Pipefitter's Hand Injured by Using Obsolete Flange Splitter

Lessons Learned

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
A USW "Lessons Learned" Activity

Pipefitter's Hand Injured by Using Obsolete Flange Splitter

Purpose

To conduct a small group "lessons learned" activity to share information gained from incident investigations.

To understand "lessons learned" through a systems of safety viewpoint.



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The incident and recommendations made are from an actual USW represented facility. These recommendations are a product of the site's analysis of the incident and not meant to represent the USW official view on the topic(s). In fact, one of the goals of this exercise is evaluate the recommendations made and to suggest improvements.

Introduction

One Hour "Lessons Learned" Safety Training Activity

This is a Small Group Activity Method (SGAM) exercise. It is designed for use in toolbox style meetings where a group of craft persons, operators, or other small group is assembled for a safety training session. The whole group should be further divided into smaller discussion groups of four to six people.

The tone of the meetings should be informal to create as much discussion as possible within the groups and among the groups. Active participation by group members is essential for this exercise to be successful.

If you plan to present a Lessons Learned Activity and have not been trained in the USW worker trainer program, you should contact the USW Health, Safety & Environment Department: Phone (412) 562-2581 email: <u>safety@steelworkers-usw.org</u> for trainer information.

For this exercise, each person in the group should have their own copy of this activity printed in its entirety. The exercise consists of three tasks. Each task is designed to provoke thought and generate discussion about the incident at hand. Each discussion group should designate a scribe to keep notes and report back to the facilitator and class after each task. When the exercise is completed, review the Summary on page 13.

Definitions of terms used in this exercise are provided throughout the activity. A glossary of terms is also provided in the appendix.

The incident(s) depicted in this activity are based upon real occurrences. The names of persons and corporations are fictitious.

Task 1

Please read the following scenario:

Four pipefitters were working on a 16" flange in the tank farm of an oil refinery. The pipefitters had been working 16 hour days all that week and the incident happened on Friday. The pipefitters had already worked 14 hours that day.

An area had been excavated to expose a flange for a blank removal job. Tank farm flanges are noted for being very tight with little give due to the piping going underground. This job was originally thought to be a quick job but the pipefitters had worked 3 hours on the job. They had been working without a break or lunch as well.

The pipefitters were using wedges to try to spread the flange to remove the blank but this method had proven to be unsuccessful on the 16 inch flange. The blank used in the line was too thin and had dished out causing removal to be very difficult. The blank had been in the line for a very long time.

After many unsuccessful and frustrating attempts to remove the blank, one of the pipefitters went to get a hydraulic flange spreader from the tool room. Training on the proper use of hydraulic flange spreaders had been discontinued because they are rarely used and the particular spreader that the pipefitter retrieved was an obsolete model.

The pipefitters installed the flange spreader on the 16 inch flange and began pumping it up to spread the flange apart. As the flange spread apart, the pipefitters removed the wedges that were left in the flange. When the wedges were removed, the flange spreader slipped. One pipefitter grabbed the back end of the spreader to try to realign it. Suddenly the apparatus came flying out of the flange, ripping the web between the pipefitter's thumb and forefinger. The bottom knuckle of his thumb was also broken.

After subsequent interviews it was discovered that some tank farm personnel thought dished blanks were normal in refinery use. They were also unaware that overpressuring a blank usually occurred during product transfer and shipping.


Task 1 (continued)

On the next page you will find a logic tree that shows how the investigators at this site linked the incident that occurred (the top event) to the facts described in the scenario and the incident's root causes. Below each root cause in the logic tree you will find a block with the title "SOS" (System of Safety).

Find the boxes marked SOS. Directly above those boxes will be a root cause of the incident. Your task is to complete the logic tree by identifying the *major* system of safety affected where the root cause failure occurred and list it in the box. These "systems" are listed in a chart on page 9. *Note: some of the SOS boxes may already be completed for you.*

Please select someone in your group to act as scribe to report back your answers.

