

**real time evaluation of  
tsunami response in asia  
and east africa, second round**

International Federation of Red Cross and  
Red Crescent Societies

**Final Report**  
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## **Abbreviations**

CHF	Swiss Francs
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD)
DP	Disaster Response
ERU	Emergency Response Unit
FACT	Field Assessment and Coordination Team
GA	Government Authority (Head of Government in districts of Sri Lanka)
GOSL	Government of Sri Lanka
GOM	Government of Maldives
HoD	Head of Delegation
HQ	Headquarter
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IRCS	Indian Red Cross Society
MCF	Movement Coordination Framework
Movement	Red Cross and Red Crescent network of organisations
NS	National Society
OD	Organisational Development
ONS	Operating National Society (of the host country)
PMI	Pelang Merah Indonesia (Indonesia Red Cross)
PNS	Participating National Society
RAT	Recovery Assessment Team
RCRC	Red Cross and Red Crescent
RDRT	Regional Disaster Response Team
RSOF	Regional Strategy and Operational Framework
RTE	Real Time Evaluation
SC-UK	Save the Children UK
SL	Sri Lanka
SRC	Seychelles Red Cross
SRCS	Somalia Red Crescent Society
SLRCS	Sri Lanka Red Cross Society
TAFREN	Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation
t-shelter	Transition Shelter
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UDA	Urban Development Authority
WHO	World Health Organisation
\$	US Dollars

## **Executive Summary:**

The Indian Ocean Tsunami disaster resulted in one of the largest relief and rehabilitation operations ever launched by the Red Cross Red Crescent (RCRC) Movement. The Federation launched a systematic process of real time evaluations (RTE) in order to assist the Movement in ensuring high standards of accountability and good practices in the operations as well as enable it to continuously improve the efficiency, effectiveness and impact of its work. The first round of RTE (1<sup>st</sup> RTE) was carried out during the peak of relief operations in early February this year, covering two key countries namely Indonesia and Sri Lanka. At that time, it was agreed that a second round of RTE (2<sup>nd</sup> RTE) will be carried out in about six months' time to look at the transition from relief to recovery phase of the operations to assess how the Movement was responding to the needs of the affected communities. This RTE was commissioned by the Monitoring & Evaluation department of the Federation Secretariat.

### ***Scope and Focus of the Evaluation:***

This evaluation covered the post-relief phase of operations, i.e., the transition from relief to recovery and reconstruction programme currently underway in various countries affected by tsunami. Field studies were conducted in three countries in Asia namely, India, Sri Lanka and Maldives, and two countries in East Africa, i.e., Somalia and Seychelles. Although field study was not carried out in Indonesia during this evaluation, interviews with Federation staff in Geneva and several PNS headquarters staff formed the basis of the observations and conclusions drawn on the operations in that country.

The central focus of the evaluation was on:

- the perspectives of the beneficiaries and affected populations,
- delivery,
- quality/ standards, and
- Movement cooperation: impact of mechanisms put in place around the Movement's cooperation on plans and implementation of the Tsunami operation.

### ***Key Findings:***

#### **a) Achievements:**

1. Water and Sanitation: A traditional strength of some PNSs, water systems have continued to deliver life-saving water to many communities in Sri Lanka, India, Maldives and Indonesia.

2. Psycho-social work: In Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Maldives, psychosocial work carried out by PNSs is playing a crucial role in the recovery process as the massive psycho-social impact of living in shelters and temporary accommodation needs to be addressed.

3. Movement Coordination: Coordination has been the cornerstone of this response. With a mobilisation as large as the tsunami response, coordination of response was a challenge the Federation Secretariat took responsibility for right from the beginning and developed new approaches to Movement coordination.

4. Needs Assessment: The RCRC response was based on initial needs assessments carried out in the early stages either locally or through FACT/ RAT missions. It was able to reach some of the remotest areas which generally have, in the conventional aid delivery system, less chance of being reached.

5. Advocacy: A significant initiative has been the involvement in the various activities of the Global Coalition on Tsunami Recovery led by Bill Clinton. IFRC co-chairs with WHO the Working Group on Impact Assessment set up by the consortium. The Federation has also been a key player in raising the issue of inadequacy in transition shelter especially in Aceh in the past three months, and has played a lead role in developing a coordinated response on this issue, albeit late.

6. Deployment of regional staff and delegates: Human resource for large disaster response is always a challenge for all the humanitarian organisations, and more so for the Federation which has to depend on PNSs as the main source for its surge capacity. However, in this response, more than in any other, the Federation effectively used various recruitment methods like regional recruitment, secondments from regional NSs, short-term staff exchanges between regional NSs, etc., which enabled it to strengthen its response capacity. In Sri Lanka, Maldives, Indonesia and East Africa wherever such deployments were made, the feedback from such experience was excellent.

**b) Challenges:**

1. Coordination: While the Movement Coordination Framework and concept of service centres developed by the Federation have been highly appreciated by PNSs, the downside has been that, as Sri Lanka experience shows, unless care is taken to ensure that results/ impact made on the lives and livelihoods of communities are put on top of the agenda by all involved, there is a danger

that coordination of response may be reduced to administration of procedures which is self-serving.

2. ***Scaling up:*** While there is a general question about proportionality of response in the tsunami crisis which has ramifications for all humanitarian crisis globally, in specific terms, a critical issue stands out in relation to RCRC's response in different countries: when scale and complexity of a response demands scaling up far beyond the limits and remit of the ONS, how does the Movement work with partners outside the RCRC network (like local NGOs, INGOs, UN etc) without undermining the auxiliary role of the ONS to the governments?

3. ***Needs Assessment:*** The RCRC response in the early stages was based on direct assessment of needs of affected communities and was responsive to the issues of overt and covert exclusion that often occurs in humanitarian programmes. However, in the recovery and reconstruction stage, the complexity of identification of the vulnerable and ensuring equity between different communities has not been fully grasped in RCRC programming. In cases where the RCRC has focused on mega-projects being planned by governments as part of recovery strategy, vulnerable communities and their immediate and long term needs have often been missed in the RCRC response, although many examples of direct focus on the vulnerable do stand out.

4. ***Shelter and Permanent housing:*** The RCRC Movement was unrealistic in its assumptions about the needs for transition shelters and its ability to deliver permanent housing. It has taken the Federation nearly seven months to realise the need to focus on transition shelters and systematic approach to livelihoods development, and that permanent housing needs complex and tortuous process of negotiations with community, governments, contractors, suppliers, utilities providers etc. There are two lessons to be learned from the RCRC's tsunami response: (a) that from the immediate relief phase in any major disaster response, one can not go straight into long term rehabilitation and development, and there is a transition phase where people need to be supported for their humanitarian needs; and (b) by not engaging in responding to the transitional needs, the Movement lost an opportunity to get to know and build relationships with the affected community better which would be crucial to successful development phase.

5. ***Accountability and Impact:*** While procedures and mechanisms have been put in place to fulfil accountability obligations to donors and other institutions, not enough systematic approach to ensuring the same to affected communities was in evidence. Beneficiary perspectives and their involvement in planning and design of programmes are often missing in RCRC response.

**6. *Disaster Preparedness and capacity building:*** Disaster preparedness needs to better address the needs of volunteers who form the main pillar of RCRC response, and capacity building initiatives undertaken with clear and direct focus on results in relation to affected communities have been successful while the ones with predominant focus on NS have distorted the central objective of the response.

**7. *Need for greater result-orientation:*** Leadership and management in the field level are more procedure- and protocol-focused, than have a result-orientation. Cumbersome procedures for tendering and financial management used by the Federation at the HQ level are also not geared towards emergency response, and reinforce the labyrinth of bureaucratic protocols the organisation appears to keep people occupied with. Furthermore, the lack of availability of appropriate skills and expertise in new areas like shelter, livelihoods, gender and vulnerability analysis etc., within the Movement has further limited the impact the response could have achieved.

## ***Recommendations:***

### ***1. Coordination:***

- R7/ Page 32     Undertake a thorough review<sup>1</sup> of the functioning of various components of the MCF in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, and revamp those that are blocking achievement of results.
- R8/ Page 32     Develop a system for reporting and monitoring of coordination results/ outcomes in terms of impact on community: at every stage, ask the question what impact an action will have on communities.
- R9/ Page 32     The technical working groups should not be reviewing/ appraising every detail of the proposals which should be left to the individual PNSs to develop, but it should rather ensure development of common standards and approaches to major practical issues like needs assessment, gender/ vulnerability analysis, contractual (staff hire) and tendering issues, etc.
- R10/ Page 34    In future response, ensure placement of Movement Coordinators and Recovery delegates early on in the field.

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<sup>1</sup> At the time of finalising the report, it is understood that this was carried out in September and October, 2005.

**2. Proportionality and scaling up:**

R21/ Page 47 Develop Movement-wide protocols and coordination mechanisms to facilitate Movement partners to work with NGOs/ INGOs/ UN agencies when humanitarian imperative warrants it. This may be done, with or without direct involvement of ONSs, but must ensure that the latter's identity as the National society or its auxiliary role is not undermined.

**3. Needs Assessment:**

R15/ Page 40 Use the technical working groups to develop a knowledge-base and analysis of issues of gender, equity and conflict affecting various communities in both Sri Lanka and Indonesia.

R16/ Page 40 Hire staff (internationally or from within the region) with expertise in social and conflict analysis, and gender programming.

R17/ Page 40 In major disasters, ensure that as follow up to RAT processes, periodic needs assessment are carried out by field teams and amendments to the programme strategy made as appropriate.

**4. Shelter and Housing:**

R1/ Page 27 Appoint a shelter expert<sup>2</sup> in the HQ Operations team who will provide overall direction, leadership and technical support on shelter.

R2/ Page 27 Invest in the transition shelters: upgrading of shelters, watsan and livelihoods.

R3/ Page 27 Review the cumbersome bureaucratic procedures dogging the housing work and put in place systems that achieve results. Plan for smaller number for a start – 15,000 houses are not built in one or two years.

R4/ Page 27 Consider various options to fast-track house construction using other organisations which have competence. While continuing to engage with communities through transition shelters, sub-contract the work to social housing companies.

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<sup>2</sup> This is now being done.



R5/ Page 27 The shelter plan developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for Aceh foresees selfbuild<sup>3</sup> as the major mechanism for shelter reconstruction. It may be appropriate to partner with other more experienced development sector players such as these which have a coherent and well developed policy and capacity.

**5. Accountability and Impact:**

R13/ Page 36 Strengthen staff capacity in community mobilisation and participatory approaches in key countries where tsunami operations are on-going.

R14/ Page 36 At the technical working group level, assess performance in every sector in terms of results which have a community perspective built into them.

R18/ Page 44 Develop staff capacity and tools to ensure that decision making is guided by beneficiary perspectives of their needs and outcome sought, rather than being driven by procedures and rules as the *overriding concern*.

**6. Disaster preparedness and capacity building :**

R6/ Page 29 Greater investment in systematic training and equipping of volunteers who form the main pillar of NS's response is needed.

R11/ Page 34 Capacity building needs to be directly linked to short- and long-term outcomes which directly affect the lives and livelihoods of the affected communities.

R12/ Page 35 Federation needs to develop guidelines on good practices on volunteers' compensation and incentives during large disasters.

**6. Result-oriented management:**

R19/ Page 46 Revamp Federation's HR system and recruitment procedures to ensure that open market recruitment and recruitment from within the region, including secondment from peer NSs, can be effectively done during emergency operations.

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<sup>3</sup> The Federation is now engaging in owner-builder programme in SL.

R20/ Page 47    Immediately review the financial and tendering procedures that apply to Federation/ secretariat as well as to the ONSs in this operation. If a full review takes long time, at least waive those rules and procedures which cause delays.

## **Chapter 1:**

### **INTRODUCTION**

*(This introductory chapter describes the background to this evaluation, the purpose and terms of reference and the methodology used by the evaluators).*

#### **1.1 Background:**

The Indian Ocean Tsunami disaster resulted in one of the largest relief and rehabilitation operations ever launched by the Red Cross & Red Crescent (RCRC) Movement. The size of the resources generated and the scale of operations require that organisations involved in the operations demonstrate their accountability to their beneficiaries, partners and donors. At the same time, organisations need to ensure that the work being carried out makes the desired impact on the lives of the affected community, as well as enables the organisations to learn from and continuously improve their performance.

The Federation launched a systematic process of real time evaluations (RTE) in order to assist the Movement in ensuring high standards of accountability and good practices in the operations as well as enable it to continuously improve the efficiency, effectiveness and impact of its work. The first round of RTE (1<sup>st</sup> RTE) was carried out during the peak of relief operations in early February this year, covering two key countries namely Indonesia and Sri Lanka. At that time, it was agreed that a second round of RTE (2<sup>nd</sup> RTE) will be carried out in about six months' time to look at the transition from relief to recovery phase of the operations to assess how the Movement was responding to the needs of the affected communities.

