

# UNDERSTANDING THE U.S.-IRAQ CRISIS: A Primer

*By Phyllis Bennis*

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## Summary

The current crisis between the U.S. and Iraq continues more than a decade of antagonism between Washington and Baghdad, involving three U.S. administrations. To truly understand why we stand now at the brink of war, however, one must look closely at the goals of the current Bush administration, which is drawn to conflict by Iraq's massive oil reserves and the goal of expanding U.S. military power around the world.

The Iraqi government's record is undeniably brutal, and the U.S. and its allies should never have facilitated its access to weapons of mass destruction, as they did during the decade of the close U.S.-Iraqi alliance in the 1980s. However, there is no evidence that Iraq currently has viable weapons of mass destruction, or that it presents an imminent threat to the United States.

Nor, despite Bush administration claims, is there any link between Iraq and the events of September 11. A U.S. war against Iraq would violate international law and worsen our global reputation as an arrogant, unaccountable superpower. The effects would be particularly dire in the Middle East, where many governments hang in the balance between increasingly outraged populations and the demands of Washington, on whom they rely for economic and military support. A war would cause great suffering within Iraq, already devastated by the 1991 war and years of crippling economic sanctions, and would put many others at risk, including tens of thousands of American troops.

A forward-looking United States would work through the United Nations to promote disarmament, human rights, and democracy at home and throughout the region, and pursue domestic energy policies that reduce our dependence on oil and thus our interventions in the Persian Gulf region and elsewhere.

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# The U.S. Rush to War

## **1. The Bush administration says that a war against Iraq is needed due to the threat of weapons of mass destruction, Iraq's support of terrorism, and human rights. Are those valid concerns?**

The government of Iraq has long been brutally repressive towards its own people, and has twice attacked other countries (Iran and Kuwait) over longstanding political, economic and security disputes. Iraq's apex as a military power came during the 1980s, as a result of its decade-long alliance with the United States, which (along with European and other U.S. allies) provided political, military, technological and financial support. In fact, it was during this period of the U.S.-Iraqi alliance that Baghdad committed its worst human rights violations.

But the 1991 Gulf War bombing and 12 years of debilitating sanctions severely diminished Iraq's military capacity. By the time the United Nations weapons inspectors left Iraq in 1998 in anticipation of the U.S. "Desert Fox" bombing campaign, they had found and destroyed or rendered harmless 90 - 95% of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, including its chemical and biological weapons and long-range missiles. They had also completely destroyed its unfinished nuclear efforts.

The Bush administration linked Iraq with North Korea and Iran as a so-called "axis of evil." Yet only Iraq is singled out for possible military attack. Unlike North Korea, which may already have nuclear weapons, has repudiated the Non-Proliferation Treaty, expelled UN nuclear inspectors and directly threatened the United States, Iraq does not have nuclear weapons and is giving UN arms inspectors open access. Unlike a number of other countries, Iraq has not made international terrorism its pattern. Iraq simply does not pose a threat to the United States.

## **2. What are the real reasons behind the administration's rush towards war?**

U.S. threats to go to war against Iraq are largely driven by oil and empire — expanding U.S. military and economic power. As these goals primarily benefit oil companies and the already rich and powerful, the Bush administration relies on fear to mobilize public support for war among ordinary Americans by linking Iraq falsely with the very real threat of terrorism and through rhetoric like "axis of evil." Bush also plays on Americans' genuine concern about human rights to gain support.

Many top officials of the Bush administration come directly out of the oil industry. President Bush himself, as well as Vice-President Dick Cheney, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Commerce Donald Evans and others all have strong ties to oil companies — Chevron once named a tanker after Rice as a gesture of thanks.

But the U.S. isn't threatening an invasion simply to ensure its continued access to Iraqi oil. Rather, it is a much broader U.S. play for control of the oil industry and the ability to set the price of oil on the world market.

Iraq's oil reserves are second only to Saudi Arabia's. And with U.S.-backed Saudi Arabia increasingly unstable, the question of which oil companies — French, Russian, or American — would control Iraq's rich but unexplored oil fields once sanctions are lifted has moved to the top of Washington's agenda. Many in the Bush administration believe that in the long term, a post-war, U.S.-dependent Iraq would supplant Saudi control of oil prices and marginalize the influence of the Saudi-led OPEC oil cartel. Iraq could replace Saudi Arabia, at least partially, at the center of U.S. oil and military strategy in the region, and the U.S. would remain able to act as guarantor of oil for Japan, Germany, and other allies in Europe and around the world.

Expanding U.S. power, central to the Bush administration's war strategy, includes redrawing the political map of the Middle East. That scenario includes U.S. control of Iraq and the rest of the Gulf states as well as Jordan and Egypt. Some in the administration want even more — "regime change" in Syria, Iran, and Palestine, and Israel as a permanently unchallengeable U.S.-backed regional power. The ring of U.S. military bases built or expanded recently in Qatar, Djibouti, Oman and elsewhere as preparation for a U.S. war against Iraq will advance that goal.

But the super-hawks of the Bush administration have a broader, global empire-building plan that goes way beyond the Middle East. Much of it was envisioned long before September 11<sup>th</sup>, but now it is waged under the flag of the "war against terrorism." The war in Afghanistan, the creation of a string of U.S. military bases in the (also oil- and gas-rich) countries of the Caspian region and south-west Asia, the new strategic doctrine of "pre-emptive" wars, and the ascension of unilateralism as a principle are all part of their crusade. Attacking Iraq is only the next step.

### **3. What does "regime change" mean?**

Regime change is a euphemism for the assassination or overthrow of Saddam Hussein. "Regime change" has been official U.S. policy since 1998's Iraq Liberation Act. The notion of the Iraqi people themselves, once economic sanctions are lifted and they are able to rebuild their country and their lives, working together to replace their government with one more representative and less repressive is simply not on Washington's agenda. It never was — although the first President Bush urged Iraqis to rise up against Saddam Hussein's government after the first Gulf War, he quickly abandoned the call to revolt and abandoned Iraqis to their fate.

### **4. What is the Bush doctrine of 'preemptive strike'?**

In a major speech in June 2002 at the United States Military Academy at West Point, and in a strategy paper released in December 2002, Bush and his administration claimed the right to use preemptive military force against countries or terrorist groups deemed "close" to acquiring weapons of mass destruction or long-range missiles, and stated that the U.S. would "respond with overwhelming force" with "all options" — code for using nuclear weapons — to any use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons against the U.S., its troops or its allies.

Such threats of using nuclear weapons — in specific violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which prohibits the use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear state — represent a significant escalation of U.S. military domination. This reflects a parallel call in the strategy documents for a new approach to military engagement in which the U.S. would prevent any nation, anywhere in the world, from even attempting to match U.S. military capacity.

Ironically, the word "preemption" does not even properly apply. The Bush strategy goes well beyond "preemption," which implies an imminent threat. Iraq, even according to those calling for war, does not pose an imminent threat to the United States. Rather, the Bush administration is actually calling for a "preventive" war, to preclude the hypothetical arming or strengthening of Iraq at any time in the future. "Preventive" war is clearly illegal.

### **5. What are the "no-fly" zones? Why are U.S. planes bombing there already?**

At the end of the Gulf War in 1991, the U.S., together with the UK (and France, which soon ended its participation) established a "no-fly" zone in northern Iraq, and then, in 1992, in the south. The ostensible reason was to protect the Kurds in the north and the restive Shi'a population in the south from Iraqi attack by prohibiting the presence of fixed wing Iraqi military planes in the area. U.S. and British planes have patrolled the no-fly zones ever since. After the "Desert Fox" bombing raids of December

1998, the U.S. began regular bombing in both zones in response to Iraq's defensive moves of "locking on" radar or targeting the planes with anti-aircraft weapons, although no manned planes were ever hit. (Iraq has downed at least three "drone" aircraft without pilots.) In 1999, the only year for which reliable figures exist, the United Nations documented 144 civilians killed by U.S. bombing in the "no-fly" zones.

The U.S. claims that its bombing is to enforce UN resolutions, sometimes citing UN Resolution 688, which called on Iraq to protect the human rights of vulnerable communities. But *no* resolution, not 688 nor any other, mentions the creation of "no-fly" zones, let alone bombing or other military enforcement. When the UN resolution authorizing new inspections was passed in November 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld claimed that Iraqi anti-aircraft defense against the bombers constituted a "material breach" of Iraq's obligations, but numerous Security Council ambassadors as well as UN Secretary General Kofi Annan strongly disagreed.

## **6. Who in the Bush administration supports going to war in Iraq?**

The strongest voices for war in the administration are from the ideologues grouped around Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Vice-President Cheney. They include Rumsfeld's deputy Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, head of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board, Cheney's chief of staff Lewis Libbey, and others. All have been urging stronger military action against Iraq for a decade or more; in 1998, they all signed an open letter to President Clinton demanding more aggressive military action against Iraq. Many of them were part of a campaign launched by the Project for the New American Century calling for a new foreign policy aimed at preventing any country from even aspiring to match U.S. power. Since almost none of them served in the military and none have actual combat experience, but they are arguing for a war that others will fight, they are known as "chicken hawks."

War remains their strategic option of choice for Iraq policy. Perle, for instance, told an audience of British parliamentarians in November 2002 that "even a clean bill of health" from the UN arms inspectors would not stave off a U.S. war against Iraq.

## **7. Who is against going to war, or at least cautious?**

Opposition to a unilateral war with Iraq is widespread among the American people, with business, religious, and even military leaders opposed. Even more remarkable is the level of opposition within the administration itself.