A Logic Tree is a pictorial representation of a logical process that maps an incident from its occurrence to the root causes of the incident.



Task 2

A. Below you will find two lists. On the left are the root causes from the logic tree on the previous page. On the right are recommendations made by the team that investigated this incident. On the chart below identify which of the "recommendations" would eliminate or reduce each "root cause" by placing the number of the recommendation(s) on the line provided. More than one recommendation can apply to a root cause.

Root Causes	Recommendations
A. No procedure to take tools out of service when no longer used or trained on	 Blanks used in lines must meet design requirements. A process to ensure this must be instituted
 B. Too thin a blank used in flange for the service it was in 	2. When the proper clearance to remove a dished blank is accomplished by loosening lines, install a banjo spacer for proper spacing on future work.
C. Flange spreader was an obsolete model	3. Identify tight locations and resolve any problems encountered.
	4. Disassemble and dispose of the obsolete flange spreader
	5. Purchase an up to date flange spreader
	 Conduct timely safety audits on tools and purge obsolete tools from tool room inventory.

B. Use the concepts found on the factsheets on pages 9 through 12 and evaluate the recommendations from Question A. How would you strengthen or add to the list?

Task 3

Discuss ways in which the "Lessons Learned" (listed below) from this incident can be applied at your workplace. Please explain.

Lessons Learned

- Jobs that are not properly planned can result in unforeseen difficulties, hazards, and wasted time
- Many tools are made obsolete due to safety hazards inherent in their design.
- Experienced craftsmen should be consulted when purchasing new tools
- Older processes often were not designed with safety in mind. Good job preplanning can help eliminate hazards presented by old equipment.
- Routine inspections should be made of all tool boxes to check for and get rid of obsolete and damaged tools.

A USW "Lessons Learned" Activity

Systems of Safety And Subsystems

Major Safety Systems	Design & Engineering	Maintenance & Inspection	Mitigation Devices	Warning Devices	Training & Procedures	Personal Protective Factors
Level of Prevention	Highest—the first line of defense	Ν	Middle—the seco	nd line of defens	e	Lowest—the last line of defense
Effectiveness	Most Effective	4				Least Effective
Goal	To eliminate hazards.	To further minimize and control hazards.				To protect when higher level systems fail.
Examples of Safety Sub- Systems*	TechnicalDesign and Engineering of Equipment, Processes and SoftwareManagement of Change (MOC)**Chemical Selection and SubstitutionSafe SitingWork Environment HFOrganizational Staffing HFSkills and Qualifica- tions HFManagement of Personnel Change (MOPC)Work Organization and Scheduling HFAllocation of ResourcesCodes, Standards and Policies**	Inspection and Testing Maintenance Quality Control Turnarounds and Overhauls Mechanical Integrity	Enclosures, Barriers and Containment Relief and Check Valves Shutdown and Isolation Devices Fire and Chemical Suppression Devices	Monitors Process Alarms Facility Alarms Community Alarms Emergency Notification Systems	Operating Manuals and Procedures Process Safety Information Process, Job and Other Types of Hazard Assessment and Analysis Permit Programs Emergency Prepared- ness and Response Training Information Resources Communica- tions Investigations and Lessons Learned	Personal Decision- making and Actions HF Personal Protective Equipment and Devices HF Stop Work Authority

HF - Indicates that this sub-system is often included in a category called Human Factors.

* There may be additional subsystems that are not included in this chart. Also, in the workplace many subsystems are interrelated. It may not always be clear that an issue belongs to one subsystem rather than another.

** The Codes, Standards and Policies and Management of Change sub-systems listed here are related to Design and Engineering. These subsystems may also be relevant to other systems, for example, Mitigation Devices. When these sub-systems relate to systems other than Design and Engineering they should be considered as part of those other systems, not Design and Engineering.


