orientation, and observance for the JOS as a whole  $r(139) = -.114, p > 0.05$ , or for either factor (all  $p$ 's  $< .05$ ). Additionally there was a small but significant positive correlation between



the Extrinsic Personal subcomponent of the Extrinsic orientation and observance,  $r(139) = .201$ ,  $p < 0.05$  (Factor 1,  $r(139) = .21$ ,  $p < .05$ ; Factor 2,  $r(139) = .17$ ,  $p < .05$ ).

## Discussion

The JOS was designed to be used in determining the level of observance of religious Jews. The purpose of this study was to validate the JOS and to begin its analysis through examining the observance of Orthodox Jewish affiliations. The results of the study appear to demonstrate that the scale is highly reliable and valid.

A factor analysis of the JOS showed that it was composed of two factors. Items 3,4,5,9 and 10 and items 1,2,6,7 and 8 (see Table 1). As before, these two factors will be referred to as JOS 1 and JOS 2. The rituals of JOS 1, listed from highest to lowest factor loadings, are Sabbath, Kosher laws (Jewish dietary laws), Yom Kippur, family purity (laws pertaining to when marital relations are religiously permissible) and general fast days.

The rituals of JOS 2, listed from highest to lowest factor loadings, are prayer with a congregation, daily recital of the Sh'ma in its proper time (a daily requirement to recite the major statement of Jewish faith), daily requirement of studying the Torah as much as possible, daily prayer requirements, blessings whenever eating.

With Cronbach alphas' above .9, each of these factors have enough internal consistency to be used as separate subscales. An examination of the items in these two factors reveals that JOS 1 seems to focus on overarching, basic and general religious requirements that most Orthodox Jews commit to. The JOS 2 seems to focus on daily requirements specific to each day, items that religious individuals often struggle with on a regular basis.

Further research may be needed to determine any deeper significance in the distinctions between the factors. However, one potential way to understand what these separate observance factors indicate is to see the JOS 1 as looking at

an underlying religious commitment and a basic identification with orthodoxy. It may therefore be indicative of a subject's self-identification as a religious observant Orthodox Jew. Fulfilling these religious requirements is part of the definition of being an Orthodox Jew and it is mostly taken for granted that a religious observant person will likely fulfill them stringently.

However, JOS 2 may be seen as tapping into the more nuanced aspects of daily religious observance. These are observance requirements that even people who identify themselves as Orthodox may not follow perfectly every day. Thus factor two, reveals more than just religious identity, it reveals to what degree that identity spills into the daily observance of individuals.

Examining the two factors in relation to different self-identified affiliations was revealing in that it showed a general trend in which more traditional and less modern and liberal affiliations differ in observance. However, the more interesting findings come from a contrast of the factors. JOS 1 does not differentiate well between most orthodox affiliations, and there is little variability on JOS 1 between subjects within the more traditional affiliations. This pattern of results is consistent with Factor 1 being representative of a basic Orthodox identity.

For JOS 2 however there is a more pronounced decline in observance and a larger difference between the means even among the three more traditional affiliations. The more traditional the affiliation the more the individual's life revolves around religion and the more the members of the affiliation are successful in modeling their daily life on religion and religious practices. So, as the affiliations get less traditional the individuals' lives revolve less around religion and their observant identity is expressed less in their lives.

To help understand the JOS construct better we compared it to the ROS, one of the most well known and commonly used religious scales (Alport and Ross, 1967). As was expected, Intrinsic orientation was highly correlated to the JOS. Extrinsic orientation, however, was negatively

correlated with JOS. These results have major theoretical implications for theories attempting to understand the psychology of Jewish religious individuals. Recent papers (Cohen et al, 2005; Cohen & Hill, 2007; Cohen, 2010) argue that Judaism is best characterized as a religion that focuses on social factors, and is much less concerned with spiritual factors or with an individual's relationship with God. The results presented here strongly argue against this view. Ritual observance is positively correlated with intrinsic orientation but is not at all correlated with the extrinsic social orientation. Thus, there does not appear to be any relationship between religious observance and social motivations.

While more research needs to be conducted to fully explore the nature of the positive correlation between observance and intrinsic orientation, we hypothesize that intrinsic orientation is a reflection of more than just ritualized religious practice. Rather, intrinsic orientation is probably a reflection of an underlying spiritual attitude towards one's religion and toward one's relationship with God.

It must be noted however that previous studies have strongly criticized the intrinsic orientation scale for its lack of clarity on what exactly intrinsic orientation measures (Kirkpatrick 1990). The best-known definition for intrinsic orientation is that intrinsic religious individuals care about religion for religion's own sake. However, this definition is circular - what is it exactly that intrinsic individuals care about? One important correlate of intrinsic orientation is the extent to which religion plays a central role in one's life. Indeed, in our study there was a high, positive correlation between religious observance, intrinsic religious orientation and importance of religion. It is thus clear that for highly observant individuals, religion plays a central role in their lives. However what it is specifically, that is centrally important to highly observant, intrinsic Orthodox Jews remains to be elucidated in future studies.

It may be that intrinsic religious individuals care about ritual for ritual's own sake. For these individuals to care about religion for religions own sake, would be to care about ritual

for rituals own sake. Indeed, a previous study (Cohen et al, 2005) found that for religions Jews, intrinsic religious orientation is highly positively correlated with extrinsic religious orientation. This pattern of correlations may be interpreted as meaning that, for Jews, to care about religion means to care about the social components of religion, as opposed to religion's spiritual components.

We think this is highly unlikely, however. To us the most plausible explanation of the above .8 correlation between ritual observance and intrinsic religious orientation is that, unlike suggested in previous studies, ritual observance among religions Jews will be correlated to the extent to which an individual perceives themselves as having a relationship with the divine. Indeed the positive correlation previously reported between intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation was not observed for the participants in our study. It may be that the discrepancy in these correlation patterns reflects differences in the level of religiosity of the participant populations studied in these different experiments. Thus, the specific nature of intrinsic religious orientation, its relationship with religious ritual observance, and the implications of this for our understanding of the psychology of religious Jews remains to be more fully explored in future studies.

One limitation in this study is the range of Jewish affiliations examined. Future studies will need to include other Jewish affiliations such as Conservative, Reform and Hasidim to more fully explore the nature of their religious observance.

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# **A Primer on Induced Pluripotent Stem Cells**

*Isaac Manaster*

## **Introduction**

Induced pluripotent stem cells (iPS cells) represent a major breakthrough in stem cell technology, and have generated major public interest. iPS cells are differentiated somatic cells which were reprogrammed, or induced, to become pluripotent. Once pluripotent, iPS cells have the capacity to turn into any type of cell found in the body.