The State Department, under Colin Powell, though not unequivocally opposed to war, supported a multi-lateral response based on using the United Nations to legitimize U.S. policies. Some political advisers in the White House are also thought to counsel an approach that includes a clear UN mandate, based on the assessment (according to *Business Week* and others) that a majority of Americans would not support a war viewed as unilateral and outside United Nations approval.

A number of former generals publicly urged caution, a sentiment reportedly shared by many of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well. General Anthony Zinni, chief of the U.S. Central Command (which includes Iraq) throughout much of the 1990s and later President Bush's special envoy to the Middle East, also has made clear his opposition to the Bush war drive.

## **8. Who will benefit from a war in Iraq?**

U.S. oil companies would be among the first to benefit, through priority access to Iraq's oil reserves, the second largest in the world. This access means not only increased supply of crude oil, but also enormous power in the global oil market, undermining that of Saudi Arabia and OPEC. In the late 1990s

through 2002, Iraq signed contracts that would give French and Russian oil companies privileged access to Iraqi reserves once economic sanctions were lifted. The U.S. has used these contracts to pressure France and Russia in Security Council deliberations. The threat — hinted at by U.S. officials and made explicitly by leaders of the Iraqi opposition — was that a post-Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq would void the existing contracts, and that French and Russian companies would have no access to new oil leases if their governments stood in the way of U.S. plans. (The countervailing concern is that in the short term a war-driven drop in oil production could have serious economic consequences. But most oil companies seem to believe they would benefit from the higher retail prices that would accompany such a production decrease. )

Companies producing and installing oil equipment would also benefit. Vice-President Cheney was CEO of one such company, Halliburton Oil Services, before returning to Washington in 2001 as part of the Bush administration. Between 1997 and 2001, Halliburton under Cheney's leadership made deals with Iraq worth at least \$73 million to rebuild Iraq's war- and sanctions-shattered oil infrastructure, but U.S.-led sanctions limited this reconstruction. With the U.S. military in control of a post-war Iraq, and U.S. oil companies in privileged positions, oil sanctions would certainly be lifted and companies like Halliburton would win giant rehabilitation contracts.

U.S. arms manufacturers would also benefit. Military producers have already won new, expanded contracts to produce more and better weapons. Boeing Aircraft, for instance, manufacturer of the "J-DAM" kits that transform huge lethal 500 and 2000-pound bombs into huge lethal 500 and 2000-pound "smart" bombs, is working around the clock on Pentagon contracts to produce the kits in anticipation of an Iraq war. Boeing is building a new 30,000-square-foot factory in St. Charles, LA to keep up with demand and its suppliers, including Lockheed, Honeywell, and Textron, are also ramping up production. Boeing spokesman Bob Algarotti anticipates "a higher level of production through the end of the decade."

## **9. Is Iraq a threat to the United States?**

Iraq's military is much smaller and weaker than before the 1991 Gulf War; the Pentagon estimates it is only about one-third its earlier size. It lacks the missile capacity to reach even most of its neighbors, let alone the United States. President Bush on one occasion claimed Iraq had pilotless drones that could fly across the ocean and attack the U.S., an obvious flight of rhetorical fancy that was never repeated. Iraq has attempted to attack U.S. bombers in the "no-fly" zones, planes that are illegally intruding into Iraqi airspace and attacking Iraqi targets; withdrawal of U.S. planes would end these [so far unsuccessful] efforts to bring them down. (See question 5 for more on the "no-fly" zones.)

In the State Department's 2001 edition of its annual *Report on Global Terrorism*, the U.S. acknowledged that Iraq "has not attempted an anti-Western attack since its failed plot to assassinate former President Bush in 1993 in Kuwait." (Whether this plot even happened remains in dispute.)

## **10. Does Iraq have weapons of mass destruction?**

We don't know for sure — that's why the UN inspectors are in Iraq. As of the end of 2002, the inspectors have not indicated they have found evidence of any viable weapons programs. When the earlier inspection team, UNSCOM, left Iraq on the eve of Washington's December 1998 Desert Fox bombing, they said they had found and destroyed or rendered harmless 90 - 95% of Iraq's WMD programs. Iraq has said that they have destroyed other weapons, but do not have a complete paper trail to fully document their destruction. There is certainly no active nuclear program — that would be easily detectable by satellite and other technologies. While it is possible that some chemical or biological

material from earlier weapons programs may remain in Iraq, as yet undetected by UN inspectors, there is no indication that a viable delivery system for such weapons exists.

The Bush administration claims Iraq does have WMDs — but they have refused to reveal the evidence they claim to have to the public and won't even provide all the evidence to the UN inspection teams. This contradicts Washington's claim of an imminent threat from Iraqi WMDs — were there such a threat, U.S. officials would surely immediately provide the inspectors all the information needed to neutralize the threat. By withholding the information, the U.S. seems more interested in playing "gotcha" than in actually finding and rendering harmless any real weapons.

Further, the emerging example of North Korean nuclear weapons may be instructive. If, as is the case in North Korea, there was actual evidence of an Iraqi nuclear weapon, Bush would be unlikely to be threatening to go to war against Iraq. Instead, a combination of diplomacy and deterrence would be used. The U.S. willingness to talk to nuclear-armed North Korea, while refusing to talk to Iraq, provides another clear indication that Iraq does not have nuclear weapons.

### **11. Did Iraq have anything to do with September 11th, or with al-Qaeda? Would going to war against Iraq improve the security of Americans at home and abroad?**

Iraq had nothing to do with the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks.

In fact, Iraq has a long history of antagonism to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. According to the *New York Times*: "[S]hortly after Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait in 1990, Osama bin Laden approached Prince Sultan bin Abdelaziz al-Saud, the Saudi defense minister, with an unusual proposition.... Arriving with maps and many diagrams, Mr. Bin Laden told Prince Sultan that the kingdom could avoid the indignity of allowing an army of American unbelievers to enter the kingdom to repel Iraq from Kuwait. He could lead the fight himself, he said, at the head of a group of former *mujahideen* that he said could number 100,000 men." Even though the offer was undoubtedly exaggerated, bin Laden's hostility toward secular Iraq is clear. There is no evidence that that has changed.

Far from making Americans more secure, there is every reason to fear that war against Iraq will place Americans in greater danger. Across the Middle East, anti-American feeling is already widespread due to U.S. financial and diplomatic backing of Israel's occupation of Palestinian land and its support for corrupt and repressive regimes across the Arab world. A U.S.-led war against Iraq will further exacerbate that anger, perhaps leading more desperate individuals to turn to acts of violence against individual Americans or institutions perceived as symbols of American power or policy.

### **12. If the U.S. doesn't attack Iraq, how can we be sure there are no weapons of mass destruction?**

By supporting the United Nations weapons inspectors, whose mandate is to finish the job of earlier inspection teams by finding and rendering harmless any remaining weapons of mass destruction. We can get further reassurance by implementing Article 14 of UN Resolution 687, which states that disarming Iraq of WMDs should be seen as a step towards a region-wide Middle East "zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and a global ban on chemical weapons." Such an approach, rather than the current U.S. posture of flooding the arms-glutted region with ever more powerful weapons, would certainly help reduce military tensions in the region.

### **13. How much will war against Iraq cost? Who will pay for it and what will be its impact on the domestic U.S. economy?**

Estimates range from \$60 billion up to perhaps \$1.6 *trillion* when the war's aftermath is included. Even the lower figures represents between 1 and 2% of the current U.S. GDP. The 1990-91 Gulf crisis



cost about \$80 billion, or about 1% of GDP, but 80% of that cost was paid by our allies, which is unlikely this time around.

The final bill will include far more than just the military deployments, troops and weapons. It will also include pay-offs to reluctant coalition partners. Turkey, for example, has made plain its conditions a U.S. war: compensation for up to \$25 billion in losses, which Turkey says should come not from congressional legislation but directly from the Pentagon; a clear U.S. prohibition on creation of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq; and granting Turkey security control in northern Iraq. Not coincidentally, during a December 2002 visit to Ankara by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Turkey was promised lavish new economic aid, the construction of permanent military bases in the Kurdish southeast, and renewed diplomatic support, including a major U.S. campaign to back Turkey's entrance to the European Union.

And none of those initial costs of war include the price of reconstruction. Former National Security Advisor Sandy Berger recently testified that rebuilding the Iraqi economy would cost between \$50 and \$150 billion. But given Washington's habit of leading the war, and leaving the rebuilding to the United Nations and the rest of the international community (as seen most recently in Kosovo and Afghanistan), it is unlikely that the U.S. intends to pay for Iraq's reconstruction.

Even without a new war in Iraq, the U.S. spends more than \$11,000/second on the military. That means more than \$1 billion per day, half of all the world's military expenditures by our friends and adversaries combined.

#### **14. The Administration has talked about plans for a long-term military occupation of Iraq. What would that mean?**

Some in the Bush administration have advocated direct U.S. take-over of Iraq after a war, based on the occupations of Germany and Japan after World War II. This model imagines the world of 1945, before five decades of decolonization had reshaped the political frameworks of newly independent countries. It envisions a widespread Iraqi greeting of U.S. troops as not only immediate liberators but as acceptable, even welcome, permanent occupiers, unlikely given the widespread understanding in Iraq that U.S. pressure has kept the devastating economic sanctions in place for 12 years. It imagines the U.S. paying billions of dollars to rebuild a war-ravaged Iraqi economy. But everyone knows that is imaginary. Even the fractious and diverse U.S.-backed Iraqi opposition, meeting in London in December 2002, was able to agree on only one thing — that a U.S. military occupation of their country was not acceptable.

