SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS

Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement of the SwissSign Platinum CA and its subordinated issuing CAs.

Document Type:	Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement
OID:	2.16.756.1.89.1.1.1.1.3
Author:	Michael Doujak
Classification:	C1 (public)
Applicability:	Global
Owner:	CEO
Issue Date:	May 1st, 2010
Version:	3.1.0
Obsoletes:	Version 2.1.1, April 28th, 2008
Storage:	SwissSign Document Repository
Distribution:	Global
Status:	Released
Review:	This document is reviewed periodically at least once per calendar year. The owner is responsible for this review.
Compliance:	The SwissSign Platinum CA and its subordinated SwissSign Qualified Platinum CA operating under this CP/CPS and issuing certificates under this CP/CPS are fully compliant with the rules and regulations of ZertES, VZertES and all stipulations therein.

Version Control

Date	Version	Comment	Author
17.08.2005	1.1.4	Initial version	Joseph A. Doekbrijder
04.10.2005 – 19.10.2005	1.1.5 – 1.1.7	Update	J.Doekbrijder with ext. QS, Michael Doujak
24.11.2005 - 15.12.2005	1.2.0 – 1.2.3	KPMG Audit Input	Michael Doujak, J. Doekbrijder
05.03.2006 - 14.03.2006	1.3.0 - 1.3.1	KPMG Audit Input	M. Doujak, M. Raemy
30.04.2006 – 18.10.2006	1.4.0 - 1.4.9	Minor Changes and KPMG Audit Input	M. Raemy, M. Doujak, B. Kanebog, ext. QS
12.01.2007	2.0.0	CP/CPS split	M. Raemy, M. Doujak, B. Oechslin
04.05.2007	2.0.1	Review, Minor Changes	Björn Kanebog
11.04.2008	2.1.0	New layout, Review, added changes about life cycle management	Björn Kanebog
15.04.2008	2.1.1	Review	Michael Doujak
27.06.2009	3.0.0	Merged Root, Qualified, Personal and Swiss Post CP/CPS in one document	Michael Doujak
30.07.2009	3.0.1	Review	B. Oechslin
03.11.2009	3.0.2	KPMG Audit Input: KPMG Klynfeld Peat Marwick Goerdeler SA changed to KPMG AG	Christoph Graf
30.03.2010	3.1.0	Added SuisseID, Renewal, G3 CA, SHA-2	Michael Doujak

Authorization

Date	Approved by	Approved by	Version
19.10.2005	Michael Doujak	Joseph A. Doekbrijder	1.1.7
15.12.2005	Michael Doujak	Joseph A. Doekbrijder	1.2.3
01.05.2006	Michael Doujak	Melanie Raemy	1.4.1
29.08.2006	Michael Doujak	Melanie Raemy	1.4.6
26.09.2006	Michael Doujak	Melanie Raemy	1.4.8
18.10.2006	Michael Doujak	Melanie Raemy	1.4.9
27.02.2007	Michael Doujak	Melanie Raemy	2.0.0
21.05.2007	Melanie Raemy	Björn Kanebog	2.0.1 / OID=1
17.04.2008	Adrian Humbel	Björn Kanebog	2.1.1 / OID=2
01.05.2010	Adrian Humbel	Michael Doujak	3.1.0 / OID=3

digital signature

digital signature

Table of Contents

1 Introduction

The “SwissSign Platinum CA” is a root certification authority operated by SwissSign AG.

The “SwissSign Platinum CA” only issues certificates to its subordinated issuing CAs and special purpose certificates for the operation of the CSP (e.g. Time Stamping Authority).

The “SwissSign Platinum CA” has several subordinate CAs: the “SwissSign Qualified Platinum CA”, the “SwissSign Personal Platinum CA”, the “SwissSign SuisseID Platinum CA”, the “SwissSign Server Platinum CA” and the “Swiss Post Platinum CA”. The “SwissSign Qualified Platinum CA” issues qualified certificates that meet the stipulations of the Swiss Digital Signature Law and which may be distributed under different trade marks. The “SwissSign Personal Platinum CA” issues certificates that support digital signing and/or encryption for individuals and organizations. The “Swiss Post Platinum CA” issues certificates for distribution under the trade mark of the Swiss Post that support digital signing and/or encryption for individuals and organizations.

Under this CP/CPS SwissSign currently supports two generations of CA hierarchies. The generation 2 (G2) CA hierarchy is issued by a Root CA signed with SHA-1 hash algorithm. The generation 3 (G3) CA hierarchy is issued by a Root CA signed with a SHA-2 hash algorithm. Unless explicitly stated, all statements made in this CP/CPS pertain to both generations.

The “SwissSign Platinum CA” and its subordinate “SwissSign Qualified Platinum CA” comply with Swiss digital signature laws, i.e.

- ZertES: Bundesgesetz über Zertifizierungsdienste im Bereich der elektronischen Signatur (SR 943.03)
- VZertES: Verordnung über Zertifizierungsdienste im Bereich der elektronischen Signatur (SR 943.032)
- TAV-BAKOM: Technische und administrative Vorschriften über Zertifizierungsdienste im Bereich der elektronischen Signatur (SR 943.032.1)

The “SwissSign Platinum CA” and all its subordinate CAs comply with Swiss VAT tax laws, i.e.

- EIDI-V: Verordnung des EFD vom 30. Januar 2002 über elektronische Daten und Informationen (SR 641.201.1)
- TAV-EIDI-V: Technische und administrative Vorschriften über Zertifizierungsdienste im Bereich der EIDI-V im Zusammenhang mit der Ausstellung von Zertifikaten basierend auf fortgeschrittenen Signaturen (SR 641.201.11/Anhang)

The “SwissSign SuisseID Platinum CA” and the “SwissSign Qualified Platinum CA” comply with the SuisseID specifications according to eCH-0113.

Swiss digital signature law refers to the standards listed below and declares them prerequisites for the issuance of qualified certificates:

- ETSI TS 101 456 v1.4.1: Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI) – Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework
- ETSI TS 101 861 v1.3.1: Time Stamping Profile
- ETSI TS 101 862 v1.3.3: Qualified Certificate Profile
- IETF RFC 3647 (2003): Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure – Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework
- IETF RFC 5280 (May 2008): Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile

In this CP/CPS, “this CA” refers to the “SwissSign Platinum CA” and all its subordinated issuing CAs, unless stated differently.

1.1 Overview

The picture below shows the hierarchy of the SwissSign Platinum CA tree for the generation G2:



Illustration 1: Platinum CA Hierarchy G2

The picture below shows the hierarchy of the SwissSign Platinum CA tree for the generation G3:



Illustration 2: Platinum CA Hierarchy G3

This SwissSign AG certificate policy and certification practice statement (CP/CPS) for the “SwissSign Platinum CA” and its subordinated issuing CAs describes:

- The certification and registration policy of this CA.
- Practices and procedures of this CA.
- Practices and procedures of the registration authorities for this CA.
- Terms and conditions under which this CA is made available.

This CP/CPS is applicable to all persons, including, without limitation, all requesters, subscribers, relying parties, registration authorities and any other persons that have a relationship with SwissSign AG with respect to certificates issued by this CA. This CP/CPS also provides statements of the rights and obligations of SwissSign AG, authorized registration authorities, requesters, subscribers, relying parties, resellers, co-marketers and any other person, or organization that may use or rely on certificates issued by this CA.

SwissSign AG provides a detailed product overview on their website (swisssign.com) for Platinum Certificates and for other services.

1.2 Document name and identification

This document is named ”SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS - Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement of the SwissSign Platinum CA and its subordinated issuing CAs” as indicated on the cover page of this document.

The Object identification number (OID) for this document is:

OID 2.16.756.1.89.1.1.1.1.3

Please note that the above OID identifies this document and this document only. According to the requirements for SuisseID certificates, SwissSign uses the following OID to identify its SuisseID certificates:

Policy: 2.16.756.5.26.1.1.2

The OID of SwissSign AG is based on the RDN issued by the Swiss Federal Office of Communications (OFCOM) and structured as follows:

Position 1	Position 2	Position 3	Position 4	Position 5	Meaning
2					Joint ISO-CCITT Tree
	16				Country
		756			Switzerland
			1		RDN
				89	SwissSign

Position 6 to 9 of the SwissSign OID number represent the document and 10 represents the document version, which is only shown in subscriber certificates (see chapter 7).

1.3 PKI participants

1.3.1 Certification authorities

SwissSign AG operates a Public Key Infrastructure, consisting of a “SwissSign Platinum CA” and its subordinated issuing CAs. The “SwissSign Platinum CA” is the only CA operated by SwissSign AG that issues root certificates under this CP/CPS.

1.3.2 Registration authorities

SwissSign AG operates a registration authority, called “SwissSign RA” that registers subscribers of certificates issued by this CA.

SwissSign AG operates a registration authority called “RA Post” that operates under the trade mark of “Die Schweizerische Post” and registers subscribers of certificates issued by this CA.

Third parties may operate their own registration authority services, if these third parties abide by all the rules and regulations of this CP/CPS, Swiss law and the stipulations of applicable standards (see chapter 1).

Any RA operating under this CP/CPS must adhere to the following rules:

- The RA must have a contractual agreement with SwissSign AG which indicates the authorization for their role as RA and clearly details the minimum requirements, processes and liabilities.
- The registration process must meet the stipulations of Swiss Digital Signature Law. It must be documented, published, and distributed to all parties involved in the RA process.
- The RA must be certified according to Swiss Digital Signature Law and must pass an annual audit. All costs related to this audit are to be paid by the operator of the RA. Failure to pass the annual audit may lead to the revocation of RA privileges.

1.3.3 Subscribers

In the context of this CP/CPS, the term “subscriber” or “Certificate Holder” encompasses all end users of certificates issued by this CA:

- Requesters are individuals or organizations that have requested (but not yet obtained) a certificate.
- Subscribers are individuals or organizations that have obtained a certificate.

Subscribers and requesters are responsible for:

- having a basic understanding of the proper use of public key cryptography and certificates;
- providing only correct information without errors, omissions or misrepresentations;
- substantiating information by providing a properly completed and legally correctly signed registration form;
- supplementing such information with a proof of identity and the provision of the information as specified in chapter 3.1 and 3.2;
- using a secure, and cryptographically sound key pair on a crypto device provided or approved by the registration authority;
- maintaining the crypto device unmodified and in good working order;
- reading and agreeing to all terms and conditions of this CP/CPS, other relevant regulations and agreements;
- the maintenance of their certificates using the tools provided by the registration authority;
- deciding on creation of a certificate whether the respective certificate is to be published in the public directory: directory.swisssign.net;
- using SwissSign certificates exclusively for lawful and authorized purposes;
- ensuring that SwissSign certificates are exclusively used on behalf of the person or the organization specified as the subject of the certificate;
- protecting the private key from unauthorized access;
- using the private key only in secure computing environments that have been provided by trustworthy sources and that are protected by state-of-the-art security measures;
- ensuring complete control over the Secure Signature Creation Device and activation data (PIN) by not entrusting any other person with the safekeeping of this device and data;
- notifying the registration authority of any change to any of the information included in the certificate or any change of circumstances that would make the information in the certificate misleading or inaccurate;
- invalidating the certificate immediately if any information included in the certificate is misleading or inaccurate, or if any change of circumstances makes the information in the certificate misleading or inaccurate;
- notifying the registration authority immediately of any suspected or actual compromise of the private key and requesting that the certificate be revoked;

- immediately ceasing to use the certificate upon (a) expiration or revocation of such a certificate, or (b) any suspected or actual damage/corruption or (c) any suspected or actual compromise of the private key corresponding to the public key in such a certificate, and immediately removing such a certificate from the devices and/or software onto which it has been installed;
- refraining to use the subscriber's private key that corresponds to the public key certificate to sign other certificates;
- using their own judgment about whether it is appropriate, given the level of security and trust provided by a certificate issued by this CA, to use such a certificate in any given circumstance;
- using the certificate with due diligence and reasonable judgment;
- complying with all laws and regulations applicable to a subscriber's right to export, import, and/or use a certificate issued by this CA and/or related information. Subscribers shall be responsible for procuring all required licenses and permissions for any export, import, and/or use of a certificate issued by this CA and/or related information.

Additionally subscribers and requesters of certificates issued by the "SwissSign Qualified Platinum CA", may add a transaction limit to the qcStatements of their certificate. This addition shall be

- optional for the requester;
- optional for the registration authority;
- under the sole responsibility of the requester. The requester must consider all possible monetary consequences, such as, but not limited to, any kinds of damages and other obligations which can result from using the qualified certificate.

1.3.4 Relying parties

Relying parties are individuals or organizations that use certificates of this CA to validate the signatures and verify the identity of subscribers and/or to secure communication with these subscribers. Relying parties are allowed to use such certificates only in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in this CP/CPS. It is in their sole responsibility to verify legal validity, transaction limits and applicable policies.

The Relying Party agrees to observe the following conditions:

- Platinum Certificates may only be used in accordance with the rules stipulated in the "SwissSign Platinum Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement".
- The Relying Party is obliged to have an appropriate understanding of the proper use of public key cryptography as well as an understanding of the associated risks.
- SwissSign Certificates may be used exclusively in accordance with applicable laws, rules, and regulations and only for authorized intended purposes.
- It is the sole responsibility of the Relying Party to always use the certificate with due diligence and reasonable judgment.
- It is in the sole responsibility of the Relying Party to verify revocation status, legal validity, transaction limits and applicable policies.
- The revocation status can be checked via OCSP or via CRL (Certificate Revocation List). The Relying Party must be aware, that the CRLs are valid 10 days, but updated each day. Therefore the Relying Party shall always check the newest available CRL to have the complete, up to date revocation information.
- Should the situation arise that for technical reasons an updated CRL is not available, it is the relying party's responsibility to decide how long a CRL is to be trusted for revocation checking. This decision may depend on the type of transaction being authorized and the damage potential. Under no circumstances should the trust be extended beyond the maximum life time of the CRL.

Relying parties can also be subscribers within this CA.

1.3.5 Other participants

Other participants are individuals or organizations that rely on the certificate of a subscriber, or are in some way involved with certificate manufacturing and may or may not wish to verify the identity of subscribers and/or to secure communication with this subscriber.

The following participants have very specific roles with regard to this CA:

Switzerland:	On January 1, 2005, Swiss Digital Signature Law (ZertES) was officially put into force.
BAKOM:	BAKOM issues the "Technische und administrative Vorschriften über Zertifizierungsdienste im Bereich der elektronischen Signatur" which governs the technical aspects of the CSP operation.
SAS:	SAS, as the accreditation authority, chooses the auditors for the certification of CSPs in Switzerland.
KPMG:	KPMG is the official recognition body for Swiss CSPs and, as such, conducts the audits prescribed by Swiss digital signature law.
eCH:	eCH has issued under the name SuisseID the standard specification eCH-0113 for a combination of digital certificates and core infrastructure services.

Other participants can also be subscribers within this CA.

1.4 Certificate usage

1.4.1 Appropriate certificate uses

[PA] personal authentication certificate:

A certificate is issued by the “SwissSign Personal Platinum CA”, “SwissSign SuisseID Platinum CA” or “Swiss Post Platinum CA” for authentication and digital signing purposes. See chapter 6.1.7 and 7.1. The corresponding private key is required to have been created on an SSCD and may only exist once.

[PE] personal encryption certificate:

A certificate is issued by the “SwissSign Personal Platinum CA” or “Swiss Post Platinum CA” for encryption purposes. See chapter 6.1.7 and 7.1. Additional copies of the corresponding private key may exist. The use of an SSCD is optional.

[OA] organizational authentication certificate:

A certificate is issued by the “SwissSign Personal Platinum CA” or “Swiss Post Platinum CA” for authentication and digital signing purposes. See also chapter 6.1.7 and 7.1. The corresponding private key is required to have been created on an SSCD but may be cloned. The [OA] can be used for authentication and digital signing in accordance with Swiss VAT tax laws (SR 641.201.1).

[OE] organizational encryption certificate:

A certificate is issued by the “SwissSign Personal Platinum CA” or “Swiss Post Platinum CA” for encryption purposes. See chapter 6.1.7 and 7.1. Additional copies of the corresponding private key may exist. The use of an SSCD is optional.

[QC] qualified certificate:

A qualified certificate is issued by the “SwissSign Qualified Platinum CA” for qualified digital signing purposes. See chapter 6.1.7 and 7.1. The corresponding private key is required to have been created on an SSCD and may only exist once. The [QC] may also be used for digital signing in accordance with Article 14 para. 2bis OR (Swiss Code of Obligations).