Many believe that iPS cells, developed in 2006, will have a major impact in the fields of embryonic development, regenerative medicine, and pharmaceuticals. iPS cells are also significant, and have attracted a lot of public interest, because of what they are not. A decade before the development of iPS cells some of the same scientists involved in creating iPS cells developed embryonic stem cell (ES cells). ES cells are also pluripotent, and therefore have similar abilities, and potential benefits, of iPS cells. However, ES cell production requires the destruction of an embryo. Because of this ES cells have been the source of a lot of public controversy. In 2001, President George W. Bush severely limited government funding toward ES cell research. Although President Barak Obama has overturned the Bush era ordinances, iPS cells provide an alternative to a divisive issue which may have had further ramifications toward pluripotent research and medicine. Additionally, iPS cells have advantages over ES cells because they can be generated from any person, allowing for the development of patient specific treatments.

The discovery of iPS cells was inspired by another area of research.<sup>1</sup> In 1996 scientist in Britain led by Dr. Ian Wilmut developed Somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) popularly known as cloning. Like those involved in ES cells, this lab was interested in regenerative medicine, and also

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<sup>1</sup> Yu and Thomson 2010b.

stirred up a lot of publicity and controversy. SCNT involves the removal of the nucleus of an oocyte, followed by the implantation of the nucleus from a cell of a different animal within the same species. This egg is then allowed to gestate inside a surrogate mother. The result of Wilmut's SCNT was the famous Dolly, a sheep that expressed the DNA of an implanted mammary nucleus.

## **How SCNT works**

There are over two hundred types of cells in the body, yet all of them contain a complete copy of the genome. When a cell is differentiated into a particular type it does not use the same parts of the genome which a different type of differentiated cell uses. These two cells do not remove the parts of the genome which they no longer use, rather they control the expression of the different genes in the genome. Those parts of the genome which they use more frequently are made more available, and those parts which are not frequently needed are made less available.

For example, chromosomes are made up of DNA and proteins called histones. The DNA is wrapped around the histones, which are useful for packaging the DNA in a condensed form as well as controlling the expression of certain genes (Fig. 3). If a segment of a certain gene is wrapped around a histone then that gene is not accessible to RNA polymerase. It cannot be transcribed, and the protein it codes for will not be produced. If the cell requires the genes wrapped around the histone it can unwrap the DNA in order to make it available. Another important way in which gene expression is regulated is through methylation. Proteins will add methyl groups on to certain segments of DNA in order to make them more or less likely to be transcribed (Fig. 3). Expression can also be controlled beyond the level of transcription.

In the case of Dolly the sheep, the nucleus which was inserted into the host cell was not from a sheep zygote, but rather was from an adult mammary cell. The inserted DNA should have been hard wired to express the genes associated



with its function as a mammary cell, and it should not have made available the broader range of the genome which is characteristic of a zygote. Yet, upon being inserted into the host oocyte the inserted DNA expressed itself as it would have if it was the DNA of the oocyte. Certain factors within the host oocyte reprogrammed the nucleus.<sup>2</sup> The DNA lost its identity as mammary cell DNA, and took on the mantle of the more expressive, zygote DNA.

## **Applying the idea of SCNT, but not the method**

Stem cell scientists credit the SCNT cloning of Dolly as their inspiration to seek to reprogram cells. Until Dolly it was not known that a mammal cell could be reprogrammed. Stem cell scientists sought to uncover the interactions between the factors inside the cytoplasm that reprogrammed the nucleus. They theorized that the direct reprogramming of an adult cell's DNA into that of an embryo would create a cell akin to an embryo, and a new path toward creating pluripotent stem cells. These scientists already knew that the fusion between a regular somatic cell and a pluripotent stem cell would bring about the reprogramming of the somatic cell into a pluripotent state.<sup>3</sup> In order to develop a mechanism to reprogram cells, researchers began by cataloging the proteins which are extremely common in ES cells, but less common in somatic cells. They theorized that these factors were responsible for enabling the ES cell to maintain its pluripotent state.

## **Discovery of iPS cells**

In 2006 a Japanese lab from the Institute for Frontier Medical Sciences at the University of Kyoto lead by Shinya Yamanaka successfully reprogrammed adult somatic mice cells into pluripotent stem cells. They identified twenty four factors which were involved in maintaining mouse ES cells in their pluripotent state. They inserted different permutations of these factors in a guess and check process in order to

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<sup>2</sup> Yu and Thomson 2010a.

<sup>3</sup> Yu and Thomson 2010b.

identify which of these highly expressed factors were responsible for pluripotency. The lab was able to successfully induce an adult cell into a pluripotent stem cell. They identified the four factors which were required to accomplish this goal: SOX 2, OCT 4, c-MYC, and KLF 4.<sup>4,5</sup> The following year these scientists used these same four factors to induce a human adult cell into a pluripotent stem cells.<sup>6</sup>

That same year, 2007, another lab also successfully induced adult human cells into pluripotent stem cells. The University of Wisconsin-Madison lab headed by James Watson, the very same group who developed ES cells, successfully induced somatic cells into pluripotent stem cells. They also identified four factors which were necessary to do so: SOX 2, OCT 4, NANOG, and LIN 28. The Wisconsin lab achieved somewhat different results than the Kyoto lab because the two groups differed in procedure. Whereas the Kyoto lab first worked with mice, and then applied their results to human cells, the Wisconsin lab worked exclusively with factors that they identified in human ES cells.<sup>7</sup>

It should be noted that both labs required SOX 2 and OCT 4 factors in order to achieve their goal. In fact, it is even possible to make iPS cells using these two factors alone,<sup>8</sup> although efficiency would be sacrificed (Fig. 4). Researchers believe that the OCT 4 factor is important because it is involved in maintaining the cell in its pluripotent form, as well as cell self renewal.<sup>9</sup> SOX 2 is also involved in these two functions as well as regulating OCT 4. SOX 2 and OCT 4 can interact to form a dimer. These two factors play a big role in pluripotency. Scientists believe that they interact with over a hundred different genes.<sup>10,11</sup> Importantly OCT 4 and SOX 2 should not be over or under expressed as this will cause the cells to differentiate.<sup>12</sup>

While SOX 2 and OCT 4 seem to be required to induce pluripotency, the other factors used, c-MYC and KLF

<sup>4</sup> Cox and Rizzino 2010.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Takahashi and Yamanka 2010.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Lensch 2010.

<sup>9</sup> Wikipedia.com 2010.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Yu and Thomson 2010a.