Occupation probably means immediate U.S. seizure of Iraq's oilfields, swift rehabilitation of the oil infrastructure, and rapid redistribution of oil contracts to U.S. companies. Iraq's oil income would be diverted to repay Washington for the costs of the invasion and occupation itself, delaying reconstruction of Iraq's battered social and physical civilian infrastructure indefinitely. And American troops — and Americans in general — would become the symbols throughout the region of a hated super-power.

### **The World's Response, the UN & International Law**

#### **15. Does the U.S. have the right to invade Iraq?**

No. The UN resolution passed in November 2002 sent arms inspectors back into Iraq to verify Iraq's disarmament, the final requirement before lifting sanctions. The resolution says there will be "serious consequences" if there is a "material breach" of the resolution, but it specifically does not identify what

those consequences should or might be. The resolution states that a finding of "material breach" requires both omissions or lies in Iraq's arms declaration and non-compliance with inspectors. It reserves for the Council as a whole, not any individual country, authority to make those determinations.

When the resolution was passed, every Council ambassador other than Washington's made clear the resolution provides no authorization for war. According to Mexico's Ambassador, Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, force could only be valid, "with the prior, explicit authorization of the Security Council." The U.S. may decide to go to war without the Security Council's OK, and regardless of what the UN inspectors find or don't find. But the terms of the UN resolutions are very important considerations for Security Council countries such as France, Mexico, Germany and others, whose governments must balance their desire to join Bush's war with widespread public anti-war sentiment.

#### **16. Does the U.S. have the right of self-defense against Iraq?**

According to the United Nations Charter, no nation has the right to attack another. The only exceptions are 1) if the Security Council specifically authorizes a military strike, or 2) in self-defense. "Self-defense" is defined very narrowly. Article 51 of the Charter says a country has the right of self-defense only "IF an armed attack occurs." Iraq has not attacked the U.S. (see section 5 on "no-fly" zones), so self-defense does not apply. The U.S. claims it has the right of "preemptive self-defense" to go to war against Iraq, without any further authorization from the United Nations. But the UN Charter does not authorize such a claim. Some scholars believe that stopping an imminent attack would also give a country the right to use military force in a kind of self-defense. But even that argument fails, because no one, even the Bush super-hawks, claims that an Iraqi attack of any sort, especially on the United States, is "imminent."

#### **17. What does the rest of the world think about the current crisis with Iraq?**

There is almost no international support for the Bush administration's war drive. Most governments, and probably a majority of people around the world, accept the legitimacy of sending UN inspectors back to finish the task of disarming Iraq's WMD programs, although most also believe economic sanctions should be lifted immediately. But only a few governments, including Israel's and top officials in the UK, are unreservedly in favor of the Bush war calls. The call for war does not have the support of Iraq's closest neighbors, not even Kuwait, the victim of Iraq's 1990 invasion and occupation. Enormous mobilizations have brought Europeans out in the millions to protest the looming war. Public opinion across Asia, Latin America and Africa is similarly opposed to war. And throughout the Middle East, governments are struggling to satisfy demands from their economic and/or military sponsor in Washington while facing (and suppressing) massive citizen outrage against Washington's planned war (See question 30)

Many governments' opposition is based on the lack of United Nations authority for war. Yet some, such as Germany, have rejected direct participation of their military in a U.S. war in Iraq even if a Security Council resolution was passed. In the region, key U.S. dependents, such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, have reluctantly agreed to provide support to a U.S. war only if it is authorized by a new UN resolution. For that reason, the U.S. is likely to escalate the pressure — bribes, threats, punishments — on the UN Security Council to win the necessary votes. (See questions 19 and 20.)

#### **18. What are the legal consequences of an invasion? What precedent does it set elsewhere in the world?**

Without UN authority, and since there is no legitimate claim of self-defense, any U.S. strike on Iraq would violate international law. It would constitute the crime of aggression, one of the most serious war

crimes. Anyone with command responsibility for such an illegal war could be held accountable in a U.S. or international court.

A unilateral decision to invade Iraq (even if U.S. pressure drags other countries in) also sets a dangerous precedent. If the U.S. example of unilateral war is put forward as the standard response to another government's violation of a UN resolution, the world might see Algeria attack Morocco for its failure to abide by UN resolutions demanding an end to Rabat's occupation of the Western Sahara. Greece could go to war against Turkey for Ankara's continued violation of UN resolutions requiring an end to its occupation of northern Cyprus. And Syria or Jordan or Lebanon could cite the U.S. precedent to legitimize an attack on Israel for its violation of 60+ UN resolutions regarding its illegal occupation of Palestine and the Syrian Golan Heights. Already, Russia and Israel have cited Bush's claim of the right to "preemptive war" to justify their escalating repression in Chechnya and in occupied Palestine.

Further, if the U.S. claims its invasion is legitimate as "preventive self-defense" because Iraq may in the future acquire weapons of mass destruction, the United States itself would stand vulnerable to attack from virtually every country in the world as the world's biggest holder of all forms of weapons of mass destruction, and the only government ever to have used nuclear weapons.

At the end of the day, a U.S. preventive war in Iraq undermines the potential for U.S. collaborative non-military influence in the world, weakens U.S. efforts to bring international terrorists to justice, and constitutes a recipe for global chaos. As Nelson Mandela put it, "the attitude of the United States of America is a threat to world peace. Because what [America] is saying is that if you are afraid of a veto in the Security Council, you can go outside and take action and violate the sovereignty of other countries."

## **19. What is the role of the United Nations in the Iraq crisis?**

The United Nations has played a central role in the U.S.-Iraq conflict since 1990, when the U.S. used bribes, threats and punishments to ensure Security Council endorsement of the Gulf War. Since then, the U.S. has manipulated the UN for its own political goals of war and sanctions against Iraq. Madeleine Albright, then-U.S. Ambassador to the UN and later Secretary of State was not shy in declaring, in 1995, that "the UN is a tool of American foreign policy." Even so, Bush administration ideologues have objected to UN centrality, or even UN involvement, in the Iraq crisis as a matter of principle.

This is particularly clear in the case of the economic sanctions that have devastated Iraq since the end of the Gulf War. While virtually every other country in the UN would support lifting sanctions and allowing Iraq to rebuild its shattered country, the sanctions remain in place because governments are afraid to defy the United States. (For more on sanctions and their impact, see question 26.) Much of the UN's continuing influence in the Iraq crisis stems from Resolution 687, the disarmament-sanctions-ceasefire resolution, which, ironically, is the very resolution the U.S. cites to justify its march to war. The resolution actually authorizes the UN Security Council, not any individual country, to make all decisions regarding Iraq's disarmament. It also states very specifically that sanctions must be lifted when Iraq is certified free of WMDs. The U.S., of course, has a long history of ignoring UN resolutions that do not fit its foreign policy goals, or imposing its own interpretation over weak objections from the Security Council (See question 5, on "no-fly zones," for one example.) In the past U.S. officials including Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, Secretaries of State James Baker and Madeleine Albright, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger and others have all asserted that they would not allow sanctions to be ended regardless of UN requirements unless Saddam Hussein has been removed from power -- something definitely not called for in any UN resolutions.

As of November 2002, the UN is again charged with implementing the UNMOVIC/IAEA inspection regime, and certifying disarmament that would require the end of sanctions. If the UN certifies disarmament, and war is averted, the U.S. is certainly likely to object to the end-the-sanctions

requirements of Resolution 687, and a new campaign of U.S. bribes, threats and punishments of the Security Council to maintain sanctions can be anticipated. In response, the General Assembly could, under UN precedent allowing it to step in when the Security Council is deemed unable to act, take up the issue despite it being ordinarily reserved for the Council. Such a General Assembly initiative, of course, could only happen if the political backbone of other UN members were strengthened, for example by the expansion of a global peace and justice movement demanding that the more democratic Assembly challenge the U.S.-dominated Council.

## **20. Can the U.S. get UN authority to go to war in Iraq?**

If the Administration decides to operate within the UN framework, and if it is prepared to pay high financial, political and diplomatic prices, there is little doubt that U.S. has the tools in its diplomatic arsenal to force a vote in its favor; it has done so in the past. But it may be difficult, especially without a "smoking gun" of Iraqi WMDs. Under such conditions, even though a majority of Council members may succumb to Washington's pressure, the resulting resolution would likely still constitute a violation of the UN Charter's commitment to peaceful solutions, rendering any war based on its terms still illegal.

In 1990, the U.S. bribed China with post-Tiananmen Square diplomatic rehabilitation and renewal of long-term development aid to prevent a veto of resolutions leading to the 1991 Gulf War. (China then abstained.) Poor countries on the Council's votes were purchased with cheap Saudi oil, new military aid, and economic assistance. And when Yemen, the sole Arab country on the Council, voted against the resolution authorizing war, a U.S. diplomat told the Yemeni ambassador, "that will be the most expensive 'no' vote you ever cast." Three days later the U.S. cut its entire aid budget to Yemen.

This time around, it was Mauritius that became the example. During the first two weeks of the UN debate on the inspections resolution, Jagdish Koonjul, the ambassador from Mauritius was recalled by his government because he had failed to clearly express Mauritius' support for the proposed U.S. resolution, despite instructions to do so. Why was his government concerned? Because Mauritius receives significant U.S. aid through the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which requires that as a recipient of US assistance, it "does not engage in activities contrary to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests".