1.4.2 Prohibited certificate uses

Any other use than defined in chapter 1.4.1 is prohibited.

1.5 Policy administration

1.5.1 Organization administering the document

The SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS is written and updated by SwissSign AG.

SwissSign AG
Sägereistrasse 25
Postfach
8152 Glattbrugg
Switzerland

Tel.: +41 (44) 838 36 00
Mail: info@swisssign.com
Web: http://swisssign.com

Current versions of documents may be downloaded from the SwissSign website:

- http://repository.swisssign.com

The current version of this CP/CPS document must be digitally signed by two officers of SwissSign AG and is the only reliable source for the SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS.

1.5.2 Contact persons

The following person is the main contact for any questions or suggestions regarding the SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS.

Adrian Humbel
C.E.O of SwissSign AG
csp.feedback@swisssign.com

All feedback, positive or negative, is welcome and should be submitted to the above e-mail address to ensure that it is dealt with appropriately and in due time.

1.5.3 Person determining CPS suitability for the policy

Executive management of SwissSign AG determines the suitability and applicability of this CP/CPS.

Changes or updates to relevant documents must be made in accordance with the stipulations of Swiss Digital Signature Law and the provisions contained in this CP/CPS and can therefore be subject to an approval by the organization appointed by SAS. Currently, this role is held by:

KPMG AG
Badenerstrasse 172
8026 Zürich
Switzerland

1.5.4 CP/CPS approval procedures

Executive management of SwissSign AG regularly evaluates this CP/CPS and its related documentation so that it adheres to applicable law, such as stipulated in chapter 1 of this CP/CPS.

1.6 Definitions and acronyms

Term	Abbrev.	Explanation
Advanced Digital Signature		A digital signature that can be associated with the owner and enables his identification. It is created using means that are under the sole control of the owner and makes any modification of the associated set of data obvious.
Algorithm		A process for completing a task. An encryption algorithm is merely the process, usually mathematical, to encrypt and decrypt messages.
Attribute		Information bound to an entity that specifies a characteristic of that entity, such as a group membership or a role, or other information associated with that entity.
Authentication		The process of identifying a user. User names and passwords are the most commonly used methods of authentication.
CA Operator	CAO	A person responsible for CA operation, including establishment of certificate parameters for RA and RAO in accordance with certificate policy.
Certificate		Information issued by a trusted third party, often published in a directory with public access. The certificate contains at least a subject, a unique serial number, an issuer and a validity period.
Certification Authority	CA	An internal entity or trusted third party that issues, signs, revokes, and manages digital certificates.
Certificate Extension		Optional fields in a certificate.
Certificate Policy	CP	A set of rules that a request must comply with in order for the RA to approve the request or a CA to issue the certificate.
Certificate Revocation List	CRL	List of certificates that have been declared invalid. This list is issued by the CA at regular intervals and is used by applications to verify the validity of a certificate.
Certification Practice Statement	CPS	Document that regulates the rights and responsibilities of all involved parties (RA, CA, directory service, end entity, relying party).
Certification Service Provider	CSP	Individual or corporation that issues certificates to individual or corporate third parties.
Cipher		A cryptographic algorithm used to encrypt and decrypt files and messages.
Cipher Text		Data that has been encrypted. Cipher text is unreadable unless it is converted into plain text (decrypted) with a key.
Coordinated Universal Time	UTC UTC(k)	Mean solar time at the prime meridian (0°). The time scale is based on seconds as defined in ETSI TS 102.023 v1.2.1. Time scale realized by the laboratory “k” and kept in close agreement with UTC, with the goal to reach ±100 ns.
Credentials		Evidence or testimonials governing the user's right to access certain systems (e.g. User name, password, etc)
Decryption		The process of transforming cipher text into readable plain text.
DES		Data Encryption Standard. A cipher developed by the United States government in the 1970s as the official encryption algorithm of the U.S.
Digital signature		A system allowing individuals and organizations to electronically certify features such as their identity or the authenticity of an electronic document.
Directive 1999/93/EC		European digital signature law: Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a community framework for electronic signatures. Compliance with this law always implies compliance with the following standards: ETSI TS 101 456 v1.4.1, ETSI TS 101 861 v1.3.1 and ETSI TS 101 862 v1.3.3
Distinguished Name	DN	-> Subject
DNS		Domain Name System. The Internet system of holding a distributed register of entity names. For example, the domain is the part of the email address to the right of the `@', e.g. `anytown.ac.uk'.
Electronic Signature		-> Digital Signature
Encryption		Encryption is the process of using a formula, called an encryption algorithm, to transform plain text into an incomprehensible cipher text for transmission.
End Entity		Used to describe all end users of certificates, i.e. subscribers and relying parties.

Term	Abbrev.	Explanation
End-User Agreement	EUA	Contractual agreement between seller of certificates and the subscriber.
Entropy		A numerical measure of the uncertainty of an outcome. The entropy of a system is related to the amount of information it contains. In PKI and mathematics, a cryptographic key contains a certain amount of information and tends to lose a small amount of entropy each time it is used in a mathematical calculation. For this reason, one should not use a key too frequently or for too long a period.
Extension		-> Certificate Extension
FIPS 140		FIPS 140 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140) is a United States federal standard that specifies security requirements for cryptography modules.
FQDN	FQDN	Fully Qualified Domain Name.
Hardware Security Module	HSM	Hardware Security Module is a device that physically protects key material against unauthorized parties.
HTTP	HTTP	Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol used by the Internet. HTTP defines how data is retrieved or transmitted via the Internet and what actions should be taken by web servers and browsers.
HTTPS	HTTPS	Secure Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol using TLS/SSL
Key		The secret input for cryptographic algorithms that allows a message to be transformed. -> See Private Key, Public Key
Key password		Password used to encrypt the private key.
Key size		Length of private and public key. Regular key sizes are 512, 768, 1024, 2048 and 4096. 2048 bit is the recommended key size according to NIST today.
Key usage		Key's intended purpose. This information is stored in the certificate itself to allow an application to verify that the key is intended for the specified use.
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol	LDAP	LDAP is used to retrieve data from a public directory.
LDAP Secure	LDAPS	LDAP secured with TLS/SSL
Online Certificate Status Protocol	OCSP	Method to verify the validity of a certificate in real time.
Participants		Entities like CAs, RAs, and repositories. These can be different legal entities.
PKCS		PKCS refers to a group of Public Key Cryptography Standards devised and published by RSA Laboratories.
Plain Text		The original message or file.
Privacy Level		Used to determine how the certificate can be accessed in the directory. Private, Public Lookup and Public Download are the available levels.
Private Key		One of two keys used in public key cryptography. The private key is known only to the owner and is used to sign outgoing messages or decrypt incoming messages.
Profile		A user profile is a personal area where end users can access and manage their digital identities and requests directly on the SwissSign web page. Access to this profile can be granted by means of user name and password.
Public Key		One of two keys used in public key cryptography. The public key can be known to anyone and is used to verify signatures or encrypt messages. The public key of a public-private key cryptography system is used to verify the “signatures” on incoming messages or to encrypt a file or message so that only the holder of the private key can decrypt the file or message.
Public Key Infrastructure	PKI	Processes and technologies that are used to issue and manage digital identities that may be used by third parties to authenticate individuals or organizations.
Qualified Certificate	QC	Certificate which meets the requirements of article 7 ZertES.
Qualified Certificate Policy	QCP	Certificate policy which incorporates the requirements laid down in annex I and annex II of the Directive 1999/93/EC.

Term	Abbrev.	Explanation
Qualified Digital Signature		Advanced electronic signature, which is based on a qualified certificate and created by a secure-signature creating device, as defined in article 5.1 of the Directive 1999/93/EC. According to Article 14 para. 2^{bis} OR (Swiss Code of Obligations; SR 220) a qualified digital signature based on a qualified certificate of a recognized CSP equates with a handwritten signature.
RA Operator	RAO	The person responsible for identifying the requester, collecting the identity substantiating evidence, authorizing the CSR, and forwarding the authorized CSR to the CA.
Recognition Body		The Recognition Body of Switzerland is accredited by the SAS and conducts the audits prescribed by Swiss Digital Signature Law.
Recognized Qualified Digital Signature		Qualified digital signature created with a certificate issued by a CA that has successfully been certified by a Swiss recognition body.
Relying Party		Recipient of a certificate which acts in reliance on that certificate and/or digital signatures verified using that certificate.
Requester		Requesters are individuals or organization that have requested, but not yet obtained a certificate.
Revocation		Invalidation of a certificate. Every CA regularly issues a list of revoked certificates called CRL. This list should be verified by all applications using certificates from that CA before trusting a certificate.
Rollover		To rollover a certificate means that a new certificate is issued while the old one is still valid and usable. The rollover is used to issue a new CA certificate while keeping the old one valid along with all the certificates issued with it.
RSA		A public key encryption algorithm named after its founders: Rivest-Shamir-Adleman.
S/MIME		Secure / Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions is a standard for public key encryption and signing of e-mail.
Secure Signature Creation Device	SSCD	Signature-creation device which meets the requirements specified in annex III of Directive 1999/93/EC.
Smart-card		Credit Card or SIM-shaped carrier of a secure crypto processor with tamper-resistant properties intended for the secure storage and usage of private keys.
Signature		Cryptographic element that is used to identify the originator of the document and to verify the integrity of the document.
Signature-creation data		Unique data, such as parameters of signature algorithms or private cryptographic keys, used by the signatory to create an electronic signature.
Signature-creation device		Configured software or hardware used to implement the signature-creation data
Signature-verification data		Data, such as parameters of signature algorithms or public cryptographic keys, used for the purpose of verifying an electronic signature.
SSL/TLS		Secure Sockets Layer. A protocol developed by Netscape that enables secure transactions via the Internet. URLs that require an SSL/TLS connection for HTTP start with https: instead of http:.
SSO		Single Sign On: The user only needs to log in once to access various services.

Term	Abbrev.	Explanation
Subject	DN	Field in the certificate that identifies the owner of the certificate. Also referred to as distinguished name (DN). Examples: /CN=John Doe /Email=jd@signdemo.com /CN=pseudo: Marketing /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH /Email=marketing@signdemo.com /CN=John Doe /O=SwissSign AG /OU=DEMO/C=CH /Email=john.doe@signdemo.com /CN=swiss.signdemo.com /O=SwissSign AG /OU=DEMO /C=CH /Email=root@signdemo.com mandatory fields in the subject: Common Name --- /CN Email address --- /Email optional fields in the subject: Organization --- /O Organizational Unit --- /OU Domain Component --- /DC Country Name --- /C Locality Name --- /L Street Address --- /STREET Given Name --- /G Surname --- /S Initials --- /I Unique Identifier --- /UID Serial Number --- /SN Title --- /T Description --- /D
Subscriber		Subscribers are individuals that have obtained a certificate.
SuisseID		Specification for certificates and services, issued by eCH as eCH-0113. see www.ech.ch
TAV-BAKOM		Amendment to VZertES, technical and administrative directives on the issuance of digital signatures, issued December 1st, 2006. SR 943.032.1.
Time-stamping Authority	TSA	Authority which issues time-stamp tokens.
Time-stamp Policy	TP	Named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a time-stamp token to a particular community and/or class of application with common security requirements.
Time-stamp Token	TST	Data object that binds a representation of a datum to a particular time, thus establishing evidence that the datum existed before that time.
Time-stamping Unit		Set of hardware and software which is managed as a unit and has a single time-stamp token signing key active at a time.
TSA Disclosure statement		Set of statements concerning the policies and practices of a TSA that require emphasis or disclosure to subscribers and relying parties, for example, to meet regulatory requirements.
TSA practice statement	TPS	Statement of the practices that a TSA employs in issuing time-stamp tokens.
TSA system		Composition of IT products and components organized to support the provision of time-stamping services.
Transaction Limit		The transaction limit is detailing liability limits of SwissSign AG, the subscriber and relying parties. This limit is published in the respective certificate.
Triple DES		A method of improving the strength of the DES algorithm by using it three times in sequence with different keys.
Two-factor authentication		A two-factor authentication is any authentication protocol that requires two independent ways to establish identity and privileges.
Uniform Resource Locator	URL	The global address of documents and other resources on the WWW, e.g. http://swisssign.net. The first part indicates the protocol to be used (http) and the second part shows the domain where the document is located.
USB Token		Secure crypto processor that appears like a common USB memory stick. It has tamper resistant properties and is intended for the secure storage and usage of private keys.
VZertES		Swiss directive for digital signatures, issued December 3, 2004. SR 943.032.
ZertES		Swiss Digital Signature Law. Issued December 19, 2003. SR 943.03. Compliance with this law always implies adherence to VZertES and TAV-BAKOM.

2 Publication and Repository Responsibilities

SwissSign AG will make its certificate(s), CP/CPS, CRL and related documents for this CA publicly available through the swisssign.com or swisssign.net web sites. To ensure both integrity and authenticity, all documents must be digitally signed. To document the validity period of the document, a version history is included.

2.1 Repositories

SwissSign AG maintains all documentation related to any of its CAs on the swisssign.com and swisssign.net web sites. The web sites are cross-linked to enable seamless browsing.

SwissSign AG maintains two web sites to enhance the overall security of the solution:

swisssign.net: This web site is used for all certificate- (CRL, LDAP, ...) and certificate-management-related functions. (request, renew, revoke, download...). SwissSign employees access to this web site is strictly regulated (role-based access control) and the coding as secure as possible.

swisssign.com: This web site is used for the distribution of information. Product and corporate information can be found here. Access to this web site by SwissSign employees does not follow the general role model as all important content (documents) consists of digitally signed documents.

http://www.admin.ch/ch/index.de.html	This link points to the official web site of the Swiss government. Relevant documentation to Swiss Digital Signature Law can be found here.
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/c943_03.html	“Bundesgesetz vom 19. Dezember 2003 über Zertifizierungsdienste im Bereich der elektronischen Signatur”
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/c943_032.html	“Verordnung vom 3. Dezember 2004 über Zertifizierungsdienste im Bereich der elektronischen Signatur”
http://www.sas.ch/de/pki_isms/pki.html	PKI page of the Swiss accreditation body.
http://pda.etsi.org/pda/queryform.asp	ETSI provides a searchable download area where standards like ETSI 101.456, ETSI, 101.861 and ETSI 101.862 can be found.
https://www.ech.ch	Home page of the eCH society. The eCH publishes the SuisseID stanard as eCH-0113.

2.2 Publication of certification information

SwissSign AG publishes all current documentation pertaining to this CA on the swisssign.com and/or swisssign.net web site. This web site is the only source for up-to-date documentation and SwissSign AG reserves the right to publish newer versions of the documentation without prior notice.

For this CA, SwissSign AG will publish an approved, current and digitally signed version of:

- the certificate policy and certification practice statement (CP/CPS)
- the end-user agreement (EUA) for subscribers
- the end-user agreement (EUA) for relying parties
- pricing information

SwissSign AG publishes information related to certificates issued by this CA on the swisssign.net web site. The swisssign.net web site and the LDAP directory directory.swisssign.net are the only authoritative sources for:

- All publicly accessible certificates issued by this CA.
- The certificate revocation list (CRL) for this CA. The CRL may be downloaded from the swisssign.net web site. The exact URL is documented in every certificate that is issued by this CA or its subordinated issuing CA in the field: “CRL Distribution Point”. For details, please refer to chapter 7.

The data formats used for certificates issued by this CA and for certificate revocation lists in the swisssign.net web site are in accordance with the associated schema definitions as defined in the X.500 series of recommendations.

Certificate dissemination services are available 24 hours per day, 7 days per week.

2.3 Time or frequency of publication

SwissSign AG will publish the most current version and all superseded versions of the following publications on its web site:

- SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS: This document will be reviewed at least once a year. If no updates are required, no new version will be published.

SwissSign will publish this information on a regular schedule:

- CRLs for the “SwissSign Qualified Platinum CA” are published according to the schedule detailed in chapter 4.9.7.
- OCSP Information: Real-time. The OCSP responder will immediately report a certificate that has been revoked. See also chapter 4.9.9.

2.4 Access controls on repositories

The LDAP, CRL and OCSP information is managed in an encrypted database system. All access to the data in this database system is managed through the swisssign.net web interface and requires sufficient authorization. The type of authorization required depends on how the process is executed. Manager access always requires certificate-based two factor authentication.