#### **1.2 Rationale and Scope of the Evaluation:**

##### **a) Rationale:**

Ensuring dignity and improving the lives of vulnerable people is central to the mission of the International Federation. This requires that the success of the operation is assessed and judged *only* by the support provided to the affected individuals, families and communities made vulnerable by the Tsunami in terms of how the operation has helped affected people to survive, regain their livelihood, rebuild their homes, social life and physical infrastructure, cope with destruction and loss of family members, relatives and friends, and restore normality. Therefore, the criteria such as efficiency, effectiveness and impact will be measured or judged in this evaluation only in terms of these concerns of the affected communities.

##### **b) Scope:**

This evaluation covered the post-relief phase of operations, i.e., the transition from relief to recovery and reconstruction programme currently underway in various

countries affected by tsunami. However, since countries like India, Maldives and the affected region of Eastern Africa (namely Somalia and Seychelles) were not covered in the 1<sup>st</sup> RTE, it was decided that a rapid *ex poste* assessment of relief operations in these countries would be in order. Field studies were conducted in three countries in Asia namely, India, Sri Lanka and Maldives, and two countries in East Africa, i.e., Somalia and Seychelles. Although field study was not carried out in Indonesia during this evaluation, interviews with Federation staff in Geneva and several PNS headquarters staff as well as perusal of various country reports/studies formed the basis of the observations and conclusions drawn on the operations in that country.

### **1.3 Objectives and Focus:**

The objectives of this round of the real time evaluations were to:

- 1) improve the lives of the affected people through generating lessons and providing input into the operation;
- 2) take stock of progress, provide an independent and objective basis to review performance of the Asia Earthquake and Tsunami operations, their processes and systems;
- 3) provide recommendations to the participating and host National Societies, Federation Secretariat and the donors for any necessary changes in management and coordination, the overall implementation of the operation, and the future work-programme of the operation;
- 4) bring all members of the International Federation participating in the Tsunami operation under a common purview of accountability and evaluations;
- 5) address concerns of the victims and the affected communities;
- 6) ensure and demonstrate active accountability in the achievement of the objectives and utilisation of resources to our beneficiaries, public, partners and donors.

Detailed Terms of Reference for the Review is attached as Annexe 1.

### **1.4 Methodology and process followed by the Evaluators:**

#### **a) Field Studies and Interviews:**

As mentioned in the scope, a series of three field studies were conducted separately by four consultants contracted by the Federation's Monitoring & Evaluations Departments between early August and September. The coverage of the field studies were as follows:

India and Maldives:	1 consultant
Sri Lanka:	2 consultants
East Africa:	1 consultant (team leader)
PNS HQ interviews:	Team leader

The Executive Summary of the field studies are annexed as Annexe 4, 5 and 6 respectively for Sri Lanka, India/Maldives and East Africa respectively.

A total of thirteen PNS HQ managers/Directors were interviewed by the team leader as part of this RTE. A list of people interviewed is given in Annexe 2.

**b) Emphasis of this evaluation:**

As outlined in the TOR, the evaluation has been based on understanding the perspectives of beneficiaries and affected communities of their needs and assessing how the RCRC Movement is contributing to fulfilment of these. Unlike in conventional evaluations, less emphasis has been given on assessing internal issues of management and operational mechanisms, although wherever such issues were seen to have a direct bearing on beneficiary-outcomes, comments have been made in the report.

**c) Methods Employed:**

The evaluation has used two principal frameworks and standards to assess the response:

- The Regional Strategy and Operational Framework of the Movement; and
- Principles of Conduct for The Red Cross & Red Crescent Movement & NGOs in Disaster Response Programme.

The Sphere common standards were used in addition to the above. The report however does not specifically present the evaluation findings in the framework of the Sphere common standards as these are all covered by the two principal frameworks used in carrying out the analysis of and drawing conclusions from the observations and information. References have been made in different sections in footnotes to indicate the Sphere Common Standards which are pertinent to a point under discussion. The DAC criteria for evaluation was not directly used as it was felt that the RSOF and Code of Conduct covered all aspects, although a few standard DAC criteria like Timeliness, Effectiveness and Quality have been used in this report in the latter sections.

The methods employed by the evaluators in gathering and assessing information were the following:

- Detailed briefing, meetings and discussion with staff at the Federation secretariat (both HQ and Delegations), various units and departments involved in emergency response in general and tsunami response in particular.
- Key informant interviews with staff from regional/international HQ offices of the PNSs.
- Desk research: Study of the Operations updates, progress reports, monitoring mission reports, 1<sup>st</sup> RTE reports, reports on other relevant evaluations and all relevant documents made available in hard copies as well as electronically.

- Country studies carried out in Sri Lanka, India, Maldives, Somalia and Seychelles during August and September 2005.
- Triangulation of information gathered from the country studies by comparing the findings with interviews with PNSs, through debriefings held with Federation Delegates and HQ Managers, comparison of statements made by interviewees with reports and published information as well as author's own background knowledge about the tsunami-operations in affected countries most of which the author has visited over the past several months (Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Somalia, Seychelles) in connexion with various evaluations, including the 1<sup>st</sup> RTE for the Federation.
- Perusal of progress reports and review documents on Indonesia.

A list of key documents reviewed by the evaluators is attached as Annexe 3.

### **1.5 The Report:**

The report was written by the Evaluation team leader, with inputs from country studies carried out in different countries. Specific references have been made wherever information and analysis has been drawn from a country study.

Throughout the report, conclusions and central issues arising from discussions/observations have been highlighted with grey shading, and Recommendations are typed in Verdana 9 font in order to separate these from the main text.

### **1.6 Constraints:**

- i) All observations regarding Indonesia in this report have been based on discussions with PNSs and some Secretariat Staff as no field study was carried out in Indonesia during the 2<sup>nd</sup> RTE.
- ii) The financial aspects of the operation were not examined in this RTE as a separate process was commissioned by IFRC to examine the financial side of the operations.
- iii) Personnel issues, issues related to staff competence<sup>4</sup> and management were not examined in detail in this RTE as, it was understood that, the Federation Secretariat has been already addressing these issues through a comprehensive set of assessments and measures over the past several months.

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<sup>4</sup> Sphere Common Standards 7 and 8.

## **Chapter 2:**

### **ISSUES ARISING OUT OF THE EARLY PHASE OF TSUNAMI RESPONSE**

*(This chapter describes, analyses and draws conclusions on the early relief phase of the operations based on the country studies, discussion with various interlocutors and study of relevant documents as mentioned in the Methodology section in the previous chapter. In three separate sections, brief assessment of early response in different countries is presented, with conclusions at the end of relevant section; assessment of early response in Indonesia and Sri Lanka is based on the 1<sup>st</sup> RTE and have been briefly recapitulated here, while for other countries this is described in greater detail as these countries were not covered in the 1<sup>st</sup> RTE. The conclusions pull out the strategic issues that the organisation needs to address).*

#### **2.1 Indonesia and Sri Lanka:**

##### **a) Strengths in the early response:**

The first round of RTE undertaken in February covered the early phase of the response in these two major tsunami-hit countries, namely Indonesia and Sri Lanka. Hence the relief phase of these two countries is not re-examined in the current RTE, while the relief phase in India, Maldives and eastern Africa which were not covered in the 1<sup>st</sup> RTE are examined in this RTE, in addition to looking at recovery and reconstruction work in all the countries.

To recap, some of the major achievements highlighted in the 1<sup>st</sup> RTE were:

- a. mobilising massive number of local volunteers and international resources to launch immediate relief and rescue operations, including provision of basic healthcare, supply of drinking water and food for the affected communities in both countries;
- b. in Indonesia, the Movement was to first to arrive on the scene and began rescuing the injured and recovering the dead; some of the affected people in remote areas got access to first aid and basic health care within the first two weeks of the disaster through the work of RCRC members;
- c. the establishment of Movement coordination framework which laid the foundation for a coordinated RCRC long term response; and
- d. a concerted effort to assess the recovery needs in both the countries was undertaken which yielded a comprehensive plan of action.

##### **b) Challenges faced in early response:**

While the relief operations were by and large handled efficiently and were generally timely and effective especially after the initial chaos and confusion that existed in the early weeks, shortage of skills and competence within the Movement in terms of undertaking a major recovery and reconstruction operation was noted as a potential challenge as most of the conventional strengths of the RCRC Movement were around immediate relief. Another major issue highlighted in the 1st RTE was the need for strengthening leadership and decision-making capacity at the operational level as the success of recovery/ reconstruction will be incumbent on stronger leadership at the field level.

Some of the other specific challenges highlighted in the 1<sup>st</sup> RTE were as follows:

1. A large number of PNSs rushed in to launch their own operations without any coordination with the secretariat, and sometimes without any consultation with the local Red Cross Societies in Indonesia and Sri Lanka.
2. Involvement of the affected community in planning and design of the response or integrating a 'beneficiary-perspective' into the humanitarian response of the RCRC (this applies to other humanitarian organisations as well) was conspicuously lacking throughout the operation.
3. The response was strongly influenced more by the domestic and media needs and the perception of donors in the home countries of the PNSs than by the *expressed* needs of the affected community.

Given the scale of resources the Movement mobilised and the *relatively* limited nature of relief and recovery needs, the 1<sup>st</sup> RTE noted that tsunami offered an opportunity to link the response to long-term disaster preparedness in all the affected countries.

## **2.2 Early response in East Africa:**

### **Fast mobilisation of relief and rescue operations by national societies:**

In both Somalia and Seychelles, the respective National Societies launched appropriate response immediately after the disaster. The Somalia Red Crescent Society (SRCS) was the first organisation to reach the most-affected areas in the country, and launched a search and rescue operation, provided first aid and healthcare services and undertook clearing of debris in the affected areas immediately after the disaster. Communities interviewed appreciated the role played by the SRCS volunteers as they were the first to arrive on the scene; all other organisations arrived a few days after SRCS, especially in Hafun which is a remote area<sup>5</sup>. It is to be noted here that SRCS is the only institution in the country which has a nationwide presence, with branches in all the districts. It is amazing that SRCS was able to launch such a

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<sup>5</sup> Hafun is not connected by road to other parts of the country. SRCS did not have a branch in Hafun. The nearest branch was in Bossasso, two days' of travel from Hafun. Volunteers were drawn from Bossasso and other districts in Bari region. The last part of the journey required the volunteers to walk several hours to reach the affected area.



speedy response given the remoteness of some areas and lack of any communication and logistics infrastructure in the country, as well as the fact that SRCS's top leadership is based in Nairobi which is at least 4 hours by flight from the affected areas. Staff from Northeastern branches of SRCS participated in UN OCHA-led assessment missions in tsunami-affected areas. A total of 100 volunteers from across the region were mobilised by the SRCS in the early days of the operation. UNICEF and WHO both depended a great deal on SRCS volunteers for their relief response.

In Seychelles, the Seychelles RC (SRC) was the only organisation which came to the assistance of the affected people. Despite lack of resources, Seychelles RC was able to respond speedily and proportionately to the humanitarian needs in the country. In this small country, RC was the *only* organisation which responded to the disaster in immediate relief, rescue and provision of non-food items. SRC's current focus is on disaster preparedness as the needs for further assistance in recovery and reconstruction is minimal in the country. Towards this, it is working closely with the French RC funded regional initiative, PIROI, and German RC which is funding pre-positioning of essential stocks in a few islands in the country. Seychelles RC assisted about 350 families in the relief phase. In the recovery phase, about 50 fishermen will be assisted with fishing kits, and 30 families with building materials. Overall the NS did a good job, and the support from the Federation was timely. The SRC also undertook regular follow up with the families supported to monitor how they were recovering.

#### **b) Proportionality of response in Somalia:**

While the number of people directly affected by tsunami in both Somalia and Seychelles was small compared with any of the Asian countries, one can not ignore the fact that especially in Somalia, Tsunami only added to the misery of a large population already under chronic humanitarian crisis due to conflict<sup>6</sup>, floods (2004), four successive years of droughts (2001-2004), tropical storm, locust invasion (June 2004) and cold rain (December 2004). These disasters have had the consequence of stripping large portions of the population, particularly in the rural and coastal areas of their livelihoods. According to Tsunami Assessment Report<sup>7</sup>, the areas most affected by Tsunami were Hafun, Bender Beyla, Dharin Raqas and Kulub where substantial damage was caused to housing and infrastructure. The joint strategy<sup>8</sup> estimated that about 16,000 people will require food assistance or cash. This evaluator has seen all the tsunami affected areas in Aceh, Sri Lanka and India, and can not think of any community where the *humanitarian needs of survivors* was more pressing than what was seen in Somalia, although not all of these were caused by tsunami alone.

SRCS' response was limited to the initial first aid, rescue, debris clearing and healthcare which are the areas of its competence, and its intervention in the area of

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<sup>6</sup> In Puntland region alone, the number of IDPs before tsunami was estimated at 50,000 (Aminata Wlansaray, OCHA, Garowe in a personal communication with the team leader).

<sup>7</sup> Joint Assessment undertaken by OCHA, WHO, FAO, with Puntland Authorities in January 2005.