4 by the Japanese group, and NANOG and LIN 28 by the American group, are less important factors. First, they can clearly be replaced by each other, and second, as mentioned before, pluripotency can be induced using exclusively OCT 4 and SOX 2. Due to their non-essential nature, scientists suspect that there may be other factors which can replace the function of these less important factors.<sup>13</sup> The role of NANOG and KLF 4 is to promote efficiency. C-MYC is important for promoting replication. LIN 28 interferes with the micro-RNA, LET 7. Micro-RNA is a small nucleotide which serves to interfere with mRNA. LET 7 down regulates the mRNA of growth promoting genes. When LIN 28 interferes with LET 7 it allows these genes to successfully promote growth.<sup>14</sup>

## Impact

The news of induced pluripotent stem cells created waves throughout the scientific and non-scientific communities. It introduced a reasonable alternative to embryonic stem cells, helping to diffuse the ES cell controversy. James Thomson, the researcher behind both ES and iPS cells was particularly relieved by the beginning of the end of the controversy. He was quoted as saying “Isn’t it great to start a field and then to end it.”<sup>15</sup> Ian Wilmut, whose NSCT research appears to have the potential to accomplish many of the regenerative and research goals of iPS cells, recognized the significance of this competing field, remarking “I have no doubt that in the long term, direct reprogramming will be more productive (than cloning)”<sup>16</sup> Many believe that talented researchers avoid stem cells because of the ES cell controversy, and that these scientists have become more involved in iPS cell research.

In addition to providing an alternative, controversy free path to pluripotency iPS cells also project potential benefits which ES cells do not. iPS cells have the capacity to

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<sup>13</sup> Lensch 2010.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> [www.fwd.oc.org/ministries/respect-life/documents/resources](http://www.fwd.oc.org/ministries/respect-life/documents/resources), web 2010a.

<sup>16</sup> Highfield 2010.

be more advantageous than ES cells in the area of organ development. Current non-stem cell based organ transplants require doctors to be sensitive to the blood and tissue types of the donating and receiving patients in order to prevent an immunological rejection of the donated organ. Additionally, even when organ donor and patients are well matched the receiving patient will generally have to take immunosuppressants in order to prevent rejection.

If pluripotent ES cells were used to develop organs they would solve the problem of organ availability, but they would not solve the problem of the need to match similar organ donors and receivers, and they would also not solve the need for organ recipients to take immunosuppressants. However, using iPS cell technology doctors can potentially take cells from the very same patient in need of an organ transplant, induce them into iPS cells, and then generate the desired organ. This organ would be a perfect match for the patient because it would be made out of the patients own cells, thus obviating the threat of organ rejection and the need for organ recipients to be placed on immunosuppressants.

Another potential future benefit which is made possible by iPS technology is the development of patient specific drugs by means of testing the drugs against patient iPS generated tissues. This would allow Doctors to fine tune medications based on their patients particular needs.

## **Current Efforts**

Current efforts in iPS cells focus on three major areas: safety, efficiency and fidelity.

Safety concerns will be a major setback in bringing iPS cells to clinical use. The process of cell reprogramming often causes cells to become cancerous. Scientists have eliminated the usage of certain cancer causes factors used to reprogram cells and have also looked for safer ways to insert these factors as the insertion process also increases the risk of cancer. Additionally, scientists need to have a higher yield of reprogrammed cells per reprogramming cycle in order for the processes efficiency to be viable. Areas being explored,

among others, include improving cell media and using previously reprogrammed cells which have subsequently differentiated. Importantly, although apparently not as significant as the two abovementioned issues, scientists have discovered that although iPS creates a near replica of a somatic cell, there are still some genes which are not fully reprogrammed. Efforts are being made to identify and reprogram these parts of the iPS genome.

While iPS cells are exciting because of their potential payoffs, scientists are years away from bringing this technology to clinical settings. Some experts expect the process of developing patient ready iPS cells to be fifty years away if not more. The road to developing practical stem cell technology will be a long one, but the potential payoffs appear to be well worth the effort.

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## **Religious Orientation's Interaction with Psychology**

*Moshe L Miller*

The study of universal behaviors is a topic social psychologists have been investigating for many years. Many innate behaviors such as universal facial expressions (Ekman & Friesen, 1971) as well the universality of music (Goldenberg, Maursky, & Solomon, 2001) have been discovered. One such universal item that has been heavily studied is religion. With few exceptions, wherever one may travel in the world there exists some form of religion. These religions vary greatly in their beliefs and general goals (Cohen & Hill, 2007), which has raised the question of how to measure some of the components that make up religion?

In a seminal study of religion Allport and Ross (1967) addressed this very question. Religious orientation is a concept that attempts to describe the motivation behind a person's religious belief and actions. Allport and Ross (1967) created a Religious Orientation Scale (ROS) to evaluate specific orientations toward religion. Since its creation the ROS has been helpful in understanding many facets of religion. In the pilot study done by Allport and Ross, the ROS was originally used to show that religious people with high levels of Intrinsic orientation were less prejudiced than those high in Extrinsic orientation (Allport and Ross, 1967). Since then the ROS has been used in a wide range of studies and has implications in various aspects of psychology and mental health, as will be discussed in this paper.

It is important to understand the workings of the Religious Orientation scale since there have been many articles written developing and elaborating on the scale since its introduction. Originally the scale identified only two orientations: Intrinsic and Extrinsic. In further research, the Extrinsic orientation was split into Extrinsic Social (ES) and Extrinsic Personal (EP) making three orientations, Intrinsic, Extrinsic Social and Extrinsic Personal (Genia, 1993 &

Kirkpatrick, 1990), that many but not all researchers choose to use. An Intrinsic religious orientation is characterized by an individual being religious for religion's own sake (Allport and Ross, 1967). Extrinsic Social orientation refers to the use of religion for social reasons, such as a sense of community and social interaction, while an Extrinsic Personal orientation refers to use of religion for personal reasons, such as deriving comfort from religion during difficult and stressful life events (Genia, 1993). Allport and Ross originally thought of the ROS as a bipolar scale where a person is on a continuum from Intrinsic to Extrinsic but to be high or low in both would be contradictory. However they realized, from the way people filled out the survey, that the scale is orthogonal, meaning one is not necessarily either strictly Intrinsic or Extrinsic but can have fluctuating levels of each (Allport & Ross, 1967). As a result of this development four types of people have been distinguished. There are Intrinsic, who are high in Intrinsic and low in Extrinsic, and Extrinsic, who are high in Extrinsic but low in Intrinsic. If a person is high in both Intrinsic and Extrinsic they are referred to as "indiscriminately pro-religious" or just "pro-religious" (Paragement, 1987) as opposed to Allport and Ross's derogatory term of "muddleheads." Those low in Intrinsic and Extrinsic are labeled "non-religious" or "anti-religious."