This CP/CPS is provided as public information on the swisssign.com web site. Public documents are only valid if they are published as a PDF with the digital signatures of two officers of SwissSign AG. Write access to the document repository is controlled through certificate-based two factor authentication.

3 Identification and Authentication

3.1 Naming

3.1.1 Types of names

The distinguished name (DN) in a certificate issued by this CA complies with the X.500 standard and with RFC 5280.

For the distinguished name, a minimum of one field is required. This field must be /CN=.

To comply with SuisseID specifications, the SuisseID number must be present in the distinguished name. It must be added as serialNumber (OID: 2.5.4.5).

For the common name (CN), SwissSign allows two types of names to be specified:

- real names
- pseudonyms.

Real names are specified as /CN='First Name' optional 'Middle Names' 'Last Name'.

- First, Middle and Last Name in the CN have to be absolutely identical to the names as they appear in the identifying documentation provided. Special characters are treated according to chapter 3.1.4. Abbreviations or nicknames are prohibited. Names consisting of multiple words are permissible.
- The organizational name in /CN or in /O must be spelled absolutely identical to the name as it appears in the documentation provided according to chapter 3.2.2.
- If the /CN is an organizational name, then the /O field must also be present and it must be identical to the /CN field.
- If a /O field is present, the /C field must also be present.

Pseudonyms are specified as /CN='identifier': 'arbitrary string'. The SwissSign RA requires pseudonym certificates to use the string 'pseudo' as identifier. An example of a correctly formulated pseudonym is: "/CN=pseudo: John Doe". Other registration authorities may use other identifiers. To comply with SuisseID specifications, the pseudonym must be added as /pseudonym (OID: 2.5.4.65)

For CodeSigning Certificates, the common name (/CN) is identical to the Organization field (/O).

The use of names in the /CN and /O fields must be authorized. This means:

- The use of a real name and its identifying information must be authenticated and authorized according to chapter 3.2.3.
- A pseudonym requires that the requester authenticates and authorizes the request containing identifying information according to chapter 3.2.3.

SubjectAltName is an optional field for certificates issued with real names or pseudonyms. If it is present, it contains at least an email address.

3.1.2 Need for names to be meaningful

The subject and issuer name contained in a certificate MUST be meaningful in the sense that the registration authority has proper evidence of the existing association between these names or pseudonyms and the entities to which they belong. To achieve this goal, the use of a name must be authorized by the rightful owner or a legal representative of the rightful owner.

3.1.3 Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers

Subscribers can be anonymous or pseudonymous. For the latter option, subscribers have to clearly mark the certificate as a pseudonym. To this end the /CN= attribute in the subject must start with the following sequence:

<identifier><colon><space>

The registration authorities decide on the acceptability of a given identifier based on the following requirements:

- Identifier is a string that clearly indicates the nature of the CN.
- The identifier and the resulting /CN= values are neither incorrect nor misleading.
- The identifier and the remainder of the /CN= attribute must be separated with a <colon> <space> sequence.

A subscriber can use any string of characters after the 'identifier'.

SwissSign AG and its registrations authorities reserve the right to reject certificate requests or revoke certificates containing offensive or misleading information or names protected by legislation and infringing rights of others. However, SwissSign AG and its registrations authorities are not obliged to verify lawful use of such names. SwissSign AG and its registrations authorities reserve

the right to decline any request for anonymity or pseudonymity. Anonymous or pseudonymous common names are available on a “first come, first served” basis. Chapter 3.1.6 applies.

Other registrations authorities may use different identifiers to identify pseudonym certificates, if they meet the following requirements:

- SwissSign has approved the identifier.
- The identifier and the resulting /CN= values are neither incorrect nor misleading.
- The identifier is alphabetical and can be used with the <identifier><colon><space> formatting.

3.1.4 Rules for interpreting various name forms

For all attributes in the distinguished name that are specified as UTF8string, it is permissible to use UTF8 encoding.

Many languages have special characters that are not supported by the ASCII character set used to define the subject in the certificate. To avoid problems, local substitution rules may be used:

- In general, national characters are represented by their ASCII equivalent, e.g. é, è, à, ç are represented by e, e, a, c.
- The German “Umlaut” characters may receive special treatment: ä, ö, ü are represented by either ae, oe, ue or a, o , u.

3.1.5 Uniqueness of names

All CAs issued under the SwissSign Platinum CA – G2 do enforce the uniqueness of certificate subject fields in such a manner that all certificates with identical subject fields must belong to the same individual or organization. The following rules are enforced:

- All certificates for individuals with identical subjects must belong to the same individual. This explicitly includes possession of revoked or expired certificates.
- All certificates with the identical SuisseID number must belong to the same individual. This explicitly includes possession of revoked or expired certificates.
- All organizational certificates with identical subjects must belong to the same organization.

See also chapter “1.4.1, Appropriate certificate uses”.

3.1.6 Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks

SwissSign and its RAs reserve the right to reject certificate requests or revoke certificates containing offensive or misleading information or names protected by legislation and possibly infringing rights of others. SwissSign AG is not obliged to verify lawful use of names. It is the sole responsibility of the subscriber to ensure lawful use of chosen names.

SwissSign AG will comply as quickly as possible with any court orders issued in accordance with Swiss Law that pertain to remedies for any infringements of third party rights by certificates issued under this CPS.

3.2 Initial identity validation

The initial identity validation is part of the Certificate Application process as described in chapter 4.1.

3.2.1 Method to prove possession of private key

The registration authorities operation under this CP/CPS must adhere to the stipulations of Swiss digital signature law and ensure possession of private key:

SwissSign RA:	The RA operator and the Requester witness the generation of the key pair in person.
RA Post:	The registration process guarantees the proper generation of the key pairs, the individual personalization of the SSCD and the secure dissemination of SSCD and activation data over separate routes to the subscriber.

3.2.2 Authentication of organization identity

Individuals may use an organization's name with sufficient authorization by the organization.

The DN of a certificate issued by this CA may contain one instance of the organization field. Should the requester decide to make the organization field part of the DN, the following rules must be adhered to:

- The use of the organization field means that the use of the country field is mandatory.

- The registration process of any registration authority operating under this CP/CPS must contain provisions to determine the identity of an organization and to authorize the use of its name.
- To validate the name of the organization, the requester must provide official documentation about the organization.
  - Organizations with an entry in a nationally recognized commercial register must supply a verifiably current excerpt.
  - All other organizations must supply either the certificate of registration with the ESTV or a current VAT invoice.
  - Government entities must supply official documentation to prove the existence and the correct spelling of the entities name.
  - Registrations authorities operating under this CP/CPS may choose to validate an organization's name directly with the authorative source instead of having requesters supply this information.

3.2.3 Authentication of individual identity

Various individuals may need to authorize the use of names in different parts of the DN. The registration process of any registration authority operating under this CP/CPS must contain provisions to determine the identity of such individuals. To achieve this goal, all individuals must be identified according to the Swiss Digital Signature Law (ZertES). The regulations defined in the registration forms may be summarized as follows:

- The registration form must carry original, personal handwritten signatures or it must be supplied electronically and digitally signed using a qualified certificates according to ZertES..
- The information on the identifying document must match both the name and signature on the registration form.
- The wording in the request has to be identical to the given name(s) and the family name of the identifying documents.

Additionally the requester and only the requester must be identified according to these additional rules:

- The registration process must require an identification step where the requester is present in person. This step may be conducted by:
  - The registration authority processing the certificate request.
  - An accredited notary
  - Any Post Office in Switzerland (gelbe Identität)
- The individual must present a valid original of an official photo ID. The identifying agent is to make a high-quality copy or scan of the documentation and to confirm proper execution of the identification in writing.
- The photo in the identifying document is compared to the person physically present (facial features, age, gender and size).
- The /Email= field must be verified during the registration process. The requester must prove that he has access to the mailbox and that he can use it to receive mail.

3.2.4 Non-verified subscriber information

All subscriber information required by Swiss Digital Signature Law has to be duly verified. Additional information given by the subscriber can be ignored.

3.2.5 Validation of authority

The requester provides current and valid documentation for the organizational or corporate name that should be included in the certificate, according to Chapter 3.2.2. The wording of the organizational or corporate name that should be included in the certificate must be exactly identical to the wording in the documentation provided.

In accordance with Swiss Digital Signature Law, the use of the organizational name must be authorized by top level representatives of this organization.

- The use of the organizational name of an organization with a commercial register entry must be authorized by representatives from the board of directors and/or executive management, which are listed in the excerpt of the Federal Commercial Registry.
- The use of the organizational name of a sole proprietorship must be authorized by the owner named in the current VAT invoice.
- The use of the organizational name of an organization with a deed of partnership must be authorized by a partner named in the deed of partnership.
- The use of the organizational name of a community must be authorized by the corresponding cantonal agency and a copy of the directive of election.

These individuals must be identified according to the stipulations given in chapter 3.2.3.

3.2.6 Criteria for interoperation

SwissSign does not support cross-certification.

3.3 Identification and authentication for re-key requests

3.3.1 Identification and authentication for routine re-key

In accordance with Swiss digital signature law, re-keying requires the re-keying request to be digitally signed with the qualified certificate that is to be re-keyed.

3.3.2 Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation

Re-keying after revocation is not permissible.

3.4 Identification and authentication for revocation request

Revocation of a certificate that is issued by this CA requires that the subscriber is authenticated according to one of the following methods:

- Successful login to the user profile.
- Providing proof of the possession of the private key on the web site of the registration authority.
- With a personal signature on a revocation form.
- Personal appearance at the registration authority.
- Providing a one-time revocation key on the web site of the registration authority.

Not all registration authorities must support all methods of revocation.

The process how the revocation request can be submitted is described in chapter 4.9.3.

4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements

4.1 Certificate application

4.1.1 Who can submit a certificate application

Applications can be submitted by anyone who complies with the provisions specified in the registration form, CP/CPS and relevant End-User Agreement.

4.1.2 Enrollment process and responsibilities

The registration authority must establish an enrollment process that meets the requirements of Swiss digital signature law and proves this in an annual audit. In particular it must:

- Determine the identity of the requester and of all persons authorizing the certificate request according to chapter 3.
- Collect and verify all the required documentation according to chapter 3.
- Personalize and disseminate a SSCD in a secure manner to the requester and ensure that the activation data is only known to the requester.

4.2 Certificate application processing

4.2.1 Performing identification and authentication functions

The registration authority identifies the requester on the basis of the identifying documents that the requester presents, as stipulated in chapter 3.2 of this document.

4.2.2 Approval or rejection of certificate applications

The registration authority will approve a certificate request if all of the following criteria are met:

- the requester has presented the identifying documentation according to chapter 3.2.3,
- all documentation has been received and verified successfully,
- all authorizations have been received and verified successfully,
- the information provided in the registration form is deemed adequate and complete,
- the verification of the Uniqueness of Names according to chapter 3.1.5 has not revealed any collisions.

If the requester fails to adhere to any of the above, or in any other way violates the stipulations of this document, the SwissSign RA must reject the certificate signing request.

SwissSign reserves the right to decline certificate requests without giving reasons.

4.2.3 Time to process certificate applications

Registrations authorities must design their processes in such fashion that the processing of a regular, fully documented certificate request takes no longer than two business days.

This time may be extended by circumstances not fully under the control of the registration authority:

- Delivery times of postal services
- Incomplete or incorrect documentation
- Validation of information with external sources

4.3 Certificate issuance

4.3.1 CA actions during certificate issuance

Upon receipt of an approved certificate signing request, the SwissSign CA will verify

- the integrity of the request;
- the authenticity and authorization of the RA operator;
- verify the contents of the certificate requests for compliance with the technical specification as outlined in chapter 7.1.2.

On successful verification, the SwissSign CA will then issue the requested certificate.

4.3.2 Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate

The CA may notify the requester in different ways:

- If the certificate is presented to the subscriber immediately, special notification may not be necessary.
- The CA may:
  - email the certificate to the subscriber
  - email the certificate to the requesting RA
  - email information permitting the subscriber to download the certificate from a web site or repository
  - email information permitting the RA to download the certificate from a web site or repository

4.4 Certificate acceptance

4.4.1 Conduct constituting certificate acceptance

Subscribers are not required to confirm the acceptance of the certificate.

The registration authority ensures that certificate issuance will only take place when the subscriber is ready to download and install the certificate. This step is considered sufficient and no further confirmation is required.

4.4.2 Publication of the certificate by the CA

The requester agrees that SwissSign AG will publish certificate status information in accordance with applicable regulations. The requester decides in the course of the registration process whether or not the certificate will be published in a public directory service.

4.4.3 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities

The CA will not notify other entities about the issuance of certificates.

4.5 Key pair and certificate usage

4.5.1 Subscriber private key and certificate usage

The use of certificates by subscribers must adhere to the obligations stipulated in chapter 1.3.3, summarized as follows:

- Qualified certificates issued by the “SwissSign Qualified Platinum CA” can be used for qualified electronic signatures in accordance with Article 14 para. 2^{bis} OR (Swiss Code of Obligations).
- Subscribers may only use a SwissSign certificate on behalf of the person or the organization listed as the subject of such a certificate.

4.5.2 Relying party public key and certificate usage

Relying parties shall:

- be held responsible for the understanding of:
- the proper use of public key cryptography and certificates
- the related risks;
- read and agree to all terms and conditions of this CP/CPS and the End-User Agreement for relying parties;
- verify certificates issued by this CA, including use of revocation information, in accordance with the certification path validation procedure, taking into account any critical certificate extensions;
- use their best judgment when relying on a certificate issued by this CA and assess if such reliance is reasonable under the circumstances;
- determine whether such reliance is reasonable given the extent of the security and trust provided by a certificate issued by this CA;
- verify the transaction limit provided in the aforementioned certificate;
- comply with all laws and regulations applicable to a relying party's right to export, import, and/or use a certificate issued by this CA and/or related information. Relying parties shall be responsible for procuring all required licenses and permissions for any export, import, and/or use of a certificate issued by this CA and/or related information.

4.6 Certificate renewal

Certificate renewal is a process in which a new certificate is issued to a subscriber. The certificate contains new validity information, but retains subject and key information.

If the legal and regulatory requirements governing the certificate to be issued and the stipulations in this CP/CPS are met, registrations authorities may choose to:

- Implement a registration process for renewing certificates of this CA.
- choose to allow changes to the information contained in the subject, if all changes are validated and authorized.

4.6.1 Circumstance for certificate renewal

The subscriber may choose to renew a certificate if the following conditions are met:

- The subscriber owns a currently valid certificate from this CA.
- All information in the certificate is still correct. Changes to the certificate subject are validated and properly authorized.
- The verification of the identity is still within the time period allowed by legal and regulatory requirements governing this type of certificate.

4.6.2 Who may request renewal

Renewal may be requested by the subscriber only. To renew a certificate of type [QC] the law requires the subscriber to digitally sign the renewal request with this certificate.

4.6.3 Processing certificate renewal requests

The process of the initial certificate request will be amended as follows:

- The identification of the requester will be replaced with the verification of the digital signature on the request form.
- Validation results from previous requests are considered valid while the information validated has not changed.
- Any and all data that has changed is to be validate as if this was a new request.

4.6.4 Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

The registration authorities must use the same notification processes as for a newly requested certificate.

4.6.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate

The registration authorities must use the same processes as for a newly requested certificate.

4.6.6 Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA

The registration authorities must use the same processes as for a newly requested certificate.

4.6.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities

The registration authorities must use the same notification processes as for a newly requested certificate.

4.7 Certificate re-key

Certificate re-keying is a process where a subscriber automatically obtains a new certificate if proof of key possession of the old certificate can be provided. The resulting certificate contains new validity information, a new key pair but retains the same subject.

If the legal and regulatory requirements governing the certificate to be issued and the stipulations in this CP/CPS are met, registrations authorities may choose to:

- Implement a registration process for re-keying certificates of this CA.
- choose to allow changes to the information contained in the subject, if all changes are validated and authorized.

4.7.1 Circumstance for certificate re-key

The subscriber may choose to re-key a certificate if the following conditions are met:

- The subscriber owns a currently valid certificate from this CA.
- All information in the certificate is still correct. Changes to the certificate subject are validated and properly authorized.
- The verification of the identity is still within the time period allowed by legal and regulatory requirements governing this type of certificate.

4.7.2 Who may request certification of a new public key

Re-key may be requested by the subscriber only. To renew a certificate of type [QC] the law requires the subscriber to digitally sign the renewal request with this certificate.