## **21. What did the November 2002 United Nations inspections resolution say? Does it authorize war against Iraq?**

The Resolution 1441 does not endorse the use of force. It officially redefines the Iraq crisis, at least in the international arena, as one of disarmament, not regime change, and may at least delay a U.S. attack. It provided a powerful tool to fight for U.S. accountability to multilateralism and the United Nations, and can be claimed as a partial victory by those who oppose the war. But it still reflects the United States' domination of the UN and the rest of the world and ultimately sets the terms for war.

The real victory is that the Bush Administration felt it necessary to go to the UN at all. As late as the summer of 2002 the Pentagon's "chicken-hawks" appeared to have derailed any UN-based strategy for Iraq. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff remained skeptical, polls showed less than a quarter of Americans supported attacking Iraq without the UN, and hundreds of thousands of protesters filled the streets. Washington's closest allies, from Germany to Mexico and even Tony Blair's own Labour Party, railed against growing US unilateralism. The "chicken-hawks", who felt that acknowledging any authority of even a U.S.-dominated UN was a mistake, lost the internecine battle, and the U.S. took its case for war to the UN.

Eight weeks of negotiations led to a series of U.S. compromises on what role its military or intelligence officials would be allowed to play in the inspections. But the resolution still lays out an

inspection regime of unprecedented power and intrusiveness that allows UN inspection teams free rein to go anywhere in Iraq, with no notice, and gain access anywhere they like in their search for weapons, including the most high-security "presidential sites." The inspectors also gained extraordinary new powers, including the ability to take Iraqi scientists and their families out of Iraq for interrogation, and provide them with asylum abroad.

But the resolution does not authorize war. Instead, it specifies that the inspectors' reports of Iraqi violations are to trigger special Security Council consultations in response to any such violations. In the first month of its work, the new UN inspectors — UNMOVIC and IAEA — with unfettered cooperation from the Iraqis, carried out intrusive and wide-ranging inspections and interviews, and indicated no evidence of any prohibited weapons. The U.S. continues to claim it has "proof" of such WMDs, but has refused to provide enough evidence for the inspectors to be able to confirm the allegations. And under the terms of the resolution, these unsubstantiated, unilateral claims are insufficient to even trigger further Security Council consultations.

The Bush administration may still launch its own war for oil, for expansion of U.S. power, and for empire — but Resolution 1441 does not authorize it to do so in the name of the United Nations.

## **22. How did arms inspections in Iraq get started in the first place? What happened during the earlier inspections?**

At the end of the Gulf War in 1991, the UN passed Resolution 687, which declared a ceasefire in the war, spelled out requirements for Iraq's disarmament of weapons of mass destruction, and imposed economic sanctions to be lifted when Iraq had fully complied with the disarmament requirements. To monitor the disarmament, the Security Council established the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), which along with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) sent teams of inspectors into Iraq to find and destroy or render harmless all of Iraq's programs for chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. UNSCOM worked in Iraq for seven years. During that time Iraq cooperated in some areas, but refused cooperation at other times. Despite the lack of full Iraqi cooperation, UNSCOM found and destroyed the overwhelming majority of Iraq's weapons programs components

But during that time, UNSCOM was severely compromised by the revelation that it was illegally spying for U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies. UN inspectors were turning over information that had nothing to do with Iraq's prohibited weapons programs, but everything to do with the whereabouts of Saddam Hussein, the patterns of high-ranking government officials, the locations of the Republican Guards and more — all very useful for Washington's expressed intentions to overthrow the Iraqi regime, something definitely not on the UN agenda. At the same time, U.S. officials were attempting to micro-manage the inspection process, controlling the pace, intrusiveness, site selection and more, leading to a severe crisis within UNSCOM and the resignation of at least one top inspector.

During several crises between UNSCOM and Baghdad, the U.S. threatened massive military assault against Iraq. In early 1998, such a threat was derailed by last-minute negotiations of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in Baghdad. But Washington continued to ratchet up the pressure, including pressure on UNSCOM itself. By the end of 1998, the U.S. and UNSCOM together orchestrated a new crisis, in which UNSCOM chief Richard Butler claimed with great fanfare that Iraq was completely preventing UNSCOM from doing its work. In fact, that was not the case. Butler's own report, despite the hysterical introduction, stated that "in statistical terms, the majority of the inspections of facilities and sites under the ongoing monitoring system were carried out with Iraq's cooperation."

But the U.S. again threatened to use force, and at U.S. urging, Butler suddenly pulled out his inspectors. Twenty-four hours later, the U.S. launched the 4-day illegal assault dubbed Desert Fox. There is no question that the U.S. was orchestrating the UNSCOM crisis. Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) admitted in

a television interview that he spent several hours with Butler at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations on December 13, two days before Butler's report was released. The *Washington Post* reported that on December 15, as he flew home from Israel, President Clinton reviewed "the final language" Butler intended to use in the report. The *Post* noted that this timetable indicated that Washington's sneak preview of the report "long preceded its delivery to its official first recipient, [UN Secretary-General Kofi] Annan."

Following the Desert Fox bombing, which destroyed most of the modest rehabilitation that Iraq had achieved since the end of the 1991 war, Iraq refused to allow the UNSCOM inspectors back into the country.

### **23. What are war crimes? Are war crimes likely if the US attacks Iraq? What are the implications for US soldiers? For Iraqi civilians?**

War crimes are violations of the international laws governing warfare. They include such things as deliberately targeting civilians, attacking even military targets when the effect is disproportionately harmful to civilians, or violating the 4<sup>th</sup> Geneva Convention's requirements for humane treatment of civilians, wounded combatants or prisoners of war in wartime. War crimes were committed on all sides during the Gulf War. U.S. war crimes did not receive as much publicity during the war as Iraqi war crimes, so there is a great danger they will occur again. Those U.S. war crimes during the war itself include bombing a civilian air raid shelter, killing more than 400 civilians, and the attack on Iraqi troops fleeing Kuwait as they tried to surrender. Protocol II of the Geneva Convention also prohibits attacking "objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population" under any circumstances, so the Pentagon's deliberate targeting of Iraq's electrical system was a war crime — regardless of its military value, civilian life depends on electricity for hospitals, clean water and the whole range of electricity-driven life support in an advanced industrial country. Though the U.S. has so far refused to sign Protocol II, that does not make U.S. violations of it legal.

U.S. political and military leaders could be held liable for war crimes if they issue orders similar to those of the 1991 Gulf War. For example, documents from January 1991 made public years later [see Tom Nagy's "The Secret Behind the Sanctions: How the US Intentionally Destroyed Iraq's Water Supply," in *The Progressive*, September 2001] demonstrate the Pentagon's knowing intent to destroy Iraq's electrical system with the explicitly known and identified consequence of disabling the life-support systems on which Iraqi civilian life depends — for instance, water treatment facilities -- thus allowing the spread of water-borne diseases that would kill large numbers of infants and children.

Almost all of the U.S. military strategies publicly debated in 2002 begin with a massive air campaign against Baghdad. The Pentagon rationale is that Baghdad is —as it is commonly described — "studded with anti-aircraft batteries and surrounded by crack troops of the Republican Guards." Whether or not those claims are true, Baghdad is a crowded city populated by 5 - 6 million ordinary Iraqi civilians, desperately trying to live something approach a normal life. However "smart" the U.S. bombs, it is unlikely those civilians will all be spared.

The economic sanctions themselves, responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of innocents, clearly violate the laws of war prohibiting attacks on civilians, since their murderous impact is well known to their U.S. and UN perpetrators. Under international law, political and military leaders are accountable for their commands, and individual soldiers may also be charged with war crimes if they carry out such illegal orders. (In 2002, peace organizations began distributing warnings to young Israeli soldiers, cautioning them that orders they may be given in the occupied territories may constitute war crimes, and following the orders may subject them to criminal proceedings.)

## **The Consequences of War: Iraq & Beyond**

### **24. Who will suffer from a war in Iraq?**

The first to suffer will be the people of Iraq. However smart the Pentagon's so-called "smart bombs," there is no doubt that a U.S. war against Iraq will lead to massive human suffering. Even the newest weapons, such as the carbon fibers designed to cripple Iraq's electrical grid without hurting the buildings, will lead to wide-spread civilian deaths when vital institutions such as hospitals and water treatment plants are suddenly without electricity. The Pentagon's use of depleted uranium weapons will continue to threaten civilian life and health. After twenty years of war, and twelve years of deadly economic sanctions, Iraq's already-devastated social fabric will be further shredded by another war.

In the already volatile region, the war will fuel tension and anti-American anger. Countries across the Middle East will likely pay a high price in economic disruption. Absolute monarchies and repressive pseudo-democracies will tighten their repressive control over populations outraged by their governments' support for Washington's war. Israel's support for the war will exacerbate its isolation in the region; Palestinians will pay a high price in lives and land as Israel cracks down even more dramatically in the occupied territory as war engulfs the neighborhood. The environmental devastation such a war will leave behind will respect no borders.

The war will heighten the U.S. position as an unaccountable superpower with little regard for the rest of the world. It will serve as a new recruitment campaign for those who would use violence against American target and increase the possibility of terrorist attacks on the U.S.. American military personnel face the possibility of a new round of exposure to depleted uranium, even beyond the normal risks of battle. At a moment when the overall U.S. economy is in serious trouble, and only weapons manufacturers and oil companies are riding high, cuts in schools, health care, social security, urban infrastructure all are part of the price Americans will pay for war in Iraq.