<sup>8</sup> Joint UN Strategy to address the needs of the internally displaced persons in Somalia, Draft, July 2005.

water, sanitation and debris clearing prevented any outbreak of diseases. SRCS was the only organisation which fulfilled this role in a country where the pre-existing health and hygiene levels were already low, and hence their contribution to saving lives was immense. Despite this positive contribution in the early stages, the scale of SRCS's response was small in comparison with the humanitarian needs that existed. Communities and local officials interviewed in all locations mentioned that in the first few days (about 10 days or so) they had shortage of food and water which no one was providing. SRCS volunteers stated that they could not respond to needs other than first aid as they had no supply of relief materials. Unicef and WFP provided these, but it appears that these reached people only after 7-10 days. This raises two issues for SRCS and the Federation:

- a) By not scaling up the operation and by not taking into account the totality of communities' needs and suffering in designing the response programme, the agencies failed to respond proportionately to the humanitarian needs that existed.
- b) If SRCS's capacity was limited to healthcare only (the health work is all centred around clinics), should not the Federation have brought<sup>9</sup> in staff from other neighbouring countries and launched a more substantive response, especially in areas where security situation is much better than in the South and central parts of the country?

**c) Opportunities lost:**

Although the direct effect of tsunami in Somalia (150 dead and 5,000 displaced<sup>10</sup>) was small compared with the worst-hit countries like Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Thailand and Maldives, the incidence of the disaster on the communities which lost all their fishing-related livelihoods, combined with the fact that there existed a dire humanitarian situation pre-tsunami, with little local capacity to cope exacerbated the situation. The communities and local authorities spoken to were critical of the fact that SRCS/RC did not launch any recovery/reconstruction response after the initial few weeks of emergency phase. The present phase of the response is supposedly integrated into long term plan which is centred around establishing primary health care centres in different districts. While creating healthcare infrastructure is a critical need in the country which has very little infrastructure, the Federation is losing an opportunity to scale up the humanitarian response in the areas of sanitation (solid waste disposal which is a major problem in all areas<sup>11</sup>), livelihoods, creation of community infrastructure like roads, wells etc., through cash-for-work which would have benefited large communities affected by tsunami, floods, droughts and conflict over the past fifteen years.

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<sup>9</sup> The delegation initially planned a very small response. Direct help to people was minimal. SRCS volunteers distributed food supplied by WFP and collected from non-affected communities.

<sup>10</sup> OCHA, 18 January, 2005. Number of dead was higher in Somalia than in Maldives (82), and number of displaced was about a quarter of that in Maldives (21,663).

<sup>11</sup> In Puntland, SC-UK has been running Cash for Work programme in several tsunami-hit areas; one of the major activities under the CFW is solid waste disposal which is major problem in many communities. The evaluator is informed by the Federation delegation that sanitation and solid waste disposal are included in the long term programming strategy.

Challenges/Issues emerging:

- While the ONS did the right things by concentrating on its areas of competence, should not the Federation, with support from PNSs, have launched a substantive response in Somalia in proportion to the needs of the affected communities and resources available?

## **2.3 India and Maldives:**

### **a) Mobilisation of speedy relief response by Indian Red Cross Society:**

IRCS volunteers were on the scene in most of the stricken districts within hours of the disaster, and played a critical role in rescue and relief operations, in assisting the district administration in early relief efforts. The IRCS declined offer of assistance from the Federation and several PNSs which were ready to support its efforts as the IRCS was confident that it had the necessary resources and capacity to deal with the disaster on its own. The initial response in the country did show that the NS has an excellent capacity to respond to the immediate needs. In one area (Andaman & Nicobar islands) where there did not exist a functioning branch of the IRCS, a senior official from the NHQ accompanied by a Federation delegate visited the area in the first week after the disaster and initiated relief activities with the help of government machinery.

### **b) Federation-led response in Maldives:**

As there is no NS in the country, the response here was led by the Federation. A combined FACT and RDRT team was deployed which was able to initiate an early response working directly with the Government of Maldives (GOM) as the operational partner. The Federation provided relief supplies to the GOM which undertook their distribution including selection of beneficiaries. Since the Federation did not have any previous presence in the country, the approach taken to work through government was appropriate. Small number (compared to Sri Lanka and Indonesia) of PNSs responded to the needs in the country, with close coordination with the Federation.

### **c) Needs assessment in India and Maldives in the relief phase:**

In Maldives, Federation has primarily used the government beneficiary list, and not cross-checked it with its own assessment of vulnerable target group. The country study points out that the GOM beneficiary list, as is to be expected, was full of gaps and biases. The country study carried out as part of this RTE did not find any evidence that beneficiary participation was encouraged either in needs assessment or during planning or relief distribution stage in various islands in Maldives. In India, there were two rounds of assessments carried out by the IRCS. However, the second round of assessments was done without any reference to the first one, and did not capture the changing needs of the communities in a fast-evolving situation. Overall the country studies point to a gap in systematic needs assessment at the level of

community, based on an understanding of vulnerable groups and their needs. The FACT/RDRT teams in Maldives were preoccupied with operationalities of the response, rather than carrying out a systematic community focused assessment of needs.

Challenges/Issues emerging:

- Needs assessment during the relief phase is not a one-off affair and needs to be sensitive to affected communities' perception of needs.

## **Chapter 3:**

### **TRANSITION FROM RELIEF TO RECOVERY STAGE**

*(This chapter focuses on the Regional Strategy and Operational Framework agreed by the Movement in March this year for the recovery and reconstruction response by the entire Movement. In five separate sections, this chapter examines the achievements and challenges faced in delivery of the recovery response agreed in the Framework. At the end of each section, attempt has been made to pull out the key challenges/issues and provide corresponding recommendations which the evaluators believe will address the issues).*

#### **3.1 Key Components of the recovery strategy:**

##### **3.1.1 Regional strategy and operational framework:**

The Federation's recovery strategy was outlined in the RSOF in the Response Forum in Hong Kong in early March. Clear delineation of the RSOF and its agreement by over 30 Movement partners from across the world was itself an important achievement in the evolution of the recovery response. The recovery strategy was centred around four key elements<sup>12</sup>:

- building on the nature and experiences of the emergency response, plan and implement a range of early and long-term recovery programmes guided by established standards and best practice;
- establishing new in-country coordination structures for effective collaboration between the Movement components, and ensuring effective coordination with government authorities as well as with UN agencies/other international agencies;
- introducing new strategic elements to strengthen inter- and intra-agency coordination and response, including cross-cutting issues of gender, conflict, equity and capacity building; and
- establishing a robust accountability framework.

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<sup>12</sup> Asia earthquake and tsunamis: Regional Strategy and Operational Framework for the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, March 2005

### **3.1.2 Outcomes sought at beneficiary/community level:**

This relates to the first of the four elements mentioned above. As outlined in the RSOF, the recovery strategy is geared towards delivering the following key outcomes for the affected communities:

*Priority programme      Key Outcomes sought at community level*

Health	Health care and basic welfare; rebuilding water and sanitation systems; sustainable health systems complementary to government efforts; ongoing psychosocial support to affected community.
Livelihoods	Cash for work to recover productive assets, assist local economy to recover in a sustainable way; families economically self-sufficient; reduce vulnerability of households to future hazards.
Reconstruction	Reconstruct and develop communities' social, health, educational and household coping mechanisms and infrastructure through participatory actions.
Disaster Management	Enhance coping mechanism; early warning system; National Societies able to support community-based disaster preparedness.
Humanitarian values	Equitable rights and dignity of all affected people through Better Programming Initiatives.

## **3.2 Key Achievements and Lessons on implementation of the recovery strategy:**

### **3.2.1 Health and Care:**

#### **a) Meeting basic health needs:**

In all the countries this RTE carried out field work, the health work carried out by NSs either as part of the regular clinics and community health programmes (Sri Lanka), primary health centres (Somalia) are providing basic health care to people. In Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Maldives, psychosocial work carried out by PNSs is playing a crucial role in the recovery process as the massive psycho-social impact of living in shelters and temporary accommodation needs to be addressed. Country studies in Sri Lanka and Somalia indicate that the health and care programme provided the unique (and often the only) opportunity for the RCRC to maintain a continuous engagement with the community as other programmes and activities had limited community engagement in the recovery process. In Maldives, a PNS-run psychosocial programme

continues to play a critical role in providing support to the communities. In the most affected areas in Somalia, 4 new Mother and child health clinics were set up after the tsunami bringing in life-saving health care to a community which had no access to even the rudimentary health system for over two decades.

While continuing to provide healthcare services, RCRC have also been focusing on rehabilitation and reconstruction of health infrastructures in different countries destroyed by tsunami. For example, in Indonesia, by the end of September 2005, 132 health facilities were completed and more were in progress.

#### **b) Water and sanitation:**

A traditional strength of some PNSs, water systems have continued to deliver life-saving water to many communities in Sri Lanka, India, Maldives and Indonesia. Although Indian RCS did not depend on Federation or PNS support, the water purification systems previously donated by one PNS came in handy in this disaster. IRCS now has water units which it runs like ERUs in the country. In Somalia, SRCS whose response has been centred around primary health clinics, is now building its Watsan capacity to integrate with its health care programme. Initially the Watsan systems will be piloted in the MCH/OPD clinics to enable them to focus on Watsan awareness.

In Sri Lanka, several PNSs continuing to provide water to displaced communities through cleaning of wells and rehabilitation of damaged infrastructures. While these small-scale Watsan interventions are benefiting communities directly, there are instances especially in Sri Lanka where vulnerable population and communities' needs are being ignored, as plans are being made to support big-budget infrastructure projects identified by government in the area of water and sanitation. To what extent these infrastructure projects planned by the government without any involvement of the communities will benefit the affected communities and the vulnerable remains unclear. As one PNS Watsan delegate put it, these projects may remain a pipe-dream while community level water projects do not receive adequate attention. The Sri Lanka study expressed concern that such large infrastructure projects being planned with GOSL, without necessary technical expertise and needs assessment may not bring desired benefits in a timely and effective way for the affected communities. Moreover, in Sri Lanka the under-current of ethnic conflict which strongly influences politics at local and national level means that the government-initiated projects are heavily driven by political interests than by pure humanitarian needs.

In Maldives, similar large water and sanitation (waste management) infrastructure projects are being planned with Government of Maldives. While these projects are appropriate public health interventions and are designed to assist communities in garbage and waste disposal, it is important that community participation and ownership dimensions of the project design and implementation are given adequate attention. Left to themselves, it is feared that the government institutions may not prioritise the community processes in project implementation.

### **3.2.2 Livelihoods:**

Livelihoods is always a complex area for any organisation, especially for the RCRC which is not known for its strength in this area. There are some good examples within the Movement to link livelihoods with shelter strategy, and some innovative approaches by a few PNSs: the cash disbursement system through banks initiated by the British Red Cross Society for income-generation and micro-enterprise programme is particularly noteworthy and can provide interesting lessons for the entire humanitarian sector. Likewise, the cash-for-work carried out by many PNSs in Sri Lanka and Indonesia which assisted with short term livelihoods support to families and local economies affected by tsunami, conflict and other natural disasters provides excellent example of how equity issues and dimensions of conflict and vulnerability have been dealt with in programming. However, these examples are few in number, given RCRC's resources and sheer scale of involvement in all the affected countries.

In Somalia and India, the Federation or NSs have not got involved in any livelihoods restoration activities. In Somalia, where several assessments have highlighted the need for short and long term livelihoods strategies to be developed, the RCRC has not attempted to address any aspect of livelihoods recovery. In Maldives, BRCS has been carrying out assessments for livelihoods recovery and with their widely acclaimed expertise in this area, the BRCS will take the lead in RCRC livelihoods interventions in the country, with appropriate support from the Federation. In Sri Lanka, there have been some cash-for-work carried out by several PNSs, but in the absence of any concerted strategy to link these to a recovery process, there is not a great deal to go by. The RTE noted that in recent weeks, with the placement of recovery delegates in country, the technical working groups<sup>13</sup> have begun looking into livelihoods issues in Sri Lanka and Indonesia.

### **3.2.3 Reconstruction:**

#### **(a) Shelter:**

Approach to shelter taken in early phase: The RCRC Response Forum<sup>14</sup> stressed that while the focus of many humanitarian agencies would remain on provision of temporary shelters, the RCRC will focus on rebuilding permanent houses while advocating the importance of voluntary relocation of the affected populations. Many interlocutors in the Federation have said that there was reluctance to engage in transitional shelters as there were too many examples of such shelters becoming permanent. With the exception of Maldives where the Federation got involved in transition shelter from the very early stages, need for transition shelter was not paid attention to by the RCRC. In Indonesia, where the government was building military-type barracks as transition shelters, RCRC (and other humanitarian agencies) did not get involved in shelters in the early stages as the government shelters were seen to be sub-standard; another concern of all human rights organisations was that the temporary shelters, known as 'barracks', would be used for forced settlement as they

<sup>13</sup> TWGs are part of Movement Coordination Framework, explained in section 3.3.1

<sup>14</sup> RCRC Response Forum, 3-5 March 2005, Hong Kong

had been during the war. In Sri Lanka, RCRC did not engage on the t-shelter issues in the early stages as it saw many organisations taking up shelter construction.