4.7.3 Processing certificate re-keying requests

The process of the initial certificate request will be amended as follows:

- The identification of the requester will be replaced with the verification of the digital signature on the request form.
- Validation results from previous requests are considered valid while the information validated has not changed.
- Any and all data that has changed is to be validate as if this was a new request.

4.7.4 Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

The registration authorities must use the same notification processes as for a newly requested certificate.

4.7.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate

The registration authorities must use the same processes as for a newly requested certificate.

4.7.6 Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA

The registration authorities must use the same processes as for a newly requested certificate.

4.7.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities

The registration authorities must use the same notification processes as for a newly requested certificate.

4.8 Certificate modification

Certificate modification is the process through which a subscriber requests a certificate with modified subject information. Registration authorities may decide to accept certificate modification requests.

4.8.1 Circumstance for certificate modification

The subscriber may choose to modify a certificate if the following conditions are met:

- The subscriber owns a currently valid certificate from the “SwissSign Qualified Platinum CA”.
- The personal information in the certificate is still correct.
- The verification of the identity is still within the time period allowed by the ordinance to the Swiss digital signature law.
- Any and all additional information in the certificate is authenticated and authorized as it was during the original request. This includes that all documentation supplied in the original request is supplied again.

4.8.2 Who may request certificate modification

The ordinance to Swiss digital signature law clearly states that a modification may only be requested by the subscriber and the request must be digitally signed with the qualified signature of the certificated that is to be modified.

4.8.3 Processing certificate modification requests

The process of the initial certificate request will be amended as follows:

- The identification of the requester will be replaced with the verification of the digital signature on the request form.
- All other steps of the process must be executed and must remain the same.

4.8.4 Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

The registration authorities must use the same notification processes as for a newly requested certificate.

4.8.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate

The registration authorities must use the same processes as for a newly requested certificate.

4.8.6 Publication of the modified certificate by the CA

The registration authorities must use the same processes as for a newly requested certificate.

4.8.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities

The registration authorities must use the same notification processes as for a newly requested certificate.

4.9 Certificate revocation and suspension

4.9.1 Circumstances for revocation

Subscribers may revoke their certificates at will.

Registration authorities must revoke a subscriber’s certificate if one of the following conditions is met:

- The private key of the issuing CA or any of its superior CAs has been compromised.
- The subscriber's private key store (= cryptographic token) is lost.
- Any part of the certificate subject has changed.
- The certificate /O= field is no longer valid.
- The certificate issued does not comply with the terms and conditions of this CP/CPS.
- The subscriber does not comply with the agreed conditions and/or other applicable laws, rules and regulations. In addition, SwissSign AG may investigate any such incidents and take legal action if required.

4.9.2 Who can request revocation

This CA accepts certificate revocation requests from the following sources:

- the owner of the profile used to issue the initial registration request,
- the owner of the private key,
- an authorized representative of the organization that has approved the content of the /O= field in the certificate,
- a properly authorized RAO
- a properly authorized CAO
- a Swiss court of law

4.9.3 Procedures for revocation request

Any one of these procedures can be used to successfully revoke a certificate:

- The subscriber can use the ID management functions in the profile that issued the initial registration request.
- The owner of the private key can use an SSL session with strong authentication to revoke this certificate on line.
- By using the pre-filled revocation form, handed out at the end of the registration process, the subscriber can issue an off line revocation request in writing. Such a request, in order to be authorized, must carry the personal signature of the original requester of the certificate, proof of identity (as described in chapter 3.2.3) and must be sent through registered mail.
- The subscriber can personally visit the RA offices and request the revocation of a certificate off line. The subscriber must present either a valid passport or Swiss identity card.

Off line revocation methods are typically several days slower than on line revocations. The subscriber must take full responsibility for any and all delays that result from the chosen revocation method.

4.9.4 Revocation request grace period

After the formal requirements as detailed in chapters 4.9.1 and 4.9.2 have been met, the registration authority will process the revocation requests as soon as practicable and without unnecessary delay.

4.9.5 Time within which CA must process the revocation request

The time within which the CA must process the revocation request is specified in the CP/CPS of the Root CA “SwissSign Platinum CP/CPS”.

Should the on line revocation methods be unavailable, the subscriber must use the off line method. Every registration authority must guarantees processing of off-line revocation requests without undue delay, if they are supplied according to the procedure described in 4.9.3.

4.9.6 Revocation checking requirement for relying parties

Relying parties must, when working with certificates issued by this CA, verify these certificates at all times. This includes the use of CRLs, in accordance with the certification path validation procedure specified in RFC 5280. Also, any and all critical extensions, key usage, and approved technical corrigenda as appropriate should be taken into account.

4.9.7 CRL issuance frequency (if applicable)

CA	Information	Frequency
SwissSign Platinum CA (Root CA)	CRL	At least once every 365 days and within 24 hours for every revocation. At most 24 hours may pass from the time a certificate is revoked until it is reported on the CRL.
Subordinated issuing CAs	CRL	At least once every 24 hours. At most, 24 hours may pass from the time a certificate is revoked until the revocation is reported on the CRL. CRLs are issued with a life-time of at least 10 days.
	OCSP Information	Real-time. The OCSP responder will report a certificate's revocation immediately after the revocation has been completed.

4.9.8 Maximum latency for CRLs (if applicable)

The CRL of this CA and all its subordinated issuing CAs is issued according to chapter 4.9.7 and published without delay.

4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability

This CA and all its subordinated issuing CAs support the OCSP protocol for on line revocation checking. The OCSP responder URL is stored in every certificate issued by one of the subordinated issuing CAs of the “SwissSign Platinum CA” (field “Authority Info Access”).

4.9.10 On-line revocation checking requirements

The details are specified in the CP/CPS of the according issuing CA.

4.9.11 Other forms of revocation advertisements available

Currently, no other forms of revocation advertisements are available.

4.9.12 Special requirements re key compromise

If a subscriber knows or suspects that the integrity of his certificate's private key has been compromised, the subscriber shall:

- immediately cease using the certificate,
- immediately initiate revocation of the certificate,
- delete the certificate from all devices and systems,
- inform all relying parties that may depend on this certificate.

The compromise of the private key may have implications on the information protected with this key. The subscriber must decide how to deal with the affected information before deleting the compromised key.

4.9.13 Circumstances for suspension

According to Swiss Digital Signature Law, certificates may not be suspended.

4.9.14 Who can request suspension

According to Swiss Digital Signature Law, certificates may not be suspended.

4.9.15 Procedure for suspension request

According to Swiss Digital Signature Law, certificates may not be suspended.

4.9.16 Limits on suspension period

According to Swiss Digital Signature Law, certificates may not be suspended.

4.10 Certificate status services

4.10.1 Operational characteristics

The SwissSign certificate status services are CRL and OCSP. Access to these services is through the web site “swisssign.net” and the on line LDAP directory “directory.swisssign.net”. The certificate status services provide information on the status of valid certificates. The integrity and authenticity of the status information is protected by a digital signature of the respective CA.

4.10.2 Service availability

Certificate status services are available 24 hours per day, 7 days per week.

4.10.3 Optional features

The SwissSign certificate status services do not include or require any additional features.

4.11 End of subscription

End of subscription occurs after:

- successful revocation of the last certificate of a subscriber,
- expiration of the last certificate of a subscriber.

For reasons of legal compliance, the SwissSign CA and all registration authorities must keep all subscriber data and documentation for a minimum period of 11 years after termination of a subscription.

4.12 Key escrow and recovery

4.12.1 Key escrow and recovery policy and practices

[QC]:	Swiss Digital Signature law does not allow key escrow for qualified certificates.
[PA], [OA]:	Registration Authorities operating under this CP/CPS may not offer key escrow.
[PE], [OE]:	Registration Authorities operating under this CP/CPS may offer key escrow.

4.12.2 Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices

This CA does not support session key encapsulation.

5 Facility, Management, and Operations Controls

5.1 Physical controls

- Two identical clones of the SwissSign Platinum CA keys are stored off line in Swiss bank safe deposit boxes.
- The SwissSign CA servers are located in a commercial data center that meets the highest security requirements:
- The data center complies with the IT-Security outsourcing requirements (99/2) of the Swiss banking committee.
- The data center is a SunTone Certified Member.
- The data center as well as its operation is annually reviewed by PricewaterhouseCoopers llc.

5.1.1 Site location and construction

Swiss bank:	The Swiss bank safe deposit boxes have been opened with different Banks. One is located in Zurich, the other is located in Bern.
Data center:	The SwissSign electronic data processing center is located in a data center in the greater Zurich area in Switzerland.

5.1.2 Physical access

Swiss bank:	Physical access is only granted to a group of three persons, where one must be a member of the board of directors and one must be a member of the SwissSign executive management. Identification documentation (Passport, ID) and the personal signature of every employee are checked by the personnel of the Swiss Bank. Swiss bank personnel does not have access to the safe deposit box.
Data center:	Physical access is restricted to system administrators and authorized data center personnel. Biometric and electronic badge identification is required to enter the facility in which all movements are recorded by video and access control points.

5.1.3 Power and air-conditioning

Swiss Bank:	Workspace with power facilities is available whenever needed.
Data center:	The data center is air-conditioned so as to create an optimal environment for the system according to generally accepted best practices. Power relies on two independent local power suppliers as well as on independent emergency diesel generators and on emergency battery power.

5.1.4 Water exposure

Swiss bank:	The two Swiss banks are not located in the same zone of exposure.
Data center:	The data center has water sensors in all double floors. Adequate alarming is ensured. The data center is located in an area that has no special exposures.

5.1.5 Fire prevention and protection

Swiss bank:	Both Swiss banks have fire prevention and protection.
Data center:	The fire prevention system is an advanced VESDA (very early smoke detection system) and gas-type system. The data center has an Energen-based fire extinguishing system.

5.1.6 Media storage

All data relevant to CA services, whether off line or on line in nature, is encrypted and stored.

The disposal of storage media is outsourced to a third party specializing in the destruction of data on storage media.

5.1.7 Waste disposal

The regular operations of the CA services do not create waste in the data center that would require any special action.

5.1.8 Off-site backup

The system periodically generates a backup of all digital information (data, code, configuration, etc.). The backup contains all information relevant for the CA service in encrypted form. A CD or DVD is created and stored off-site in a bank safe deposit box.

This process guarantees that the off-site storage of all data from the PKI environment is fully encrypted.

5.2 Procedural controls

5.2.1 Trusted roles

In order to guarantee a segregation of duties, the roles within the SwissSign CA software are operated by three separated authorization groups: Access, Operations and Audit. Any person may only be part of one of these authorization groups. Within these authorization groups, multiple roles are defined (see picture below). A person assigned to one of the groups may have one or more roles within the same authorization group.



Illustration 3: Segregation of duties

5.2.1.1 Access (AXS & CAM)

Network Administrators (NA) have full control over the network access to all the systems that, when combined, define the SwissSign PKI. The NA has no access to the application software. In other words, an NA neither “sees” the CA software, nor the CA defined in this software, nor the data in the CA.

The CA Manager (CAM) defines, creates, changes, deletes, and thus has full control over one or more of the actual CA and RA systems. The CAM uses the hardware and software provided by the SA.

5.2.1.2 Operations (OPS & RAO/CAO)

System Administrators (SA) have full control of the hardware, operating system and application software (like the CA server), but not of cryptographically relevant information such as the private key of the CA, or the CA itself. The SA is authorized to install, configure, and maintain the CA's trustworthy systems for registration, certificate generation, subject-device provision and revocation management.

Certification Authority Operators (CAO) can manage all certificates, requests, and profiles as well as a subset of certificate authorities described by the operator access rules. The CAO works with the CA as defined by the CAM and cannot change the definition of the CA. The CAO is responsible for operating the CA's trustworthy systems on a day-to-day basis and is authorized to perform system backup and recovery.

Registration Authority Operators (RAO) can manage a subset of certificates and requests as described by the RA policies and the operator access rules. The RAO works with the RA as defined by the CAM and cannot change the definition of the RA. The RAO is responsible for operating the RA's trustworthy systems on a day-to-day basis and is authorized to perform system backup and recovery.

5.2.1.3 Audit

Auditors have read-only access to all components of the SwissSign CA to verify that the operation of these components complies with the rules and regulations of this CP/CPS. The SwissSign PKI system automatically notifies the auditor of all issues. The auditor is authorized to view and maintain archives and audit logs of all of the CA's trustworthy systems. The auditor has no direct operative abilities, but must inform SwissSign executive management, after the fact, of any irregularities in the processes.

5.2.2 Number of persons required per task

The operation of the "SwissSign Platinum CA" and its subordinated issuing CAs are entirely role-driven and therefore requires at least:

- Access: 2 employees for network access configuration and CA maintenance and management tasks
- Operations: 2 employees for system administration, RA and CA operation
- Audit: 1 auditor

The certificate store and all cryptographically relevant aspects of all CAs (signing operations) can only be accessed by two persons working together (four-eye-principle).

5.2.3 Identification and authentication for each role

Within the CA Software, identification and authentication for all roles is achieved using SwissSign certificates.

5.2.4 Roles requiring separation of duties

To guarantee a strict segregation of duties as described in section 5.2.1, roles related to access, operations, and audit must be held by separate individuals.

5.3 Personnel controls

5.3.1 Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements

SwissSign AG has very high standards with regards to the skills of employees.

To be assigned the role "Access", an employee must prove that he has expert knowledge of TCP/IP networking, Unix operating systems, and PKI technology, concepts and applications.

To be assigned the role "Operations", an employee must prove that he has expert knowledge of PKI technology and applications that use PKI. Also, he must have strong people skills and a good understanding of PKI processes.

To be assigned the role "Audit", an employee must prove that he has expert knowledge of TCP/IP networking, Unix operating systems, PKI technology and applications using PKI, as well as a good understanding of PKI processes and strong people skills.

To be assigned the role "RAO", an employee must be trained to have a good understanding of security in general and the PKI processes relevant for this role.

All SwissSign employees must demonstrate understanding of security in general and expert knowledge of IT security in particular. SwissSign personnel shall be formally appointed to trusted roles by senior management members responsible for security.

Before starting work at SwissSign AG, new staff members must sign confidentiality (non-disclosure) agreements and independence statements.

5.3.2 Background check procedures

With regard to this CA, SwissSign AG verifies the background of its employees and ensures that employees do not have a criminal record.

With regard to this CA, SwissSign will not appoint any person who is known to have been convicted of a a serious crime or other offense which could affect his suitability for the position. Personnel shall not have access to the trusted functions until all necessary checks have been completed. SwissSign AG will ask any candidate to provide such information and refuse an application if access to such information is denied.

5.3.3 Training requirements

Employees of SwissSign AG must provide evidence that they have obtained the skills required for their position. Shortcomings will be addressed and alleviated by appropriate training.

During the year, there will be at least one meeting with the Chief Security Officer, the Human Resource Officer, and staff. The meeting will be similar in structure to the one on the first working day. Topics to be covered are information-security issues and the roles of employees.

5.3.4 Retraining frequency and requirements

Retraining of employees is done as necessity arises, depending on the needs of the organization or the needs of the individual.

5.3.5 Job rotation frequency and sequence

Job rotation of employees is done as necessity arises, depending on the needs of the organization, or by request of an individual employee.

5.3.6 Sanctions for unauthorized actions

SwissSign AG reserves the right to prosecute unauthorized actions to the fullest extent of applicable Swiss law.

5.3.7 Independent contractor requirements

Above and beyond regular documentation, contractors that are candidates for an Access, Operations or Audit role must:

- provide proof of their qualifications in the same manner as internal personnel (see chapter 5.3.1),
- demonstrate a clean criminal record in a separate confidentiality statement (non-disclosure agreement) in addition to the confidentiality agreement covering the contractual relations with third-party contractors.

5.3.8 Documentation supplied to personnel

On their first day of work, all SwissSign employees receive an employee handbook and access to the SwissSign security policy, security concept, personal workspace security, and risk management documentation. Every employee is expected to read and understand all of this documentation during the first week of employment with SwissSign AG.

5.4 Audit logging procedures

The SwissSign CA software is built to journal all events that occur in the SwissSign Platinum CA. The journal is stored in the SwissSign CA database and is accessible through the SwissSign CA Web Interface.

5.4.1 Types of events recorded

The following events are recorded in the CA log:

- new certificate requests
- rejected certificate requests
- account violations
- certificate signing
- certificate revocation
- user account logon
- CRL signing
- CA rollover
- certificate expiration
- certificate downloads/installation

The above list is non-conclusive, and it is limited to events that are directly related to certificate management or trust-related functions. In particular, it does not include technical events that are logged elsewhere.