While using measures of religion it is important to keep in mind that there are still problems with the ROS that have not been solved. Certain changes have been made, as mentioned above, such as splitting the general Extrinsic orientation into two separate orientations and conceptually modifying the scale from a bipolar scale to an orthogonal one. However, there are still a number of criticisms. One of these, raised by ROS, Kirkpatrick and Hood (1990) is a very simple, yet fundamental, problem. What, they ask, is Intrinsic orientation measuring? Intrinsic religious orientation is defined as an orientation where an individual is religious for religion's own sake (Allport & Ross, 1967), but what does being religious "for religion's own sake"



mean? What characteristics define an Intrinsic person's motivations for being religious? The Extrinsic scale seems to tell us what motivates a person's religion; social or personal benefits. However, it is not clear what Intrinsic is measuring. The only measure of religion that Intrinsic orientation correlates with is the question "how important is your religion to you?" (Gorusch & Mcfarland, 1972). Does this mean that Intrinsic is only a measure of importance of religion, or does it get at motivation as well?

Another problem with the ROS is in how it is scored. The ROS poses questions such as "I often experience the presence of God" and gives four answers to choose from: "I strongly agree", "I agree", "I disagree", and "I strongly disagree." "I strongly disagree" is given a 1, "I disagree" gets a 2, "I agree" a 3, and "I strongly agree" a 4. Each subject is then given an average score for the Intrinsic questions and one for the Extrinsic questions. But when we say that someone is "high on Intrinsic" or "low in Extrinsic" what score characterizes a subject as "low" or "high"? There are two ways to evaluate it. The original way used by Allport and Ross was to use an arbitrary cut off of the median which is 2.5. For example a subject with an Extrinsic score of 3 and an Intrinsic score of 2 would be high in Extrinsic and low in Intrinsic and, according to the fourfold typology, he or she would be an Extrinsically religious person. However, the problem with this method is that unless your sampling is very diverse it is possible that your whole sample will fall into only one of the categories of the fourfold typology, but if an analysis of the variance is done it would show significant differences between clusters of subjects that do not show up if they are lumped into categories based on the median of the scale. The other way to categorize subjects is to take an average of the whole sampling and use that as a "median split" (Hood, 1970) and lower or higher than the median would be low or high in Intrinsic or Extrinsic. This takes care of the previous problem but creates another one. If you use the median split method, then if you were to take a sampling among atheists half the atheists would automatically be

labeled high Intrinsic. Also among an extremely religious group half of the group will automatically be labeled low Intrinsic although they are obviously far from Intrinsic about religion. These labels for obvious reasons do not properly assess the religious orientation of the individual and between two different studies the same subject may go from Anti-religious to Intrinsic. Therefore it is important to pay attention to how a particular study scores the ROS when comparing results between studies. Unfortunately, not all authors provide the scoring method they used in their own particular study

There have been many studies showing that different religious affiliations have different trends in their orientation toward religion (Cohen & Hill, 2007). In his recent work, Cohen et al (2007) looked at differences in religious orientation between different religions. He showed that Catholics are more Extrinsically religious than Protestant and that Jews score even higher on the Extrinsic scale. Some articles have explored how different religious orientations may correlate with certain personality traits such as neuroticism (Maltby et. al, 1999, Taylor and Mcdonald, 1999). Certain aspects of mental health have also been shown to correlate with religious orientation. In regard to depression it was found that those high in Intrinsic orientation were less depressed than Extrinsic (Genia, 1991). Extrinsic orientation also positively correlates with several undesirable traits such as prejudice (Allport & Ross, 1967), anxiety (Hettler & Cohen, 1998), obsessive-compulsive disorder, and narcissistic personality disorder (Masters & Bergin, 1992). When measuring “pressure” among college students it was found that Extrinsic orientation correlates with pressure more highly and more often than Intrinsic orientation (Laher, 2007). In regard to developmental psychology a recent study was done measuring adolescents’ religious orientation and wellbeing. It was found that those who were Pro-Religious and those high in Intrinsic had significantly higher levels of wellbeing than their anti-religious peers (Milevsky & Levitt, 2004).

In this paper four articles will be discussed in detail. They form a collection of findings on topics in psychology regarding religious orientation. These articles range from the original Allport and Ross article, which discusses the creation and pilot study of the Religious Orientation Scale, to findings on the effect of different religious orientations on psychological adjustment among adolescents, feelings of pressure among college students, and levels of depression.

### Religion, Intrinsic-Extrinsic Orientation, and Depression

Genia, V., Shaw D. G. (1991)  
*Review of Religious Research*, 32, 274-283

This article discusses the connection between different religious orientations and depression. It was theorized that different religious orientations would have various implications for mental health and that Intrinsic orientation is, as Allport said, "healthy" religion (Allport, 1963). Therefore, researchers set out to find what these findings with mental health might be. To date there have been over 70 articles showing that high Intrinsic orientation correlates to positive aspects of mental health (Danahue, 1985). The authors chose the topic of depression because, as they explain, of the 9 million adults who become depressed yearly it is likely that 15% will commit suicide (Rosenfeld, 1985) and any indication as to what may contribute to or inhibit depression is important to understand. Therefore, they chose to look at the possible connections between religious orientation and depression to see what findings might be helpful in assessing the problem of depression.

In previous research it has been shown that Intrinsic and Pro-religious individuals were the least likely to be depressed while Extrinsic were the most likely to be depressed of the fourfold typology (Watson, Morris, & Hood, 1988). One flaw with this study is that it was done with a mostly Protestant population. The authors wanted to see if these findings could be replicated among other religious affiliations. It was theorized that the previous findings with

depression and religious orientation would be replicated (Intrinsic and Pro-religious being less depressed than Extrinsic and Anti-religious) and that there would be no differences between religious affiliations in regard to religious orientation or depression.

## **Method**

### *Participants*

There were 309 subjects in this study, 97 Catholics, 39 Jews, 77 Evangelical Protestants, 51 Religiously Liberal Protestants, and 45 Unitarian-Universalists. 115 were male and 191 females (3 not indicated) with age ranging from 17 to 83 with a mean age of 29.2 and an average education level of 3 years of college.

### *Procedure*

522 questionnaires were distributed in the Washington DC area to worshipers at the various churches and synagogues of the above mentioned religions, 309 of which were returned. At some point in the service the rabbi, minister, or priest asked for volunteers to take part in an anonymous survey to be returned by mail to the “investigator” (ostensibly the religious leader).

### *Measures*

The survey contained the Religious Orientation Scale (ROS) and the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). The ROS was scored using the median split and subjects were distributed into the fourfold typology using this method.