While some of the above factors (barracks in Indonesia, multiple agencies committing shelters in Sri Lanka) may have contributed to the RCRC's decision not to engage on the t-shelters in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, the major focus right in the early stages was rebuilding permanent houses and infrastructure. This was the main weaknesses in the response - decision to hurry forward into reconstruction without adequately addressing the needs of the transitional stage. By ignoring the need for transition shelters, humanitarian agencies consigned people to unacceptable conditions for periods likely to extend to several years before permanent solutions are found. In Sri Lanka, t-shelter pledges made in the early weeks by different agencies did not mean that all the needs were being met. During January and February, pledges were made by many organisations to make t-shelters, but according to UNHCR which coordinated t-shelter work in Sri Lanka, it became evident by March-April that many of these so called pledges were not materialising, and some of the shelters being put up were of poor quality as the agencies which were building these had little prior experience<sup>15</sup>. Even at that stage (early summer) when it was obvious that t-shelter needs were not being met in Sri Lanka despite initial pledges, the RCRC stayed away from engaging on this issue. In Indonesia, Japanese RC was the only PNS which got involved in some t-shelters in the early stages bi-laterally; others disengaged from the transition shelters because of concerns about standards, but offered no alternative. As a result, some thousands of people especially in Indonesia remain in tents, even after nearly a year of the tsunami. This is an unacceptable outcome given the scale of resources available.

Needless to say, RCRC have rich experiences all over the world which clearly show that rebuilding permanent houses and rebuilding communities have never happened in anything less than several years anywhere<sup>16</sup>. In Maldives, the Federation did get involved in t-shelters right from the early days. However, what made them ignore this learning in Indonesia and Sri Lanka is unclear to the evaluators.

The Federation is now gearing itself up for transitional shelters, both construction of new ones as well as upgrading of some of the existing ones which are becoming uninhabitable in Indonesia and Sri Lanka<sup>17</sup>. Operations update of 28<sup>th</sup> July (Appeal No. 28/2004) highlights for the first time the issue of t-shelters in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, especially for people living in tented camps. In early July, OCHA and the Federation in Indonesia agreed to set up a working group to urgently address the need

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<sup>15</sup> It was not until the month of June/July that t-shelter needs in Sri Lanka were met, although the need for upgradation /repairs to many of these still remain.

<sup>16</sup> At the policy and headquarters level, the Federation senior managers were aware of the need to take a long term approach to reconstruction. However, at the operational level in the field, the preoccupation of most of the PNSs right from the early weeks (as early as February, when in-country operational plans were being drawn up) was on permanent housing. This led to near-disengagement from practical and humanitarian needs (especially in Sri Lanka) after the first phase of relief, with very little to show for in terms of actually meeting the humanitarian needs of the affected communities.

<sup>17</sup> In Sri Lanka, the Federation is undertaking a review of t-shelters and will undertake upgrading work wherever necessary. It is estimated that about 20% of the t-shelters in SL need upgrading.



of transitional shelters before the start of rainy season in mid-September. Action agreed was to distribute about 27,000 tents as transitional shelters will take time to complete and will not be ready before September, the start of the rainy season. While this does indicate the Federation's preparedness to change its operational strategy in response to needs<sup>18</sup>, one can not avoid asking the question what took it seven months to recognise a need that was there throughout.

Challenges/Issues emerging:

- The RAT team did not have any shelter/housing expertise on them and when the reports came to Geneva HQ, there was no one with in-depth understanding of post-disaster issues to critique the reports and notice that t-shelter needs were not addressed in the reports.

**(b) Permanent Housing:**

Raising unrealistic expectations, and not delivering: Experiences<sup>19</sup> from all post-disaster housing all over the world point to the complexity of planning and delivering housing programmes which usually take several years of hard work to get these right. A quick-fix solution generally ends up in failure. The RCRC Movement initially assumed that with the resources (both financial and number of PNSs involved) they have at their command, they would move very fast - one reason for not getting into transition shelter<sup>20</sup> was that the RCRC will concentrate on permanent housing. This indirectly conveyed the misleading message to all stakeholders (especially the Governments) that RCRC would move very fast on housing. In Sri Lanka the government's expectation was that since the RCRC was not involved in transitional housing, it would move ahead speedily with reconstruction of permanent shelter once lands were identified and beneficiary lists provided.

If one looked at the sheer achievement in number of houses constructed, the picture is disappointing. There is a great deal of frustration within the Movement over this issue.

To date<sup>21</sup>, of the 15,000 houses committed by the RCRC in SL, 53 have been constructed by the Maltese Red Cross in the Matara district and about twenty more by the Belgian Red Cross in the Kalutara district. The Maltese established themselves outside of the Movement Coordination Framework and commenced the construction of houses in the land provided by the GoSL. The other housing programme that is ongoing with a model house near completion and foundations laid for is that of the Turkish Red Crescent that is part of a tri-partite agreement between the GOSL and the

<sup>18</sup> In Indonesia, of the 500,000 people displaced, approximately 255,000 are living with host families, 170,000 are in tents and the remaining are in transitional living centres set up by the government.

<sup>19</sup> Permanent housing in any major resettlement programme like this has never been accomplished within anything less than 2-3 years. There are examples galore (from earthquakes in Gujarat in India, Bam earthquake in Iran etc) that rushed housing projects generally end up in failure – houses constructed but people never occupying these).

<sup>20</sup> Except in Maldives, where the Federation did get involved in provision of t-shelters right from the early days.

<sup>21</sup> As of September 2005, when field work for this RTE was carried out.

Government of Turkey to build 400 houses. Both Turkish and Maltese projects<sup>22</sup> were operational outside the Movement Coordination Framework.

The delay was for various reasons, some of which are outside the organisation's control and are attributed to complex land and domestic policy environment within the countries. However, one can not ignore the fact that RCRC did create the impression, as did the national governments in the affected countries, that need for transition shelters were only 'temporary' as permanent houses would come up fast, and hence less critical in the overall pattern of the response. A general impression was created that it was more important to focus on issues of permanent houses right from the early stage.

This evaluation considers that this was the biggest mistake of the RCRC movement, and reflects an inability to analyse the pattern of humanitarian needs as it evolved after the immediate relief stage. There is no short-cut to building permanent houses if one thinks of housing as more than bricks-and-mortar as any humanitarian agency ought to do in the situations following tsunami. While there are internal issues (as below) which caused delays in going ahead with housing and these need to be addressed, this evaluation does not consider that the delay in housing is the main issue: the evaluation is more critical of the fact that preoccupation with housing led to near-total disengagement from the issues of transition, i.e., humanitarian needs in tents and transition shelters. Apart from appropriate quality transition shelter, livelihoods support was the most important humanitarian need in the transition/recovery phase. As the Listening Project teams found, majority of people would have preferred to build their own houses if they had adequate livelihood support<sup>23</sup>. Both these needs got deprioritised in RC response. The net result was that the contribution of RCRC to meeting the humanitarian needs of the affected communities was not commensurate with the resources the former commanded. Inability to manage expectations raised on housing combined with slow progress in providing other forms of humanitarian assistance (in livelihoods, transition shelter, etc) have created a situation where RCRC can be hauled up for inefficient response.

RCRC was one of the first to have been allocated dispute-free, clear land by the GA in the 3<sup>rd</sup> week of January. The PNS concerned could not start the work in time due to the delays in decision-making within the movement and hiring of contractors. As a result, the land granted was revoked by the GoSL and handed over to another NGO which has now started building houses.

The evaluators, while being appreciative of the need for better policy and clarity on buffer zone issues (Sri Lanka) coming out of the government, do not see any reason why *in situ* constructions outside the buffer zone (which in many districts will house 40-60 per cent of the families) where the land titles are clear can not be begun. Slow progress in Indonesia can be justified to a considerable extent by the immense

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<sup>22</sup> Although the Maltese RC completed the houses in record time and people moved in, communities have complained of the quality of the construction, the doors, fitting etc., which were all done through contractors.

<sup>23</sup> Report Of Listening Project Aceh, Indonesia, November 2005

contextual problems. The capacity of government was itself decimated, land records were lost and the destruction was so total that even the most basic policies have taken time to develop. It is expected that with the Indonesian Government's Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Executing Agency (BRR) now being fully functional, policy and operational decisions will move faster enabling all humanitarian agencies move forward on house construction. It is estimated that 90% of the houses in Indonesia will be built on old locations<sup>24</sup>, i.e., only 10% will involve relocation.

As has been pointed out in previous paragraphs, some of the delay could have been foreseen. At the same time, there are several internal factors which have also caused severe delays. The Sri Lanka country study observed that to a large extent the delay is due to the constraints at the task force level and failure to arrive at a proper system for hiring requisite staff, dealing with procurement etc. Specific reasons, within the sphere of RCRC's influence, for lack of progress in constructing permanent houses highlighted in the Sri Lanka study were:

- Over-centralised RC/RC tender, procurements and hiring processes, and inability to hire consultants and contractors in a timely fashion<sup>25</sup>;
- Lack of qualified and experienced technical personnel in SLRCS, Federation and PNS delegates with experience in housing sector;
- Tendency to do problem-solving at the Colombo rather than at district level. TAFREN and GAs interviewed by evaluators in the districts mentioned that rather than come to them for solving problems on a case by case basis, RCRC has a tendency to take issues to Colombo. The government authorities in Colombo can only decide at policy level, but can not address practical problems on the ground.
- 'Blame game' between the RC/RC housing sector personnel and GoSL bureaucracy (TAFREN, UDA, GA), and lack of a constructive problem solving approach and a failure to start with the smaller lands, building small numbers of houses on available land and proceed to the larger ones.

Corrective actions and innovative approach: In this context, the evaluation team notes that the Movement is aware of the growing concern in Government<sup>26</sup> circles about the delay in commencing construction activities in the large portion of land assigned to the Red Cross. At the time of this evaluation, the RCRC Movement was considering other work in the housing sector such as reinforcing transitional shelters built by other agencies, rebuilding partially damages houses outside the buffer zone, partly to compensate for inadequate progress in building permanent houses and partly due to evident needs. This evaluation considers such a strategy appropriate in the circumstances. It is also to be noted that shelter is a continuous process, starting with

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<sup>24</sup> Re-building families, homes and society: Reviewing progress and creating next steps; Indonesia Tsunami In-Country Coordination Forum, 26-28 October 2005 Jakarta.

<sup>25</sup> The Sri Lanka country delegation informed the evaluator that this delay was caused by the need to review and renegotiate an agreement between SLRCS and PNSs on recruitment protocols.

<sup>26</sup> "Recommendation to the Movement Platform to Review the Housing and Construction Policy of the RC/RC Movement to assist the people Affected by Tsunami", dated 14-06-2005.

emergency shelter, transition shelter through to permanent housing. Shelter needs to be integrally linked to livelihoods and not seen as a product to be delivered by an outside agency. The British Red Cross is currently undertaking in Aceh a sophisticated approach to shelter reconstruction that integrates support for livelihoods, and provides beneficiaries with a choice for their house designs. As Movement partners come under pressure to commence house construction, while it is important that internal bureaucratic delays do not come in the way of timely actions, it is also equally important for PNSs to ensure that they go through proper consultation and participation process involving beneficiaries, even if that takes substantial time. Housing is not a technical response; it is highly social and political intervention, and its success depends not on how fast houses are done but on how the affected families take ownership of the process of house building. This may mean that houses will take longer than what affected communities and public have been mistakenly led to believe, and this needs to be communicated proactively and positively by RCRC Movement. However, this also must not make agencies complacent in thinking that there is no sense of urgency. Affected communities are living in unsatisfactory conditions and must not be made to bear this for a day longer than is absolutely necessary.

Challenges/Issues emerging:

- RCRC is gradually losing the credibility and goodwill it had built up with the GOSL through its relief work and is losing touch with communities.
- Lack of expertise and staff capacity to deal with a process of transition from relief to recovery of a scale that is required on the ground.

**Recommendations:**

- R1. Appoint a shelter expert in the HQ Operations team who will provide overall direction, leadership and technical support on shelter<sup>27</sup>.
- R2. Invest in the transition shelters: upgrading of shelters, watsan and livelihoods.
- R3. Review the cumbersome bureaucratic procedures and put in place systems that achieve results. Plan for smaller number for a start – 15,000 houses are not built in one or two years.
- R4. Consider various options to fast-track house construction using other organisations which have competence. While continuing to engage with communities through transition shelters, sub-contract the work to social housing companies<sup>28</sup>.
- R5. The shelter plan developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for Aceh foresees selfbuild as the major mechanism for shelter reconstruction. World Bank beneficiaries build their own houses with funds and tools provided by the Bank. It may be appropriate to partner with other more experienced development sector players such as these which have a coherent and well-developed policy and capacity on shelter.