5.4.2 Frequency of processing log

Logs are processed continuously and audited on a monthly basis by the Chief Security Officer (CSO). The audit report covers the following aspects:

- list of the audit accomplished with the results of the review of each individual item,
- list of open audit issues including status, escalation, deadline, responsible person/organization,
- prioritized list of actions to be taken.

5.4.3 Retention period for audit log

The journal information in the “SwissSign Platinum CA” database is never deleted.

5.4.4 Protection of audit log

Read access to the journal information is granted to personnel requiring this access as part of their duties. The following roles can obtain this access:

- Auditor
- RAO
- CAO
- CAM

The journal is stored in the database and access to the database is protected against unauthorized access by the CA application and through special security measures on the operating system level.

5.4.5 Audit log backup procedures

The journal is an integral part of the SwissSign CA database and is therefore part of the daily backup. The entire database is encrypted on the disk as well as on the backup media. Only employees with the role OPS have access to the backup media.

5.4.6 Audit collection system (internal vs. external)

The audit log or journal is an integral part of the SwissSign CA software.

5.4.7 Notification to event-causing subject

Depending on the severity of the log entry, SwissSign AG reserves the right to notify the subscriber and/or the responsible RA of the event, the log entry and/or the results of the event.

5.4.8 Vulnerability assessments

This CA and all its subordinated issuing CAs are constantly (24x7) monitored, and all attempts to gain unauthorized access to any of the services are logged and analyzed. SwissSign AG reserves the right to inform the Swiss authorities of such successful or unsuccessful attempts.

5.5 Records archival

5.5.1 Types of records archived

The following records are archived:

- a daily backup of any information that this CA and its subordinated issuing CAs produce
- journal
- registration information of end entities

5.5.2 Retention period for archive

Archived information is kept at least 11 years beyond the end of subscription, as specified in chapter 4.11.

5.5.3 Protection of archive

Protection of the archive is as follows:

- Archived information is only accessible to authorized employees according to the role model as presented in 5.2.
- Protection against modification: Archives of digital data are digitally signed to prevent unknown modification.
- Protection against data loss: The RA must ensure that at least two copies of the archived data is available at all times. The storage locations must be suitable for this purpose and must provide physical protection and access controls.
- Protection against the deterioration of the media on which the archive is stored: Digital data is to be migrated periodically to fresh media.
- Protection against obsolescence of hardware, operating systems, and other software: As part of the archive, the hardware (if necessary), operating systems, and/or other software is archived in order to permit access to and use of archived records over time.

5.5.4 Archive backup procedures

Archived information is stored off-site in a secure location suitable for archiving purposes.

5.5.5 Requirements for time-stamping of records

All records in the database and in log files are time-stamped using the system time of the system where the event is recorded.

The system time of all servers is synchronized with the time source of the SwissSign Time-Stamping Authority or another official time source.

All records that are created manually through the scanning of documents are time-stamped using the SwissSign TSA service.

5.5.6 Archive collection system (internal or external)

This CA and all its subordinated issuing CAs use a SwissSign-internal archiving system.

5.5.7 Procedures to obtain and verify archived information

In the event of a court order, a high-quality copy is made of the archived information and the original is temporarily made available to the court. When the original information is returned, the high-quality copy is destroyed. This process is logged and audited.

5.6 Key changeover

SwissSign AG will change over all keys of subordinated issuing CAs on a regular basis. All certificates of such subordinated issuing CAs are available for download on the swisssign.net website and in the public directory directory.swisssign.net. These CA certificates are directly signed by the long-living trust anchors (Root CA) of the SwissSign PKI.

5.7 Compromise and disaster recovery

5.7.1 Incident and compromise handling procedures

To manage all operational processes, SwissSign has adopted the ITIL best practices model:

- A service desk receives all incoming service calls and assesses them according to severity.
- Incident management has the goal to restore normal operation as quickly as possible.
- Recurring incidents or incidents with major impact are entered into the problem management process. The goal here is to find the ultimate cause of the problem and to prevent further issues.

To manage a crisis or catastrophe, SwissSign has a Business Continuity Management plan. Once this plan goes into action, the Task Force Business Continuity (TFBC) assumes managerial duties of SwissSign until the crisis is dealt with and the TFBC is disbanded.

The TFBC has a charted course of action for the following events:

- Loss of one computing facility
- System or server compromise

- CA key compromise
- Algorithm compromise

If a crisis or catastrophe situation is declared, SwissSign will communicate this state to the Board of Directors, the Swiss authorities and the Swiss Recognition Body.

5.7.2 Computing resources, software and/or data are corrupted

This CA and its subordinated issuing CA are implemented on fully redundant server systems. Any hardware defect will only affect one such system and allow a redundant system to take over and provide full functionality.

The master server of this CA and its subordinated issuing CA is part of a daily backup process.

5.7.3 Entity private key compromise procedures

If the private key of this CA or one of its subordinates issuing CAs is suspected to be compromised, executive management of SwissSign AG must be informed immediately. The following steps will be taken:

- The CA certificate will be revoked.
- SwissSign AG will inform Swiss authorities of any trust-anchor compromise.
- All subscribers with certificates issued by either the revoked CA or one of its subordinated issuing CA will be informed by e-mail as soon as possible.
- All subscriber certificates will be revoked and new CRLs will be issued.
- The cause of the key compromise will be determined and the situation rectified.
- The revoked CA will generate a new key pair and the resulting certificate request will be signed by the superior CA.
- The new CA certificate will be published on the swisssign.com or the swisssign.net web site.
- New CRLs will be issued.

If the private key of a “SwissSign Time-Stamp Unit” is suspected to be compromised, executive management of SwissSign AG must be informed immediately. The following steps will be taken:

- The certificate of the TSA Unit will be revoked.
- All registered TSA subscribers will be informed by e-mail as soon as possible.
- New CRLs will be issued.
- The cause of the key compromise will be determined and the situation rectified.
- A new key pair will be generated and the according certificate request will be signed by the SwissSign Platinum CA.
- The new certificate will be published on the swisssign.com or the swisssign.net web site.

5.7.4 Business continuity capabilities after a disaster

In case of a disaster, Executive Management and the Board of Directors of SwissSign AG will assess the situation and take all decisions necessary to establish a new, fully redundant server location for the SwissSign CA servers.

A new server location will be chosen based on its ability to support the security requirements of SwissSign with reference to the requirements as stipulated in this document. The off-site backups will be used to restore the CA, its data and its processes.

5.8 CA or RA termination

Before the SwissSign Platinum CSP terminates its services, the following actions will be executed:

- SwissSign AG will report, without delay, any threat of bankruptcy to the Swiss SAS, the Swiss Recognition Body and any other governmental control agency or legal quality control organization.
- When the decision to discontinue certification services has been taken, SwissSign AG will inform, without delay, all its subscribers, relying parties and if applicable to other registration authorities and other CAs with which there are agreements or any other form of established relations. SwissSign AG endeavors to give at least 30 days advance notice before revoking any certificates. This explicitly includes the Swiss SAS, the Swiss Recognition Body and any other governmental control agency or legal quality control organization.
- SwissSign AG will immediately stop all registration services and if applicable will enforce this cessation of services for all other registration authorities.
- SwissSign AG will immediately cancel all current and valid contracts. The cancellation is to be effective after the entire business termination process has been concluded. SwissSign AG will also immediately revoke all rights of contracted parties to act on behalf of SwissSign AG.

After a waiting period of at least 30 days, the following actions will be executed:

- SwissSign AG will revoke all subscriber certificates. SwissSign AG will issue a CRL. SwissSign AG will revoke all root certificates.
- SwissSign AG will transfer obligations for maintaining registration information, certificate status information, and event log archives that cover the respective time to the appropriate organization.
- SwissSign AG will destroy all backup copies and escrow copies of the private signing keys of the SwissSign Platinum CA, such that the private keys cannot be retrieved, retained, or put back into use.
- All copies of documents which are required to be saved according to the stipulations of any applicable law will be stored under the conditions and for the duration as stipulated in this CP/CPS.

RA termination is subject to negotiations with other equivalent RAs. Another RA may offer to assume the RA function for the subscribers of the terminating RA. Regardless of whether or not an RA assumes the role of a terminating RA, SwissSign AG will guarantee the safekeeping of any RA documents as stipulated in this document.

6 Technical Security Controls

6.1 Key pair generation and installation

6.1.1 Key pair generation

The key pair for the “SwissSign Platinum CA” (Root CA Key) has been created in an off line SSCD that meets at least FIPS 140-1 level 3 requirements.

The key pairs for the subordinated issuing CAs of the SwissSign Platinum CA (Issuing CA Keys) have been generated in an off line SSCD that meets at least FIPS 140-1 level 3 requirements. Subsequently, the Issuing CA keys have been cloned into an on line SSCD meeting at least FIPS 140-1 level 4 requirements.

TSA key pairs are generated and managed in the same SSCD as the Issuing CA keys. The same rules apply.

Subscriber key pairs for qualified and signing certificates are generated on SwissSign-approved crypto devices (ex. Smart Card, USB Token). SwissSign approved crypto-devices are listed on http://swisssign.com.

6.1.2 Private key delivery to subscriber

Private keys generated on a SwissSign-approved secure crypto device do not need to be delivered.

6.1.3 Public key delivery to certificate issuer

The requester presents the public key as a PKCS#10-formatted certificate signing request to the signing CA using a secure SSL-encrypted communication channel.

6.1.4 CA public key delivery to relying parties

Relying parties can download the issuing CA certificate from the SwissSign website by using the PKCS#7 format.

When a subscriber receives the certificate, the issuing CA public key is included. Also included is the complete chain of certificates of the hierarchical SwissSign PKI containing all public keys that are part of the trust chain.

6.1.5 Key sizes

SwissSign follows the recommendations on algorithms and key sizes as they are made available by the following institutions:

NIST:	SP 800-57	http://csrc.nist.gov
Bundesnetzagentur:	Übersicht über geeignete Algorithmen	http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de

The “SwissSign Platinum CA” uses a 4096 bit RSA key.

The subordinate CAs use a 2048 bit RSA key.

All issuing CAs allow subscribers to use RSA keys with a size of at least 1976 bits, if the recommendations require 2048 bit RSA key sizes.

6.1.6 Public key parameters generation and quality checking

Key pairs are generated on SwissSign-approved secure crypto devices and parameters have been specified to meet all certification and security requirements.

6.1.7 Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)

The signing key of this CA and its subordinated issuing CAs are the only keys permitted for signing certificates and CRLs and have the keyCertSign and CRLSign key usage bit set.

Subscribers can obtain certificates issued by this CA with the following key usage bit included:

[QC]:	nonRepudiation (qualified certificate)

[PA], [OA]:	digitalSignature For certificates that are not issued under the SuisseID guidelines the following key usages may be added as well: nonRepudiation, keyAgreement
[PE], [OE]:	keyEncipherment, dataEncipherment

Subscribers can obtain certificates issued by this CA with the following extended key usages included:

- Server Authentication
- Client Authentication
- Code Signing
- Email Protection
- Time Stamping
- Microsoft Individual Code Signing (msICS)
- Microsoft Commercial Code Signing (msCCS)
- Microsoft Trust List Signing (msTLS)
- Michrosoft Encrypted Files System (msEFS)
- Microsot Smart Card Logon (msSCL)
- IPSec End System
- IPSec Tunnel
- IPSec User

6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls

6.2.1 Cryptographic module standards and controls

The following list shows how the requirements for the different users of SSCD are implemented:

Root CA keys	The SSCD used for CA keys is kept off line at all times and meets at least FIPS 140-1 level 3 requirements.
Issuing CA keys	The SSCD used for CA keys meets at least FIPS 140-1 level 3 requirements. These keys are on line and access is strictly controlled by using the '4-eye' principle.
TSA keys	The TSA keys are generated and managed in the same SSCD as the Issuing CA keys. The same rules apply.
[QC]	Subscriber keys for certificates issued by the “SwissSign Qualified Platinum CA” must be generated and stored on an SSCD that meets EAL 4+ certification in accordance with Swiss Digital Signature Law.
[PA], [OA]:	Subscriber keys for authentication purposes and issued by the “SwissSign Personal Platinum CA” or the “Swiss Post Platinum CA” must be generated and stored on an SSCD that meets EAL 4+ certification. If the SSCD is operated in a secure computing environment, it is permissible to use SSCD that meet the FIPS-140-2 Level 3 requirements.
[PE], [OE]:	Subscriber keys for encryption purposes may be generated on the same SSCD or may be generated in software.

6.2.2 Private key (n out of m) multi-person control

The following list shows how multi-person controls are implemented:

Root CA keys	Root CA keys can only be accessed on the physical and on the logical level by adhering to '3 out of 5' control, meaning that 3 of the 5 persons are present.
Issuing CA keys	Management access to these keys is only possible using '4-eye' principle (2 out of m). Once the issuing CA is operable, signing operations can be authorized by a single RA operator.
TSA keys	The TSA keys are generated and managed in the same SSCD as the issuing CA keys. The same rules apply.
[QC], [PA], [OA]:	The registration process ensures that the subscriber is the only person with access to the keys on the subscriber SSCD.
[PE], [OE]:	The registration process ensures that the subscriber is the only person with access to the keys. If the keys are generated in software it is the responsibility of the subscriber to ensure the safety of the keys.

6.2.3 Private key escrow

The following list shows how private key escrow is implemented:

Root CA keys	Root CA keys are not in escrow.
Issuing CA keys	The issuing CA keys are not in escrow.
TSA keys	The TSA keys are generated and managed in the same SSCD as the issuing CA keys. The same rules apply.
[QC], [PA], [OA]:	Private key escrow cannot be offered for certificates issued for authentication purposes by this CA.
[PE], [OE]:	Private key escrow may be offered for certificates issued for encryption purposes by this CA.

6.2.4 Private key backup

The following list shows how private key backup is implemented:

Root CA keys	Root CA keys have been backed up onto an SSCD so that they can be recovered if a major catastrophe destroys the productive set of keys. The recovery requires that 3 out of 5 persons be present in order to gain physical and logical access. At least one of these persons must be a member of the Board of Directors of SwissSign AG.
Issuing CA keys	The Issuing CA keys have been put into backup SSCD, so that they can be recovered if a major catastrophe destroys the productive set of keys. The recovery requires that 3 out of 5 persons be present in order to gain physical and logical access.
TSA keys	The TSA keys are generated and managed in the same SSCD as the Issuing CA keys. The same rules apply.
[QC], [PA], [OA]:	All keys are generated on the SSCD and cannot be put into backup.
[PE], [OE]:	Keys may be generated and used outside an SSCD. A backup of the private keys of certificates for encryption purposes is strongly recommended to protect against data loss. Private key backup is offered by the SwissSign RA. The key pair is stored in the database and protected with a subscriber-chosen password. These key pairs are also stored in the SwissSign database which is put into backup and archived.

6.2.5 Private key archival

The following list shows how private key archival is implemented:

Root CA keys	The Root CA keys are not archived.
Issuing CA keys	The Issuing CA keys are not archived.
TSA keys	The TSA keys are generated and managed in the same SSCD as the Issuing CA keys. The same rules apply.
[QC], [PA], [OA]:	All keys are generated on the SSCD and cannot be extracted.
[PE], [OE]:	Keys may be generated and used outside an SSCD. Archiving private keys of certificates for encryption purposes is recommended to protect against data loss in archives. SwissSign RA offers subscribers the option of downloading their private keys in the form of a PKCS#12 file. Subscribers may wish to archive this file. These key pairs are also stored in the SwissSign database which is put into backup and archived.

6.2.6 Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module

The following list shows how private key transfers are implemented:

Root CA keys	The Root CA keys can be cloned from the master SSCD to other SSCDs. This is achieved in a cloning ceremony. To protect the private key during the transport, the destination SSCD provides the public key of a key pair it has generated. The master SSCD encrypts the key to be cloned with this public key. Only the destination SSCD is therefore able to successfully decrypt the key pair from the master SSCD.
Issuing CA keys	The Issuing CA keys are cloned in the same manner as Root keys.
TSA keys	The TSA keys are generated and managed in the same SSCD as the Issuing CA keys. The same rules apply.
[QC]	Subscriber keys that have been generated on the SSCD cannot be cloned.
[PA], [OA]:	Subscriber keys that have been generated on a SSCD that supports cloning of keys may be cloned. The cloning mechanism must meet the required certifications and it must guarantee that the private key never exists outside the SSCD in cleartext form.
[PE], [OE]:	Subscriber keys of certificates for encryption purposes may be transferred into an SSCD.