### **25. What is life like in Iraq today? What are the causes of civilian suffering?**

Iraqis suffer for multiple reasons. Since coming to power, Saddam Hussein's Baath Party has imposed rigorous control and a repressive political atmosphere in which dissent is forbidden and punishment swift and harsh. As in the absolute monarchies and other president-for-life "democracies" across the Arab world, Iraqis' political and civil rights are routinely violated. There is no freedom of speech or assembly, no opposition parties and no free press. Suspicion of dissent is commonly met with arrest, and reports of arbitrary arrests of family members, torture, and extra-judicial executions are common. Much of Iraq's opposition, including communist, Arab nationalist, and Islamist organizations, has been ruthlessly wiped out or driven into exile. Iraqi Kurds were the target of the brutal Anfal campaign of the 1980s, designed to drive Kurds out of key oil-rich regions in an "Arabization" version of ethnic cleansing.

For the majority of people in pre-sanctions Iraq, the "other" human rights — economic and social rights — were well respected. Unlike other Gulf oil producers, Iraq invested virtually all of its oil wealth inside the country, building the most advanced medical and educational systems in the region. Even during the decade-long Iran-Iraq War, the overwhelmingly middle-class Iraqis lived in a modern, near First World level society with one of the smallest wealth-poverty gaps of any country in the region. Food access, education, health care and general quality of life approached that of developed countries. The most common problem faced by Iraqi pediatricians was childhood obesity.

The Gulf War and sanctions changed everything. Iraq's modern technology-driven society was reduced after six weeks of intensive bombing to a pre-industrial state. Sanctions prohibited Iraqi travel,

forbid access to medical or scientific journals or participation in international conferences, and have created a generation of Iraqis inadequately educated for the twenty-first century and angry at being denied what their parents once took for granted.

Unemployment has soared, and the Iraqi dinar plummeted from its pre-sanctions level of \$3 per dinar to a 2002 rate of about 23,000 dinars per dollar. Assistant Secretary General Hans Von Sponeck, the second UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq to resign in protest of the impact of sanctions, described the impact of “the less visible, less dramatic non-material side of the economic sanctions.” “Everything is tired,” he said. “Iraq’s social fabric is under serious attack.” Like any sanctions-based economy, Iraq now has an expanding wealthy and regime-linked black marketeer class, resulting in a widening of the gap between the impoverished majority and the tiny — but vastly wealthy — rich.

The economic sanctions remain the main impediment to rebuilding Iraq. Before sanctions were imposed, ninety percent of Iraq’s income came from oil exports. Once sanctions prohibited all oil sales, lack of access to even basic food and medicine soon reached catastrophic levels for the once largely middle-class population. Repair of the country’s water, electrical, and oil systems, and other infrastructure, devastated in the 1991 bombing campaign, stalled. A 1999 delegation of Congressional staff to Iraq reported that: “the image of emaciated babies and malnourished young children ill or even dying in Iraq is by now well-known in the U.S. The staff delegation, visiting hospitals in Baghdad, Amara and Basra, found that reality unchanged, with most of these children dying from treatable diseases, usually the result of unclean water and exacerbated by malnutrition, for which basic medications and treatments are unavailable.”

## **26. What are sanctions against Iraq, why were they imposed, and why do they remain in place?**

The Security Council imposed comprehensive sanctions against Iraq on August 6, 1990, four days after Iraq invaded Kuwait. The official rationale was to pressure the regime to withdraw from Kuwait, but on the same day then-President George H. W. Bush, along with British and NATO leaders, announced plans for Operation Desert Shield, and ordered U.S. government agencies to prepare plans for “destabilizing and eventually toppling” Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. The ensuing Gulf War ended Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait, but left Saddam Hussein in power. Sanctions remained in place, contingent, according to the UN, on the disarmament of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. U.S. officials have made it plain, however, that sanctions will not end while Saddam Hussein remains in power.

Military sanctions were crafted to prevent other countries from selling weapons to Iraq. Throughout the 1970s and 80s the U.S. and its allies, especially Germany, France and Russia, sold Iraq massive armaments, as well as the materials needed for chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs. The military sanctions stopped most, though not all, of those weapons sales.

The economic sanctions that were put in place, the most comprehensive and the most tightly enforced of any sanctions regime ever imposed on any country, initially prohibited the export of all Iraqi oil, which provided all but a tiny fraction of Iraq’s access to hard currency. (See Oil for Food, next question) They also prohibited the sale of almost everything to Iraq, with the exception of some food and medicines — but even those were impossible to obtain because without oil revenue there was no money to buy anything. From the beginning, the U.S. insisted that these sanctions would directly pressure Hussein’s regime, first to get out of Kuwait, later to insure Iraq’s disarmament.

The problem is that governments themselves are largely protected from the impact of sanctions, and instead it is the people who suffer. This has certainly been the case in Iraq, where deaths from sanctions-based causes far surpass the number killed in the Gulf War itself. In the early years the deaths were primarily linked to malnutrition; by the mid- to late-1990s, the government’s strict food rationing



program had incrementally improved the nutrition situation, and a higher percentage of deaths were caused by water-borne diseases untreated because of lack of medicines and insufficient medical equipment in the hospitals. The UN mission to Iraq said in March 1991 that "Iraq has, for some time to come, been relegated to a pre-industrial age, but with all the disabilities of post-industrial dependency; on an intensive use of energy and technology."

Economic sanctions have not, as one might imagine, fomented revolt within Iraq. Instead, it has increased dependence on the regime, since the limited amount of food and medicine people have access to is provided by the government's rationing system. In addition, people struggling to find clean water and some kind of education for their children are not in a position to mobilize opposition to their government. Lifting economic sanctions and allowing the rehabilitation of Iraq's middle class would likely have the effect of renewing internal calls for democratization and a change of government.

## **27. What is the Oil for Food Program? How does it work?**

In 1996, the Security Council created the Oil for Food Program, which allowed Iraq to sell limited quantities of oil; by 1999 the limits were removed. But Iraq does not control the oil income. Instead, the oil revenue is held in a UN-run escrow account, and Iraq has to have every purchasing contract, for food, medicine, building material, whatever, approved by the UN's "661 Committee" (named for the resolution establishing the sanctions.) Thirty percent of the Oil for Food income (later reduced to 25%) was diverted to the Iraq Compensation Fund to pay reparations for losses caused by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. By the late 1990s, virtually all of the impoverished individual victims of the invasion (mostly South Asians working in Kuwait, Palestinians expelled from Kuwait, etc.) had been compensated, and the remaining compensation funds were largely going to repay the Kuwaiti royal family, Israel, and U.S. and other international oil companies, despite analysts' suggestions that paying these reparations should be postponed until UNICEF could certify that Iraqi children were no longer dying from the consequences of sanctions.

Oil for Food was never designed to rebuild Iraq's economy or even to provide a modicum of food or health security for Iraq's 22 million people. Officially, it was designed to prevent further deterioration among Iraq's civilian population. In fact, it was a PR-driven response to the growing international outrage over massive civilian casualties. With the Sanctions Committee reflecting Security Council power relations, the U.S. and four other permanent members of the Council maintain a veto over every individual contract—and have used it often. By late 2001, five *billion* dollars worth of contracts were on hold, almost all of them by U.S. directive.

Even as late as December 2002, there has been no measurable change in the sanctions-driven death rate of Iraq's most vulnerable citizens. According to UNICEF reports, 5,000 children under the age of five die every month from the results of the U.S.-imposed UN sanctions.

## **28. How are the Kurds treated in Iraq?**

Iraq, along with the other nations whose land includes Kurdish territory (Syria, Turkey, and Iran), has a history of discrimination and mistreatment of the Kurds. In recent years Iraqi Kurds have done much better, both economically and politically. A U.S. war on Iraq is not certain to better the Kurds' situation; U.S.-allied Turkey's price for participation in the war may include U.S. promises not to interfere in their repression of Turkish Kurds, which has already involved military campaigns into Iraqi Kurdistan where Turkish Kurds sometimes seek refuge. The U.S. is also likely to acquiesce to Turkish demands for guarantees that Iraqi Kurds do not win even a robust level of autonomy (which could provide a destabilizing model for Turkey's independence-minded Kurds) -- because for Washington, the U.S.-Turkish alliance is strategically more important than the desires of the Turkish or Iraqi Kurds.

Iraq has treated the Kurds brutally, even in the relatively recent past. The 1988 Anfal campaign killed tens of thousands, some by poison gas. "Arabization," — forcing Kurds out of areas of economic or strategic importance and into the northern region of Iraq — remains the policy around the oil-rich Kurdish town of Kirkuk.

The two main Iraqi Kurdish parties, the KDP and the PUK, once espoused independence, but they have long since abandoned that goal in favor of cultural and administrative autonomy within Iraq. Since the end of the Gulf War the Kurds in northern Iraq have established a largely autonomous zone in the U.S.-British "no-fly" zone. The Iraqi military did enter the area in 1996 at the request of one of the Kurdish parties, pulling out some time after the CIA's overthrow-the-Iraqi-government operation was crushed. After their withdrawal, Iraqi Kurdistan developed a separate governing and social structure. Development was aided by Kurdish access to local supplies of fresh water, substantial trade across porous borders, indigenous agriculture left largely unscathed from the Gulf War, oil smuggling revenues, and significantly, by a 22% higher per capita share of Oil for Food funds than that available in the rest of Iraq. Cultural and economic life has flourished, and by 2002 the Iraqi Kurds were participating in, though leery of the war-supporting positions of, the Iraqi National Congress and other opposition activities. Since 2000, Kurdish leaders have sent regular emissaries to negotiate with the government in Baghdad, and have asserted that they would not participate in a U.S. war to overthrow the regime.