<sup>27</sup> It is understood that a shelter expert was recruited in November 2005.

<sup>28</sup> The Turkish Red Crescent society has subcontracted the work to a well reputed sector real estate developer who can handle large scale construction projects and would approach the beneficiaries as clients with four kinds of model houses.

### **3.2.4 Disaster Management:**

#### **(a) Disaster Preparedness:**

In both India and Indonesia, the disaster preparedness work done with the NSs by the Federation came in handy in mobilising the early response: regional warehouses established under the DP programme of IRCS supported by the Federation helped in quick distribution of relief assistance to beneficiaries and in providing drinking water. In Sri Lanka, the British Red Cross Society and Federation actively advocated with the government at the highest level for a systematic disaster preparedness strategy. At the request of the government, a consultant was sent by the BRCS to advise the government on this issue.

In East Africa, the Federation Secretariat responded well to the needs of the National societies and emphasised the disaster preparedness and capacity building of the national societies in the region as a central approach to tsunami response. As most parts of the region are continually affected by disasters, both natural and man-made, risk reduction and disaster preparedness for the national societies is critically important to reduce the vulnerability of a large segment of population periodically exposed to disasters. Advocacy has taken place with the UNDP and OCHA over supporting countries like Seychelles in developing DM plans by the government. There is an Inter Agency Working Group on DP in the region of which the Federation is co-chair. The Seychelles RC is on the national disaster committee advising the government on national disaster plan. In the Indian Ocean islands, the PIROI initiative by the French Red Cross which maintains a regional warehouse was able to provide immediate response through provision of stocks of relief materials to affected countries in the region. PIROI is planning to increase the regional stock of tents/plastic sheeting for 30,000 people, water treatment for 50,000 people and other non food items in its central warehouse for the Indian Ocean island region.

#### **(b) Managing the early response:**

As described earlier, in all the countries, the early response was speedy, timely and efficient. However, there were occasions when the NSs/Federation were caught unprepared. In India, thousands of volunteers had to work without operational gear like gloves, masks, body bags, etc. It was a similar story in Somalia: the volunteers did not have the necessary tools to respond effectively; up until the end of February when the supplies arrived from the Federation, the volunteers lacked masks, gumboots, heavy duty gloves, etc. Tsunami Operational Review<sup>29</sup> of the SRCS highlighted that reduced access to safe drinking water following the tsunami had a direct impact on hygiene practices of the affected communities, resulting in increased cases of water-borne diseases. The report also highlighted that although SRCS was the first to reach the disaster site, it was not adequately prepared in its response

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<sup>29</sup> Tsunami Operational Review Report, Somali Red Crescent Society and IFRC, February 2005.

efforts. Only a few volunteers had been trained in first aid while a small number had received disaster management training.

Challenges/Issues emerging:

- Disaster preparedness needs to better address the needs of volunteers who form the main pillar of RCRC response.

**Recommendation:**

- R6. Greater investment in systematic training and equipping of volunteers who form the main pillar of NS's response is needed.

**3.2.5 Humanitarian Values:**

Promotion of humanitarian values and Principles of the Federation often gets neglected in work with the national societies. The evaluation noted a substantial emphasis being placed on this in East Africa region. In Somalia, the Federation assisted the national disaster management agency with expertise in setting up its humanitarian agenda. In Seychelles, the SRC being perhaps the only humanitarian organisation in the country, it has a key role in promoting humanitarian values and engaging with the government on best practices in disaster response. The evaluators heard many accounts from affected communities of how weak the government response was. There certainly is an advocacy role for SRC in this.

**3.3 Coordination:**

Coordinating such a larger number of PNSs has not been attempted before. Incentives for coordination are weaker in recovery as each individual agency thinks it has established its base in the area and has developed an understanding of the community and its needs. By all accounts, the Federation has done a very good job of this. With about 25 PNSs in Sri Lanka and 30 in Indonesia, good coordination of response was essential for an effective response and the Federation secretariat took up the challenge right from the start. In the early days, the ICRC and Federation agreed on a coordinated approach for their support to agencies involved in tsunami response. In line with the principles of cooperation embodied in the Seville Agreement, the IFRC and ICRC agreed that:

- The Federation would provide general overview, strategy and operational guidelines, and assume the role of Movement spokesperson;
- The Federation would provide operational coordination of international response for Indonesia (except Aceh), the Southern and Western parts of Sri Lanka, India, the Maldives, Thailand and East Africa;
- The ICRC would provide operational coordination in areas in which it had been operational before the disaster (the NE of Sri Lanka, Aceh province of Indonesia, Myanmar and Somalia) as well as ensure overall coordination of programmes related to restoring family links in all countries affected by tsunami.

### **3.3.1 Movement Coordination Framework (MCF):**

Components of the MCF: The Movement Coordination Framework<sup>30</sup> developed in the early weeks after the tsunami in Indonesia and Sri Lanka laid the foundation for a strong coordination within the Movement. There are three components of the Framework:

1. The Movement platform has the responsibility for overall management of the operation, cooperation between Movement components, and representing a unified approach to the external world. The platform comprises the Host NS, IFRC Head of Delegation and the ICRC Head of Delegation;
2. The Movement partnership task force is responsible for ensuring quality programming and coordination between the Movement components and its external partners. It provides guidance on operational aspects of the recovery and ensures the Movement's adherence to policies and standards. It comprises representatives from all the operational PNSs and ICRC, IFRC and the ONS;
3. Technical Task Force Committees or working groups, with representatives from all Movement operational partners, including, where appropriate, representative from external agencies to develop shared plans and technical standards. The technical task force/committees are focused on various sectors and are made up of representatives from Movement operational partners. They are also responsible for day-to-day programme management including division of labour between different Movement stakeholders, developing cross-cutting minimum standards on needs assessment, programme options, common capacity building strategies and agreeing on common monitoring and evaluation standards. In addition to the technical working groups, the establishment of service centres which provide office, administrative, legal and logistics services have added value in facilitating the work of PNSs.

Movement coordination in East Africa: The RC-NET which has been functioning for several years in the region played a key role in coordinating the tsunami response across the region. Following the tsunami, it set up a sub-committee on communications which brought several information/ communication staff from various NSs in the region to work with the Federation delegation on communication. This not only enabled the Federation to augment its capacity, it also helped the NS staff go back with greater understanding of complex issues in communication.

Functioning of the MCF in Asia: The MCF formalises the structure how the components of the Movement can work together to develop and implement programmes and projects in response to the tsunami and earthquake disasters. Overall the framework has been found to be an effective mechanism for coordination, and has worked to varying degrees of successes in Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Maldives. In Maldives, where the number of PNSs are small, implementation of the framework has

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<sup>30</sup> For details on the framework, see Annexe 7

been straight forward. In the other two countries, the mandate and ways of working at the Movement Platform level are clear; however, at the Movement Partnership Task Force and Technical Task Force levels, there have been concerns that sometimes the process adds to delays without necessarily adding much value to an effective coordination of response.

In Sri Lanka, the technical working groups take decision on project proposals including project appraisal. The Partnership Task Force takes decisions on concept papers. There is a lot of overlap in the remit of both these bodies, without adding much value at least in the proposal development/project appraisal. The role and tasks at both these levels need clarity. All the PNSs<sup>31</sup> spoken to strongly articulated the concern that their current mode of functioning does not add value to the work of PNSs; instead, they add to delays and create a bureaucratic monolith which only serves to deny humanitarian assistance to the communities<sup>32</sup>. The discussions in various technical committees do not lead to improved programming responses in the field. It is reported<sup>33</sup> that some PNSs have found these meetings such a waste of time that they have stopped attending. There is confusion in the Technical Committees whether their role should be project appraisal, strategic planning or a combination of both. In Indonesia, at the taskforce level, questions were raised about the ability to monitor effectiveness in general and decision making in particular across the framework<sup>34</sup>.

Deployment of Movement Coordinators: Movement Coordinators were deployed in Sri Lanka and Indonesia between 4-8 weeks after the tsunami. Movement Coordinators should ideally have been in place much earlier – this would have helped avoid some of the PNSs putting undue pressure on ONSs and developing uncoordinated response in early weeks. It was also noted that because many of the core programme positions (like programme, recovery delegates) were unfilled, the Movement Coordinators took on these additional functions as well. This put additional stress on trying to manage both coordination and programme development as well. Despite this, the Federation Movement Coordinator played a key role in forging together various platforms and task forces and ensuring that they work together to coordinate the Movement response. However, one of the weaknesses identified was the inability to manage linkages across sectors. A programme coordinator with understanding and overview of thematic sectors will help in bringing about greater coherence in programming and establishing inter-sectoral linkages at very early stage<sup>35</sup>.

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<sup>31</sup> This view is however not shared by the Federation Country delegation who suggest that the project appraisal/ proposal development mechanism through the task force as existed at the time was essential to a quality response. The PNSs and the country study do not concur with this view.

<sup>32</sup> Some technical working groups have done well – the livelihoods group has developed guidelines and approaches to livelihoods.

<sup>33</sup> Note by Senior Recovery Officer on “Strengthening Technical Committees: Issues and Options”

<sup>34</sup> Re-building families, homes and society: Reviewing progress and creating next steps; Indonesia Tsunami In-Country Coordination Forum, 26-28 October 2005 Jakarta

<sup>35</sup> Movement Coordination in the Tsunami: Learning from the first 6 months, Working Group Meeting, June 27-29, 2005, Nairobi.



Challenges/Issues emerging:

- Coordination has been the cornerstone of this response. However, when over-bureaucratised, coordination of response has been sometimes reduced to administration of procedures which is self-serving, without any consideration of results/impact made on the lives and livelihoods of communities.

**Recommendations:**

- R7. Undertake<sup>36</sup> a thorough review of the functioning of various components of the MCF in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, and revamp those that are blocking achievement of results.
- R8. Develop a system for reporting and monitoring of coordination results/outcomes in terms of impact on community: at every stage, ask the question what impact an action will have on communities.
- R9. The technical working groups should not be reviewing/appraising every detail of the proposals which should be left to the individual PNSs to develop, but rather ensure development of common standards and approaches to major practical issues like needs assessment, gender/ vulnerability analysis, contractual (staff hire) and tendering issues, etc.

### **3.4 New Initiatives, Inter-Agency coordination and cross-cutting issues:**

#### **3.4.1 Innovative approaches:**

The Movement's response to the tsunami crisis has called for developing innovative approaches to strengthening global coordination and advocacy: the creation of the post of Special Representative of the Secretary General and Movement Coordination delegates in the field, regionally recruited delegates, deployment of RAT, setting up of Movement Service Centres and service agreements are a few examples of how the Movement, led by the Federation, has geared itself up for meeting the challenge. The concept of service centres as part of the MCF has been highly appreciated by the Movement partners as these have facilitated the PNSs response.

#### **3.4.2 Global Initiatives:**

The Federation has been very active in coordinating with various UN agencies both at the HQ level and in countries particularly in Indonesia and Eastern Africa. A significant initiative led by the Special Representative of the Secretary General has been the involvement in the various activities of the Global Coalition on Tsunami Recovery led by Bill Clinton. IFRC co-chairs with WHO the Working Group on Impact Assessment set up by the consortium. The Federation proposed putting in place indicators through which the government and agencies can follow the mid- and

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<sup>36</sup> It was reported during preparation of the final report of this evaluation that such a review was undertaken in Indonesia and Sri Lanka during September/October and the issues will be further addressed in new country strategies.

long-term impact of the tsunami recovery operations. A paper was produced by the Federation which became the basis for debate and agreement of strategy among agencies for impact assessment. The Federation has also been a key player in raising the issue of inadequacy in transition shelter especially in Aceh in the past three months, and has played a lead role in developing a coordinated response on this issue, albeit late.

### **3.4.3 Cross-Cutting issues:**

#### **a) Gender and Vulnerability<sup>37</sup>:**

Some PNSs were better in taking these into account in Indonesia and Sri Lanka than others. Addressing issues of gender and vulnerability are being looked into, and delegates are being recruited to support field operations in these areas. So far gender and conflict analysis were not systematically taken on board in programming as the Federation had no expertise on the ground to support programming around these issues. In both Indonesia and Sri Lanka, as the operation proceeds, conflict issues between the tsunami-affected and conflict-affected are coming to the fore.

Currently, reconstruction is underway for those who owned homes and land and could show titles, deeds and ownership. Several PNSs are assisting this process. Those who did not own their homes, and or were squatters are not however considered eligible for GoSL housing reconstruction grants etc. This means that those who are better off will be taken care of but the poor and vulnerable and landless will not be assisted and will languish in substandard transitional housing for a very long time. RC/RC movement needs to develop a systematic housing sector policy and advocacy strategy on this issue.