6.2.7 Private key storage on cryptographic module

The following list shows how private keys are stored on cryptographic modules:

Root CA keys	The Root CA keys are stored on cryptographic modules so that they can be used only if properly activated.
Issuing CA keys	The Issuing CA keys are stored on cryptographic modules so that they can be used only if properly activated.
TSA keys	The TSA keys are generated and managed in the same SSCD as the Issuing CA keys. The same rules apply.
[QC], [PA], [OA]:	Subscriber keys are stored on cryptographic modules so that they can be used only if properly activated.
[PE], [OE]:	Subscriber keys of certificates for encryption purposes may or may not be stored in a cryptographic module.

6.2.8 Method of activating private key

The following list shows how private keys are activated:

Root CA keys	The Root CA keys are activated with a user key (physical), a user pin (knowledge) and 3 authentication keys (physical).
Issuing CA keys	The Issuing CA keys are activated with role-based access control requiring at least two persons and an SSCD PIN.
TSA keys	The TSA keys are generated and managed in the same SSCD as the Issuing CA keys. The same rules apply.
[QC]	Subscriber keys are activated with a token PIN and, in the case of the recognized qualified certificate, a secondary authentication PIN for the EAL 4+ certified key store.
[PA], [OA]:	Subscriber keys are activated with a token PIN.
[PE], [OE]:	Subscriber keys of certificates for encryption purposes may be stored in software certificate stores and can be activated according to the rules and the configuration of the store holding them.

6.2.9 Method of deactivating private key

The following list shows how private keys are deactivated:

Root CA keys	The Root CA keys are deactivated either by logging out of the SSCD, by terminating the session with the SSCD, by removing the CA token from the computer or by powering down the system.
Issuing CA keys	The Issuing CA keys are deactivated by terminating the key daemon process, by shutting down the CA server processes or by shutting down the server.
TSA keys	The TSA keys are generated and managed in the same SSCD as the Issuing CA keys. The same rules apply.
[QC]	Subscriber keys are deactivated by removing the SSCD from the computer or by terminating the application that had access to the SSCD. In the case of the recognized qualified certificate, the key is automatically deactivated with every use.
[PA], [OA]:	Subscriber keys are deactivated by removing the SSCD from the computer or by terminating the application that had access to the SSCD.
[PE], [OE]:	Subscriber keys of certificates for encryption purposes may be stored in software certificate stores and can be deactivated according to the rules and the configuration of the store holding them.

6.2.10 Method of destroying private key

The following list shows how private keys are destroyed:

Root CA keys	The Root CA keys are destroyed by initializing the SSCD.
Issuing CA keys	The Issuing CA keys are destroyed by initializing the SSCD.
TSA keys	The TSA keys are generated and managed in the same SSCD as the Issuing CA keys. The same rules apply.
[QC]	Subscriber keys can only be destroyed by destroying the SSCD.
[PA], [OA]:	Subscriber keys can only be destroyed by destroying the SSCD or if the SSCD supports this operation, by re-initialyzing the key store and all clone copies of this store.
[PE], [OE]:	Subscriber keys of certificates for encryption purposes cannot be destroyed unless they have been created and managed like subscriber keys of certificates for authentication purposes.

6.2.11 Cryptographic Module Rating

Minimum standards for cryptographic modules have been specified in chapter 6.2.1.

6.3 Other aspects of key pair management

6.3.1 Public key archival

All certificates, and therefore the public keys of all subscribers and all CAs, are stored on line in a database. This database is replicated to all servers in the CA cluster. This database is also part of the daily backup. To protect the data in the database, the database is encrypted with a special backup key before it is put into the backup.

The encrypted daily backup is copied onto a backup server and kept available on line for one year.

A weekly full dump is copied onto write-once media and stored in a bank deposit for archiving purposes. Archived media are never destroyed.

6.3.2 Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods

The usage periods for certificates issued by this CA are as follows:

- The “SwissSign Platinum CA” as well as all trust-anchor certificates are valid 30 years. Key changeover is performed every 15 years.
- Issuing CA certificates are issued for a maximum lifetime of 15 years.
- The rollover of CA certificates will be done manually and is after at most two thirds of the lifetime of the most recent CA certificate.
- End user certificates can have according to PKI “best practices” a lifetime of up to the maximum remaining lifetime of the issuing CA certificate minus 10 days.

6.4 Activation data

6.4.1 Activation data generation and installation

The activation data of the Root CA keys and the issuing CA keys are generated during the Trust Anchor Key Ceremony.

Activation data used to protect private keys inside SwissSign-approved crypto devices is generated in accordance with the requirements of this CP/CPS. It must:

- be generated by and known to the subscriber only
- have at least six characters
- not be easily guessable

6.4.2 Activation data protection

Root CA keys	The activation data is distributed over multiple physical keys. The owners of a part are required to store this part in a private safe deposit of a Swiss bank.
Issuing CA keys	The activation data is known to trusted individuals at SwissSign AG. An escrow copy is stored in a safe deposit with dual controls access.
TSA keys	The TSA keys are generated and managed in the same SSCD as the Issuing CA keys. The same rules apply.
QC, PA, OA, PE, OE:	Subscribers are obliged to keep the activation data secret at all times.

6.4.3 Other aspects of activation data

SwissSign-approved crypto devices and their product specifications are listed on http://swisssign.com.

6.5 Computer security controls

The CA servers are protected by external firewalls that filter out all unwanted traffic. Additionally, the CA systems are hardened and equipped with a high-security operating system. SA access to the system is granted only over secure and restricted protocols using strong public-key authentication.

6.5.1 Specific computer security technical requirements

SwissSign uses a layered security approach to ensure the security and integrity of the computers used to run the SwissSign CA software. The following controls ensure the security of SwissSign-operated computer systems:

- Hardened operating system
- Software packages are only installed from a trusted software repository
- Minimal network connectivity
- Authentication and authorization for all functions
- Strong authentication and role-based access control for all vital functions
- Disk and file encryption for all relevant data
- Proactive patch management
- Monitoring and auditing of all activities

6.5.2 Computer security rating

SwissSign AG has established a security framework which covers and governs the technical aspects of its computer security.

The systems themselves and the services running on these systems are subject to thorough reviews and testing (including penetration testing).

In order to make its environment more secure and to keep it on a state-of-the-art security level, SwissSign AG operates a vulnerability management process which includes monitoring of supplier security alerts.

The technical aspects of computer security are subject to periodic audits under supervision of the Chief Security Officer (CSO).

6.6 Life cycle technical controls

6.6.1 System development controls

To ensure quality and availability of the SwissSign AG software, SwissSign implements the ITIL model and the development team adheres to the following principles:

- All software is stored in the Source Code Control System to keep track of software versions.
- The software archive is put onto backup regularly, and a copy is stored externally.
- A Software Life Cycle Control based on separate environments for Development, Test and Production is in place. This software life cycle control ensures adherence to controls and checkpoints within the organization.
- Internal software development policies specify standards and principles for software engineering and related tasks.

6.6.2 Security management controls

Continuous monitoring is used to ensure that systems and networks are operated in compliance with the specified security policy. All processes are logged and audited according to applicable law and normative requirements.

6.6.3 Life cycle security controls

Development of software systems adheres to principles specified in the internal software development policies. These policies are part of a security management process covering life cycle aspects of security controls.

6.7 Network security controls

Network security is based on a multi-level zoning concept using multiple redundant firewalls.

6.8 Time-stamping

SwissSign AG operates an internal time service using various sources from the Internet and a GPS receiver.

Based on this internal time service, SwissSign AG offers a time-stamping service that can be used to create a time-stamp for arbitrary documents. This service is implemented in accordance with Article 12 of the Swiss Digital Signature Law (ZertES).

SwissSign may charge a fee for this service. The keys used for the creation of time-stamping signatures are treated in exactly the same fashion as the keys of the subordinated issuing CAs of the “SwissSign Platinum CA”.

7 Certificate, CRL and OCSP Profiles

This section contains the rules and guidelines followed by this CA in populating X.509 certificates and CRL extensions.

7.1 Certificate profile

This CA issues X.509 Version 3 certificates in accordance with PKIX. The structure of such a certificate is:

Certificate Field	Value	Comment
Version	X.509 Version 3	See Chapter 7.1.1
Serial number	Unique number	Will be used in CRL
Signature algorithm identifier	OID	See Chapter 7.1.3
Validity period	Start date, expiration date	
Subject Public Key Info	Public Key algorithm, Subject Public Key	See Chapter 7.1.3
Extensions	X509V3 Extensions	See Chapter 7.1.2
Signature	Certificate Signature	See Chapter 7.1.3

7.1.1 Version number(s)

Version of X.509 certificates: version 3.

7.1.2 Certificate Extensions

The Authority information Access extension is optional and it is derived from the issuing CA as follows:

- CA Issuers - URI:http://swisssign.net/cgi-bin/authority/download/'<keyid of the issuing CA)
- OCSP - URI:http://<ocsp server>/'keyid

The server address depends on the Issuing CA and the following OCSP Responder addresses are supported:

- ocsp.swisssign.net
- platinum-qualified-g2.ocsp.swisssign.net
- platinum-suisseid-g2.ocsp.swisssign.net
- platinum-swisspost-g2.ocsp.swisssign.net
- platinum-personal-g2.ocsp.swisssign.net
- platinum-qualified-g3.ocsp.swisssign.net
- platinum-suisseid-g3.ocsp.swisssign.net
- platinum-server-g3.ocsp.swisssign.net
- platinum-personal-g3.ocsp.swisssign.net

The Subejct Alternative Name extension is optional. It is added in accordance with rfc 5280 and the content depends on the information provided by the subscriber

7.1.2.1 SwissSign Platinum CA Certificates for Generation 2 (G2)

The generation 2 certificates of swisssign are characterized by a self-signed root certificate with the SHA-1 hash algorithm.

Subject of the SwissSign Platinum CA certificates for Generation 2

CA Type	Subject	Issuer
Root CA	/CN=SwissSign Platinum CA - G2 /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH	/CN=SwissSign Platinum CA - G2 /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH
Issuing CA	/CN=SwissSign Personal Platinum CA 2008 – G2 /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH	/CN=SwissSign Platinum CA - G2 /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH
Issuing CA	/CN= SwissSign SuisseID Platinum CA 2010 - G2 /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH	/CN=SwissSign Platinum CA - G2 /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH
Issuing CA	/CN=SwissSign Qualified Platinum CA 2010 – G2 /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH	/CN=SwissSign Platinum CA - G2 /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH
Issuing CA	/CN=Swiss Post Platinum CA 2008– G2 /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH	/CN=SwissSign Platinum CA - G2 /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH

Common extensions of the SwissSign Platinum CA certificates for Generation 2

Extension	Root CA	Issuing CA	Critical
basic Constraints	CA: TRUE	CA:TRUE, pathlen: 0	Y
key Usage	Certificate Sign, CRL Sign	Certificate Sign, CRL Sign	Y
Subject Key Identifier	50:AF:00:CC:07:87:15:47:6F:38:C5:B4:65:D1:DE:95:AA:E9:DF:9C:CC	individual per CA	
Authority Key Identifier	50:AF:00:CC:07:87:15:47:6F:38:C5:B4:65:D1:DE:95:AA:E9:DF:9C:CC	50:AF:00:CC:07:87:15:47:6F:38:C5:B4:65:D1:DE:95:AA:E9:DF:9C:CC	
Certificate Policies	Policy: 2.16.756.1.89.1.1.1.1 CPS: http://repository.swisssign.com/	Policy: 2.16.756.1.89.1.1.1.1.2 CPS: http://repository.swisssign.com/SwissSign-Platinum-CP-CPS-R2.pdf	
CRL Distribution Points	not included in Root CA certificate	http://crl.swisssign.net/<keyid>	

Extension of the Root Certificate: SwissSign Platinum CA – G2

no exceptions

Extensions of the Issuing CA: SwissSign Personal Platinum CA 2008 – G2

no exceptions

Extensions of the Issuing CA: SwissSign Qualified Platinum CA 2010 - G2

Extension Attribute	Values	Comment
Issuer Alternative Name	DirName:/C=CH/O=ZertES Recognition Body: KPMG AG	
Certificate Policies	Policy: 2.5.29.32.0 CPS: http://repository.swisssign.com/SwissSign--Platinum-CP-CPS-R3.pdf User Notice: Explicit Text: This is a certification authority that issues qualified certificates according to Swiss Digital Signature Law.	
qcStatements	OID: 0.4.0.1862.1.1 (QcCompliance)	This certificate is issued as a qualified certificate
	OID: 0.4.0.1862.1.4 (QcSSCD)	Claim that the private key related to the certified public key resides in a Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD)

Extensions of the Issuing CA: SwissSign SuisseID Platinum CA 2010 - G2

Extension Attribute	Values	Comment
Certificate Policies	Policy: 2.5.29.32.0 CPS: http://repository.swisssign.com/SwissSign-Platinum-CP-CPS-R3.pdf	The SuisseID standard requires the use of “any policy”.

Extensions of the Issuing CA: Swiss Post Platinum CA 2008 – G2

Extension Attribute	Values	Comment
Certificate Policies	Policy: 2.16.756.1.89.1.1.1.4.3 CPS: http://repository.swisssign.com/Swiss-Post-Platinum-CP-CPS-R3.pdf	

7.1.2.2 SwissSign Platinum TSA Certificate for Generation 2 (G2)

Extensions of the TSA Certificate: SwissSign Platinum TSA – G2 -Unit 0101

Extension Attribute	Values	Comment
Subject	/CN=SwissSign Platinum TSA – G2 -Unit 0101 /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH	Every Unit has a unique Common name. The Units are numbered: Unit 1, Unit 2 etc.
Issuer Name	/CN=SwissSign Platinum CA - G2 /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH	
Key Usage	DigitalSignature, NonRepudiation	Critical extension
Extended Key Usage	Time Stamping	Critical extension
Subject Key Identifier	<key identifier of this CA's public key>	
Authority Key Identifier	<key identifier of the issuing CA's public key>	
CRL Distribution Points	http://crl.swisssign.net/<keyid>	URLs of the CRL Distribution points (LDAP and/or HTTP)
Certificate Policies	Policy: 2.16.756.1.89.1.1.3.2 **Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.** http://repository.swisssign.com/SwissSign-Platinum-TSA-R2.pdf	

Extensions of the TSA Certificate: SwissSign Platinum TSA 2010 – G2 - Unit 01 (alternative)

Extension Attribute	Values	Comment
Subject	/CN=SwissSign Platinum TSA 2010 – G2 - Unit 01 /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH	Every Site is considered one Unit and has a unique Common name.
Issuer Name	/CN=SwissSign Platinum CA - G2 /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH	
Key Usage	DigitalSignature, NonRepudiation	Critical extension
Extended Key Usage	Time Stamping	Critical extension
Subject Key Identifier	<key identifier of this CA's public key>	
Authority Key Identifier	<key identifier of the issuing CA's public key>	
CRL Distribution Points	http://crl.swisssign.net/<keyid>	URLs of the CRL Distribution points (LDAP and/or HTTP)
Certificate Policies	Policy: 2.16.756.1.89.1.1.3.2 **Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.** http://repository.swisssign.com/SwissSign-Platinum-TSA-R2.pdf	

7.1.2.3 SwissSign Platinum Special Certificates for Generation 2 (G2)

Code-signing certificate issued by: SwissSign Personal Platinum CA 2008 – G2

Extension Attribute	Values	Comment
Subject	Data of Subscriber	See Definitions in Chapter 1.6
Issuer Name	/CN=SwissSign Personal Platinum CA 2008 – G2 /O=SwissSign AG/C=CH	
Authority Key Identifier	<key identifier of the issuing CA's public key>	See Chapter 7.1.3
CRL Distribution Points	http://crl.swisssign.net/<keyid>	URLs of the CRL Distribution points (LDAP and/or HTTP)
Certificate Policies	Policy: 2.16.756.1.89.1.1.1.1.3 CPS: http://repository.swisssign.com/SwissSign-Platinum-CP-CPS-R3.pdf	QCP public + SSCD
Authority Information Access		URL to OCSP responder and optional URL to CA issuer certificate
Subject Alternative Name		Alternative name of the subscriber: email address
Key Usage	digitalSignature	Critical extension
Extended Key Usage	CodeSigning	
NsComment		Optional
Microsoft Certificate Template	(OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2)	Optional