In neighboring and U.S.-allied Turkey, the southeast Kurdish region has long been a center of terrible repression and conflict. Until August 2002, Kurds were prohibited by law from teaching their own language or running their own schools. Kurds were largely excluded from national cultural or economic life. Though conflict with the separatist PKK ended in 1999, Ankara refused an amnesty and 12,000 PKK fighters and family members fled to northern Iraq. The Turkish military, with U.S. support, continues to attack alleged PKK bases in northern Iraq by air and by land.

Outside powers -- most notably the United States -- have used and forsaken the Kurds as well, embracing them one moment, abandoning them to their fate at the hands of a cruel regional power the next. The Turkish government fears that its own Kurdish population may see the autonomy of their Iraqi counterparts as a model. Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz visited Ankara in December 2002 and pledged that the U.S. would maintain Iraq's "territorial integrity," remarks which must be viewed in light of previous instances of the U.S. sacrificing Kurdish self-determination in pursuit of regional strategic goals. In one egregious example, rebellious Iraqi Kurds were armed by the U.S. in the early 1970s at the request of the Shah of Iran. A subsequent deal between the shah and then-Vice President Saddam Hussein led the U.S. to abandon the Kurds, who were massacred by Iraqi troops.

## **29. How will Iraqis be affected by war?**

War in Iraq will generate an enormous humanitarian crisis. UN planning documents anticipate that 500,000 Iraqis would be injured in the early stages of a U.S. war. The UN describes war in Iraq resulting in a crippled nation with shattered infrastructure, electricity grid badly damaged, and major damage to the oil industry. UN reports anticipate civilian damage far beyond that of the 1991 Gulf war, and a resulting refugee crisis.

In a November 2002 confidential internal planning memo, the UN's Inter-Agency Humanitarian Preparedness and Response Framework for Iraq and Neighboring Countries estimated that "up to 9.5 million people could become immediately food insecure, less than 50% of the population would retain access to clean water, and critical shortages would be experienced in essential drugs." UN planning anticipated providing emergency food aid to only half those in need — up to 4.5 million people. In a later version of the report, the UN estimated that about 3 million of those in need of food would face "dire malnutrition."

The Inter-Agency Framework states that "as a result of hostilities, over 1.2 million asylum seekers could attempt to cross international borders to seek refuge and protection in neighboring countries. New mass displacement would occur in the hardest hit and most insecure areas. Urban areas would be particularly affected." Later planning documents indicate that the UN foresees a need for border area transit camps for as many as half a million Iraqis.

### **30. What will happen in the rest of the Middle East region if there is war in Iraq?**

The Middle East is already deeply unstable. Regimes across the region face profound crises of legitimacy, with populations massively opposing their governments' dependency on the U.S. and acquiescence to its policies in the region. Especially problematic is the uncritical nature of U.S. support for Israel and Israel's occupation of Palestine.

There is little doubt that, despite often-blustering statements of opposition designed to appease public anger, governments throughout the region will, when the time comes, do what Washington asks of them. They have little choice: unsupported by their own people, they remain in power on the basis of support from the U.S., whether, like Jordan, that support is economic, or like Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf petro-states, military, or, like Egypt, both military and economic. Some of them may, however, face serious instability, even the possibility of overthrow, if their support for a U.S. war is too public or too disdainful of public sensibilities. The U.S. appears to take little interest in these political challenges, thinking, perhaps, that these problems too have military solutions, or that the current regimes are easily replaceable by others more compliant to U.S. wishes. All of the regional governments are already using the war build-up to engage in "preemptive strikes" against their own domestic dissent. This increased government repression, which will increase with an actual shooting war, will push more and more opposition underground or into extremism.

This will only increase threats to U.S. citizens throughout the region. As anger towards the U.S. government soars, fury among disempowered, disenfranchised and often marginalized populations may well turn to violence. Although it has not been a pattern so far, "soft" targets, such as individual U.S. tourists, students, businesspeople and others could become the targets of such rage. More dramatic terrorism may also result.

### **31. What does Israel have to do with war in Iraq?**

Israel is the only country in the region that openly supports a U.S. war in Iraq. Israel is likely to benefit from a U.S. war in the form of increased financial support, but will also likely pay in other ways for their closeness with the United States. Israel would like to see a broader war drastically reshape the political map of the Middle East. There are also clear indications that Israel would use a war on Iraqi as cover for a more aggressive campaign against Palestinians. (See next question.)

While Israeli leaders have for years viewed Iran as more threatening to Israeli security than Iraq (acknowledging the degraded state of Iraq's military since the Gulf War), the Bush administration's fixation with Iraq has led Tel Aviv to support that war in hopes of a follow-up war against Iran. Many Bush administration hawks, such as Richard Perle, Douglas Feith and others, have crafted strategies outlining a vision of a remapped U.S.-dominated Middle East with Israel as Washington's strategic junior partner. (See, for example, "A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm," published by the Study Group on a New Israeli Strategy Toward 2000, of the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies.)

In fact, a war with Iraq is likely to create even greater problem for Israel. Its support for the war and close ties to the U.S. will lead some to hold it accountable for Washington's wartime actions. Greater

antagonism and regional isolation towards Israel, and potential attacks against individual Israelis are likely to result, particularly if Iraq suffers a high rate of civilian casualties.

Since September 11<sup>th</sup>, Israeli officials have repeated incessantly the claim that "now you know what it's like," equating the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon with the suicide bombings of desperate young Palestinians. In the U.S., defenders of uncritical U.S. support for Israel, particularly within the Jewish and the right-wing Christian fundamentalist communities are among the staunchest backers of war with Iraq. The U.S. provides \$4 billion or so each year in military and economic aid to Israel, as well as the consistent use of Washington's veto in the UN Security Council to prevent international criticism of the Israeli occupation. Most recently, in December 2002, the U.S. vetoed an otherwise unanimous condemnation of Israel's killing of UN officials in the occupied territory and its destruction of a UN food warehouse in Gaza. By early 2003, Israel was using the likelihood of a U.S. war in Iraq to demand additional U.S. aid from the cash-strapped U.S. budget — including \$4 billion in new military grants and \$8 billion more in loan guarantees — and there was every indication that Congress would agree.

### **32. What will be the impact on the Palestinians?**

Palestinians are already suffering in the worst conditions of military occupation since 1967. The collapse of the Oslo peace process, the high hopes ended by a nightmare of disillusionment, and the current Palestinian realities are those of tightened military control, increased repression, economic devastation and social catastrophe. Unemployment has hit 70% in some areas. According to the U.S. Agency for International Development, childhood malnutrition in the occupied West Bank and Gaza has skyrocketed, and had surpassed levels in Somalia and Bangladesh by the summer of 2002. Israel's "targeted killings," or assassinations of Palestinians, continues, unchecked by international criticism. (By late 2002, the U.S. had abandoned even the pretense of criticism of such assassinations, as Washington moved towards what many in the region describe as the "Israelization" of the U.S. war against terrorism, using an Israeli-style helicopter missile attack to assassinate an alleged al-Qaeda leader and five others driving in an isolated car deep in the Yemeni desert.) Not surprisingly, the desperate conditions and complete stall in peace negotiations have led increasing numbers of Palestinians to take desperate acts in response — both legitimate acts of resistance and illegal attacks on Israeli civilians that themselves violate international law.

As war fever began to heat up in Washington in the spring of 2002, the threat of "transfer" became a much more serious concern for Palestinians. Long deemed an unacceptable topic for polite discussion in Israel, over the last two years "transfer," Israel's euphemism for ethnic cleansing, has moved into the forefront of political discussion. Featuring prominently in the Israeli media and the subject of at least one high-profile academic conference at one of Israel's most prestigious universities, "transfer" is now part of mainstream political discussion and its supporters hold seats in the Israeli Knesset and in the government.

The threat is that in the regional chaos of a U.S. war in Iraq, Israel would forcibly expel some numbers of Palestinians. Perhaps it would be in the form of a punishment against a whole village from which a suicide bomber came, or perhaps 1,000 or so targeted Palestinian individuals — political leaders, intellectuals, militants, or those Israel claims are militants — would be bused over the river into Jordan or flown into Lebanon. The possibility is not so far-fetched; besides the massive expulsions that forced more than one million Palestinians into exile during the 1947-48 and 1967 wars, as recently as 1994 Israeli troops arrested 415 Islamists from the occupied territories, forced them into military helicopters and flew them into the hills of south Lebanon. There, without documents, without permission and despite rejection by the Lebanese government, they were abandoned on the snow-covered hillsides.

And General Sharon himself, elected prime minister of Israel in January 2001, created the "Jordan is Palestine" campaign in 1981-82 that called for expelling all Palestinians out of the occupied territories as well as the one million or so Palestinians who are now citizens of Israel, and pushing them all into Jordan. In 1989, former Israeli Prime Minister and later foreign minister Binyamin Netanyahu told students at Bar-Ilan University: "Israel should have exploited the repression of the demonstrations in China, when world attention was focused on that country, to carry out mass expulsions among the Arabs of the territories." War in Iraq would provide another such opportunity for "transfer" while world attention is largely focused elsewhere.

Recent mobilizations of Israeli academics have issued public calls against "transfer," but the danger remains very real — polls show more than 40% of Israelis in favor of such ethnic cleansing.

## **The History of the U.S. - Iraq Relations**

### **33. Did Iraq ever use weapons of mass destruction? Did Iraq use them during the Gulf War? Did Iraq ever use WMDs against the U.S. or U.S. allies?**

The Iraqi military used chemical weapons against Kurdish civilians during the Anfal campaign in the 1980s. It also used them against Iranian troops during the Iran-Iraq war. All those uses of chemical weapons, whether against civilians or against enemy troops, violated the international chemical weapons treaty.