### *Results*

An intercorrelation between age, sex, education level, depression and religious orientation was done to examine the relationship between these variables. The correlations showed, as hypothesized, that depression was negatively correlated with Intrinsic orientation ( $r = -.20$ ) and positively correlated with Extrinsic orientation ( $r = .24$ ). However, unlike what was hypothesized, Pro-religious subjects were

not any less likely to be depressed than Extrinsic or Anti-religious. Other findings were that Intrinsic orientation and Extrinsic orientation were inversely related, age and education were positively related ( $r = .46$ ) (for the obvious reason that the older a person is the more likely they are to have more education), and age was positively correlated to Extrinsic orientation ( $r = .18$ ) and negatively related to Intrinsic orientation ( $r = -.23$ ). Using a multivariate ANOVA (analysis of the variance) it was found that only religious orientation was significantly related to depression ( $F=4.88, p=.0026$ ) while no significant effects were found on depression between denominations, sex, age, or education. The mean score on the BDI for Intrinsic was 3.52 and was significantly lower than Extrinsic orientation (6.26), Proreligious (6.38), and Antireligious (6.29). Although there were no differences found between religions in regard to depression, the authors were unable to get an analysis for certain items due to a small number of subjects in some of the religious orientations in certain religions. For example, there were only 3 Jewish Intrinsic so it was not possible to see if there may have been any differences between Jewish Intrinsic and Protestant Intrinsic. It was noted though that all Intrinsic, regardless of their religion, had the lowest depression scores. Contrary to the hypothesis, there were differences between religions in regard to religious orientation; Jews loaded highly on Extrinsic (27 of 39) while Evangelical Protestants loaded highly on Intrinsic (56 of 77).

### *Discussion*

This study was an important addition to the literature on the study of religious orientation and mental health. The finding that Intrinsically oriented individuals are less likely to be depressed was confirmed here and was shown to be true regardless of the religion the subject belongs to, something no other study had shown before. However, the authors admit that this also may also have led to some limitations. First, the authors say that the lack of finding that Pro-religious subjects have lower depression scores is probably due to the scoring method used. Using the median split method causes the cut

off for high and low to change in each study and since this is the first study to examine different religions, it probably caused this study not to be able to completely replicate past findings. Second, the idea to look compare different religions is a good one but it wasn't done very well. Since there weren't enough Jewish subjects the researchers were limited in what analyses they could do. This also calls into question the validity of the entire study since having few subjects in the Jewish group could potentially cause a lack of generalizability to Jewish population at large. In addition, there were entire religious groups left out of the study, such as Muslims and Mormons. Third, the surveys were given to subjects at their place of worship by their spiritual leader. This may have caused subjects to answer the questions quite differently from how they would have responded to an impartial third party. Further, although the survey was supposed to be anonymous, the subject may have feared that their religious leader would figure out who they were, and to avoid embarrassment may have answered the questions the way they thought they were supposed to rather than honestly. Fourth, the Jews, while few, were all lumped into one group. This is problematic being that it is well known that there are many subgroups within Judaism and that the difference in level of observance between these groups is enormous (Cohen & Hill, 2007). Also it is unknown in what type of synagogue these surveys were handed out. Therefore it may be false to say that this study represents "Jews" in general but really should be broken down into the various subgroup of Judaism (Reform, Conservative, Orthodox etc). The fifth problem with this article is that there is no theoretical explanation for the findings that depression is lower among Intrinsic. One might wonder why Extrinsic are not less depressed being that they seem to get more social interaction and comfort out of religion than the Intrinsic get. A discussion about why Intrinsic are less likely to be depressed would go a long way in filling in the theory as to why Intrinsic are more mentally healthy than other religious orientations.

## **Intrinsic and Extrinsic Religiosity in Preadolescence and Adolescence: Effect on Psychological Adjustment**

Avidan Milevsky & Mary J. Levitt (2004).

*Mental Health, Religion & Culture* 7, 307–321

This study was done to ascertain the influence religious orientation might have on pre-adolescent and adolescent overall “wellbeing” in an ethnically diverse population. Wellbeing is operationally defined in this study by levels of loneliness, self-esteem and depression using various measures. The authors wanted to see if the finding that adults with high Intrinsic religious orientation tend to show overall greater wellbeing could be replicated with kids, as well as what differences there may be. The authors note that although the research on adolescents and religiosity is sparse it has been found that religious participation is correlated with higher levels of self-esteem among adolescents (Bagley and Mallick, 1997). Additionally, among juniors in high school higher church attendance was negatively correlated with depression (Wright et al. 1993). The authors cite the findings that overall “religiosity has been found to relate positively to physical health (Levin & Vanderpool, 1992), longevity, life satisfaction (Gartner et al., 1991), and overall happiness (Poloma & Pendelton, 1990).” Additionally, they note that the pre-adolescence and adolescence stages are transitory stages for children in which they establish a self identity and have the cognitive ability to incorporate religion into their self identity (Fowler, 1991). It is therefore interesting to see what, if any, effects religious orientation may have on the wellbeing of children of this age.

In this study the four fold typology was used to categorize the subjects when scoring the religious orientation scale. They hypothesized that those subjects who are purely Intrinsic would score higher on wellbeing than those who are purely Extrinsic and that subjects who are Indiscriminately Pro-religious would score higher than those who are Anti-religious. They also hypothesized that the older the adolescent the higher their scores in both Intrinsic orientation

and Extrinsic orientation would be based on the idea that adolescence are still increasingly incorporating religion into their self identities as they mature. They also expected to replicate the finding that females are more Intrinsic than males (Donahue, 1985), and that African-Americans would score higher on Intrinsic orientation and Extrinsic orientation than European-Americans (Benson et al, 1989).

## **Method**

### *Participants*

In this study there were 694 sixth through eighth graders of various religions. They were categorized by ethnicity into African-American, European-American, and Hispanic-American. This sampling was taken in eight public elementary schools in a metropolitan area. The ages ranged from 11 to 15 with an mean of 12.67 years of age. Subjects were also divided into gender with 356 females and 338 males.

### *Procedure*

Students were privately interviewed by a female tester of similar ethnicity to the child. These tests were given in school with the consent of the parents. The test consisted of measures for religiosity, loneliness, self-esteem, and depression. The independent variables were loneliness, self-esteem, and depression scores while religious orientation, age, gender, and ethnicity served as the dependent variables.

### *Measures*

To measure religion, the Religious Orientation Scale was used, for Loneliness an abbreviated version of Asher, Hymel and Renshaw's Loneliness Scale was used, Self-Esteem was measured by the Harter Self-Perception Profile, and the short version of the Children's Depression Inventory/CDI-S was used to measure depression levels.

### *Results*

Six ANOVAs were done with Intrinsic and Extrinsic religiosity as the dependent variables, and age, gender, and ethnicity as the independent variables. There was a



significant difference (at the 0.05 significance level) between the Intrinsic group (mean=1.15, SD=0.22) and the Anti-religious group (mean=1.22, SD=0.28) for depression. The Indiscriminately Pro-religious subjects reported lower depression (mean=1.15, SD=0.22) and higher self-esteem (mean=3.24, SD=0.48) than the Anti-religious group (depression - mean=1.22, SD=0.28, self-esteem - mean=3.07, SD=0.48). There were no significant differences between sixth and eighth graders in Intrinsic and Extrinsic religiosity. However, females scored significantly higher (mean=3.80, SD=1.08) on the Intrinsic scale than the males (mean=3.56, SD=1.20) but no differences were found in Extrinsic orientation.