7.1.2.4 SwissSign Platinum End User Certificates for Generation 2 (G2)

End User Certificate issued by: SwissSign Qualified Platinum CA 2010 – G2

Extension Attribute	Values	Comment
Subject	Data of Subscriber	See Definitions in Chapter 1.6
Issuer Name	/CN=SwissSign Qualified Platinum CA 2010 – G2 /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH	
Issuer Alternative Name	DirName:/C=CH/O=ZertES Recognition Body: KPMG AG	
Authority Key Identifier	<key identifier of the issuing CA's public key>	See Chapter 7.1.3
CRL Distribution Points	http://crl.swisssign.net/<keyid>	URLs of the CRL Distribution points (LDAP and/or HTTP)
Certificate Policies	Policy: 2.16.756.1.89.1.1.1.1 CPS: http://repository.swisssign.com/SwissSign-Platinum-CP-CPS-R3.pdf User Notice: Explicit Text: This is a qualified certificate according to Swiss Digital Signature Law.	User notice may be product specific, but must appear at least once.
	Policy: 2.16.756.5.26.1.1.1 User Notice: Explicit Text: SuisseID qualified certificate	This certificate policy OID identifies certificates that have been issued as part of a SuisseID. For SuisseID certificate this user notice must be embedded.
Authority Information Access		URI to OCSP responder and optional URI to CA issuer certificate
qcStatements	OID: 0.4.0.1862.1.1 (QcCompliance)	This certificate is issued as a qualified certificate
	OID: 0.4.0.1862.1.2 (QcLimitValue)	Transaction limit in CHF (“user defined” and optional)
	OID: 0.4.0.1862.1.4 (QcSSCD)	Claim that the private key related to the certified public key resides in a Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD)
Subject Alternative Name		Alternative name of the subscriber: email address
Key Usage	Non Repudiation	Critical extension
subjectDirectoryAttributes	Data of Subscriber	Optional

Authentication Certificate issued by: SwissSign SuisseID Platinum CA 2010 – G2

Extension Attribute	Values	Comment
Subject	Data of Subscriber	See Definitions in Chapter 1.6
Issuer Name	/CN=SwissSign SuisseID Platinum CA 2010 – G2 /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH	
Authority Key Identifier	<key identifier of the issuing CA's public key>	
CRL Distribution Points	http://crl.swisssign.net/<keyid>	URLs of the CRL Distribution points (LDAP and/or HTTP)
Certificate Policies	Policy: 2.16.756.1.89.1.1.1.1 CPS: http://repository.swisssign.com/SwissSign-Platinum-CP-CPS-R3.pdf	QCP public + SSCD
	Policy: 2.16.756.5.26.1.1.2 User Notice: Explicit Text: SuisseID identity and authentication certificate	This certificate policy OID identifies certificates that have been issued as part of a SuisseID
Authority Information Access		URL to OCSP responder and optional URL to CA issuer certificate
Subject Alternative Name		Alternative name of the subscriber: email address
Key Usage	digitalSignature	Critical extension
Extended Key Usage	clientAuthentication, msSCL	see chapter 6.1.7 for additional values
NsComment		Optional
Microsoft Certificate Template	(OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2)	Optional

Authentication Certificate issued by: SwissSign Personal Platinum CA 2008 – G2

Extension Attribute	Values	Comment
Subject	Data of Subscriber	See Definitions in Chapter 1.6
Issuer Name	/CN=SwissSign Personal Platinum CA – G2 /O=SwissSign AG/C=CH	
Authority Key Identifier	<key identifier of the issuing CA's public key>	
CRL Distribution Points	http://crl.swisssign.net/<keyid>	URLs of the CRL Distribution points (LDAP and/or HTTP)
Certificate Policies	Policy: 2.16.756.1.89.1.1.1.1 CPS: http://repository.swisssign.com/SwissSign-Platinum-CP-CPS-R3.pdf	QCP public + SSCD
Authority Information Access		URL to OCSP responder and optional URL to CA issuer certificate
Subject Alternative Name		Alternative name of the subscriber: email address
Key Usage	digitalSignature, keyAgreement	Critical extension
Extended Key Usage		Optional, see chapter 6.1.7 for possible values
NsComment		Optional
Microsoft Certificate Template	(OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2)	Optional

Encryption Certificate issued by: SwissSign Personal Platinum CA 2008 – G2

Extension Attribute	Values	Comment
Subject	Data of Subscriber	See Definitions in Chapter 1.6
Issuer Name	/CN=SwissSign Personal Platinum CA – G2 /O=SwissSign AG/C=CH	
Authority Key Identifier	<key identifier of the issuing CA's public key>	
CRL Distribution Points	http://crl.swisssign.net/<keyid>	URLs of the CRL Distribution points (LDAP and/or HTTP)
Certificate Policies	Policy: 2.16.756.1.89.1.1.1.1. CPS: http://repository.swisssign.com/SwissSign-Platinum-CP-CPS-R3.pdf	QCP public
Authority Information Access		URL to OCSP responder and optional URL to CA issuer certificate
Subject Alternative Name		Alternative name of the subscriber: email address
Key Usage	keyEncipherment, dataEncipherment	Critical extension
Extended Key Usage		Optional, see chapter 6.1.7 for possible values
NsComment		Optional
Microsoft Certificate Template	(OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2)	Optional

Authentication Certificate issued by: Swiss Post Platinum CA 2008 – G2

Extension Attribute	Values	Comment
Subject	Data of Subscriber	See Definitions in Chapter 1.6
Issuer Name	/CN=Swiss Post Platinum CA 2008 – G2 /O=SwissSign AG/C=CH	
Authority Key Identifier	<key identifier of the issuing CA's public key>	
CRL Distribution Points	http://crl.swisssign.net/<keyid>	URIs of the CRL Distribution points (LDAP and/or HTTP)
Certificate Policies	Policy: 2.16.756.1.89.1.1.1.1 CPS: http://repository.swisssign.com/SwissSign-Platinum-CP-CPS-R3.pdf	QCP public + SSCD
Authority Information Access		URI to OCSP responder and optional URI to CA issuer certificate
Subject Alternative Name		Alternative name of the subscriber: email address
Key Usage	digitalSignature, keyAgreement	Critical extension
Extended Key Usage		Optional, see chapter 6.1.7 for possible values
NsComment		Optional
Microsoft Certificate Template	(OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2)	Optional
subjectDirectoryAttributes	Data of Subscriber	Optional

Encryption Certificate issued by: Swiss Post Platinum CA 2008 – G2

Erweiterungsattribut	Werte	Anmerkung
Subject	Data of Subscriber	See Definitions in Chapter 1.6
Issuer Name	/CN=Swiss Post Platinum CA 2008 – G2 /O=SwissSign AG/C=CH	
Authority Key Identifier	<key identifier of the issuing CA's public key>	
CRL Distribution Points	http://crl.swisssign.net/<keyid>	URIs of the CRL Distribution points (LDAP and/or HTTP)
Certificate Policies	Policy: 2.16.756.1.89.1.1.1.1 CPS: http://repository.swisssign.com/SwissSign-Platinum-CP-CPS-R3.pdf	QCP public
Authority Information Access		URI to OCSP responder and optional URI to CA issuer certificate
Subject Alternative Name		Alternative name of the subscriber: email address
Key Usage	dataEncipherment, keyEncipherment	Critical extension
Extended Key Usage		Optional, see chapter 6.1.7 for possible values
NsComment		Optional
Microsoft Certificate Template	(OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2)	Optional

EIDI-V Certificate for Organizations issued by: Swiss Post Platinum CA 2008 – G2

Erweiterungsattribut	Werte	Anmerkung
Subject	Data of Subscriber	See Definitions in Chapter 1.6
Issuer Name	/CN=Swiss Post Platinum CA 2008 – G2 /O=SwissSign AG/C=CH	
Authority Key Identifier	<key identifier of the issuing CA's public key>	
CRL Distribution Points	http://crl.swisssign.net/<keyid>	URIs of the CRL Distribution points (LDAP and/or HTTP)
Certificate Policies	Policy: 2.16.756.1.89.1.1.1.1 CPS: http://repository.swisssign.com/SwissSign-Platinum-CP-CPS-R3.pdf User notice: gestuetzt auf Art. 2 Abs. 2 EIDI-V; en vertu de l'art. 2 al. 2 OelDI; visto l'art. 2 cpv. 2 OelDI; based on art. 2 para. 2 OelDI; SR 641.201.1 / RS 641.201.1 Schweiz/Suisse/Svizzera/Switzerland	QCP public + SSCD
Authority Information Access		URI to OCSP responder and optional URI to CA issuer certificate
Subject Alternative Name		Alternative name of the subscriber: email address
Key Usage	digitalSignature, nonRepudiation	Critical extension
Extended Key Usage		Optional see chapter 6.1.7 for possible values
NsComment		Optional

7.1.2.5 SwissSign Platinum CA Certificates for Generation 3 (G3)

The generation 3 certificates of swisssign are characterized by a self-signed root certificate with the SHA-2 hash algorithm.

Subject of the SwissSign Platinum CA certificates for Generation 3

CA Type	Subject	Issuer
Root CA	/CN=SwissSign Platinum Root CA – G3 /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH	/CN=SwissSign Platinum Root CA – G3 /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH
Issuing CA	/CN=SwissSign Platinum Personal CA 2010 – G3 /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH	/CN=SwissSign Platinum Root CA – G3 /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH
Issuing CA	/CN=SwissSign Platinum SuisseID CA 2010 – G3 /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH	/CN=SwissSign Platinum Root CA – G3 /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH
Issuing CA	/CN=SwissSign Platinum Qualified CA 2010 – G3 /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH	/CN=SwissSign Platinum Root CA – G3 /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH
Issuing CA	/CN=SwissSign Platinum Server CA 2010 – G3 /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH	/CN=SwissSign Platinum Root CA – G3 /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH

Common extensions of the SwissSign Platinum CA certificates for Generation 3

Extension	Root CA	Issuing CA	Critical
basic Constraints	CA: TRUE	CA:TRUE, pathlen: 0	Y
key Usage	Certificate Sign, CRL Sign	Certificate Sign, CRL Sign	Y
Subject Key Identifier	56:2A:3F:90:58:F4:17:5A:14:B2:D7:08:1B:85:5B:54:6A:54:1A:28	individual per CA	
Authority Key Identifier	56:2A:3F:90:58:F4:17:5A:14:B2:D7:08:1B:85:5B:54:6A:54:1A:28	56:2A:3F:90:58:F4:17:5A:14:B2:D7:08:1B:85:5B:54:6A:54:1A:28	
Certificate Policies		Policy: 2.5.29.32.0 CPS: http://repository.swisssign.com/SwissSign-Platinum-CP-CPS-R3.pdf	
CRL Distribution Points	not included in Root CA certificate	http://crl.swisssign.net/<keyid>	

Extension of the Root Certificate: SwissSign Platinum Root CA – G3

no exceptions

Extensions of the Issuing CA: SwissSign Platinum Personal CA 2010 – G3

no exceptions

Extensions of the Issuing CA: SwissSign Platinum Qualified CA 2010 – G3

Extension Attribute	Values	Comment
Issuer Alternative Name	DirName:/C=CH/O=ZertES Recognition Body: KPMG AG	
Certificate Policies	Policy: 2.5.29.32.0 CPS: http://repository.swisssign.com/SwissSign-Platinum-CP-CPS-R3.pdf User Notice: Explicit Text: This is a certification authority that issues qualified certificates according to Swiss Digital Signature Law.	
qcStatements	OID: 0.4.0.1862.1.1 (QcCompliance)	This certificate is issued as a qualified certificate
	OID: 0.4.0.1862.1.4 (QcSSCD)	Claim that the private key related to the certified public key resides in a Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD)

Extensions of the Issuing CA: SwissSign Platinum SuisseID CA 2010 – G3

no exceptions

Extensions of the Issuing CA: SwissSign Platinum Server CA 2010 – G3

no exceptions

7.1.2.6 SwissSign Platinum Special Certificates for Generation 3 (G3)

TSA Certificate issued by: SwissSign Platinum Server CA 2010 – G3

Extension Attribute	Values	Comment
Subject	/CN=SwissSign Platinum TSA 2010 – G3 - Unit 01 /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH	Every Site is considered one Unit and has a unique Common name.
Issuer Name	/CN=SwissSign Platinum Server CA 2010 – G3 /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH	
Key Usage	DigitalSignature, NonRepudiation	Critical extension
Extended Key Usage	Time Stamping	Critical extension
Subject Key Identifier	<key identifier of this CA's public key>	
Authority Key Identifier	<key identifier of the issuing CA's public key>	
CRL Distribution Points	http://crl.swisssign.net/<keyid>	URLs of the CRL Distribution points (LDAP and/or HTTP)
Certificate Policies	Policy: 2.16.756.1.89.1.1.1.1 **Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.**http://repository.swisssign.com/SwissSign-Platinum-TSA-R3.pdf	

Code-signing certificate issued by: SwissSign Platinum Server CA 2010 – G3

Extension Attribute	Values	Comment
Subject	Data of Subscriber	See Definitions in Chapter 1.6
Issuer Name	/CN=SwissSign Server Platinum CA 2010 – G3 /O=SwissSign AG/C=CH	
Authority Key Identifier	<key identifier of the issuing CA's public key>	See Chapter 7.1.3
CRL Distribution Points	http://crl.swisssign.net/<keyid>	URLs of the CRL Distribution points (LDAP and/or HTTP)
Certificate Policies	Policy: 2.16.756.1.89.1.1.1.1 CPS: http://repository.swisssign.com/SwissSign-Platinum-CP-CPS-R3.pdf	QCP public + SSCD
Authority Information Access		URL to OCSP responder and optional URL to CA issuer certificate
Subject Alternative Name		Alternative name of the subscriber: email address
Key Usage	digitalSignature	Critical extension
Extended Key Usage	CodeSigning	
NsComment		Optional
Microsoft Certificate Template	(OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2)	Optional

7.1.2.7 SwissSign Platinum End User Certificates for Generation 3 (G3)

End User Certificate issued by: SwissSign Qualified Platinum CA 2010 – G3

Extension Attribute	Values	Comment
Subject	Data of Subscriber	See Definitions in Chapter 1.6
Issuer Name	/CN=SwissSign Qualified Platinum CA 2010 – G3 /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH	
Issuer Alternative Name	DirName:/C=CH/O=ZertES Recognition Body: KPMG AG	
Authority Key Identifier	<key identifier of the issuing CA's public key>	See Chapter 7.1.3
CRL Distribution Points	http://crl.swisssign.net/<keyid>	URLs of the CRL Distribution points (LDAP and/or HTTP)
Certificate Policies	Policy: 2.16.756.1.89.1.1.1.1 CPS: http://repository.swisssign.com/SwissSign-Platinum-CP-CPS-R3.pdf User Notice: Explicit Text: This is a qualified certificate according to Swiss Digital Signature Law.	User notice may be product specific, but must appear at least once.
	Policy: 2.16.756.5.26.1.1.1 User Notice: Explicit Text: SuisseID qualified certificate	This certificate policy OID identifies certificates that have been issued as part of a SuisseID. For SuisseID certificate this user notice must be embedded.
Authority Information Access		URI to OCSP responder and optional URI to CA issuer certificate
qcStatements	OID: 0.4.0.1862.1.1 (QcCompliance)	This certificate is issued as a qualified certificate
	OID: 0.4.0.1862.1.2 (QcLimitValue)	Transaction limit in CHF (“user defined” and optional)
	OID: 0.4.0.1862.1.4 (QcSSCD)	Claim that the private key related to the certified public key resides in a Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD)
Subject Alternative Name		Alternative name of the subscriber: email address
Key Usage	Non Repudiation	Critical extension
subjectDirectoryAttributes	Data of Subscriber	Optional