One former Iraqi officer, General al-Shamari, told *Newsweek* that he was in charge of firing chemical weapons from howitzers against Iranian troops, and that U.S. satellite information provided the targeting information. A former CIA official confirmed to *Newsweek* that the U.S. provided military intelligence to Iraq, including on chemical warfare. General al-Shamari now lives safely in the U.S., running a restaurant outside of Washington DC.

The Iraqi regime clearly knew that using such illegal weapons against targets of no interest to the West (such as Iranian troops or Kurdish civilians) would not result in serious consequences. They were right; the U.S. continued licensing the shipment of biological seed stock and other WMD material to Baghdad even after Iraq's use of illegal chemical weapons became news.

But during the Gulf War Iraq never used chemical or biological weapons. They knew that any use against American troops, Saudis or Israelis would be met with devastating consequences. Israel threatened to use its nuclear weapons if attacked by Iraqi WMDs, although it was still operating under U.S.-imposed constraints. The deterrence worked—the Iraqi regime never used WMDs against any U.S. or allied target. The exposure of many American troops to chemical weapons toxins, possibly part of the cause of Gulf War syndrome, resulted from the U.S. military's detonation of chemical dumps.

### **34. How did the U.S. view Iraq before the Gulf crisis of 1990-91? Why did the U.S. change its view of Iraq?**

The U.S. maintained a close alliance with Iraq all through the 1980s. In 1983, and again in 1984, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, then the special envoy of President Reagan, traveled to Baghdad to meet with Saddam Hussein and negotiate a renewal of full U.S.-Iraqi diplomatic relations. Despite at least two face-to-face meetings, Rumsfeld never expressed to Saddam Hussein any U.S. displeasure about Iraq's use of illegal chemical weapons. (The State Department claims Rumsfeld did mention it separately to Tariq Aziz.) In any case, Washington restored full diplomatic relations by November 1984, extending financial support, agricultural credits, military technology and intelligence, the seed stock for

biological weapons, and political support to the regime in Baghdad, then, as now, led by Saddam Hussein.

In July 1990, only days before Iraq invaded Kuwait, U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie met with Saddam Hussein and told him, on behalf of President George H. W. Bush that "we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait." Some analysts believe Saddam Hussein interpreted this as a green light for Iraq to invade Kuwait. Whether it was meant to be a green light or not, what it *wasn't* was a clear statement that the U.S. opposed such an invasion.

The U.S.'s position changed abruptly after Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. The invasion, a clear violation of international law, provided to the U.S. an easy pretext for war. This war mobilization was a policy choice, not a policy necessity. Iraq was not, after all, the first Middle East country to invade and occupy a neighbor. Morocco remained occupying Western Sahara; Turkey had invaded Northern Cyprus and maintained a rump "Turkish Republic" there since 1974; and Israel continued its internationally-condemned occupation of the Palestinian West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem, as well as the Syrian Golan Heights. All those occupations are illegal, and like Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, they were all carried out by close allies of the U.S.

But in 1990 Washington was responding to something beyond Iraq and Kuwait: the broader international situation and the end of the Cold War. The Soviet Union was about to collapse, leaving the U.S. as the sole global superpower. Instead of announcing a peace dividend and a pull-back from its global military reach, the U.S. decided to lead the world to war as a way of trumpeting its decision to remain a superpower, despite the lack of a strategic challenger. The alliance with Iraq was reversed, and the demonization of Saddam Hussein and all things Iraqi began.

### **35. How did U.S. corporations help Iraq obtain weapons of mass destruction?**

During its alliance with the United States in the 1970s and 1980s, Iraq had active programs producing chemical and biological weapons, and researching and working towards production of a nuclear weapon. These programs were actively and knowingly supported by U.S. corporations and the U.S. government, as revealed in 1994 House Banking Committee hearings. Those hearings revealed, among other things, that the American Type Culture Collection, a company outside of Washington DC, had provided Iraq with the seed stock for biological weapons agents including anthrax, botulinum, e-coli and many more, under license by the U.S. Commerce Department.

A leak in the German newspaper *die Tageszeitung* of some of the 8,000 pages that Washington deleted from Iraq's December 7, 2002, arms declaration provided further information. The deleted sections documented 24 U.S. corporations, 55 U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations, and a number of U.S. government agencies that provided parts, material, training and other assistance to Iraq's chemical, biological, missile, and nuclear weapons programs throughout the 1970s and 80s, some continuing till the end of 1990. The U.S. corporations include Honeywell, Rockwell, Hewlett Packard, Dupont, Eastman Kodak, Bechtel, and more. U.S. government Departments of Energy, Commerce, Defense and Agriculture, as well as federal laboratories at Sandia, Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore, were also involved.

A major front-page article in the *Washington Post* (December 30, 2002) further documented U.S. support for Iraq's WMD programs, especially the chemical program, including trade in weapons and other military goods. The article also detailed the active involvement of Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld, then a special envoy of President Reagan to Iraq, in reestablishing full diplomatic relations and improving trade and other economic ties that bolstered Washington's military support of Iraq.

Other Republican insiders were involved in shady deals that helped build Iraq's WMDs. In 1989, news broke of a secret \$4 billion loan made to Iraq by a U.S. branch of Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) of

Italy, which at the time employed Henry Kissinger on its Consulting Board for International Policy. Congressman Henry Gonzalez, chair of the banking committee, also noted that an executive of Kissinger Associates met Saddam Hussein in Baghdad in June 1989 at a meeting in which the Iraqi leader apparently expressed interest in expanding commercial relations with the U.S. "Many Kissinger Associates clients received U.S. export licenses for exports to Iraq. Several were also the beneficiaries of BNL loans to Iraq," Congressman Gonzalez wrote in a letter to then-President Bush (senior). Iraq also used the BNL loans to attempt to buy difficult-to-manufacture nuclear weapons components.

### **36. What about Iraqi opposition groups? Are they funded by the US government?**

Since the Gulf War of 1991, the U.S. has supported and funded a small number of the more than 70 opposition groups that have functioned outside of Iraq. In the first years, the CIA provided most of its millions of dollars to two groups, the Iraqi National Congress (INC), led by the London-based fugitive banker Ahmad Chalabi (wanted in Jordan for embezzling \$60 million from Petra Bank), and the Iraq National Accord (INA) made up largely of former military officers. In 1998, Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act, which authorized \$97 million to support the opposition. The INC and INA, along with the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (headquartered in Tehran), the Movement for Constitutional Monarchy (led by Sharif Hussein, a member of Iraq's old royal family), the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and two smaller parties were chosen in 1999 as recipients of U.S. financial backing. The Supreme Council, representing many Shi'a in southern Iraq and backed by Iran, immediately rejected U.S. funding. Only three of the groups, the two Kurdish parties in the North and the Supreme Council in the South, have any presence inside Iraq.

Since that time, U.S. confidence in the opposition has diminished, except among the Pentagon's super-hawks and some in the CIA. General Anthony Zinni, who headed U.S. Central Command (including Iraq) for years throughout the 1990, and who in 2001 became President Bush's special envoy to the Middle East, said that bringing the opposition to power would turn Iraq into "a Bay of Goats," alluding to the 1961 Bay of Pigs debacle.

During the first two years of the Bush administration, there were great efforts at unifying the fractious opposition. A high-profile mid-December 2002 conference in London was possible—barely—only after months of delay due to squabbles between groups on such issues as when and how to establish a government in exile. A key result of the conference was the demand that the U.S. refrain from imposing a military occupation on post-war Iraq. But much of that demand seemed based on protecting the positioning of the Iraqi exiles themselves, most of whom appear to have little or no support inside the country. The conference agreed on a call for a "democratic, pluralistic and federal" Iraq, but there was little agreement about what that meant or how to get there.

By early 2003, the administration's hopes for the opposition seemed just about ended. Continuing disagreements over money, leadership and perks kept the opposition groups feuding and unfocused. Those in the administration favoring a direct (whether short-term or longer) U.S. occupation of Iraq after a war seemed to have won the battle against those urging support for the opposition to create a government in exile even before a war begins. While exile "working groups" on Iraqi democracy and related subjects continue under State Department sponsorship, the role of the once-influential opposition had faded. (See also question 43)

## **Alternatives to War**

### **37. What should be the U.S. approach to Iraq?**

The U.S. should immediately announce that war is not a solution to the U.S.-Iraq crisis, and that it will neither initiate a unilateral war nor use the United Nations as a tool to create a false "multi-lateral" cover for war, and that diplomacy and truly international initiatives will replace war.

### **38. What should be done about economic sanctions?**

The U.S. should call for the immediate lifting of all economic sanctions against Iraq, end foreign control of Iraq's oil income, and end the prohibitions against trade and the rehabilitation of Iraq's economy. In the meantime the U.S. should allow Iraq to suspend repayment of 25% of its oil revenues to the compensation fund until such time as UNICEF certifies that Iraqi children are no longer at grave risk from sanctions-driven impoverishment.

### **39. What should be U.S. policy regarding disarmament in and around Iraq?**

The U.S. should support the work of the UN inspectors in Iraq, and respect the independence and authority of the United Nations as decision-maker regarding inspections.

The U.S. should transform military sanctions on Iraq by immediate implementation of Article 14 of the UN ceasefire Resolution 687, which says that disarming Iraq's WMDs should be a step towards the creation of a Middle East-wide zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them. This of course requires an end to the U.S.-led double standard that ignores the need for international inspection and destruction of Israel's known but unacknowledged nuclear arsenal, and provides a framework for ending all chemical and biological weapons programs in Iran, Israel and elsewhere in the region.