In regard to the differences between the different ethnicities it was found that the African-American group had higher levels of Extrinsic orientation (mean=3.57, SD=1.31) than the Hispanic-American group (mean=3.17, SD=1.45). The African-American group also had higher levels of Intrinsic orientation (mean=3.89, SD= 1.07) than both the European-American (mean=3.55, SD=1.08) and the Hispanic-Americans (mean=3.62, SD=1.22). No differences were found between the European-American and the Hispanic-American groups in any measure of religiosity.

### *Discussion*

This study was able to replicate certain findings that have been found in the past. These include the findings that Intrinsic reported lower levels of depression than Extrinsic. The largest findings for differences in wellbeing were between the Indiscriminately Pro-religious and the Anti-religious. The Pro-religious scored lower on depression and higher on self-esteem measures than the Anti-religious. This finding provides evidence for the idea that being more religious in general is better for mental health. This is shown by the fact that the difference between being Pro-religious, which amounts to being highly religious in general, and being Anti-religious, which means a person is less religious overall, was a mediating factor in depression. This fits clearly into the studies that have been cited showing higher levels of

religion and church attendance to be correlated with factors in mental health (Bagley & Mallick, 1997, Poloma & Pendelton, 1990).

In addition, the findings that females tend to be higher on the Intrinsic scale than males (Donahue, 1985) was replicated. This study did not find any differences between the sixth to eighth graders. This is interesting since these years in a child's life, as pointed out by the author, are transitory and it would be expected that the difference in age would yield some significantly different levels of religious orientation. However, the authors also note that the age difference may be too narrow to see the progression between age groups and a larger sampling is needed to assess what religious differences exist between adolescents of different ages. In regard to ethnicity it seems that the African-American group is more highly religious overall than the European-American and Hispanic-American groups, since the former group scored higher in both Intrinsic and Extrinsic. This is explained by the author based on the theory originated by Beit-Hallahmi and Argyle (1997), who propose that it is common for oppressed groups to seek refuge in religious institutions. Since the African-American population is in certain ways still oppressed in America this theory is identified as a possible explanation for these findings. Another proposed explanation for these findings is based on a theory by Brodsky (2000), who contends that changes in the social services which involve churches would increase the overall levels of religiosity in this population.

Although this study was quite thorough in its methodology there are a few critiques that should be made. The most pressing problem with this study is that anyone at all familiar with the field of religious study knows that the most common way to break up groups is to divide them into the various religions that subjects belong to. This study was aberrant in that it divided subjects only by ethnicity. The fact that the investigators failed to ask subjects what religion they belong to leaves a gaping hole in this paper. The differences between the ethnic groups may have been much more

profound and in many more areas if the subjects were categorized into their respective religions. The literature abounds in differences in religions (Cohen et al, 2007) that may have caused two subjects of the same ethnicity but different religions to have canceled out each other's scores, creating a lack of difference between ethnicities. It is almost surprising that there were any significant findings found between ethnicities. This may also explain the general findings that the only differences were found for African-Americans since the African-American population may have clustered into one religious group whereas the European-Americans and Hispanic-Americans may have had more diverse religions that would cause a cancellation of scores on the religious orientation scale.

A second problem is that the study lacks generalizability for two reasons. First, the age of the subjects is very specific to sixth, seventh, and eighth graders and is not generalizable to most of the population. This is especially true since, as the author points out, this age group is in a transition stage in their development and their religious orientation is changing as they develop a more complex self-schema. The second lack of generalizability comes from the fact that the adolescents in the study are part of an urban multiethnic culture which may affect their religious orientation as well as their well-being scores. Therefore, it is possible that these findings will apply only among this cultural population of sixth through eighth graders. But among an upper class, suburban, single ethnicity group of adolescents these findings may not hold true. The last criticism of this article is that the interviews were conducted in school. This may be a problem since the context of school may have primed the subjects to try and answer the questions the way they would on a test. They may have been trying to get the answer "right" as opposed to answering honestly.

# **The Relationship Between Religious Orientation and Pressure in Psychology I Students at the University of Witwatersrand**

S. Laher. *South African Journal of Psychology*, 37(3), 2007, pp. 530–551

This study seeks to find a connection between pressure and religious orientation. As previously discussed, the relationship between Intrinsic religious orientation and positive mental health has been shown through many avenues, whether it be lower levels of depression (Genia, 1991) or a robust sense of wellbeing among adolescents (Milevsky & Levitt, 2004). Extrinsic orientation has also been shown to be positively correlated with several undesirable individual variables, such as prejudice (Allport & Ross, 1967), trait anxiety (Hettler & Cohen, 1998), obsessive-compulsive disorder, and narcissistic personality disorder (Masters & Bergin, 1992), and depression (Genia, 1991). Reported correlations between measures of change-related stress and a vast array of physical illnesses (Aneshensel, 1992) make it interesting to determine whether religious orientation will mediate pressure or not. In this study “pressure,” a subcategory of stress, is operationally defined by using the Weiten Pressure Inventory (PI) (Weiten, 1988). This new scale was validated by being measuring against the well known Holmes and Rahe’s (1967) Social Readjustment Rating Scale (SRRS), but for methodological reasons the authors chose to use the PI over the older SRRS. The PI measures pressure evenly among six areas: Family relations, Work relations, Intimate relations, University relations, Peer relations, and Self-imposed pressures.

The Pressure Inventory is based on the Transactional Model of Stress (Folkman & Lazarus, 1988), which looks at the individual-environment interaction followed by the personal appraisal of situation, emotion that is felt, coping mechanism and finally the outcome level of stress felt by the individual. The authors said that “stress is seen as a function of the discrepancy between the perceived demands of a

situation and a person's resources for meeting those demands." The idea is that the same situation may cause one person to feel great amounts of anxiety, whereas another person might not be bothered at all. Based on this model it is easy to understand that the differences in a person's appraisal of the situation and coping mechanisms would explain the same situation having completely different effects on people.

The authors also looked at religious affiliation as a factor in pressure because, according to Ross (1990), Protestants had the lowest levels of general "distress", followed by Catholics, Jews, and others. Differences in belief systems, it seems, can affect the way an individual views the world around them and, in turn, processes various types of stress. In this study, the authors measured religious orientation, religious affiliation, and levels of pressure. They hypothesized that Intrinsic orientation would negatively correlate with pressure, while Extrinsic orientation would positively correlate with it, and that there would be no differences in pressure between religious affiliations. The authors also noted that there have not been many studies of religion done in South Africa and this will greatly add to the literature on religion in this country.