All Systems of Safety Are Not Created Equal!




Surprisingly, the same hazard can often be addressed in more than one system. Take the low pipe in the doorway above, on the next two pages you'll see how this same problem could be handled by each of the major Systems of Safety.

Which is the best approach? Well, if you look at the Systems of Safety Chart on the previous page, you will find the SOS's arranged in order of strength: the most powerful – Design – on down to the least powerful – Personal Protective Factors.

A good investigation team will consider the full range of recommendations for each root cause.





Summary: Lessons Learned

- 1. The objective of "lessons learned" is to prevent accidents through identifying and correcting underlying defects in systems of safety. To achieve maximum prevention, all recommended changes should be made.
- 2. Corrective action resulting from lessons learned is one of the best methods for achieving proactive health and safety. Maximum prevention is achieved by correcting the conditions that led to the incident at other sites in the plant and at other sites.
- 3. Systems of safety-based analysis help identify the underlying causes of incidents and are valuable for determining what corrective measures should be taken as a result of the lessons learned.
- 4. Many times the result of an incident investigation is that worker error is identified as the main contributing factor. When a systems of safety-based analysis is used, multiple root causes are usually uncovered.
- 5. The most effective controls of health and safety hazards are those which are integrated or designed into the process, such as engineering controls. The least effective controls involve personal protective equipment and procedures that merely acknowledge the hazard and do nothing to eliminate it.
- 6. All work-related hazards must be evaluated before work begins to eliminate or reduce worker exposure to hazards and to prevent injuries.

Glossary of Terms (Appendix)

Several unique terms are used while doing the "Lessons Learned" exercises. Their definitions are listed below.

Contributing Factor—something that actively contributes to the production of a result, an ingredient.

Fact—a piece of information presented as having objective reality, an actual occurrence or event.

Hierarchy of Systems of Safety—the ranking of systems of safety as to their relative effectiveness in providing accident prevention. This hierarchy is represented by the "Fulcrum" with the most effective system of safety residing on the left side of the lever. Less effective systems reside further to the right on the lever.

Lessons Learned—A summation of an investigation that describes safety hazards or conditions with general educational recommendations to identify and correct similar conditions. These differ from investigation recommendations as illustrated below:

Investigation recommendation: Replace the carbon steel gate valve on the vacuum tower bottoms line with a chrome valve. The valve failed due to corrosion.

Lessons Learned: Verify that carbon steel valves and piping are not used in vacuum tower bottoms service because corrosion can cause them to fail.

Logic Tree—a pictorial representation of a logical process that maps an incident from its occurrence to the root causes of the incident.

Recommendations—calls for specific changes that address each root cause of an incident or accident to prevent its reoccurrence.

Root Cause—basic cause of an accident found in management safety systems.

Glossary of Terms (continued)

Supports and Barriers—"supports" are conditions that promote or render assistance to implementing recommendations while "barriers" are conditions that obstruct the implementation of recommendations.

Systems of Safety—management systems that actively seek to identify and control hazards before they result in an incident or injury.

- Design and Engineering
- Maintenance & Inspection
- Mitigation Devices
- Warning Systems
- Procedures and Training
- Personal Protective Factors

Conducting a "Lessons Learned" Activity

Circle the number that best shows your response to each of the following questions.

1. How easy was it for you to understand the "systems of safety" approach presented in this activity?

4	3	2	1
Very easy	Somewhat easy	Somewhat hard	Very hard

2. How useful do you think this "systems of safety" way of thinking could be for tackling safety and health problems at your workplace?

4	3	2	1
Very useful	Somewhat useful	Not very useful	Of no use

3. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

The logic tree diagram approach can be helpful for analyzing the root causes of safety and health incidents.

4	3	2	1
Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree

4. Overall, how useful was this "lessons learned activity" for considering safety and health problems at your workplace?

4	3	2	1
Very useful	Somewhat useful	Not very useful	Of no use