#### **b) Capacity building:**

Several PNSs have played a significant role in building water and sanitation response capacity of the IRCS. Spanish RC in Indonesia is helping PMI to develop capacity to run and maintain the Water ERU which was brought into the country by one PNS in the relief phase. Equipments have been provided to and PMI about 100 volunteers and staff have been trained in handling the ERU. This would substantially reinforce the capacity of PMI to respond to water needs following any disaster. A PNS is also helping SLRCS in strengthening its finance department through a capacity building project which would enhance its human resource capacity, financial and accounting software/ systems and procedures. There is also an initiative to assist PMI in its emergency communication and early warning systems.

While the above are a few examples of significant capacity building initiatives being carried out, there is also a growing concern that sometimes capacity building diverts attention from the central issues facing the Movement. In a correspondence with the Federation, one PNS rightly points out the distorted emphasis being laid on building capacity of SLRCS in every aspect of each project, with little reference to the primary

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<sup>37</sup> Sphere Common Standard 4.

objective which is to address the needs of the tsunami victims. The insistence that SLRCS must be involved in implementing each and every project assumes<sup>38</sup> that SLRCS is a well-functioning NS with reasonable capacity to do so; but that is not the case in reality.

**c) RCRC Radio Programme in Indonesia:**

A highly innovative method of communication with beneficiaries has been developed in Indonesia by the IFRC Information Department working with Turkish Red Crescent and PMI. Built around a Psychosocial Support Programme (PSP) launched earlier, the RCRC Radio Programme aims at reaching out to the tsunami-affected populations (majority of whom living in temporary/transition shelters now have access to radios, as found in studies conducted by UNDP and IFRC) and enable all movement partners to communicate regularly regarding all sectors of RCRC operations and services. This would include communication for purposes of dissemination, volunteer and staff recruitment, health education, programme advisories, and relationship-building between RCRC and beneficiaries.

**d) Volunteerism:**

Volunteers form the backbone of RCRC response. There is a high demand, especially in the relief stages, for volunteers to work with PNSs and the latter were prepared to pay substantial wages/per diem for the services which affected the concept of volunteerism. This can have a negative effect on the NS in the long run.

Challenges/Issues emerging:

- In a large operation like this involving record number of NSs, the Federation has been highly successful in introducing new ways of working and innovative approaches. Effectiveness of Movement Coordinators depends to a large degree on various thematic/programme delegates being able to provide programmatic leadership on targeting, vulnerability and other complex issues.
- Capacity building initiatives undertaken with clear and direct focus on results in relation to affected communities have been successful while the ones with predominant focus on NS have distorted the central objective of the response.

**Recommendations:**

- R10. In future response, ensure placement of Movement Coordinators and Recovery delegates early on in the field.
- R11. Capacity building needs to be directly linked to short and long-term outcomes which directly affect the lives and livelihoods of the affected communities.

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<sup>38</sup> It is argued that one of the reasons for doing so is the need to respect the role of NS as required under the statutes. While that (respect for the role of the NS) is central in any response, this does not necessarily mean that the NS has to get involved in every project even if it is beyond its capacity. Secondly while the statutes need to be respected, all components of the RCRC Movement are also signatories to the RCRC code of conduct which has its first principle that 'humanitarian needs come first'. Needs of NS can not be put before the humanitarian needs of affected communities.

- R12. Federation needs to develop guidelines on good practices on volunteers' compensation and incentives during large disasters.

### **3.5 Accountability to stakeholders<sup>39</sup>:**

Mechanism put in place: The Movement has rightly placed a great deal of emphasis on ensuring transparent and regular narrative and financial reporting to all stakeholders. A real time evaluation system has also been put in place. A review of the internal financial systems with specific reference to the tsunami response is currently underway. In addition, periodic independent financial audit is also being conducted to ensure that the funds are being utilised and accounted for in proper order. The RSOF outlined that a committee comprising five Movement Secretary Generals will be created to oversee the accountability and evaluation systems, which has now been done through the setting up of High Level Group for Tsunami Response. This group would also advise the Federation Secretary General as well as peer members on the overall strategy, with particular emphasis on accountability and risk management<sup>40</sup>. In the General Assembly in 2005, it was agreed to review and revise RSOF, involving smaller number of PNS and HNS, and link to in-country strategy processes. It has also been agreed that periodic monitoring of implementation of strategy at RSOF level will be conducted through field visits in 2006 to Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Maldives.

Accountability to affected communities: There have been some attempts to initiate mechanisms to ensure accountability to beneficiaries. The RCRC Radio initiative and Listening Project in Aceh in Indonesia are good beginnings. However, the Movement needs to show a greater commitment to affected communities and beneficiaries.

Obsessive preoccupation in Sri Lanka with adherence to bureaucratic procedures have led to near-total disengagement with the affected communities, which has been exacerbated by the Movement's decision not to get involved in transitional shelters. Only in sectors like psychosocial support, there is a continuing engagement with the communities. The Sri Lanka study notes that the cumbersome and over-centralised bureaucracy is "considerably distant in space and mentality from the districts where disaster occurred and the beneficiaries' need for speedy recovery evident". One PNS argues that while other organisations can focus on the needs of the most vulnerable and move ahead with the implementation, the RC Movement's efforts go in to setting up complex administrative structures, procedures, rules and regulations which limit the capacity to carry out any work, to the detriment of a swift, efficient, professional support to the victims.

In Sri Lanka, there is growing criticism of the tardiness of the international response by the government and communities as it is perceived that the donor agencies/INGOs

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<sup>39</sup> Sphere Common Standards 5 & 6

<sup>40</sup> Tsunami Partnership and Accountability Follow Up Meeting held in Seoul, at the General Assembly, November 10<sup>th</sup>, 2005

are not doing enough while spending a disproportionate amount of money on expatriate staff salary and benefits. While some of this is to be expected during transition from relief to recovery/long term development as having got used to the pace of relief delivery where things happen faster, lack of local and community ownership in the planning, design and implementation of recovery and reconstruction programmes remains an issue for the Movement and other international humanitarian organisations.

*Challenges/Issues emerging:*

- While procedures and mechanisms have been put in place to fulfil its accountability obligations to donors and other institutions, not enough systematic approach to ensuring accountability to affected communities was found to be in place.
- Beneficiary perspective and involvement in planning and design of programmes is often missing in RCRC response in Sri Lanka in particular.

**Recommendations:**

- R13. Strengthen staff capacity in community mobilisation and participatory approaches in key countries where operations are on-going.
- R14. At the technical working group level, assess performance in every sector in terms of results which have a community perspective built into them.

## **Chapter 4:**

### **RED CROSS CODE OF CONDUCT, ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY:**

*(In this chapter, the operations in different countries have been assessed against the Principles of Conduct for the Red Cross & Red Crescent Movement & NGOs in Disaster Response – briefly called RCRC code of Conduct).*

#### **4.1 Humanitarian Imperative: Primacy of needs of affected communities versus needs of Agencies, and access to affected communities (Principle 1 of the RCRC & NGOs Code of Conduct):**

As the disaster response moves from emergency phase into recovery and reconstruction phase, more systematic information is needed to plan appropriate response as beneficiary numbers and needs change. This is also borne out by the Sri Lanka study where it was found that beneficiary pool has reduced, and as the response moved from relief into recovery phase, it became distant from community's needs.

Mention has been made of the case in Sri Lanka where needs of the NS overtook the needs of communities so much so that an obsessive fulfilment of the bureaucratic requirements of the NS became almost a full-time occupation of most delegates in the field for months. The Federation failed to lay the ground rules with SLRCS in the early stages based on an objective analysis of the latter's strengths and weaknesses. By projecting the SLRCS as the central focus of the Movement support, both the Federation and SLRCS made unrealistic assumptions about a Society which has had a history of lack of capacity and accountability in the past, and ignored the fact that the humanitarian imperative came first in the post-disaster situation.

In Indonesia, the response had a reasonable balance between the needs of the communities and the NS as the latter had a better sense of community's needs and its own strengths and limitations. Within the broad principles of the MCF, the PNSs had the space and scope to address needs of affected communities.

Sri Lanka presents a complex situation in terms of how tsunami affected the country's economy and various sections of population. Several assessment reports from the North and East of the country highlighted the disparity between the North and East and the South. The already conflict-affected areas were further burdened with the complications brought on by the tsunami. An assessment by ICRC identified that the most vulnerable communities were in conflict as well as tsunami-affected areas. The economies of these communities are interlinked as goods produced in one area are brought to markets in the other. Furthermore, seasonal labour in the fishing and agricultural sectors requires that households will often have a series of income generating strategies that rely on a number of different sectors in several different geographies. Some PNSs and ICRC have quite rightly emphasised the need to address the poverty and vulnerability issues arising from twenty years of conflict as integral part of tsunami response.

#### **4.1.1 Humanitarian Access and Timely Response<sup>41</sup>:**

India presents a clear example where the affected communities' need for recovery assistance went unmet. Although IRCS responded very well in the immediate aftermath of the disaster and met the relief needs well, with leadership crisis within the organisation, things have come to a standstill over the past several months. At the same time, the IRCS has insisted that everything has to go through them, and that Federation or any PNS should not work directly with the branches. By this, the NS, in utter violation of the first principle of the RCRC code of conduct<sup>42</sup>, blocked all access for the Federation and PNSs to stricken communities.

Another issue that is arising increasingly frequently in many countries is how much the boundary of humanitarian response should be determined by the capacity of the ONS, when the community's needs are far greater than the existing and potential capacity of the ONS. In Somalia, despite the excellent work done by the SRCS in the

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<sup>41</sup> Sphere Common Standard 3.

<sup>42</sup> Principles of Conduct for the International Red Cross & Red Crescent Movement & NGOs in Disasters Response Programmes.

relief phase, the response did not address the critical humanitarian needs except in the area of first aid, rescue and immediate health care in the early stages after the disaster. The same question has been raised in the context of both India and Sri Lanka.

#### **4.1.2 Non-conventional partnership:**

The evaluation noted an encouraging trend in that the Movement is now sometimes getting into non-conventional partnership with organisations outside the Movement in order to respond to affected communities' needs. Livelihoods partnerships are being explored with INGOs working in Sri Lanka, and in Indonesia with a UN agency. In Sri Lanka, a water supply partnership is being created with a government agency. In India, a PNS has been funding local NGOs for long-term recovery and reconstruction work in Tamil Nadu. These are steps in the right direction. Over the past decade or so humanitarian response has become more and more complex and this demands a level of standard which not all NSs were required to address or develop capacity in their conventional role as a National Society. Hence conventional wisdom in the Movement that everything must be done only through the ONS is unrealistic, utopian and has more-than-an-average-chance of undermining RCRC's adherence to humanitarian imperative. The Federation needs to address this tension between building NS's capacity versus primacy of humanitarian imperative and develop its capacity to coordinate and support initiatives like the ones now in India and Sri Lanka mentioned above. It is also important that such initiatives with organisations outside the Movement network do not lead to cowboy humanitarianism or undermine the ONS's image and credibility through uncoordinated response.

#### *Challenges/Issues emerging:*

- When scale and complexity of a response demands scaling up of the capacity far beyond the limits and remit of the ONS, how does the Movement work with partners outside the RCRC network without undermining the auxiliary role of the ONS to the governments?

#### **4.2 Non discrimination: Needs-based aid, targeting the vulnerable, equity and gender issues (Principle 2 of the RCRC & NGOs code of Conduct):**

Needs Assessment<sup>43</sup>: The RCRC response was based on initial needs assessments carried out in the early stages either locally or through FACT/RAT missions. It was able to reach some of the remotest areas which generally have, in the conventional aid delivery system, less chance of being reached (for example, Andaman & Nicobar islands in India, worst-affected communities in inaccessible Hafun in Somalia). Needs change over time, and therefore there is need for ongoing needs assessments. Where ongoing assessment is lacking, the programme response gets distorted. Early needs assessments<sup>44</sup> ignored the need for t-shelters. RCRC went into heavily infrastructure-oriented response in the recovery stage, rather than a community/people-focused response. The entire programme needed a reassessment when transitioning from relief

<sup>43</sup> Sphere Common Standard 2.

<sup>44</sup> RAT process was undertaken fairly early on when the operation was on high relief gear.

to recovery to check for the consistency of the logic of the programmes which was developed by the RAT six weeks after the disaster.

Targeting<sup>45</sup>: Targeting and identifying the vulnerable in the recovery and reconstruction phase is always a complex task. On-going relationship and engagement with the community is essential to gaining a good understanding of who the vulnerable groups are and who may slip through the aid system. The response in Sri Lanka (and to some extent in Indonesia) has been primarily designed around large-scale/heavy infrastructure projects, planned generally with or by government officials, with beneficiary lists provided by government authorities. In Maldives, although there were some beneficiary consultation and involvement in assessing house designs and obtaining community feedback on desalination plants for example, the process still had a top-down approach, working through the island development committees. As is universally acknowledged, official plans and beneficiary lists are usually biased against the less vocal, less visible and politically weaker sections of the population. Likewise, the women-headed households without adequate document to prove their housing status pre-tsunami and others similarly vulnerable have not been adequately focused on by the Movement. Country studies in India, Sri Lanka and Maldives highlight this as a major lacuna in the Federation response as the plans and programme designs have been developed through a top-down approach<sup>46</sup>, although some PNSs have highlighted the needs of the squatters in Sri Lanka who do not figure in the official list for transition shelters and permanent houses.