## **Method**

### *Participants*

This study used 494 undergraduate Psychology I student at the University of the Witwatersrand. Their ages ranged from 17 to 57 with a mean age of 19. There were 141 males and 353 females. There were 340 Christians, 30 Hindus, 28 Muslims, 52 Jews, and 44 labeled themselves "other." Atheists and non-religious subjects were dropped from the study.

### *Procedures*

Students were asked during classes to participate in the study by completing the questionnaire. They were briefly told about the goals of the study while anonymity and confidentiality of the questionnaire were clearly stated.

Students were also informed in person and in the cover letter of the survey that the return of the completed questionnaire indicated that they had consented to participate in the study.

### *Measures*

The questionnaire contained the Religious Orientation Scale and the Pressure Inventory along with demographic questions regarding age, gender, and religious affiliation. The Religious Orientation Scale was broken into Intrinsic and Extrinsic orientation but did not use the four fold typology.

### *Results*

When looking at the sample as a whole, Intrinsic religious orientation was only significantly correlated with University relations pressure ( $r = 0.10, p < 0.05$ ), suggesting that the more Intrinsically oriented a person is, the more pressure the person experiences with regard to his or her university commitments. For Extrinsic religious orientation, there were significant positive correlations with the overall pressure score ( $r = 0.12, p < 0.05$ ), Work relations ( $r = 0.12, p < 0.05$ ), Intimate relations ( $r = 0.11, p < 0.05$ ), and University relations ( $r = 0.23, p < 0.01$ ). This suggests that the more Extrinsically oriented person tends to experience more overall pressure as well as more pressure in terms of his or her work, university commitments, and intimate relationships. Given that there were significant correlations for both Intrinsic religious orientation and Extrinsic religious orientation and the University relations subscale, these correlations were tested to see if they were significantly different from each other using Fisher's 'z' transformation and the normal test ( $r'$ ). A significant difference was found ( $z = -2.0396, p < 0.05$ ), suggesting that Extrinsically oriented individuals are more likely to experience greater pressure with regard to university relationships than Intrinsically oriented individuals. There were standard differences found with religious orientation and the different religions (see Cohen 2007), but in regards to pressure there were no differences between different religious affiliations.

### *Discussion*

This study sought to discover the effects that religious orientation would have on a specific form of stress, namely pressure. It found that Extrinsic orientation was positively correlated with overall pressure scores, Work relations, Intimate relations, and University relations. While Intrinsic religious orientation was only correlated with University relations, the Extrinsic correlation was still significantly higher than Intrinsic on this variable. These findings mostly fit the study's hypothesis. However, it is surprising that Intrinsic positively correlated with any form of pressure. A vindicating fact is that even when there was a correlation between pressure and Intrinsic orientation, Extrinsic orientation was still higher. This can be explained by hypothesizing that everyone has pressure from school and that Extrinsic orientation was the factor that increases pressure in every area including regarding education.

There are a few problems with this study. First, the methodology for scoring the ROS was strange, since they didn't use the four fold typology but just looked at Intrinsic scores and Extrinsic scores alone. It is unclear what was done with the Pro-religious and Anti-religious groups. Second, atheists and non-religious were excluded from this study. That is unusual because all subjects are usually included. This may have affected the data since these two groups, if they score at all, will usually score on the Extrinsic scale and if included may have highlighted even greater correlations between Extrinsic and pressure. In addition, it is now unknown how those who are not influenced by religion at all compare to those who are religious in regard to pressure since they were excluded from the study. Third, the PI scale that is used in this study has only been used in two previous studies and lacks strong reliability. This significantly weakens the study since it casts doubt on the measure of pressure in general. The population of students is also very specific to freshmen, taking psychology, and only in this one college. There may be something about psychology students or maybe first year students at the University of Witwatersrand that

skewed these results. In all, it is clear that Extrinsic orientation is more strongly associated with pressure as measured by the PI than Intrinsic orientation. This adds to the literature which indicates that Intrinsic orientation promotes mental health and general wellbeing.

### **Personal Religious Orientation and Prejudice**

Allport, G. W., & Ross, J.M. (1967).

*Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*,  
5(4) 432-443.

When this study came out in 1967 the field of study on psychology and religion was very young. There had been some attempts to determine what effects religion had on peoples' attitudes and beliefs about the world (Rokeach, 1960). Some people, such as church attendees, were found to be more prejudiced than those who do not go to church (Allport & Kramer, 1946). Religious people in general were found to be less humanitarian than non-religious people in regard to homosexuals, criminals, delinquents, and prostitutes (Kirkpatrick, 1949). The problem with these studies is that no explanations were given as to why religious, church attending people have these attitudes. The seeming contradiction, as noted Allport and Ross, is that the religious teachings seem to promote equality and brotherhood, not intolerance and prejudice. They also point to bible figures that are talked about in church, who took on suffering and great labors on behalf of the people. The authors point to a study by Struening (1963) which shows a curvilinear trend with church attendance and prejudice. Those who never attend church had a prejudice score of 14.7 with scores rising among attendees and peaking at those who go twice a week scoring 26. After that it is downhill, with those who attend church 11 or more times a week scoring 11.7, lower even than those who never attend church. These findings seem odd since if it is religion that causes higher levels of prejudice why do those who attend church the most have the lowest scores?



The authors therefore hypothesize a construct that can explain these findings. They characterize two different motivations for religion; Intrinsic and Extrinsic. They explain that an Intrinsically religious person “lives” his religion and “having embraced a creed, the individual endeavors to internalize it and follow it fully.” While an Extrinsically religious person “uses” his religion and “may find religion useful in a variety of ways – to provide security and solace, sociability and distraction, status and self-justification.” The authors note that others have tried to create scales looking at Intrinsic and Extrinsic dimensions (Wilson, 1960) but have been unsuccessful for a variety of methodological reasons. For this reason Allport and Ross decided to create their own scale which measures Intrinsic and Extrinsic religious orientation reliably and robustly. The authors hypothesize that subjects of an Intrinsic religious orientation would score lower on prejudice scales than those of an Extrinsic religious orientation.

## **Method**

### *Participants*

The sample consisted of 309 subjects from six groups of church attendees. The breakdown was 94 Roman Catholics, 55 Lutherans, 44 Nazerene, 53 Presbyterian, 35 Methodist, and 28 Baptists.

### *Measures*

The measure of religion was the Religious Orientation Scale (ROS) created specifically for this study. Subjects were split into Intrinsic, Extrinsic, and Pro-Religious groups with Anti-Religious being left out based on the fact that subjects were taken from a pool of churchgoers. The prejudice scale was a combination of a yet unpublished scale measuring anti-Negro, anti-Jewish, and anti-Other (Hispanics and Asians) attitudes. Indirect measures of prejudice were also added such as six questions from the Custodial Mental Illness Ideology scale (CMI) and four “Jungle” philosophy of life questions.