Authentication Certificate issued by: SwissSign Platinum SuisseID CA 2010 – G3

Extension Attribute	Values	Comment
Subject	Data of Subscriber	See Definitions in Chapter 1.6
Issuer Name	/CN=SwissSign Platinum SuisseID CA 2010– G3 /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH	
Authority Key Identifier	<key identifier of the issuing CA's public key>	
CRL Distribution Points	http://crl.swisssign.net/<keyid>	URLs of the CRL Distribution points (LDAP and/or HTTP)
Certificate Policies	Policy: 2.16.756.1.89.1.1.1.1 CPS: http://repository.swisssign.com/SwissSign-Platinum-CP-CPS-R3.pdf	QCP public + SSCD
	Policy: 2.16.756.5.26.1.1.2 User Notice: Explicit Text: SuisseID identity and authentication certificate	This certificate policy OID identifies certificates that have been issued as part of a SuisseID
Authority Information Access		URL to OCSP responder and optional URL to CA issuer certificate
Subject Alternative Name		Alternative name of the subscriber: email address
Key Usage	digitalSignature	Critical extension
Extended Key Usage	clientAuthentication, msSCL	see chapter 6.1.7 for additional values
NsComment		Optional
Microsoft Certificate Template	(OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2)	Optional

Authentication Certificate issued by: SwissSign Platinum Personal CA 2010 – G3

Extension Attribute	Values	Comment
Subject	Data of Subscriber	See Definitions in Chapter 1.6
Issuer Name	/CN=SwissSign Platinum Personal CA 2010– G3 /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH	
Authority Key Identifier	<key identifier of the issuing CA's public key>	
CRL Distribution Points	http://crl.swisssign.net/<keyid>	URLs of the CRL Distribution points (LDAP and/or HTTP)
Certificate Policies	Policy: 2.16.756.1.89.1.1.1.1 CPS: http://repository.swisssign.com/SwissSign-Platinum-CP-CPS-R3.pdf	QCP public + SSCD
Authority Information Access		URL to OCSP responder and optional URL to CA issuer certificate
Subject Alternative Name		Alternative name of the subscriber: email address
Key Usage	digitalSignature, keyAgreement	Critical extension
Extended Key Usage		Optional, see chapter 6.1.7 for possible values
NsComment		Optional
Microsoft Certificate Template	(OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2)	Optional

Encryption Certificate issued by: SwissSign Platinum Personal CA 2010 – G3

Extension Attribute	Values	Comment
Subject	Data of Subscriber	See Definitions in Chapter 1.6
Issuer Name	/CN=SwissSign Platinum Personal CA 2010 – G3 /O=SwissSign AG /C=CH	
Authority Key Identifier	<key identifier of the issuing CA's public key>	
CRL Distribution Points	http://crl.swisssign.net/<keyid>	URLs of the CRL Distribution points (LDAP and/or HTTP)
Certificate Policies	Policy: 2.16.756.1.89.1.1.1.1 CPS: http://repository.swisssign.com/SwissSign-Platinum-CP-CPS-R3.pdf	QCP public
Authority Information Access		URL to OCSP responder and optional URL to CA issuer certificate
Subject Alternative Name		Alternative name of the subscriber: email address
Key Usage	keyEncipherment, dataEncipherment	Critical extension
Extended Key Usage		Optional, see chapter 6.1.7 for possible values
NsComment		Optional
Microsoft Certificate Template	(OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2)	Optional

7.1.3 Algorithm object identifiers

The algorithms with OIDs supported by this CA and its subordinates issuing CAs are:

Algorithm	Object Identifier
Sha1WithRSAEncryption	1.2.840.113549.1.1.5
SHA2withRSAEncryption	1.2.840.113549.1.1.13
rsaEncryption	1.2.840.113549.1.1.4

7.1.4 Name forms

Certificates issued by the subordinated issuing CAs of this CA contain the full X.500 distinguished name of the certificate issuer and certificate subject in the issuer name and subject name fields. Distinguished names are in the form of an X.501 printable string.

7.1.5 Name constraints

Not implemented.

7.1.6 Certificate policy object identifier

Each certificate must reference a policy OID, and may contain several as long as none of the policy constraints conflict.

For information see chapter 7.1.2 of this document.

7.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints extension

Not implemented.

7.1.8 Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics

The policy qualifier is an OID that identifies this document and a URL that points to this document.

7.1.9 Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies extension

PKI client applications must process extensions marked as critical.

7.2 CRL profile

This CA and its subordinated issuing CAs issue X.509 Version 2 CRLs in accordance with IETF PKIX RFC 5280

7.2.1 Version number(s)

The CRL version is v2.

7.2.2 CRL and CRL entry extensions

Version 2 CRL, and CRL extensions and their current status are specified below:

- CRLNumber: Populated by the CA application
- reasonCode: not populated
- authorityKeyIdentifier: Populated by CA application contains key id (SHA1) of issuer public key

7.3 OCSP profile

The SwissSign OCSP functionality is built according to RFC 2560.

7.3.1 Version number(s)

The OCSP version is set to v1.

7.3.2 OCSP extensions

The OCSP extensions used are specified below:

- Nonce
- ServiceLocator

8 Compliance Audit and Other Assessments

The terms and conditions of this CP/CPS, Swiss Digital Signature Law and all dependent rules and regulations will be used to conduct compliance audits for:

- The SwissSign Qualified Platinum CA
- All registration authorities that process requests for issuance by the “SwissSign Qualified Platinum CA”.

8.1 Frequency or circumstances of assessment

The compliance audit will be conducted annually as prescribed by Swiss Digital Signature Law.

More than one compliance audit per year is possible if this is requested by the audited party or is a result of unsatisfactory results of a previous audit.

8.2 Identity/qualifications of assessor

KPMG is the auditor chosen by SAS and the audits (scope, reporting) will be fully ZertES-compliant.

8.3 Assessor's relationship to assessed entity

KPMG is an independent auditor and will conduct the compliance audits according to the stipulations of ZertES.

KPMG will conduct an initial assessment of SwissSign AG. Once SwissSign AG has achieved certification, KPMG will continue with annual assessments.

KPMG has the right to withdraw the certification of SwissSign AG if a compliance audit reveals a severe deficiency in the operation of SwissSign AG.

Internal audit generates objective evidence that is presented to KPMG for the annual assessment.

8.4 Topics covered by assessment

KPMG will choose the control objectives that are to be covered by the assessment in accordance with ZertES.

Objective evidence as generated by the internal audit is covered by the annual assessment of KPMG.

8.5 Actions taken as a result of deficiency

SwissSign AG implements the ITIL best practices model and the results of a compliance audit are handled within this framework. Depending on severity and urgency, all issues will be entered into the ITIL system either as incidents or as problems and tracked accordingly.

Through the use of a supporting tool, SwissSign AG ensures that all issues are being tracked and resolved in due course. Management reporting and escalation are part of the system.

8.6 Communication of results

The results of the compliance audit shall be communicated to SwissSign executive management in a timely manner.

Within 30 days of receiving the compliance audit results, SwissSign AG will prepare a statement regarding the open issues and present SwissSign executive management and the ZertES Recognition Body a plan how the issues are going to be addressed.

Within 30 days of presenting the action plan, SwissSign AG will publish a summarized result of the compliance audit on the SwissSign web site.

9 Other Business and Legal Matters

9.1 Fees

SwissSign AG must provide a price list for certification and registration services on their website swisssign.com.

9.1.1 Certificate issuance or renewal fees

SwissSign AG can charge fees for issuing certificates according to the respective price list published on their website or made available upon request.

9.1.2 Certificate access fees

SwissSign AG may charge a fee according to their pricing policy.

9.1.3 Revocation or status information access fees

There is no charge for certificate revocation and the provision of certificate status information.

9.1.4 Fees for other services

SwissSign AG reserves the right to charge an hourly rate or a fee, depending on the services rendered, additional to the fees mentioned above.

9.1.5 Refund Policy

SwissSign AG may establish a refund policy.

9.2 Financial responsibility

9.2.1 Insurance coverage

SwissSign AG is a Swiss corporation 100% owned by Swiss Post (Die Schweizerische Post). Concerning the qualified certificates issued under this CP/CPS Swiss Post contractually guarantees to cover liability claims against SwissSign AG, limited to the minimum amounts stipulated in Art. 16 ZertES and Art. 2 VZertES.

This guarantee expires on the date an insurance according to Art. 2 para. 1 VZertES is concluded, to the extent permitted by applicable law.

9.2.2 Other assets

Not applicable.

9.2.3 Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities

It is in the sole responsibility of subscribers and relying parties to ensure an adequate insurance, to cover risks using the certificate or rendering respective services, according to Swiss Digital Signature Law.

Upon request, SwissSign AG will give advice about adequate insurances to cover potential risks.

9.3 Confidentiality of business information

9.3.1 Scope of confidential information

Any information or data SwissSign AG obtains in the course of business transactions is considered confidential, except for information defined in chapter 9.3.2. This includes, but is not limited to business plans, sales information, trade secrets, organizational names, registration information, and subscriber data. No breach of the duty of confidentiality shall be deemed to have taken place where confidential information has been disclosed by SwissSign AG within the SwissPost group.

9.3.2 Information not within the scope of confidential information

Any information that is already publicly available or contained in certificates is not considered confidential, nor is any information considered confidential which SwissSign AG is explicitly authorized to disclose (e.g. by written consent of involved party, by law or because it is part of the publicly available certificate information).

9.3.3 Responsibility to protect confidential information

SwissSign AG is responsible to take all required measures to comply with the Swiss Data Protection Law.

9.4 Privacy of personal information

SwissSign AG fully complies with the Swiss Data Protection Law. Information and data can be used where needed for professional handling of the services provided herein. No breach of the duty of confidentiality shall be deemed to have taken place where confidential information has been disclosed by SwissSign AG within the SwissPost group. Subscribers and other third parties have to comply with the privacy standards of SwissSign AG.

9.4.1 Privacy Plan

The stipulations of chapter 9.3 and 9.4 apply.

9.4.2 Information treated as private

Any information about subscribers and requesters that is not already publicly available or contained in the certificates issued by this CA, the CRL, or the LDAP directory's content is considered private information.

9.4.3 Information not deemed private

Any information already publicly available or contained in a certificate issued by this CA, or its CRL, or by a publicly available service shall not be considered confidential.

9.4.4 Responsibility to protect private information

Participants that receive private information secure it from compromise and refrain from using it or disclosing it to third parties.

9.4.5 Notice and consent to use private information

SwissSign AG will only use private information if a subscriber or proxy agent has given full consent in the course of the registration process.

9.4.6 Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process

SwissSign AG will release or disclose private information on judicial or other authoritative order.

9.4.7 Other information disclosure circumstances

SwissSign AG will solely disclose information protected by the Swiss Data Protection Law with prior consent or on judicial or other authoritative order.

9.5 Intellectual property rights

All intellectual property rights of SwissSign AG including all trademarks and all copyrights remain the sole property of SwissSign AG.

Certain third party software is used by SwissSign AG in accordance with applicable license provisions.

9.6 Representations and warranties

9.6.1 CA representations and warranties

SwissSign AG warrants full compliance with all provisions stated in this CP/CPS, Swiss Digital Signature Law (as far as qualified certificates are concerned), and related regulations and rules.

9.6.2 RA representations and warranties

All registration authorities must warrant full compliance with all provisions stated in this CP/CPS, related agreements, Swiss Digital Signature Law (as far as qualified certificates are concerned), and related regulations and rules.

9.6.3 Subscriber representations and warranties

Subscribers warrant full compliance with all provisions stated in this CP/CPS, other related agreements, Swiss Digital Signature Law, and related regulations and rules.

9.6.4 Relying party representations and warranties

Relying parties warrant full compliance with the provisions of this CP/CPS, related agreements, Swiss Digital Signature Law, and related regulations and rules.

9.6.5 Representations and warranties of other participants

Any other participant warrants full compliance with the provisions set forth in this CP/CPS, related agreements, Swiss Digital Signature Law, and related regulations and rules.

9.7 Disclaimers of warranties

Except for the warranties stated herein including related agreements and to the extent permitted by applicable law, SwissSign AG disclaims any and all other possible warranties, conditions, or representations (express, implied, oral or written), including any warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular use.

9.8 Liability

9.8.1 Liability of SwissSign AG

As far as qualified certificates are concerned SwissSign AG is liable for damages which are the result of SwissSign's failure to comply with Swiss Digital Law (Art. 16 ZertES).

SwissSign AG shall not in any event be liable for any loss of profits, indirect and consequential damages, or loss of data, to the extent permitted by applicable law. SwissSign AG shall not be liable for any damages resulting from infringements by the Certificate Holder or the Relying Party on the applicable terms and conditions including the exceeding of the transaction limit.

SwissSign AG shall not in any event be liable for damages that result from force majeure events. SwissSign AG shall take commercially reasonable measures to mitigate the effects of force majeure in due time. Any damages resulting of any delay caused by force majeure will not be covered by SwissSign AG.

9.8.2 Liability of the Certificate Holder

The Certificate Holder is liable to SwissSign AG and Relying Parties for any damages resulting from misuse, willful misconduct, failure to meet regulatory obligations, or noncompliance with other provisions for using the certificate.

The Certificate Holder and Relying Parties are fully liable for any damages resulting from the exceeding of the transaction limit specified in the certificate (Article 7 para. 2 ZertES and Article 16 para. 3 ZertES). The Certificate Holder of a qualified certificate is also liable according to Article 59a OR (Swiss Code of Obligations).

9.9 Indemnities

Indemnities are already defined in the provisions stated in this CP/CPS and other related documents.

9.10 Term and termination

9.10.1 Term

This Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement and respective amendments become effective as they are published on the SwissSign website at “http://repository.swisssign.com”.

9.10.2 Termination

This CP/CPS will cease to have effect when a new version is published on the SwissSign website.

9.10.3 Effect of termination and survival

All provisions regarding confidentiality of personal and other data will continue to apply without restriction after termination. Also, the termination shall not affect any rights of action or remedy that may have accrued to any of the parties up to and including the date of termination.

9.11 Individual notices and communications with participants

SwissSign AG can provide notices by email, postal mail, fax or on web pages unless specified otherwise in this CP/CPS.

9.12 Amendments

9.12.1 Procedure for amendment

SwissSign AG will implement changes with little or no impact for subscribers and relying parties to this CP/CPS upon the approval of the executive board of SwissSign AG.

Changes with material impact will be first submitted to the Swiss Recognition Body to obtain the required approval.

Updated CP/CPS become final and effective by publication on the SwissSign website and will supersede all prior versions of this CP/CPS.

9.12.2 Notification mechanism and period

The SwissSign AG executive board can decide to amend this CP/CPS without notification for amendments that are non-material (with little or no impact).

The SwissSign AG executive board, at its sole discretion, decides whether amendments have any impact on the subscriber and/or relying parties.

All changes to the CP/CPS will be published according to chapter 2. of this CP/CPS. Material changes for the subscriber will be sent to the respective parties via email 30 days before the changes become effective, provided that email addresses are known.

9.12.3 Circumstances under which OID must be changed

Changes of this CP/CPS that do affect subscribers and/or relying parties do require the OID of this CP/CPS to be updated.

9.13 Dispute resolution provisions

In case of any dispute or controversy in connection with the performance, execution or interpretation of this agreement, the parties will endeavor to reach amicable settlement.

9.14 Governing law and place of jurisdiction

The laws of Switzerland shall govern the validity, interpretation and enforcement of this contract, without regard to its conflicts of law. The application of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for International Sale of Goods shall be excluded. Exclusive place of jurisdiction shall be the commercial court of Zurich (Handelsgericht Zürich), Switzerland.

9.15 Compliance with applicable law

This CP/CPS and rights or obligations related hereto are in accordance with Swiss Law.

9.16 Miscellaneous provisions

9.16.1 Entire agreement

This CP/CPS and the End-User-Agreement of SwissSign AG state the agreement between SwissSign AG and the Certificate Holder.

9.16.2 Assignment

The Certificate Holder is not permitted to assign this agreement or its rights or obligations arising hereunder, in whole or in part.

SwissSign AG can fully or partially assign this agreement and/or its rights or obligations hereunder.

9.16.3 Severability

Invalidity or enforceability of one or more provisions of this agreement and its related documents shall not affect any other provision of this agreement, provided that only non-material provisions are severed.

9.16.4 Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)

Not applicable.

9.16.5 Force Majeure

SwissSign AG shall not be in default and the customer cannot hold SwissSign AG responsible and/or liable for any damages that result from (but are not limited to) the following type of events: any delay, breach of warranty, or cessation in performance caused by any natural disaster, power or telecommunication outage, fire, unpreventable third-party interactions such as virus or hacker attacks, governmental actions, or labor strikes.

SwissSign AG shall take commercially reasonable measures to mitigate the effects of force majeure in due time.

9.17 Other provisions

9.17.1 Language

If this CP/CPS is provided in additional languages to English, the English version will prevail.