The India study highlights the fact that tsunami has created a new class of vulnerable people. As more women than men died, a new class of *motherless* families with children needing to be looked after by men who traditionally in the affected societies have not played the role of a carer has come into being. Support is needed for such families to cope with the new reality. Likewise, enforced relocation of displaced people from buffer zones is being done by many governments, without adequate consultation with affected communities. This is increasing the insecurity and vulnerability of these communities as it threatens their livelihoods and current social network. It is unclear what policy positions are being taken by the Movement on this<sup>47</sup>.

Conflict Analysis<sup>48</sup>: The issue of conflict is critical in Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Somalia. To a large extent the Movement has been sensitive to this issue and agencies have attempted to make sure that while targeting the tsunami-affected families, the families who were conflict-affected and live in the tsunami-hit areas are also included in the targeting. This has ensured that the agencies deal with the tensions between conflict-affected and tsunami-affected in a balanced way. However, more systematic analysis of the relationship between conflict and recovery/reconstruction issues have

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<sup>45</sup> Sphere Common Standard 4

<sup>46</sup> PNSs and Federation were required to engage with communities at the grassroots level. In some cases this was not happening systematically, and in such instances, the Task Force intervened and made it obligatory for the agency concerned to include community engagement in project design.

<sup>47</sup> In his Mission report, dated 26-29 August to Sri Lanka, Special Representative, Johan Schaar raised this issue as well.

<sup>48</sup> Sphere Common Standards 3



not been done in Sri Lanka or Indonesia. This evaluation concluded that such an analysis is critical for the Movement as a large amount of Movement resources in Sri Lanka is planned to be spent on projects initiated by the government which is one of the parties to the seemingly-calm-for-now conflict that the country has seen for over two decades. A conflict assessment and socio-economic analysis of benefits and costs to different communities is ideally needed before investing in such huge projects.

*Challenges/Issues emerging:*

- The RCRC response in the early stages was based on direct assessment of needs of affected communities and was responsive to the issues of overt and covert exclusion that often occurs in humanitarian programmes.
- In the recovery and reconstruction stage, the complexity of identification of vulnerable and ensuring equity between different communities has not been fully grasped in RCRC programming.

**Recommendations:**

- R15. Use the technical working groups to develop a knowledge-base and analysis of issues of gender, equity and conflict affecting various communities in both Sri Lanka and Indonesia.
- R16. Hire staff (internationally or from within the region) with expertise in social and conflict analysis, and gender programming.
- R17. In major disasters in future, ensure that as follow up to RAT processes, periodic needs assessment are carried out by field teams and amendments to the programme strategy made as appropriate.

**4.3 Impartiality and Neutrality:** *(Principles 3 & 4 of RCRC & NGO code of conduct)*

The evaluators have not come across a single instance where these have not been totally upheld by RCRC members in any of the countries covered by this evaluation. Credit must go to the ONSs, some of who are working in highly polarised and conflict-ridden environments (Somalia, Sri Lanka and Indonesia in particular) for rigorous adherence to these standards. Some PNSs who came in as implementers of their national government programmes as part of bi-lateral support in Indonesia and Sri Lanka have also carried out their operations in a way where no one can accuse them of being agents or promoters of their governments' foreign policies<sup>49</sup>.

**4.4 Local culture, custom and building on local solutions**  
*(Principles 5 of the RCRC & NGO Code of Conduct):*

It is a recognised strength of the Federation that it seeks to work in partnership with ONSs and local governments, with due respects to the latter's ways of operating in the country. It was learnt that in the early stages, in a few rare instances, some actions of a

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<sup>49</sup> The evaluator formed this opinion on the basis of discussions with PNSs and Federation staff who were interviewed.

few PNSs did undermine the ONSs, but that was more due to lack of knowledge and awareness about the ONS or government systems in the affected countries. As PNSs continued their work beyond the relief stage, there was greater understanding and sensitivity to local customs and knowledge.

The evaluators however consider that stretched too far, this sensitivity to local culture and custom has its downside too. When respect and sensitivity is taken so far that space for constructively challenging ideas or actions of NS which may go against fulfilment of humanitarian imperative is forfeited, that is failing the entire Movement. A mature relationship is built on respect, dialogue, dissent and space for constructively challenging each other and finding the best solutions possible.

#### **4.5 Local Capacity building** (*Principles 6 of the RCRC & NGOs Code of conduct*):

As mentioned in previous sections (section 3.4.3b), there are many examples of some very creative initiatives to build capacity of ONS and national governments undertaken by the Federation and many PNSs. The initiative in Somalia to build the capacity of the national disaster management agency<sup>50</sup> or development of water ERUs in India and Indonesia are best examples of how the RCRC builds local capacities while simultaneously delivering humanitarian aid to affected communities.

However, there are also bad examples of how capacity must not be built. The overriding emphasis in Sri Lanka on capacity building of the ONS in every aspect of recovery/reconstruction activities at the cost of delivering humanitarian aid to victims of the disaster is an abuse of Federation's mandate on capacity building. The Sri Lanka study strongly articulates that SLRCS has been the principal target and beneficiary of the IFRC capacity building and reconstruction efforts in the past few months.

The 1<sup>st</sup> round of RTE warned that although availability of large amounts of money could be an opportunity to improve ONS's capacity as auxiliaries to government and their preparedness, there is need to justify openly big effort and spending on NS capacity building, depending to some degree on their immediate performance in responding to this disaster. It needs also to be recognised that there is a limit to which any organisation's capacity can be developed, even with investment of unlimited resources. Without an understanding of the OD dimensions of capacity building, mindless investment in capacity building can be a bottomless pit. The evaluation concluded that the capacity building approach taken in Indonesia is better informed by a deeper understanding of what capacity building can and can not do.

#### **4.6 Beneficiary Involvement and peoples' participation**<sup>51</sup> (*Principle 7 of the RCRC & NGOs code of conduct*):

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<sup>50</sup> Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management Agency (HADMA)

<sup>51</sup> Sphere Common Standard 1.

The performance on this front leaves much to be desired. As discussed in the previous sections, this evaluation observed a pattern of top-down programme planning the Federation has used especially in Sri Lanka. The Sri Lanka study noted a general lack of emphasis on community-level planning and project design, except in the health sector where the ONS, Federation and PNSs had prior experience and expertise in smaller community health projects that access beneficiaries directly, and these were fairly effective. A few PNSs which have begun house construction are engaging in some consultation with beneficiaries in terms of design etc., but these are only a few examples. It is to be noted here that the 1<sup>st</sup> RTE had also drawn attention to a similar lack of participation and beneficiary consultation during the relief phase. This code also demands that apart from passive consultation and participation, the communities have a say in the management of a project aimed at them – the evaluation did not find enough evidence that this was happening anywhere. While lack of expertise in participatory approaches to planning and project design among the field staff may be an issue, the heavy emphasis on engaging in government-planned infrastructure projects is another reason why space for engagement with communities remains limited in RCRC operations.

This evaluation is not suggesting that the Federation should not get involved in heavy-infrastructure projects. Given that the RCRC is the largest funder (nearly \$ 2.5 billion), it is important to position the Movement at an appropriate level of partnership with the government and UN. However, there needs to be a clear analysis of needs of the communities and every decision to get involved in any project needs to be justified only by the benefits it offers to affected and vulnerable communities. It needs to be noted here that there is a widespread recognition amongst the humanitarian organisations in Sri Lanka that the government plans are not always informed by assessment of community needs, vulnerability and conflict, especially in the North and East of the country.

#### **4.7 Risk Reduction and disaster preparedness (*principle 8 of the RCRC & NGOs code of conduct*):**

This issue has been covered in some detail in section 3.2.4. Risk reduction and community-based preparedness has been a key focus of Federation's DP work in the regions. Following the tsunami, the Secretariat has developed key initiatives, in collaboration with other international organisations, in ensuring that reconstruction work is undertaken on the basis of well developed technical standards for earthquake and tsunami resistance. The Federation is also collaborating with the UN system in developing and promoting early warning system in the Asia region. There is an increasing realisation within the Movement that risk reduction needs to be part of the overall anti-poverty plans or Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers of different national governments, and hence there is need for advocacy on this issue.

#### **4.8 Accountability to donors and beneficiaries (*principle 9 of the RCRC & NGOs code of conduct*):**

As described in section 3.5.

#### **4.9 Dignity in Images and communication** (*principle 10 of the RCRC & NGOs code of conduct*):

This aspect was not examined during the 2<sup>nd</sup> RTE as it was covered in the 1st RTE.

## **Chapter 5:**

### **MANAGING FOR RESULTS**

*(This chapter summarises some of the key management issues related to delivery of quality and impact in programming, and certain core operational issues which have a direct bearing on quality and effectiveness of the response in terms of effect on the beneficiaries).*

#### **5.1 Quality, Effectiveness and Impact:**

Balancing speed and quality of response: While the Federation is rightly emphasising on quality of the response (the concept of MCF, for example, is geared towards that), seeking quality is not the same thing as seeking ‘perfection’. Discussions with over a dozen PNSs indicate that search for the near-perfect solution has often caused serious delays in meeting major humanitarian needs. “Little action, too much of thinking and analysis has led to a state of paralysis” is how one PNS put it. The Sri Lanka study notes that the Movement, in its attempt to facilitate and coordinate the PNSs by instituting a comprehensive set of measures, appears to have lost the primary agenda which is to meet the needs of survivors in a timely manner.

The Sri Lanka field study also highlighted that while the Movement contributed significantly during the emergency phase, there is a risk that some of the impact made in the early stages may be eroded as a bureaucratic delays have overtaken the Movement response in the recovery and reconstruction phase. Many projects were delayed for a number of reasons including over centralisation and top-down approach to planning<sup>52</sup>.

Impact: Lack of baseline data and clearly defined outcome-related objectives in humanitarian operations is a well known problem in every major disaster response. This operation is clearly a classic example of that. There is need to develop guidelines, strategies and capacity to ensure that response is guided by the affected community’s perception of their need, rather than by Agency’s perception of what communities need. One approach could be to use quick-and-dirty result based management (RBM) framework, with results defined in terms of *beneficiary perspectives of their needs and outcome sought*. Periodic surveys to assess lives-and-livelihoods outcome that have either made a difference or are needed to make a

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<sup>52</sup> The country delegation in Sri Lanka does not agree with this view which was strongly articulated by the country study and almost all the PNSs spoken to.

difference could provide a tracking mechanism for both monitoring and impact assessments.

**Recommendation:**

- R18. Develop staff capacity and guidelines to ensure that decision making is guided by beneficiary perspectives of their needs and outcome sought, and not driven by procedures and rules as the overriding concern.

## **5.2 Management and Operational Issues:**

### **5.2.1 Reporting and Communication:**

The Federation must be geared towards maximising the reach and impact of the actions of its members<sup>53</sup>. Towards this end, it needs to mobilise its own network of members and work with others to scale up programming wherever needed, and this needs efficient and timely communication and reporting. All the PNSs and staff interviewed by the evaluator stated that reporting and operations updates have been significant achievements during this response. PNS reports come to Movement Coordinator in each country, and then these are compiled. Information flow from Indonesia in particular has been excellent. Good communication between PNS delegates and Federation delegates at the field level has been critical to good coordination on the ground.

### **5.2.2 District approach versus sectoral approach:**

The issue of whether PNSs should take a sector approach that enables PNSs with strong sector-specific technical skills, capacities and experience to work in all the affected districts on a particular sector, rather than a geographic area (covering 3-4 districts) approach has been raised. Currently at the Movement Platform level it has been decided that each PNS may work in 2 of the Tsunami-affected geographic areas in Sri Lanka. This is a sensible approach in order to make sure that an agency does not spread itself too thin on the ground. However, in the interest of providing quality services in a timely fashion to the largest number of identified beneficiaries, some flexibility may be necessary, particularly for PNSs with very strong sector-specific, technical-skills and large budgets. These PNSs may be able to complement the work of smaller PNSs who may need sector-specific technical skills. This will enable better skills reaching beneficiaries, though in the long run the regional and integrated development focus that the platform's 2-areas rule promotes will likely be the more successful community and beneficiary-friendly approach.