The Jungle questions assessed the extent to which a person feels that men are innately evil and that the world is naturally a dangerous place.

### *Results*

The Extrinsic scored significantly higher than Intrinsic on every measure of prejudice with Indiscriminately Pro-Religious scoring higher than either of them. Anti-Negro: Intrinsic - 28.7 Extrinsic - 33 Pro-Religious 37.9, Anti-Jewish: Intrinsic - 22.6 Extrinsic - 24.6 Pro-Religious - 30.1, Anti-Other: Intrinsic - 20.4 Extrinsic - 23.3 Pro-Religious - 28.2, Jungle: Intrinsic - 7.9 Extrinsic - 8.7 Pro-Religious - 10.2, CMI: Intrinsic - 10.2 Extrinsic - 11.8 Pro-Religious - 14.6.

### *Discussion*

It was shown in this study that Pro-Religious subjects had the highest prejudice scores followed by Extrinsic and finally Intrinsic. The finding that Extrinsic are more prejudiced than Intrinsic is used to explain the curvilinear findings with church attendance. Those who attend church infrequently are hypothesized to have an Extrinsic religious orientation that is causing a strong in-group to be created but a lack of spirituality causes higher levels of prejudice. Intrinsic on the other hand are probably those who attend church more often and “live” their religion including the ideas of acceptance and caring about others even those outside their own group. This may be one limitation to the study since they did not actually measure church attendance and any connection between church attendance and religious orientation is conjecture. The problem comes when trying to understand the Pro-Religious group. Allport and Ross suggest that these subjects have a certain cognitive style called “undifferentiated thinking” which amounts to the subject answering in the positive to every question about religion even when they may seem contradictory. The people with this cognitive style, suggest the authors, view the world this way as well as religion and are not able to differentiate between the “good” minorities and the “bad” minorities.

Their cognition therefore leads them to have extreme views in all areas of life resulting in prejudice. The fact that the Anti-Religious group was left out of this study is problematic since there may have been some who would fall into that category even among churchgoers if the authors had included that group. Another criticism is that, although we now know that the ROS is a valid scale, when investigating this article on its own, it should be noted that the scale was yet to be validated. The prejudice scales were also not validated yet as they took part of the scale from an unpublished study and another part from a theoretical "Jungle" construct. In addition the authors didn't talk about how they scored the test but it is assumed that they used the middle score split method (Hood, 1990) when distributing subjects into their groups which as discussed before has methodological problems. Another problem is that the sampling was only among Christians and is therefore not generalizable to other religions. Even among the Christians it is noted that all subjects were churchgoing people, which, as the authors comment, automatically biases them to answer the questions in a Pro-religious way.

## **General Summary**

The field of the study in the interaction between religion and psychology has made great progress over the last half century. In this time a validated and widely used scale has been developed as well as enumerable findings that indicate that different orientations toward religion have profound effects on peoples' lives. The original Allport and Ross study (1967) showed that although up until then studies had pointed to higher levels of religiosity as a whole to be responsible for higher levels of prejudice that was in fact not the case. While piloting the Religious Orientation Scale they showed that it was not religion per se that increased prejudice but the type of orientation toward religion that was important. Those with an Intrinsic religious orientation had significantly lower levels of prejudice than those with an Extrinsic orientation. Extrinsic orientation was the factor responsible for high prejudice.

It was noted that there are a few methodological issues with the ROS. These include problems with scoring, differences in categorizing the orientations into three group instead of two, and creation of the fourfold typology. Some of the changes to the scale have been adopted by researchers while others have not. This leaves the field of psychology of religion in a quandary when trying to compare results between different studies.

In a paper by Allport (1963) it was hypothesized that Intrinsic is a “healthy” form of religion. This led to many investigations into what health differences would be found between the various religious orientations. Since then many studies have found benefits of an Intrinsic orientation including, but not limited to, lower trait anxiety (Hettler & Cohen, 1998), obsessive-compulsive disorder, narcissistic personality disorder (Masters & Bergin, 1992), and depression (Genia, 1991). These are just a few of the articles to illustrate the idea that an Intrinsic orientation is healthier than an Extrinsic one.

In this paper the original Allport and Ross (1967) study was analyzed and its findings were discussed. The idea that the Pro-religious had the highest levels of prejudice followed by Extrinsic and Intrinsic paints a picture of a cognitive style that lends itself to extreme thinking. The fact that Extrinsic had higher levels of prejudice than Intrinsic fits with Allports’ idea of Intrinsic orientation being a “healthy” form of religion that leads to many good things. Vicky Genia’s paper (1990) on depression was also summarized here and illustrates that Allport’s idea about Intrinsic orientation is true by showing that Intrinsic have lower depression levels than Extrinsic. In an investigation into the developmental side of religious orientation, Milevsky et al (2004) showed that it was higher levels of religiosity marked by the Pro-religious group that mediated levels of well-being operationalized by self esteem, loneliness, and depression scales. Lastly feelings of pressure were found to be lower and in fewer areas among Intrinsic individuals in a study by Laher (2007), who investigated college freshmen in

South Africa. All measures of pressure were significantly correlated with Extrinsic and showed again that it is Intrinsic that is the "healthy" form of religion.

There are many avenues for future research in the field of psychology of religion. One very important thing that needs to happen is for the measures that are being used to measure religion to be universalized so that everyone is able to know exactly what is being measured in each study. The fact that this has not happened until now is a fault that cannot be overlooked since it has potentially caused great confusion among those who are reading papers from various authors. The different scoring methods and categorizations need to be unified into one accepted structure for a real step forward in the field to take place. Second, the problems that Kirkpatrick et al (1990) outline are very pressing, especially the question of what exactly is Intrinsic religious orientation measuring. The answer to this question may lead to a split between different Intrinsic orientations such as what has been found with Extrinsic. This could lead to many interesting new findings that may specify what it is about Intrinsic that makes it such a powerful orientation that affects many areas of life. Third, although certain religious orientations have been found to correlate with various factors, the cause and effect relationship has not been clearly established. Is it the religious orientation that changes the person or the person that picks the orientation? A series of experimental studies that manipulate religion may be able to discern which factors are causing what. Lastly, the study of between religion differences is still fresh. There are many groups that are investigating this very problem currently (Cohen et al, 2007) yet the findings are scarce. Many subgroups of various religions (Mormons, Orthodox/Chasidic Jews etc) do not welcome research in their communities and this creates great difficulty in gathering data. By explaining the benefits of having data on their congregants it may be possible to sway religious leaders to encourage their followers to consent to letting psychology into their world and lives. This would benefit the people who are being studied as well as the world

of psychology in general since findings in these groups may hold to the key to a fuller and more comprehensive understanding of what religion is all about and the effects it has on society as a whole.

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