The U.S. should move to end its role as the largest supplier of arms of all kinds to this already arms-glutted region. The U.S. should immediately go public with the documentation of all U.S. companies and government agencies involved in Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs in the past, and announce new restrictions that will prohibit all U.S. companies from exporting arms to any country in the Middle East.

The U.S. should announce its intention to follow the model of the UN arms inspections regime in Iraq to welcome international inspections of all U.S. WMD facilities and dual-use programs, and urge the other four permanent members of the Security Council to follow suit.

The U.S. should immediately resume participation in the negotiations it walked out of to strengthen enforcement of the Biological Weapons Treaty.

The U.S. should announce its intention to provide a model for nuclear disarmament by reaffirming its commitment to implementation of Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty requiring moves towards complete nuclear disarmament by the official nuclear weapons states.

### **40. What should a new U.S. policy on oil look like?**

The U.S. should recognize that the only route to energy independence lies with decreasing our dependence on oil in favor of alternative fuels. The United States represents 4% of the world's people; we consume 25% of the world's oil and other resources. The Persian Gulf region holds 65% of the



world's oil; as long as the U.S. remains dependent on ever-increasing supplies of oil, we remain dependent on that region.

#### **41. What should we do about the "No-Fly" zones?**

The U.S. should immediately end its bombing of the "no-fly" zones in Iraq, end military enforcement of the zones, and declare an end to the "no-fly" zones.

The U.S. should call on Turkey to respect its own borders and to keep its air force and ground troops out of Iraqi territory.

The U.S. should encourage the continuation of the recent negotiations between Kurdish leaders and the Iraqi regime regarding protection of the Iraqi Kurdish population and other potentially threatened communities in Iraq. The U.S. should also encourage other third parties (such as the European Union, the Arab League, Jordan, Qatar, France) to work through the UN to initiate such discussions with the Iraqi government. Since the EU is already involved in discussions regarding Turkey's treatment of its Kurdish minority, broadening those talks in such a way as to include protecting the rights of Iraqi as well as Turkish Kurds might be a useful beginning.

#### **42. How can the U.S. better promote human rights for Iraqis?**

The U.S. should recognize the limitations on its credibility because of its long-standing support for the Iraqi regime during the periods of the most egregious human rights violations.

The U.S. should support international initiatives (tribunals or other forums) designed to hold individuals and governments (Iraq, U.S., and others) accountable for the violations of all categories of human rights of civilians — political, civil, economic, social and cultural — in Iraq or occupied Kuwait from the mid-1980s until the present to include the periods of most serious violations. The tribunal could investigate violations of the laws of war (the use of chemical weapons, failure to account for missing prisoners of war, etc.); violations of civil and political rights (widespread use of arbitrary arrest, torture, extrajudicial killings, forced expulsions and relocations, etc.), and violations of economic and social rights (denial of food, water, medical care through the imposition of economic sanctions).

The U.S. should initiate internal investigations to determine the accountability of U.S. officials responsible for crafting or implementing policies in Iraq that have violated the human rights of the Iraqi population and should take steps to prevent such policies from being imposed in the future. Such an investigation should cover all violations of the laws of war, including attacks against nonmilitary and retreating Iraqi troops by allied forces during the Gulf War and the ongoing bombing of "no-fly" zones in Iraq. There should also be a U.S. investigation of large-scale violations of economic, social, and cultural rights from the allied bombing and sanctions regime, including the denial of a civilian population's access to sufficient food, water, medicine, and education, as well as the destruction of educational, medical, economic and cultural institutions.

#### **43. What should be done with the Iraqi opposition?**

The U.S. should announce an immediate end to support for armed Iraqi opposition groups. Since the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act does not include specific implementation requirements, the White House can and should reverse its current position of support for the act and announce its intention to disregard it.

The U.S. should reassert its commitments to abide by the UN Charter and other international legal prohibitions against efforts to overthrow other countries' governments.

The U.S. should agree to provide funds only to Arab League, European Union, UN, or other multilateral efforts to provide economic and humanitarian aid to civil society organizations and humanitarian institutions inside Iraq; Washington should provide no funds to unilaterally selected recipients or campaigns, including propaganda or political campaigns.

The U.S. should work to protect Kurdish interests through a reconciliation process aimed at establishing a non-discriminatory regional autonomy agreement with the Iraqi Kurds, and guaranteeing that, with the lifting of sanctions, the region's economic well-being is protected.

## Iraq Action Resource Guide

*Would you like the bound, printed version of this pamphlet? \$2 for one copy, \$1.50 each for 2-5, \$1 each for 6-49, \$.75 each for 50-249, and \$.50 each for 250 or more. Contact Dorian Lipscombe at 202-234-9382 or [dorian@ips-dc.org](mailto:dorian@ips-dc.org) Orders of 50 or more receive a free VHS copy of IRAQ: Voices From the Streets (see video section, below)*

### Websites

**United for Peace and Justice** is a national campaign that brings together a broad range of organizations throughout the United States to help coordinate our work against a U.S. war on Iraq. UFPJ provides links to peace organizing resources and dozens of organizational websites.

[www.unitedforpeace.org](http://www.unitedforpeace.org)

**The Institute for Policy Studies** is working with the peace movement to provide analysis about US policy toward Iraq and resources for activists. [www.ips-dc.org](http://www.ips-dc.org)

**Cities for Peace** links local campaigns to obtain anti-war city council resolutions

[www.citiesforpeace.org](http://www.citiesforpeace.org)

**The Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP)** maintains one of the most informative websites on Middle East politics, culture and society. [www.merip.org](http://www.merip.org)

**Institute for Public Accuracy** works to broaden public discourse about Iraq and the peace movement by gaining media access for those whose perspectives are commonly drowned out by corporate-backed institutions. [www.accuracy.org](http://www.accuracy.org)

### Iraq Speakers Bureau

The Iraq Speakers Bureau provides direct access to policy experts, diplomats, former UN officials, human rights activists and public health researchers who are committed to taking you beyond the headlines. A project of the Education for Peace in Iraq Center. [iraqspeakers.org](http://iraqspeakers.org)

### Books

*Beyond the Storm: A Gulf Crisis Reader*; ed. Phyllis Bennis & M. Moushabeck, Olive Branch Press, 1991. Order at [www.ips-dc.org](http://www.ips-dc.org)

*Before and After: US Foreign Policy and the September 11<sup>th</sup> Crisis*; by Phyllis Bennis, Olive Branch Press, 2002. Order at [www.ips-dc.org](http://www.ips-dc.org)

*Calling The Shots: How Washington Dominates Today's UN*; by Phyllis Bennis, Preface by Denis Halliday, Interlink Publishing, 2000. [www.interlinkbooks.com](http://www.interlinkbooks.com)

*The Economy of Iraq: Oil, Wars, Destruction of Development and Prospects, 1950-2010*; by Abbas Ainasrawi, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1994.

*Imposing Economic Sanctions: Legal Remedy Or Genocidal Tool*; by Geoff Simons, Pluto Press, 1999.

*Iraq Under Siege: The Deadly Impact of Sanctions & War*, ed. Anthony Arnove, South End Press, 2000.

*A Modern History Of The Kurds*, by David McDowall, I. B. Tauris, 1997.

*A People Without A Country: The Kurds And Kurdistan*, edited by Gerard Chaliand, foreword By David McDowall, Interlink Publishing, 1993. [www.interlinkbooks.com](http://www.interlinkbooks.com)

*Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge*, Said K. Aburish, Bloomsbury, 2000.

*The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies In The 1990s*, by David Cortright & George A. Lopez, Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2000.

*The Scourging of Iraq*; Geoff Simons, St. Martin's Press, 1996.

*Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq*; Alan Friedman, Bantam Books, 1993.

*Spoils of War, The Human Cost of America's Arms Trade*; by John Tirman, The Free Press, 1997.

## **Film/Video Documentaries**

**Paying the Price: the Killing of the Children of Iraq**, 78 min.; by John Pilger, 2000. This is probably the most powerful documentary produced to date about this crisis. Ideal for educational events and lobbying. Available online for \$39 at <http://www.bullfrogfilms.com/catalog/pay.html>, or through Bullfrog Films at (610) 779-8226.

**Let Iraq Live: Iraq Sanctions Challenge**, 25 min.; by Academy Award-winning Gloria LaRiva, 1998. This video follows former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, Bishop Thomas Gumbleton, Rev. Lucius Walker, and others through their May, 1998 Sanctions-busting trip to Iraq. Available online for \$17 at <http://www.leftbooks.com>, or through the IAC at (212) 633-6646.

**IRAQ: Voices From the Streets**. 2002/23 min. Filmmakers Saul Landau and Sonia Angulo record the encounters of Members of Congress on a visit to Iraq in September 2002 and take their own journey to the streets to hear from those who have been and will be affected most by war: the Iraqi people. Distributed by The Cinema Guild in New York City. Call 1-800-723-5522

**Hidden Wars of Desert Storm**. 2000/64 min. Was Iraq's invasion of Kuwait a surprise? Did we use all methods of diplomacy before entering combat? Was Iraq really about to invade Saudi Arabia? Prominent personalities such as Desert Storm Commander General Norman Schwarzkopf, former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, former UN Iraq Program Director Denis Halliday, and analyst Phyllis Bennis all speak out about the hidden policies and politics behind the war as well as its bitter legacies, including sanctions and the "Gulf War Syndrome."

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