### **5.2.3 Staff recruitment:**

a) Recruitment of delegates is a major challenge. One senior manager pointed out that more than half the delegates in Aceh are on their first mission. Lack of experienced delegates in the field of needs assessment, community mobilisation, shelter and

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<sup>53</sup> Our Federation of the Future, Internal Issues Discussion Paper, Draft 1.

livelihoods are highlighted as major weaknesses in both Indonesia and Sri Lanka by the country studies and in discussions with PNSs.

b) Staff continuity is also a problem. Duration of placements is a critical issue as 6-12 months contract is too short to make a critical difference in recovery operations. By the time a person begins to understand the complexity of recovery work and build some key relationships, the person has to move on.

c) Often times in Sri Lanka, all recruitment of local staff by PNSs need to be handled by SLRCS as the latter was made the contracting authority. This puts heavy burden on the SLRCS also. SLRCS's rigid salary structure also comes in the way of recruiting qualified local delegates who could play a critical role in the recovery process. In Indonesia on the other hand, local staff are contracted by the Federation and put on the bi-lateral/PNS projects.

d) The tsunami response in Asia has seen a sizeable number of delegates/staff being recruited from the region, including some from NSs in the region, either on long term mission or on short-term secondment. This experience in Maldives, Indonesia and Sri Lanka has been found to be rewarding and enriching for both host NS as well the 'seconding' NS. Staff exchanges between peer NSs on a regular basis, and especially in times of disasters like tsunami, can way of building collective capacity of the NSs in the region.

#### **5.2.4 Tendering/Approval authority and internal procedures:**

a) The Secretariat procurement procedures and financial authority delegated to field delegates (CHF 50,000 limit for HoD) are not geared to an efficient and timely response. While accountability is critical, having cumbersome and archaic procedures which neither strengthen accountability nor help in timely response need critical review. Apart from the financial authority which is only a fraction of what most international agencies including Country Heads of INGOs have during major disasters, the basic procedure for funds release is also equally cumbersome: budget approval for East Africa came in May, but then each country budget needs to be approved separately in Geneva. Budget prepared by the regional delegation goes to Regional Finance Unit which checks and validates and then this goes to Geneva where it can take upto 4-8 weeks to get a response<sup>54</sup>. In case of tsunami, an additional layer in Geneva end has been the Asia Pacific department. Once budget is approved, for cash disbursements, similar routes are followed. Somalia programme suffered due to non-receipt of funds on time.

In the recovery phase more than in the relief stage, at the delegation level, greater decision making authority and capability is critical to a timely and efficient response.

b) In Sri Lanka, Complicated tendering procedures are in place, and delegates (including PNS delegates) are busy in tendering documentation. Right now, in both

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<sup>54</sup> This observation came out strongly in East Africa. Apart from several delegates, ONSs concerned also mentioned this delay as a major constraint in speedy implementation of response.

Indonesia and Sri Lanka, delegates are busy handling the pre-qualification process for tenders on housing. This should have been handled by the Federation which could have come up with a global list that PNSs could have used, rather than each PNS having to reinvent the wheel many times over.

c) It is now widely accepted within the humanitarian community that emergency response should follow established procedures and processes that are as close to the norm (principle of normality) as possible, or in exceptional cases even lower than the norm if necessary<sup>55</sup>, without causing serious delay, as personnel will already be familiar with these processes. In the Federation's tsunami response, extra layers of procedures and mechanisms were added which personnel were not familiar with, without enough consideration of the sense of urgency the situation demanded.

### **5.2.5 India and Thailand:**

The report has briefly explored in previous sections issues about limited access to affected communities for the Federation and PNSs in India. The Federation made a contribution of CHF 10 million to the IRCS for recovery activities, but the money is sitting there without any plans having been drawn up. Half of the funds were for replenishment of stocks used up in early stages. It is understood that the procurement has not happened yet, raising questions about the Society's preparedness in the event of another disaster now. Spanish RC allocated Euro 2 million for India, but no progress as IRCS has not taken any decision on any programme nor any active engagement has been possible.

Commitments for financial contributions were also made for Thailand, and it is understood that like in India, there has been no progress.

#### Challenges/Issues emerging:

- Dearth of appropriate skills and expertise in new areas like shelter, livelihoods etc., within the Movement partners necessitates that in major emergencies like the tsunami, the Federation takes early action to recruit from open market.
- Outdated procedures for tendering and financial management used by the Federation are not geared towards emergency response.
- Where ONSs are failing to deliver RCRC's humanitarian mandate, increasing number of PNSs will get involved through non-RC members (NGOs, UN etc), as has happened this time in India.

#### **Recommendations:**

- R19. Revamp Federation's HR system and recruitment procedures to ensure that open market recruitment and recruitment from within the region, including secondment from peer NSs, can be effectively done during emergency operations.

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<sup>55</sup> Even a government like the Government of India known for its monolithic bureaucracy truncated its normal audit and procurement procedure for the first 90 days after the tsunami in order to enable it to respond speedily to the humanitarian needs.

- R20. Immediately review the financial and tendering procedures that apply to Federation/secretariat as well as to the ONSs in this operation. If a full review takes long time, at least waive those rules and procedures which cause delays.
- R21. Develop Movement-wide protocols and coordination mechanisms to facilitate Movement partners to work with local NGOs/INGOs/UN agencies when humanitarian imperative warrants it. This may be done, with or without direct involvement of ONSs, but must ensure that the latter's identity as the National Society or its auxiliary role is not undermined.

## **Chapter 6:**

### **SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

This chapter summarises the conclusions and comments on the overall impression of the evaluators about the response. A comprehensive list of key recommendations made in the report is also pulled together, and the recommendations which the evaluator considers strategic and urgent in terms of their overall impact on the tsunami response are highlighted *italics*.

#### **a) Scaling up and Proportionality:**

##### **Issues and Conclusions:**

As is widely acknowledged, the response mobilised by the RCRC to the tsunami is the biggest ever. With 25-30 PNSs in each of the major countries, with a total budget of around \$2 billion, the deployment of resources and personnel by the Movement is huge. It is beyond the scope of this evaluation to comment on what effect such a mobilisation for one single disaster response has had on the ability of the Movement to respond to other serious disasters around the world. However, if one goes by humanitarian needs alone, the mobilisation of response (not necessarily the quality and impact) in Indonesia and Sri Lanka have been far out of proportion. This applies to all humanitarian organisations, and not just the RCRC alone.

In specific terms, two issues stand out from RCRC's response in different countries:

- While the ONS in Somalia did the right thing by concentrating on its areas of competence, should not the Federation, with support of the PNSs, have launched a more substantive response in Somalia in proportion to the needs of the affected communities and resources available?
- When scale and complexity of a response demands scaling up of a response far beyond that limits and remit of the ONS (India), how does the Movement work



with partners outside the RCRC network without undermining the auxiliary role of the ONS to the governments?

**Recommendation:**

R21. *Develop Movement-wide protocols and coordination mechanisms to facilitate Movement partners to work with local NGOs/INGOs/UN agencies when humanitarian imperative warrants it. This may be done, with or without direct involvement of ONSs, but must ensure that the latter's identity as the National society or its auxiliary role is not undermined.*

**b) Needs Assessment:**

**Issues and Conclusions:**

Needs assessment in any operation is not a one-off affair. As the response moves from relief to recovery, periodic needs assessment becomes necessary to take into account the affected communities' perception of needs and the changing pattern of need. In this operation, this has not happened systematically. The last systematic assessment was the one done by RAT which was about 4-5 weeks after the disaster. The RAT team did not have any shelter/housing expertise on them and when the reports came to Geneva HQ, there was no one with in-depth understanding of post-disaster issues to critique the reports and notice that t-shelter needs were not addressed in the reports.

Two particular issues related to needs assessment stand out:

- The RCRC response in the early stages was based on direct assessment of needs of affected communities and was responsive to the issues of overt and covert exclusion that often occurs in humanitarian programmes.
- In the recovery and reconstruction stage, the complexity of identification of vulnerable and ensuring equity between different communities has not been fully grasped in RCRC programming.

**Recommendations:**

R15. *Use the technical working groups to develop a knowledge-base and analysis of issues of gender, equity and conflict affecting various communities in both Sri Lanka and Indonesia.*

R16. *Hire staff (internationally or from within the region) with expertise in social and conflict analysis, and gender programming.*

R17. In major disasters in future, ensure that as follow up to RAT processes, periodic needs assessment are carried out by field teams and amendments to the programme strategy made as appropriate.

**c) Shelter and Permanent housing:**

**Issues and Conclusions:**

The Federation was unrealistic in its assumption about the needs of transition shelters and its ability to deliver permanent housing. It has taken the Federation nearly seven months to realise the need to focus on transition shelters, and that permanent housing

needs complex and tortuous process of negotiations with community, governments, contractors, suppliers, utilities providers etc which will take a fairly long time.

**Recommendations:**

- R1. *Appoint a shelter expert in the HQ Operations team who will provide overall direction, leadership and technical support on shelter<sup>56</sup>.*
- R2. *Invest in the transition shelters in both Sri Lanka and Indonesia where these were initially ignored by the RCRC: upgrading of shelters, watsan and livelihoods.*
- R3. *Review the cumbersome bureaucratic procedures and put in place systems that achieve results. Plan for smaller number for a start.*
- R4. Consider various options to fast-track house construction using other organisations which have competence. While continuing to engage with communities through transition shelters, sub-contract the work to social housing companies (the Turkish Red Crescent society has subcontracted the work to a well reputed real estate developer who can handle large scale-construction projects and would approach the beneficiaries as clients with four kinds of model houses).
- R5. The shelter plan developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for Aceh foresees selfbuild<sup>57</sup> as the major mechanism for shelter reconstruction. World Bank beneficiaries build their own houses with funds and tools provided by the Bank. It may be appropriate to partner with other more experienced development sector players such as these which have a coherent and well developed policy and capacity.

**d) Coordination:**

**Issues and Conclusions:**

In a large operation like this involving record number of NSs, the Federation has been highly successful in introducing new ways of working and innovative approaches. Coordination has been the cornerstone of this response. However, Coordination of response is sometimes reduced to administration of procedures which is self-serving, without any consideration of results/impact made on the lives and livelihoods of communities. Placement of Movement Coordinators in each major country has been critical to this response. An important lesson that comes out of this response is that the effectiveness of Movement Coordinators depends to a large degree on various thematic/programme delegates being able to provide programmatic leadership on targeting, vulnerability and other complex issues.

**Recommendations:**

- R7. *Undertake a thorough review of the functioning of various components of the MCF in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, and revamp those that are blocking achievement of results<sup>58</sup>.*

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<sup>56</sup> At the time of preparation of the final report, it is understood that this is currently being done.

<sup>57</sup> The Federation is now engaging in owner-builder programme in SL.

<sup>58</sup> This was carried out in September and October.

- R8. Develop a system for reporting and monitoring of coordination results/outcomes in terms of impact on community: at every stage, ask the question what impact an action will have on communities.
- R9. *The technical working groups should not be reviewing/appraising every detail of the proposals which should be left to the individual PNSs to develop, but rather ensure development of common standards and approaches to major practical issues like needs assessment, gender/ vulnerability analysis, contractual (staff hire) and tendering issues, etc.*
- R10. In future response, ensure placement of Movement Coordinators and Recovery delegates early on in the field.

**e. Accountability and Impact:**

**Issues and Conclusions:**

- While procedures and mechanisms have been put in place to fulfil accountability obligations to donors and other institutions, not enough systematic approach to ensuring the same to affected communities is visible in the operations.
- Beneficiary perspective and involvement in planning and design of programmes is often missing in RCRC response in Sri Lanka in particular.

**Recommendations:**

- R13. Strengthen staff capacity in community mobilisation and participatory approaches in key countries where operations are on-going.
- R14. *At the technical working group level, assess performance in every sector in terms of results which have a community perspective built into them.*
- R18. Develop staff capacity and guidelines to ensure that decision making is guided by beneficiary perspectives of their needs and outcome sought, and not driven by procedures and rules as the overriding concern.

**f. Disaster Preparedness and capacity building:**

**Issues and Conclusions:**

- Disaster preparedness needs to better address the needs of volunteers who form the main pillar of RCRC response.
- Capacity building initiatives undertaken with clear and direct focus on results in relation to affected communities have been successful while the ones with predominant focus on NS have distorted the central objective of the response.

**Recommendations:**

- R6. Greater investment in systematic training and equipping of volunteers who form the main pillar of NS's response is needed.
- R11. *Capacity building needs to be directly linked to short and long term outcomes which directly affect the lives and livelihoods of the affected communities.*
- R12. Federation needs to develop guidelines on good practices on volunteers' compensation and incentives during large disasters.

**g) Managing for results:**

**Issues and Conclusions:**

- Dearth of appropriate skills and expertise in new areas like shelter, livelihoods, gender and vulnerability analysis etc., within the Movement necessitates that in major emergencies like the tsunami, the Federation takes early action to recruit from open market.
- Outdated procedures for tendering and financial management used by the Federation are not geared towards emergency response.
- Where ONSs are failing to deliver RCRC's humanitarian mandate, increasing number of PNSs will get involved through non-RC members (NGOs, UN etc), as has happened this time in India.

**Recommendations:**

- R19. Revamp Federation's HR system and recruitment procedures to ensure that open market recruitment and recruitment from within the region, including secondment from peer NSs, can be effectively done during emergency operations.
- R20. *Immediately review the financial and tendering procedures that apply to Federation/secretariat as well as to the ONSs in this operation. If a full review takes long time, at least waive those rules and procedures which cause delays.*